ML15072A009

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R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Submittal of Flood Hazard Report Per 10CFR50.54(f) Re Fukushima Near-Term Force Recommendation 2.1: Flooding
ML15072A009
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/11/2015
From: Korsnick M G
Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, Exelon Generation Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML15072A008 List:
References
RS-15-069
Download: ML15072A009 (15)
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'AýýAMENOWANNOWExeLon Generation, Maria KorsnickSenior Vice President.

Northeast Operations Chief Nuclear Officer, CENG100 Constellation WaySuite 500PBaltimore, MD 21202Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC410-470-5133 Office443-213-6739 Faxwww.exeloncorp.com maria.korsnick@exeloncorp.com 10 CFR 50.54(f)RS-1 5-069March 11, 2015U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk11555 Rockville PikeRockville, MD 20852R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power PlantRenewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-18Docket No. 50-244

Subject:

Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f)

Regarding theFukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Flooding

References:

(1)Letter from E. J. Leeds (NRC) and M. R. Johnson (NRC) to All PowerReactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active orDeferred Status, "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Codeof Federal Regulations 50.54(f)

Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"

dated March 12, 2012 (ML12053A340).

(2) Letter from E. J. Leeds (NRC) to All Power Reactor Licensees and Holdersof Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status, "Prioritization ofResponse Due Dates for Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of theCode of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)

Regarding Flooding HazardReevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task ForceReview of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"

dated May 11,2012 (ML12097A509).

(3) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-7046, "Design-Basis Flood Estimation for Site Characterization at Nuclear Power Plants in theUnited States of America",

dated November 2011.(4)(5)ECP-14-000571, "External Flood Barrier Qualification,"

Revision 0001.Letter from M. G. Korsnick (CENG) to Document Control Desk (NRC),"Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f)

Request for Information, Recommendation 2.3, Flooding,"

dated November 27, 2012 (ML12335A029).

(6) Letter from D. L. Schroeder, (NRC) to J. E. Pacher, (Exelon),

"R.E. GinnaNuclear Power Plant -NRC Supplemental Inspection Report05000244/2014010 and Assessment Follow-up Letter,"

dated September 30, 2014 (ML14273A035).

A00#

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 11, 2015Page 2(7) IP-CON-9, "Plant Barrier Control Program Implementation,"

Revision 002.(8) UFSAR, "Updated Final Safety Analysis Report,"

Revision 25.(9) CR-2014-004023, "Potential Minor Leakage into the "B" Battery Room."(10) Letter from M. G. Korsnick (CENG) to Document Control Desk (NRC),"Update to Response to NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f)

Request for Information Regarding Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3, Flooding

-Review of Available Physical Margin (APM) Assessments,"

dated January31, 2014 (ML14038A1 22).(11) CA-2014-000194, "Review All APM and Document per NRC RAI."(12) Letter from David L. Skeen, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, toJoseph E. Pollock, Nuclear Energy Institute

-"Trigger Conditions forPerforming an Integrated Assessment and Due Date for Response",

datedDecember 3, 2012 (ML12326A912).

(13) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, JLD-ISG-2012-05, "Guidance forPerforming the Integrated Assessment for External Flooding",

datedNovember 30, 2012.(14) GMM-23-99-FLOODBARRIER, "Flood Barrier Installation and Removal inTurbine Building Basement,"

Revision 00001.(15) ER-SC.2, "High Water (Flood) Plan," Revision 01001.(16) ECP-14-000900, "Auxiliary Building Block Wall Reinforcement,"

Draft.(17) AP-SW.2, "Loss of Service Water," Revision 00801.(18) AP-ELEC.17/18, "Loss of Safeguards Bus 17/18," Revision 00802.On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference (1) torequest information associated with Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 for Flooding.

One of the Required Responses in this letter directed licensees to submit a Flood HazardReevaluation Report (FHRR), including the interim action plan requested in Item 1.d ofReference (1), Enclosure 2, if appropriate.

On May 11, 2012, the NRC issued the prioritization plan developed by the NRC and resultant Flood Hazard Reevaluation due dates for all sites.Reference (2), Enclosure 1 identified R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Ginna),

as a Category 3Site requiring a FHRR submittal due date of March 12, 2015. The information in the enclosedprovides the Ginna FHRR. The Ginna FHRR follows the Hierarchical Hazard Assessment

approach, as described in Reference (3).

