ML14189A285

Topical Report 213, 40th Year Reactor Building Tendon Surveillance (Period 10), (Rev 0)

ML14189A285
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	04/30/2014
From:	Grimm M D, Hill H T, Sherrie Taylor, Torborg M Exelon Generation Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML14189A283	List: ML14189A284 ML14189A285 ML14189A286 ML14189A287 TMI-14-061, 40th Year Tendon Surveillance Engineering Report (Topical Report 213), Precision Surveillance Corporation in-Service Inspection Quality Control Procedure, Monitoring Tendon Force (Lift-Offs)
References
TMI-14-061
Download: ML14189A285 (159)

Text

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 1 of 49Topical Report 21340th Year Reactor Building Tendon Surveillance (Period 10)(Rev 0)Responsible Engineer DateýA;ReviewerDesign Verification Required?Section ManagerDoteEJYes DgNoDate4W-#

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 2 of 49Table of Contents1. PURPOSE AND INTRODUCTION p42. SUMMARY OF WORK PERFORMED AND INSPECTION RESULTS p62.1. Work Performed p62.1.1. Sample Selection p62.1.2. Post-Tensioning System Testing and Examination p72.1.3. Containment Surface Examination p82.2. Inspection Results p92.2.1. Post-Tensioning System p92.2.2. Containment Surface p113. POST-TENSIONING SYSTEM TESTS AND EXAMINATION p123.1. Examination Sample Selection p123.2. Tendon Forces p143.2.1. Individual Tendon Forces p143.2.2. Group Mean Forces p173.2.3. Projected Group Mean Forces p183.2.4. Control Tendon Force Trends p273.3. Tendon Elongations and Re-Tensioning p293.3.1. Elongations p303.3.2. Re-Tensioning p313.4. End Anchorage Condition p323.4.1. Corrosion p323.4.2. Physical Damage p333.4.3. Missing Button Heads p333.4.4. Unseated Button Heads p343.4.5. Free Water p343.4.6. Concrete Within Two Feet of Bearing Plate p343.4.7. Shim Gaps p35 Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 3 of 493.5. Specimen Wire Test Results p363.6. Corrosion Protection Medium Test Results p373.7. Corrosion Protection Medium Removal / Replacement p393.8. Tendon End Anchorage Cover Examination p413.9. Topical Report No. 203 Examination and Test Commitments p424. CONTAINMENT SURFACE EXAMINATIONS4.1. Overall Concrete Surface Condition4.2. Topical Report No. 203 Follow-up Examinationsp43p43p435. REPAIRS AND FOLLOW-UP EXAMINATIONS p455.1. Repairs p455.2. Follow-Up Examinations During 45th Year Surveillance (Period 11)p456. CONCLUSIONS p467. REFERENCESp48ATTACHMENT 1: Engineering Technical Evaluations and Issue ReportsATTACHMENT 2: Final Report for the Three Mile Island Unit 1 40th YearContainment Building Tendon SurveillanceATTACHMENT 3: Exelon Approval of PSC Procedures and Personnel Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 4 of 491. PURPOSE AND INTRODUCTIONThis topical report documents the performance and results of the 40th Year(Period 10) Reactor Building In-Service Inspection. The Reactor Building in-service inspection (ISI), referred to herein as surveillance, is performed at 5 yearintervals to demonstrate the continued structural integrity of the reactor building.The 40th year Surveillance was conducted on site from September to December2013, with lab tests being performed during January and February of 2014 andthe final visual examinations on April 15, 2014. The surveillance, in its entirety,was performed in the examination window between March 2013 and March2015, time window defined by the earliest start and latest finish dates specified inthe governing code, ASME Section Xl, Subsection IWL, as cited in USNRCRegulation 10CFR50.55a.This topical report also serves as the Engineering Evaluation Report required by10CFR50.55a and the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Sub-Section IWL, Article IWL-3310. The ISI Summary Report, consisting of the NIS-1and NIS-2 forms, identified in Subsection IWA-6000 and required by10CFR50.55a, are separate documents.The 40th year surveillance includes, for the first time, two distinct sets of randomlyselected tendons. One set is selected from the population of tendons not de-tensioned during the 2009 steam generator replacement (SGR) outage. Theother set, identified as SGR tendons, is selected from the population of tendonsde-tensioned and re-tensioned (or replaced) during that outage. The selection oftendons for the SGR set follows Subsection IWL requirements and the additionalrequirements, imposed by TMI procedures.The random sample of tendons drawn for this surveillance includes hoop tendonsinitially tensioned from a single-end during construction. As this is the first timesince the second inspection period, special considerations were made asdiscussed later in this report.The Surveillance, performed per Technical Specification 4.4.2.1, conforms to therequirements of Subsection IWL of Section Xl of the ASME Boiler and PressureVessel Code, as incorporated by reference into 10CFR50.55a. The Surveillancemeets the requirements as described in the Updated Final Safety AnalysisReport (UFSAR) and is performed in accordance with TMI-1 SurveillanceProcedure 1301-9.1, in addition to Exelon Corporate Procedures ER-AA-330-005, ER-AA-330-006, ER-AA-335-001, and ER-AA-335-019. The actualimplementation of the surveillance is conducted using approved vendorprocedures.The Surveillance is comprised of the measurements, examinations, tests andrelated activities identified in Section 2. Surveillance activities also includedreplacement of one hoop tendon end cap gasket to eliminate a corrosionprotection medium leak.Measurements, examinations and tests on randomly selected tendons areperformed on a regular basis (5 year frequency as required be Subsection IWL)

