05000219/LER-1983-011, Forwards LER 83-011/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 83-011/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20072U298
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	03/23/1983
From:	Fiedler P GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20072U299	List: 05000219/LER-1983-011, Forwards LER 83-011/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8304110266
Download: ML20072U298 (3)

LER-2083-011, Forwards LER 83-011/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2192083011R00 - NRC Website

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., o GPU Nuclear g g{ P.O. Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 609-693-6000 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

March 23, 1983 Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Subject:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/8 3-ll/03L This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report (LER) to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-ll/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours, pu n 2 a Pet'er B. Fiedler Vice President and Director Oyster Creek PBF:jal Enclosure s cc: Director (40 copies) l Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dire ctor (3)

Of fice of Management Information and Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 l

NRC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, NJ 08731 i

I 8304110266 830323 PDR ADOCK 05000219 l 5 PDR l

GPU Nuclear is a part of the General Pubhc Utilities System gW

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-11/03L

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Report Date March 23, 1983 Occurrence Date March 6, 1983 Identification of Occurrence l

Operation in a degraded mode permitted by limiting condition for operation as

., specified in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.B.3, when the low flow switch for Standby Cas Treatment System fan 1-9 failed to sense flow in System II causing the inlet and outlet valves for fan 1-9 to shut. This item is reportable per paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence The Plant was shutdown for refueling.

Mode Switch Position Refuel Reactor Coolant Temperature 90 0F ~

- Debription of Occurrence On Sunday, March 6,1983 at 2012 hours0.0233 days <br />0.559 hours <br />0.00333 weeks <br />7.65566e-4 months <br />, during the execution of the Standby Gas Treatment System ten hour operability test in the System II preferential mode, System II valves V-28-27 and V-28-30 shut with fan 1-9 running. System II was declared out of service. At 2140 hours0.0248 days <br />0.594 hours <br />0.00354 weeks <br />8.1427e-4 months <br /> System I was verified to be operable. On Monday, March 7,1983 at 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> System II was tested and returned to service.

1 Apparent Cause of Occurrenca The apparent cause of. this occurrence was a damaged sensing line on fan 1-9 low flow switch. The sensing line, which is constructed of plastic, was postioned too close to a cabinet heater and subsequently melted from the high temperature.

During normal system operation, valves V-28-27 and V-28-30 would remain open with fan 1-9 low flow switch sensing flow in System II.

Licensee Event Report Page 2 Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-ll/03L Analysis of Occurrence The Standby Gas Treatment System filters and exhausts the reactor building atmosphere to the stack during secondary containment isolation condition with a minimum release of radioactive materials from the reactor bulding to the environs.

The safety significance of this event is minimized as the Standby Gas Treatment System was operational in the System I preferential mode in the event that a demand for system operation had occurred.

Corrective Action The damaged sensing line for System II flow switch was repaired and positioned so it was an adequate distance from the cabinet heater. On Monday, March 7, 1983 at 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> an operability and flow test was completed in the System II preferential mode and System II was returned to service.

As a preventive maintenance measure, the sensing lines for System I flow switch were checked for possible degradation and to ensure that they were not located near any heating elements.

An engineering evaluation will be performed to determine if the tubing material is correct.

Failure Data Dwyer Instruments , Inc.

Catalog # 1637 .25 Michigan City, Indiana Switch Sensing Lines were repaired. Switch was not replaced.

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