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 11, 2015Page 3Information Requested in Reference (1), Enclosure 2a. Site information related to the flood hazard. Relevant SSCs important to safety andthe UHS are included in the scope of this reevaluation, and pertinent data concerning these SSCs should be included.

Other relevant site data includes the following:

i. Detailed site information (both designed and as-built),

including present-day sitelayout, elevation of pertinent SSCs important to safety, site topography, as well aspertinent spatial and temporal data sets;Response" Site layout and topography

-See Section 1.2 and Figure 1.2-1 of Enclosure 2.* Equipment required to obtain safe shutdown following an external flooding eventare located in the Diesel Generator Buildings (DGBs), Control Building (CB)including Battery Rooms (BRs) and the Air Handling Room (AHR), the Auxiliary Building (AB), Reactor Containment (RC), Cable Tunnel (CT), and the StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater Building (SAFWB).ii. Current design basis flood elevations for all flood causing mechanisms; Response" Current design basis flood (DBF) elevations were developed from the probablemaximum flood on streams and rivers. -See Section 1.3 and Table 2.2-6 ofEnclosure 2.* Flood causing mechanisms

-See Section 1.4.1 of Enclosure 2.iii. Flood-related changes to the licensing basis and any flood protection changes(including mitigation) since license issuance; Response" No flood-related changes to the licensing basis have been made since Full TermOperating License (FTOL) issuance.

  • Flood protection changes (including mitigation) have been made since FTOLissuance:

o Two cable penetrations between Manhole 1 and Battery Room B werehydrostatically sealed.o Two unsealed 4-inch round conduits, containing telecommunications cables, penetrating through Manhole 1 into Battery Room B were sealed.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 11, 2015Page 4iv. Changes to the watershed and local area since license issuance; Response* Watershed and local area changes have been minimal since FTOL issuance asdescribed in Section 1.6 of Enclosure 2.* Site configuration changes since FTOL issuance include:o New Buildings:

" Contaminated Storage" Canister Preparation

" Administrative

" Engineering and Projects" Quality Control Storage" Receiving

" Storage and Fab Shop" Vehicle Storage" Offsite Warehouse West with separate Storage Building" Steam Generator Storage" Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

" Training Center East" Simulator

" Training Labso Guard House Expansion o Passive Barrier Systemv. Current licensing basis flood protection and pertinent flood mitigation features atthe site;Response* See Section 1.4 of Enclosure 2 for a description of Current Licensing Basis (CLB)flood protection and pertinent flood mitigation features at the site.* The SAFWB is not protected from the current DBF through use of barriers;

however, the height of the equipment ensures the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater system will be available for use during a flood. The CT is a structure belowgrade that connects the CB, Intermediate
Building, and AB. The elevation of thefloor of the CT is at an elevation of 261 feet 10 inches, which is above the DBFdepth at the TB of 256.6 feet; hence, no flooding concerns exists due to the flooddepth to the north. The CT is located below the Transformer Yard (TY), which isat an approximate elevation of 270 feet. The CT is fully enclosed and containsno penetrations that communicate with the TY. The CT was originally built withan access hatch for access from the TY to the CT. The hatch has since beengrouted, and there is an RTV seal to prevent water ingress.

The BRs and AHRare accessible from the Turbine Building (TB) at elevation 253 feet 6 inches. The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 11, 2015Page 5doors from the TB to the DGBs, AHR and BRs are sufficient to protect againstthe DBF (Reference (4)).vi. Additional site details, as necessary, to assess the flood hazard (i.e., bathymetry, walkdown

results, etc.)Response" See Section 1.6 of Enclosure 2 for watershed and local area changes.* See Reference (5) for the walkdown results submitted to the NRC." As a result of subsequent walkdowns of restricted access flood barriers, deficiencies were identified with flood barriers in Manhole 1, which impacted theBRs. Two non-hydrostatically sealed cable penetrations between Manhole 1 andBR B were identified and sealed, and two unsealed 4-inch round conduitpenetrations through Manhole 1 and BR B were identified and sealed.(Reference (6)) As a result of these deficiencies:

" A comprehensive barrier control program was created under Reference (7)that includes flood barriers.

