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Commonw::lth Edis:n ATTACHMENT 2 Quad Cites Nuclear Power Statori 22710 206 Avenue North Cordovi mitos 61242 9740 j
Telechene 309/654 2241 GGC-94 079 May 16. 1994 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Reference:
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Docket Number 50-265. OPR-30. Unit Two Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER)94-008. Revision 00 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plant Station.
This report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations. Title 10. Part 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B).
Any event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant including its principal safety barriers being seriously degraded or that resulted in the nuclear plant being in a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant.
The following commitments are being made by this letter:
e Stroking of the A0 2-220-45 valve will be performed at varying frequencies to ensure the failure does not recur due to inactivity, e
At the next outage of sufficient duration, the valves and valve operators will be disassembled and inspected.
A supplemental re) ort. including ~any additional corrective actions e
determined, will )e submitted upon the completion of the investigation.
If there are any questions or coments concerning this letter, please refer them to Nick Chrissotimos. Regulatory Assurance Administrator at 309-654-2241, ext. 3100.
Respectfully.
COMMONWEALTH EDIS0N QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION
$0 9
G. G. Campbell Station Manager GGC/TB/pim Enclosure cc:
J. Schrage
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INPO Records Center NRC Region III STMGR\\07994.GGC 9509190063 950907 PDR ADOCK 05o00265 S-PDR
IJCDfSEE EVENT REPORT (12R)
Forum Rev.3.0 F-.'.;.1,Nasse (1)
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Quad Cities Unit Two 0l5l0l0l.0l2l6l5 I l of l 0 l 4 Tlee (4)
Imboard And Outboard Reactor Racimilation Seanple Isolation Valve AO-2-220 44 i
And 45 Faikare To Close IMring Quarterly Surva81==e*
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ABSTRACT:
l At 0850 on 04/17/94, Unit-2 was in the Run mode at approximately 95% rated core thermal powar. During performance of quarterly Reactor Recirculation System Air Operated Valve i
Testing (QCOS 202-12), the inboard and outboard Reactor Recirculation (RR) sample isolation valves A0 2-220-44 and 45 failed to close. Additional attempts to close both valves were successful.
The valves were declared inoperable due to failure to meet inservice inspection testing (IST) requirements.
The valves A0 2-220-44 and 45 were verified closed and taken out of service at 1000, on 4/17/94.
At 1140 the station made a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ENS phone call under 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii), degraded j
condition while operating.
The cause of the event and recommended corrective actions will be determined based on continuing testing and investigation.
Further information will be provided as a supplement to this report.
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i LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER11TXT COPmMUATION Form Rev. 2.0 l
FACILRT NAME tU Du. At & NUMat.K (2)
LAR MUhaca (6)
FAGE (3)
Year sequeenal Revsmoe Number Number Quad Cities UnitTwo 0l5lol0l0l2 6l5 9l4 0l0l8 0l0 2 lOFl 0 l 4 j
it.ra Energy Induary idenuncanoo sysum (cam codes are useonced an me was as ai l
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PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
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General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2511 Wt rated core thermal power.
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EVENT IDENTIFICATION:
Inboard and outboard reactor recirculation sample isolation valves l
A0 2-220-44 and 45 failure to close during quarterly surveillance.
A.
CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT
I Unit: Two Event Date: Aar11 17. 1994 Event' Time:
0850
]
Reactor Mode:
04 Mode Name:
RJN Power Level:
95 l
This report was initiated by Licensee Event Report 265\\94-008.
i RUN (4) - In this position the reactor system pressure is at or above 825 psig, and the reactor protection system is energized, with APRM protection and RBM interlocks j
in service (excluding the 15% high flux scram).
B.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS:
At 0850 on 04/17/94. Unit-2 was in the Run mode at approximately 95% of rated core thermal power.
During performance of quarterly Reactor Recirculation System Air Operated Valve Testing (0COS 202-12). the inboard Reactor Recirculation (RR) [AD]
4 sample isolation valve A0 2-220-44 [SHV]. failed to indicate closed (in the control j
room) when attempting to operate the valve.
