ML20133J707

Insp Repts 50-454/85-38 & 50-455/85-34 on 850909-13. Violation Noted:Failure to Complete Required Quarterly Inventories of Emergency Supplies in Technical Support Ctr & Operational Support Ctr Between Apr & Sept 1985

ML20133J707
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	10/04/1985
From:	Patterson J, Phillips M, Ploski T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20133J629	List: ML20133J628 ML20133J653 ML20133J707
References
50-454-85-38-01, 50-455-85-34, NUDOCS 8510210047
Download: ML20133J707 (14)

See also: IR 05000454/1985038

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-454/8503 DRSS); 50-455/850 DRSS)

Dockets No. 50-454; 50-455 Licenses No. NPF-37; CPPR-131

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

P.O. Box 767

Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: Byron Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Byron Site, Byron, IL

Inspection Conducted: September 9-13, 1985

Inspectors: T. os I

Team Leader Date

/$}N$ 'Afr

J. Pattersonu '

/c --

Date

Approved By . PPffllips, Chief / >

Emergency Preparedness Section Date

Inspection Summary

Inspaction on September 9-13, 1985 (Reports No. 50-454/85038(DRSS);

No. 50-455/85034(ORSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of the following areas of

the emergency preparedness program: L'censee action on previously identified

items; emergency plan activations; emargency detection and classification;

protective action recommendations; notifications and communications; changes

to the emergency preparedness program; shift staffing and augmentation;

knowledge and performance of duties (training); dose calculation and

assessment; licensee audits; and maintenance of emergency preparedness. The

inspection involved 150 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors and two

consultants.

R_esults: One violation of NRC requirements was identified.

8510210047ONh54

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Commonwealth Edison Company

• R. Querio, Station Manager

• R. Ward, Assistant SuperintenJent, Administrative and Support Services

• R. Pleniewicz, Assistant Superintendent, Operations

• T. Higgins, Training Supervisor

!, *W. McNeill, Training Instructor

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. *J.'Vanlaere, Rad Chem Supervisor

• M. Whitemore, GSEP Coordinator

• W. Burkamper, Quality Assurance Supervisor, Operations

• A. Britton, Quality Assurance Inspector

• A. Chomacke, ONSG

• J. Langa, Compliance Department ,

S. Sober, Health Physicist '

B. Scott, Health Physicist

i L. Bushman, Rad Chem Foreman

. R. Colglazier, Health Physicist

, S. Barrett, Chemistry Department '

! T. Tulon, Operating Engineer '

T. Joyce, Operating Engineer

P. Harmon, Fire Brigade Training Instructor

J

J. Schrock, Shift Engineer

R. Franklin, Shift Engineer

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A. Kimbler, Shift Engineer

W. Kouba, Station Control Room Engineer

P. Allen, Station Control Room Engineer

! L. Bunner, Station Control Room Engineer

i S. Campbell, Central Files Supervisor '

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C. Bennett, Environmental Health Physicist, CECO

D. St. Clair, Tech Staff Supervisor  :

D. Popkins, Shift Foreman

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i G. Frantz, Shift Foreman

! H. Krist, Assistant Security Administrator '

R. Branson, Master Electrician

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, Non-Commonwealth Edison Personnel  :

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J. Fairow, Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency 1

S. Brooks, Ogle County Sheriff's Department

S. Walters, Byron Fire Protection District

J. Lobel, Rockford Memorial Hospital

• Indicates those who attended the September 13, 1985 exit interview.  ;

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2. Licensee Action on Previously Identified' Items

(0 pen) Item Nos. 50-454/85015-01 and 50-455/85010-01: During the 1985

emergency preparedness exercise, the offsite environmental monitoring

team's performance was weak, as evident from the following: inadequate

contamination contial practices; uncertainty in operating the SAM II; and

failure to follow procedure tiG-3 when taking radiation surveys. In its

formal response to this exercise weakness, the licensee indicated that

remedial training would be completed by September 30, 1985. The

inspector determined that this training was progressing on schedule for

persons who may be assigned to offsite teams. Also, it was evident from

records of a September 1985, environmental monitoring drill that greater

emphasis had been placed on the weak points identified during the 1985

exercise. This item remains open oending completion of remedial training

and evaluation of offsite monitori..g team performance during the next

exercise.