o An engineering evaluation (Reference (4)) was completed to provide aqualification for each external flood barrier with respect to the externalflooding levels described within the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report(Reference (8)). This evaluation clearly demonstrates acceptability of eachbarrier.o All junction boxes and electrical panels below the DBF elevation in buildings with equipment required for safe shutdown were opened and inspected (Reference (9)).* In response to a NRC request for additional information (RAI) associated withNear-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3, Flooding

-Review of Available Physical Margin (APM) (Reference (10)), a review of all flood barriers andpenetrations was conducted per Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 12-07. Allpenetrations were determined to be capable of withstanding the DBF as requiredby the RAI. (Reference (11))b. Evaluation of the flood hazard for each flood causing mechanism, based on present-day methodologies and regulatory guidance.

Provide an analysis of each floodcausing mechanism that may impact the site including local intense precipitation andsite drainage, flooding in streams and rivers, dam breaches and failures, storm surgeand seiche, tsunami, channel migration or diversion, and combined effects.Mechanisms that are not applicable at the site may be screened-out;

however, ajustification should be provided.

Provide a basis for inputs and assumptions, methodologies and models used including input and output files, and other pertinent data.Response U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 11, 2015Page 6A description of the flood hazard reevaluation for each flood-causing mechanism and thebasis for inputs, assumptions, methodologies, and models are referenced below. PerNRC/NEI public meeting dated January 16, 2013 input-output files are not included with thissubmittal package but are available upon request.* Local Intense Precipitation (LIP) and Drainage:

See Section 2.1 of Enclosure 2.* Flooding in Streams and Rivers: See Section 2.2 of Enclosure 2.* Dam Breaches and Failures:

See Section 2.3 of Enclosure 2." Storm Surge: See Section 2.4 of Enclosure 2." Seiche: See Section 2.5 of Enclosure 2.* Tsunami:

See Section 2.6 of Enclosure 2.* Ice Induced Flooding:

See Section 2.7 of Enclosure 2.* Channel Migration or Diversion:

See Section 2.8 of Enclosure 2.* Combined Effects:

See Section 2.9 of Enclosure 2.c. Comparison of current and reevaluated flood causing mechanisms at the site.Provide an assessment of the current design basis flood elevation to the reevaluated flood elevation for each flood causing mechanism.

Include how the findings fromEnclosure 4 of the 50.54(o) letter (i.e., Recommendation 2.3 flooding walkdowns) support this determination.

If the current design basis flood bounds the reevaluated hazard for all flood causing mechanisms, include how this finding was determined.

ResponseThe current DBF does not bound the reevaluated hazard for all applicable flood-causing mechanisms, combined-effect floods, associated

effects, and/or flood event durationparameters.

A comparison of current design basis and reevaluated flood hazards isprovided in Section 3 of Enclosure

3. The summary below describes how this finding wasdetermined for the applicable flood hazards.

The dam breaches and failures, storm surge,seiche, tsunami, ice-induced

flooding, and channel migration or diversion flood-causing mechanisms were either determined to be implausible or completely bounded by othermechanisms.

Some individual flood-causing mechanisms (i.e. surge and seiche) areaddressed in one or more of the combined-effect floods.1. Local Intense Precipitation The current DBF for effects of LIP, as discussed in Section 2.4.2.2 of Reference (8)only evaluates flooding at the Screen House (SH). In an evaluation made by theNRC staff of the flood levels which would occur at safety-related buildings assumingan occurrence of the local maximum precipitation on the immediate site area, it wasconcluded that flood water will pond to an elevation of about 254.5 feet mean sealevel at the north area of the site in the vicinity of the SH. The limiting elevation for U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 11, 2015Page 7safety-related equipment in the SH is elevation 254.8 feet (SH floor elevation of253.5 plus 1.3 feet to Safeguards Buses 17 and 18).The maximum reevaluated flood elevation at the SH of 255.8 feet, as shown inTable 1 of Enclosure 1, is not bounded by the current LIP DBF limiting elevation atthe Screen House of 254.8 feet.2. Probable Maximum Flooding (PMF) in Streams and RiversBased on the PMF calculation for the total contributory drainage area for DeerCreek and Mill Creek, the PMF elevation on streams results from the All-Season 72-hour probable maximum precipitation depth of 30.5 inches. The current designbasis peak flood flow in Deer Creek is 26,000 cubic feet per second (cfs), or abouttwo-thirds of the previous, NRC-calculated, PMF peak flow of 38,700 cfs. The floodreevaluation PMF peak flow in Deer Creek is 28,500 cfs, including adjustments fornon-linearity.