[
The unit process computer indicated the valve had closed, however, open indication was noted on control panel 902-4. A second atte7t to close the valve was successful, with closed indication from both the process computer and the control panel.
The valve A0 2-220-44 was reopened per procedure.
l At 0853. the RR outboard sample isolation valve A0 2-220-45 was tested per the next step of OCOS 202-12. This valve also indicated closed on the process computer but failed to indicate closed on control panel 902-4.
Further closure attempts were made and on the fourth attempt the valve indicated closed on both the process computer and the control panel.
4 The valve A0 2-220-45 was reopened per procedure.
1 At approximately 0950 the valves were declared inoperable due to failure to meet inservice inspection testing (IST) requirements.
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LER265\\94W8.WPF l
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Form Rev. 2.0 FACUJTY NAME 0)
IXXM.I NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGEQ)
Year Sequennal Revision Number Number Quad Cities Unit Two 0l5l0l0l0l2 6l5 9l4 0l0l8 0l0 3 lOFl 0 l 4 in.u E crsy indunry saenuncaaon sysiem te:.iu, codes are 2 a.4 in in text as tx.x i The Unit-2 Supervisor generated priority Nuclear Work Requests (NWR) #015877 and
- 015878 to investigate the event.
l The valves AD 2-220-44 and 45 were closed and taken out of service at 1000, on 4/17/94.
Isolation of the process sample line was verified by direct observation of no flow through the sample line at the sample sink.
4 After review of the event, the SE determined it was reportable at approximately 1045 on 4/17/94.
At 1140 the station made a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ENS phone call to the NRC under 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii), degraded condition while operating.
Problem Identification Form (PIF)94-967 was generated by the Operations Department on 4/17/94 to document the valves A0 2-220-44 and 45 failure to close.
C.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii). The licensee shall report any serious degradation in the condition of the plant or safety barriers.
The investigation into the cause of the valves A0 2-220-44 and 45 failure to close is still in progress.
D.
SAFETY ANALYSIS
The failure of the valves A0 2-220-44 and 45 to close had no impact on the plant's operating conditions at the time of the event.
There is limited safety significance due to both sample isolation valves failing to close during the first attempt.
Had a Design Basis Accident occurred simultaneously with a break in the RR sample line the event is bound by FSAR analysis 15.6.2..
This section analyzes a scenario involving the reactor coolant pressure boundary and a 1 inch instrument line break outside of primary containment. The sample line isolated by A0 2-220-44 and 45 is a 3/4 inch line.
Failure of valves A0 2-220-44 and 45 did not place the station in an unanalyzed condition.
E.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The imediate corrective actions associated with this event were to declare the valves A0 2-220-44 and 45 inoperable.
The NRC was notified, and priority NWR's were generated to investigate the valves failure to close.
LER265\\94\\008.WPF
i UCENSEE EVENT REPORT n.ER) TEXT CONTINUA 110N Form Rev.2.0 FACI 3.ITY NAME (I)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBtR (6)
PAGEth Year Sequennal Revismo Number Number Quad Cities Unit Two 0l5l0l0l0l2l6l5 9l4 0l0l8 0l0 4 joFl 0 l 4 6 tal Energy latustry idenaficauon Sysicm (Lils) codes an Wenhed m the trat as (AX)
Recent failures of valve A0 2-220-45 to close were attributed to solenoid valve problems.
The solenoid was replaced as a preventive action under NWR #015878, on 4/21/94. The removed solenoid was bench tested, and disassembled for internal inspection.
No abnormalities were noted in respect to the bench test or internal inspection.
Continuing efforts to determine the cause of the event include investigation and testing of an appropriate stroking schedule for the valves and valve operators, as well as disassem)1y and inspection of the valves.
Stroking of valve A0 2-220-45 will be performed weekly, bi-weekly and then monthly to ensure the failure does not recur due to inactivity. Appropriate corrective actions for both the A0 2-220-44 and 45 valves will be determined based on the results of this testing (NTS# 2651809400801).