3. Emergency Plan Activations

The inspector reviewed records related to the activation of the

Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) for the period November 1, 1984

through August 31, 1985. The GSEP was activated on six occasions during

this period. All six Unusual Event declarations were appropriate.

Notifications of the NRC and State agencies were adequately documented.

The review included the following documents and contacts:

• Licensee Event Reports

• Shift Engineer's Logs

• Copies of Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) Forms

• Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (IESDA)

• Event Notification Worksheets, used by the licensee to document

telephone conversations with the NRC Headquarters Duty Officer.

The inspector determined that the licensee initially notified NRC

Headquarters within the required time period following each emergency

declaration. The licensee is responsible for having the capability to

notify responsible State and local governmental agencies within about

fifteen minutes after any emergency declaration. The following table

summarizes initial notification information for both State and Ogle

County for the Byron Station's GSEP activations:

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GSEP ACTIVATIONS

NOVEMBER 1984 - AUGUST 1985

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Declaration State Agencies a Ogle County

b

Elapsed

Date Time Initially Notified Initially Notified Time (Minutes)

March 14,--1985 2209 2215 2220 11

April 17, 1985 1033 1047 1059 26

June 16, 1985 0539 0545 0555 16

July 27, 1985 2101 2105 211E 15

August 1, 1985 2030 2033 2045 15

August 29, 1985 1700 1702 1710 10

a

Simultaneous notification of IESDA and Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety

(IDNS).

b

Times listed are the later of the times in licensee and IESDA records.

c

Based on IESDA records

From declaration time to notification of both State and county agencies.

As evident from the table, the licensee initially notified IESDA and IDNS

on the average about six minutes after the emergency declarations. Elapsed

time from emergency declaration to initial notification of State and

local governmental agencies averaged about fifteen minutes. Thus, based

on records of actual emergency plan activations through August 1985. for-

the Byron Station, the licensee has adequately demonstrated the

capability to initially notify State and local governmental agencies in a

timely manner.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is

acceptable.

4. Emergency Detection and Classification (82201)

The inspectors conducted walkthroughs with three teams, each consisting of

a Shift Engineer (SE) and a Station Control Room Engineer (SCRE),

regarding their abilities to detect and classify several emergency

conditions and to perform all initial offsite notifications. It was clear

to all individuals that the SE had the ultimate responsibility for

declaring an emergency. Interviewees demonstrated good teamwork and

exhibited adequate familiarity with the Station's Emergency Action Levels

(EALs), relevant emergency plan implementing (BZP-series) procedures, use

of the NARS dedicated telephone equiprent and message forms, and use of

the Emergency Notification System (ENS) communications equipment and

associated Event Notification Worksheets,

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Emergency classifications described in the GSEP, Byron Annex, and in

procedure BZP 200-Al were the Transportation Accident, Unusual Event,

Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency. All but the first

i class were consistent with the four emergency classes described in

10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Part IV.C and NUREG 0654, Revision 1. The EALs

included inplant conditions and onsite and offsite radiological

monitoring results. The EALs were evaluated versus the regulatory

guidance, as part of the 1985 review of Revision 1 to the Byron Annex, j

and found to be in accordance with the guidance, including those EALs which

referenced Byron Status Trees. The inspector determined that the Status

i Trees were worded such that a user would also be directed to the

j appropriate EALs, as listed in BZP 200-A1, in order to make an emergency  ;

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classification decision.

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Upon comparing the EALs listed in Revision 1 of the Byron Annex and in

procedure BZP 200-A1, the inspectors identified typographical errors in

the Annex's Table of EALs for the following conditions:

• Condition 2, Alert EAL -

work " exceeded" was repeated.

• Conditions 7 through 9, -

portions of these EALs were

i Site Area Emergency Eats listed under the General  :

Emergency EAL column

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• Condition 278, General -

The equation contained an

Emergency EAL incorrect exponent.