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 5 of 49throughout the life of the plant. Complete examination of the containmentexterior as specified in Sub-Section IWL, examination of tendon end anchoragecaps and tendon force trend extrapolation commenced with the Period 7surveillance (performed in 2000) in accordance with requirements introduced in a1996 amendment to 10CFR50.55a. The Period 10 surveillance is the fifth to beconducted per 10CFR50.55a and Sub-Section IWL. The Period 7, Period 8,Period 9 and 2010 Augmented Surveillances are documented in topical ReportsNo. 136, 183, 203 and 204, respectively. The 2010 augmented surveillanceaddressed a small sample of the tendons affected (de-tensioned / re-tensionedor replaced) by steam generator replacement activities.The remainder of this topical report is divided into the following sections:Section 2, Summary of Work Performed and Inspection Results, is a synopsis ofSurveillance activities and findings.Section 3, Post-Tensioning System Examinations and Tests, describesmeasurements, tests, and examinations performed on post-tensioning systemcomponents (except bearing plate and end cap examinations performed as apart of the overall containment exterior examination), tabulates results, providesa detailed development of tendon force trend extrapolation and includesevaluations of conditions that do not meet acceptance criteria. Post-tensioningsystem follow-up examinations and tests as defined in topical Report 203 arealso covered in this section.Section 4, Containment Surface Examinations, describes the examinationprocess, discusses examination findings and includes evaluations of conditionsthat do not meet acceptance criteria. Containment surface follow-upexaminations as defined in Topical Report 203 are also covered in this section.Section 5, Repairs and Follow-Up Examinations, is a summary list of requiredrepair work and damage / deteriorated area re-examinations to be performedduring the 45th year surveillance.Section 6, Conclusions, summarizes overall conclusions regarding containmentintegrity as demonstrated by the Surveillance.Section 7, References, identifies the documents that govern the performance ofthe Surveillance and are cited in this report.Attachment 1, Engineering Technical Evaluations and Issue Reports, includesthe issue reports written for conditions found during Surveillance activities andtheir evaluations.Attachment 2, Final Report for the Three Mile Island Unit 1 40th YearContainment Building Tendon Surveillance, is the Vendor Surveillance Reportcomplete with data sheets and applicable procedures.Attachment 3, Exelon Approval of PSC Procedures and Personnel, provides thedesignation of the Responsible Engineer, approval of the PSC Surveillanceprocedure, and approval of the PSC quality control personnel.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 6 of 492. SUMMARY OF WORK PERFORMED AND INSPECTION RESULTSThe work performed during the 40th year surveillance and the results of theseexaminations and tests are summarized in 2.1 and 2.2 below.2.1 Work PerformedThe 40th year surveillance consisted of testing and visual examination of arandomly selected sample of post-tensioned tendons and a visual examination ofthe accessible containment exterior.2.1.1 Sample SelectionSub-Section IWL requires that tendons impacted by repair / replacementactivities be treated as a separate population for sampling and examinationpurposes. This population includes those tendons (subsequently identified-asSGR tendons) that were de-tensioned / re-tensioned or replaced in 2009 toaccommodate the access opening for installation of new steam generators.SGR tendons are sampled and examined as required by Subsection IWL-2521.2and Table IWL-2521-2. The remaining tendons are sampled and examined inaccordance with Subsection IWL-2520.The SGR tendons are H46-28 through H46-42 inclusive, H51-28 through H51-42inclusive and V113 through V1 57 inclusive for a total of 30 hoops and 45verticals. Table IWL-2521-2 specifies that at least 4% of each type, hoop orvertical, be examined during the first two inspections following the repair /replacement work. The 40t year ISI was the 2nd inspection, the first being theaugmented inspection in 2010. Consequently, 2 vertical and 2 hoop SGRtendons were selected for examination during this ISI. The SGR tendons consistof both de-tensioned/re-tensioned and replacement tendons, and as goodpractice one tendon from each of these populations was included in both thevertical and horizontal group selection.The non-SGR tendon group sample size is, as specified in Table IWL-2521-1,the lesser of 5 tendons or 2% of the non-SGR population but at least 3 tendons,with one tendon in each group being the previously designated control tendonand the remainder randomly selected. The 40th year Surveillance includedadditional tendons identified for follow-up examination during previoussurveillance reports.The following table lists, for each group, the total number of tendons, the numberof SGR tendons, the number of non-SGR tendons and the correspondingminimum required sample sizes.0 Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 7 of 49Table I -1: Number of Tendons and Sampling Requirements:Group Vertical Hoop DomeNumber of Tendons in Group 166 330 147Number of SGR Tendons 45 30 0Number of Non-SGR Tendons 121 300 147SGR Tendon Sample Size 2 2 0Non-SGR Tendon Sample Size 3 5 31Discussion of the specific tendon selection is covered in Section 3.One tendon in each non-SGR group and one in each of the SGR groups wererandomly selected from among the non-control tendons for de-tensioning andremoval of a wire for tensile testing. As a good practice, one of the SGR tendonsselected for wire removal was from the new tendon population and the other fromde-tensioned/re-tensioned population.In addition to the sample tendons discussed above, the following tendon endanchorages were designated for limited examination (reasons noted)." V-84: The tendon gallery end anchorage was examined for bearing platecorrosion in accordance with the Topical Report 203 (Reference 28)follow-up actions. As the end cap had to be removed for this activity, acomplete visual examination of anchorage components was done andcorrosion protection medium (CPM) samples were taken and tested." H42-47: The Buttress 2 end cap gasket was replaced. Examinationactivities were limited to observations for free water and to ensurecomplete CPM coverage of anchorage components prior to cap re-installation.2.1.2 Post-Tensioning System Examinations and TestsExaminations and tests consisted of the following activities, with exceptions asnoted. These were performed in accordance with TMI Surveillance Procedure1301-9.1, in addition to Exelon Corporate Procedures ER-AA-330-005, ER-AA-330-006, ER-AA-335-001 and ER-AA-335-019, which incorporate the applicablerequirements of the 2004 Edition (no Addenda) of the ASME Boiler and PressureVessel Code, Section Xl, Subsection IWL and the additional requirementsspecified in 1OCFR50.55a(b)(2)(viii). The surveillance procedures alsoincorporate applicable requirements from the UFSAR. The actualimplementation of surveillance activities is conducted in accordance with theapproved vendor procedures.1 Four (4) dome tendons were selected for examination during the 40th Year Surveillance Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 8 of 49" Collection of corrosion protection medium (CPM) samples from both endsof each tendon (samples are not taken if an end cap is removed solely forthe purpose of gasket repair) and laboratory tests conducted to determinewater content, concentration or corrosive ions (chlorides, nitrates, andsulfides), and reserve alkalinity (base number). Further tests areconducted for the acid number where the base number is determined tobe below the reporting threshold of 0.50." Visual examination of end anchorage hardware (button heads, anchorheads, shims and bearing plates) and concrete within 2 feet of the bearingplate edge.* Measurements of end anchorage force using the Lift-Off proceduredescribed in Surveillance Procedure 1301-9.1." De-tensioning of one tendon in each non-SGR group (vertical, hoop anddome) and each SGR group (vertical and hoop only), extraction of a testwire for visual examination and performance of tensile tests on specimenscut from the removed test wire.* Re-tensioning of the de-tensioned tendons with measurement ofelongations at several loads (Pre-Tension Force (PTF), 1/3 OverstressForce (OSF), 2/3 OSF, and OSF).* Refilling of tendon ducts and end caps with CPM (the quantities of CPMremoved and replaced are measured and documented).Additionally, all tendon end anchorage covers (End Caps) were examined fordamage and CPM leakage in accordance with the requirements of ASMESection Xl, Article IWL-2510(c).2.1.3 Containment Surface ExaminationThe entire accessible exterior surface of the containment was visually examinedin accordance with ASME Section Xl, Subsection IWL-2510 using a GeneralVisual (defined by TMI procedure as a VT-3C) technique. This examination wasperformed directly (without optical aids) and remotely using binoculars. Thetendon anchorage end caps and bearing plates were examined at the same time.The specific conduct of this inspection is governed by ER-AA-330-005, ER-AA-335-019, and the approved vendor procedures.The concrete was examined for evidence of cracking, spalling, efflorescence andother types of damage / deterioration as identified in ACI 201.1 R (Reference 1).This examination was also focused, as specified in IWL-2510(c), on CPMseepage through the concrete.The Bearing plates were examined for detached or missing coatings andcorrosion.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 9 of 49Areas with possible damage or degradation as identified during general visualexamination were re-examined using a Detailed Visual (defined by TMIprocedure as a VT-IC) technique in accordance with IWL-2310(b).Topical Report No. 203, Section 5.3, specifies the detailed visual examinationson concrete surfaces to be performed as follow-up examinations during the 40thYear Surveillance. The specific examinations are as follows:" The grout overlay of previously exposed reinforcing steel on the vertical faceof the ring girder sector in the southeast quadrant." The tendon gallery ceiling area including base mat concrete, tendon bearingplates, and tendon end caps for evidence of CPM leakage, effects of groundwater seepage on concrete and steel items, deterioration of previouslydocumented exposed reinforcing, and other damage or deterioration.* The lower wall, above the base mat, for evidence of increased CPM leakagethrough the vertical cracks.2.2 Inspection Results SummaryThe results of the 40th Year (Period 10) Reactor Building Surveillance aresummarized below.2.2.1 Post-Tensioning SystemThe results of the post-tensioning system examinations, measurements and testsmet all prescriptive acceptance criteria except as noted below. The results aresummarized as follows:" All tendon forces were above 95% of predicted value. Hoop tendon H13-03 was lift-off tested from only one buttress. This test is valid as thetendon was originally single-end stressed from the tested buttress.* The vertical, hoop, and dome tendon normalized group mean forces wereabove the minimum required values. As the SGR tendon forces aresignificantly greater than those documented for the other sample tendons,these are, for conservatism, not included in the vertical and hoop tendongroup means." The 95% lower confidence limits on vertical, hoop and dome tendon forcetrends projected through the latest date for the completion of the 45th yearSurveillance are above the minimum required forces." Elongations measured during the re-tensioning of de-tensioned tendonswere within 10% of the "as-installed" construction values.* End anchorage hardware items were free of active corrosion, cracking,and distortion. Some tendons; i.e. V84, V115 and V1 36 tendon gallerybearing plates, exhibited minor rust which does not show evidence ofprogression (not active). A number of tendon gallery bearing plates arefrequently wetted by ground water seepage between the gallery walls and Topical Report No. 213.Revision 0Page 10 of 49the Reactor Building base mat. This has caused minor corrosion. Thereis no significant loss of metal, and at the present time, no need to takeremedial action other than re-examination during the 45th yearsurveillance." As-found button head conditions were, with 3 exceptions, as documentedduring construction. Two button heads at the Buttress 4 end of H24-15were found unseated and one buttonhead was found missing at thegallery end of SGR tendon V-1 36 (all buttonheads were intact at the topend). These conditions were deemed to have no structural significanceand were accepted by evaluation.* The tensile strength and elongation (at failure) of all wire test samples wasabove the minimum required values.* Water content, corrosive ion (chlorides, nitrates, and sulfides)concentration, and reserve alkalinity (base number) of all corrosionprotection medium samples met acceptance criteria, except as notedbelow.o 9 CPM samples had base numbers less than the 0.50 reportingthreshold and required further tests for their acid number.o 3 of the 10 acid number tests resulted in acid numbers in excess ofthe acceptance limit of 1. These 3 samples were accepted byevaluation.* No free water was found at tendon anchorages. 5" Concrete adjacent to the tendon end anchorages was free of cracks over0.01 inches wide.* The differences between the quantities of corrosion protection mediumremoved from sample tendons and the quantities replaced were, with 3exceptions, within 10% of net duct volume. The 3 exceptions, involving"as-found" under-fill of the dome tendon ducts, were accepted byevaluation." All tendon end anchorage covers (end caps) were free of damage and,with one exception, free of corrosion. The single exception consisted oflight, dry rust covering part of a dome tendon end cap. CPM wasobserved to be leaking from 6 dome and 3 hoop end caps. All leakagenoted was minor (estimated quantities lost on the order of 0.1 liter or less)and was deemed to require no corrective action at the present time.* Several shim pairs were found to have gaps in excess of the specifiedmaximum, and the gaps were restored to an acceptable condition oraccepted by evaluation. Technical evaluations showed that the "as-found"reduced bearing area was sufficient to carry the maximum expectedtendon load, with a bearing stress below the material allowable. Theseevaluations concluded that no further examination is required at this time.0 Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 11 of 492.2.2 Containment SurfaceThe Reactor Building concrete surfaces and tendon anchorage bearing plateswere generally free of damage and deterioration. Minor corrosion was noted onthe V84, V115, and V1 36 bearing plates in the tendon gallery, a result of groundwater seepage between the gallery outer wall and the Reactor Building base mat.As the loss of metal is not significant, remedial action, other than re-examinationduring the 45th year surveillance, is not considered necessary at this time.Minor seepage of corrosion protection medium (CPM) through vertical cracks inthe lower wall was found to be continuing at a nominal rate unchanged from thatobserved during the 35th year surveillance. This is expected since most of theCPM in the TMI tendon ducts is of an older formulation that liquefies at relativelylow temperatures. Most of the seepage was noted in the area below theequipment access hatch. Ducts in this area curve around the opening, and arethusly flexible and not fabricated for leak tightness. The seepage, which has nostructural significance, is monitored and corrective actions will be taken to top offthe vertical tendon CPM levels when seepage rates warrant.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 12 of 493. POST-TENSIONING SYSTEM TESTS AND EXAMINATIONSThe following tests and examinations were performed to assess the continuingquality and integrity of the post-tensioning system.* Measurement of tendon end anchorage forces.* Measurement of tendon elongations during re-tensioning.* Measurement of wire test specimen strength and elongation at failure.* Chemical analysis to determine corrosion protection medium testspecimen water content, reserve alkalinity (base number), andconcentration of corrosive ions (chlorides, nitrates, and sulfides)." Visual examination of the post-tensioning system components, as well asthe concrete adjacent to the bearing plates, to detect accumulation of freewater, corrosion, deformation, cracking, wire breakage, shim gaps, andwire button head failures." Visual examination of the tendon end anchorage covers (end caps) todetect damage and corrosion protection medium leakage.All but the last of the above tests and examinations involved a small sample ofthe total tendon population as covered in Section 2. In accordance with ASMESection XI, Subsection IWL, Article IWL-251 0, 100% of the end caps wereexamined.3.1 Examination Sample SelectionFive sample sets were selected for examination, from two tendon populations.The larger population included tendons that were not de-tensioned during the2009 steam generator replacement (SGR) outage and met the sample sizerequirements of Table IWL-2521.1. The smaller population included the tendonsaffected by the SGR and conformed to the size requirements of Table IWL-2521-2.Tendons, except control tendons, initially selected for tests and examinationswere randomly picked from populations (non-SGR and SGR) that included alltendons not examined during a prior surveillance. Control tendons (the SGRpopulation does not include control tendons) are common to consecutivesurveillances. The non-SGR population consists of three sample sets; vertical,hoop, and dome tendons. For the 40th Year Surveillance; 3 vertical, 5 hoop and4 dome tendons were selected. The SGR population consists of two sample sets;vertical and hoop tendons. For the 40th Year Surveillance; two vertical and twohoop tendons were selected. As a good practice both the SGR sample setsincluded one de-tensioned/re-tensioned and one new tendon.The following tendons, which are listed in TMI Surveillance Procedure 1301-9.1,Attachment 2, were included in the initially selected samples. Control tendonsand new SGR tendons are identified by the notations '(control)' or '(new)'following the tendon number.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 13 of 49* Non-SGR Tendonso Verticals: V-32 (control tendon), V-108, V-159 (wire)o Hoops: H13-03 (wire), H13-08, H24-15, H35-02, H62-26 (controltendon)o Domes: D-143, D-225 (control tendon), D-237 (wire), D-303* SGR Tendons" Verticals: V-115, V-136 (new, wire)o Hoops: H46-34 (new), H51-40 (wire)One tendon in each non-SGR group and one in each of the SGR groups wasrandomly selected from among the non-control tendons for de-tensioning andremoval of a wire for tensile testing. These are identified above by the notation'(wire)' following the tendon number. As a good practice, one of the SGRtendons selected for wire removal is new and the other is de-tensioned/re-tensioned.Of the non-SGR tendons listed above, two hoops and one dome weredetermined to be inaccessible at one end. Each was replaced in the sample bythe nearest undisturbed (i.e., not yet subjected to lift-off), fully accessible tendon.The replaced tendon was examined to the extent practical as specified in SectionXl, Subsection IWL-2521.1. The basis for declaring the tendon inaccessible anddesignating a replacement tendon is as follows:* H13-08: Access to the Buttress 3 end of this tendon is partially obstructedby the Reactor Building Flood Seal. The flood seal is not removable. TheButtress 3 end of H13-07 falls within the concrete cut-out in the floor anddoes not allow access of a stressing ram. The flood barrier, which waslocated directly below the Buttress 3 anchorage of H13-09, preventedinstallation of a ram at this location. The nearest undisturbed and fullyaccessible tendon is H13-10, and was designated as the replacementtendon for H 13-08." H24-15: Access to the Buttress 4 end of H24-15 was restricted by safetyrelated conduit and piping in the immediate area. Two additionalconsiderations were that the transport of the stressing ram to the tendonbuttress was impaired by safety related motor control centers (MCC), andthat the dose rates in the area were high when the safety relatedequipment was not required to function due to fuel movements. Due tothe high dose rates and concern for repositioning/damaging safety relatedcomponents, it was determined that the Buttress 4 end of H24-15 and theadjacent anchorages in the seal injection room were inaccessible for raminstallation. The first tendon adjacent to H24-15 outside of the sealinjection room was H24-18. This tendon was determined to beinaccessible on the Buttress 4 end due to interferences with the AuxiliaryBuilding roof. Tendon H24-19, H24-20, and H24-21 were all tested during Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 14 of 49previous surveillances. The closest undisturbed replacement tendon forH24-15 was determined to be H24-22.D-143: During surveillance activities it was determined that stressing ramaccess to one end of tendon D-143 was obstructed by a permanentlymounted seismic monitor. The nearest undisturbed and fully accessibletendon was found to be D-146, which was designated as the replacementtendon. D-145 and D-141 were tested in previous surveillances, and D-142 and D-144 had the same interference as D-143.In addition to the above, the following tendons were designated for examinationor corrective action at the end anchorages." V-84: The tendon gallery end anchorage was examined for bearing platecorrosion in accordance with a Topical Report 203 (Reference 28) follow-up action. As the end cap had to be removed for this activity, a completevisual examination of the anchorage components was performed andcorrosion protection medium (CPM) samples were taken and tested.* H42-47: The Buttress 2 end cap gasket was replaced to eliminate CPMleakage. Examination activities were limited to ensuring complete CPMcoverage of anchorage components prior to end cap re-installation.3.2 Tendon ForcesTendon end anchorage forces were measured using the lift-off techniquedescribed in Surveillance Procedure 1301-9.1. The actual performance of lift-offswas conducted in accordance with the approved vendor procedures. Forceswere measured at both ends of hoop (except as noted) and dome tendons and atthe top end of vertical tendons.Acceptance criteria cover individual tendon forces, and for the non-SGR tendons,group mean forces and projected group mean force trends. The SGR tendonswere recently tensioned to a nominal 70% of the Guaranteed Ultimate TensileStrength (GUTS) lock-off force and have current lift-off forces well above those ofthe non-SGR tendons. Therefore the SGR tendon lift-off forces are excludedfrom group mean forces and the group mean force trends. Individual tendonforces, group mean forces, group mean force trends, and the associatedacceptance criteria are discussed in the following sections.3.2.1 Individual Tendon ForcesTable 3-1 lists the measured end anchorage forces, average tendon forces,predicted forces, and the lower acceptance limits (there is no stated upperacceptance limit) for non-SGR tendon population. Table 3-2 lists this informationfor the SGR tendon population. The lower acceptance limit is equal to 95% ofthe tendon's predicted force. Predicted forces are documented in Calculation C-1101-153-E410-046.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 15 of 49Measured End Anchorage and Predicted Forces for Non-SGRTendonsTable 3 -1:Tendon "d .. Meisuired Mean End Predicted" 95% of PredictedForce, kip ,. orce, KiFo p ,Force, kip Force, kiprc -kip Force, k ,..V32 Top 1,181 1,181 1,176 1,117V108 Top 1,225 1,225 1,155 1,097V159 Top 1,154 1,154 1,149 1,092B-1 1,230H13-03 /A2 N/A 1,141 1,084B-3 N/AB-1 1,140H 13-10 1,150 1,097 1,042B-3 1,161B-2 1,143H24-15 B-2 j_1,143 _ N/A 1,073 1,019B-4 N/A3B-2 1,136H24-22 1,161 1,137 1,080B-4 1,186B-3 1,216H35-02 1,216 1,093 1,038B-5 1,216B-6 1,117H62-26 1,126 1,099 1,044B-2 1,136S 1,219D143 N/A 1,153 1,095E N/A4S 1,173D146 1,184 1,110 1,055E 1,195W 1,099D225 1,106 1,061 1,008E 1,114W 1,191D237 1,167 1,088 1,034SE 1,144N 1,181D303 1,200 1,142 1,085SE 1,2192 Lift-off force at the B-3 end of H31-03 not measured.3 B-4 end of H24-15 not accessible for lift-off measurement.4 East end of D143 not accessible for lift-off measurement.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 16 of 49Table 3 -2: Measured End Anchorage and Predicted Forces for SGR TendonsTendon E.. nd Measured Mean End Predicted 95%:of PredictedTeo Ed Force, kip Force, kip Force; kip' Forcekip.V115 Top 1,378 1,378 1,306 1,241V136 Top 1,335 1,335 1,311 1,245B-4 1,457H46-34 1,397 1,232 1,170B-6 1,338B-5 1,286H51-40 -_1,341 1,198 1,138B-I 1,396Hoop and dome tendon forces are, with three exceptions (H13-03, H24-15,D143) computed as the average of both end anchorage lift-off measurements.Vertical tendon forces are documented as the force measured at the top end; thegallery end force is not measured.Sample tendon H13-03 is one of 14 hoop tendons that were originally tensionedfrom a single-end during construction. Due to a miscommunication during thesurveillance, H13-03 was de-tensioned from the Buttress 1 end prior toperformance of a lift-off on the Buttress 3 end. Therefore, the force in this tendonis reported as two values. One is the lift-off force measured at Buttress 1. Theother is the mean force determined using the "as-found" shim stack heights andre-tensioning (this tendon was de-tensioned for wire removal) elongations. Themean force calculation is documented in Technical Evaluation 1645620, includedin Attachment 1.The H13-03 predicted forces are based on the initial lock-off force documentedfor the Buttress 1 end in construction records. Therefore, the single endanchorage force measured at Buttress 1 is used in the assessment of currentforce against predicted value as shown in Table 3-1. The current and projectedgroup means are based on the mean force computed using shim stack heightand re-tensioning elongations. The Technical Evaluation compares thecomputed average pre-stress force to a modified version of the predicted force todemonstrate the average force is within expected limits.As previously discussed, hoop tendon H24-15 was determined to be inaccessiblefor lift-off at the Buttress 4 end, and was replaced by an alternate tendon H24-22.H24-15 was single-end tensioned during construction from the Buttress 2 end; itwas determined to be in keeping with the intent of ASME Section Xl SubsectionIWL to measure the anchorage force at Buttress 2. This lift-off value is forinformation only, and provides assurance that the tendon's pre-stressing force isnot degraded.As shown in Tables 3-1 and 3-2, all tendon forces (including that listed for theButtress 2 end of H24-15) exceed predicted values and are well above the loweracceptance limit (95% of predicted value). H13-03 meets the acceptance criteria Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 17 of 49as discussed above. This demonstrates that the predictions for individual tendonforces are based on a conservatively high estimate of overall time dependentlosses resulting from the combined effects of concrete creep, concrete shrinkage,and tendon wire stress relaxation.3.2.2 Group Mean ForcesAs previously discussed, SGR tendon forces are well above those in theremaining tendons, and are thusly not included in the vertical and hoop tendongroup mean forces.The mean force in each group of tendons must be equal to or greater than theminimum required force for the group as stated in section 9.3.1 of SurveillanceProcedure 1301-9.1. The minimum required force values are:* Vertical Tendons: 1,033 kip* Hoop Tendons: 1,108 kip* Dome Tendons: 1,064 kipDuring construction of the containment, individual tendons were tensioned toanchorage forces between 70% and 74% of GUTS. Differences in initial seatingforce are expected to be reflected in the lift-off force measured throughout the lifeof the structure.Also, as tendons were tensioned in sequence, force in any tendon falls (elasticshortening loss) during the subsequent tensioning of tendons in the same group.Surveillance samples are quite small, nominally 2% of the tendons in each group.For this reason, there is a relatively high probability that the samples will consistof tendons initially tensioned to the high end or the low end of the acceptancerange and / or tendons tensioned close to the beginning of the sequence or endof the sequence. Consequently, the sample mean force calculated usingmeasured end anchorage forces has a high probability of deviating significantlyfrom the true group mean.Therefore, measured forces are adjusted (normalized) to account for initialtensioning force and stressing sequence. Calculation C-1101-153-E410-046describes the normalization procedure and lists the adjustments for all TMItendons.Table 3-4 lists average tendon forces, adjustments, normalized forces, and thegroup mean normalized forces. The individual tendon forces, other than that forH13-03 are those shown in Table 3-1. The 1,076 kip force listed for H13-03 isthe mean value computed in previously cited Technical Evaluation 1645620. Asnoted above, group mean value computations exclude SGR tendon forces whichare, as shown in Table 3-1, all significantly above those listed for non-SGRtendons. Also, the group means exclude the H24-15 and D143 single-end lift-offs, which were measured and reported in Table 3-1 for information only. All Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 18 of 49group mean normalized forces are above the minimum required values assummarized in Table 3-3.Table 3 -3: Group Mean vs. Minimum Mean ForceGroup MeaIn Normalized Force (kips) Minimum Required Mean (kips)Vertical 1,195 1,033Hoop 1,133 1,108Dome 1,170 1,064Table 3 -4: Normalized Tendon and Group Mean ForcesTendon Measured force, kip Adjustment, kip Normalized force, kipV32 1,181 -7 1,174V1 08 1,225 14 1,239V159 1,154 20 1,174Vertical Group -Mean Normalized Force 1,195Tendon Measured force, kip Adjustment, kip Normalized force, kip-.H 13-03 -40 1,036H13-10 1,150 4 1,154H24-22 1,161 -37 1,124H35-02 1,216 8 1,224H62-26 1,126 2 1,128Hoop Group -Mean Normalized Force 1,133Tendon Measured force, kip, .Adjustment, kip Normalized force, kipD146 1,184 -4 1,180D225 1,106 45 1,151D237 1,167 19 1,186D303 1,200 -35 1,165Dome Group -Mean Normalized Force 1,1703.2.3 Projected Group Mean ForcesASME Section Xl, Subsection IWL-3221.1(c) requires projecting the trends oftendon forces to determine whether or not group means are expected to remain5 Computed mean as discussed in Section 3.1 Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 19 of 49above the minimum required values until the time of the next scheduledsurveillance.Topical Report No. 136, which documents the results of the 25th yearsurveillance, develops the procedure used to extrapolate tendon force trends. Asexplained in that report, the projection uses the tendon force data acquiredduring the 10th year and later surveillances. It does not use data from the 1st, 3rd,and 5 year surveillances for two reasons. First, the trends of the forcesmeasured during those early surveillances appear to differ significantly from thetrends established by the data recorded during the later surveillances. Second,the later (10th year forward) surveillances are more completely documented,which ensures that the correct force values are used in trend development.As discussed in Topical Report No. 136, the force data for all three groups exhibita considerable degree of scatter. As a result, fitted lines or curves do notnecessarily provide meaningful representations of force trends. Therefore, theforecasted forces are not determined as the ordinates of the regression curves,but are reported as the 95% lower confidence levels computed using thepostulated log-linear relationship between force and time. The basis for usingthe confidence level approach is extensively discussed in the cited topical report.Figures 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3 are log-linear plots for the vertical, hoop, and domegroup tendon forces measured from the 10th year through the latest surveillance.The data scatter, which is typical, is evident in these plots. The plots include log-linear trend lines for reference; however, the magnitude of the scatter is such thatthese fitted trends cannot necessarily be considered meaningful (note that thehoop tendon trend, Fig 3-2, shows force increasing with time). The LowerConfidence Limit (LCL) values are also displayed on the plots.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 20 of 49Table 3 -5: Summary of Vertical Tendon ForcesSurveillance YearI Sincet SIT, Years- Tendon' Force, kipoV14 1,243V30 1,19310 11.2 V32 1,196V84 1,189V160 1,192V19 1,187V21 1,196V22 1,17115 15.6 V23 1,175V50 1,213V83 1,196V85 1,179V32 1,21020 20.6 V78 1,306V126 1,209V32 1,19325 25.5 V40 1,202V114 1,189V164 1,181V32 1,190V53 1,222V66 1,178V137 1,218V140 1,144V141 1,207V11 1,206V32 1,175V90 1,200V132 1,206V32 1,18140 39.6 V108 1,225V159 1,154 Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 21 of 4913501.3001 250-X1 200 -U-.1 1500U.1 1001 0501 002025 30 35Ln (T, Years Since SIT)Figure 3 -1: Vertical Tendon Force ProjectionTable 3 -6: Summary of Hoop Tendon Forces4045Surveillance Year Time Since SIT, Years Tendon Force, kipH13-35 1,191H 13-36 1,066H13-37 1,18210 11.2 H24-26 1,173H35-26 1,156H62-26 1,145H62-30 1,152H24-29 1,072H24-30 1,139H24-31 1,11415 15.6 H24-51 1,142H46-34 1,177H62-13 1,088H62-26 1,128 Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 22 of 49SuriVeillance Year Time Since Years Tendon H24-40 1,132H35-23 1,20020 20.6 H35-47 1,192H62-26 1,161H62-49 1,163H13-50 1,159H35-33 1,16925 25.5 H46-37 1,129H51-43 1,170H62-26 1,136H13-11 1,218H35-49 1,20130 30.6 H46-25 1,121H62-18 1,105H62-26 1,120H13-41 1,151H24-33 1,12335 35.6 H46-50 1,131H51-49 1,154H62-26 1,141H13-03 1,076H13-10 1,15040 39.6 H24-22 1,161H35-02 1,216H62-26 1,126 Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 23 of 4911.2501 200_l 150U.tLA1 1001 050204025 30 35Ln (T, Years Since SIT)Figure 3 -2: Hoop Tendon Force PredictionTable 3 -7: Summary of Dome Tendon ForcesSurveillance Year Time Since SIT, Years Tendon Force, kipD133 1,10710 11.2 D225 1,125D314 1,290D145 1,22015 15.6D347 1,183D141 1,16420 20.6 D225 1,120D248 1,202D102 1,28025 25.5 D225 1,104D313 1,120D213 1,09430 30.6 D225 1,120D230 1,149 Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 24 of 49D122 1,119D225 1,08835 35.6D322 1,135D342 1,150D146 1,184D225 1,10640 39.6____D237 1,167D303 1,1651 .3501 3001 2501,2001,1500UL1,1001 0501 00020 2.5 30 35 40Ln (T, Years Since SIT)Figure 3 -3: Dome Tendon Force Prediction4.5S Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 25 of 49The tendon forces listed in Tables 3-5, 3-6 and 3-7 (and plotted in Figures 3-1through 3-3) are used to compute 95% lower confidence limits projected throughMarch 2020 (46 years after the SIT and the latest date for the completion ofSurveillance 11). These limits, also plotted in Figures 3-1, 3-2 and 3-3, were6computed using the following procedures.LCL(X)= (a0+b) (X-tO.05,2) (Se) 1+ "[X-X ]2)Where, with all summations from 1 to n:1. LCL(X) is the lower confidence limit on Y at an abscissa value of X.2. a is the intercept of the least squares fit trend linea=(Ym-b)XmnXM= xiXm=-n3. Xi and Yi are data sets where:Xi = In(ti) and Yi = tendon force (kips)4. b is the slope of the least squares fit trend lineb =SX-,5. to.05, n-2 is the t statistic for a 95% confidence level and (n-2) degrees offreedom6. Se is the standard error of the estimateSe = [tsn(ng- 2)Sx]6 The procedure shown is that developed in Reference 15. The 95% LCL's onthe projected means for the three groups are above the minimum requiredvalues, which provides a significant degree of confidence that actual mean forceswill be above minimum required levels in March 2020 (T = 46 years), the latestdate for completion of the 45th Year Surveillance.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 26 of 497. n is the number of data sets used in the LCL CalculationSy n~X I (xi)2= nI(XiY1) -[( x1) (Y3]The lower confidence limits (LCL's) on group means at T = 46 years and thecorresponding lower limit on group mean are listed below.Table 3 -8: 95% LCL vs. Minimum Mean ForceGroup 95% LCL on GroupMean, kip Lower Limit, kip.Vertical 1,178 1,033Hoop 1,129 1,108Dome 1,079 1,064Vertical, hoop and dome LCL forces at T = 46 years are above are above thecorresponding lower limits. This supports the conclusion that actual group meanforces will continue to be acceptable through the period ending in March 2020,the latest date for completion of the 45th year surveillance.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 27 of 493.2.4 Control Tendon Force TrendsOne tendon in each group is designated as a control tendon and is, barringexceptional circumstances, included in each consecutive surveillance sample toprovide information on the time dependent behavior of individual post-tensioningelements. Control tendons are not de-tensioned. The control tendons andconsecutively measured (not normalized) forces are listed in the table below.Prior to the 10th year surveillance, all sample tendons were de-tensioned and re-tensioned; control tendons were not designated until after the 5th yearsurveillance.As previously stated, the SGR sample groups do not include control tendons.Table 3 -9: Control Tendon Forces, ..:~~~oSurveillance Year I PeriodTendon. ..... =.. ... .. .1 oth:f .ýj 81h. / 5 20t" ...... 'tth /7 30. /8 1Wl 9 40"oth 10V-32 1,196 N/A 1,210 1,193 1,190 1,180 1,181H62-26 1,145 1,128 1,161 1,136 1,120 1,148 1,126D-225 1,125 1 N/A 1,120 1,104 1,120 1,093 1,106There is no clear trend to the above forces, which fluctuate in a random mannerover a relatively narrow range. The fluctuations, which probably result fromtemperature changes, tendon force redistribution and small measurement errors,tend to mask the expected trend (a slow, linear decrease with the logarithm oftime).The measured forces, measured force trend line (log-linear fit to the force data)and predicted force trend line are shown for each of the control tendons inFigures 3-4 through 3-6. These plots exhibit the following consistent features.* Trend lines fitted to the measured forces all have flatter slopes than thepredicted force trend lines and, as expected, all fitted trend lines havenegative slopes.0 40th year surveillance measured forces are above predicted values.* The log-linear trends of measured forces are above the predicted forcetrends, both at the time of the 40th year surveillance and at all future times.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 28 of 491,3001,250a.01,2001,1501,1001,0501,2501,2001,1502L1,100.01,0501,00010100Time, T, Years Since SIT (log scale)Figure 3 -4: Vertical Control Tendon V-3210100Time, T, Years Since SIT (log scale)Figure 3 -5: Hoop Control Tendon H62-26 Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 29 of 491,2501,2001,1501,1000:0.1,0501,0001u100Time, T, Years Since SIT (log scale)Figure 3 -6: Dome Control Tendon D-225These plots provide a positive indication that tendon forces are currentlydecreasing at a lower than expected rate and support the conclusion that meantendon forces will remain above minimum required values, through March 2020,the latest date for completion of the 45th year surveillance.3.3 Tendon Elongations and Re-TensioningOne tendon in each group for both populations (non-SGR and SGR) was de-tensioned to allow removal of a wire for testing. Tendon elongations weremeasured during the subsequent re-tensioning and compared to originalconstruction values to verify that the tendons were intact and that there were noobstructions to tendon motion within the ducts. Following the elongationmeasurements at Overstress Force (OSF), nominally 80% of GUTS, each tendonwas seated, in accordance with Subsection IWL requirements, at a forcebetween that predicted for the time of the surveillance and 70% of GUTS, exceptfor vertical tendon V-136 (IR 1569458).Tendons V-136 (SGR), V-159, H13-03, H51-40 (SGR) and D-237 were de-tensioned for wire removal.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 30 of 493.3.1 Elon-gationsElongations measured during initial tensioning and re-tensioning are normalizedto account for differences between the pre-tension force (PTF) and over stressforce (OSF) applied during original construction or SGR work, those appliedduring the 10thsurveillance, and differences in the number of wires (one wasremoved from each tendon for testing prior to re-tensioning). Normalizingconstruction (or SGR) and surveillance values in this manner allows for the directcomparison of the elongations regardless of differences in PTF, OSF, andnumber of wires. Normalized elongations are expressed as inches per kip perwire.Elongations are acceptable if:-0.1 < dR = (A2-A"i) _ 0.1, where:An11. An1 is the normalized elongation determined for original stressing2. An2 is the normalized elongation determined for re-tensioning3. dR is the fractional difference of the normalized elongationThe pertinent information from initial construction tensioning and the 40th yearsurveillance re-tensioning is tabulated for each of the sample tendons below.These tabulations also list the calculated normalized elongation rates. Originalstressing data is as listed on the tendon stressing cards completed duringconstruction and maintained as permanent plant records.Table 3 -10: Tendon ElongationTendonTime Frame Parameter _'Td__V-436 V-159 H13-03 H5140 D-237Original Fosf, kip 1,587 1,473 1,593 1,589 1,519Construction dosf, in 15.3 Note 1 Note 1 18.0 6.6or Fptf, kip 199 208 208 200 208SGR dptf, in 4.3 Note 1 Note 1 7.3 16.0asWires, N, 169 169 169 169 169Applicable Fosf -Fptf, kip 1,388 1,265 1,385 1,389 1,311fromStressing dosf-dpff, in 11.0 12.3 9.8 10.7 9.4Cards Ani, in / (kip / wire) 1.34 1.64 1.20 1.30 1.21Note 1: Only the difference (net elongation) between individual dosf and dptfvalues is shown on the V-159 and H13-03 stressing cards. Individual dosf and dptfvalues are not listed.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 31 of 49ýTendon,Time Frame Parameter 'H13V-136 V \&59. H13-03 V-136 D-237Fosf, kip 1,567 1,463 1,463 1,583 1,509dosf, in 16.0 18.3 18.0 19.0 14.6Fptf, kip 197 206 207 199 2012013 dptf, in 4.0 6.0 8.5 8.7 5.6Surveillance Wires, Nw 167 168 168 168 168Fosf- Fptf, kip 1,370 1,257 1,256 1,384 1,308dosf- dpff, in 12.0 12.3 9.5 10.3 9.0An2, in / (kip/ wire) 1.46 1.64 1.27 1.25 1.16dR = (An2-AnA)/Anl 1J0.090 1J0.000 1j0.058 -0.038 -0.041In the above table:1. Fos is the overstress force (two end average for hoop and dome tendons)2. dosf is the overstress reference distance (two end sum for hoop and dometendons)3. Fptf is the pre-tension force (two end average for hoop and dome tendons)4. dptf is the pre-tension reference distance (two end sum for hoop and dometendons)5. An is the normalized elongation = (dosf -dptf) X Nw / (Fosf -Fptf)All of the above dR values are between the limits of-0A1 and +0.1 and areacceptable. Tendon H13-03 was single end tensioned during construction butre-tensioned at both ends during the surveillance.3.3.2 Re-TensioningAfter elongations at OSF were measured, tendons (with the exception of V-1 36)were reseated at forces between those predicted for the time of the surveillanceand 70% of specified minimum ultimate strength in accordance with SubsectionIWL-2523.3. Final lock-off forces documented in the surveillance data sheets arelisted below with the applicable lower and upper limits.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 32 of 490Table 3 -11: Tendon Re-TensioningLower Limit Upper Limit'Tendon Lock-Off Force (kips)Predicted Force (kips) 70% GUTS (kips)V-1 36 1,315 1,414 1,377V-159 1,149 1,205 1,385H 13-03 1,141 1,272 1,385H51-40 1,211 1,368 1,385D-237 1,088 1,224 1,385All final lock-off forces except that documented for V-1 36, are between thespecified limits. The V-1 36 lock-off force of 1,414 kip, equivalent to 72% GUTS,resulted from an incorrect interpretation of the procedural requirements assummarized on the data sheet. The responsible engineer evaluated the out ofrange force, and as the lock-off was below the 74% GUTS upper limit allowedwhen this tendon was tensioned during the SGR outage, concluded that it couldbe left "as-is". Resolution of the procedure deviation and the SGR tensioningforce limits are documented in IR 1569458 (Attachment 1) and SGR Calculation38455-CALC-C-008 (Reference 31), respectively.3.4 End Anchorage ConditionAll sample tendon end anchorages except the H13-08 Buttress 3 anchoragewhich is partially encased by the Reactor Building flood seal, were visuallyexamined for evidence of corrosion, physical damage, missing buttonheads,unseated buttonheads, and the presence of free water. In addition, concretesurrounding each anchorage was examined out to a distance of two feet beyondthe bearing plate edge (or to the edge of the adjacent bearing plate if closer than2 ft) to detect cracks >0.01 inches in width, spalls, and other indications ofdamage or deterioration.Examination acceptance criteria and the inspection results are listed below.These cover all Surveillance tendon end anchorages, including V-84 Gallery,except H 13-08 Buttress 3.3.4.1 Corrosion* Acceptance CriterionNo evidence of active corrosion Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 33 of 49* Examination ResultsNo corrosion was found on wires7, buttonheads, or stressing washers.Small patches of light, dry, tightly adhering rust was observed on a fewshims and bearing plates. All documented rust patches were acceptableby examination; i.e., none required evaluation.3.4.2 Physical Damage" Acceptance CriterionAnchor heads, shims and bearing plates are free of cracks, deformation,and other signs of physical damage.* Examination ResultsNo cracks, deformation, or other signs of physical damage were found.3.4.3 Missing Button Heads" Acceptance CriterionNo missing button heads not previously documented (no specific criterionset for button heads that detach during surveillance operations)." Examination ResultsEnd anchorage examinations uncovered only one missing buttonhead,which is documented as a missing wire at the V-136 gallery end (allbuttonheads were present at the top end). The data sheet documentingthe condition of this anchor head at the completion of pre-stressing duringthe SGR outage, notes that there are 169 seated wires. Therefore, it wasconcluded that the buttonhead detached while in service (a rare but notunknown event), allowing the wire to pull through the anchor head.The CPM drained from the end cap and tendon duct during surveillanceactivities, was heated and strained. The buttonhead was not recovered,and due to its size (-0.25 inch diameter), could have been caught in anddiscarded with the cleaning cloths used to remove CPM from theanchorage components after end cap removal.The condition was evaluated and determined to be acceptable asdocumented in IR 1567224 (Attachment 1).7 Short segments of some wires were visible when tendons were de-tensionedfor wire removal Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 34 of 493.4.4 Unseated Button Heads" Acceptance CriterionNo unseated buttonheads not previously documented (no specific criterionset for buttonheads that are unseated following re-tensioning).* Examination ResultsEnd anchorage examinations uncovered only two unseated buttonheads,both at the Buttress 4 end of H24-15. One was estimated to be 0.2 inchesoff of its seat and the other 0.3 inches. These were not noted in theoriginal construction records. All buttonheads at the Buttress 2 end werefound fully seated.H24-15 was a single-end tensioned tendon, and the original stressing wasperformed from the Buttress 2 end. As the tendons are twisted at the timeof fabrication to enhance strain equalization among the wires, it is possiblethat near the Buttress 4 end, the force was transferred to the protrudingwires through friction resulting from the twist and the buttonheads did notseat. This is a phenomenon that is occasionally seen in 2400 hooptendons tensioned at both ends (TMI tendons span a nominal 1200).An engineering evaluation concluded that the condition is acceptable as-found and that there is no need for a continuity test to demonstrate thatthe unseated wires are intact. The evaluation is documented in IR1565440 (Attachment 1).3.4.5 Free Water" Acceptance CriterionNo evidence of free water inside the end cap, on anchorage components,or CPM enclosed by the cap.* Examination ResultsEnd anchorage examinations uncovered no evidence of free water eitherinside the end caps, on components, or CPM enclosed by the caps.3.4.6 Concrete Within Two Feet of Bearing Plate" Acceptance CriterionNo concrete cracks wider than 0.01 inches.* Examination ResultsEnd anchorage concrete examinations uncovered a number of minorshrinkage cracks radiating from the corners of bearing plates. All werereported as less than 0.01 inches wide and are acceptable.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 35 of 493.4.7 Shim GapsAcceptance CriterionDuring the 40th Year Surveillance TMI fully implemented the guidanceprovided in Exelon corporate procedure ER-AA-330-006 for the first time.Previous surveillances utilized only the guidance in TMI procedure 1301-9.1 for the conduct of surveillance activities and the approval of vendorprocedures.ER-AA-330-006, unlike 1301-9.1, provides acceptance criteria for themaximum shim gap. Shim gaps, while observed, were not measured andrecorded in previous surveillances. ER-AA-330-006 specifies thefollowing:"The gap between shim halves for the first set of shims underanchorhead shall not exceed an average of 0.25". A maximum gap of0.50" is acceptable at one gap location if other side of shim halves isin contact. The remaining shims are allowed a maximum gap of 0.50"at each location of shim halves."Examination ResultsGaps in excess of the allowable 0.25 inch average were found at thefollowing anchorages:H24-22: Documented in IR 1567897 (included in Attachment 1), theshims were found with a 1 inch gap on the top and in contact on thebottom. This shim gap was restored to the ER-AA-330-006 acceptablelimits and evaluated for "as-found" acceptance in order to determine pastoperability. No further actions were required.H13-08: Documented in IR 1579266 (included in Attachment 1), theshims were found with a 1 inch gap on the top and in contact on thebottom. The shim gap was determined to be acceptable as-found. Noevaluation was performed for this tendon end as it was bounded by theH24-22 evaluation.D-143: Documented in IR 1569980 (included in Attachment 1), the shimswere found with a 1 inch gap on the top and in contact on the bottom.Efforts to reset the shim gap to the 0.25 inch allowable were unsuccessfuldue to interferences at the tendon anchorage. The final "as-left" shim gapwas 0.5 inches on top and 0.25 inches on bottom (average gap of 0.375inches). Both the "as-found" and "as-left" shim gaps were evaluated asacceptable and no further actions were required.Technical evaluations determined that the observed over limit gaps wouldnot result in excessive bearing stresses at the maximum expected tendonpre-stressing force. Therefore, no further inspections were required onother anchorages. The maximum evaluated shim gaps for each tendon Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 36 of 49group will be documented in a procedure revision prior to the nextsurveillance. The evaluations are discussed in Attachment 1.3.5 Specimen Wire Test ResultsA sample for wire examination and testing was removed from one sample tendonin each of the non-SGR and SGR groups. Each wire was visually examined overits entire length for corrosion, pitting, and physical damage. Test specimenswere then cut from near each end and the middle of the sample wires. Thesewere tested in accordance with ASTM A370 (Reference 4) to determine tensilestrength and elongation at failure.The visual examinations, documented on data sheets 10.2 in Attachment 2,verified that all five specimen wires were free of corrosion, pitting, and physicaldamage. As no corrosion was found, there was no need to cut an additional testspecimen from the most corroded section of wire as specified in surveillanceprocedures.The tensile strength of all 15 test specimens exceeded the specified lower limit of240 ksi (GUTS), and the elongations at failure exceeded the lower limit of 4%.The test results are tabulated below.Table 3 -12: Tendon Wire Test ResultsTendon TestSample Tensile Strength (ksi) Elongation at Failure (%)V-136 1 262.8 4.2SGR 2 262.0 5.4New 3 263.4 4.71 249.4 5.7V-159 2 251.6 5.03 253.5 4.81 258.9 5.8H13-03 2 258.5 6.23 257.8 5.81 248.2 5.2H51-402 249.7 5.8SGR3 248.8 5.01 259.6 5.2D237 2 254.7 5.23 253.5 5.1S Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 37 of 493.6 Corrosion Protection Medium Test ResultsSamples of corrosion protection medium (CPM) were collected from both ends ofeach Surveillance tendon as well as from the gallery end of V-84. Laboratorytests were performed on these samples to determine the characteristics listed(with acceptance limits) below. Surveillance procedure ER-AA-330-006 identifiesthe process and standardized tests used during the laboratory analysis.Table 3 -13: CPM Test CriteriaCharacteristic Acceptance LimitWater Content Not to Exceed 10% by weightWater Soluble Chlorides Not to Exceed 10 ppmWater Soluble Nitrates Not to Exceed 10 ppmWater Soluble Sulfides Not to Exceed 10 ppmRy0.508 for originally installed CPMReserve Alkalinity (Base Number) 1.foVicnrs20-P>-1 7.5 for Visconorust 2090-P4Table 3-14 lists the laboratory test results which are documented in thelaboratory report included in Attachment 2. As shown in the table, 9 CPMsamples had base numbers <0.50 and required an acid number test. Anadditional acid number test was performed on a V108 field end sample whichhad a base number of 0.52. Of the10 samples, 3 had acid numbers testingabove the acceptance limit of 1. IR 1626566 was issued to document the acidnumber results, and determined that there was no current concern from thedegraded CPM. Follow-up visual examinations during the 45th Year TendonSurveillance, in addition to pump-through with new CPM, will correct this issue.8 If the base number for originally installed CPM is <0.50 (the laboratory's reporting limit), then anacid number test is performed as described in ER-AA-330-006. The acid number must be <1 tobe acceptable.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 38 of 49Table 3 -14: CPM Test Results.... .... ;: ' w aterEn Chlorides, Nitrates, Sulfides, Content, Base AcidiTendon Ed "otet NueSlles ..Ai.PPM p .p ppm Number NumberShop <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 53.1 N/AField <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 0.20 <0.500 2.64'Shop N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/AV-84Field <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 1.61 N/AShop <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 26.9 N/AV-108Field 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 0.520 0.530Shop <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 0.28 57.9 N/AField <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 28.4 N/AShop <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 45.9 N/AV-136Field <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 0.22 35.2 N/AShop <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 26.3 N/AV1 59Field 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 0.19 <0.500 <0.50Shop 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 0.31 <0.500 <0.50Field 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 <0.500 0.530H13-08 Shop 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 <0.500 1.06'Field N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/AH13-10 Shop <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 0.10 1.98 N/AField 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 <0.500 0.530Shop 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 1.44 N/AH24-15Field 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 2.26 N/AShop 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 0.10 <0.500 <0.50H24-22Field 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 3.70 N/AH35-02 Shop 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 2.72 N/AField 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 <0.500 1.06'9 Acid Numbers >1 were evaluated and accepted under IR 1626566 Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 39 of 49L ..,% ..... W ,!Chlorides, Nitrates, Sulfides, Base AcidTendon End ppm ppm ppm Content, NH63Sh P <0.5 pM0 <0.5 <0%.1 5.Number Numb/AdShop <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 56.4 N/AField <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 50.4 N/AH51-40 Shop <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 46.6 N/AField <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 48.2 N/AH62-26 Shop <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 42.1 N/AField <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 47.9 N/AD-143 Shop 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 1.02 N/AField 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 1.02 N/AShop 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 2.08 N/AD-1 46Field 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 1.90 N/AD225 Shop <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 38.4 N/AField <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 38.1 N/AD-237 Shop 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 2.06 N/AField <0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 34.6 N/AD-303 Shop 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 <0.500 0.530Field 0.50 <0.50 <0.50 <0.10 1.04 N/A3.7 Corrosion Protection Medium Removal IReplacement--re .. ........When CPM was removed from tendon sheathing and end anchorage areas, itwas collected in containers, measured, and recorded. After examinations werecompleted, new CPM was poured or pumped into the sheathing and end caps.The quantity of CPM replaced was measured and recorded for comparison. Thedifference in these quantities provides the information to assess the acceptabilityof both the level of CPM fill prior to removal and the level following replacement.If the amount replaced is significantly less than the amount removed, the level islow and must be increased. If the amount replaced is significantly greater thanthe amount removed the condition must be evaluated to determine the reasonfor, and acceptability of, the "as-found" under-filled condition.Quantities of CPM removed and replaced during the 40th year surveillance aredocumented in Attachment 2 and listed in Table 3-15. All differences (absolutevalues), except as noted, are less than the 10% of the tendon net duct volumeallowable difference specified in ASME Section Xl, Subsection IWL-3221.4.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 40 of 49Table 3 -15: CPM Quantities Removed/Replacedo "a~rntity qQuantity Absolute. .NetDDuct %.Rmoved (gal), Replaced (gal) Difference (gal) Volume (gal) Diff.V-32 14.0 16.4 2.4 120.4 2.3V-84 8.0 8.8 0.8 120.0 0.7V-108 18.5 18.6 0.1 120.3 0.1V-115 14.0 16.4 2.4 119.0 2.0V-136 12.0 13.3 1.3 121.6 1.1V-159 74.0 77.8 3.8 119.9 3.2H13-03 9.7 15.0 5.3 109.7 4.8H13-08 4.5 5.3 0.8 110.7 0.7H13-10 8.0 11.5 3.5 110.7 3.2H24-15 12.0 12.9 0.9 110.9 0.8H24-22 8.5 11.3 2.8 110.1 2.5H24-47 3.0 5.3 2.3 110.1 2.1H35-02 8.7 10.6 1.9 110.1 1.7H46-34 9.8 10.6 0.8 109.8 0.7H51-40 7.4 11.1 3.7 109.1 3.4H62-26 10.0 11.1 1.1 110.1 1.0D-143 19.5 70.7 51.2 85.4 60.0D-146 15.5 63.2 47.7 81.0 58.9D-225 8.2 10.2 2.0 97.5 2.1D-237 20.8 65.4 44.6 92.8 48.1D-303 9.8 11.5 1.7 80.3 2.1The amounts of CPM replaced in dome tendons D-143, D-146, and D-237exceeded the amounts removed by more than 10% of the net duct volume asnoted in Table 3-8 and listed below.10 Gasket repair only (Buttress 2 end)

