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I NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150..{)104 (4-95)
EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER
RESPONSE
TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:
50.0 HRS.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.
FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND (See reverse for required number of RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33~,
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 205 5-0001, AND TO THE digits/characters for each block)
PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT g150-0104).
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, C 20503.
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
PAGE(3)
SALEM UNIT 1 05000272 1 OF 5 TITLE (4)
FAILURE TO PLUG STEAM GENERATOR TUBES DUE TO MISSED EDDY CURRENT INDICATIONS EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
I FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL I REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 01 06 94 95 023 01 11 xx 97 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)
MODE (9) 4 20.2201 (b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL (10)
ODO 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71
- ll!l!ll!llliiji.1.ll!lllli!lllllllllll!lll!lllllilll!llllllll!illllllllJlllllilllil!llll 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)
OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v)
Speci~ in Abstract below or in NR Form 366A
-~~~~~~~~f~~~tt~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~tt~~tt?~~~~~tt~tf~
20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Philip J. Duca Jr., Salem Licensing (609) 339-2381 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS TONPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR IYES xjNO SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
DATE (15) xx xx xx ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
During a review of prior outage test data to support estimations of Steam Generator (S/G) tube indication growth rates, eight tubes were identified to have exceeded the Salem Technical Specification plugging criteria of 40% of tube wall as specified in the acceptance criteria of the surveillance requirements of Section 4.4.5.4. Contrary to the Limiting Condition for Operations, Section 3.4.5, the unit was operated in modes 1 through 4 with steam generators that did not meet the operability requirements described in Section 4.4.5.4.
The root cause of this event was the lack of contractor oversight in the area of eddy current testing.
Based on the results of inspections performed, PSE&G changed out the steam generators with Model F steam generators from Seabrook. As of August 1996 all testing and analysis of the scrapped steam generator tubes was suspended. As the steam generators completed cycle 11, there were no safety consequences to this event.
This is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
9801130418 971230 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S
PDR
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I (4-95)
.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (61 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I RE\\l1SION NUMBER NUMlER PAGE (3)
SALEM UNIT 1 05000272 95 --
023 --
01 2
OF 5
TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Reactor Coolant System/Steam Generator (AB/SG)*
- Energy Industry Identification System (EllS) codes and component function identifier codes appear in the text as (SS/CCC).
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Missed Eddy Current Testing (ECT) indications during the 1993 Salem Unit #1 Refueling Outage (1 R11) steam generator tube evaluations.
Event Date: January 6, 1994.
Discovery Date: September 26, 1995.
Report Date: November xx, 1997.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Defueled - Reactor Power 0%
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE To determine the growth rate of indications during the operating period between past outage 1 R11 I and current outage 1R12, a review of 1993 ECT data was performed. During this review, on September 26, 1995, bobbin probe indications with depths which exceed the Technical Specification plugging criteria of 40% of tube wall specified in section 4.4.5.4 were identified for I eight tubes (seven tubes with one indication each and the remaining tube with two indications) which were not plugged.
.. (4-95)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1)
SALEM UNIT 1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I RE\\llSICX'l NUMBER NUM3ER 05000272 95 --
023 --
01 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE PAGE (3) 3 OF 5
Four conditions adverse to quality (CAQs) lead to the undetected eddy current indications. These CAQs are causal factors which collectively point to the lack of contractor oversight during eddy current testing. The CAQs were: (1) There was no requirement for an eddy current data analyst performance demonstration program; (2) There was a lack of assurance of the independence of the primary and secondary analysts. The data was sent to only one location, where both primary and secondary data analysts worked. The work was performed in the same room with work stations set up for each data analyst. With both primary and secondary analysts working in the same room, total independence could not be ensured; (3) All analysis was performed by contractors with no PSE&G Level Ill oversight. Oversight by PSE&G may have reduced non-conservative calls; and (4) Only the lead analyst was required to be a Qualified Data Analyst (QDA). QDA is an EPRI qualification program for nondestructive examination personnel specifically for the analysis of eddy current data from steam generator tubing. The American Society for Nondestructive Testing (ASNT) sets the minimum standards for eddy current testing personnel. The EPRI QDA program focuses on the degradation mechanisms specific to steam generators. At the time of the inspections, the EPRI qualification program was new and the contractor had only sent some of their people for qualification.
PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES There is no prior similar occurrence at Salem of the identification of an ECT indication which should have been called at a previous inspection. A review of events previously reported to the NRC by other plants indicates that missed bobbin coil probe pluggable indications have been experienced at Sequoyah Unit 1, ANO Unit 2, North Anna Unit 1, Ginna, Yankee Rowe, and Maine Yankee.
tSSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS Based on the number of indications observed during the inspections performed during 1 R12, the amount of tubes required to be plugged would have challenged the analyzed plugging limit. As a result PSE&G changed out the Unit 1 steam generators with unused model F steam generators obtained from Seabrook. As of August 1996 PSE&G suspended all activities associated with the scrapped steam generator tube inspections, analysis, or testing. Therefore, a planned structural integrity assessment was never performed.
As the steam generators completed cycle 11 without any measurable tube leakage, there were no safety consequences to this event.
Based on the above, the Health and Safety of the public was not affected. (4-95)
.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUM3ER PAGE (3)
SALEM UNIT 1 05000272 95 --
023 --
01 4
OF 5
TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Salem Unit #1
- 1. As of August 1996 PSE&G suspended all activities associated with the scrapped steam generator tube inspections, analysis, or testing. Given PSE&G's decision to replace the generators, further financial expenditures and additional man-rem burden on site personnel resulting from the canceled activities was no longer warranted. Therefore, a planned structural integrity assessment was never performed.
- 2. A number of corrective actions were taken including:
a. An independent assessment of the training and qualification of analysts involved in the 1993 and 1995 analyses of Salem Unit 1 ECT data has been performed. This assessment indicates that there are no apparent procedural or regulatory violations. However, specific areas where the program for training and qualification of analysts could be improved were noted. Each of these areas has been discussed with the contractor.
b. Analyst guidelines specific to Salem Units 1 and 2 and a performance demonstration program were developed. PSE&G contracted a L:evel 3 analyst to oversee eddy current activities. A steam generator examination engineering organization was developed.
c. A 100% bobbin coil inspection of all unplugged tubes in 11-14 steam generators was performed.
Two separate inservice inspection organizations performed primary and secondary data analysis. PSE&G provided Level Ill oversight of all eddy current activities. The Motorized Rotating Pancake Coil (MRPC) inspections were r.at completed. Based on the number of indications observed during the MRPC inspections, the amount of tubes required to be plugged would have challenged the analyzed plugging limit. PSE&G decided to change out the steam generators to Model F unused steam generators obtained from Seabrook. As a result, only the bobbin coil data and applicable MRPC +point data could be utilized to determine if additional tubes were mis-called during the 1993 eddy current inspection. Based on this review, no additional tubes were identified during the data analysis process. Due to the change in unit schedule priority associated with the decision to change out the Unit 1 steam generators, this task was not completed by March 29, 1996.
d. All bobbin coil inspection data already taken was not reanalyzed as planned. In lieu of this, the inspection described in "c" above was performed.
~ (4-95)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISlON NUMBER NUM3ER PAGE (3)
SALEM UNIT 1 05000272 95 -- 023 --
01 5
OF 5
TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) e. Given the decision to replace the Unit 1 steam generators, no tube plugging occurred.
Salem Unit #2
- 3. The corrective action described in item 2b above for site specific training and testing was implemented prior to performing ECT on Salem Unit #2.
- 4. The scope of the Unit 2 eddy current inspection program performed during its outage was:
- - 100% full length bobbin coil inspection of each steam generator.
- - 100% +point MRPC inspection of all (1 through 7) hot leg tube support plate intersections in each steam generator.
- - 100% + point MRPC inspection of all hot leg top of tube sheet transition locations in each steam generator.