• Condition 28, second Unusual -

the exponent was missing.

Event EAL

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is

acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for '

improvement:

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• The licensee should eliminate typographical errors in the EALs

! listed in Table BYA 5-1 of the Byron Annex.

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5. Protective Action Decisionmaking (82202)

The GSEP, Byron Annex, and appropriate BZP-series procedures indicated

that the SE,.who is on-shift 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day, is the Acting Station

Director and, as such, has the undelegatable responsibility for making

offsite protective action recommendations until properly relieved. The

GSEP and related procedures specified the line of succession in the

event that the SE would become incapacitated or otherwise unable to

perform his responsibilities as Acting Station Director. During the

Control Room walkthroughs described in Paragraph 4 of this report,

various aspects of onsite and offsite protective action decisionmaking

were addressed. All personnel were clearly aware of the SE's

responsibility for making an offsite recommendation following any General

Emergency declaration and all were adequately familiar with procedural

guidance for formulating such a recommendation and transmitting it to

State and County officials. The GSEP and procedural guidance for-

formulating offsite protective action recommendations were consistent with

current regulatory guidance.

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The procedural guidance, found in BZP 300-A2, included copies of Table

6.3-1 and Figure 6.3-1 of the generic GSEP. During the walkthroughs

Controi Room personnel exhibited some difficulty in reading the smaller

print in the protective action recommendation flowchart reproduced in

BZP 300-A2. At least one individual expressed momentary confusion by the

references in the procedure's table and figure to " Table 6.3-1" or

" Figure 6.3-1", which are identifiers associated with the generic GSEP,

but not in BZP 300-A2.

All those interviewed were adequately familiar with the procedural

guidance dealing with the assembly, accountability of all onsite

personnel and subsequent evacuation guidance for non-essential onsite

personnel. The procedural guidance was consistent with the GSEP and

regulatory guidance.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program in

acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for

improvement:

• A more legible copy of the protective action decisionmaking

flowchart should be incorporated in BZP 300-A2.

• Protective action deci ionmaking t guidance reproduced and

incorporated in BZP 309-A2 should not refer to Table 6.3-1 and Figure

6.3-1, which are their identifiers in the generic GSEP.

6. Notifications and Communications (82203)

The licensee's provisions fer notifying appropriate offsite organizations

of emergency plan activations have been described in the GSEP and Byron

Annex. Specific, adequately detailed guidance regarding offsite

notifications was found in the following BZP-series procedures: 100-T1,

300-A1, 310-1, 310-2, 310-3 and 310-5. Notifications to IDNS and IESDA

have been accomplished using the NARS system. In the event of a General

Emergency declaration, the NARS system provides the capability for the

licensee to directly contact both State and County emergency *

organizations. Should the NARS and/or Emergency Notification System (ENS)

become inoperable, backup commercial telephone numbers for normal and

off-hours have been provided for the relevant governmental agencies in

the appropriate BZP. procedures and in the GSEP Telephone Directory, which

has been updated quarterly by corporate staff. The inspectors determined

that dedicated communications equipment had been installed in the onsite

and offsite emergency response facilities as described in the GSEP and

Byron Annex, with the exception of the ENS line in the Emergency

Operations Facility (E0F). The licensee indicated that progress has been

made with NRC Headquarters regarding installation of the E0F's ENS line,

and that a November 1985 operability date was now anticipated. Backup

, power supplies to emergency communications equipment have been

i identified in Inspection Reports No. 454/83056(DRMSP) and

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No. 455/83039(0RMSP).

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Adequate copies of the NARS Form used to document initial notifications

to State agencies were available in the Control Room and Technical

Support Center (TSC). Copies of the Event Notification Worksheet, used

to document conversations between onsite licensee personnel and the NRC

Operations Center, were available in the Control Room. The worksheet,

found in procedure 1250-T4, was a modified version of the NRC

Headquarters Duty Officer's Event Form. Based on records of actual GSEP

events and conversations with Control Room personnel, the inspectors

concluded that this worksheet had been utilized as intended and provided

useful guidance to Control Room personnel regarding anticipating the Duty

Officer's information needs, as well as serving as a readily available

means of documenting conversations with the Duty Officer.

