ML20134L890

Proposed Tech Specs 3.3-3 Re Safety Injection Pump Low Temp Operations

ML20134L890
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	02/12/1997
From:	NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20134L888	List: ML20134L885 ML20134L890
References
NUDOCS 9702200002
Download: ML20134L890 (5)

Text

.

6 TS.3.3-3 l

RP! 91 10/27/99 3.3.A.2.g.

The valve position monitor lights or alarms for motor-operated valves specified in 3.3.A.1.g above may be inoperable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> provided the valve position is verified once each shift.

3.

At least one safety injection pump control switch in the control room shall be in pullout whenever RCS temperature is less than 310*F* except that both SI pumps may be run gg~p1Wi~[W while conducting the integrated SI testgf(when either{M,'~igt@he~^ ZG mi of t following conditions is met:

j (a) There is a steam or gas bubble in the pressurizer and ilijii}gjgggigpa}gjgtgijgf{the SI pump Mf@ggggj))

g"$Tffy'diccher;: :1 ze: cre shut, or (b) The reactor vessel head is removed.

4.

Both safety injection pump control switchesMg in the Control Room shall be in pullout whenever RCS temperature is less than 200*F (except jish]jjjgg]jsiiN[piiii@y@!@]as specified in 3.3.A.3 and 3.1.A.1.d.(2)).

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B.3.3-2

3. 3 ' ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES Bases continued (1) Assuring with high reliability that the safety system will function properly if required to do so.

(2) Allowance of sufficient time to complete required repairs and testing using safe and proper procedures.

Assuming the reactor has been operating at fell RATED THERMAL POWER for at least 100 days, the magnitude of the decay heat decreases as follows after initiating HOT SHUTDOWN.

Time After Shutdown Decay Heat. % of RATED POWER 1 min.

4.5 i

30 min.

2.0 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1.62 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 0.96 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> 0.62 Thus, the requirement for core cooling in case of a postulated loss-of-coolant accident while in the shutdown condition is significantly reduced below the requirements for a postulated loss-of-coolant acci-dent during POWER OPERATION.

Putting the reactor in the HOT SHUTDOWN condition significantly reduced the potential consequences of a loss-of coolant accident, and also allows more free access to some of the engineered safeguards components in order to effect repairs.

The accumulator and refueling water tank conditions specified are consistent with those assumed in the LOCA analysis (Reference 2).

Specification 3.3.A.3 allows use of an SI pump to perform operations required at low RCS temperatures; e.g.,

raising accumulator levels in order to meet the level requirement of Specification 3.3.A.1.b(2) or ASME Section XI tests of the SI system check valves.

Specification 3.3. A.3 also allows use of both SI pumps at low tempera-tures for conduct of the integrated SI testThsd?bthef751EWystemstists EhdNPMEUEfh551psdidiMIth(M$5MAININ1.eshnknhiNh0f'."ii~ Oil 7 case, pressurizer level is maintained at less than 50% andfaypdsitiiVs

--^ -'"* to prevent fluid injection into the RCS.$This$..S. 5E5 ear c

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isolstibn Is7aEE6mpliishlEd[bfNsingeithiWsI61bisd@isualyyslyRoEMelbs e[m6 tat opefatsd@Alpejwithjthe{poweriremoirjdyThis combination of conditions under strict administrative control assure that over-pressurization cannot occur. The option of having the reactor vessel head removed is allowed since in this case RCS overpressurization cannot occur.

Maintaining both safety injection pump Control Room control switches in pullout, as specified in 3.3.A.4, will ensure that the RCS pressure /

temperature limitations specified in Figures TS.3.1-1 and TS.3.1-2 will not be exceeded, at low RCS temperatures, as the result of mass input into the RCS from an inadvertent safety injection pump start.$Ths provis ionsIo ff th tC a pedifihatiohiir ein6t$ap plis khlsEhhenith el(Ve ss to r hNS.'*kkih @epjedjsinc @M$hai[cMditioniRNhy@yes surizafilin can;nggieceurg

ATTACHMENT 2 SUPPLEMENT to LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST DATED February 6,1997 Amendment of Safety iniection Pumo low Temperature Operations Appendix A, Technical Specification Pages Revised Pages as proposed in this Supplement TS.3.3-3 B.3.3-2 1

1 4

m 4

r TS.3.3-3 a

3.3.A.2.g.

The valve position monitor lights or alarms for motor-operated 3

valves specified in 3.3.A.l.g above may be inoperable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> provided the valve position is verified once each shift.

3.

At least one safety injection pump control switch in the control room shall be in pullout whenever RCS temperature is less than 310*F* except that both SI pumps may be run for up to one hour while conducting the integrated SI test ** when either of the following conditions is met:

(a) There is a steam or gas bubble in the pressurizer and an isolation valve between the SI pump and the RCS is shut, or I-(b) The reactor vessel head is removed.

4 Both safety injection pump control switches *** in the Control Room shall be in pullout whenever RCS temperature is less than 200*F (except one or both pumps may be run as specified in 3.3.A.3 and 3.1.A.1.d.(2)).

• • 0ther SI system tests and operations may also be conducted under these conditions.

• • • This specification does not apply whenever the reactor vessel head is removed.

B.3.3-2 l

3. 3

• ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES 1

Bases continued (1) Assuring with high reliability that the safety system will function properly if required to do so.

(2) Allowance of sufficient time to complete required repairs and testing using safe and proper procedures.

Assuming the reactor has been operating at full RATED THERMAL POWER for at least 100 days, the magnitude of the decay heat decreases as follows after initiating HOT SHUTDOWN.

Time After Shutdown Decay Heat. % of RATED POWER 1 min.

4.5 30 min.

2.0 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1.62 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 0.96 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> 0.62 Thus, the requirement for core cooling in case of a postulated loss-of-coolant accident while in the shutdown condition is significantly reduced below the requirements for a postulated loss-of-coolant acci-dent during POWER OPERATION.

Putting the reactor in the HOT SHUTDOWN condition significantly reduced the potential consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident, and also allows more free access to some of the 1

engineered safeguards components in order to effect repairs.

The accumulator and refueling water tank conditions specified are consistent with those assumed in the LOCA analysis (Reference 2).

Specification 3.3.A.3 allows use of an SI pump to perfctm operations required at low RCS temperatures; e.g.,

raising accumulator levels in order to meet the level requirement of Specification 3.3.A.1.b(2) or ASME Section XI tests of the SI system check valves.

l Specification 3.3. A.3 also allows use of both SI pumps at low tempera-tures for conduct of the integrated SI test and other SI system tests and operations providing the pumps run for less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. In this case, pressurizer level is maintained at less than 50% and a positive means of isolation is provided between the SI pumps and the RCS to prevent fluid injection into the RCS. This isolation is accomplished by using either a closed manual valve or a closed motor operated valve with the power removed. This combination of conditions under strict administrative control assure that overpressurization cannot occur. The option of having the reactor vessel head removed is allowed since in this case RCS overpressurization cannot occur.

Maintaining both safety injection pump Control Room control switches in pullout, as specified in 3.3.A.4, will ensure that the RCS pressure /

temperature limitations specified in Figures TS.3.1-1 and TS.3.1-2 will not be exceeded, at low RCS temperatures, as the result of mass input into the RCS from an inadvertent safety injection pump start. The provisions of this specification are not applicable when the reactor vessel head is removed since in that condition RCS overpressurization can not occur.