05000272/LER-1980-056, Forwards LER 80-056/01X-2,replacing Previously Sent LER 80-56/01X-2.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 80-056/01X-2,replacing Previously Sent LER 80-56/01X-2.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML18085B126
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	03/24/1981
From:	Uderitz R Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML18085B127	List: 05000272/LER-1980-056, Forwards LER 80-056/01X-2,replacing Previously Sent LER 80-56/01X-2.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000272/LER-1980-056-01, /01X-2:on 801107,discovered That Discrepancy Exists Between Const Specs & Design Drawings for Masonry Block Wall in Auxiliary Bldg Elevation 122 Feet.Caused by Conflict Between Specs & Drawings for Walls
References
NUDOCS 8104020577
Download: ML18085B126 (4)

LER-1980-056, Forwards LER 80-056/01X-2,replacing Previously Sent LER 80-56/01X-2.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2721980056R00 - NRC Website

text

s PSl~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Pla7a Newark. N.J. 07101 Phone 201/430 700CJ March 24, 1981 Mr. Boyce H. Grier Director of USNRC Off ice of Inspection and Enforcement Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 80-56/0lX-2 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1, we are submitting supple-mental Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 80-56/0lX-2.

Sincerely yours,

/f~-U~

R. A. Uderiti° I.

General Manager -

Nuclear Production CC:

Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30 copies)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3 copies)

"if - '..

95 2001 f350'. 4 8

Report Number:

Report Date:

Occurrence Date:

Facility:

80-56/0lX-2 March 24, 1981 11/07/80 Salem Generating Station - Units 1&2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Masonry Walls CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Unit 1 -

Mode 6 -

Refueling Unit 2 -

Mode 5 -

Cold Shutdown DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

During an investigation of masonry walls pursuant to NRC Bulletin IE 80-11, it was discovered that a discrepancy exists between a Public Service Electric & Gas Company detailed construction speci-fication and the design drawings.

This specification and the drawings are for a masonry block wall in the Auxiliary Building on Elevation 122' separating the control equipment room from a corridor and a maintenance room.

This wall is in both Units 1 and 2.

The discrepancy concerns the amount of reinforcing (dur-o-wall) in the horizontal joints.

A field investigation was undertaken to ascertain the as-built condition.

The field procedure consisted of drilling a l" diameter hole into all the 3/8" horizontal mortar joints between blocks to determine whether or not the horizontal reinforcing is in place.

Although no such discrepancy existed for any of the other masonry walls, it was decided to repeat the above procedure in several other walls; the battery rooms on Elevation 64'; one for each unit, and the corridor wall on Elevation 100' separating Unit 1 from Unit 2, all in the Auxiliary Building.

On December 1, 1980, it was discovered that the controlled facilities building (maintenance facility) and its associated walkway exceed the allowable design stresses during a site seismic event.

However, we believe that the ultimate structural capacity of this building would not be exceeded during a site safe shutdown earthquake.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The apparent cause was an unresolved conflict between specification and drawings for walls on Elevation 122', continual long term interruptions during construction of the wall on Elevation 100',

and the wanting design of the walls of the controlled facilities building and its associated walkways.

LER 80-56/0lX-2

• Maxtt* 24, 1981 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The walls (one in each unit) on Elevation 122' were reinforced during construction in accordance with the Detail Specification and not the design drawing, as revealed by the field investiga-tion.

This resulted in these masonry walls having horizontal reinforcement in alternate joints rather than every joint.

The field investigation further revealed that the wall on Elevation 100', separating Unit 1 from Unit 2, had not been erected in accordance with the design drawing, and therefore was lacking some of the required horizontal reinforcing.

The walls enclosing the battery rooms on Elevation 64' in each unit were built in accordance with the design drawings and did not require modifications.

The Controlled Facilities Building and its associated walkway are in the vicinity of the Unit 1 and 2 Refueling Water Storage Tanks and the Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tanks.

PSE&G has investigated the apparent omission of consideration of the effects of a non-seismic structure in proximity to Safety Related equipment: specifically the proximity of non-seismic masonry walls in the Controlled Facilities Building to the Auxil-iary Feedwater and Refueling Water Storage Tanks.

Review of this omission was conducted both from the point of view of ascertaining the existence of adequate administrative controls to require the analysis, and from the point of view of correct application of extant procedures.

It was concluded that adequate administrative systems were in existence to reasonably assure correct assessment of the safety impact.

A detailed review of the actual safety evaluation process has revealed that such strong emphasis was placed upon the consequences of failure of systems and equipment contained within the building and their effects on other plant equipment and offsite exposure, that the effect of gross building failure upon adjacent equipment was inadvertently missed.

PSE&G regards this as an isolated occurrence.

No systematic problems are found to exist in the design control process, and no further action is planned beyond correction of the immediate effects of the occurrence.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The wall on Elevation 122' in each unit was re-analyzed in accord-ance with the as-built condition.

The Unit 1 wall on Elevation 100' was reinforced with structural steel columns.

LER 80-56/0lX-2 41tiarch 24, 1981 The external walls of the Controlled Facilities Building was reinforced with tie rods and gusset plates.

The walkway was reinforced with cross braces.

The Unit 2 walls were reinforced with structural steel columns.

FAILURE DATA:

N/A Prepared by ___

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Manager,_ alem Generating Station 81-15 SORC Meeting No. --------