ML20138H085
| ML20138H085 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1995 |
| From: | Linville J NRC |
| To: | Parra S NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138G636 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-96-351 NUDOCS 9701030118 | |
| Download: ML20138H085 (1) | |
Text
-
h
/k,
7 7
/(l fr M,
From:
James C.
Linville (JCL)
To:
G:\\GRPs\\ SAP.GRP-Date:
Tuesday, August 22, 1995 1:48 pm
Subject:
SAP Meeting The next SAP meeting will tentatively be hel n September 6 1995 at the site following the exit with the licensee on our, inspections of the System Readiness Review process.
Attached for your review and comment are the minutes from 1.he last SAP meeting.
To date I have not received any comments on the minutes 4
of the first meeting.
The agenda for the meetong will be as follows:
1.
Results of System Readiness Review Inspections-Kelly 2.
Salem MIP-White 3.
Correlation of NRC Restart List to PSE&G System Readiness Review List-Marschall 4.
Additions to the NRC Restart List-Marschall/Olshan
_g 5.
Outage Status-Marschall' T~
p.
O scussion Pap h 8 Q
6.
Discuss Senior Mana ement Meetin Fu Content-Linville =>
015 N
- D Lh
~hN If you have any other items to add please let me know.-Al I
NM Files:
G:\\ BRANCH 3\\SAPMIN M @ BRANCH 3\\SAPPLAN.JCL ~h b
RJL y
-T l
k n<e/E.
p
% a eda erft of cc de&fcBM
' Alk{ fl f&
W M L*"td
\\
w
- Serl. I?
g $
' f-Z) Cd.
IC~
y 09 9701030118 961226 PDR FOIA 0'NEILL96-351 PDR
l i
pf From:
James C.
nville (JCL)
To G:\\GRPS\\ SAP.GRP Date:
Wednesday, September 27, 1995 3:58 pm
Subject:
SAP Meeting The next SAP meeting will be at 10:30 a.m. on Friday, October 6, 1995 in the DRP conference room.
The proposed agenda is as follows:
Introduce new member-Linville Results of system readiness review inspection-Kelly Review additions to restart list-Marschall d.
Discuss items on restart list not included as res t items from PSE&G system readiness reviews-M schall p i pq/%
M M~
b T N,So(b Review MIP-White Q *.
5.
pg6. t c.
E05ff-h Discuss A g
nv lly All Observers //g on n
7.
Feed ack from Regional Administrato visit-Nicholson
((/M Future plans and Schedule including Senior Management Meet'ing 8.
Prebrief Preps-Linville gg If you would like to add anything to the agenda or cannot make the meeting please let me know by COB September 29.
The minutes of the September 11 conference call are attached for your review 1
and comment.
i CC:
G:\\ BRANCH 3\\SAPMIN3.JCL l
f f
Do/G% lfQ b
//
D
$ y pq4t14 rles S. Marscha 1 (CSM)
From C
To:
GSB, EMK, JCL, LNO, JFS3, jrwl Dates Thursday, September 21, 1995 4:56 pm subject:
Restart list John:
I've attached a copy of the updated Restart List.
We have added a few items that stem from a review of the Open Item List and compared the results with the results of the MRC and SRRB reviews.
The Salem review process captured the items on our Restart List with the following exceptions:
k1N D - Circulating Water screen motors burn up at low d.
We di
't find this on the licensees list of required or recommended e 7
tions; acEDG loading margin; not on the list; Oh OHAT.7
- - Fire retardant material qualification, only RECOMMENDED for M,
l b estart; g % p ff-TO $3 l
r SI relref valve design basis requirements and performance history, not on the list; and
@-Switchyardfailures, not on the list.
]
Our review did not address the people and process problems, since the MRC has not yet completed review of 'che action plans.
If you have any questions, call Joe Schoppy, Todd Fish, or me.
Charlie i
4 CC:
SKC, LMH1, BDW Files P:\\EQUIPLST.RV1
')
~.