The reevaluated PMF peak flow is lower than the previous, NRCcalculated, PMF due principally to refinements in the methodologies used. Inparticular, the subdivision of the contributory watershed to reflect the separatebranches of Deer Creek (i.e. Deer Creek and Mill Creek) results in differences in thetiming of the peak flows from each basin, reducing the peak flow at Ginna.The reevaluated peak PMF elevations at the safety-related structures, systems andcomponents (SSCs) at Ginna generally range from 258.1 feet to 273.5 feet,corresponding to a PMF peak flow of approximately 28,500 cfs. Based on the re-evaluated peak PMF elevations, the RC, TB, CB including the BRs and AHR, SHand DGBs are not bounded by the current DBF levels. The AB, All-Volatile-Treatment-Building (AVTB), and the SAFWB have increased margin compared tothe current DBF levels. (See Table 2 of Enclosure 1)3. Combined-Effect Flood in Section H.1, Reference (3), from the PMF in Deer Creekwith Critical Wind SpeedWave runup resulting from Deer Creek flooding with the critical wind speed isexpected to influence the flood elevations only at the southern end of the site, withthe waves likely to break against the SAFWB Annex, the Canister Preparation Building and the Contaminated Storage Building, which results in elevated floodlevels at the AB and SAFWB. The maximum wave runup at the southern end of thepower block at Ginna causes a flood elevation along the south wall of the ABranging from 273.5 feet to 275.3 feet (Enclosure 3). This results from the greateststraight line fetch of 870 feet (Figure 2.9-3 in Enclosure 2), an average water depthof 15.7 feet and a 2-year return period wind speed of 73.9 feet/sec.

The maximumreevaluated wind-wave runup elevations at the SAFWB and SAFWB Annex arepeak flood elevations 0.9 feet higher than the Deer Creek PMF flood levels. Peakelevations for the remaining structures are the same as the Deer Creek PMF floodlevels. Thus, based on the re-evaluated peak elevations, the RC, AB, TB, CBincluding the BRs and AHR, SAFWB, SH and DGBs are not bounded by the currentDBF levels. The AVTB has increased margin compared to the current DBF levels.(See Table 3 of Enclosure

1)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 11, 2015Page 84. Combined-Effect Flood in Section H.4.2, Reference (3), Floods along the Shores ofEnclosed Bodies of Water for Lake Ontario (Streamside Locations)

Section H.4.2, Reference (3), presents three alternatives (streamside locations) forflooding along shores of enclosed bodies of water that considers the combined-effects of precipitation-induced

flooding, surge/seiche, and wind-wave runup. Themaximum reevaluated wind-wave runup elevations (Alternative
2) are peak floodelevations 0.1 feet higher than the Deer Creek PMF flood levels at the TB, SH, andDGBs due to contributing flood waters from the 25-year storm surge and associated wave runup. Peak elevations for the remaining structures are the same as the DeerCreek PMF flood levels. Thus, based on the re-evaluated peak elevations, the RC,TB, CB including the BRs and AHR, SH and DGBs are not bounded by the currentDBF levels. The AB, AVTB, and the SAFWB have increased margin compared tothe current DBF levels. (See Table 4 of Enclosure 1)Findings from Enclosure 4 of Reference (1) support this determination as discussed in a.vi.above.d. Interim evaluation and actions taken or planned to address any higher floodinghazards relative to the design basis, prior to completion of the integrated assessment described below, if necessary.

ResponseIntegrated Assessment (IA) Trigger and PlanPer Enclosure 2 of Reference (1), an IA is required for plants where the current DBFs do notbound the reevaluated hazard for all flood causing mechanisms.

Reference (12) presentsfour approaches for performing an IA based on the results of the flood hazard reevaluation.