The inspector determined that 1985 communications equipment tests had

been conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements and commitmerts

in the GSEP. All tests had been adequately documented. The inspector

also observed a portion of the monthly onsite equipment checks that were

efficiently performed by a licensee representative. The equipment checks

were thorough, incorporating facsimile and computer terminal equipment in

addition to telephone and radio equipment. Corrective actions on the few

identified problems were promptly initiated.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is

acceptable.

7. Changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program (82204)

The staff indicated its approval of Revision 1 to the Byron Annex in a

letter to the licensee dated April 26, 1985. Several inconsistencies

between the Annex and the generic GSEP were noted in that correspondence,

regarding out-of-date Annex descriptions of several emergency response

facilities and the licensee's method of initially notifying State and

local authorities of an onsite emergency. In addition to these items,

the inspectors determined that Section 4.1.1.2 of the Annex stated that

any offsite protective action recommendations would be provided to County

officials, rather than to both State and County officials as indicated in

the GSEP and procedures. Section 8.1 did not indicate that the Station

has also been entirely responsible for conducting semi-annual, off hours

staff augmentation drills. Section 8.1 did not indicate that the licensee

has annually reviewed the Station's EALs with offsite authorities and has

made provisions for making available to offsite authorities the results of

independent audits which dealt with the adequacy of the station's

interfaces with State and local emergency support organizations.

The inspector examined the licensee's provisions for preparing, internally

reviewing, and distributing new or revised BZP-series procedures. These

provisions were adequately described in various BAP-series procedures. A

procedures coordinator was responsible for selecting personnel,

pre-designated as having the qualifications to review one or several

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categories of information, who would then be tasked to review a BZP-series

procedure. The coordinator was able to identify exactly who in the review

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chain currently had possession of a specific revision. Following review and

approval by the Station Manager and completion of a safety evaluation, procedure

distribution to holders of controlled copies of procedure manuals would occur.

Onsite distribution to both individuals and work locations having controlled

copies of procedure manuals was accomplished by file clerks, rather than by

internal mailings. Manual holders were still required to acknowledge receipt

and correct filing of the changes to their manuals by written form sent to

Central Files. Offsite distribution of procedure changes also required that

those authorized to possess controlled procedures acknowledge receipt and

filing of any changes via form sent to Central Files. The inspector spot

checked records of several recent revisions to BZP-series procedures and

determined that the described preparation, review, and distribution

procedures had been followed.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is

acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for

improvement:

• The Byron Annex should indicate that both State and County officials

will be directly provided any offsite protective action

recommendations that are issued.

• The Annex should indicate that the Station is entirely responsible

for conducting semi-annual, off-hours staff augmentati n drills.

• The GSEP or Anr.ex should indicate that the licensee annually reviews

the Station's EALs with appropriate offsite officials and that

results of independent audits addressing the adequacy of the

Station's interfaces with State and local emergency support

organizations are made available to those organizations.

8. Shift Staffing and Augmentation (82205)

The licensee's provisions for the minimum shift staff and for augmenting

this staff were reviewed and were found to have met the goals of Table B-1

of NUREG 0654, Revision 1. Provisions for onsite staff augmentation for

each emergency class were adequately described in the GSEP, BZP 300-A5,

and in BZP 600-series procedures. Provisions included adequate guidance

on what constituted a minimum staff needed to declare certain emergency

response facilities fully operational. The licensee's call tree

procedure and prioritized call list for staff augmentation identified at

least two persons for each key position in the onsite emergency

organization. Personnel assignment and associated telephone number

information has been updated quarterly by the GSEP Coordinator. BZP

600-series procedures also included lists needed by certain Station Group

directors in order to contact vendors of various supplies and services.

Such lists have also been updated quarterly and were available in the

onsite emergency response facilities.