- - 100% + point MRPC inspection of all row 2 U-bends in each steam generator.
- - 100% + point MRPC inspection of one steam generator (22 steam generator) cold leg tube support plate intersections ( 1 through 7).
- - 100% + point MRPC inspection of one steam generator (22 steam generator) cold leg top of tube sheet transition locations.
Based on the results of the inspections and the review of previous refueling outage eddy current data, where applicable, there were no obvious or reported missed eddy current indications.
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| 05000311/LER-1995-001, :on 950212,manually Initiated Esfa to Effect MSIS in Order to Increase RCS T-avg Above 541 Degrees F. Caused by Less than Conservative Decision Making.Temporary Hold Placed on Startup Activities |
- on 950212,manually Initiated Esfa to Effect MSIS in Order to Increase RCS T-avg Above 541 Degrees F. Caused by Less than Conservative Decision Making.Temporary Hold Placed on Startup Activities
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-1995-001-01, :on 950201,both Ssps Trains Declared Inoperable After Discovery That AC Power Distribution within Ssps Susceptible to Common Mode Failure.Caused by Aged Components.New Power Supplies Installed |
- on 950201,both Ssps Trains Declared Inoperable After Discovery That AC Power Distribution within Ssps Susceptible to Common Mode Failure.Caused by Aged Components.New Power Supplies Installed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000272/LER-1995-002-01, :on 950224,required TS 1 H Timeframe Not Met Re Closing Associated Block Valve.Caused by Personnel Error. Positive Discipline Has Been Taken |
- on 950224,required TS 1 H Timeframe Not Met Re Closing Associated Block Valve.Caused by Personnel Error. Positive Discipline Has Been Taken
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1995-003-01, :on 950228,four Planned TS 3.0.3 Entries Occurred During Maintenance Analog Rod Position Indication Drift.Drift Caused by Mfg,Design,Const/Installation.Internal Adjustments to Rods Made |
- on 950228,four Planned TS 3.0.3 Entries Occurred During Maintenance Analog Rod Position Indication Drift.Drift Caused by Mfg,Design,Const/Installation.Internal Adjustments to Rods Made
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-003-02, :on 950311,three Planned TS 3.0.3 Entries Occurred During Maint to Correct Analog RPI Drift Affecting Rod 2SB4.Caused by Design Mfg Const/Installation.Ts 3.0.3 Was Exited |
- on 950311,three Planned TS 3.0.3 Entries Occurred During Maint to Correct Analog RPI Drift Affecting Rod 2SB4.Caused by Design Mfg Const/Installation.Ts 3.0.3 Was Exited
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000311/LER-1995-003-03, :on 890309,failed to Perform Type C Local Leak Rate Testing Following Piping Mod to 21 Containment Spray Piping Sys Due to Not Identifying Need to Perform Required Testing.Enhanced Business Procedures |
- on 890309,failed to Perform Type C Local Leak Rate Testing Following Piping Mod to 21 Containment Spray Piping Sys Due to Not Identifying Need to Perform Required Testing.Enhanced Business Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000272/LER-1995-004-01, :on 790515,used Ten Containment Air Temp Points to Determine Primary Containment Average Air Temp.Caused by Mgt/Qa Defeciency.Implemented Procedure Revs to Satisfy TS SR |
- on 790515,used Ten Containment Air Temp Points to Determine Primary Containment Average Air Temp.Caused by Mgt/Qa Defeciency.Implemented Procedure Revs to Satisfy TS SR
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000311/LER-1995-004-02, :on 950607,ESFA RT Occurred During Unit 2 Controlled Shutdown Per TS 3.0.3.Caused by RHR Sys Inoperability.Replaced All SBF-1 Failed Protection Relays on 500 Kv Breakers |
- on 950607,ESFA RT Occurred During Unit 2 Controlled Shutdown Per TS 3.0.3.Caused by RHR Sys Inoperability.Replaced All SBF-1 Failed Protection Relays on 500 Kv Breakers
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-004, :on 950607,EFS Actuation Occurred During Unit 2 Controlled Shutdown Per TS 3.0.3.Caused by Inadequate Mgt Oversight of Operability Determination Process.Trained All Licensed Operators |