/
q ninsoc2c
/p-
?
e f* *'%
f, UNITED STATES l
y'
'h NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
Et i C REGION I
%.... + /[
475 ALLENDALE ROAD KING oF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 1415 1
August 15, 1995
\\
l Memorandum To:
J. Linville, DRP l
C. Marschall, DRP G. Kelley, DRS G. Barber, DRP J. Stolz, NRR m
L. Olshan, NRR ff From:
J. White, Chief i
Reactor Projects Section 2A
Subject:
SALEM EPPR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SALEM ASSESSMENT PANEL CONSIDERATION On May 30, 1995, an EPPR was conducted to assess performance at the Salem Generating Station for the period between November 6, 1994, and May 16, 1995.
Since both Salem units were shutdown for an extended period shortly after this EPPR. Subsequently, the Salem Assessment Panel (SAP) was commissioned to plan i
and coordinate all NRC inspection-related activities for the Salem units.
Consequently, the EPPR recommendations were not initially implemented, but rather deferred for consideration by the SAP. Notwithstanding, the SAP should consider the outcome of the EPPR to assure that the issues are addressed within the scope of planned NRC activities to confirm restart readiness.
The following is a synopsis of the May 30, 1995, Salem EPPR assessment and recommendations:
e Operations Operators did not consistently communicate or document plant problems and deficiencies.
Support from the maintenance and engineering organizations was inconsistent and tended to vary with the quality of information communicated and documented. Equipment deficiencies provided frequent challenges to operators at a rate that appeared unchanged and without any perceived achievement of performance improvement. In many instances, operators were remiss in their application of technical specifications. Operability determinations (00) were of inconsistent quality, i.e., generally, ODs that were documented reflected consultation with engineering; while ur. documented ODs often exhibited insufficient safety bases or rationale to support a positive operability conclusion.
EPPR Recommendation Consider whether DRP and/or DRP should perform focused inspection relative to the f operability determinations involving degraded eauioment and orkarounds)~ Additionally,theEPPRTettershoulddiscuss
<r whut is it 7 Wuf'sS% bbLblQ
/jl3 qqgruovn
/
NRC concerns relative to the generally poor quality of operability determinations that has been exhibited.
Maintenance 4
i High profile maintenance activities receive a high level of management attention. Consequently. the efforts are usually well managed, coordinated, and executed; and the outcomes for such efforts are usually 1
successful. Other efforts are usually less that adequate. Some maintenance activities were performed without procedures. The j
maintenance organization consistently failed to involve engineering L
support for the resolution of repetitive equipment failures. Weak root cause (or failure to perform root cause assessments) was evident.
Consequently, corrective actions were usually unsuccessful in effecting lasting remediation of equipment problems. Maintenance almost always applied a " broke-fixed" approach to equipment problems involving B0P 3
issues; and generally attempted resolution of safety-related equipment 3
in the same manner, with some variance, i
l EPPR Recommendation Regional initiative inspection (Module 62700; 2 to 4 insned e waab ) to qj assess the aggregate safety effect of the growing tLacklog of unattended q
or uncorrected degraded conditions affecting 80P and safety-related f
equipment. The effort should diagnose deficient equipment performance, particularly in systems having several EMIS tags, to determine if increased risk exists relative to failure of the system to perform as designed or expected.
W e
Enaineerina l
i The engineering organization has not aggressively addressed frequent Hagan module configuration control problems. The licensee's level of i
effort reflects only minimal progress resolve the issue relative to equipment upgrades or refurbishment. The assembly of resources and
}
establishment of a plan to address the matter has been slow even though j
a long history of problems exist.
1 i
The system engineering organization does not always aggressively pursue l
or resolve difficult issues. Decision-making is often delayed by i
extended analysis of issues; and a tendency exists to accept as the root cause the most plausible or perceivable reason for an equipment failure.
Management and operations does not challenge the rationale or basis for conclusions, or expect more than what is delivered.
Incident reports rarely contain well documented root cause assessments. Consequently, corrective action efforts are generally ineffective.
Systemic problems appear to prevail relative to parts and sunolies
'available to support modifications, remairs._ and desiggs.
i 2
?
1 l
EPPR Recommendation 1
i Regional initiative inspection (Module 62704/38702) to review and assess i
the extent of problems involving Hagan modules and the resultant safety-effect of the existing configuration control problems.
