ENS 50296
ENS Event | |
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17:43 Jul 22, 2014 | |
Title | Diesel Generator for High Pressure Core Spray Declared Inoperable During Surveillance Testing |
Event Description | This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. During the conduct of the Unit 2 Division 3 High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Diesel Generator (DG) surveillance test, one of 2 Cooling Water Outlet Valves failed to automatically open. The Division 3 Diesel is supplied by two redundant trains of cooling water one from each Service Water Divisional Header. Although the redundant cooling water supply was fully available and supplied adequate cooling to the diesel generator, the DG was at reduced margin to have adequate cooling water supply, if required during a loss of offsite power. Due to this loss of margin and inoperable condition, it has been determined that this failure could potentially affect the safety function of this system, and is being reported as an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> ENS notification.
The licensee has attributed the failure to high resistance in a relay which is currently being replaced. This places Unit 2 in the Technical Specification Action Statement 3.8.1, which requires restoration of Diesel Generator within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or commence a Reactor Shutdown. All other ECCS Systems have been verified operable. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and will inform the State of New York.
This update retracts Event Notification#50296, which reported an event or condition that could have potentially prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Upon further review, it was determined that the ability of the HPCS system (single supported train) remained operable and capable of performing its safety function as evaluated by the NMP Unit 2 Safety Function Determination Process (TS 5.5.11). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R1DO (Ferdas). |
Where | |
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Nine Mile Point New York (NRC Region 1) | |
Reporting | |
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+3.88 h0.162 days <br />0.0231 weeks <br />0.00531 months <br />) | |
Opened: | Carl Jones 21:36 Jul 22, 2014 |
NRC Officer: | Steve Sandin |
Last Updated: | Sep 2, 2014 |
50296 - NRC Website
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Unit 2 | |
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Reactor critical | Critical |
Scram | No |
Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Nine Mile Point with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 546922020-05-03T21:50:0003 May 2020 21:50:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Main Control Room Air Treatment System Inoperable ENS 543642019-11-01T07:16:0001 November 2019 07:16:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Core Spray (Hpcs) System Inoperable ENS 502962014-07-22T17:43:00022 July 2014 17:43:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Diesel Generator for High Pressure Core Spray Declared Inoperable During Surveillance Testing ENS 498592014-02-27T08:30:00027 February 2014 08:30:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Core Spray (Hpcs) System Declared Inoperable ENS 490292013-05-14T16:15:00014 May 2013 16:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Steam Flow Isolation Capability Identified as Non-Functional ENS 487942013-02-28T18:19:00028 February 2013 18:19:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Core Spray Pump Failure ENS 486962013-01-23T20:16:00023 January 2013 20:16:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Concurrent Loss of High Pressure Reactor Makeup Systems Capability ENS 479672012-05-25T17:22:00025 May 2012 17:22:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident De-Energization of Both Divisions of Rhr Suction Line Primary Containment Isolations Valves During Testing ENS 452842009-08-23T21:50:00023 August 2009 21:50:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Unplanned Inoperability of the High Pressure Core Spray System ENS 442062008-05-13T12:25:00013 May 2008 12:25:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation Unusual Event Declared Due to Loss of Offsite Power ENS 409202004-08-03T14:46:0003 August 2004 14:46:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Core Spray Rendered Inoperable Due to Faulty Test Equipment ENS 405062004-02-05T18:40:0005 February 2004 18:40:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Emergency Diesel Generator Ventilation Exhaust Damper Covered with Snow and Ice 2020-05-03T21:50:00 | |