- on 950607,EFS Actuation Occurred During Unit 2 Controlled Shutdown Per TS 3.0.3.Caused by Inadequate Mgt Oversight of Operability Determination Process.Trained All Licensed Operators
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000311/LER-1995-005-02, :on 950705,failure to Analyze Second Sample W/ Radiation Monitor Inoperable Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Second Sample Analyzed & Determined to Be in Agreement W/First Sample |
- on 950705,failure to Analyze Second Sample W/ Radiation Monitor Inoperable Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Second Sample Analyzed & Determined to Be in Agreement W/First Sample
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-1995-005-01, :on 900508,seven Occurrences Noted That Revealed Lift Settings of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves on Both Units Out of Required Tolerance.Util Supplemented Rept W/Results of Vendor Conducted Root Cause |
- on 900508,seven Occurrences Noted That Revealed Lift Settings of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves on Both Units Out of Required Tolerance.Util Supplemented Rept W/Results of Vendor Conducted Root Cause
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-005, Forwards LER 95-005-00 Re Failure to Analyze Second Sample W/Radiation Monitor Inoperable | Forwards LER 95-005-00 Re Failure to Analyze Second Sample W/Radiation Monitor Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1995-005, :on 950508,eight Occurrences Revealed Lift Settings of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves on Both Units Out of Required Tolerance.Caused by Testing Intrument Error. Counseled Personnel Involved |
- on 950508,eight Occurrences Revealed Lift Settings of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves on Both Units Out of Required Tolerance.Caused by Testing Intrument Error. Counseled Personnel Involved
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000311/LER-1995-006, Revises Corrective Action Due Date in LER 95-006-00 to Correspond W/Due Dates in Restart Action Plan,Consisting of 960501 for Reviews & 960630 for Applicable Procedure Revs | Revises Corrective Action Due Date in LER 95-006-00 to Correspond W/Due Dates in Restart Action Plan,Consisting of 960501 for Reviews & 960630 for Applicable Procedure Revs | | | 05000272/LER-1995-006-01, :on 950404,TS 3.0.3 for Both Units Was Entered Due to Inability of CR Emergency Air Conditioning Sys to Automatically Actuate.Operability Determination Has Been Completed |
- on 950404,TS 3.0.3 for Both Units Was Entered Due to Inability of CR Emergency Air Conditioning Sys to Automatically Actuate.Operability Determination Has Been Completed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-006-02, :on 950822,surveillance Was Missed & Charcoal Absorber Testing Exceeded TS SR Time Limit.Caused by Informal Process to Monitor Charcoal Absorber Run Time Hs Being Used.Assigned Responsibility to Operations Dept |
- on 950822,surveillance Was Missed & Charcoal Absorber Testing Exceeded TS SR Time Limit.Caused by Informal Process to Monitor Charcoal Absorber Run Time Hs Being Used.Assigned Responsibility to Operations Dept
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000311/LER-1995-007-02, :on 900503,diesel Surveillance Required by TS Was Missed.Revised Process for Modifying EDG Surveillance Frequency |
- on 900503,diesel Surveillance Required by TS Was Missed.Revised Process for Modifying EDG Surveillance Frequency
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1995-007, :on 950505,EDGs 1A,1B & 1C Simultaneously Paralleled to Electrical Grid,Resulting in Potential for Common Mode Failure of All Three Edgs.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Procedures Revised |
- on 950505,EDGs 1A,1B & 1C Simultaneously Paralleled to Electrical Grid,Resulting in Potential for Common Mode Failure of All Three Edgs.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-008-02, :on 951215,Tech Spec 4.9.9 Missed Isolation Testing Discovered.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls to Ensure All Testing Requirements Addressed.Procedure S2.IC-FT.RM--0088(Q) Revised |
- on 951215,Tech Spec 4.9.9 Missed Isolation Testing Discovered.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls to Ensure All Testing Requirements Addressed.Procedure S2.IC-FT.RM--0088(Q) Revised