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 41 of 49Table 3 -16: Dome Tendons Exceeding Acceptance LimitTendon % Differen'eD-143 60.0%D-146 58.9%D-237 48.1%The percentages noted show that there was void space in the dome tendonducts. This condition was evaluated and concluded to be acceptable withoutcorrective action for the following reasons:" Dome ductwork consists of Schedule 40 pipe segments with sealed joints,making the ducts essentially impervious to water intrusion." No water was found at any of the 10 dome tendon anchorage areasexamined." There was no evidence of corrosion on either anchorage components orthe test wire pulled from D-237.* The end caps, the lowest point of the dome tendons and the mostsusceptible to water intrusion, were found completely filled with CPM andwere thusly protected from corrosion.The full evaluation is documented in IR 1585403 (Attachment 1).3.8 Tendon End Anchorage Cover ExaminationTendon end anchorage covers (end caps) were examined as specified in ASMESection Xl, Subsection IWL-2510(c) for damage, deformation, and CPM leakage.The results of this examination are documented on Data Sheets 8.5 inAttachment 2 and summarized below.* No end caps show signs of deformation or other damage.* With one exception, no end caps show signs of corrosion. The cap at theeast end of D-243 is lightly rusted, but not pitted, over roughly one quarterof its surface.* There is minor CPM leakage from the tendon ends noted below. Each ofthese locations has an estimated quantity of CPM accumulation in thearea of the leak less than 0.1 Liters. Oil (separated from the CPMformulation) seeping in small quantities through threaded connections isnot considered to constitute CPM leakage and is not reported.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 42 of 49Table 3 -17: Quantity of CPM LeakageTendon Numberi- Anchloirage" CPM Le akage.rD-102 Southwest <1 ozD-104 Southwest <1 ozD-105 Southwest <1 ozD-113 Northeast <2 ozD-115 Northeast <2 ozD-229 Unspecified -2 oz (oil stain)H13-51 Unspecified -1 ozH13-55 Unspecified -3 ozH35-25 Buttress 5 <2 ozThe light rust on the D-243 end cap and the CPM leakage listed above areconsidered to have no structural significance. All of these reported conditionsare concluded to be acceptable as-is and no corrective action or additionalexaminations are required at this time.3.9 Topical Report No. 203 Follow-up ExaminationsTopical Report No. 203 (Reference 28) Section 5.3 directed a re-examination ofthe V-84 bottom bearing plate during the 40th Year Surveillance. The end capwas removed and the bearing plate as well as other anchorage hardware itemsexamined for free water, corrosion, and damage. In addition, CPM samples weretaken for testing.There was no free water evident in the end cap or on the anchoragecomponents. The only corrosion observed was an area of light rust at theoutside (furthest from containment) edge of the bearing plate. No damage toeither the end cap or the load bearing anchorage components was found. Thecondition of the V-84 bottom anchorage is, in essence, unchanged from the "as-left" condition following the 35th year examination in 2009.The condition of the V-84 bottom end anchorage is acceptable "as-found", andno corrective action or additional examinations are required.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 43 of 494. CONTAINMENT SURFACE EXAMINATIONSThe accessible exterior surface of the containment was examined using thegeneral visual technique defined in Section Xl, Subsection IWL-2310(a).Detailed visual examinations were performed in areas showing signs of possibledamage or degradation. The detailed visual examination technique wasperformed in accordance with Subsection IWL-2310(b).Examination results are documented in Attachment 2 on ER-AA-336-019Attachment 4 and specific vendor data sheets with supplemental descriptionsand sketches as applicable. The results are summarized in the followingsections.4.1 Overall Concrete Surface ConditionThe overall concrete surface shows no evidence of damage or degradation otherthan some non-structural degradation consisting of grout patches degradation inseveral areas, minor spalling of the surface concrete at sharp edges, and spallingadjacent to embedded steel plates.There are numerous small shrinkage cracks on the concrete surface reported asless than 0.01 inches wide and below the recording threshold. Several cracks onthe tendon gallery ceiling were reported with widths <0.015 inches, all of whichwere previously documented.As previously documented, CPM is seeping through small vertical cracks inareas of the lower wall that are visible in the alligator pit region; this condition isessentially unchanged from that documented during prior surveillances.Data sheets included in Attachment 2 identify areas on Tendon Buttresses 3, 4,5, and 6 where embedded steel plates are pulling away from the concrete. Afollow-up walk-down conducted by engineering determined that these embeddedsteel plates are not pulling away from the concrete, but were in fact originallyinstalled in the concrete with an overlap. This was evidenced by the lack ofcracking and degradation in the grouting and concrete surrounding theembedded steel plate overlaps. The formal evaluation is included in Attachment1.4.2 Topical Report No. 203 Follow-up ExaminationsTopical Report No. 203 directed a detailed visual re-examination of threecontainment exterior surface areas during the 40th Year Surveillance. Theseareas are documented below with their results.,The grout overlay of ring girder reinforcing steel once exposed by anextensive spall of cover concrete on the southeast facing sector andrepaired in 2006 was examined for grout deterioration or detachment fromthe concrete substrate.The grout overlay was found to be fully intact, with no evidence ofdegradation or separation from the underlying concrete.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 44 of 49* The tendon gallery ceiling was examined for indications that the extent ofpreviously documented leaching, cracking, and spalling that exposed theunderlying reinforcement is not increasing.The gallery ceiling condition does not appear to have changed since the35th Year Surveillance in 2009. The extent of leaching, cracking, andspalling is unchanged. Further, the condition of the exposed base matreinforcing steel is unchanged, with only minor corrosion noted.* The lower wall in the alligator pit area was examined for indications thatthe rate of CPM seepage through vertical cracks is increasing with time.The extent of CPM leakage areas and the quantities of CPM observed onthe lower wall and top of the base mat at the wall-to-mat juncture areunchanged. It is concluded that the CPM seepage is a steadyphenomenon and is not increasing significantly with time.All areas identified in Topical Report No. 203 for detailed visual examinationduring the 40th Year Surveillance were found to be unchanged. The groutoverlay repair to the exposed reinforcing steel on the southeast sector of the ringgirder was done after the completion of the 30th Year Surveillance. The repairedarea currently shows no sign of damage or deterioration.These detailed visual examinations, expanded to include the exposed surfaces ofall tendon gallery ceiling bearing plates, will be performed again during the 45thYear Surveillance.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 45 of 495. REPAIRS AND FOLLOW-UP EXAMINATIONS5.1 RepairsThe results of the surveillance show that no repair to either the concrete or thepost-tensioning system is necessary at the present time.5.2 Follow-up Examination During 45th Year Surveillance (Period 11)Detailed visual examinations will be performed in the following areas during the45th Year Surveillance.* The grout overlay of previously exposed reinforcing steel on the vertical faceof the ring girder SE quadrant for degradation and separation from theunderlying concrete." The tendon gallery ceiling area; including base mat concrete, tendon bearingplates, and tendon end caps for evidence of CPM leakage, the effects ofground water seepage onto concrete and steel items, deterioration ofpreviously documented exposed reinforcing steel, and other damage ordeterioration." The lower wall above the base mat will be examined to determine if corrosionprotection medium seepage through the previously documented verticalcracks is increasing." Tendon anchorage assemblies, noted below, for evidence of corrosion.Pump-through of new CPM in the tendon ducts will be used to correct apossible degraded CPM condition (test sample acid numbers >1).o H13-08 Buttress 1o H35-02 Buttress 3o V-32 Gallery Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 46 of 496. CONCLUSIONSThe following conclusions are based on, and supported by, evaluation of thesurveillance results.* The force in each individual sample tendon exceeds the lower acceptancelimit (95% of the predicted value); no sample tendon force exceeds theimplied upper limit of 74% GUTS (the limit imposed during initial andSteam Generator Replacement Project tensioning)." Vertical, hoop and dome sample tendon mean normalized forces areabove the minimum required values." The 95% lower confidence limits on vertical, hoop, and dome tendon forcetrends are forecast to remain above minimum required levels throughMarch 2020, the deadline for completion of the 45th year surveillance.* Control tendon lift-offs exhibit relatively little scatter; vertical, hoop anddome control tendon trends indicate that forces are decreasing moreslowly than predicted.* Elongations (normalized to account for wire stress at PTF and OSF)measured during the re-tensioning of de-tensioned tendons are all within10% of previously measured values." All examined tendon end anchorage hardware is free of active corrosion,cracks, and distortion. Observed corrosion is limited to light, dry rust onend caps, bearing plates, and shims. No corrosion was found on wires oranchorheads." With two exceptions, all examined wire button heads are seated. Twowires at the Buttress 4 end of H24-15 were found unseated. Thiscondition, which has no structural significance, was accepted byevaluation and requires no corrective action or further examination." With one exception, all button heads are intact. One wire was found to bemissing at the bottom end of SGR tendon V-136. This condition, whichhas no structural significance, was accepted by evaluation and requires nocorrective action or further examination.* Several shim pairs were found to have gaps that exceeded the specifiedlimit. These were corrected or evaluated for continued service. Allobserved gaps were such that bearing area was still sufficient to carry themaximum expected tendon load without generating bearing stresses inexcess of the allowable values for the shim material. No additionalexaminations are required at the present time.* The difference between the quantities of CPM removed from sampletendons and quantities replaced were, with 3 exceptions, within 10% ofthe tendon net duct volume. The 3 exceptions, all involving "as-found" Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 47 of 49under-fill of the dome tendon duct, were determined to be acceptable byevaluation." Corrosion protection medium samples meet specified limits on watercontent and concentrations of corrosive ions (chlorides, nitrates, andsulfides). All CPM samples, save for 9, met the reserve alkalinity (basenumber) requirements. An acid number test was conducted on the 9samples below 0.50 reserve alkalinity and on one additional sample with abase number of 0.52. Three were found with acid numbers greater thanthe acceptance limit of 1. The 3 sample failures were accepted byevaluation with follow-up actions during the 45th Year Surveillance." No free water was detected at tendon end anchorages; showing that waterintrusion is not an issue.* Tendon wire samples meet the specified limits on ultimate strength andelongation at failure.* Concrete surrounding tendon bearing plates is free of damage,deterioration, and cracks exceeding 0.010 inches in width.* Concrete surfaces are free of damage and degradation. The deteriorationof grout patches, as noted in various areas, has no structural significance.The few concrete cracks that exceed the threshold width of 0.010 inches(none exceed 0.015 inches) were previously documented, accepted byevaluation, and reported as unchanged from previous surveillances." Tendon end caps are free from damage, and with one exception, free fromcorrosion. The corrosion observed consisted of light, dry rust with nonoticeable loss of metal." Conditions in areas identified for detailed visual examination in TopicalReport 203 have not changed since the 35th year surveillance in 2009.Detailed visual examination of these areas is recommended again duringthe 45th Year Surveillance.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 48 of 497. REFERENCESThe following documents (applicable sections noted) were used in thedevelopment of this report and /or are specifically referenced herein.1. ACI 201.1 R-92, Guide for Conducting a Visual Inspection of Concrete inService, Published by the American Concrete Institute.2. ACI 349.3R-96, Evaluation of Existing Nuclear Safety-Related ConcreteStructures, Published by the American Concrete Institute.3. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (2004 Edition with no Addenda),Section XI, Sub-Sections IWA and IWL.4. ASTM A370, Standard Test Methods and Definitions for MechanicalTesting of Steel Products.5. ASTM D974, Standard Test Method for Acid and Base Number by Color-Indicator Titration.6. Calculation C-1101-153-E410-028, Rx Building Tendons, MinimumRequired Prestressing Forces, Revision 0, 10 Feb 99.7. Calculation C-1 101-153-E410-046, TMI-1 RB Post Tensioning System ISIProgram Tendon Force Prediction, Revision 0, 6 Oct 2010.8. ER-AA-330-005, Visual Examination of Section XI Class CC ConcreteContainment Structures, Revision 10, 6 Sept 2013.9. ER-AA-330-006, Inservice Inspection and Testing of the Pre-StressedConcrete Containment Post Tensioning Systems, Revision 7, 12 Sept2013.10. ER-AA-335-001, Qualification and Certification of NondestructiveExamination (NDE) Personnel, Revision 6, 31 July 2012.11. ER-AA-335-019, Visual Examination of ASME IWL Class CC ContainmentComponents, Revision 0, 10 April 2012.12. Gilbert / Commonwealth Letter (with attachments) G/C/TMI-1 CS/1 6616dated 27 Dec 88, Transmitting Tendon Stressing Record Data (ECD C-310055).13. Miller, Irwin and John E. Freund, Probability and Statistics for Engineers,Prentice-Hall, 196514. PSC Procedure N1091, Post Tensioning System In-Service InspectionManual, Revision 0, 3 Sept, 2013.15. TMI -Unit 1 UFSAR Section 5.7.5, Revision 2216. TMI -Unit 1 Technical Specification Sections 3.19.1 & 4.4.2.117.TMI -Unit 1 Surveillance Procedure 1301-9.1, RB Structural IntegrityTendon Surveillance, Revision 23A, 30 Sept 2013.

Topical Report No. 213Revision 0Page 49 of 4918. TMI -Unit 1 EER JO # 162193, Rx Building Tendons, Minimum RequiredPrestressing Forces.19. TMI -Unit 1, Reactor Containment Building / First Tendon Surveillancetest / One Year After SIT, GAI Report No. 1880, 29 Sep 7520. TMI -Unit 1, Second Tendon Surveillance Test of Reactor ContainmentBuilding / Three Years After SIT, VSL Corp. Report No. GQL 0204, Dec77.21.TMI -Unit 1, Containment Building Tendon Surveillance Test report forThird Period (5 Years After SIT), TDR No. 229, 27 Mar 81.22. TMI Vendor Manual VM-TM-2485.23. Topical Report 025, Reactor Building Tendon Surveillance Test IInspection Period 4 (10 Years), 27 Aug 85.24. Topical Report 069, Reactor Building Fifteen year Tendon SurveillanceTest (Inspection Period 5), 2 May 90.25. Topical Report 093, Reactor Building Twenty Year Tendon SurveillanceTest (Inspection Period 6), 22 Mar 95.26. Topical Report 136, 25th Year Reactor Building Tendon Surveillance(Period 7), Revision 1, 31 Jul 01.27. Topical Report No. 183, 30th Year Reactor Building Tendon Surveillance(Period 8), Revision 0, 10 Mar 2005.28. Topical Report No. 203, 35th Year Reactor Building Tendon Surveillance(Period 9), Revision 0, 19 April 2010.29. Topical Report No. 204, 2010 Augmented Reactor Building TendonSurveillance, Revision 1, 13 June 2012.30. United States Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50, Subpart50.55a (1OCFR50.55a).31.38455-CALC-C-008, Determination of Losses in New and Re-TensionedTendons, Revision 8, 9 Jan 2010.

ATTACHMENT 1Engineering Technical Evaluations and Issue ReportsTable of Contents1. IR 1541172: 40th Year Surveillance Tendon Tensioned from Single End p022. IR 1567897: Shim Gap Identified on H24-22 Buttress 4 p203. IR 1579266: Shim Gap Identified on Hoop Tendon H 13-08 p294. IR 1569980: Shim Gap Identified on Dome Tendon D-143 p345. IR 1565440: Tendon H24-15 had 2 Wires Protruding from Anchor Head p446. IR 1567224: Tendon V136 Missing 1 Wire p487. IR 1569458: Lock-Off Force in Tendon V-136 Exceeded Acceptance Criteria p588. IR 1572452: Dome Tendon D-143 Identified to be Inaccessible p639. IR 1585403: Tendon Regreasing Exceeded Acceptance Limits p6610. IR 1587456: Surveillance Tendon De-tensioned Before Lift-off Completed p7511. Ev luation of the As-Found Condition of Embedded Ste l Plates in the ReactorBuilding Tendon Buttresses p8912. IR 1626566: Tendon Grease Sample Acid Number Exceeds Acceptance Criteriap9413. Ring Girder Southeast Quadrant Follow-up VT-1 C p101Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 1 of 110 0Go BackPrint I New Search I HomeAR Number: 01541172 Linked ARsAff Fac: Three Mile AR Type: CR Status: APPROVEDIslandAff Unit: 01 Owed To: A5551CAP Due Date: 09/30/2014Aff System: 153 Event Date: 07/29/2013CR 4/D Disc Date: 07/29/2013Level/Class:How H02 Orig Date: 07/30/2013Discoverld:Action Request Details

Subject:

i 40TH YEAR SURVEILLANCE TENDON TENSIONED FROM SINGLE ENDDescription: Originator: MICHAEL GRIMM Supv Contacted: John Piazza/Mark TorborgCondition

Description:

Random sample selection was performed to establish RB tendon populationfor the 40th year tendon surveillance scheduled in TIR20. Hoop tendons,H24-15 and H13-03, were selected for examination and lift-off testing.Stressing cards indicate that these tendons are two of 14 hoop tendonsthat were single end tensioned during construction.It is industry practice to tension horizontal hoop tendons from both endsand the perform lift-off testing from both ends. With single endtensioning the potentiaI exists that lower pre-stressing forces wereachieved and subsequ nt lift-off testing may yield stressing forces belowthe ASME Section XI Subsection IWL-3220 Code Acceptance Criteria.If results of lift-off testing do not meet acceptance criteria, thecondition must be evaluated for continued operation and additional testingwill need to be performed on adjacent tendons. In the case of H24-15 thenext adjacent accessible tendons are H24-18 and 19. These tendons werealso single end tensioned. The adjacent tendons for H13-03 were tensionedfrom both ends.An additional concern is that the contracted MPRjanalysis for theacceptability of reduced force tendons assumes a11 TMI hoop tendons aredual end tensioned.Immediate actions taken:Conducted phone call with Responsible Engineer (Howard Hill), CorporateISI Program Engineer (Gene Navratil), TMI Design Manager (John Piazza),TMI Programs Manager (Mark Torborg) and TMI ISI Program Engineer (MichaelGrimm) to discuss options for inspection of tendon H24-15 and path goingforward for the MPR analysis.Reviewed single end tensioned tendons to determine if any were previouslysurveilled (ex. H24-19).Recommended Actions:1. Work with Howard Hill to develop flow chart for decision making wheninspecting single end tensioned tendons. (Sean Taylor -9/30/2013)Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 2 of 110

2. Walkdown the 14 single end tensioned tendons to determine accessiblityof both ends. (Michael Grimm -8/30/2013)3. Revise procedure 1301-9.1 to incorporate single end tensioned tendoninspection methodolgy. (Sean Taylor -9/30/2013)4. Work with Howard Hill to provide calculations of reduced forceestimates for the 14 single end tensioned tendons for the MPR analysis.(Sean Taylor -9/30/2013)6. Determine if calculation C-1101-153-E410-046 required revision, andinitiate revision accordingly. (Sean Taylor -9/30/2013)7. Rev~iew original design basis/calculations for single end tensioningjustification. (Dave Yerkes -9/30/2013)What activities, processes, or procedures were involved?Tendon Surveillance planning activities including review of tendon dataand force curves.Why did the condition happen?During construction Inryco single end tensioned 14 hoop tendons because ofaccessibility issues. Gilbert Associates reviewed/approved single endtensioning.What are the consequences?The potential exists that the 14 single end tensioned tendons will have areduced pre-stress force below predicted values in calculationC-1101-153-E410-046 and below the ASME Section XI Subsection IWL-3220 codeacceptance criteria of 95% of predicted force. This will result inadditional tendons requiring lift off testing. Additionally the MPRanalysis being performed for the acc ptance of reduced forces in adjacenttendons may be affected by the redu1ed pre-stress tendons.Review of H24-19 (originally single end tensioned) surveillance in year 3,indicates that though the pre-stress after the Structural Integrity Testwas lower than similar hoop tendons (double end tensioned), the differencewas minimal and has no consequence with respect to containment structuralintegrity.This IR is to identify potential additional scope. It does not imply adeficient condition with the containment building.Were any procedural requirements impacted? ISite procedure 1301-9.1 and corporate procedure ER-AA-330- P6 do notaddress the condition where a hoop tendon was only single enltensioned.Were there any adverse physical conditions?There is the possibility of reduced pre-stressing forces in the 14 singleend tensioned hoop tendons. However, review of H24-19 (single endtensioned tendon) in subsequent surveillance indicates that the reductionwas minimal and did not impact containment structural integrity.List of knowledgeable individuals:John PiazzaMark TorborgGene NavratilMichael GrimmHoward HillRepeat or similar condition?Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 3 of 110 NoOperable Basis:Reportable Basis:Functional Basis:Reviewed by: CRAIG W SMITH 07/30/2013 14:23:06 CDTReviewer Comments:There are no operability, reportability, or functionality concerns.Additional lift off testing may be neeyed to evaluate as found condition.If not stisfactory, additional IR will bý requied to document condition.SOC Reviewed by: MELISSA L MORLEY 08/01/2013 09:40:11 CDTSOC Comments:Close to actions created (MGF 8/1/13) (SOC 8/1/13)0Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 4 of 110 Assign #: 01 AR #: 01541172Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: TRKG Status: COMPLETEPriority: Assigned To: Due Date: 08/04/2013Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: ACAPALL Orig Due Date:Unit Condition: Sec Grp:Assignment DetailsI/Subject/Description: 40TH YEAR SURVEILLANCE TENDON TENSIONED FROM SINGLE ENDAssignment CompletionI IIn Progress Notes:Completion Notes:-1Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 5 of 110 Single End Tensioned Hoop Tendon DiscussionPage 1 of 39/5/2013TMI-1 40th Year Containment (RB) In-Service Inspection (ISl)Measurement & Evaluation of Force in Single End Tensioned Hoop TendonsThe following discussion and flow chart address issues unique to the treatment of the single-endtensioned hoop tendons randomly selected for examination during the 40th year ReactorBuilding (RB) Inservice Inspection (ISI). Single-end tensioned tendons are not addressed in ISIprogram documents or ASME Section XI Subsection IWL and, with one exception, have notbeen previously included in the random examination samples. Single end tensioned hooptendon H24-19, the exception, was included in the 3rd year (after the 1976 Structural IntegrityTest (SIT)) ISI surveillance Oample. During that examination, lift-off forces were measured atboth ends of H24-19. The average of the measured end anchorage forces was reported tohave met the acceptance criterion (at or above 95% of the predicted value determined for adouble end tensioned tendon).IIThe tendon sample randomly selected for examination during the 40th year RB in-serviceinspection includes 2 hoop tendons, H13-03 and H24-15, tensioned at only one end duringconstruction. It has been determined that both ends of H13-03 are currently accessible for lift-off measurement. Subsequent to selection, H24-15 has been determined inaccessible due toaccess restrictions to the Seal Injection Room. H24-22, double end tensioned, has replacedH24-15 for this surveillance. H24-15 shall be examined per the requirements of this documentand the attached flow chart.During construction, 14 hoop tendons were single end tensioned. The mean force in a singleend tensioned hoop tendon is calculated to be about 6.5% less than that in a hoop tendontensioned at both ends. The RB design calculations do not account for the associated reductionin mean hoop pre-stressing force. The RB is pre-stre sed by 330 hoop tendons and if 14 ofthese are 6.5% below the level specified in the design, the overall reduction in mean hoop pre-stressing force is 6.5