The inspector reviewed records of off-hours staff augmentation drills

that had been conducted in September 1984 and March 1985, in accordance

with the semi annual drill commitment in the GSEP and Byron Annex. The

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drills were adequately documented and demonstrated the licensee's

capability to adequately augment onshift personnel in a timely manner

following an emergency declaration.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is e

acceptable.

9. Knowledge and Performance of Duties (Training) (82206)

The licensee's Production Training Center (PTC) has overall responsibility

for ensuring that all licensee, contractor, and other personnel granted

unescorted access privileges receive annual training of general aspects of

the GSEP and Byron Annex. The Station's Training Department has

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administered this training and has adequately supplemented it with

site-specific information on the Station's emergency alerting systems and

associated personnel response actions.

The Training Department has provided additional annual training to

persons assigned to specific positions in the onsite emergency .

organization. Training requirements for all but one Station Group

3 director position were specified in BTP 300-T2, the Byron Station EPIP

j Training Matrix. The matrix did not specify the training required for

l Operational Support Center (OSC) Directors, who were Shift Foremen in the

normel plant organization. A review of the Shift Foremens' training

records indicated that all had completed, within the annual period, the

equivalent training as that given Station Directors which included

j procedure BZP 400-2, the Role and Staffing of the 05C. The inspectors

examined the training records of fifteen other persons identified by name

as being assigned to various Station Group director positions and

j determined that all had completed, within the annual period, all training

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specified in BTP 300-T2. In addition to annual training on specific

, implementing procedures, Station Group directors were also required to

complete annual training on eighteen subject areas derived from the GSEP

and Byron Annex. The inspector reviewed lesson plans for this additional

GSEP training and determined that they were adequately detailed.

In addition to the annual training requirements on the GSEP and

implementing procedures, operating shift personnel have been kept

informed of revisions to relevant emergency plan implementing procedures

as part of a periodic required reading program administered by the

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Station's Training Department. Completion of periodic required reading

assignments has been documented by sign-off sheets which have been

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monitored by Training Department personnel. The licensee indicated that

it has been developing written tests for persons assigned key positions in

the onsite emergency organization, as part of its efforts to receive INP0

accreditation for the emergency preparedness training effort.

Besides records reviews and the SE/SCRE walkthroughs previously described

in this inspection report, the inspectors conducted walkthroughs with one

, or more persons assigned to all but the lead position (Station Director)

in the Station Group. Persons who participated in or observed the June

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1985 exercise were exempted from these walkthroughs. All persons'

interviewed demonstrated adequate understandings of their emergency

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duties. During these interviews the inspectors learned that the OSC

Directors' training did not include familiarization training within the

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OSC.itself, which served as a large meeting room during normal plant

operations.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is '

acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for

improvement:

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* The annual training requirements for the OSC Director position i

} should be specified in the Byron Station EPIP Training Matrix.

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• Persons assigned as OSC Directors should receive some familiarization

training within the workspace that is reconfigured to become the OSC

during an emergency.

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10. Dose Calculation and Assessment (82207)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's offsite dose calculation and

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assessment methods as contained in the Environmental Director (ED-series)

procedures. The ED-series procedures contained step-by-step instructions

for performing computerized and manual dose calculations for ground level

or elevated releases, monitored and unmonitored release pathways, and

field monitoring teams' measurements. Procedures also addressed

, acquisition of real-time and forecast meteorological-information.

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Walkthroughs were conducted with several licensee personnel assigned to

the Environs Director position in the emergency organization. Those

interviewed demonstrated adequate familiarity with the E0-series procedures

and the manual and computerized methods of perforniing offsite dose

calculations. One individual did, hawever, exhibit some uncertainty when

the Station's computer momentarily went off line during an attempted demand

poll of onsite meteorological data. The individual could not locate

procedural guidance for accessing an offsite computer through which the

data could have been accessed.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is

acceptable;.however, the following item should be considered for

improvement:

• The ED-series procedures should contain guidance on how to access a

compatible offsite computer in the event that the station's computer

cannot be accessed.

i 11. Licensee Audits (82210)