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-008-01, :on 950517,controlled Shutdown Completed Due to Inoperability of Switchgear & Penetration Area Ventilation Sys (Spavs).Three Spavs Supply Fans Will Be Inspected & Fan Motors Replaced |
- on 950517,controlled Shutdown Completed Due to Inoperability of Switchgear & Penetration Area Ventilation Sys (Spavs).Three Spavs Supply Fans Will Be Inspected & Fan Motors Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-1995-009, :on 950601,valid Test of 1B EDG & Subsequent Inoperability of 1B & 1C EDGs Identified.Caused by Inadequate Vibration Tolerant Design of Original Equipment. Cracked Nipple Replace to Restore EDG 1B Availability |
- on 950601,valid Test of 1B EDG & Subsequent Inoperability of 1B & 1C EDGs Identified.Caused by Inadequate Vibration Tolerant Design of Original Equipment. Cracked Nipple Replace to Restore EDG 1B Availability
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-010-01, :on 950615,RHR Pumps for long-term Flow Requirements for Both Units Declared Inoperable Due to RHR Flow Instrument Uncertainties.Evaluated EOPs |
- on 950615,RHR Pumps for long-term Flow Requirements for Both Units Declared Inoperable Due to RHR Flow Instrument Uncertainties.Evaluated EOPs
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-1995-010, :on 950615,both Units RHR Pumps Inoperable for long-term Flow Requirements Due to RHR Flow Instrument Uncertainties.Further Evaluated New EOP Setpoint for RHR Pump Operation |
- on 950615,both Units RHR Pumps Inoperable for long-term Flow Requirements Due to RHR Flow Instrument Uncertainties.Further Evaluated New EOP Setpoint for RHR Pump Operation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000272/LER-1995-011, :on 880222,inconsistency Between WCAP-11634 Analysis Used for Postulated Steam Line Breaks Outside Containment & Updated FSAR Was Discovered Due to Inadequate Design Review |
- on 880222,inconsistency Between WCAP-11634 Analysis Used for Postulated Steam Line Breaks Outside Containment & Updated FSAR Was Discovered Due to Inadequate Design Review
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000272/LER-1995-012, :on 761211,adequacy of Turbine Driven Auxiliary FW Pump Encls Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Verification of Assumptions in Calculations Performed to Evaluate Previously Identified.Calculation Assumptions Reviewed |
- on 761211,adequacy of Turbine Driven Auxiliary FW Pump Encls Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Verification of Assumptions in Calculations Performed to Evaluate Previously Identified.Calculation Assumptions Reviewed
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-012-01, :During Nov 1995,TDAFWP Encl Not Matching as- Built Conditions of 761211.Caused by Inadequate Verification of as-build Design Deficiency Calculations.Helb Calculations Reviewed |
- During Nov 1995,TDAFWP Encl Not Matching as- Built Conditions of 761211.Caused by Inadequate Verification of as-build Design Deficiency Calculations.Helb Calculations Reviewed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1995-013-01, :on 950703,surveillance Testing of Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Was Performed Approx Six & One Half Hr Late Due to Personnel Error.Provides Appropriate Levels of Discipline to Personnel Involved |
- on 950703,surveillance Testing of Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Was Performed Approx Six & One Half Hr Late Due to Personnel Error.Provides Appropriate Levels of Discipline to Personnel Involved
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1995-014-01, :on 951211,SI Throttle Valve Was Inoperable. Caused by Inadequate Deficiency.Installed Orifice in Cold Leg Branch Lines Prior to Startup |
- on 951211,SI Throttle Valve Was Inoperable. Caused by Inadequate Deficiency.Installed Orifice in Cold Leg Branch Lines Prior to Startup
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1995-015-01, :on 950711,failed to Complete Documentation of EDG TS Surveillance.Caused by Lack of Procedural Clarity Re Method of Timing EDG Start & Standby Performance.Developed Special Surveillance Testing Procedures |
- on 950711,failed to Complete Documentation of EDG TS Surveillance.Caused by Lack of Procedural Clarity Re Method of Timing EDG Start & Standby Performance.Developed Special Surveillance Testing Procedures