At the next outage of sufficient duration, the valves and valve oaerators will be disassembled and inspected. Appropriate corrective actions will Je taken based on the results of the inspections (NTS# 2651809400802).
A supplemental report. including any additional corrective actions determined, will be suamitted upon the completion of the investigation (NTS# 2651809400803).
The RR sample valves provide a primary containment isolation of the RR sampling pathway. With either valve inoperable, one valve must remain closed at all times.
The valve A0 2-220-44 will remain out of service closed until corrective actions for valve A0 2-220-45 can be determined.
F.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCE:
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After review of the Nuclear Tracking System data base, there were no LER's generated in the past three years which involved RR sample isolation valve failure on either unit at Quad Cities Station.
G.
COMPONENT FAILURE DATA
There has not been any specific failed component identified in this event to date.
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LER265\\94\\008.WPF
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| 05000265/LER-1994-001, Forwards LER 94-001-00.IST Procedures Revised to Incorporate Interim Procedure Requirements & RCIC Pump Tested Using Revised Procedures | Forwards LER 94-001-00.IST Procedures Revised to Incorporate Interim Procedure Requirements & RCIC Pump Tested Using Revised Procedures | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000254/LER-1994-001-04, :on 940102,inadvertent Insertion of Control Rod H-1 from Position 48 to 14 Occurred During Instrument Maint Surveillance.Cause Not Determined.Crd H-1 Inserted Into Position 00 & HCU Rebuilt |
- on 940102,inadvertent Insertion of Control Rod H-1 from Position 48 to 14 Occurred During Instrument Maint Surveillance.Cause Not Determined.Crd H-1 Inserted Into Position 00 & HCU Rebuilt
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000265/LER-1994-001-03, :on 940216,RCIC Failed to Meet TS Flow & Pressure Requirements.Caused by Increased Clearances Between Pump Shaft Throttle Sleeve & Throttle Bushing & Wear Rings Reducing Margin of Performance.Rotating Element Replaced |
- on 940216,RCIC Failed to Meet TS Flow & Pressure Requirements.Caused by Increased Clearances Between Pump Shaft Throttle Sleeve & Throttle Bushing & Wear Rings Reducing Margin of Performance.Rotating Element Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000254/LER-1994-002-03, :on 940104,B CR HVAC Declared Inoperable. Caused by Failure in Contactor Which Resulted from Cumulative Cycling of Compressor.Contactor Replaced |
- on 940104,B CR HVAC Declared Inoperable. Caused by Failure in Contactor Which Resulted from Cumulative Cycling of Compressor.Contactor Replaced
| | | 05000254/LER-1994-002, Forwards LER 94-002,Rev 0 Re B CR HVAC Being Inoperable Due to Failure of Compressor Motor Contactor.Hot Gas Bypass Sys for Compressor Will Be Installed to Minimize Cycling by Inducing Larger Heat Load on Compressor | Forwards LER 94-002,Rev 0 Re B CR HVAC Being Inoperable Due to Failure of Compressor Motor Contactor.Hot Gas Bypass Sys for Compressor Will Be Installed to Minimize Cycling by Inducing Larger Heat Load on Compressor | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000265/LER-1994-002, Forwards LER 94-002-00.OGCP 4-1 Will Be Revised to Clarify Specific Requirements for Independent Rod Verification | Forwards LER 94-002-00.OGCP 4-1 Will Be Revised to Clarify Specific Requirements for Independent Rod Verification | | | 05000265/LER-1994-002-04, :on 940127,control Rods M-8 & M-6 Mispositioned During Testing.Caused by Inappropriate Work Practices,Mgt/ Supervisory Methods & Verbal Communications.Rods M-8 & M-6 Returned to Position 00 |
- on 940127,control Rods M-8 & M-6 Mispositioned During Testing.Caused by Inappropriate Work Practices,Mgt/ Supervisory Methods & Verbal Communications.Rods M-8 & M-6 Returned to Position 00
