06-13-2003 | On May 15, 2003, with Columbia Generating Station (Columbia) shut down for a refueling outage, a vulnerability in a safeguards system was discovered that could have allowed -unauthorized-orundetected access-to-the-Columbia protected area (ref: Event-Report-39852).--The_ _ vulnerability existed due to a Safeguards Information ( SGI) container that was determined to be unlocked and unattended for a period of approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The unlocked SG! container allowed access to site-specific drawings, diagrams, and technical details regarding the physical security system that could facilitate access to the protected and vital areas.
Subsequent to discovery of the vulnerability, the contents were inventoried and fully accounted for. The SGI container is located in a room for which access is controlled with a keycard reader and there was no evidence of forced entry.NNeither is there indication the vulnerable condition resulted in an actual unauthorized or undetected entry into the protected area nor has this event presented a challenge to the safe operation of Columbia.
NRC FORM 366A� U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001) FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) Columbia Generating Station 50-397 NUMBER
|
---|
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
On May 15, 2003, with Columbia Generating Station (Columbia) shut down for a refueling outage, a vulnerability in a safeguards system was discovered that could have allowed unauthorized or undetected access to the Columbia protected area (ref: Event Report 39852). The vulnerability existed due to a Safeguards Information (SGI) container that was determined to be unlocked and uifttencialor—Cpafiod—ofTpproximAtely-24 hours:- The unlocked SGI-container allowed access to site-specific drawings, diagrams, and technical details regarding the physical security system that could facilitate access to the protected and vital areas.
Subsequent to discovery of the vulnerability, the contents were inventoried and fully accounted for. The SGI container is located in a room for which access is controlled with a keycard reader and there was no evidence of forced entry. Neither is there indication the vulnerable condition resulted in an actual unauthorized or undetected entry into the protected area nor has this event presented a challenge to the safe operation of Columbia.
This 30-day follow-up written report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(b)(2) in accordance with paragraph (a)(4) of that section. Regulatory Guide 5.62, revision 1, section 3.2 instructs licensees to use the Licensee Event Report form, NRC Form 366 and describes the report content that is sufficient for NRC analysis and evaluation. Because this event does not involve a security system failure or a threat related incident, only items 1 through 14 in section 3.2 of the Regulatory Guide are germane to this issue and are addressed below:
Date and Time of Event May -15,-2003-at 1315.-PDT.
Location of Actual or Threatened Event The SGI container that was open and unattended is in a plant records storage area in a building adjacent to Columbia's protected area and within the owner controlled area.
Plant Operating Phase Columbia Generating Station was shutdown for a refueling outage.
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001) FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) Safety Systems Threatened, directly or indirectly Because the vulnerability did not result in an actual unauthorized entry into the protected area, no safety systems were threatened.
Type of Security Force onsite Columbia Generating Station maintains a proprietary security force.
Number and type of personnel involved The personnel involved with the discovery and mitigation of the vulnerability were a records management clerk, distribution clerk, records management supervisor, and a safeguards information specialist.
Method of discovery of vulnerability A records management clerk observed the unlocked and unattended SGI container and reported the condition.
Procedural errors involved A records management clerk left the SGI container unlocked and unattended. The unlocked SGI container was a violation of security procedure SWP-SEC-02, "Protection of Safeguards Information.
Immediate aitiOns taken in iesponselo—dievulnerability Upon discovery of the vulnerability, the contents were inventoried, fully accounted for, and the SGI container secured. The security computer was queried to determine the scope of keycard access to the room during the time the SGI container was unlocked. Personnel that gained access to the room were either cleared for access to SGI or were escorted by SGI-cleared individuals. Local copiers were checked to determine usage during the time the SGI container was unlocked and unattended. This investigation revealed no copier usage during the period.
No local, State, or Federal law enforcement agencies were contacted regarding this condition.
Description of media interest or press release A press release was not issued regarding this condition and there has been no media interest.
Indication of previous similar events No indication of previous similar events that could have allowed unauthorized or undetected access to the Columbia Generating Station protected area due to an unsecured SGI container have been found.
Knowledgeable contact For questions or additional information the point of contact is Mr. Fred Schill at the Columbia Generating Station Licensing department, who may be reached by telephone at 509-377-2269.
26158 R1
|
---|
|
|
| | Reporting criterion |
---|
05000397/LER-2003-010 | | | 05000528/LER-2003-001 | Pressurizer Safety Valve As-Found Lift Pressure Outside of Technical Specification Limits | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000277/LER-2003-001 | | | 05000282/LER-2003-001 | | | 05000301/LER-2003-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000261/LER-2003-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000251/LER-2003-001 | Channel Failure of Qualified Safety Parameter Display System | | 05000316/LER-2003-001 | Unit 2 Shutdown In Accordance With Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, A.C. Sources, Action b | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000324/LER-2003-001 | Main Steam Line Drain Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Test Failures | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000352/LER-2003-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000353/LER-2003-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000397/LER-2003-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000364/LER-2003-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000529/LER-2003-001 | Reactor Trip with Loss of Forced Circulation Due to Failed Pressurizer Main Spray Valve | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000278/LER-2003-001 | | | 05000305/LER-2003-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000331/LER-2003-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000313/LER-2003-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000352/LER-2003-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000301/LER-2003-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000305/LER-2003-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000316/LER-2003-002 | Supplemental LER for Unit 2 Reactor Trip due to Instrument Rack 24 Volt Power Supply Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | 05000458/LER-2003-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(c) | 05000348/LER-2003-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000341/LER-2003-002 | Automatic Reactor Shutdown Due to Electric Grid Disturbance and Loss of Offsite Power | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000261/LER-2003-002 | | | 05000285/LER-2003-002 | 4 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000397/LER-2003-002 | | | 05000499/LER-2003-002 | Safety Injection Actuation | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000440/LER-2003-002 | Reactor Scram as a Result of a Loss of Off-site Power | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | 05000400/LER-2003-002 | 1 O OF 3 3 | | 05000266/LER-2003-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | 05000250/LER-2003-003 | Unescorted Access Inappropriately Approved Due to Falsified Pre-Access Information | | 05000261/LER-2003-003 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | 05000219/LER-2003-003 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000247/LER-2003-003 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000530/LER-2003-003 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000331/LER-2003-003 | | | 05000529/LER-2003-003 | SOURCE RANGE MONITOR INOPERABLE DURING CORE RELOAD | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000440/LER-2003-003 | Unrecognized Diesel Generator Inoperability During Mode Changes | | 05000348/LER-2003-003 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000482/LER-2003-003 | REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION AND REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVE CLOSURE | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | 05000301/LER-2003-003 | | | 05000302/LER-2003-003 | Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage Limit Exceeded Due To Pressurizer Instrument Tap Nozzle Cracks | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000382/LER-2003-003 | RCS Pressure Boundary Leakage Due to Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000397/LER-2003-003 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | 05000458/LER-2003-003 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(c) | 05000454/LER-2003-003 | Licensed Maximum Power Level Exceeded Due to Inaccuracies in Feedwater Ultrasonic Flow Measurements | | 05000282/LER-2003-003 | | | 05000346/LER-2003-014 | Steam Feedwater Rupture Controls System Re-Energizes in a Blocked Condition | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
|