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-016-01, :on 950720,difference Between Containment Design Parameters & Accident Analysis Was Discovered.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 SEs for Changes in Containment Temp Profiles.Changed UFSAR & TS |
- on 950720,difference Between Containment Design Parameters & Accident Analysis Was Discovered.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 SEs for Changes in Containment Temp Profiles.Changed UFSAR & TS
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-016, Informs That Revised Date for Submission of Suppl to LER 95-016 Will Be 960329 | Informs That Revised Date for Submission of Suppl to LER 95-016 Will Be 960329 | | | 05000272/LER-1995-017, :on 950718,CR Emergency Air Conditioning Sys Failed to Meet GDC 19 Criteria.Performed Calculactions to Identify Alternative Operating Mode for Eacs to Ensure That Requirements of GDC 19 Satisfied |
- on 950718,CR Emergency Air Conditioning Sys Failed to Meet GDC 19 Criteria.Performed Calculactions to Identify Alternative Operating Mode for Eacs to Ensure That Requirements of GDC 19 Satisfied
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-018, :on 950720,improper Range Gauges Used for Ist. Caused by Inadequate IST Program & Lack of IST Program Maint & Implementation Processes & Associated Controls.Issued Stop Work Order by QA 950731 |
- on 950720,improper Range Gauges Used for Ist. Caused by Inadequate IST Program & Lack of IST Program Maint & Implementation Processes & Associated Controls.Issued Stop Work Order by QA 950731
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | 05000272/LER-1995-019, :on 950726,operability Functional Test Was Not Performed Prior to Mode Entry.Caused by Lack of Managerial Oversight & Organizational Breakdowns.Entered Tracking as for 1VC1 & 1VC2 for Mode 6 |
- on 950726,operability Functional Test Was Not Performed Prior to Mode Entry.Caused by Lack of Managerial Oversight & Organizational Breakdowns.Entered Tracking as for 1VC1 & 1VC2 for Mode 6
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | 05000272/LER-1995-020, Forwards LER 95-020-00 Re Inoperable Volt Motor Control Ctrs Due to Failed Bus Bar Bolting.Attachment a Contains Commitments Currently Outstanding Related to Issue | Forwards LER 95-020-00 Re Inoperable Volt Motor Control Ctrs Due to Failed Bus Bar Bolting.Attachment a Contains Commitments Currently Outstanding Related to Issue | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1995-020-01, :on 950914,vital 230 Volt MCCs Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Bus Bar Bolting.Caused by Stress Corrosion Cracking.Design Change Package DCP-1ER-0098 Implemented to Replace Bus Bolts W/Carbon Steel Bolts |
- on 950914,vital 230 Volt MCCs Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Bus Bar Bolting.Caused by Stress Corrosion Cracking.Design Change Package DCP-1ER-0098 Implemented to Replace Bus Bolts W/Carbon Steel Bolts
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-021-01, :on 930403,both Reactor Vessel Level Indication Sys Trains Inoperable Due to Inadvertent CO2 Actuation Due to Water Intrusion.Completed RVLIS & Cabinet Sealing Repaired |
- on 930403,both Reactor Vessel Level Indication Sys Trains Inoperable Due to Inadvertent CO2 Actuation Due to Water Intrusion.Completed RVLIS & Cabinet Sealing Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000272/LER-1995-022, :on 950916,ABV Sys Exceeded Allowable Bypass Leakage Due to Tear in Expansion Joint Fabric.Caused by Equipment Failure.Expansion Joint Fabric Replaced |
- on 950916,ABV Sys Exceeded Allowable Bypass Leakage Due to Tear in Expansion Joint Fabric.Caused by Equipment Failure.Expansion Joint Fabric Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1995-023-01, Forwards Supplemental LER 95-023-01 Re Failure to Plug SG Tubes Due to Missed Eddy Current Indications.Suppl Being Submitted to Discuss Cause & Safety Significance of Event | Forwards Supplemental LER 95-023-01 Re Failure to Plug SG Tubes Due to Missed Eddy Current Indications.Suppl Being Submitted to Discuss Cause & Safety Significance of Event | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1995-023, :on 940106,failed to Plug SG Tubes.Caused by Lack of Contractor Oversight in Area of Eddy Current Testing.Analyst Guidelines Specific to Salem,Units 1 & 2 & Performance Demonstration Program Were Developed |