• 14 / 330 -0.3%.The 0.3% overall reduction would be relatively insignificant if the 14 tendons were welldistributed around the circumference and height of the RB wall. However, 5 of the 14 single endtensioned hoops are in the Hxx-03 group, one is in the adjacent Hxx-04 group and 3 are closelyspaced in the H24-xx group. As a consequence, there is a -3' high band low on the RB wallthat has a possible significant shortfall in pre-stressing force.The reduced pre-str ssing force in these localized regions may have struc ural significancewhen the reduction iý evaluated against the design criteria. For this reason, 'lit is important tomeasure, where possible, the force at both anchorages of each single end tensioned randomsample tendon. Having data for both ends of said tendons will greatly facilitate any requiredevaluation of structural conditions in the localized regions.If a single end tensioned hoop tendon is only accessible at one end, lift-off at the accessible endshould be measured for confirmatory information, this is not a code required examination. Thelift-off force will be evaluated but, if it is below 0.95 of the forecast value, subsequent actions willbe as specified by the Responsible Engineer (RE). In addition, the originally designated sampletendon will be replaced with the nearest tendon in the same buttress grouping that is accessibleat both ends. TMI site procedure (1301-9.1) requirements will apply to the replacement tendonwhether it is single or double end tensioned (a requirement for additional evaluation isdiscussed in the subsequent paragraph).Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 6 of 110 Single End Tensioned Hoop Tendon DiscussionPage 2 of 39/5/2013The following flow chart identifies actions to take depending both on the accessibility of single-end tensioned random sample hoop tendons and on the results of the lift-off measurements.The flow chart includes an action to evaluate the condition if the average (both ends) lift-offforce determined for a single end tensioned hoop tendon is below 84% of the predicted force(which is based on double end tensioning). As noted above, the mean force in a single endtensioned tendon is expected to be about 93.5% of that in a double end tensioned tendon. Ifthe average lift-off force determined for a single end tensioned tendon is below 90% of thisexpected value or, below 0.935

• 0.9 = 0.84 of the predicted force, additional engineeringevaluation is deemed necessary. If the lift-off is above 0.84 the acceptance and evaluationcriteria of 1301-9.1 shall apply.Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 7 of 110 Single End Tensioned Hoop Tendon DiscussionPage 3 of 39/5/2013Tendon Lift-Off Measurement Flow ChartIs random sample, replacement Noor adjacent hoop tendon single o Proceed perend tensioned? 1301-9.1Select as replacementthe nearest tendonaccessible at bothends.YesAFIs tendon accessible for lift-offmeasurements at both ends?4YesMeasure singleend lift-off.VIs average (both ends)lift-off force below 0.84times predicted force?YesRE to evaluate.Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 8 of 110 A walkdown was performed on the single end tensioned tendons. Several tendons could not beaccessed due to current plant conditions, i.e. scaffold builds, temporary RCAs, etc. A follow-upassignment will be issued to verify accessibility of these tendons prior to annotation in procedure 1301-9.1.A follow-up assignment will be issued to document the following walkdown as an attachment to 1301-9.1. While the single end tensioned tendons determined to be inaccessible during this walkdown willremain in population, they can be diagnosed from the pictures, or those taken during the follow-upwalkdown, as inaccessible or accessible based on the rams available for the surveillance. If the ramtechnology is the same as it was for the 40th year surveillance, then these inaccessible tepdons willremain inaccessible and an adjacent tendon will be selected.The seal injection room, will be annotated in the procedure as inaccessible, as current equipment can'taccess the room because of space restrictions around the motor control centers.Disposition of Single End Tensioned Tendons1. Summarya. Accessible Tendonsi. H24-18ii. H24-19iii. H62-44iv. H 13-03b. Inaccessible Tendonsi. H24-15ii. H13-12iii. H51-20iv. H46-03v. H24-03c. Indeterminate due to current access restrictions -Conduct additional walkdowni. H62-24 -Turbine Building RCA Restrictionii. H3p2 Turbine Building RCA Restrictionii. H 5-03 -Access to part of alligator pitiv. H35-04 -Access to part of alligator pitv. H62-03 -Access to part of alligator pitII. H24-15a. Scheduled in T1R20b. End Locationsi. Buttress 2-Turbine Building 322' ElevationTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 9 of 110 ii. Buttress 4-Auxiliary Building 305' Elevation -Seal Injection RoomTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 10 of 110

1. The seal injection room is inaccessible as the rams can't fit around the MCCs2. Additional clearance issues exist with safety related conduit in front of the tendonend cap111. H-24-18a. Not Scheduledb. End Locationsi. Buttress 2 -Turbine Building 322' Elevation1. Inaccessible due to piping obstructionii. Buttress 4 -Above Auxiliary Building RoofTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 11 of 110

1. Last Tendon above roof line -accessibleIV. H24-19a. This tendon was inspected during 3 d Year Surveillancei. Lift-Off was conducted from both ends.ii. Tendon passed surveillance -no issues identifiedV. H62-24a. Not Scheduledb. End Locationsi. Buttress 2 -Turbine Building 346' Elevation1. Indeterminate accessibility -Roped off RCA area due to scaffold constructiona. Appears to be inaccessible due to Fire Service Piping2. Will need to re-assess when access is availableii. Buttress 6- RB Exterior Above Equipment Hatch1. Accessible with Work PlatformVI. H62-34a. Not Scheduledb. End LocationsTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 12 of 110

i. Buttress 2 -Turbine Building 365' Elevation1. Indeterminate accessibility -roped off RCA due to scaffold construction2. Will need to re-assess when access is availableii. Buttress 6 -RB Exterior above Equipment Hatch1. Accessible with work platformVII. H62-44a. Not Scheduledb. End Locationsi. Buttress 2 -Below Roof line of Turbine Building.Tendon is accessibleii. uttress 6- RB Exterior1. Accessible from Work PlatformVIII. H 13-012a. Not Scheduledb. End Locationsi. Buttress 3 -Turbine building 302' Elevation outside of Personnel HatchTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 13 of 110

1. Accessibleii. Buttress 1 -Intermediate Building 295' Elevation1. Inaccessible due to piping interferencec. Note: This tendon deforms around the personnel hatch.IX. H51-20a. Not Scheduledb. End Locationsi. Buttress 1- Intermediate Building 322' Elevation1. Inaccessible due to pipe interferenceii. Buttress 5- RB exterior above Auxiliary Building1. Accessible with Work PlatformX. H46-03a. Not Scheduledb. End Locationsi. Buttress 6- Alligator PitTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 14 of 110

1. Accessibleii. Buttress 4- Auxiliary Building 281' Elevation1. Inaccessible due to pipe interferenceXI. H24-03a. Not Scheduledb. End Loca ionsi. Buttress 4 -Auxiliary Building 281' ElevationITopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 15 of 110

1. Inaccissible due to pipe interference and contaminated areaii. Buttress 2 -Alligator Pit1. Indeterminate -will need to identify in an additional walkdownXII. H35-04a. Not Scheduledb. End Locationsi. Buttress 3 -Alligator Pit1. Indeterminate -will need to id ntify in an additional walkdownii. Buttress 5- Alligator PitTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 16 of 110

1. AccessibleXIII. H35-03a. Not Scheduledb. End Locationsi. Buttress 3 -Alligator Pit1. Indeterminate -will need to identify in an additional walkdownii. Buttress 5 -Alligator Pit1. AccessibleXIV. H 62-03a. Not Scheduledb. End Locationsi. Buttress 6 -Alligator PitTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 17 of 110

1. Accessibleii. Buttress 2 -Alligator Pit1. Indeterminate- will need to identify in an additional walkdownXV. H 13-03a. Scheduled T1R20b. End Locationsi. Buttress 3 -Alligator Pit1. Accessibleii. Buttress 1 -Alligator PitTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 18 of 110

1. AccessibleTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 19 of 110 0Go BackPrint I New search I HomeAR Number: 01567897 Linked ARsAff Fac: Three Mile AR Type: CR Status: COMPLETEIslandAff Unit: 01 Owed To: A5551CAP Due Date: 12/31/2013Aff System: 153 Event Date: 10/03/2013CR 4/D Disc Date: 10/03/2013Level/Class:How H02 Orig Date: 10/04/2013Discovered:Action Request Details

Subject:

SHIM GAP IDENTIFIED ON H24-22 BUTTRESS 4Description: Originator: MICHAEL GRIMM Supv Contacted: John Piazza/Mark TorborgCondition

Description:

During tendon surveillance activities on Hoop Tendon H24-22 at Buttress 4a shim gap measuring linch was identified, with the opposite side of theshims measuring zero. This shim gap is in excess of the 0.25 inch averageallowed per procedure ER-AA-330-006.Immediate actions taken:IR initiated eThe shim gap was reset to meet de1ign requirements after lift-off.Briefed Responsible Engineer on the conditionRecommended Actions:Evaluate the pre-existing condition.What activities, processes, or procedures were involved?Conduct of tendon surveillance activities.Why did the condition happen?During original construction the shim gap was not set properly.What are the consequences?The shim gap is important in maintaining the bearing stresses within theallowable design limits of the anchorage components. The shim gap hassince been reset. The anchorage components exhibited no evidence ofdegradation. Tendon H24-22 Buttress 4 has been fully restored to thedesign requirements.Were any procedural requirements impacted?The shim gap does not meet the acceptance criteria of ER-AA-330-006.Were there any adverse physical conditions?The AISC allowable design bearing stress of 90% of yield was exceeded atthe time of original construction, the yield stress was not exceeded.Relaxation of the tendon and the corresponding loss of prestress duringTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 20 of 110 the first year of service, resulted in a reduction in the bearing stress,and thereafter, 90% yield criteria was met.The shim gap has been reset to an acceptable average width of 0.25 inchesor less, and the lift off test was performed satisfactory, restoringH24-22 Buttress 4 to teh as-designed condition.List of knowledgeable individuals:John PiazzaMark TorborgMichael GrimmSean TaylorHoward HillRepeat or similar condition?YesIR 1014485 written on 1/10/2010. Non conforming shim gaps on threetendons during the final stressing inspections of the steam generatorreplacement tendons.Operable Basis:Reportable Basis:Functional Basis:Reviewed by: CRAIG W SMITH 10/05/2013 12:10:45 CDTReviewer Comments:There are no operability, reportability, or fj nctionality concerns.The shim gap has since been reset. The arýchorage components exhibited noevidence of degradation. Tendon H24-22 Buttress 4 has been fully restoredto thedesign requirements. Initial engineering evaluation has determined tendoncontinued to maintain design function in as found condition. Action toEngineering to document formal evaluation when complete. If evaluationdoes not reach satisfactory conclusion, a separate IR should be generated.SO( Reviewed by: DIANE M SCHNEIDER 10/08/2013 09:40:56 CDTSO Comments:REACTOR BUILDINGAdded bldg component ID. This IR identified deficiency does not meet thedefinition of a CCF (Kaplan,BD 10/07/13).10/07/2013 -Per S/M Comments: The shim gap has since been reset. Theanchorage components exhibited no evidence of degradation. Tendon H24-22Buttress 4 has been fully restored to the design requirements. Initialengineering evaluation has determined tendon continued to maintain designfunction in as found condition. Action to Engineering to document formalevaluation when complete. If evaluation does not reach satisfactoryconclusion, a separate IR should be generated. D. HockleyClose to comments and action taken and created. (benson 10/8/13) (SOC10/08/13)Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 21 of 110 1 0Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 22 of 110 Assign #: 01 AR #: 01567897Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: TRKG Status: COMPLETEPriority: Assigned To: Due Date: 10/09/2013Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: ACAPALL Orig Due Date:Unit Condition: Sec Grp:Assignment DetailsSubject/l!escription: SHIM GAP IDENTIFIED ON H24-22 BUTTRESS 4Assignment CompletionIn Progress Notes:Completion Notes:t4Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 23 of 110 Exelon Generation. Evaluation of Shim Gap 1567897-02at H24-22 AnchoragePREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of H24-22 Shim Gap 1 of 51.0 Reason for Evaluation/ScopeThis is evaluation is being performed to document the acceptability of a non-conforming conditionthat was identified during the TMI-1 40th year In-service Inspection of the Reactor Building post-tensioning system (tendons). During the as-found examination of surveillance hoop tendon H24-22(a non Steam Generator Replacement Project affected tendon) end anchorage at buttress 4, the topside shim gap was found to be 1 linch. The shim halves were in sensible contact at the bottom. tAfterthe lift-off measurement was completed, the shims were realigned to restore the gaps betweenshim halves to 0.25 inches, which is compliant with the requirements specified in Par. 4.4.1.5.A ofExelon Corporate Procedure ER-AA-330-006, Inservice Inspection and Testing of the Pre-StressedConcrete Containment Post Tensioning Systems. This evaluation is conducted in accordance with CC-AA-309-101, Engineering Technical Evaluations, and ASME Section XI 2004 Edition Subsection IWL,to evaluate and document the acceptability of the as-found condition for tendon H24-22, as well asto establish criteria for the maximum allowable shim gap for hoop tendons to be used in futureinspections.This evaluation was screened per HU-AA-1212. Review of attachment 2 of HU-AA-1212 identified norisk factors, however, as this evaluation pertains to a safety related component, it requires anindependent review. An additional review has been performed by the Responsible Engineer,Howard Hill, as required by ASME Section Xl, 2004 Edition, SuIsection IWL.2.0 Detailed EvaluationAs documented in IR 1567897, the shim stack on hoop tendon H24-22 was found with a 1 inch gapon one side and no gap on the other side. During lift-off testing of the tendon, technicians restoredthe shim gap to the acceptable 0.25 inches average gap in accordance with ER-AA-330-006. Thisevaluation provides the maximum allowable shim gap assuming the highest as-found hoop tendonlift-off force. This evaluation may be used for the acceptance of additional hoop tendon shim gapsassuming the maximum issumed lift-off force is not exceeded.2.1. As-Found ConditionThe post-tensioning system vendor (INRYCO) manual, VM-TM-2485, provides relativelydetailed instructions for tendon installation and stressing. However, these instructions do notaddress shim gap, suggesting that the implied warranty of good workmanship would result inshim halves being pushed into contact either with each other or with the tendon wire bundle.The manual includes a drawing (identified only by title as 170 Wire Split Shim / Part No.101006), also present in TMI Electronic Document Management System (EDMS) as PS-01. Thisdrawing shows a maximum material removal of 0.25 inches along the line where the 10 inchsquare shim blank is flame cut in half. Drawings are available for all shims sizes. The smallestTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 24 of 110 Exelon Generation, Evaluation of Shim Gap 1567897-02at H24-22 AnchoragePREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of H24-22 Shim Gap 2 of 5shim, 10 gauge, shows dimensions for the cut gap as a maximum of 0.125 inches. Althoughmanufacturing tolerances allow for the flame cut to remove up to 0.25 inches along thecenterline, a conservative assumption of 0.125 inches is used for the purposes of thisevaluation as it provides the greatest reduction in bearing surface area making it a boundingcondition.A 5.625 inch diameter center hole is cut through the shim blank before the blank is cut in half.This is sufficient to clear the wire bundle maximum diameter (diameter varies with angularposition due to the anchor head hole pattern) at the anchor head exit. If 0.125 inches areremoved along the cut line when the shim blank is split, the shim halves may not necessarilyclose against each other when placed around the wire bundle. Depending on the orientation ofthe anchor head relative to the shim parting line, shim halves may be separated by up to 0.125inches when pushed into contact with the wires.American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) specifications (which covers TMI's post-tensioning system components) limit steel bearing stress to 90% fv, where fy is the minimumtensile yield stress specified for the material. Shims 0.25 inches and larger are cut from ASTMA 36 plate (per the previously cited shim drawing) which has a minimum required tensile yieldof 36 ksij Therefore, the AISC bearing limit for this material is 0.90

• 3 1 = 32.4 ksi.All tendons were initially tensioned to a nominal force of 70% Guaranteed Ultimate TensileStrength (GUTS), or 1,394 kips, per TMI Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 5Appendix 5B. This seating force requires an area of 1,394 / 32.4 = 43.02 in2 between theanchor head and the shim in contact with the anchor head. To ensure a bearing area of at least43.02 in2, the average shim gap, computed using the expression discussed in Section 2.2 of thisevaluation, cannot exceed a value of 0.21 inches, which is 0.085 inches greater than the cut gapof 0.125 inches.The 1 inch gap observed at the top of the H24-22 buttress 4 shim stack results in a net bearingarea of about 42 in2.At the design tendon seating force of 1,394 kip (0.70 GUTS), the resultingbearing stress would be close to 1,394 / 42 = 33.2 ksi or about 92% f,.While it is conservative to limit bearing to 90% fv, this conservatism is provided by AISC toaccount for unknown variations in loads and material properties. Construction records showthat H24-22 was seated at an average (of both ends) force of 1,458 kips and not 70% GUTS(1,394 kips). If both ends of the tendon are treated as having equal seating forces, the initialanchor head to shim bearing stress at the buttress 4 end would have been about 34.8 ksi, or97% f,. While this stress exceeds the AISC limit of 90% fv, it is still below the minimum specifiedTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 25 of 110 Exelon Generation. Evaluation of Shim Gap 1567897-02at H24-22 AnchoragePREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of H24-22 Shim Gap 3 of 5material yield and well below the actual material yield. Therefore, it can be assumed that theshim stack did not yield under the initial tendon load. Therefore, it can be assumed that theshim stack did not yield under the initial tendon load, which was verified by visual inspection ofthe shim stack.Tendon forces are currently well below the initial seating levels (lift-oft at the shop end of H24-22 was 1,186 kips) due to the effects of elastic shortening and time dependent losses. At thistime, bearing stress at all hoop tendon anchor head to shim interfaces should be under 32.4 ksi(90% fy for A 36 material), assuming that bearing areas are not significantly less than 42 in'.The bearing stress at the buttress 4 end of H24-22 with the as-found 1 inch shim gap was1,186 kips / 42 in2 = 28.2 ksi, which is well below the 90% fy level of 32.4 ksi. Still, there is nocurrent design basis for reducing the required bearing area to anything less than that needed atinitial tensioning. For this reason, it is important to show with confidence that shim gaps areacceptable based on the initial design requirements. This is done below.2.2. Maximum Evaluated Acceptable Shim GapThe subsequent evaluation applies only to hoop tendons. Vertical and Dome (Evaluation1569980-02) Tendons will require a separate evaluation.At the present time, hoop tendon forle levels are well below initial lock-off values. Theexpected current mean hoop tendon force level, determined by the trend of surveillancemeasurements is 1,150 kips. The greatest mean anchorage force observed in hoop tendonsexamined during surveillances 4 through 9 (surveillance years 10 through 35) is 1,218 kips. Thisvalue was computed as the average of the 1,201 kips and 1,235 kips forces measured at theanchorages of hoop tendon H13-11 during Surveillance 8 (30th year) in 2004. On the basis ofthese trended and measured tendon force levels, it is reasonable to conclude that anyeasured dome tendon anchorage force from this time forwa 1d will not exceed 1,235 kips. If aim gap is found in a dome tendon with a lift-off exceeding this 1,235 kips criteria, a separateevaluation shall be conducted to determine its acceptability.The minimum required shim bearing area required to support a tendon anchorage force of1,235 kips is 1 k10 =M ng .The anchor head to shim bearing area, Ab, is effectivelyequal to the value computed using the following expression:Where; -6 Id c) iWhere;Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 26 of 110 Exelon Generation. Evaluation of Shim Gap 1567897-02at H24-22 AnchoragePREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of H24-22 Shim Gap 4 of 5-ý m %,S75 Inc.,, which is the Anchor Head Diameterdz -5,I25 .'-,, which is the Shim Hole Diameterd, = 0.25 i.P.,, which is the assumed width of the shim cut lineG, is the sum of the top and bottom shim gap widthsSubstituting the above values, rounded to the nearest 0.01 inches, into the expression for Abgives:--%.15D ---01z) % -C 44'For a required bearing area of 38.12 in2, the sum (G) of the top and bottom gaps may notexceed = ,,, .9, this value is reduced to 1.4 inches for conservatism. Usingthe conservative value of 1.4 inches for G, mean gap width (G / 2) cannot exceed 0.70 inches.3.0 Conclusion/FindingsBased on the above computation, the conclusion of this evaluation is that a mean shim gap width _0.70 inches is acceptable for hoop tendons. This conclusion is considered to be valid unless acurrent or future measurement of a dome tendon anchorage force exceeds 1,235 kips.There is no evidence that hoop tendon average shim galls in excess of 0.70 inches have beenobserved during prior examinations. In addition, during the present surveillance a total of 35 hoop,vertical, and dome end anchorages will be examined. Of these, 28 ends are randomly selectedsample tendons (including 4 Steam Generator Replacement (SGR) tendons) that have not beenpreviously examined since initial installation. The remaining seven have been previously examined.It is expected that the results of the examinations performed during the present surveillance willshow that the 0.7 ihch mean gap between the H24-22 shim stack halves is an ano naly and thatmean gaps found aý the anchorages of the remaining surveillance sample dome t ndons will besmaller.As is shown above, a mean gap of 0.70 inches is acceptable for hoop tendons. If the remaining hooptendon end anchorage examinations do not uncover a larger gap and if no hoop tendon endanchorage lift-off force is found to exceed 1,235 kips, conditions with respect to shim gap will beconsidered acceptable and no further evaluation will be required.In summary, based on the computation presented in this evaluation, it is concluded that a meandome tendon shim gap < 0.70 inches is acceptable for an end anchorage force < 1,235 kips. As theTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 27 of 110 Exelon Generation. Evaluation of Shim Gap 1567897-02at H24-22 AnchoragePREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of H24-22 Shim Gap 5 of 5lift-off measured on H24-22 was 1,186 kips, which is less than 1,235 kips, the as-found shim gap isacceptable.4.0 References1. ASME Section Xl, Subsection IWL, 2004 Edition2. ER-AA-330-006 Revision 7, Inservice Inspection ond Testing of the Pre-Stressed ConcreteContainment Post Tensioning Systems3. 1301-9.1 Revision 23A, RB Structurol Integrity Tendon Surveillance4. AISC Handbook5. IR 15699806. TMI-1 UFSAR Chapter 5, Appendix 5B5.0 AttachmentsNoneApprovalsResponsible Engineer: Howard Hill Date: See EDMSPreparer: Michael Grimm Date: See EDMS VIndependent Reviewtr: Sean Taylor Date: Sle EDMSManager: MarkTorborg Date: See EDMS0Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 28 of 110 0 Go BackPrint I New Search I Home0 Go Back Print New Search HomeAR Number: 01579266 Linked ARsAff Fac: Three Mile AR Type: CR Status: COMPLETEIslandAff Unit: 01 Owed To: A5551CAP Due Date: 12/06/2013Aff System: 153 Event Date: 10/31/2013CR 4/D Disc Date: 10/31/2013Level/Class:How H02 Orig Date: 10/31/2013Discovered:IAction Request Details

Subject:

SHIM GAP IDENTIFIED ON DOME TENDON H13-08Description: Originator: MICHAEL GRIMM Supv Contacted: Mark TorborgCondition

Description:

During tendon surveillance activities on Hoop Tendon H13-08 a shim gapmeasuring 1 inch was identified, with the opposite side of the shimsmeasuring 0.125 inches. This shim gap is in excess of the 0.25 inchaverage allowed per PSC procedure SQ 8.0 Revision 1 and corporateprocedure ER-AA-330-006.This condition was previously evaluated for Hoop Tendon H24-22 Buttress 4(IR 1567897) and Dome Tendon D-134 (IR 1569980); both tendons weredetermined to be acceptalle.Tendon H13-08 is undergding visual examination only as it was determinedto be inaccessible during pre-outage walk downs. There are no plans torestore this shim gap to the 0.25 inch acceptable gap.The evaluation of shim gaps for hoop tendons was completed previously forHoop Tendon H24-22 Buttress 4 under IR 1567897. At construction thedesign lock-off force was 1394 Kips which results in a bearing force 92%of yield. The allowable design bearing force per the AISC manual is 90%of yield.Lift-off data from past tendon surveillances shows tljat pre-stressingforce decreases rapidly over the first couple years oflservice and thenmore slowly during the remaining lifetime. During thl 40 year life of theTMI Unit 1 containment building the highest as-found lift-off force for ahoop tendon was 1218 Kips. It was determined in the evaluation of H24-22in IR 1567897 that a maximum shim gap average of 0.7 inches was acceptablefor service at an as-found force of 1218 Kips.As H13-08 has not had a lift-off performed, the maximum observed lift-offforce for the life of the plant is assumed. The as-found shim gap averagewas 0.6 inches. Therefore the shim gap average is below the allowableshim gap and acceptable for continued service.Immediate actions taken:IR initiatedBriefed Responsible Engineer on the conditionTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 29 of 110 PSC issued NCR-N1091-005Recommended Actions:Create action to close to evaluation in IR 1567897 once completed (MichaelGrimm)What activities, processes, or procedures were involved?Conduct of tendon surveillance activities.Why did the condition happen?During original construction the shim gap was not set properlyWhat are the consequencWs?The shim gap is important in maintaining the bearing stresses within theallowable design limits of the anchorage components. The anchoragecomponents exhibited no evidence of degradation. Tendon H13-08 could notbe restored to the as-designed condition as the tendon will not undergo alift-off test and will remain' under tension.Were any procedural requirements impacted?The shim gap does not meet the acceptance criteria of PSC procedure SQ 8.0Revision 1 or corporate procedure ER-AA-330-006.Were there any adverse physical conditions?The AISC allowable design bearing stress of 90% of yield was exceeded atthe time of original construction; however the yield stress was notexceeded. Relaxation of the tendon and the corresponding loss ofpre-stress during the first year of service, resulted in a reduction ofthe bearing stress, and thereafter, the 90% yield criterion was met.The shim gap could not be reset to the as-designed cond tion as nolift-off test was performed and the bearing assembly renjained undertension.List of knowledgeable individuals:Mark TorborgMichael GrimmSean TaylorHoward HillRepeat or similar YesIR 1569980 for shim gap on Dome Tendon D-143IR 1567897 for shim gap on Hoop Tendon H24-22.IR 1014485 written on 1/10/2010. Non conforming shim gaps on threetendons during the final stressing inspections of the steam generatorreplacement tendons.Operable Basis:Reviewed TS 3.19 and 4.4.2. This 'as found' shim gap was in excess of the0.25 inch average allowed per ER-AA-330-006. As documented in the IR, Itwas determined in the evaluation of H24-22 in IR 1567897 that a maximumshim gap average of 0.7 inches was acceptable for service at an as-foundforce of 1218 Kips. The as-found shim gap average was 0.6 inches.Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 30 of 110 Therefore the shim gap average is below the allowable shim gap andacceptable for continued service.1. Is the SSC operable? (Y/N) YESIf inoperable, list tech spec and LCO action.2. What licensing documents were reviewed to evaluate operability? TS3.19, 4.4.2, 1301-9.1, ER-AA-330-0063. Describe the function of the SSC and basis foroperability/availability determination. See below4. Is the SSC available (Paragon)? (Y/N) YES5. Does this deficiency require Operations to take compensatory actions?(Y/N) NOIf yes, then perform an initial screening for Operator workaround/challenge per OP-AA-102-103.6. Is an operability evaluation or technical evaluation being requested?(Y/N) NO IThe following functions are maintained even with the deviation in shimgaps:153-ROl : Contain fission products to prevent radioactive release (153).153-R02 : Maintain containment integrity during normal ops and after theSSE (DBE)153-R03 : Maintain structural integrity (153).Reportable Basis:This is not reportable IAW the Exelon Reportability Manual.Functional Basis:See operability basisSOC Jeviewed by: CRYSTAL A WARLOW 11/04/2013 09:47:40 CSTSOC Comments:REACTOR BUILDINGClose to action created. (benson 11/1/13)11/03/2013 -Unchecked Shift Review Complete Radio Button because theshift needs to address the TS=Yes Required Modes. D. HockleyNot a CCF. Close to action created. (SOC 11/04/13)Reviewed by: BRADLEY A PARFI-T 11/01/2013 16:19:17 CDTReviewer Comments: ISee operability and reportability basis.Reviewed by: EDWARD M CARRERAS 11/03/2013 13:44:45 CSTReviewer Comments:Added required modes. EMC 11/3/13Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 31 of 110 Assign #: 01 AR #: 01579266Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: TRKG Status: COMPLETEPriority: Assigned To: Due Date: 11/05/2013Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: ACAPALL Orig Due Date:Unit Condition: Sec Grp:Assignment DetailsSubject/Description: ISHIM GAP IDENTIFIED ON DOME TENDON H13-08Assignment CompletionIn Progress Notes:Completion Notes:4Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 32 of 110 Assign #: 02 AR #: 01579266Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: ACIT Status: COMPLETEPriority: Assigned To: GRIMMX Due Date: 12/06/2013Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: A5551NESPR Orig Due Date: 12/06/2013Unit Condition: Sec Grp:Assignment DetailsSubject/Description: Ensure that evaluation under IR 1567897 satisfactorily co vers this issue. Createadditional actions as needed.Assignment CompletionIn Progress Notes: The condition observed on this tendon is addressed under technicalevaluation 1567897-02 as the condition is bounded by the evaluation. Nofurther actions are required.-Michael Grimm 11/27/2013Completion Notes:Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 33 of 110 0Go BackPrint I New Search I Home0 Go Back Print New Search HomeAR Number: 01569980 Linked ARsAff Fac: Three Mile AR Type: CR Status: COMPLETEIslandAff Unit: 01 Owed To: A5551CAP Due Date: 11/15/2013Aff System: 153 Event Date: 10/09/2013CR 4/D Disc Date: 10/09/2013Level/Class:How H02 Orig Date: 10/09/2013Discovered:Action Request Details