The inspector examined the records of the independent audits and

surveillances of'the emergency preparedness program, which were conducted

by the licensee's Quality Assurance (QA) Department. Records of the

following audits were reviewed: onsite audit QAA 06-84-11; onsite audit

QAA 06-85-19; and offsite audit 06-85-II. Each audit das adequately

documented and was adequate in scope and depth of questions, regarding

the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t). ' Reference documents from

which audit questions were developed included the following:

10 CFR Part 50; Technical Specifications; the GSEP and Byron Annex; and the

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emergency plan implementing procedures. Negative responses to audit

questions were categorized as findings, open items, or observations,

which are analogous to the NRC's categorizations of violations or open

items, unresolved items, and improvement items, respectively. It was

apparent from the audit records that all responses to finding had been

received and followed-up by QA auditors' in a timely manner, while previous

audits' observations could be specifically incorporated in subsequent

audits.

Records of the following surveillances were reviewed: QAS 06-85-48;

QAS 06-85-115; QAS 06-85-143; QAS 06-85-237; and QAS 06-85-305. The first

three surveillances were essentially documentation of a QA auditor

observing emergency preparedness exercise scenario development meetings,

while QAS 06-d5-237 was the QA auditors' evaluation of the annual exercise.

The final surveillance was an auditor's evaluation of the annual medical

drill. All surveillances were adequately documented. The inspector

concluded that the surveillances of the exercise and medical drill were

more meaningful subjects for surveillances versus scenarios development

meetings.

Although not specifically stated in the Byron Annex, the licensee has

made provisions for making available to representatives of appropriate

State and local government organizations the audit and surveillance

results addressing the Station's interface with offsite emergency support

organizations. Offsite officials were to be informed of the availability

of such records during the annual emergency preparedness meeting held by

the licensee.

The inspector reviewed the GSEP Coordinator's records associated with

actual GSEP events. The coordinator has been required to evaluate the

adequacy of records generated by the Station during GSEP events, as well

as the timeliness of all offsite notifications. The inspector determined

that the GSEP Coordinator had been performing this task in a satisfactory

manner.

The inspector also reviewed the GSEP Coordinator's records associated

with tracking progress made on corrective actions on items identified

during NRC inspections or licensee drills. The records were adequately

detailed and indicated that timely corrective actions had been initiated

on exercise or drill weaknesses and appropriate improvement items that

had been identified.

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program is

acceptable.

12. Maintaining Emergency Preparedness

The inspectors determined that the licensee's Letters of Agreement with

local emergency support organizations were current. An inspector also

contacted management level representatives of the Ogle County Sheriff's

Office, Byron Fire Protection District, and Rockford Memorial Hospital.

Persons contacted expressed no dissatisfaction with emergency

preparedness training that had been provided by the licensee and all were

adequately aware of their organizations' roles in the event of an

emergency at the Byron Station. Based on discussions with the licensee's

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training instructors, the inspectors learned that representatives of the

Fire Protection District had participated to some extent in some of the

Station's fire drills, while the Station's fire brigade had completed

some training at the District's training facility.

The inspectors examined records of the September 1984 and 1985. offsite

agency meetings. The records indicated that appropriate State and local

officials had been invited. The 1985 meeting agenda included the

following topics: the GSEP; overview of the Station's Fire Protection

and Security Plans; discussion of EALs; and a overview of the licensee's

QA Program.

The licensee has conducted or was scheduled to conduct during the annual

period all emergency preparedness drills required by the regulations and

committed to in the GSEP and Byron Annex. All drills that have been

completed had been critiqued and adequately documented, including any

corrective actions that had been initiated as a result of identified

weaknesses.

The inspector examined 1985 records of inventories of emergency supplies

and kits, identified in procedure BZP 500-4 and associated checklists,

which were conducted before or during this inspection. The inventory

instructions contained in the procedure and checklists were clear.