The focus of the j
initiative is to be on root cause and effectiveness of corrective 1
actions. Additionally, assure that the niannad OS"I effort includes l'
review of procurement engineering effectiveness re' ative to parts control.
i e
PLANT SUPPORT j
Radiation protection program activities, including radioactive waste handling and effluent controls, were well established and performed.
Emergency preparedness activities were well control and managed.. The security program was generally sound, but assessment aid performance is degrading, such that NRC intervention has been necessary to ensure that adequate upgrading is planned. Fire protection programs, including Appendix R requirements, were generally well performed, excepting reactor coolant pump (RCP) oil collection specifications as described in 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.
Inspectors observed that not all plug and flange locations were considered as credible leak sites. Timely resolution l
does not appear inevitable.
j EPPR Recommendations Initiate conference call with licensee to discuss their plans to resolve RCP oil collection concerns in light of letter from NRR clarifying Appendfi(TTequWements (Kelleyy Harrison).
Security section to W
initiate meeting with licensee to discuss NRC concerns relative to g ded asses== ant aids (Shankman, Smith).
1 cc:
R. Cooper, DRP W. Lanning, DRP
1
\\
l Front Lept $ard N. Olshan (LNO)
To JFS3 Date Friday, September 8, 1995 2:44 pm Subjects ADDITIONS TO NRC RESTART LIST I will not be available for the SAP conference call on Monday, September 11.
I am partly responsible for Item 4 of the agenda, I
which is " Additions to the NRC Restart List".
So far, we have two additions:
i
/1.Licenseemustinstallthehgitalfeedwatercontrolsyste i
n both units prior to restart.
(see am.udm nus 17 5
...J 1,,, i.. ed j
7 ugust 7, 1995.)
A Licensee must replace th 6 si_lient seal D n the c.ontainment 2.
s pressure-vacuumreliefisolationvaiv-_wisametal-to-metalseafs on uvun units prAor to restart.
(See Amendments 172 and 153, issued August 1, 1995.)
CC:
JCL i
h wra 1
4 l
U 4
4 i
/
7 4
9 4
4 4 C4 o h o cq 1 1 pe-
/p#
)
I Sales Restart j
j Equipment Problems h.
Containment spray discharge isolation valves (CS-2) operability concern.MDJ ted'y (9g-04) VMR.,
i Control air system not reliable (94-19, 24, 35)
CW screen motors burn up at low speed; can' t be run in manual (95-10)
Digital feedwater NJ) : b) 17 3 154)($e/g[bh EDG air start system carbon steel components (check valve problems)
+
(94-19) p EDG 1A load fluctuations root cause (94-18-02)
EDG output breaker anomalies (95-10)
EDGloadingmargin(95-07,13)(59l[
p.
EDSFI followup items resolution (inspection scheduled for IAW 96) (93-082 - 01 04, 06, 07, 08, 13, 14, 16) O EiD5FI 4 tem 3, piping gS- [g (NS M~
4 s
p Feedwater nozzles (94-024-04)
Feedwater system performance problems (oscillating pump speeds) (94-13)
Fuses: Salem must insure that the correct fuses are installed in all applications and that the correct fuses will be installed in the future.
(95-10)
Gas turbine batteries need to be replaced again (what is the reliability
=
of the GT if the batteries need to be replaced whenever one source of offsite power is lost?) (95-13)
Hagan modules have not been compared to accurate controlled drawings to insure modules are correctly configured, parts have been replaced with non-equivalent parts by vendors, contract refurbishers, and maintenance staff without proper controls.
(94-80,95-02)
SL.
p Inadequate 125V battery acceptance criteria (94-18-01) g 4
IST requirements (94-021-01 / 94-021-02 / 94-021-03)
Main steam isolation required for every turbine trip to prevent excessive RCS cooldown workaround due to problems with Main Condenser Steam Dumps and other leak paths.
(95-13) (94-008-01)
PDP charging pumps not reliable (gas leakage, seal leakage, heat
/7/
l\\*
j i
l l
exchanger leakage, etc). (?)
f.
Piping and pipe supports safety concerns (95-006-01) N l
p+
POPS resolution (94-032-05) l Potential problems in separation / redundancy and isolation in safety-related wiring.