| | | 05000254/LER-1994-003-03, :on 940121,noted Continuous Firewatch Not Established Following Impairment of Safe Shutdown Path Due to Inadequate Verbal Communications.Formal Training W/ Support of Fire Protection Sys Engineer Will Be Conducted |
- on 940121,noted Continuous Firewatch Not Established Following Impairment of Safe Shutdown Path Due to Inadequate Verbal Communications.Formal Training W/ Support of Fire Protection Sys Engineer Will Be Conducted
| | | 05000265/LER-1994-003-02, :on 940130,two HPCI Room Coolers Declared Inoperable Due to Buildup of Silt.Discharge Valve Opened Wider to Increase Flow Rate & Surveillance Increased from Monthly to Every Two Weeks |
- on 940130,two HPCI Room Coolers Declared Inoperable Due to Buildup of Silt.Discharge Valve Opened Wider to Increase Flow Rate & Surveillance Increased from Monthly to Every Two Weeks
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000254/LER-1994-003, Forwards LER 94-003,Rev 0 Re Not Establishing Continuous Firewatch Following Impairment of Safe Shutdown Path. Commitments Listed | Forwards LER 94-003,Rev 0 Re Not Establishing Continuous Firewatch Following Impairment of Safe Shutdown Path. Commitments Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000265/LER-1994-004-03, :on 940131,control Rod Coupling Integrity Neutron Instrumentation Response Test Untimely Completed. Caused by Failure to Prioritize & Track Completion of Qcos 300-4.Procedures Revised |
- on 940131,control Rod Coupling Integrity Neutron Instrumentation Response Test Untimely Completed. Caused by Failure to Prioritize & Track Completion of Qcos 300-4.Procedures Revised
| | | 05000254/LER-1994-004-04, :on 940228,results of Feedwater Flow Testing Found Flow Indications in Nonconservative Direction.Cause Not Determined.Management Issued Special Instructions.W/ |
- on 940228,results of Feedwater Flow Testing Found Flow Indications in Nonconservative Direction.Cause Not Determined.Management Issued Special Instructions.W/
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000254/LER-1994-004, Submits Reproduction of Original Text of LER 94-004 & Suppl Info | Submits Reproduction of Original Text of LER 94-004 & Suppl Info | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000254/LER-1994-005, Forwards LER 94-005-00.Suppl Rept Will Be Issued,Documenting Valves & Penetrations That Had Excessive Leakage,What Caused Leakage & Corrective Actions | Forwards LER 94-005-00.Suppl Rept Will Be Issued,Documenting Valves & Penetrations That Had Excessive Leakage,What Caused Leakage & Corrective Actions | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000265/LER-1994-005-06, :on 940621,reactor Manually Scrammed & Main Turbine Manually Tripped Due to Anticipation of Low EHC Control Oil Pressure.Replacement of EHC Lines to 2 Control Valve & Replaced Flared Fittings |
- on 940621,reactor Manually Scrammed & Main Turbine Manually Tripped Due to Anticipation of Low EHC Control Oil Pressure.Replacement of EHC Lines to 2 Control Valve & Replaced Flared Fittings
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000265/LER-1994-006-08, :on 940823,reactor Scram Followed from Main Steam Isolation Valves Not Being Full Open While in Run Mode.Caused by Inadvertent Vibrational Disturbance to Msl. Installed Vibration Dampening Pads |
- on 940823,reactor Scram Followed from Main Steam Isolation Valves Not Being Full Open While in Run Mode.Caused by Inadvertent Vibrational Disturbance to Msl. Installed Vibration Dampening Pads
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000254/LER-1994-006-05, :on 940808,uncontrolled Personnel Exposure from Sr-90 Radioactive Source Occurred Due to Personnel Error. Access to Check Sources Restricted & General Employee Training Will Be Modified as Necessary |
- on 940808,uncontrolled Personnel Exposure from Sr-90 Radioactive Source Occurred Due to Personnel Error. Access to Check Sources Restricted & General Employee Training Will Be Modified as Necessary