Scenario 1 -Reevaluated Hazard Bounded by Design BasisScenario 2 -Only Local Intense Precipitation Scenario 3 -All Permanent and Passive Flood Protection Scenario 4 -Integrated Assessment RequiredAn IA is not necessary in Scenario

1. Limited evaluations can be conducted and submitted with the FHRR under Scenarios 2 and 3 that only address specific sections of the Integrated Assessment Interim Staff Guidance (Reference (13)). Licensees in Scenario 4 and thosenot including limited evaluations in the FHRR under Scenarios 2 and 3 are required toperform a full IA.Per "Part c" above, the DBF does not bound the reevaluated hazard for all applicable flood-causing mechanisms and combined-effect floods. Specifically, local intense precipitation, PMF in Streams and Rivers, and combined-effect flood combinations H.1 and H.4.2 werenot bounded by the DBF hazard. Therefore, Ginna plans to prepare a full IA (Scenario 4).Interim Evaluation and Actions Taken or Planned U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 11, 2015Page 9Actions taken and planned to address flooding hazards not bounded by the current DBF forPMF in Streams and Rivers and both combined effect flood combinations H.1 and H.4.2include:* Provided for Aquafence installation in the TB around the BRs and Diesel Generator Rooms to increase flood protection height. Aquafence is a portable barrier systemthat is installed prior to an impending flood at Level 1 flood condition per GMM-23-99-FLOODBARRIER, "Flood Barrier Installation and Removal in Turbine BuildingBasement" (Reference (14)).* Revised ER-SC.2, "High Water (Flood) Plan," (Reference (15)) to shutdown prior toan impending flood (Level 2 flood condition),

and install flood barriers in the ABground level doorways.

  • Purchased dewatering pumps to remove water from structures.

Dewatering pumpsare staged in the AB and inside the Aquafence barriers at Level 1 flood condition perER-SC.2.* A modification to the AB (ECP-14-000900, "Auxiliary Building Block WallReinforcement")

(Reference (16)) will be installed to protect safe-shutdown equipment in the AB from the new flood height.Ginna is not bounded for the reevaluated LIP flood hazard. The maximum reevaluated floodelevation in the SH will cause a loss of 480 Safeguards Busses 17 and 18, which will resultin a loss of the Service Water Pumps. While the reevaluated SH flood elevation is notbounded for LIP, the flood elevation is below the current DBF elevation for PMF in Streamsand Rivers. ER-SC.2 and current procedures for loss of service water (Reference (17)) andloss of Safeguards Busses 17 and 18 (Reference (18)) provide guidance to address thereevaluated LIP flood elevation.

In addition to the above actions taken or planned for the not bounded reevaluated floodhazards, when the mitigation strategies for beyond-design-basis external events have beenimplemented, Ginna can utilize the FLEX strategies to mitigate the reevaluated floodhazards.e. Additional actions beyond Requested Information item 1.d taken or planned toaddress flooding

hazards, if any.Response* None requiredA list of regulatory commitments contained in this letter is provided in Enclosure
4.

4U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 11, 2015Page 10If there are any questions regarding this letter, please contact Thomas Harding Jr. at 585-771-5219.I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on the 11thday of March 2015.Respectfully, Mary G Korsnick

Enclosures:

1. Flood Hazard Reevaluation Tables for Flood-Causing Mechanisms and Combined-Effects Floods Not Bounded by the Reevaluated Hazard2. Constellation Energy Nuclear Group Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report for R. E. GinnaNuclear Power Plant3. Combined Events Flood Analysis for R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant4. Summary of Regulatory Commitments cc: Regional Administrator, Region I, USNRCNRC Project Manager, NRR -R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power PlantNRC Senior Resident Inspector

-R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power PlantDirector, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mr. G. Edward Miller, NRR/DORL/LPL2-1, NRC Enclosure 1Flood Hazard Reevaluation Tables forFlood-Causing Mechanisms and Combined-Effects FloodsNot Bound by the Reevaluated HazardPage 1 of 5 Table 1: Local Intense Precipitation Reevaluation ResultsLIP DBF Reevaluated Maximum Maximum Bounded (B) or NotStructure Levels (ft)* Peak (ft)** Flow Depth Flow Velocity Bounded (NB)(ft) (fps)Reactor Containment N/A 270.9 0.7 0.4 N/AAuxiliary Building N/A 270.7 0.2 0.5 N/ATurbine Building(includes Battery N/A 255.8 1.8 1.5 N/ARooms and Air HandingRoom flood elevations)

Control Building N/A 270.9 0.5 0.6 N/AAll-Volatile-Treatment N/A 270.8 0.1 0.8 N/ABuildingStandby Auxiliary Feedwater Pump N/A 270.2 0.2 0.6 N/ABuildingProposed StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater N/A 270.5 0.6 0.8 N/APump Building AnnexScreen House 254.5 255.8 2.1 0.7 NBDiesel Generator N/A 255.8 2.1 3.0 N/ABuildingNotes:* Only the flood elevation at the Screen House was determined for the current LIP DBF.** LIP Peak Elevations are approximate and vary depending on the exact location.

