05000219/LER-1983-012, Forwards LER 83-012/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 83-012/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20073G577
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	04/04/1983
From:	Fiedler P GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20073G580	List: 05000219/LER-1983-012, Forwards LER 83-012/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000219/LER-1983-012-01, /01T-0:on 830319,door to Main Steam Line Trunnion Room Found Open During Refueling Checkoff.Caused by Design Deficiency,Personnel Error & Failure to Post Sign Identifying Door as Secondary Containment.Door Closed
References
NUDOCS 8304180329
Download: ML20073G577 (3)

LER-1983-012, Forwards LER 83-012/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2191983012R00 - NRC Website

text

_ _ _ _ _ _ _

GPU Nuclear h.

QQ g7 100 Interpace Parkway Pars ppany. New Jersey 07054 201 263-6500 TELEX 136-482 Writer's Direct Dial Number.

April 4, 1983 Regional Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 De ar Mr. Ha yne s :

Subj ect: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Do cke t No. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/8 3-12 /0lT This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report (LER) to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-12/OlT in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.a.9 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours, 2

Peter B. Fiedler Vice President and Director Oyster Creek PEF:ja1 Enclosure s cc: Director (40 copies)

Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washi ngton, D.C.

20555 Director (3)

Of fice of Management Information and Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 NRC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, NJ 08731 8304180329 830404 PDR ADOCK 05000219

/V s

PDR Q

h'

/

GPU Nuclear is a pet of tne General Pubhc Utihtees System

O OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-12/0lT Report Date April 4, 1983 Occur re nce Dat e March 19, 1983 Identification of Occurrence During a refueling surveillance check-of f, the door to the Main Steam Line Trunnion Room was discovered open. This is a violation of Secondary Containment as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.B.l.

This event is considered to be a Reportable Occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.4.2.a.9.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence The plant was shut down for refueling with the mode switch in Refuel. Reactor coolant temperature was approximately 90 F.

Description of Occurrence One of the required checks prior to commencing refueling is for Operations to verify Secondary Containment Integrity. During this check-off, Operations personnel discovered the door to the Main Steam Line Trunnion Room open. This violates Secondary Containment as defined in the Technical Specifications.

Based on the time of the entry prior to the operator's discovery of the door being open, it is estimated that the door remained ajar for approximately four (4) hours.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence The cause of the occurrence is attributed to a combination of design deficiency, personnel error, and the fact that the door was not posted as a Secondary Containment access.

i 1

_ ~ - -, _,,....,,. - -,. -, -.. - -. -, -,

~... - -. _. ~. -,.. - - - - - - - - - - - - -. -... - -. - - - -

. - - - -.. -. - ~. - - -, -

Licensee Event Report

.Page 2 Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-12 /0lT Analysis of Occurrence Secondary Containment is required to minimize ground level release of airborne radioactive material and to provide for controlled, elevated release of the building atmosphere under accident conditions. The ability of Secondary Containment to perform its intended function with this door open was potentially degraded.

Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action taken was to verify that no personnel were inside the Trunnion Room and then the door was secured. At the present time, the following items are being addressed:

1.

The original design of the room and access door is being evaluated as it relates to Secondary Containment.

2.

The penetrations between the Trunnion Room and the Reactor Building have been examined and the possibility of sealing some or all of these penetrations is being evaluated.

3.

The need for the installation of an airlock access is being evaluated.

4.

A sign stating that the Trunnion Room door must remain closed, except for passage, will be posted at the Trunnion Room access point.

5.

The lock on the Trunnion Room door is being changed to a lock series whose key is controlled by the Group Shif t Supervisor, which provides for better administrative control over personnel access to the Trunnion Room.

Failure Data N/A i