| | | 05000254/LER-1994-007-03, :on 940321,HPCI Restricting Orifice (RO) Found Clogged Approx 95% Closed.Cause of Clogged RO Unknown.Steam Line Drain ROs & Steam Traps on Unit 2 HPCI & RCIC Sys Disassembled & Inspected |
- on 940321,HPCI Restricting Orifice (RO) Found Clogged Approx 95% Closed.Cause of Clogged RO Unknown.Steam Line Drain ROs & Steam Traps on Unit 2 HPCI & RCIC Sys Disassembled & Inspected
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000254/LER-1994-008-07, :on 940820,unit 1 Reactor Was Manually Scrammed by Procedure to Achieve Shutdown Condition Required by Tss. Caused by Work Practices Associated W/Crimping Terminal Lug. Wire Terminal Lugs Were Replaced W/New Parts |
- on 940820,unit 1 Reactor Was Manually Scrammed by Procedure to Achieve Shutdown Condition Required by Tss. Caused by Work Practices Associated W/Crimping Terminal Lug. Wire Terminal Lugs Were Replaced W/New Parts
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000265/LER-1994-008-02, :on 940417,inboard & Outboard RR Sample Isolation Valves A0 2-220-44 & 45 Failed to Close.Cause of Event & Corrective Actions Still Under Investigation.W/ |
- on 940417,inboard & Outboard RR Sample Isolation Valves A0 2-220-44 & 45 Failed to Close.Cause of Event & Corrective Actions Still Under Investigation.W/
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000265/LER-1994-008, Informs of Commitments Being Made Re LER 94-008,rev 0 | Informs of Commitments Being Made Re LER 94-008,rev 0 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000254/LER-1994-009-06, :on 940823,omissions in Inventory & Leak Test Paperwork Discovered During Review of Inventory & Leak Test Program for Sealed Sources.All Sealed Sources That Required Leak Test But Missed Tested |
- on 940823,omissions in Inventory & Leak Test Paperwork Discovered During Review of Inventory & Leak Test Program for Sealed Sources.All Sealed Sources That Required Leak Test But Missed Tested
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000265/LER-1994-009-01, :on 940522,containment Interlock Doors Defeated to Release Personnel Trapped Inside Due to Malfunction of Interlock Door Linkage.Interlock Doors Repaired |
- on 940522,containment Interlock Doors Defeated to Release Personnel Trapped Inside Due to Malfunction of Interlock Door Linkage.Interlock Doors Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000265/LER-1994-009-03, :on 940522,primary Containment Interlock Doors Defeated to Release Personnel Trapped Inside.Caused by Malfunction of Interlock Door Linkage.Corrective Actions Will Be Determined During Insp During Outage |
- on 940522,primary Containment Interlock Doors Defeated to Release Personnel Trapped Inside.Caused by Malfunction of Interlock Door Linkage.Corrective Actions Will Be Determined During Insp During Outage
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000265/LER-1994-010-06, :on 940829,scram Signal Was Intentionally Inserted.Caused by Instrument Air Leakage Past Exhaust Port Diaphragm of 7 Ddpv Sol.Sspvs 117 & 118,were Rebuilt & Repaired & Replaced All Program Diaphragms |
- on 940829,scram Signal Was Intentionally Inserted.Caused by Instrument Air Leakage Past Exhaust Port Diaphragm of 7 Ddpv Sol.Sspvs 117 & 118,were Rebuilt & Repaired & Replaced All Program Diaphragms
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000254/LER-1994-010-05, :on 940808,when Attempting to start-B-train CR Air Conditioning,Compressor Repeatedly Tripped on High Pressure Due to Plugged Svc Water Strainers.Flow Indicator Repaired & Procedure Qcop 5750-9 Changed |
- on 940808,when Attempting to start-B-train CR Air Conditioning,Compressor Repeatedly Tripped on High Pressure Due to Plugged Svc Water Strainers.Flow Indicator Repaired & Procedure Qcop 5750-9 Changed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000265/LER-1994-011-06, :on 941006,thirty Day Limited Condition of Operation Exceeded for 2B RHR Swp Due to Inadequate Work Planning & Scheduling.Evaluating Inventory of Major Rhrswp Parts |