(89-13-07,90-81-13) 4 PORY (1PRI) leaks by the seat, requiring operation with the block valve closed. Va ve should be rep based on a root cause determination.
(94-35) 9$ -Sys.fM b m5 g.
PORY accumulators may be undersized for RCS protection, assuming a transient starting at full RCS pressure.
In reviewing, include history of operators need to close PORVs and start emergency air compressors (are accumulators leaking excessively?).
(95-13) p Pressure locking & thermal binding of Gate valves (93-026-01) )U Pressurizer spray did not operate properly. As a result, operators used auxiliary spray. Did they follow procedures? Do the spray nozzles need i
to be inspected as a result of the 90* F water used (letdown was isolated) (95-13)
Radiation Monitoring System multiple problems (both units) (94-24)
Reactor Coolant Pump oil collection systems do not contain oil effectively (94-33, 35)
Reactor Coolant Pump seals - several failures in the last two operating cycles suggest root cause analysis weaknesses (94-32, 95-02)
Reactor Head Vent valve stroke time failures (95-02)
Residual Heat Removal: root cause of R#29 minimum flow valve failures (95-10)
Residual Heat Removal: manual discharge valve (21RN10) makes a banging noise louder than other RH10 valves (95-10)
Resilient seals Rod stepping - rods step in with no temperature error signal (94-19)
SI pumps (high head CCP) have numerous deficiencies (flex hose installed, but not on drawings, repeated speed increaser problems, relief valves need to be replaced, etc). Review work history for pumps to Atermine recurring problems and potential common mode failures.
Perform corrective maintenance based on root cause determinations.
l (95-13)
SI pump suction boost - the TS minimum required SI pump flows would cause the pumps to go into runout; they did not consider the " suction l
l
(.
I i
boost" provided by the RHR pump. Salem has administrative 1y lowered flow balance numbers for ECCS from the number in the TS surveillance.
(95-13)
SI relief valves: review design basis requirements and performance history (leakage on startups, etc). (94-13, 31, 95-01)
Service water piping erosion; repair and thoroughly review basis for l
condition of SW piping in general. Repair / replace pipe as necessary.
l (95-07) l 4
Spurious high steam flow signals (94-112-01013) EA h6.k l
Switchyard failures: review available vendor recommendations for preventative maintenance to insure that they have been incorporated.
Perform a thorough root cause evaluation of switchyard failures, including quality of maintenance. (94-31)
+
54 7ik %+eyy - Ecr P&s.
O W Leul Arm w iakis
+
& uhafskt,
+-
- sert &hs l, cal g h i
l
l l
)
Process Problems
[dt/ V[/
Appendix R jumpers f(j g g,o g
4 Appendix R requirements not met (93-80-06/07/08) p.
Atmospheric steam dumps failed open (94-01-01)
/8fdth4h.
i y*
Fire retardant material qualificatio 3 - p - e r h5 Bill of Materials unreliable, ##IS not reifable or easy to use procurement engineering unreliable (95-02)
Configuration control - bolting, Hagan modules (E94-112-04013 in 94-80)
(94-112-06014) l l
Control of safety-related activities (hot-spot flushing without a l
procedure or other mechanism to insure job performed safely, RH 29 test without a test procedure). (95-03, 07) (95-07-03)
Control room indicators: all red-striped indicators should be repaired based on a thorough root cause determination. (95-80)
Engineering / Maintenance backlogs not evaluated for impact on safe plant l
l operation and ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident s---,
l (review previous safety evaluations for adequacy) (94-07) (95-80)
+.
rMe (F/yWime c+4-w) m/p.