Subject:

SHIM GAP IDENTIFIED ON DOME TENDON D-143Description: Originator: MICHAEL GRIMM Supv Contacted: Mark TorborgCondition

Description:

During tendon surveillance activities on Dome Tendon D-143 a shim gapmeasuring 1 inch was identified, with the opposite side of the shimsmeasuring zero. This shim gap is in excess of the 0.25 inch averageallowed per PSC procedure SQ 8.0 Revision 1 and corporate procedureER-AA-330-006. The as-found condition corresponds to a bearing stress of81% of yield., which is less than the 90% of yield strength designcriteria.This condition wos previously evaluated for Hoop Tendon H24-22 Buttress 4(IR 1567897) a Id determined to be acceptable.After lift-off the shim gap was adjusted, but was unable to be restored tothe required 0.25 inch average gap required by procedure due tointerference from the wire bundle. The as-left condition of the shimstack is 0.5 inch gap on top and 0.25 inch gap on the bottom. Thiscondition is acceptable as the bearing stress is 78% of yield.Immediate actions taken:IR initiatedThe shim gap was reset to the smallest ga 3 achievable with the wire bundleinterference (the shims are in contact withl the wire bundle).Briefed Responsible Engineer on the conditionPSC issued NCR-N1091-004Recommended Actions:Document evaluation of the pre-existing and as-left conditionWhat activities, processes, or procedures were involved?Conduct of tendon surveillance activities.Why did the condition happen?During original construction the shim gap was not set properly.What are the consequences?Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 34 of 110 The shim gap is important in maintaining the bearing stresses within theallowable design limits of the anchorage components. Per AISC the designcriteria for the bearing stress should be 90% of yield. With the as-foundshim gap, the bearing stress at time of construction was 92% of yield and81% of yield with the as-found lift-off. The bearing stress of theanchorage assembly never exceeded the yield strength of the material.The anchorage components exhibited no evidence of degradation. TendonD-143 could not be restored to the as-designed condition, the as-left shimgap is 0.5 inch on top and 0.25 inch on the bottom. The as-left conditioncorresponds to bearing stress of 78% of yield.Were any procedural requirements impacted?The shim gap does not meet the acceptance criteria of PSC procedure SQ 8.0Revision 1 or corporate procedure ER-AA-330-006.Were there any adverse physical conditions?The AISC allowable design bearing stress of 90% of yield was exceeded atthe time of original construction; however the yield stress was notexceeded. Relaxation of the tendon and the corresponding loss ofpre-stress during the first year of service, resulted in a reduction ofthe bearing stress, and thereafter, the 90% yield criterion was met.The shim gap could not be reset to the as-designed condition due tointerference with the wire bundle. The as-left condition of the shimstack has a 0.5 inch gap on top and 0.25 inch gap on the bottom, anaverage of 0.375 inches. This condition is below the 90% yield criteria(actual is 78% of yield) with the current pre-stress in the tendon(1218.68 kips), and is therefore acceptable for continued service.List of knowledgeable individuals:John PiazzaMark TorborgMichael GrimmSean TaylorHoward HillRepeat or similar condition?YesIR 1567897 for shim gap on Hoop Tendon H24-22.IR 1014485 written on 1/10/2010. Non conforming shim gaps on threetendons during the final stressing inspections of the stearn generatorreplacement tendons. /Operable Basis:Reviewed TS 3.19 and 4.4.2. This 'as found' shim gap was in excess of the0.25 inch average allowed per ER-AA-330-006. As docuimented in the IR,this corresponds to a bearing stress of 81% of yield., which is less thanthe 90% of yield strength design criteria. The shim gap has been adjustedbut cannot attain the desired final average gap. The as-left conditionresults in an acceptable bearing stress of 78% of yield.1. Is the SSC operable? (Y/N) YESIf inoperable, list tech spec and LCO action.2. What licensing documents were reviewed to evaluate operability? TS3.19, 4.4.2, 1301-9.1, ER-AA-330-0063. Describe the function of the SSC and basis foroperability/availability determination. See belowTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 35 of 110

4. Is the SSC available (Paragon)? (Y/N) YES5. Does this deficiency require Operations to take compensatory actions?(Y/N) NOIf yes, then perform an initial screening for Operator workaround/challenge per OP-AA-102-103.6. Is an operability evaluation or technical evaluation being requested?(Y/N) NOThe following functions are maintained even with the deviation in shimgaps:153-ROl : Contain fission products to prevent radioactive release (153).153-R02 : Maintain containment integrity during normal ops and after theSSE (DBE)153-R03 : Maintain structural lintegrity (153).Reportable Basis:This does not meet any reporting thresholds.Functional Basis:Reviewed by: EDWARD M CARRERAS 10/09/2013 19:29:22 CDTReviewer Comments:Engineering to document an evaluation of the pre-existing and as-leftcondition for this tendon. Generate an IR, as needed, if results requireadditional actions.SOC Reviewed by: DIANE M SCHNEIDER 10/11/2013 09:30:25 CDTSOC Comments: SREACTOR BUILDINGThis IR identified deficiency does not meet the definition of a CCF(Kaplan,BD 10/10/13).Close to action created. (benson 10/10/13) (SOC 10/11/13)0Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 36 of 110 S Assign #: 01 AR #: 01569980Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: TRKG Status: COMPLETEPriority: Assigned To: Due Date: 10/14/2013Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: ACAPALL Orig Due Date:Unit Condition: Sec Grp:Assignment DetailsSubject/Description: SHIM GAP IDENTIFIED ON DOME TENDON D-143Assignment CompletionIn Progress Notes:Completion Notes:Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 37 of 110 Exeton Generation. Evaluation of Shim Gap 1569980-02at D-143 AnchoragePREPARED BY J SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of D-143 Shim Gap 1 of 61.0 Reason for Evaluation/ScopeThis evaluation is being performed to document and evaluate for acceptability a non-conformingcondition that was identified during the TMI-1 40th year In-service Inspection of the Reactor Buildingpost-tensioning system (tendons). During the as-found examination at the buttress 4 end ofsurveillance dome tendon D-143, the top side shim gap was found to be 1 inch. The shim halveswere in sensible contact at the bottom. After the lift-off measurement was completed, the shimswere realigned to restore the gaps between halves to 0.5 inches on the top and 0.25 inches on thebottom. It was not possible to reduce the gaps further. Both the as-found mean gap of 0.5 inchesand the resulting as-left mean gap of 0.375 inches exceed the 0.25 inches limit specified in Par.4.4.1.5.A of Exelon Corporate Procedure ER-AA-330-006, Inservice Inspection and Testing of the Pre-Stressed Concrete Containment Post Tensioning Systems. This evaluation is conducted in accordancewith CC-AA-309-101, Engineering Technical Evaluations, and ASME Section Xl, 2004 Edition,Subsection IWL, to evaluate and document the acceptability of both the as found and as leftconditions of tendon D-143, as well as establish criteria for the maximum allowable shim gap fordome tendons to be used in future inspections.This evaluation was screened per HU-AA-1212. Review of attachment 2 of HU-AA-1212 identified norisk factors, however, as this evaluation pertains to a safety related component, it requires anindependent review. An additional review has been performed by the Responsible Engineer,Howard Hill, as required by ASME Section XI, 2004 Edition, Subsection IWL.2.0 Detailed EvaluationAs documented in IR 1569980, the shim stack on dome tendon D-143 was found with a 1 inch gapon top and no gap on the bottom. During lift-off testing of the tendon, technicians attempted torestore the shim gap to the acceptable 0.25 inches average gap as provided in ER-AA-330-006. Dueto interferences with the wire bundle, the as-left shim gap was 0.5 inches on top and 0.25 inches onthe bottom, for an average of 0.375 inches gap. This evaluation provides the maximum acceptableshim gap assuming the highest as-found dome tendon lift-off force. This evaluation may be used forthe acceptance of additional dome tendon shim gaps assuming the maximum assumed lift-off forceis not exceeded.2.1. As-Found ConditionThe post-tensioning system vendor (INRYCO) manual, VM-TM-2485, provides detailedinstructions for tendon installation and stressing. However, these instructions do not addressthe presence of shim gaps, suggesting that the implied warranty of good workmanship of theshims would result in shim halves being pushed into contact either with each other or with thetendon wire bundle, resulting in a gap consistent with manufacturing tolerances.Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 38 of 110 ExeLon Generation. Evaluation of Shim Gap 1569980-02at D-143 AnchoragePREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of D-143 Shim Gap 2 of 6The manual includes a drawing (identified only by title as 170 Wire Split Shim / Part No.101006). This drawing shows a maximum material removal of 0.25 inches along the line wherethe 10 inch square shim blank is cut in half (flame cut). Drawings are available for all shimssizes. The smallest shim, 10 gauge steel, shows dimensions for the cut gap as a maximum of0.125 inches. Although manufacturing tolerances allow for the flame cut to remove up to 0.25inches along the centerline, a conservative assumption of 0.125 inches is used for the purposesof this evaluation as it provides the greatest reduction in bearing surface area making it abounding condition.A 5.625 inch diameter center hole is cut through the shim blank before the blank is cut in half.This is sufficient to clear the wire bundle maximum diameter (diameter varies with angularposition due to the anchor head hole pattern) at the anchor head exit. If 0.125 inches isremoved along the cut line when the shim blank is split, the shim halves may not necessarilyclose against each other when placed around the wire bundle. Depending on the orientation ofthe anchor head relative to the shim parting line, shim halves may be separated by up to 0.125inches when pushed into contact with the wires.American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) specifications (which covers TMI's post-tensioning system components) limit steel bearing stress to 90% fy, where fy is the minimumtensile yield stress specified for the material. Shims 0.25 inches and larger are cut from ASTMA 36 plate (per the previously cited shim drawing) which has a minimum required tensile yieldof 36 ksi. Therefore, the AISC bearing limit for this material is 0.90

• 36 = 32.4 ksi.All tendons were initially tensioned to a nominal force of 70% Guaranteed Ultimate TensileStrength (GUTS), or 1,394 kips, per TMI Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 5Appendix 5B. This seating force requires an area of 1,394 / 32.4 = 43.02 in2 between theanchor head and the shim in contact with the anchor head. To ensure a bearing area of at least43.02 in2, the average shim gap, computed using the expression discussed in Section 2.2 of thisevaluation, cannot exceed a value of 0.21 inches, which is 0.085 inches greater than the cut gapof 0.125 inches.The 1 inch gap observed at the top of the H24-02 Buttress 4 end shim stack results in a netbearing area of approximately 42 in2.At the design tendon seating force of 1,394 kip (70%GUTS), the resulting bearing stress would be approximately 1,394 / 42 = 33.2 ksi or about 92%fy.While it is conservative to limit bearing to 90% fy, this conservatism is provided by AISC toaccount for unknown variations in loads and material properties. Construction records showthat D-143 was seated at an average (of both ends) force of 1,394 kips = 70% GUTS. If bothTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 39 of 110 Exelon Generation. Evaluation of Shim Gap 1569980-02at D-143 AnchoragePREPARED BY SUBJECT I PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of D-143 Shim Gap 3 of 6ends of the tendon are treated as having equal seating forces, the initial anchor head to shimbearing stress at the shop end would have been approximately 33.2 ksi, or 92% fy, as stated inthe previous paragraph. While this stress exceeds the AISC limit of 90% fy, it is still belowminimum specified material yield and well below the actual material yield. Therefore, it can beassumed that the shim stack did not yield under the initial tendon load, which was verified byvisual inspection of the shim stack.Tendon forces are currently well below the initial seating levels (lift-off at the shop end of D143is 1,219 kip) due to the effects of elastic shortening and time dependent losses. At this time,bearing stress at all dome tendon anchor head to shim interfaces should be under 32.4 ksi (90%fy for A 36 material), assuming that bearing areas are not significantly less than 42 in2.Thebearing stress at the shop end of D143 with the as-found I inch shim gap was about 1,218 / 42= 29 ksi which is well below the 90% fy level of 32.4 ksi. Still, there is no current design basis forreducing the required bearing area to anything less than that needed at initial tensioning. Forthis reason, it is important to show with confidence that shim gaps are acceptable based on theinitial design requirements. This is done below.2.2. Maximum Evaluated Acceptable Shim GapThe subsequent evaluation applies only to dome tendons. Vertical and Hoop Tendons willrequire a separate evaluation.At the present time, dome tendon force levels are well below initial lock-off values. Theexpected current mean dome tendon force level, determined by the trend of surveillancemeasurements is 1,121 kips. The greatest mean anchorage force observed in dome tendonsexamined during surveillances 4 through 9 (surveillance years 10 through 35) is 1,290 kips. Thisvalue was computed as the average of the 1,286 kip and 1,294 kip forces measured at theanchorages of dome tendon D-314 during Surveillance 4 (l0th year) in 1984. On the basis ofthese trended and measured tendon force levels, it is reasonable to conclude that anymeasured dome tendon anchorage force from this time forward will not exceed 1,294 kips. If ashim gap is found in a dome tendon with a lift-off exceeding this 1,294 kips criteria, a separateevaluation shall be conducted to determine its acceptability.The minimum required shim bearing area required to support a tendon anchorage force of1,294 kip is 1294kips -39.94 in2.The anchor head to shim bearing area, Ab, is effectively(90%*36 ksi)equal to the value computed using the following expression:7r (d,2 -d 2)GAb -dc(d- dh) -(2_dcd. in2Where;Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 40 of 110 Exeton Generation, Evaluation of Shim Gap 1569980-02at D-143 AnchoragePREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of D-143 Shim Gap 4 of 6da = 9.375 inches, which is the Anchor Head Diameterdj, = 5.625 inches, which is the Shim Hole Diameterd, = 0.125 inches, which is the assumed width of the shim cut lineG, is the sum of the top and bottom shim gap widthsSubstituting the above values, rounded to the nearest 0.01 inches, into the expression for Abgives:Ab 7 (9.382 -5.622) _ 0.12(9.38 -5.62) -(-0.12) 9.38 =44.97 -4.69G i712For a required minimum bearing area of 39.94 in2, the sum (G) of the top and bottom gaps maynot exceed (44973994) = 1.07 inches, this value is reduced to 1.0 inches for conservatism.4.69Using the conservative value of 1.0 inches for G, mean gap width (G / 2) cannot exceed 0.50inches.3.0 Conclusion/FindingsBased on the computation performed in section 2.2, the conclusion of this evaluation is that a meanshim gap width < 0.50 inches is acceptable for dome tendons. This conclusion is considered to bevalid unless a current or future measurement of a dome tendon anchorage force exceeds 1,294 kip.There is no evidence that dome tendon average shim gaps in excess of 0.50 inches have beenobserved during prior examinations. In addition, during the present surveillance a total of 35 hoop,vertical and dome end anchorages will be examined. Of these, 28 ends are randomly selectedsample tendons (including 4 Steam Generator Replacement (SGR) tendons) that have not beenpreviously examined since initial installation. The remaining seven have been previously examined.It is expected that the results of the examinations performed during the present surveillance willshow that the 0.5 inch mean gap between the D-143 shim stack halves is an anomaly and that meangaps found at the anchorages of the remaining surveillance sample dome tendons will be smaller.As is shown above, a mean gap of 0.50 inches is acceptable for dome tendons. If the remainingdome tendon end anchorage examinations do not uncover a larger gap and if no dome tendon endanchorage lift-off force is found to exceed 1,294 kips, conditions with respect to shim gap will beconsidered acceptable and no further evaluation will be required.In summary, based on the computation presented in this evaluation, it is concluded that a meandome tendon shim gap < 0.50 inches is acceptable for an end anchorage force < 1,294 kip. As thelift-off measured on D-143 was 1,219 kips, which is less than 1,294 kips, the as-found shim gap isTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 41 of 110 Exelon Generation. Evaluation of Shim Gap 1569980-02at D-143 AnchoragePREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of D-143 Shim Gap 5 of 6acceptable. Based on this same analysis and reasoning, the as-left shim gap of 0.375 inches isacceptable for continued service of tendon D-143.4.0 References1. ASME Section X1, Subsection IWL, 2004 Edition2. ER-AA-330-006 Revision 7, Inservice Inspection and Testing of the Pre-Stressed ConcreteContainment Post Tensioning Systems3. 1301-9.1 Revision 23A, RB Structural Integrity Tendon Surveillance4. AISC Handbook5. IR 15699806. TMI-1 UFSAR Chapter 5, Appendix 5B5.0 AttachmentsNoneTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 42 of 110 Exelon Generation. Evaluation of Shim Gapat D-143 AnchoragePREPARED BY SUBJECTMichael Grimm Evaluation of D-143 Shim GapApprovalsResponsible Engineer: Howard Hill (See EDMS)Preparer: Michael Grimm (See EDMS)Independent Reviewer: Sean Taylor (See EDMS)IManager: Pat Bennett (See EDMS)1569980-02PAGE6 of 6Date:Date:Date:Date:lTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 43 of 110 0Go BackPrint I New Search I Home0 Go Back Print j New Search HomeAR Number: 01565440 Linked ARsAft Fac: Three Mile AR Type: CR Status: COMPLETEIslandAff Unit: 01 Owed To: A5552CAP Due Date: 12/20/2013Aff System: 153 Event Date: 09/30/2013CR 4/D Disc Date: 09/30/2013Level/Class:How H02 Orig Date: 09/30/2013Discovered:Action Request Details

Subject:

TENDON H24-15 HAD 2 WIRES PROTRUDING FROM ANCHOR HEADDescription: Originator: MARVIN H ESPENSHADE Supv Contacted: Howard SteinCondition

Description:

While performing a visual inspection on tendon H24-15 it was discovered byQV personnel that there was 2 wires protruding about 0.25" above theanchor head. Per the vendors procedure an NCR-N1091-001 was written forengineering to evaluate and comment on a corrective action if required.Immediate actions taken:Generated this IR to capture that engineering reviews the NCR-N1091-001for resolution on protruding 2 wires.Recommended Actions:Assignment to engineering (Mike Grinm and Howard Hill) to reviews theNCR-N1091-001 for any resolutions that may be required.Operable Basis:Discussed issue with Engineering. The 2 protruding wires represent apotential issue where the cables are not tensioned. Numerous wires existin the anchor head and per engineeing up to 12 cables can be detensionedbefore the structural integrity of the tendon is challenged. Reasonableassurance exists that tendon H24 remains capable of performing its designfunction.Reportable Basis:This is not reportable IAW the Exelon Reportability manual.Functional Basis:Reviewed by: JOSEPH W KULASINSKY 09/30/2013 12:39:26 CDTReviewer Comments:JWKSOC Reviewed by: LINDA C WITTER 10/01/2013 09:42:22 CDTSOC Comments:REACTOR BUILDING(#1)This condition does not meet definition for CCF. Close to action created(MGF 10/01/13) (SOC 10/01/13)0Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 44 of 110 Assign #: 01 AR #: 01565440Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: TRKG Status: COMPLETEPriority: Assigned To: Due Date: 10/05/2013Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: ACAPALL Orig Due Date:Unit Condition: Sec Grp:Assignment DetailsSubject/Description: TENDON H24-145 HAD 2 WIRES PROTRUDING FROM ANCHOR HEADAssignment CompletionIn Progress Notes:Completion Notes:tTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 45 of 110 Exelon Generation. Evaluation of Unseated Buttonheads 1565440-02at H24-15 Buttress 2 AnchoragePREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of H24-15 Unseated Buttonheads 1 of 21.0 Reason for Evaluation/ScopeThis evaluation is performed to document the acceptability of the condition observed at theButtress 2 end of the hoop tendon H24-15 during the 40th Year Tendon Surveillance. IR 1565440was issued to document that 2 buttonheads were protruding on H24-15 during the as-found visualexamination of the tendon. The buttonheads were protruding 0.1 inches beyond the seatingsurface. Hoop tendon H24-15 was single-end stressed durin, construction from the Buttress 4 end.This evaluation was screened per HU-AA-1212. Review of attachment 2 of HU-AA-1212 identified norisk factors, however, as this evaluation pertains to a safety related component, it requires anindependent review. An additional review has been performed by the Responsible Engineer,Howard Hill, as required by ASME Section Xl, 2004 Edition, Subsection IWL.2.0 Detailed EvaluationDuring the as-found visual examination of hoop tendon H24-15 two protruding buttonheads werefound. The buttonheads were protruding 0.1 inches from the seating surfaces and IR 1565440 waswritten to document the non-conforming condition. During examination it was noted that thebuttonheads did not move when pushed or pulled, which indicates that the wires are not brokenclose to the anchorhead.The observed condition is nct unexpected for the non-tensioned end of a curved single enctensioned tendon. Due to tendon twist (nominally one turn per 40 feet of length) and the effect ofthe curved duct, contact friction results in a gradual transfer of force between wires. In extremecases, the load in one or more wires is completely transferred to other wires along the tendonlength. In these cases, the affected wires are essentially load-free at the non-tensioned end. Thuslybuttonheads on theses wires may remain unseated after tensioning at the far end is completed.This frictional force transfer phenomenon does not affect the total force in the tendon, only itsdistribution among wires. Therefore, the observed ccnndition, which is occasionally found at theanchorages of single-end tensioned, curved tendons, nd more rarely at the anchorages of tendonstensioned from both ends, does not degrade the performance of the post-tensioning system.3.0 Conclusion/FindingsIn light of the above discussion, it is concluded that the unseated button heads at the H24-15Buttress 2 end are acceptable as-is. No corrective action, further evaluation or additionalexamination is required.4.0 References1. ASME Section Xl, Subsection IWL, 2004 EditionTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 46 of 110 ExelonGeneration. Evaluation of Unseated Buttonheads 1565440-02at H24-15 Buttress 2 AnchoragePREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of H24-15 Unseated Buttonheads 2 of 22. ER-AA-330-006 Revision 7, Inservice Inspection and Testing of the Pre-Stressed ConcreteContainment Post Tensioning Systems3. 1301-9.1 Revision 23A, RB Structural Integrity Tendon Surveillance4. IR 1565440, Tendon H24-15 had 2 Wires Protruding from Anchor Head5.0 AttachmentsNoneApprovalsResponsible Engineer: Howard Hill Date: EDMSPreparer: Michael Grimm Date: EDMSIndependent Reviewer: Sean Taylor Date: EDMSManager: MarkTorborg Date: EDMStTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 47 of 110 0Go BackPrint I New Search I Home0 Go Back Print New Search HomeAR Number: 01567224 Linked ARsAff Fac: Three Mile AR Type: CR Status: COMPLETEIslandAff Unit: 01 Owed To: A5551CAP Due Date: 12/13/2013Aff System: 153 Event Date: 10/03/2010CR 4/D Disc Date: 10/03/2010Level/Class:How H02 Orig Date: 10/03/2013Discovered:Action Request Details

Subject:

TENDON V136 MISSING 1 WIRE.Description: Originator: MARVIN H ESPENSHADE Supv Contacted: Butch EspenshadeCondition

Description:

While performing the 40 year tendon surveillance V136 had a missing wireidentified on the bottom end. The top had no protruding wires visible.NCR-N1091-002 was generated for engineering to evaluate the as foundcondition.Immediate actions taken:Generated this IR to track that engineering(Mike Grimm & Howard Hill)perform an evaluation of NCR-N1091-002Recommended Actions:Engineering to perform NCR-N1091-002 evaluation on missind wire.Operable Basis:Discussed issue with Engineering. The missing wire does not impact theoperability of the tendon. 169 wires exist in each tendon and perengineering up to 12 wires can be missing, or detensioned, before thestructural integrity of the tendon is challenged. Reasonable assuranceexists that tendon V136 remains capable of performing its design functionwith one wire missing.Reportable Basis:This is not reportable I W the Exelon Reportability manual.Functional Basis:SOC Reviewed by: CRYSTAL A WARLOW 10/04/2013 09:26:03 CDTSOC Comments:REACTOR BUILDINGAdded bldg component ID. This IR identified deficiency does not meet thedefinition of a CCF (Kaplan,BD 10/03/13).Close to action created. (benson 10/4/13) (SOC 10/04/13)Reviewed by: CRAIG W SMITH 10/03/2013 14:07:35 CDTReviewer Comments:There are no operability, reportability, or functionality concerns.Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 48 of 110 Assign #: 01 AR #: 01567224Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: TRKG Status: COMPLETEPriority: Assigned To: Due Date: 10/08/2013Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: ACAPALL Orig Due Date:Unit Condition: Sec Grp:Assignment DetailsSubject/Description: TENDON V136 MISSING 1 WIRE.Assignment CompletionIn Progress Notes:Completion Notes:tTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 49 of 110 V136 Evaluation and Recommendation1567224-02Page 1 of 4131004Vertical Tendon V136 Discontinuous WireEvaluation and Recommendation11 October 2013During the as-found visual examination of the V136 bottom end anchor head, one wirebutton head was observed to be missing. The V136 stressing card completed by SGTat the end of the steam generator replacement outage identifies 169 effective wires; i.e.,no missing button heads. The button head was not found in the CPM removed from theV136 hardware. HovIever, the search for the button head did not includý heating andsieving the CPM. Passing the CPM through a % inch mesh is required by Par. 11.4 ofPSC Procedure SQ 8.0, Anchorage Inspection.During the late 2010 augmented surveillance of Steam Generator Replacement (SGR)tendons, two wires were observed to be protruding above the top anchor head of onevertical. Subsequent examination determined that both wires had broken at a pointclose to the bottom face of the top anchor head. As this condition was not documentedon the SGT stressing cards, it was concluded that these wires fractured after the as-leftexamination of the anchor head, i.e., after the application of the Original Stressing Force(OSF) load and final seating of the anchor head on the shim stack and, probably, afterre-installation of the end cap.As noted in the above paragraphs, three SGR tendon wires have been found to bediscontinuous (two fractured and one for a reason yet to be determined). Themetallurgical report on the evaluation of the br ken wires found in 2010 concluded thatthese were somehow bent and significantly ov rstressed to the point of eventual failureduring installation and / or stressing.It is important to establish the reason for the apparent failure of the discontinuous wirein V136 and, in particular, to show that there is not a generic issue associated with theSGR tendons; i.e., to show that the breaks found in 2010 and the current discontinuityrepresent unique, isolated and unrelated events. As the initial search of the removedCPM did not uncover a broken wire segment, it is tentatively concluded that one of thefollowing condillions exists.(1) The button head was incompletely formed and, over time, pulled through theanchor head.(2) The button head detached (a not uncommon phenomenon that generally resultsfrom a problem with button header adjustment or operation) and, due to its smallsize, was missed during the search through the CPM removed from the tendonhardware (some was drained directly into a drum and not searched).(3) The wire was not button headed at the bottom end, an unlikely but not impossibleQC oversight.Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 50 of 110 V1 36 Evaluation and Recommendation1567224-02Page 2 of 4131004Condition (2) is considered to be the most likely. Therefore, it is recommended that allof the CPM removed from V136, including the CPM drained directly into the drum, bethoroughly searched by heating and:(1) Trying to retrieve the button head with a magnet and/or;(2) Pumping all heated CPM through a sieveIf a detached button head is recovered, this should be sent off for metallurgicalexamination. I IIf a button head is not recovered, it will be necessary to remove the discontinuous wirefor visual and, probably, metallurgical examination to establish cause (continuity test).While at this point it could be postulated that the cause is either a defective button heador no button head, the cause remains indeterminate until the button head or wire isretrieved. The cause of the break is required to determine if there is a generic issueapplicable to the SGR tendons and if corrective actions are required.The discontinuous wire can be identified through the continuity test procedure describedin PSC Procedure SQ 10.5 (the tendon must be de-tensioned first). Once it is identified,it can be removed from the tendon by the procedure employed for test wire removal.The current condition of V-136 with 167 effective wires (removal of test wire and loss ofan ad litional load carrying wire) does not represent an op rability concern. The tendonis co npletely capable of performing its design function an carrying a pre-stressing loadin excess of the required 1033 kips, the current pre-stress on V-136 is 1414 kips.Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 51 of 110 V136 Evaluation and Recommendation1567224-02Page 3 of 4131004N1091 PSC PROCEDURE SQ 8.0ANCHORAGE INSPECTIONData Sheet 8.OA09103/13Page 1 of IRevision 0Project: TMI 2013 TENDON SURVEILLANCE Ig UNIT 1(7.13)Tendon No.: V -, Tendon End: ' FieldANCHORAGE INSPECTION CRITERIAIR As-Found 0 Post De-Tensioning I Pre-Wire Removal [3 Post Re-Tensioning Q.C. Signoff9.0 & 10,0 CORROSION & CRACK INSPECTION(9.2) Buttonheads Level: (10.1) Cracks [] Yes17 , No MI N/A(9.2) Anchorhead Level- (10.1) Cracks r'0 Yes 12) RNo Q N/A(9.2) Shims Level: (10.1) Cracks E] Yes 12) No [O N/A(9.2) Bearing Plate Level: (10.1) Cracks [3 Yes [] No 0 N/A ,o-- I)llLCoisroon Leye of C rquims a NCR. {1CoSe a sketch of the cracks on Sketch Sheet 8,0 and Inate a NCR.11.0- PUTTONHEAD IN.PECTIOND Offsize (Malformed)ProtrudIngfunseated' wire/butlonheads0 Broken/missing wire/buttonheads* Pevlousty idenriied as missing 0000000000000000000Dlsconllnuous-removed this 000000000000,,, surveillance. O2 O0000000000vira(s) removed during this I 0000000000000C0suverllance for testing 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000q 00000000000000(11.2)Anchorieaddl.D. Iq oooo00o oooooooo/Located on Sketch [&,Yes [INo 000000000000(11.4) Missing Buttonheads Found; 00000000000 OO OO00000000-Yes W No Quantity:. 1 0000000Additional Information:(12.2) Number of Protruding Buttonheads (w):(18.31 Illumiaion a 4 2e -2 U(12.3) Number of Missing Buttonheads (0, g _):(12.4) Total of Protruding + Missing Buttonheads: -(12.6) Continuity Test Requested? 0 Yes EJ No(12.5) Total # of Effective Buttonheads Seated: Wtres Identified? E] Yes E) No(12.7) Overall Results [l Acceptable I. Un-Acceptable Customer Notified NCR#* rJ .CO. -/..QC Reviewed: Level: Date:18 SQ 8.O.TMl.13 1SlTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 52 of 110 V136 Evaluation and Recommendation1567224-02Page 4 of 4131004NONCONPORMANCE/ CORRECTIVE ACTION REPORT FORMVHOLD TAG NO.: #/A NC ICA NO.: ,Vee- At/01( -a t ?NONCONFORMANCE.,1: AdA -4ki,4 I n~N f~4 44o heAd-%4 /A Alt%# /p/evst1ilyrepodAed. ier Psc proceeck4re SO t -o sec, t3.' wle-u I e~o ne0re n,,.S5,?j wjt5or &NoV-HWhCA d~ 5 1f die-4C(e 8~go. CKXO-A% 10, 6#8j0. 'Aq 6ý j / A(AfillelY ~ Jjg /fic vo .2-J'I'S S 4 w /f., 0 ,,, 0- -,F-Aitl!E,n -4 V I i';ClAPPARENT CAUSE KNOWN: Uj YES MMO IF YES, DESCR~IBE:RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION: Cl;w4 4,> .ANY NONCONFORMING ITEM TO BE REPAIRED SHALL HAVE AN APPROVED REPAIR PROCEDURE.CORRECTIVE ACTION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: j #_ INITIATOR: TITLE DATE:SIGNIFICANT CONDITION: El YES 9 NO IF YES. REFER TO OAM SECTION 15,APPROVAL COMMENTS:SIGN & DArE: /- 2-Za __/EXELON AP ROVALREQUIRED 0 YES N- NO ENGINEER D AllIQA DATECOMMENTS:DISTRIBUTION DISPOSITION COMPLETEDEl QASECT'ION 0 VICE PRESIDENT E VENDOR SIGNED:Cl CE SECTION Fj CONTR. MGMT. 0_ _ TITLE:l ENGINEERING [3 EXELON El _ DATE:43 OA o'rMI. 3 ISITopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 53 of 110 Assign #: 03 AR #: 01567224Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: ACIT Status: COMPLETEPriority: Assigned To: GRIMMX Due Date: 12/13/2013Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: A5551NESPR Orig Due Date: 12/13/2013Unit Condition: Sec Grp:Assignment DetailsSubject/Description: Track completion of follow-uplactivites for V-136 Track follow up activities as follows: 1.Retrieve button head from grease using strainer or magnet or; 2. Retrieve broken wirefrom tendon using a continuity testAssignment CompletionIn Progress Notes: Grease was heated and run through a strainer. The buttonhead was notfound. This assignment is closed to 1567224-04, technical evaluation thataccepts the tendon condition as is.-Michael Grimm 11/27/2013Completion Notes:Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 54 of 110 Exelon Generation. Evaluation of Missing Buttonhead 1567224-04at V-136 Lower AnchoragePREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of V-136 Missing Buttonhead 1 of 31.0 Reason for Evaluation/ScopeThis evaluation is being performed to evaluate the acceptability of a condition in which abuttonhead was found missing on the lower anchorage of vertical tendon V-136 during the 40th YearTendon Surveillance. Previously, under assignment 1567224-02, it was identified that while thiscondition does not represent a failure of the tendon, efforts should be taken to retrieve either themissing buttonhead or the broken wire for evaluation. Assignment 1567224-03 tracked thecompletion of activities to locate the missing buttonhead. This included heating the grease removedfrom V-136 and draining it through a Y4" strainer/filter in accordance with PSC procedure SQ8.0. Thebuttonhead was not recovered during this activity. This evaluation will demonstrate that while thebuttonhead was not recovered the condition is acceptable and no further actions are required toretrieve the broken wire.This evaluation was screened per HU-AA-1212. Review of attachment 2 of HU-AA-1212 identified norisk factors, however, as this evaluation pertains to a safety related component, it requires anindependent review. An additional review has been performed by the Responsible Engineer,Howard Hill, as required by ASME Section XI, 2004 Edition, Subsection IWL.2.0 Detailed EvaluationDuring visual examination of the bottom anchorage of vertical tendon V-136 one buttonhead wasobserved to be missing. The top anchorage was found with 169 buttonheads, which alig rs with theSGT stressing cards from 2J09, indicating 169 buttonheads for both the top and bottom dlnchorages.This indicates the 168 observed buttonheads on the bottom anchorage is a post-constructioncondition.The corrosion protection medium (CPM) removed from the bottom end of V136 was searched forthe broken wire stub and/or buttonhead. Since nothing was found, it can be concluded that thewire itself did not break, as any length of wire attached to the buttonhead would have made themissing piece larger and easier to find. Additionally, since the as-left examination records from 2009show 169 acceptable button heads following tensio ing, it can be concluded that the missing wiredid not have a significantly undersized button head ýhat may have pulled through the drilled hole inthe anchor head.This leads to the conclusion that the button head detached from the wire. Per the ResponsibleEngineer this is a rare, but not an unheard of condition, which usually results from an imperfectionin the forming process inducing an area of weakness due to excessive cold working. Since thebutton head itself is quite small, it could have easily been missed in the search for a stub wire or,possibly, caught on one of the rags used to wipe CPM from the anchor head.As stated above, detached button heads are rare, isolated events, that are not indicative of a genericcondition; either at an individual anchor head or across a set of anchorages regardless of crew andTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 55 of 110 Exelon Generation. Evaluation of Missing Buttonhead 1567224-04at V-136 Lower AnchoragePREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of V-136 Missing Buttonhead 2 of 3hydraulic dies. For this reason, there is no concern that additional instances of detachedbuttonheads at the anchorages of other SGR replacement tendons exist in sufficient numbers todegrade containment integrity. To date, eight anchorages at the ends of SGR replacement tendonshave been examined with no evidence of other detached buttonheads.The current condition of V-136 with 167 effective wires (removal of test wire and loss of anadditional load carrying wire due to a missing buttonhead) does not represent an operabilityconcern. The tendon is completely capable of performing its design function and carryinL a pre-stressing load in excess of the required 1033 kips as each tendon wire is capable of carrying a load of11.77 kips or 1966 kips total with 167 wires. The current pre-stressing force on V-136 in the as-leftcondition is 1414 kips.3.0 Conclusion/FindingsFor the above reasons, it is concluded that the missing buttonhead at the bottom anchorage of V136is an isolated finding and does not represent current or potential future degradation of the TMI-1pre-stressing system. The loss of a single effective vertical tendon wire is an insignificant conditionwith respect to the structural integrity of the Reactor Building and the ability of the tendon toperform its design function. Therefore, the condition is deemed acceptable as-is and no furtherexaminations or evaluations are required. However, as the broken wire was not retrieved duringthe 40th Year Tendon Surveillance, it is recommended that an additional visual examination beperformed on the bottom anchorage of vertical tendon during the 45th year TendonSurveillance (scheduled for 2018). This is to provide ye rfication that the missing wire found at theV136 bottom anchorage was the result of a unique and isolated event.4.0 References1. ASME Section Xl, Subsection IWL, 2004 Edition2. ER-AA-330-006 Revision 7, Inservice Inspection and Testing of the Pre-Stressed ConcreteContainment Post Tensioning Systems3. 1301-9.1 Revi ion 23A, RB Structural Integrity Tendon Surveillance4. IR 1567224, T"ndon V-136 Missing 1 WireT5.0 AttachmentsNoneSTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 56 of 110 Exelon Generation. Evaluation of Missing Buttonheadat V-136 Lower AnchoragePREPARED BY SUBJECTMichael Grimm Evaluation of V-136 Missing Buttonhead1567224-04PAGE3 of 3ApprovalsResponsible Engineer: Howard HillPreparer: Michael GrimmIndependent Reviewer: Sean TaylorManager: MarkTorborgDate: EDMSDate: EDMSDate: EDMSDate: EDMSTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 57 of 110 0Go BackPrint I New Search I HomeAR Number: 01569458 Linked ARsAff Fac: Three Mile AR Type: CR Status: COMPLETEIslandAff Unit: 01 Owed To: A5551CAP Due Date: 11/07/2013Aff System: 153 Event Date: 10/07/2013CR 4/D Disc Date: 10/07/2013Level/Class:How H02 Orig Date: 10/08/2013Discovered:Action Request Details

Subject:

, LOCK-OFF FORCE IN TENDON V-136 EXCEEDED ACCEPTANCE CRITERIADescription: Originator: MICHAEL GRIMM Supv Contacted: John Piazza/Mark TorborgCondition

Description:

During tendon surveillance activities, selected tendons are de-tensioned(pre-stressing force is removed) and a wire sample is taken from thetendon. The tendons are then re-stressed to within plus 6%/minus 0% ofthe as-found lift off force or 70% of the Guaranteed Ultimate TensileStrength (GUTS), whichever is less, by procedure 1301-9.1 and PSC VendorProcedures.During re-stressing activities vertical tendon V-136 was locked-off at1414 kips. This value exc eds the 70% GUTS value allowed by procedure asdetermined by the effecti e number of wires. This condition wasidentified during the data sheet review by the Responsible Engineer.V-136 has 167 effective wires (one broken, one removed for testing), 70%GUTS corresponds to 8.24 kip per effective wire or 1376 kips. Thelock-off value of 1414 kips corresponds to 72% GUTS.This condition has no impact on the ability of the tendon to perform itsfunction and does not compromise the tendon integrity as it does notexceed the Guaranteed Ultimate Tensile Strength of the tendon wirematerial. The lock-off force of 1414 kips restores the tendon pre-stressto the as-left condition during the Steam Generator lReplacement Project,71% GUTS, which was performed by a different procedure with differentacceptance criteria.Immediate actions taken:IR initiatedNCR issued by PSCRecommended Actions:Revision to PSC procedure SQ 11.0 to clarify requirement to not exceed 70%GUTS during re-tensioning.What activities, processes, or procedures were involved?Review of Tendon Surveillance data sheets by the Responsible Engineer.Why did the condition happen?Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 58 of 110 During re-tensioning activities PSC restored the tendon to the as-foundcondition instead of the 70% GUTS condition as required by the procedure.What are the consequences?There are no adverse consequences on the containment or the tendon. Thetendon is capable of performing its intended design function and is withinthe guaranteed strength of the material.Were any procedural requirements impacted?The lock-off force exceeded the acceptance criteria of both the approvedPSC Vendor Procedures and the TMI Surveillance Procedure 1301-9.1.Were there any adverse physical conditions?There arý no adverse physical conditions. The tendon stress is higherthan the acceptable value; however it is well within the guaranteedstrength of the tendon material. The containment and the tendon arecapable of performing their design functions in this condition.List of knowledgeable individuals:John PiazzaMark TorborgMichael GrimmSean TaylorHoward HillRepeat or similar condition?NoOperable Basis:Reviewed TS 3.19 and 4.4.2. Tendon V-136 is tensioned slightly greaterthan desired. However, this does not compromise its ability to performits intended function. Applied forces are greater than the minimumrequired by procedure (1033 Kips) and lust slightly greater than the uppertarget of 1376 Kips. The as left corresponds to 72% GUTS whichis well below the ultimate yield strength of the tendon.As noted in the IR, this condition has no impact on the ability of thetendon to perform its function and does not compromise the tendonintegrity as it does not exceed the Guaranteed Ultimate Tensile Strengthof the tendon wirematerial. The lock-off force of 1414 kips restores the tendon pre-stressto the as-left condition during the Steam Generator Replacement Project,71% GUTS, which was performed by a different procedure with differentcceptance criteria..Is the SSC operable? (Y/N) YESIf inoperable, list tech spec and LCO action.2. What licensing documents were reviewed to evaluate operability? TS3.19, 4.4.2, 1301-9.13. Describe the function of the SSC and basis foroperability/availability determination. See below4. Is the SSC available (Paragon)? (Y/N) YES5. Does this deficiency require Operations to take compensatory actions?(Y/N) NOIf yes, then perform an initial screening for Operator workaround/challenge per OP-AA-102-103.6. Is an operability evaluation or technical evaluation being requested?(Y/N) NOThe following functions are maintained even with the slightly greaterapplied force on this tendon.Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 59 of 110 153-ROl Contain fission products to prevent radioactive release (153).153-R02 Maintain containment integrity during normal ops and after theSSE (DBE)153-R03 : Maintain structural integrity (153).Reportable Basis:This does not meet any reporting thresholds.Functional Basis:Reviewed by: EDWARD M CARRERAS 1/08/2013 23:39:35 CDTReviewer Comments:Added Reactor Building as the component ID. Engineering review isrequired.SOC Reviewed by: DIANE M SCHNEIDER 10/10/2013 09:52:14 CDTSOC Comments:REACTOR BUILDING(#1)This IR identified deficiency does not meet the definition of a CCF(Kaplan,BD 10/09/13).HU has been adressed with the PSC crew (Kaplan,BD 10/10/13).Close to actions taken/created. (benson 10/10/13) (SOC 10/10/13)Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 60 of 110 Assign #: 01 AR #: 01569458Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: TRKG Status: COMPLETEPriority: Assigned To: Due Date: 10/13/2013Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: ACAPALL Orig Due Date:Unit Condition: Sec Grp:Assignment DetailsSubjectlDescription: LOCK-OFF FORCE IN TENDON V-136 EXCEEDED ACCEPTANCE CRITERIAAssignment CompletionIn Progress Notes:Completion Notes:Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 61 of 110 Assign #: 02 AR #: 01569458Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: ACIT Status: COMPLETEPriority: Assigned To: STEIHX Due Date: 10/18/2013Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: A5520MS Orig Due Date: 10/18/2013Unit Condition: Sec Grp:Assignment DetailsSubject/Description: (Steinj Verify (PSC) has revised PSC procedure SQ 11.0 to clarify requirement to notexceed 70% GUTS during re-tensioning. Create additional action as needed.Assignment Completion,In Progress Notes:Completion Notes: 9.8.3 Lock-off Force (LOF) -That force at which the tendon load is transferred to the shimstack from the ram. If the detensioned tendon had an accepted lift-off force greater thanits Predicted Force obtained in PSC Procedure SQ 9.0 the Lock-Off Force shall be the asfound lift-off force within a tolerance of minus 0% and plus 6%. If the detensioned tendonhad a lift-off force less than its Predicted Force obtained in PSC Procedure SQ 9.0 theLock-Off Force shall be the Predicted Force from PSC Procedure SQ 9.1 within a toleranceof minus 0% and plus 6%. Lock-off Force is not to exceed 70% of G.U.T.S. (1394 kips fora 169 wire tendon, or 8.25 kips per wire).Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 62 of 110 0 Go BackPrint I New Search I Home0 Go Back Print New Search HomeAR Number: 01572452 Linked ARsAff Fac: Three Mile AR Type: CR Status: COMPLETEIslandAff Unit: 01 Owed To: A5520CAP Due Date: 11/14/2013Aff System: 153 Event Date: 10/15/2013CR 4/D Disc Date: 10/15/2013Level/Class:How H02 Orig Date: 10/15/2013Discovered:Action Request Details

Subject:

DOME TENDON D-143 IDENTIFIED TO BE INACCESSIBLEDescription: Originator: MICHAEL GRIMM Supv Contacted: Mark TorborgCondition

Description:

The tendons selected for examination during the 40th Year TendonSurveillance were walked down prior to the start of the surveillance toidentify any tendons that were inaccessible. During the walk down dometendon D-143 was not identified as inaccessible.During the performance of surveillance activities, it wa-s identified thatan installed Seismic Box, with Accelerometer, created an interference withthe hydraulic ram, making the tendon inaccessible for surveillance. Perthe requirements of ASME Section XI Subsection IWL-2541.1 the closesttendon, not previously inspected, shall be selected as a s bstitute. Theinaccessible tendon shall have a visual examination and a grease sampletaken for analysis.The nearest accessible tendon for surveillance is D-146.Immediate actions taken:Verified condition in fieldWrote this IRRecommended Actions:1. Add replacemerlt tendon D-146 to the scope of the surveillance forexamination (lift-off, visual, and grease sample).2. Perform visual examination and take a grease sample from D-143.3. Identify why the condition was not identified during pre-surveillancewalk downs.What activities, processes, or procedures were involved?Tendon surveillance activities on Dome Tendons.Why did the condition happen?Pre-surveillance walk down of tendon did not identify the interference.What are the consequences?Tendon is inaccessible, and additional adjacent tendon is required to beselected and examined. The inaccessible tendon is examined to the extentpossible.Were any procedural requirements impacted?Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 63 of 110 NoWere there any adverse physical conditions?NoList of knowledgeable individuals:Mark TorborgButch EspenshadeHoward SteinMike GrimmRepeat or similar condition?YesPre surveillance tendons H24-15 and H13-08 were identified to beinaccessible and alternate tendons were selected for exa mination.Operable Basis:Reportable Basis:Functional Basis:Reviewed by: ROBERT R BRADY 10/16/2013 04:01:45 CDTReviewer Comments:Reviewed by Operations for operability and reportability. This issue hasno impact on the ability to safely operate the plant, to achieve ormaintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition, or to mitigate the effectof any accident condition. This is a process issue that does not identifyan equipment deficiency that affects operability of any SSC. There are nooperability or reportability concerns.SOC Reviewed by: CR4STAL A WARLOW 10/18/2013 09:46:55 CDTSOC Comments:REACTOR BUILDINGThis IR identified deficiency does not meet the definition of a CCF(Kaplan,BD 10/16/13).Recommended Actions 1 &2 should go to Maintenance Support (Howard Stein)for scheduling.andRecommended action 3 should go to Maintenance Support (Butch Espenshade)for review of how it was missed.Followup to Maint CR to address actions. (SOC 1 /17/13)RA#1 -Completed 10/17/2013.RA#2 -Scheduled under existing work order for 10/18/2013.RA#3 -Walkdowns were done prior to ability to be at the tendon with useof inspection platform. Interference was not seen during walkdown due tothe inaccessiblityClose to comments and actions taken. (Smokowicz 10/17/13) (SOC 10/18/13)10/16/2013 -Per the IR Originator's request, corrected Tendon Nos.throughout the IR. D. HockleyReviewed by: JONATHAN J SMOKOWICZ 10/17/2013 16:12:06 CDTReviewer Comments:Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 64 of 110 Assign #: 01 AR #: 01572452Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: TRKG Status: COMPLETEPriority: Assigned To: Due Date: 10/20/2013Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: ACAPALL Orig Due Date:Unit Condition: Sec Grp:Assignment DetailsSubject/Description: DOME TENDON D-143 IDENTIFIED TO BE INACCESSIBLEAssignment CompletionIn Progress Notes:Completion Notes:Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 65 of 110 0 Go BackPrint New Search I HomeAR Number: 01585403 Linked ARsAff Fac: Three Mile AR Type: CR Status: COMPLETEIslandAff Unit: 01 Owed To: A5551CAP Due Date: 12/30/2013Aff System: 153 Event Date: 11/14/2013CR 4/D Disc Date: 11/14/2013Level/Class:How H02 Orig Date: 11/14/2013Discovered:Action Request Details

Subject:

TENDON REGREASING EXCEEDED ACCEPTANCE LIMITSDescription: Originator: MICHAEL GRIMM Supv Contacted: John PiazzaCondition

Description:

The tendon population selected for inspection during the 40th year tendonsurveillance included four dome tendons. Of the four dome tendons, onewas found to be inaccessible during the conduct of surveillance activities(IR 1572452), and a replacement was selected. All five dome tendons hadend caps removed and inspection activities performed:D-143D-146D-237D-22During the conduct of the surveillance activities, the bulk filler greasethat protects the tendons from corrosion drains from the tendon conduit.The grease is collected in drums and the amount removed is measured. Thetendon duct is then refilled with grease after inspection activities arecompleted. Per procedure 1301-9.1, the regreasing is required to be with-0/+10% of the total tendon duct volume. Reference AR Evals A2238266-02and 04 for the computed tendon duct volumes.During refill activities, three dome tendons took more the +10% ductvolume to fill.D-143 .+59.94% grease fillD-146 .+58.84% grease fillD-237 .+48.08% grease fillIt is noted that no grease leakage was noted from the dome area of thecontainment building prior to the conduct of inspection activities.Additionally no water was found in the grease removed from the dometendons. A wire sample was taken from D-237 and no corrosion was notedon the wire surface.Immediate actions taken:Contacted Responsible EngineerWrote IRRecommended Actions:Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 66 of 110