- on 941006,thirty Day Limited Condition of Operation Exceeded for 2B RHR Swp Due to Inadequate Work Planning & Scheduling.Evaluating Inventory of Major Rhrswp Parts
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000254/LER-1994-011-05, :on 940829,CRD L-11 Failed to Scram When Given Signal Due to Pipe Plug Inserted Into Solenoid Valve Due to Personnel Not Adhering to Procedure.Crd Inserted to Position 00 & Insps Conducted for Similar Obstructions |
- on 940829,CRD L-11 Failed to Scram When Given Signal Due to Pipe Plug Inserted Into Solenoid Valve Due to Personnel Not Adhering to Procedure.Crd Inserted to Position 00 & Insps Conducted for Similar Obstructions
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | | 05000254/LER-1994-012-06, :on 941011,U-1 Drywell HP Switches Found Out of Tolerance.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Revising Calbr Procedure |
- on 941011,U-1 Drywell HP Switches Found Out of Tolerance.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Revising Calbr Procedure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000265/LER-1994-013-04, :on 941012,nonconformance w/10CFR50 App R SS Analysis Separation Requirements.Caused by Sys Interactions Not Considered.Util Will Implement Mod to Resolve Nonconformance of Sys W/Ss Analysis |
- on 941012,nonconformance w/10CFR50 App R SS Analysis Separation Requirements.Caused by Sys Interactions Not Considered.Util Will Implement Mod to Resolve Nonconformance of Sys W/Ss Analysis
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000254/LER-1994-014-05, :on 941107,twelve Instrument Maint Dept Fire Surveillance Exceeded Critical Dates.Caused by Lack of Training in Use of Stations General Surveillance Database for Im Dept Schedulers |
- on 941107,twelve Instrument Maint Dept Fire Surveillance Exceeded Critical Dates.Caused by Lack of Training in Use of Stations General Surveillance Database for Im Dept Schedulers
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000254/LER-1994-015, Forwards LER 94-015-00:on 941002,single Loop Operation in Unanalyzed Condition Occurred | Forwards LER 94-015-00:on 941002,single Loop Operation in Unanalyzed Condition Occurred | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | | 05000254/LER-1994-015-03, :on 941002,single Loop Operation in Unanalyzed Condition Occurred.Caused by Failure to Previously Establish,In Procedure & Training,Min Core Flow Limit. Training & Procedure Revised |
- on 941002,single Loop Operation in Unanalyzed Condition Occurred.Caused by Failure to Previously Establish,In Procedure & Training,Min Core Flow Limit. Training & Procedure Revised
| | | 05000254/LER-1994-016, Forwards LER 94-016,Rev 0 for Plant.Licensee Commitments Listed | Forwards LER 94-016,Rev 0 for Plant.Licensee Commitments Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000254/LER-1994-016-03, :on 941116,while Repairing 1/2 EDG CW Pump Bedplate,Hanger (H) 1052-M-303 Noted as Being Unloaded. Cause Unknown.Rod Hanger re-adjusted,units 1 & 2 EDG CW Pumps Reviewed & Rev of Applicable Procedures Made |
- on 941116,while Repairing 1/2 EDG CW Pump Bedplate,Hanger (H) 1052-M-303 Noted as Being Unloaded. Cause Unknown.Rod Hanger re-adjusted,units 1 & 2 EDG CW Pumps Reviewed & Rev of Applicable Procedures Made
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000265/LER-1994-017-03, :on 941205,banked Position Withdrawal Sequence Rules Violated Since Oct of 1991 Due to Training,Procedure & Work Practice Deficiencies in Nuclear Engineering Group. Retrained,Evaluation of Rod Drop Analysis |
- on 941205,banked Position Withdrawal Sequence Rules Violated Since Oct of 1991 Due to Training,Procedure & Work Practice Deficiencies in Nuclear Engineering Group. Retrained,Evaluation of Rod Drop Analysis
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) |
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