05000219/LER-1983-006, Forwards LER 83-006/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 83-006/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20069A746
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 03/04/1983
From: Fiedler P
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20069A747 List:
References
NUDOCS 8303160225
Download: ML20069A746 (3)
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LER-1983-006, Forwards LER 83-006/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2191983006R00 - NRC Website
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text

',

GPU Nuclear Q

g7 P.O. Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 609-693-6000 Writer's Direct Dici Number:

March 4, 1983 Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subj ect: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Do cke t No. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-06/03L This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report (LER) to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-06/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours, Pet'er B. Fiedler Vice President and Director Oyster Creek PBF:jal Enclosure s cc: Dire ctor (40 copies)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Dire ctor (3)

Of fice of Management Information and Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 NRC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, NJ 08731 8303160225 030304 PDR ADOCK 05000 s

y GPU Nuclear is a part of the General Pubhc Utilities System

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

. Forked River,' New Jersey 08731.

Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-06/03L

- Report Date March 4, 1983 Occurrence Date February 6,1983 Identification of Occurrence '

Operation in a degraded mode permitted by limiting condition for operation as specified in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.B.3, when the low flow switch for Standby Gas Treatment System fan 1-9 failed to sense a low flow condition therefore preventing system II valves from closing. This item is reportable per paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Conditions Frior to Occurrence The plant was operating at steady state power.

Mode Switch. Position Run Power:

Core 803.5 MWt Electrical 232 MWh Description of Occurrence On Sunday, February 6,1983 at 2100 hours0.0243 days <br />0.583 hours <br />0.00347 weeks <br />7.9905e-4 months <br />, during the execution of the Standby Gas Treatment System ten hour operability test in the system I preferential mode,' valves V-28-24, V-28-27 and V-28-30 failed to close af ter fan 1-9 tripped as part of the normal system line-up.. System I was declared out of sevice. At 2205 hours0.0255 days <br />0.613 hours <br />0.00365 weeks <br />8.390025e-4 months <br /> an operability and flow test was completed in the system II preferential mode with system II functioning normally.

Apparert Cause of Occurrence The apparent cause of this occurrence was moisture accumulation in fan 1-9 low flow switch sensing lines. This moisture and possible icing due to outdoor temperatures below freezing, prevented the flow switch from sensing a low flow Leondition with fan 1-9 off.

j During -normal system operation, valves V-28-24, V-28-27 and V-28-30 would close with a low flow condition sensed by fan 1-9 low flow switch.

L

f 9

Licensee Event Report Page 2 Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219 /83-06/03L Analysis of Occurrence The Standby Gas Treatment System filters and exhausts the reactor building atmosphere to the stack during secondary containment isolation condition with a minimum release of radioactive materials from the reactor building to the environs.

The safety significance of this event is minimized as the Standby Gas Treatment System was operational in the system II preferential mode in the event that a demand for system operation had occurred.

Corrective Action

The low flow switch sensing lines for system I were blown out with nitrogen to remove existing moisture and the low flow switch was checked for proper operation. On Monday, February 7,1983 at 0220 hours0.00255 days <br />0.0611 hours <br />3.637566e-4 weeks <br />8.371e-5 months <br /> an operability and flow test was completed in the system I preferential mode with system I returned to servi ce.

As a preventative maintenance measure, st 0251 hours0.00291 days <br />0.0697 hours <br />4.150132e-4 weeks <br />9.55055e-5 months <br />, low flow switch sensing lines for system-II were blown out with nitrogen and the low flow switch was checked for proper operation., System II was returned to service following an operability and ficw test.

Failure Data Dwyer Instruments, Inc.

Catalog # 1637.25 Michigan City, Iniiana Switch was repaired and not replaced

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