1. Evaluate cause of the condition and acceptability for continuedservice.What activities, processes, or procedures were involved?Tendon Surveillance Activities / regreasingWhy did the condition happen?The condition is a result of original construction greasing. The greasewas pumped into the tendon duct using the opposite end cap as the ventpoint. As the dome is spherical, the high point of the tendon duct is ata higher elevation than the vent location. Dome tendons that run alongthe outer edges of dome have less of an elevation difference and as aresult will have a smaller grease void.What are the consequences?The consequences of the grease void is that a section of the dome tendonsis not covered by bulk filler grease. There are no adverse consequenceson the containment as these three dome tendons were tested satisfactorily.The lift-off and grease visuals were acceptable and as expected. A wiresample was pulled from D-237 and did not show signs of corrosion.Were any procedural requirements impacted?The grease refill did not meet the acceptance criteria of 1301-9.1.Were there any adverse physical conditions?There are no adverse physical conditions in the containment. The dometendons are performing their functions as demonstrated by the acceptablelift-off tests. Additinally there is no noted grease leakage from thedome tendons and there was no water found in the tendon grease or endcaps.Additionally there was no corrosion found on the wire sample taken fromD-237 which stands as a representative sample. The tendon wires werecoated in Viscon rust 1601 Amber, that per UFSAR section 5.2.2.3.7provides protectifon from corrosion prior to bulk grease filling.List of knowledgeable individuals:Michael GrimmSean TaylorHoward HillRepeat or similar condition?NoOperable Basis:As stated in ht body of the IR there are nooperability issues with thecontainment.Reportable Basis:There are o reportability concernsFunctional Basis:Reviewed by: MARKO MALINEN 11/14/2013 21:02:26 CSTReviewer Comments:MPMSOC Reviewed by: CRYSTAL A WARLOW 11/16/2013 10:47:32 CSTSOC Comments:Close to action created (BBalliet 11/15/13) (SOC 11/16/13)Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 67 of 110 IITopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 68 of 110 Assign #: 01 AR #: 01585403Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: TRKG Status: COMPLETEPriority: Assigned To: Due Date: 11/19/2013Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: ACAPALL Orig Due Date:Unit Condition: Sec Grp:Assignment DetailsSubject/Description: TENDON REGREASING EXCEEDED ACCEPTANCE LIMITSAssignment CompletionIn Progress Notes:Completion Notes:.tTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 69 of 110 Exeton Generation. Evaluation of Dome Grease Voids 1585403-02that Exceed Acceptance CriteriaPREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of 40th Year Surveillance Dome Grease Voids 1 of 51.0 Reason for Evaluation/ScopeDuring tendon bulk filler grease (Corrosion Protection Medium (CPM)) refill activities in the dometendons during the TMI Unit 1 40th Year Tendon Surveillance, the quantity of refill tendon greasewas found to exceed the acceptance criteria specified in Exelon Procedure ER-AA-330-006 Revision7, section 4.4.4.1, states:I I"The absolute difference between quantity of corrosion protection medium (sheathing filler grease)removed and amount replaced shall not EXCEED 10% of net duct volume."I IThe purpose of this evaluation is to evaluate this condition for its affect on containment integrityand to determine its acceptability for continued service. This evaluation is conducted in accordancewith CC-AA-309-101, Engineering Technical Evaluations, and ASME Section XI 2004 Edition,Subsection IWL.This evaluation wasscreened per HU-AA-1212. Review of attachment 2 of HU-AA-1212 identified norisk factors; however, as this evaluation pertains to a safety related component, it requires anindependent review. An additional review has been performed by the Responsible Engineer,Howard Hill, as required by ASME Section Xl, 2004 Edition, Subsection IWL.2.0 Detailed EvaluationAs IR 1585403 documents, dome tendon regreasing activities conducted during the TMI Unit 1 40thYear Tendon Surveillance resulted in grease fill exceeding the acceptance criteria of PSC procedureSQ 12.1 and Exelon procedure ER-AA-330-006 of 10% of the total net duct volume. The actualquantities of grease replaced are shown below in table 1.Table 1: Grease Replacement Volumes% Difference Net Duct Grease Added' tal Grease Total Duct VolumeTe don Volume1 (Gallons) Replaced (Gallons) (Gallons)D143 59.94% 51.2 70.69 85.4D146 58.84% 47.7 63.16 81.0D237 48.08% 44.6 65.37 92.8Notel: Net duct volume is gross volume of duct, trumpets and end caps less the volume of tendonwire, anchor heads and shims.Note 2: Grease added is the difference between the grease removed during surveillance activitiesand that pumped back into the tendon aTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 70 of 110 Exelon Generation. Evaluation of Dome Grease Voids 1585403-02that Exceed Acceptance CriteriaPREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of 40th Year Surveillance Dome Grease Voids 2 of 5As there has been no evidence of significant leakage at the tendon end caps as evidenced fromTopical Report 150, it can be concluded that the tendon ducts did not drain during their 40 yearservice life. Thusly this implies that the tendon ducts were not completely filled at the time ofconstruction. TMI does not have high point vents for the dome tendons; as such the observedcondition is not unexpected.I IDuring construction, dome tendon ducts were generally filled with CPM in pairs. The supply hosefrom the pump was connected at the end of one tendon and the return (to the hot CPM reservoir)hose at the nearby end of an adjacent tendon. A third hose was connected to the far ends of thetwo tendons. CPM was pumped through the two tendons until the CPM exiting the end cap at thereturn end reached a specified temperature. At that point, the supply and return hoses wereisolated by valves and the end caps sealed by threaded plugs inserted through the fittings used toattach the hoses.This procedure ensured that the duct on the inlet side of both tendons was filled to the high pointand that the end caps on the outlet ends were filled. But, since the hot, fluid CMP flowed freelyfrom the high points to the outlet end caps, the air voids on the outlet sides of the ducts were notnecessarily purged. As a consequence, it is expected that dome tendon ducts have significant airvoids trapped between the duct high points and the end caps on the return ends.It should be noted that while this condition is not 4uexpected, past tendon surveillances at TMI havenot reported grease voids in excess of the acceptance criteria. This may be due to limitations withinthe procedure used for grease refill, or these three tendons could be an anomaly from original plantconstruction. As the number of confirmed dome tendons affected by this condition is small, and thelack of high point vents to allow for the filling of the duct, it is desired to show by evaluation that thedome tendons will continue to perform acceptably for the remainder of plant life.Unlike typical Bechtel containments, the TMI Unit 1 containment uses schedule 40 pipe for thetendon duct than rolled spiral seam sheet metal. As such the pipe du ts are impervious towater penetration and are well protected from exterior corrosion by the suriounding alkalineconcrete environment. Since water penetration is not an issue with the TMI design, it is notnecessary to fill tendon duct with bulk filler grease (CPM) as the entry point for water into thetendon duct is at the low points (tendon end caps). During initial tendon greasing, grease waspumped through the tendon duct from one end until a constant stream of grease exited theopposite side, ensuring that the tendon end caps are filled with CPM. This is sufficient forpreventing water intrusion into the tendon end cap and lower portions of the tendon duct, andthusly into the upper portions.Additionally, during construction, the TMI tendons were coated with a hard wax-like corrosionpreventive material, Visconorust 1601 Amber, as referenced in the TMI Updated Final SafetyAnalysis Report section 5.2.2.3.7. Further during CPM pump through, the tendon wires wouldTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 71 of 110 Exelon Generation. Evaluation of Dome Grease Voids 1585403-02that Exceed Acceptance CriteriaPREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of 40th Year Surveillance Dome Grease Voids 3 of 5experience some CPM coating. Therefore, the tendon wire maintains some corrosion protectionagainst the initial environment within the tendon duct.The dome area above the ring girder is well drained with no areas in which rain water or snow meltcan collect in significant quantity, percolate into the concrete, and accumulate around the tendonducts. To date 72 TMI-1 dome tendon anchorages (both ends of 36 dome tendons) have beenexamined under the containment ISI program. Forithe life of the plant (40 years), no significantwater intrusion has been noted, and all grease samples taken from the dome tendons have met theacceptance criteria in procedure ER-AA-330-006. Test wires have been removed from 10 tendonsand examined. No significant corrosion has been found and all wire samples have had satisfactorytensile tests. This provides convincing evidence that water intrusion and wire corrosion are notareas of concern for the TMI Unit 1 dome tendons.Additional industry Operating Experience (OPEX) on tendon grease voids was reviewed forapplicability to TMI. Both Crystal River Unit 3 (OE 169794 and 178114) and South Texas (CE 121945)have identified grease replacements that exceeded the acceptance criteria on their vertical tendons.Both plants reported that the conditions did not pose a containment integrity issue, and no tendondegradation was observed.3.0 Conclusion/FindingsThe above discussion supports the conclusion that the observed shortfall of CPI does not have anadverse impact on the dome tendon integrity. The geometry of the dome and the rigid pipe ductensure that tendons are fully protected from water intrusion. The shop coating of Visconorust 1601Amber on the tendon wires and further coating during CPM installation ensures that the baretendon wire is not exposed to a possibly moist atmosphere in those segments of duct that are notcompletely filled with CPM. Extensive examinations conducted to date provide conclusive evidencethat there has been no degradation of the TMI Unit 1 dome tendon wires, and scheduled futureexaminations are expected to yield similar results. Therefore it is concluded that the as-foundgrease void condition in the dome tendons is acceptable for continued operation and no furtherinspection or repair activities are required It this time.4.0 References1. ASME Section Xl, Subsection IWL, 2004 Edition2. ER-AA-330-006 Revision 7, Inservice Inspection and Testing of the Pre-Stressed ConcreteContainment Post Tensioning Systems3. 1301-9.1 Revision 23A, RB Structural Integrity Tendon Surveillance4. TMI-1 UFSAR Chapter 55. IR 1585403, Tendon Regreasing Exceeded Acceptance Limits6. Tendon Surveillance Topical Reports7. InRyco Drawings PS-xx seriesTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 72 of 110 ExeLon Generation. Evaluation of Dome Grease Voids 1585403-02that Exceed Acceptance CriteriaPREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of 40th Year Surveillance Dome Grease Voids 4 of 55.0 AttachmentsNoneTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 73 of 110 INEMW Exeton Generation.Evaluation of Dome Grease Voidsthat Exceed Acceptance Criteria1585403-02PREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of 40th Year Surveillance Dome Grease Voids 5 of 5ApprovalsResponsible Engineer: Howard HillPreparer: Michael GrimmIndependent Reviewer: Sealn TaylorManager: Mark TorborgDate: EDMSDate: EDMSDate: EDMS IDate: EDMSTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 74 of 110 Full Action Request ReportPage I of 5O Go Back Print I New Search HomeAR Number: 01587456 Linked ARsAff Fac: Three Mile AR Type: CR Status: COMPLETEIslandAff Unit: 01 Owed To: A5520CAP Due Date: 12/20/2013Aff System: 153 Event Date: 11/18/2013CR 4/D Disc Date: 11/19/2013Level/Class:How H02 Orig Date: 11/19/2013Discovered:Action Request Details

Subject:

SURVEILLANCE TENDON DE-TENSIONED BEFORE LIFT-OFF COMPLETEDDescription: Originator: MICHAEL GRIMM Supv Contacted: Mark TorborgCondition

Description:

The random tendon selection for the TMI Unit 1 40th Year TendonSurveillance included Hoop Tendon H13-03. H13-03 was originally tensionedfrom a single-end (Buttress 1) during construction due to interferencesand as such it is expected that the opposite end (Buttress 3) will have alower lift-off force.IR 1541172 was put in previously for another single-end tensioned tendon(H24-15) to declare the tendon inaccessible as it was not possible toccess both ends of the tendon. Per ASME Section XI, 2004 Editioln,ubsection IWL-3000 the average lift-off value from both ends shiall beused for comparison to the acceptance criteria. This implies that Alltendons should have the lift-off test performed from both ends. TMI hasproceduralized that all dome and hoop tendons shall have lift-off testsperformed from both ends, only vertical tendons are exempt from thisrequirement. Per Exelon procedure and ASME Section XI, it was determinedthat any hoop tendon not accessible from both ends, regardless of how thetendon was originally stressed, would be declared inaccessible. TMI hastaken a further stance that information only lift-offs will be performedon single-end tensioned tendons inaccessible from the opposite end tocomply with the intent of ASME Section XI, Subsection IWL-2521 whichstates that the tendon anc orage shall be examined to the extentpractical.Due to questions raised around this issue during the planning phase of thetendon project, a decision tree flow diagram was issued to PSC underassignment 1541172-02. This decision tree was intended to provide avisual representation to aide PSC and Exelon personnel with determiningthe best course of action for various conditions (such as this one) duringthe surveillance.During the pre-surveillance walkdowns it was identified that both ends ofH13-03 were accessible for lift-off testing. As a result, this tendon wasnot declared inaccessible and PSC was instructed to test the tendon,de-tension, and re-tension the tendon from both buttresses.Once in the field for performance of the surveillance on H13-03, PSCidentified that they could not in fact couple their ram to the tendon toperform the lift-off measurement. PSC did not stop work, and continued tode-tension the tendon from one end, after lift-off was performed from theTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 75 of 110http://eamgenco.ceco.com/cap/serv let/ReportFu I IA RServ let4/10/2014 Full Action Request ReportPage 2 of 5accessible end. This course of action was not proscribed by the decisiontree and is counter to PSC procedure SQ9.0 which states:"The tendon will have been monitored for tendon force as required of PSCProcedure SQ9.0. The De-tensioning shall continue from that point wherethe final or third liftoff was taken. The tendon shall not be de-tensioneduntil the liftoffs are documented. The ram will still be coupled to theanchorage that all Hoop tendons are to have lift-off tests performed fromboth ends."In addition, the measurement of the lift-off on H13-03 was counter to PSCprocedure SQ9.0 which states the following:"Monitoring of Tendon Force can be performed on both ends of a tendon in animultaneous and controlled manner or on one tendon end at a titne,independent of the opposite end of the tendon. These procedures have beendeveloped so that they apply to one end of the tendon. Every effort shouldbe made to measure lift-off at opposite ends of a tendon at the same time.If this is prohibited by plant conditions (i.e., one end is accessibleonly with the plant operating and the other only when the plant is shutdown), then measurements must be made as close together in time aspossible and under similar temperature regimes. Adequate communicationshall be maintained between both ends of the tendon during the taking oflift-off readings for simultaneous stressing operations. Vertical tendonmonitoring of force is to be performed from one end, top end, only unlessthe tendon was double end stressed during original installation."As H13-03 is not a vertical tendon the lift-off testing of a single-end isnot acceptable.Further PSC procedure SQ10.0 specifies that both ends of a tendon bede-tensioned in unison except single-end stressed vertical tendons. Thusthe de-tensioning of H13-03 from one end violated the procedure SQ10.0.Finally PSC and TMI do not havr a procedure that allows for or addressesthe re-tensioning of hoop tend d ns from a single-end. PSC procedure SQ12.0states that "Retensioning of te' dons shall be performed on both ends of ahoop and dome tendon, or, single end of a vertical tendon which are onlyretensioned from the top end. Where it is not possible to performsimultaneous stressing of a tendon, Exelon Engineering shall be notifiedin writing to provide resolution for such conditions."Immediate actions taken:IR initiatedPSC personnel modified the ram jib arm to allow access tp the Buttress 3end of H13-03.Recommended Actions:1. Maintenance Support to address Human Performance issue2. Engineering to perform technical evaluation to determine the averageas-found tendon pre-stressing force.3. Maintenance to submit vendor FMSWhat activities, processes, or procedures were involved?Conduct of tendon surveillance activities.Why did the condition happen?Failure to comply with procedureTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 76 of 110http://eaiigenco.ceco.com/cap/servlet/ReportFuIlARServ let4/10/2014 Full Action Request Report Page 3 of 5What are the consequences?Per the intent of ASME Section XI, subsection IWL and TMI engineeringposition the lift-off of H13-03 does not constitute a code exam as it wasnot taken from both ends of the tendon. However, the as-found averagepre-stressing force in the tendon can be determined through a computationusing the tendon elongation during re-tensioning activities.Were any procedural requirements impacted?PSC procedures SQ9.0, SQ10.0, and SQ12.0 were violated during theperformance of surveillance activities on H13-03. Further engineering wasnot notified of the non-conforming condition.Were there any adverse physical conditions?None. The plant is currently in Cold Shutdown, however, it is acceptableto have one h~op tendon de-tensioned while the plant is in operation.List of knowledgeable individuals:Mark TorborgMichael Grimm,Sean TaylorHoward HillRepeat or similar condition?NoOperable Basis:Reportable Basis:Functional Basis:Reviewed by: BRADLEY A PARFITT 11/20/2013 11:39:55 CSTReviewer Comments:Reviewed by Operations for operability and reportability. This issue hasno impact on the ability to safely operate the plant, to achieve ormaintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition, or to mitigate the effectof any accident condition. This issue does not identify an equipmentdeficiency that affects operability or functionality of any SSC. theas-found average pre-stressing force in the tendon can be determinedthrough a computation using the tendon elongation during re-tensioningactivities. The tendon will be retensioned prior to heat up, however, itis acciptable to have one hoop tendon de-tensioned while the plant is i hopera ion. This issue is not reportable because this condition doesn'tmeet 6r exceed any reportability criteria of the Exelon ReportabilityReference Manual.SOC Reviewed by: CRYSTAL A WARLOW 11/21/2013 09:56:12 CSTSOC Comments:Tendon surveillances are complete. HU addressed with contractor. Actioncreated to submit FMS for contractor. Close to actions created/taken(Smokowicz 11/21/2013)Action created for RA#2. (Lytle 11/21/13)Close to actions taken/created. (SOC 11/21/13)Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 77 of 110http://eamgenco.ceco.com/cap/servlet/ReportFullARServlet4/10/2014 Full Action Request ReportPage 4 of 5Assign #: 01 AR #: 01587456 0Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: TRKG Status: COMPLETEPriority: Assigned To: Due Date: 11/24/2013Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: ACAPALL Orig Due Date:Unit Condition: Sec Grp:Assignment DetailsSubject/Description: SURVEILLANCE TENDON DE-TENSIONdD BEFORE LIFT-OFF COMPLETEDAssignment CompletionIn Progress Notes:Completion Notes:0Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 78 of 110http://eam-genco.ceco.comn/cap/servlet/ReportFulIARServlet 4/10/2014 Full Action Request ReportPage 5 of 5' Assign #: 02 AR #: 01587456Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: ACIT Status: COMPLETEPriority: Assigned To: STEIHX Due Date: 12/20/2013Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: A5520MAINT Orig Due Date: 12/20/2013Unit Condition: Sec Grp:Assignment DetailsISubject/Description: Submit FMS for vendor PSCAssignment CompletionIn Progress Notes: Surveillance Tendon H 13-03 De-tensioned before Liftoff of other Tendon EndContract & ProcedureThe 40th Year Tendon Surveillance was performed by Precision SurveillanceCorp. The surveillance process followed an approved Procedure thatincorporated both Station and Corporate requirements. N1091 PSC ProcedureSQ 10.0, Section 8.0 Detensioning the Tendon, provides direction for thisactivity.Procedure SQ 10.0, Section 8.0 Detensioning the Tendon"Both ends of a tendon shall be de-tensioned in unison unless otherwisedirected by the PSC Superintendent."The H13-03 hoop tendon was only tensioned from one (1) end during Stationconstruction as confirmed by the shim on the side that PSC initiallydetensioned being a proximately 14 inches thick whereas the opposite endshim thickness was he minimal 2 inches thickness for a non-tensioned end.Based on this finding, PSC elected only to detension from one end(following the Procedure). Per direction from the Station via Howard Hill(consulting engineer), PSC retensioned H13-03 from both ends.Recommendations1) Insure that Station requirements are made clear in the Procedure(which was updated, reviewed and approved by the Station).2) Clearly define during the walkdown as well as confirm via theSchedule Description for each tendon when a tendon is to be retensionedfrom both ends. Secondly, a Summary Scope 9f Work should be developed thatclearly describes what is to be performed for elch tendon to be surveyed.As-Built Tendon CardShows one end was stressed.Completion Notes:0Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 79 of 110http://eamgenco.ceco.com/cap/servlet/ReportFullARServlet4/10/2 014 Full Action Request ReportPage I of 30 Go Back Print I New Search HomeAR Number: 01645620 Linked ARsAff Fac: Three Mile AR Type: CR Status: APPROVEDIslandAff Unit: 01 Owed To: A5551CAP Due Date: 05/10/2014Aff System: 153 Event Date: 04/09/2014CR / Disc Date: 04/09/2014Level/Class:How H02 Orig Date: 04/10/2014Discovered:Action Request Details

Subject:

REVISION REQUIRED FOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION 1587456-03Description: Originator: MICHAEL GRIMM Supv Contacted: Mark TorborgCondition

Description:

During the preparation of the 40th Year Tendon Surveillance Topical Report213 it was identified that an alternate method for computing the averagetendon pre-stressing force would provide a more conservative result fortrending purposes. The average pre-stressing force in the tendons is usedto demonstrate that the expected tendon pre-stressing force will begreater than the minimum required pre-stressing force at the time of thenext tendon surveillance.This IR is written to supersede the original technical ev luation.Immediate actions taken:Revised the technical evaluationIssued IRRecommended Actions:Close to actions taken.What activities, processes, or procedures were involved?Preparation of the 40th Year Tendon Surveillance Topical Report 213.Why did the con lition happen?A different methodology was used in the preparation of the originalevaluation under IR 1587456-03 that was not as conservative. A moreconservative approach was utilized in the revision of the technicalevaluation.What are the consequences?None, the force computed in the technical evaluation is not used foracceptance of the tendon's as-found condition, but is utilized in the hooptendon force trend to predict the expected pre-stressing force at the timeof the next surveillance.Were any procedural requirements impacted?NoWere there any adverse physical conditions?NoneList of knowledgeable individuals:Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 80 of 110http://eamngenco.ceco.com/cap/servlet/ReportFullARServ let4/14/20 14 Full Action Request ReportPage 21 of 3Mike GrimmSean TaylorMark TorborgRepeat or similar condition?NoOperable Basis:Reportable Basis:Functional Basis:Reviewed by: JOSEPH W KULASINSKY 04/10/2014 13:28:54 CDTReviewer Comments:The information in the Tech Eval is not used to determine surveillancetesting acceptance criteria. Reasonable assurance exists that the RBtendons remain operable. There are no reportability or functionalityconcerns.SOC Reviewed by: RANDY E HESS 04/11/2014 10:53:43 CDTSOC Comments:Close to action created. (benson 4/11/14)Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 81 of 110http://earngenco.ceco.comn/cap/servlet/ReportFullARServlet4/14/2014 Full Action Request ReportPage 3 of 3Assign #: 01 AR #: 01645620Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: TRKG Status: AWAIT/CPriority: Assigned To: Due Date: 04/15/2014Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: ACAPALL Orig Due Date:Unit Condition: Sec Grp:Assignment DetailsSubject/Description: REVISION REQUIRED FOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION 158ý456-03Assignment CompletionI IIn Progress Notes:Completion Notes:Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 82 of 110http://eai-genco.ceco.co-n/cap/servlet/ReportFullARServlet4/14/2 014 Exelon Generation. Evaluation of As-Found Force 1645620-02for H 13-03PREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of H13-03 As-Found Force 1 of 61.0 Reason for Evaluation/ScopeThe purpose of this evaluation is to determine the as-found average pre-stress force in hoop tendonH13-03. H13-03 was single-end stressed during plant construction due to access restrictions duringthe construction process. Prior to the 40th Year Tendon Surveillance it was determined that bothends of H13-03 were accessible for testing and the tendon was not declared inaccessible. Duringsurveillance activities, safety related conduit was found to be in the way of the ram jib arm and as aresult the Buttress 3 end was not tested. Further H13-03 was de-tensioned without informingengineering, reference IR 1587456 for complete description.ASME Section XI 2004 Edition No Addenda Subsection IWL, Subsection IWL-2522(a) requires that"The pre-stressing force in all inspection sample tendons shall be measured by lift-off or anequivalent test." The force in a curved tendon is normally documented as the average of the lift-offvalues measured at the individual ends. However, this is not mandated in IWL. A technicallyacceptable alternative, i.e., "equivalent test", for tendons that are de-tensioned/re-tensioned is tocompute tendon mean force using the as-found shim stack height, the re-tensioningforce/elongation data, tendon length, tendon area and elastic modulus of the wire.This evaluation will analytically determine the as-found average pre-stressing force on tendon H13-03. The computed mean force will be used in the hoop tendon normalized group mean force andmean force trend projections. The H13-03 predicte force (C-1101-153-E410-046) is based on thesingle end (Buttress 1) lock-off force as documentedIon the stressing cards. Therefore, forcemeasured at the tensioned end of H13-03 (Buttress 1), and not the computed mean, is compared tothe predicted value for the purpose of determining the acceptability of time dependent losses(which are normally assumed to be relatively proportional at all points along the tendon length)experienced by this tendon. Therefore, special considerations are required to compare the "as-found" and predicted forces. These considerations are discussed the following evaluation.This evaluatio was screened per HU-AA-1212. Review of attachment 2 of H -AA-1212 identified norisk f hoever, as this evaluation pertains to a safety related componeft, it requires anindependent review. An additional review has been performed by the Responsible Engineer,Howard Hill, as required by ASME Section Xl, 2004 Edition, Subsection IWL.2.0 Detailed EvaluationDuring the 40th Year Tendon Surveillance hoop tendon H13-03 was lift-off tested from one end andthen detensioned. This single end lift-off provides the data needed to establish time dependentlosses and the acceptability of these as determined by comparing this lift-off force to the predictedvalue. The predicted value, taken from Calculation C-1101-153-E410-046, is based on the "as-installed" lock-off force, which was performed from one end (Buttress 1). For this reason it isreasonable to use the single-end lift-off measurement from Buttress 1 for direct comparison withTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 83 of 110 ExeLon Generation. Evaluation of As-Found Force 1645620-02for H13-03PREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of H13-03 As-Found Force 2 of 6the predicted force to determine time dependant losses. However, it is prudent to compare theaverage "as-found" force computed in the following evaluation with a modified version of thepredicted force.2.1. Development of single-end tensioned acceptance criteriaDuring construction of the TMI Unit 1 Containment Building 14 hoop tendons were found to beinaccessible from one end, and were thusly single-end tensioned. Correspondance between Inland-Ryerson (Inryco), Gilbert Associates (GAI), and GPU Nuclear shows acceptance the acceptance of thiscondition with the acknowledgement of reduced pre-stressing forces in the affected tendons.However, during the original tendons selection for surveillance (TMI selected all 40 years ofsurveillance tendons at the same time shortly after original construction), the single-end tensionedtendons were not included in the surveillance population due to their accessibility. As a result theoriginal pre-stressing force calculation, DC-5390-225.01-SE, did not address the difference in thepredicted tendon force.During the revision of the predicted force calculation to include the steam generator replacement(SGR) tendons and a complete listing of all TMI tendons as a result of the incorporation of the IWLrequirements into the surveillance, no consideration was given to single-end tensioned tendonsoutside of identifying which tendons were single-end stressed. At the start of the 40th Year TendonSurveillance in 201 it was identified that two tendons selected for examination vere originallysingle-end tension4d. While one of these tendons was eventually ruled to be ia ccessible, it wasdeemed prudent to develop guidance to help in the disposition of these tendons. This guidanceincluded a flow-chart for determining accessibility, lift-off measurements, and methodology forevaluating the results.The main conclusion from the guidance was that the predicted force values developed for thesingle-end tensioned tendons were not representative of the expected average pre-stressing forcein the single-end tensioned tendons. It was expected that single-end tensioned tendons would havea predicted pre-stress force approximately 5% less than that in double-end tensioned tendons.This led to a modified predicted force of 93. % of the originally calculated predicted force (1,013.5kips), with the 95% of predicted force acceptance criteria being equal to 88% of the originalpredicted force (954 kips).Further evaluation of the single-end tensioned tendons and their effect on the pre-stressedcontainment structure for the period of extended operation will be evaluated in an MPR analysis.The forces developed in this analysis will be utilized for future surveillances as applicable, andadditional guidance will be incorporated into the TMI Surveillance Procedure, 1301-9.1, to addresssingle-end tensioned tendons.Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 84 of 110 Exelon Generation. Evaluation of As-Found Force 1645620-02for H13-03PREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of H13-03 As-Found Force 3 of 62.2. Computation of the "As-Found" Average Pre-Stressing ForceWhile the actual surveillance test results are acceptable for determining time dependent losses, the"as-found" average pre-stressing force is required to compute the normalized group mean pre-stressing force, the group mean trend to demonstrate acceptability until the next surveillance, andto compare to the modified predicted force developed in section 2.1. The mean force in anindividual hoop tendon can be represented as the average of lift-off forces measured at theindividual ends approach) or computed directly as outlined belowThe method of computing the as-found average tendon pre-stress force is as follows:1. Using the force (F,) and elongation (Xi) data recorded at Buttresses 1 and 3 during re-tensioning,where i represents the buttress number, plot the average end force (Favg) against the totaltendon elongation (Xtotal).avg F + F3XtotaI= X1 + X3The plot is represented by a linear trend line; represented as follows:F = mX + b2. Extrapolate the plot back to zero force to determine the zero-stress clearance (X0) between thebearing plate and anchor head for both tendon ends.X =--3. Subtract X0 from the total "as-found" shim stack height (hs)to get the "as-found" tendonelongation (Xf). The "as-found" shim stack height will be the same as the "as-installed" shimstack height. Then divide by tendon length (L) to get the mean "as-found" tendon strain (Ema).hs = h1 + h3Xf = h, -Xoxr4. Computý mean as-found tendon force (Fm) using the tendon modulus oý elasticity (E) and thecross sectional area of the tendon (A).F.= ()(E)(A)E = 29x103ksiT/r2A = (Nvires) 2In accordance with PSC procedure SQl.0, Retension Tendons, the pre-stress force in the tendons istaken at four separate elongations as the tendon is taken to 80% of the Guaranteed Ultimate TensileStrength (GUTS), referred to as the overstress condition. This is done from both endssimultaneously and the tendon elongation and force are recorded on data sheet SQl1.1. Table 1Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 85 of 110 ExeLon Generation. Evaluation of As-Found Force 1645620-02for H13-03PREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of H13-03 As-Found Force 4 of 6shows the pre-stressing forces and corresponding elongations recorded during re-tensioning of H13-03. The total elongation and the average pre-stress force are computed in table 1.Table 1: Tendon Pre-Stressing Force for Recorded Tendon ElongationsButtress 1 Buttress 3 H13-03Elongation Force Elongation Force Total Elogation Average Force(inches) (kips) (inches) (kilýs) (inches) (kips)4.4 206.04 4.1 207.2 8.5 206.626.8 800.28 6.2 797.59 13 798.9358.2 1199.18 7.65 1201.15 15.85 1200.1659.3 1462.37 8.7 1462.72 18 1462.545The total elongation is then plotted in figure 1 versus the average pre-stressing force. A linear trendline is fitted to the data to show the as-found tendon condition.Tendon Elongation vs. Pre-Stressing Force2000:15001004 500y = 133.12x -924.920I I I I I I I I0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14Tendon Elongation (inches)I I I16 18 20Figure 1: Plot of the total tendon elongation versus the average pre-stressing force.Using the linear trend equation X0 is found to be 6.95 inches. Tendon H13-03 had 169 wires in the"as-found" condition and the corresponding tendon area (A) is 8.30 in2.The total shim height (hj)from measurements taken by PSC and recorded on data sheets 8.OA and 8.0B is 15.3 in. The tendonlength (L), as recorded on test wire examination data sheet 10.2, is 155 ft and 6 in, or 1,866 in.Using this data, the "as-found" mean strain (Em) is found to be 4.47x10-3 , and the respective "as-found" mean pre-stressing force (Fm,) is 1,076 kips.The measured lift-off at Buttress 1 was recorded on PSC data sheet 9.0 as 1,230 kips. The T = 39.5(years after the March 1974 RB SIT) prediction for force at the Buttress 1 end of H13-03 is 1,141 kip.STopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 86 of 110 Exelon Generation. Evaluation of As-Found Force 1645620-02for H13-03PREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of H13-03 As-Found Force 5 of 6The measured force exceeds that predicted and, therefore, meets the acceptance criterion(measured force at least 95% of predicted (1,084 kips)), and is used to show the time-dependantpre-stessing losses are acceptable.Additionally, the computed average tendon force (1,076 kips) is equivalent to 94.3% of the predictedpre-stressing force, which exceeds the modified predicted force (1,013.5 kips) discussed in section2.1. Therefore, both the Buttress 1 measured lift-off force and the computed average pre-stressingftrce are acceptable in the "as-found" condition. The comparison of the computed average pre-stressing force to the modified predicted force is included for reference only.The computed average pre-stressing force will be further utilized in the 40th Year TendonSurveillance Topical Report for computation of the Hoop Tendon Group Mean Pre-Stressing Forceand the Group Mean Pre-Stressing Trend.3.0 Conclusion/FindingsAs the above computation shows, the as-found mean pre-stressing force in hoop tendon H13-03 is1,076 kips, or 94.3% of the predicted tendon pre-stress force, which is greater than the modifiedpredicted force developed in section 2.1. Additionally, as the "as-found" lift-off force measured atButtress 1 was 1,141 kips, which is greater than 95% of the predicted tendon pre-stress force thetendon's "as-found" condition is acceptable. The average pre-stressing force, computed in theabove evaluation, will be used in the 40th Year Tendon Surveillance Topical Report for computling themean hoop tendon force as w~ll as determining the hoop tendon force trend until the nextsurveillance. No additional actions are required.4.0 References1. ASME Section Xl, Subsection IWL, 2004 Edition2. ER-AA-330-006 Revision 7, Inservice Inspection and Testing of the Pre-Stressed ConcreteContainment Post Tensioning Systems3. 1301-9.1 Revision 23A, RB Structural Integrity Tendon Surveillance4. IR 1587456, Surveillance Tendon Detensioned Befor Lift-Off Completed5. PSC Inspection Manual N10916. C-1101-153-E410-046, TMI-1 RB Post Tensioning System ISI Program Tendon Force Prediction7. DC-5390-225.01-SE, Surveillance Tendon Selection Reactor Bldg. Post Tensioning System TendonSelection and Force vs. Time Curves Surveillances 6 through 105.0 Attachments1. Data sheets SQ11.1 for H13-03 Buttress 1 and Buttress 3Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 87 of 110 Exelon Generation. Evaluation of As-Found Forcefor H13-03PREPARED BY SUBJECTMichael Grimni Evaluation of H13-03 As-Found ForceApprovalsResponsible Engineer: Howard HillPreparer: Michael GrimmIndependent Reviewer: Sean TaylorManager: MarkTorborg1645620-02PAGE6 of 6Date: See EDMSDate: See EDMSDate: See EDMSIDate: See EDMS,Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 88 of 110 ExeLon Generation. As-Found Condition ofReactor Building Embed PlatesPREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of the As-Found Condition of Embedded Steel 1 of 5Plates in the Reactor Building Tendon Buttresses1.0 Reason for Evaluation/ScopeThe purpose of this technical evaluation is to evaluate the "as-found" condition of the embeddedplates in the reactor building tendon buttress concrete. During the 40th Year Tendon Surveillancegeneral concrete examination, several embedded steel plates were identified as "pulling away" fromthe concrete. The embedded plates identified in these data sheets are shown on drawing 421030.This constitutes a new recordable indication' that needs to be addressed, and evaluated foracceptability.This evaluation was screened per HU-AA-1212. Review of attachment 2 of HU-AA-1212 identified norisk factors; however, as this evaluation pertains to a safety related component, it requires anindependent review. An additional review has been performed by the Responsible Engineer,Howard Hill, as required by ASME Section Xl, 2004 Edition, Subsection IWL.2.0 Detailed EvaluationThe 40th Year Tendon Surveillance was performed at Three Mile Island (TMI) during the Fall of 2013.The surveillance began on September 23, 2013 and Precision Surveillance Corporation (PSC) left siteon December 4, 2013. The surveillance completed on January 31, 2014 with the receipt of thecorrosion protection medium (CPM) and tendon wire test results. Additional CPM tests are inprocess; hcýwever, these are follow-up actions to the original surveillance As part of thesurveillance, PSC conducted a general concrete visual examination of the accessible exterior reactorbuilding surfaces. These inspections were documented in the PSC surveillance report submitted toTMI on February 4, 2014.Subsequent to the receipt of the surveillance report, the Responsible Engineer (RE), Howard Hill,performed a review for his agreement/concurrence with the conclusions reached by PSC. Thisreview is part of the RE duties and is included as part of the final TMI Engineering Topical Reportissued to the NRC within 90 days of he surveillance completion. The Topical Report is required tobe submitted by April 31, 2014. During this review the RE identified that the PSC data sheets for theconcrete visual inspection identified new recordable indications of several embedded steel platespulling away from the concrete surface. The indications were reported on Tendon Buttresses 3, 4, 5,and 6.The embedded plates in question are depicted on drawing 421030, Reactor Building ConcreteExterior Wall Concrete Outline. Detail A of this drawing shows the details of the embedded plates(Figure 1, below). Figure 2, below, shows the locations of the embedded plates on the tendonbuttress.Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 89 of 110 Exeton Generation. As-Found Condition ofReactor Building Embed PlatesPREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of the As-Found Condition of Embedded Steel 2 of 5Plates in the Reactor Building Tendon Buttresses,-68" 6 3 8NELSON ANCHO015TUD5 ?.'O",c,) ~ k : .d 38F(CONTI N)DSTAiL "A"Figure 1: Details of Embedded Steel PlatesFigure 2: Location of Embedded PlatesTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 90 of 110 Exelon Generation. As-Found Condition ofReactor Building Embed PlatesPREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of the As-Found Condition of Embedded Steel 3 of 5Plates in the Reactor Building Tendon ButtressesThe embedded steel plates do not run the entire length of the tendon buttress but are primarilyabove the rooflines of the adjacent buildings.1. Buttress 1 -Elevation 369' to 436'2. Buttress 2 -Elevation 405' to 436'3. Buttress 3 -Elevation 403' to 436'4. Buttress 4 -Elevation 400' to 436'5. Buttress 5 -Elevation 305' to 436'6. Buttress 6a. North Side -Elevation 341' to 436'b. South Side -Elevation 305' to 436'Upon discovery, an attempt was made to conduct an interview with the inspector to determinewhat the exact phenomena observed was. The inspector who performed the concrete visualinspections was a temporary contractor for PSC and no longer works for the company. A phoneinterview conducted with his direct supervisor indicated that the inspector identified severallocations where the embed plates were bulging from the concrete surface, no photographs wereavailable of this condition.Following the phone interview, the Tendon and ISI prigram engineers conducted a walk down ofthe tendon buttresses in question to view and photograph the indications. The walk down did notreveal any indications where the embedded plates were bulging or pulling away from the concrete.However, several locations where the embedded plates overlap were observed, as shown in Figure3, below. The overlap locations are consistent with the locations where the inspector identified theembed plates pulling away, as documented in the PSC Inspection Report.Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 91 of 110 Exelon Generation. As-Found Condition ofReactor Building Embed PlatesPREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of the As-Found Condition of Embedded Steel 4 of 5Plates in the Reactor Building Tendon ButtressesFigure 3: Overlap of Embedded Steel PlatesIn these locations the overlapping embedded plates have grouting around them. The grouting isuncracked with no significant degradation noted. This implies that the overlap is the installedcondition of the emlIedded plates and that no significant degradation has occurred.I3.0 Conclusion/FindingsBased on the walk down performed by Programs Engineering and discussions with both PSC andthe Responsible Engineer, Howard Hill, it is determined that the embedded plates are in theinstalled condition with no degradation. These findings, as documented in this evaluation,determine that there is no recordable indication, and no further evaluation for acceptability isrequired.4.0 References1. CC-AA-309-101, Engineering Technical Evaluations2. HU-AA-1212, Technical Task Risk/Rigor Assessment, Pre-Job Brief, Independent Third PartyReview, and Post-Job Review3. ASME Section XI 2004 Edition No Addenda, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Division 1 Rules forInspection and Testing of Components of Light-Water Cooled Plants4. REP-1091-510, Final Report for the 2013 Tendon Surveillance at TMI5.0 Attachments5.1. General Concrete NDE Data SheetsTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 92 of 110 Exeton Generation As-Found Condition ofReactor Building Embed PlatesPREPARED BY SUBJECT PAGEMichael Grimm Evaluation of the As-Found Condition of Embedded Steel 5 of 5Plates in the Reactor Building Tendon Buttresses IAzRoLM TPreparer: Michael Grim m Independent Peer Reviewer: Se an TaylorResponsible Engineer: Howard HillManager: Mark Torbor-Date: __//_O"___Date: Ai25 16ADate: AwDate:_____ITopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 93 of 110 0Go BackPrint I New Search I Home0 Go Back Print New Search HomeAR Number: 01626566 Linked ARsAff Fac: Three Mile AR Type: CR Status: APPROVEDIslandAff Unit: 01 Owed To: A5551CAP Due Date: 04/30/2014Aff System: 153 Event Date: 02/26/2014CR 4/D Disc Date: 02/26/2014Level/Class:How H02 Orig Date: 02/26/2014Discovered:Action Request Details

Subject:

TENDON GREASE SAMPLE ACID NUMBER EXCEEDS ACCEPTANCE CRITERIADescription: Originator: MICHAEL GRIMM Supv Contacted: Mark TorborgCondition

Description:

On February 26, 2014 TMI received the initial acid number test resultsfrom Precision Surveillance Corporation (PSC). The official lab reportwill be included in a revision to the PSC Surveillance Report. PSCreported that 7 of the 10 samples tested for acid number, did not meet thePSC acceptance criteria of <0.500. The seven samples reported to TMIwere:1. D-303 (North): 0.5302, H13-03 (Buttress 3): 0.5303. H13-08 (Buttress 1): 1.064. H13-10 (Buttress 3): 0.5305. H35-02 (Buttress 3): 1.066. V-32 (Gallery): 2.647. V-108 (Gallery): 0.530A follow-up phone call with the PSC Quality Assurance Manager revealedthat the above test results were confirmatory test numbers, which agreedwith the initial test results.Samples D-303, H13-03, H13-10, and V-108 are acceptable per Exelonprocedure ER-AA-330-006, which has an acceptance criteria of <1 for theacid number. N# additional actions are required for these tendons.Samples H13-0ý, H35-02, and V-32 do not meet the <1 acid numberrequirement.Immediate actions taken:Notified Responsible EngineerIssued IRRecommended Actions:1. Include formal discussion of acid number results in the TendonSurveillance Topical Report (Grimm, March 31, 2014)2. Define additional actions to be taken during the 45th Year TendonSurveillance in 2019 in accordance with TS 4.4.2.1.4 (Grimm, March 31,2014)What activities, processes, or procedures were involved?Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 94 of 110 Laboratory analysis of tendon filler grease samples. The acid numbertests were a follow-up action driven by Exelon procedure ER-AA-330-006 andthe vendor (PSC) surveillance procedure for grease sample base numbertests below the reporting limit of 0.50.Why did the condition happen?Unknown. This condition is new and has not been previously identified inprior tendon surveillances at TMI.What are the consequences?NoneTendon filler grease sample testing is performed to verify there is noevidence of filler grease degradation that could result in the corrosionof the tendon wire or anchorage comlionents and lead to future failure ofthe tendon components. The reported acid number results indicate that thegrease in these 3 tendons has become acidic and may not be fully effectivein performing its intended corrosion prevention function. While there isevidence that the filler grease has degraded, the surveillance indicatesthat no active corrosion is occurring on the three tendons in question.Visual inspections were conducted on each of the three tendon anchorages(H13-08 Buttress 1, H35-02 Buttress 3, and V-32 Gallery) with thefollowing results:1. No free water was found during end cap removal, this includes in theend cap and on the anchorage components.2. No anchorage component (including the shims, buttonheads, anchorheads,bearing plate, and bushing) exhibited a corrosion category above "A",which indicates no visible rust.3. There were no protruding buttonheads identified, and all three tendonshad 169 effective wires.4. Other than the base and acid numbers, grease testing results werewithin acceptable limits for chlorides, nitrates, sulfides, and moisturecojnent.Lift offs were conducted on H35-02 and V-32 with acceptable resultslH35-02 had a lift-off of 1216 kips, which was greater than the predictedvalue of 1093 kips. V-32 had a lift-off of 1181.27 kips which was greaterthan the predicted value of 1176 kips. No lift-off was conducted onH13-08 as the Buttress 3 end of the tendon was inaccessible due to theReactor Building Flood Seal.Additionally, during original manufacture the tendon wires were coatedwith Visconorust 1601 Amber, which provides another layer of corrosionprotection in addition to the filler grease. Given the results of thesurveillance it is reasonable t9 conclude that there is no activecorrosion on the tendon com lpnents (anchorage or wire) and that thetendons in question will contilue to perform their function through thenext surveillance in 2019.Were any procedural requirements impacted?No. Exelon procedure ER-AA-330-006 requires notification of theresponsible engineer and evaluation of the condition for follow-up actionsand acceptability. A formal discussion of this condition will be includedin the surveillance topical report, and will address the requiredfollow-up actions during the 45th Year Tendon Surveillance.Were there any adverse physical conditions?There are no adverse physical conditions in the plant. Based on thesurveillance results discussed above, it is reasonable to conclude thatthe structural integrity of the Reactor Building Containment has not beenchallenged. The Limiting Condition for Operation concerning structuralintegrity is provided in TS 3.19.1 and states:Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 95 of 110 "With the structural integrity of the containment not conforming to theinservice tendon surveillance program requirements of 4.4.2.1 for thetendon lift off forces, perform an engineering evaluation of thestructural integrity of the containment to determine if COLD SHUTDOWN isrequired. The margins available in the containment design may beconsidered during the investigation. If the acceptability of thecontainment tendons cannot be established within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, restore thestructural integrity to within the limits within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in atleast HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within thefollowing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />."As the surveillance results indicate acceptable lift-off values with noobservable degradation to the tendon components that could challenge thepre-stressing ability of the tendons, the Reactor Building Containmeltretains its structural integrity. Additionally there is reasonableevidence to conclude that no degradation will be experienced to challengethe structural integrity prior to performance of the next scheduled tendonsurveillance in 2019.List of knowledgeable individuals:Mike GrimmHoward HillSean TaylorJohn PiazzaRepeat or similar condition?NoOperable Basis:The Containment Structure remains operable. Tech Spec 3.19 specificallycovers the tendon lift off forces and does not cover corrosionprotection.Tech Spec 4.4.2.1 statqs that the Inservice Tendon Surveillanceprogram for structural integrity a rd corrosion protection conforms to ASMEcode requirements.As noted in the IR, tendon filler grease sample testing is performed toverify there is no evidence of filler grease degradation that could resultin the corrosion of the tendon wire or anchorage components and lead tofuture failure of the tendon components. While there is evidence that thefiller grease has degraded, the surveillance indicates that no activecorrosion is occurring on the three tendons in question.As the surveillance results indicate acceptable lift-off values with noobservable degradation to the tendon components that couly challenge thepre-stressing ability of the tendons, the Reactor Building Co tainmentretains its structural integrity. l1. Is the SSC operable? (Y/N) YESIf inoperable, list tech spec and LCO action.2. What licensing documents were reviewed to evaluate operability? TS,ER-AA-330-0063. Describe the function of the SSC and basis foroperability/availability determination. Functions are listed below. Asdiscussed in the IR, the containment structure continues to meet itsdesign requirements.4. Is the SSC available (Paragon)? (Y/N) YES5. Does this deficiency require Operations to take compensatory actions?(Y/N) NOIf yes, then perform an initial screening for Operator workaround/challenge per OP-AA-102-103.6. Is an operability evaluation or technical evaluation being requested?(Y/N) NOTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 96 of 110 153-MOl : Exterior wall provides jet fuel fire barrier. Part of theoriginal design basis (153).153-M02 Provide aircraft protection (153).153-M03 : Provide environmental protection for systems and components(153).153-M04 Provide protection from groundwater (153).153-MO5 Provide protection from turbine generated or other missiles(153).153-M06 Provide radiation shielding from fission products in the RB(153).153-M07 Provide train or channel separation (153).153-M08 : Withs nd short-term tornado loading including tornado-generatedmissiles (153). T153-NO1 Provide fire barrier (153).153-N02 Provide personnel access to systems and components (153).153-N03 : THE SHIELD BARRIER WITH THE STEEL PLATING ACTS TO RESTRICT ARELEASE OF POST ACCIDENT FISSION PRODUCTS153-ROl Contain fission products to prevent radioactive release (153).153-R02 Maintain containment integrity during normal ops and after theSSE (DBE)153-R03 Maintain structural integrity (153).153-R04 Provide fluid containment (153).153-RO5 Provide pressure boundary integrity for internal pressure.153-RO6 Provide protection from flooding (153).153-R07 Provide support for systems and components (153)Reportable Basis:This does not meet any reporting thresholds.Functional Basis:Reviewed by: EDWARD M CARRERAS 02/26/2014 22:24:24 CSTReviewer Comments:EMCReviewed by: EDWARD M CARRERAS 02/27/2014 02:56:47 CSTReviewer Comments:SOC ReviLwed by: CAROLYN J FLORY-MAGATZ 02/28/2014 10:00:10 CSTSOC Comments:REACTOR BUILDINGAdded bldg component ID. This IR identified deficiency does not meet thedefinition of a CCF (Kaplan,BD 02/27/14).Close to actions created. (McDowell 2/28/14) (SOC 2/28/14)Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 97 of 110 Assign #: 01 AR #: 01626566Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: TRKG Status: COMPLETEPriority: Assigned To: Due Date: 03/03/2014Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: ACAPALL Orig Due Date:Unit Condition: Sec Grp:Assignment Detailssubject/Description: TENDON GREASE SAMPLE ACID NUMBER rXCEEDS ACCEPTANCE CRITERIAAssignment CompletionIn Progress Notes:Completion Notes:0Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 98 of 110 Assign #: 02 AR #: 01626566Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: ACIT Status: COMPLETEPriority: Assigned To: GRIMMX Due Date: 04/30/2014Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: A5551NESPR Orig Due Date: 03/31/2014Unit Condition: Sec Grp:Assignment DetailsSubject/Description: Include formal discussion of acid number results in the T endon Surveillance TopicalReport (Grimm, March 31, 2014)Assignment CompletionIn Progress Notes: A formal discussion of the acid number results and the conclusions fromthe associated IR 1626566 was included in Topical Report 213 section 3.6.No further actions are required.-Michael Grimm 4/09/2014Move assignment to correspond with the due date for the TendonSurveillance Topical Report. This assignment can't be closed until theTopical Report is signed off and submitted.Michael Grimm 3/26/2014Completion Notes:Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 99 of 110 Assign #: 03 AR #: 01626566Aff Fac: Three Mile Island Assign Type: ACIT Status: COMPLETEPriority: Assigned To: GRIMMX Due Date: 04/30/2014Schedule Ref: Prim Grp: A5551NESPR Orig Due Date: 03/31/2014Unit Condition: Sec Grp:Assignment DetailsSubject/Description: Define additional actions to be taken during the 45th Yea r Tendon Surveillance in 2014in accordance with TS 4.4.2.1.4 (Grimm, March 31, 2014)Assignment Completion IIn Progress Notes: Section 5.2 of Topical Report 213 documents the follow-up actions to betaken during the 45th Year Surveillance. During the 45th YearSurveillance the tendon anchorage components of H13-08 Buttress 1, H35-02Buttress 3, and the Gallery end of V-32 will be visual inspected forcorrosion and the tendon duct will be pumped through with new CorrosionProtection Medium. No further actions are required.-Michael Grimm 4/09/2014Move due date to 4/30/14 which is the submittal date for the tendonsurveillance Topical Report to the NRC. This assignment can't be closeduntil the report is submitted.Michael Grimm 3/26/14Completion Notes:Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 100 of 110 1@toExelkn.ER-AA-335- 019Revision 0NuclearATTACHMENT 4ASME IWL (Class CC) Containment Concrete Detailed or General Visual ExaminationNDE ReportStation I Three Mile Island Uni It Date: 104-09-14 ReportNo: /ASystem[ 153 1 Component: .SE Quad of ring girder (Above Butressg3 & 2) WO No(s).: R2163325-87Location: Building: COO. E(ev. t6 0 1 N/A Rowl NA Azimuth/RadiusExam Type: 1Z Detailed Visual Type Of Exam: E]Direct i[-General Visual lRemote MI l Type: Outside ConialnmentConcreteDesign Drawing(s) TMII-0014 REV. I Visual Aids: Orion Apex 102mm, Model 9823 Optical TubeAssembly telescope with 26m5m Simus Eye Piece, 45Degree Correct Image Diagonal adaptor & CorrectImage Finder ScopeSurface: DD 00 10I Surface / Comp~onents Coaled: F1 YES NOIllumination Used IAttribute RI NRI 10 tExplanation / Comments .-Cracks (Characterize and Size) q See attached sheets for photos of degraded areasExposed Reinforcing Steel 4 No changes noted from 2006 Inspoction other than evidence of aExpospd 'Metallic Items (Other) _ N1 leak area gatting larger.Evidence Of Greaes Leakage 4 Photos and videos taken of exam volume.-.Evldence-.lMolsture ..-. .... .--4 .......Videos avallable If.requested,..-.-........ -.Leaching Or Chemical Attack 1 Photos and Videos supplied to ISI program owner: Mike GrimmSehlements Or dflectionsDegraded Patches or epairs .P opouts, Voids, Honeycomb ,.Spells i, ,_,_ __,_,Cold Joint Unes 4Corrosion Staining 'Scaling I Ousting 'Coating Deterioration 'Abrasion, Cavitaton, Wear .4Air Velds I Bug Holes. I4- REACTOR BUILDING TENdON SURV. (oT005278)OthIer lain ) --NDE VT-1 BE QUAD RING GIRDERReasulte Legend; -1 il -Recordable Indieatii NRI -No Recordabl Indliatlons 10 -Information OnlySupplemental Information: UYes [No El S[ ketch ,Photo ZVldeo E] Other (Describe):IIi~~~

• i-f J~Examiner: James L Newaiob II &M/ 9 I [ ff/'Mf / Level: l Oate 04-09-14Further Evaluation Required: YesU k;?-/.zAdditional Aotionswzi r- -ldcc-,5 rxv7oc x. -~ ýi:4A )(Action ReqlUeat, .k Order, Issue Repeod. etc. f;l dorCoetve Action) Suspect Aras shall be dlsposflloned by a Responsible EnlteerReviewer, i2_Mike Grmiml Date 04-10-14ANti: Data " ,Page 1 of iOTopical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 101 of 110 ER-AA-335-019Revision 0aI7II5HAR64 tXAmidei~7I j I. 1I I ,"i '.Sa'I"~2u tL ~I- I17,.$r.-1z.iZS. jbl~5CI!rv pepa v 9 haH AI -4 c. :3'F ::-I ~ I, 2-* Ird IH 1' .Ad.2302~~ ;41 1 I 'lz-IH* *'C2", 0, t 4 VV.4. 13-aIt ok ;.I 4 -!A#r it -:D..2L~ A.2LI~e~-ill..11,2- II. J*4~4.'.14 ~I 4)-I4Page 2 of 10Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 102 of 110 ER-AA-335-019Revision 0~iuurnPage 3 of 10Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 103 of 110 ER-AA-335-019Revision 0THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 1 OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT CONCRETEARFA II\JPFCTFF) nN I1q11A FRfnM, F1nlKF TFNfnlN rm-'In TC) r)-9nl1 RINC IriFrpPaue 4 of 10Topical Report 213"Attachment 1 Page 104 of 110 ER-AA-335-019Revision 0Pane 5 of 10Topical Report 213-Attachment 1 Page 105 of 110 ER-AA-335-019Revision 00IPage 6 of 10Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 106 of 110 ER-AA-335-019Revision 0Page 7 of 10Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 107 of 110 ER-AA-335-019Revision 00Topical aO Page 108 of 110 ER-AA-335-019Revision 0Page 9 of 10Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 109 of 110 ER-AA-335-019Revision 0ORION APEX 102mm, MODEL 9823 OPTICAL TUBE ASSEMBLY TELESCOPE WITH 25mmSIRUS EYE PIECE, 45 DEGREE CORRECT IMAGE DIAGONAL ADAPTER AND CORRECTIMAGE FINDER SCOPE.ENTIRE AREA INSPECTED USING THE SCOPE ABOVEREFERENCE REMOTE VISUAL EXAMINATION DEMONSTRATION # TMI-02-09VISUAL ACUITY CARD USED AT START OF THE INSPEC TION AND AT THE END MAX DISTANCE CHECKWAS 75' IINSPECTION PERFORMED FROM -40' TO 60' ON TOP OF THE TURBINE BUILDING ROOFENTIRE EXAM VOLUME ALSO RECORDED USING A SONY "HANDYCAM" HD 30X EXTENDED ZOOMCAMCORDERPHOTOS TAKEN USING A SONY "CYBERSHOT" 12.1 MEGA PIXEL CAMERAPHOTOS TAKEN DURING 2006 INSPECTION WERE USED TO VERIFY ANY CHANGE IN CONDITIONSSEVERAL AREAS NOTED AS HAVING DEGRADATION, CRACKED & MISSING GROUT, STAINING, MINORCHIPS, PEELING, POPOUTS. OVERALL NO CHANGE FROM 2006 EXCEPT FOR A LEAK AREA IDENTIFIEDIN THE PHOTOS ABOVE.Page 10 of 10Topical Report 213 Attachment 1 Page 110 of 110