Documentation of completed inventories was adequate. Inventories of

supplies found in the emergency response facilities and kits used by

environmental monitoring teams had been performed during the first two

weeks of January and April 1985. The procedure stated that these

inventories were to be done " quarterly," rather than sometime "during the

quarter". While emergency supplies in the Emergency Operations Facility

(E0F) had again been inventoried in early July 1985, the inspectors

determined that prior to this inspection the most recent documented

inventories of the TSC and OSC emergency supplies had occurred in early

April 1985. The inspectors learned that the GSEP Coordinator had

recognized in late August that he had not yet received completed inventory

checklists for all quarterly inventories that should have been completed

in July. The Coordinator had so indicated in a note addressed to the

foreman responsible for personnel normally assigned the inventory tasks.

BZP 500-4 also instructed that any items identified as missing shall be

replaced and so indicated on the inventory checklists as corrected, and

that checklist items having change-out schedules were to be replaced as

stated. The inspector examined the emergency supplies stored in the TSC,

OSC, and both environmental monitoring team kits. The following

discrepancies from these instructions were noted in the most recently

documented inventories:

TSC Supplies:

• Two survey meters and two probes were to be available. Only one

survey meter and one probe were found.

• BZP 500-T6 stated that "there was a 6-month limit on film" badges.

Twenty-four film badges were dated January 1985 and another was

dated August 1984.

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OSC Supplies:

• Two survey meters were to be available. Only one was found.

• BZP 500-T7 stated that "there was a 6-month limit on film" badges

and finger rings. The film badges and finger rings were dated

January 1985.

Environmental Monitoring Team Kits:

.* Gold Team Kit -

No discrepancies

-* Black Team Kit - One survey instrument bagged and left in the "on"

position. Used (dirty) soil and vegetation sample containers,-used

cartridges.

The inspector concluded that the Black Team Kit had been used in the

September 6,1985 environmental monitoring drill. The condition of this

kit's contents gave the appearance of not having been inventoried after

use. Procedure BZP 500-4 did not contain inventory requirements for

emergency supplies and kits following.their use. The licensee must

develop and implement procedural guidance to ensure that emergency

supplies and kits shall be inventoried after use and that missing or

expended items shall be replaced in a timely manner. This is an Open

Item (454/85034-01 and 455/85038-01).

Promptly after being informed that inventories of emergency supplies in

the TSC and OSC had not been documented since early April 1985 and that

evidence of missing or expended items had been discovered upon inspection

of these supplies and an environmental monitoring team kit, the licensee

initiated the following corrective actions:

• Inventory of the TSC and OSC emergency supplies and monitoring team

kits.

• Establishment of a reminder system to the GSEP Coordinator from

Central Files, as to when periodic inventory records were due for

specific emergency kits and supplies.

Despite these prompt corrective actions, the licensee's failuce to

-complete quarterly inventories of TSC and OSC emergency suppiies since

early April 1985 together with the failure to follow procer'. oral

requirements regarding periodic replacement of associated film badges and

finger rings constitute a Severity Level IV violation of NRC requirements

(Supplement VIII). However, in view of the licensee's prompt initiation

of adequate corrective measures, no written response to this violation is

necessary.

13. Onsite Meteorlogical Monitoring Program

The inspector examined the licensee's corrective actions following

lightning damage to components of the onsite meteorological monitoring

system in mid-August 1985. The licensee reported the inoperability of

these components per the requirement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.4.

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The inspector determined that the lightning strike had damaged fuses in

the communications link between the meteorological tower and the Control

Room's strip chart recorders for certain meteorological parameters. The

licensee's meteorological contractor was onsite within an acceptable

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eighteen hours of the lightning strike and ascertained that the sensors

had not been damaged or rendered out of calibration limits. The

communications line was repaired and the strip chart recorders were all

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recalibrated by the evening of August 20, 1985. During the time period

from the lightning strike to the completion of repair and recalibration .

j activities, onsite meteorological data was available in the Control Room  !

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and TSC through the use of the Station's PRIME computer or the Offsite Dose }

Calculation System (0DCS).  ;

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j Based on the above findings, the licensee's corrective action was timely i

and acceptable.  ;

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l 14. Exit Interview

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The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph I

at the conclusion of the inspection to present and discuss their

preliminary findings. The licensee agreed to consider the items

discussed and stated that none of the information was proprietary in

nature.

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