Elevations wereconservatively rounded up, and peak elevations in the time-series plots are slightly lower that the peakelevations above.IPage 2 of 5 Table 2: PMF in Streams and Rivers Reevaluation ResultsPMF DBF Reevaluated Maximum Maximum Bounded (B) or NotStructureLevels (ft)* Peak (ft) Flow Depth Flow Velocity Bounded (B)(ft) (fps) Bounded (NB)Reactor Containment 272.0 272.4 2.2 1.0 NBAuxiliary Building 272.0 to 273.8 272.6 2.1 2.8 BTurbine Building(includes Battery 256.6 258.1 4.2 3.1 NBRooms and Air HandingRoom flood elevations)

Control Building 272.0 272.4 2.1 2.2 NBAll-Volatile-Treatment 272.0 271.3 0.7 5.3 BBuildingStandby Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 273.0 272.8 2.7 4.0 BBuildingProposed StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater N/A 273.5 3.6 2.8 N/APump Building AnnexScreen House 256.6 258.1 4.4 3.3 NBDiesel Generator 256.6 258.3 4.6 4.3 NBBuildingNotes:* Current design basis flood elevations are approximated from Reference (8).** PMF Peak Elevations are approximate and vary depending on the exact location.

Page 3 of 5 Table 3: Combined-Effects Flood in Section H.1 of Reference (3)PMF DBF Reevaluated Maximum Maximum Bounded (B) or NoteLevels (ft)* Peak (ft)** Flow Depth Flow Velocity Bounded (NB)(ft)*** (fps)****

Reactor Containment 272.0 272.4 2.2 1.0 NBAuxiliary Building 272.0 to 273.8 273.5 to 3.0 2.8 NB275.3Turbine Building(includes Battery 256.6 258.1 4.2 3.1 NBRooms and Air HandingRoom flood elevations)

Control Building 272.0 272.4 2.1 2.2 NBAll-Volatile-Treatment 272.0 271.3 0.7 5.3 BBuildingStandby Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 273.0 273.7***

3.6 4.0 NBBuildingProposed StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater N/A 274.4***

4.5 2.8 N/APump Building AnnexScreen House 256.6 258.1 4.4 3.3 NBDiesel Generator 256.6 258.3 4.6 4.3 NBBuildingNotes:* Current design basis flood elevations are approximated from Reference (8).** Peak Elevations are approximate and vary depending on the exact location.

The maximum reevaluated wind-wave runup elevations at the AB, SAFWB and SAFWB Annex arepeak flood elevations 0.9 feet higher than the Deer Creek PMF flood levels from Table 2. Other valuesare taken directly from Table 2.Values are taken directly from Table 2.Page 4 of 5 Table 4: Combined-Effect Flood in Section H.4.2 of Reference 3)PMF DBF Reevaluated Maximum Maximum Bounded (B) or NotStructure Levels (ft)* Peak (ft)** Flow Depth Flow Velocity Bounded (NB)(ft) (fps)Reactor Containment 272.0 272.4 2.2 1.0 NBAuxiliary Building 272.0 to 273.8 272.6 2.0 2.8 BTurbine Building(includes Battery 256.6 258.2 4.2 3.1 NBRooms and Air HandingRoom flood elevations)

Control Building 272.0 272.4 2.0 2.1 NBAll-Volatile-Treatment 272.0 271.3 0.7 5.3 BBuildingStandby Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 273.0 272.8 2.7 4.0 BBuildingProposed StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater N/A 273.5 3.6 2.8 N/APump Building AnnexScreen House 256.6 258.2 4.5 3.3 NBDiesel Generator 256.6 258.4 4.7 4.4 NBBuildingNotes:* Current design basis flood elevations are approximated from Reference (8).** Peak Elevations are approximate and vary depending on the exact location.

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