Licensing commitments (LER submittals) (95-010-02)
Modifications such as a service water pump junction box change have been performed as maintenance activities (95-07)
Operability determinations are inadequate. (94-19, 95-10, 80, others)
Operator performance (use of alarm response procedures, failure to close block valves, repeated entry into (and abuse of) LCO action statements, inadvertently purging PRT to containment, e.g.)(94-06,80, 94-006-01) l (94-14-01) (94-112-03013) (94-112-05014) (95-007-02)
Operator workarounds; need to be reviewed and those with an impact on safe plant operation or that pose challenges to operators need to be corrected.(95-80) e Operating Experience feedback review (94-32) l Planning: (for example; ) frequently results in excessive LCO outage l
l 1
l time, with unplanned maintenance causing crisis management and unnecessary challenge to operators. (95-07) (94-024-03) k*
Procedure adherence (94-003-01013, 94-003-01023, 94-003-01033, 94-003-01043, 94-003-01053, 94-003-01063, 94-003-01073, 94-003-01083) (94-024-
- 05) (95-010-01) j Procedures, operations; evaluate root cause assessment with past procedure problems.
(95-02,07,E94-113-04013)
Root cause determinations not timely or adequate (95-02, 07, 10, 80)
I Safety Evaluations (10 CFR 50.59) like POPS are weak. (94-007-01, 95-07) e l
(94-019-02) (94-112-02013) ;15-07-04)
Setpoint control program - establish and implement. (95-13)
System Engineering poor performance including equipment performance j
Tagging / TRIS ineffective actio)ns to prevent problem fecurre
<bCg addressed individually without thorough root cause (95-02,80) i e
EP ssM,(WprQ
+'
%*'b'%;1iC' Cb'A%" ~** ' ' M "^T-n Y
Work prioritization 13 not effective. Degraded components th t cou impact compliance with TS requirements frequently do not receive the 4
proper priority.
(This ties in with MMIS, the BOM, and the design basis).
95-80)
T*
gT (Souts People P bloms Design Basis: Drawings have numerous errors. The ability to determine a system, subsystem, or component's intended safety function is severely 4
impaired. The configuration baseline document (CBD) contains numerous errors, and frequently cannot be supported when challenged. The licensee has made changes in the docketed design basis assumed parameters for safe plant operation (e.g. POPS /LTOP) without submitting the changes for NRC review, when appropriate. (94-31, 95-07, 95-80)
Systen engineers don't understand can't find design basis or its relationship to s/r equipment.(95-02,07) 4 Employee discrimination (94-239-01012) r Plant Management approaches problems with the assumption that there is no safety problem, and no reason to interrupt plant operation. Plant management team does not focus on nuclear safety. Plant management team
~
frequently does not recognize impact of degraded conditions on safety.
They assume that an indeterminate state of operability equals operability until confronted with evidence to the contrary. They do not ask for evidence to the contrary. They do not challenge assumptions 4
)
A l
e l
I
("we have engineering assurance"). They have "a reasonable assurance of operability" without demanding a basis. This is a lack of appreciation i
of the basic )rinciples of safe plant operation. Management must j
demonstrate tie ability to assure safe plant operation before the Salem units are allowed to continue to operate.
(Switchgear fans ->
inadequate operability determination, followed by determination of an i
USQ, followed by a request for a JCO, followed by a plant shutdown (the j
l shutdown wasn't timely or adequate]; 22RHR29 assumed operable based on a l
test wherein the valve worked properly with no other evidence that the previous failure to operate properly had been addressed).
(95-07, 95-10)
Problem identification not effective in insuring problem identification, l
corrective action, and proper management focus. (Same as root cause determination, above) (93-015-04, 95-02, 07, 10) (94-239-01012) l l
l TATRn' i
1 l
l i
l
From:
James Unville W
To:
WND2.WNP3.JFS3, WND2.WNP3.LNO, WND2.WNP3.D B1, NCD...
Date:
11/28/95 5:40pm
)
Subject:
SAP Meeting l
The meeting previously scheduisd for 12/7 must be moved to not later than Wednesday 12/6 l
a.m. so that we can brief Tim Martin before his site visit with Bill Kane on 12/7 Please try to l
reschedule your action plan review activities to support this date.
The egenda will be as follows:
- 1. Discuss results nf Action Plan reviews.-All
- 2. Discuss Restart Plan submittal (Express mailed 11/28).-All
- 3. Discuss 12/11 licensee meeting and 12/18 meeting to receive public comments.-Nicholson
- 4. Receive comments from N.J. and DEL. representatives.
Others?
l CC:
NCD2.KP2.RWC i
e l
l
\\'
\\
qiviuavv
~7 ni s on m
\\
-