- on 940106,failed to Plug SG Tubes.Caused by Lack of Contractor Oversight in Area of Eddy Current Testing.Analyst Guidelines Specific to Salem,Units 1 & 2 & Performance Demonstration Program Were Developed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-024, :on 950911,determined Fuel Handling Bldg Low Differential Pressure Surveillance Testing Did Not Ensure Compliance W/Ts Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Basis Info.Fuel Handling Bldg Changed |
- on 950911,determined Fuel Handling Bldg Low Differential Pressure Surveillance Testing Did Not Ensure Compliance W/Ts Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Basis Info.Fuel Handling Bldg Changed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1995-025, :on 951012,identified Plant Procedures Did Not Contain Specific Instructions to Limit Sys Flow for Pump Accident Alignments.Caused by Limited Appreciation of Significance of Operating.Baseline Document Revised |
- on 951012,identified Plant Procedures Did Not Contain Specific Instructions to Limit Sys Flow for Pump Accident Alignments.Caused by Limited Appreciation of Significance of Operating.Baseline Document Revised
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-026, :on 951023,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Cause Under Investigation.Appropriate Enhancements Will Be Made to Safety Valve Program Based on Results of Root Cause Determination |
- on 951023,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Cause Under Investigation.Appropriate Enhancements Will Be Made to Safety Valve Program Based on Results of Root Cause Determination
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000272/LER-1995-026-01, :on 951023,main Steam Safety Valves Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Use of Furmanite Trevitest Equipment That Had Inaccuracies.Rebuilt MSSV That Failed Lift Setpoint Test or Exceeded Allowable Seat Leakage Limits |
- on 951023,main Steam Safety Valves Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Use of Furmanite Trevitest Equipment That Had Inaccuracies.Rebuilt MSSV That Failed Lift Setpoint Test or Exceeded Allowable Seat Leakage Limits
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1995-027-01, :on 761211,doses During LOCA Exceeded Plant Licensing Basis Due to Inaccurate Assumptions in Dose Calculations.Revised Procedures in August 1994.W/forwarding Ltr |
- on 761211,doses During LOCA Exceeded Plant Licensing Basis Due to Inaccurate Assumptions in Dose Calculations.Revised Procedures in August 1994.W/forwarding Ltr
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-028-01, :on 950920,effective Leakage Monitoring Program Did Not Meet TS 6.8.4a Requirements Due to Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Consolidated Program Under Single Organization to Assure Plant Design Basis Satisfied |
- on 950920,effective Leakage Monitoring Program Did Not Meet TS 6.8.4a Requirements Due to Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Consolidated Program Under Single Organization to Assure Plant Design Basis Satisfied
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-029, :on 951219,all 4 Kv Vital Busses Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Initial Design of GE Type SBM Switches by Mfg.Replaced All Suspect Switches in 4 Kv Switchgear |
- on 951219,all 4 Kv Vital Busses Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Initial Design of GE Type SBM Switches by Mfg.Replaced All Suspect Switches in 4 Kv Switchgear
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1995-029-01, :on 951219,4 Kv Vital Buses Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Initial Design of GE Type SBM Switches by Mfg.All Suspect Switches in 4 Kv Switchgear, Vital & Group Busses Replaced |
- on 951219,4 Kv Vital Buses Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Initial Design of GE Type SBM Switches by Mfg.All Suspect Switches in 4 Kv Switchgear, Vital & Group Busses Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability |
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