05000275/FIN-2015002-06
From kanterella
Revision as of 08:57, 25 September 2017 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by Mark Hawes)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | High Voltage Insulator Flashover Resulted in Loss of 230 kV Offsite Power and Start of Emergency Diesel Generators |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, Green finding for the licensees failure to adequately implement procedure OM7.ID1, Problem Identification and Resolution, to prevent a high voltage insulator flashover event in the 230 kV switchyard that occurred on October 31, 2014. Specifically, corrective actions from three previous root cause evaluations were not effective to prevent a loss of the 230 kV start-up power and subsequent auto start of all of the safety standby emergency diesel generators (EDGs). This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Notification 50699230. The licensees failure to adequately implement procedure OM7.ID1, Problem Identification and Resolution was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. Specifically, this failure resulted in another high-voltage insulator flashover, which resulted in loss of 230 kV offsite startup power and activation of all safety-related EDGs, on October 31, 2014. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined that the impact of the finding on Unit 1 should be evaluated using Exhibit 1 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, and further determined that this finding required a detailed risk evaluation by the regional senior risk analyst because the finding involved a partial loss of offsite power, a support system that contributes to the likelihood of an initiating event and affected mitigation equipment. The risk analyst determined that, with the 230 kV system de-energized, any plant transient would result in a plant-centered loss of offsite power. Therefore, the risk analyst calculated the incremental conditional core damage probability for an exposure period of 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> to be 2.09 x 10-7, which is lower than the 1 x 10-6 threshold in the significance determination process; this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) for Unit 1. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined that the impact of the finding on Unit 2 should be evaluated using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, because the finding pertained to operations, an event, or a degraded condition while the plant was shut down. Unit 2 was shutdown in a refueling outage when the event occurred on October 31, 2014. Because of the shutdown configuration of Unit 2, the loss of 230 kV support system did not impact the ability to continue to provide decay heat removal for the unit. Therefore, the analyst determined qualitatively that this finding is also of very low safety significance (Green) for Unit 2. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of work management, in the area of human performance, for failing to implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is an overriding priority. Specifically the licensee failed to effectively plan and coordinate preventative maintenance strategies associated with root causes from previous high-voltage insulators flashover or failures since 2008 to prevent the loss of offsite 230 kV and the transient on October 31, 2014 [H.5]. |
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000275/2015002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Reynoso M Hayes M Kennard R Alexander T Buchanan T Hipschman |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - Diablo Canyon - IR 05000275/2015002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Diablo Canyon) @ 2015Q2
Self-Identified List (Diablo Canyon)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||