ML20138G792
| ML20138G792 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1996 |
| From: | Laughlin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Kantor F, Lusher J, Scott(Ois) Morris, David Silk, Stinson N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138G636 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-96-351 NUDOCS 9701020269 | |
| Download: ML20138G792 (5) | |
Text
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s UNITED STATES
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KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415 May 7,1996 MEMORANDUM T0:
S. Morris, Resident Inspector, Hope Creek D. Silk, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist J. Lusher, Emergency Preparedness Specialist N. Stinson, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRR F. Kantor, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRR THRU:
R. Keimig, Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branc FROM:
J. Laughlin, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, Team Leade
SUBJECT:
ARTIFICIAL ISLAND FULL-PARTICIPATION EXERCISE (INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-354/96-01,50-272,311/96-02)
The Artificial Island full-participation exercise is scheduled for Wednesday, May 29, 1996.
Lodging arrangements have been made at the Christiana, DE Fairfield Inn (Ph. 302/292-1500) for three nights, beginning May 28, 1996. The room rate is 48.55 and the confirmation number is RU65855.
Rooms must be confirmed by 6:00 p.m. on May 28'".
Team members should arrive at the site by Tuesday, May 28'", at 2:00 p.m. for access training and the licensee scenario briefing.
Please review and be familiar with the " Rules for Exercise Observers" (attached) prior to the exercise. Copies of the scenario and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures will be available at the site for review.
A team roster, with assignments, and schedule of key events is also attached.
Team members will be free at approximately 11:00 a.m. on May 31, 1996. If there are any questions, contact me at (610) 337-5074.
Attachments: As stated cc w/o attachments:
L. Nicholson, DRP S. Barber, DRP R. Summers, SRI, Hope Creek C. Marschall, SRI, Salem R. Bores, DRS
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97 O'NEILL96-351 PDR
EXERCISE SCHEDULE Tue., May 28 2:00 p.m.
Access Training, Processing Center 3:00 p.m.
Scenario briefing, EP Classroom 255 Wed., May 29 3:30 p.m.
Team members in assigned locations 4:00 p.m.
Exercise commences 11:30 p.m.
Exercise concludes Thu., May 30 8:00 a.m.
Team Meeting, EP Classroom 255 1:00 p.m.
Complete write-ups Fri., May 31 9:00 a.m.
Licensee Critique, HC General Purpose Room 10:00 a.m.
NRC exit TEAM AS$1GNMENTS S. Morris Simulator Control Room D. Silk OSC F. Kantor TSC N. Stinson E0F/ Command and Control J. Lusher E0F/ Dose Assessment J. Laughlin Team Leader / Float
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RULES FOR EXERCISE OBSERVERS 4
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REVIEW THE SCENARIO l
Review the time-line of major events and the details relevant to the area you will be observing. Scenario copies will be available at least the day before the exercise. That will normally occur at the final licensee pre-exercise briefing of controllers / observers.
REVIEW THE ENERGENCY PLAN Als INPLENENTING PROCEDURES Review the Emergency Plan sections on command and control, decision-making, and 4
communications.
Review the Implementing Procedures for the area you will be observing.
4 REVIEW NC82301. " EVALUATION 0F EXERCISES FOR POWER REACTOR $"
This inspection manual chapter details inspection requirements in each area of licensee response. Note that more emphasis is placed on the licensee's ability to implement the Emergency Plan (i.e., detection,. classification, notifications, dose assessment, and protective action recommendations) than on the ability of the operators to mitigate the accident. It'is not that operator action is less important to protection of public health and safety, but that the exercise is primarily a test of the Emergency Plan.
Operators are examined separately on their response to transients, and for the most part will be prevented from mitigating the accident during the exercise because of the need to test other parts of the response.
INTERACTIONS WITH LICENSEE PERSONNEL DURING THE EXERCISE Once the exercise starts, do not question players on their response. Direct your questions to the Controller in your area. Interaction with the player (s) could be construed as prompting players or otherwise interfering with the response.
If questions cannot be satisfactorily resolved with the Controller, note the questions and pursue them after the exercise.
PRONPTING Be alert for indications of prompting by Controllers (e.g., providing information which would not normally be available to the players and thereby steering their response).
PROTECTION OF SCENARIO INFORNATION Care should be taken to ensure that the exercise scenario is not compromised before or during the exercise by insufficient safeguarding of the scenario in your possession.
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RECORDKEEPING DURING THE EXERCISE Maintain a log of times and actions for the major events during the exercise.
This will be very valuable during the team critique that follows.
Use of the evaluation forms that are included in MC82301 are not required; however,.your notes should be sufficiently detailed such that you will be able to reconstruct pertinent information.
(It is not necessary to maintain field notes after you are satisfied that the report is issued and that it adequately addresses your observations.)
TEAM CRITIQUE Following the exercise, the observation team will assemble to critique the findings.
Sufficient time will be allowed for observers to resolve questions which arose during the exercise. At the critique, be prepared to provide the team leader a short written summary of findings from your area.
These should include both strengths and weaknesses, and provide sufficient detail that they can be presented to the licensee by the team leader. Normally, these findings will be incorporated into the inspection report without any need for additional inspection report feeder.
If you feel that these findings are tentative in any way, such that more information is necessary to determine their validity, clearly indicate that concern to the team leader and obtain c reement as to how the a
issues will be resolved before the exit interview.
If they have not been resolved before the exit interview, inform the team leader of that fact, so that findings can be properly presented and discussed.
LICENSEE CRITIQUE Plan to attend the licensee's formal post-exercise critique. Attendance at the group critiques conducted by controllers / observers in preparation for their formal critique is not necessary; in fact, such attendance may unnecessarily inhibit licensee openness in discussing issues.
During the critique, note licensee-identified weaknesses / problems also identified by the NRC.
REVIEW CLASSIFICATION OF EXERCISE FINDINGS Exercise Weakness:
A finding that the licensee's demonstrated level of preparedness could have precluded effective implementation of the emergency plan in the event of an actual emer ency. An exercise weakness does not preclude a finding of overall emergency response adequacy, but a recurrent exercise weakness may be considered for enforcement action.
Exercise weaknesses are tracked as Unresolved Items (URIs) or as Inspector Follow-up Items (IFIs) and will be specifically re-evaluated in another drill or exercise.
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Other Findines Planning inadequacies identified during the exercise will be categorized separately (i.e., violation, unresolved item, inspector follow-up item).
INFORN THE LICENSEE THAT CLASSIFICATION OF FINDINGS ARE SU8 JECT TO NANAGEMENT REVIEW PRIOR TO FINAL ISSUANCE OF THE REPORT.
1 RENIND THE LICENSEE THAT THE OBSERVERS CANNOT OBSERVE ALL DETAILS OF THE RESPONSE. IF THEY HAVE ADDITIONAL INFORNATION WHICH COULD CAUSE US TO RECONSIDER OUR FIN 0!NGS, THEY SHOULD PROVIDE THAT INFORNATION TO US.
J
y UNITED STATES i
p, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
re j
REGION I t
475 ALLENDALE ROAD
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KING OF PRUSSIA. PENNSYLVANIA 19406 1415 j
June 27, 1996 1
Mr. Leon R. Eliason Chief Nuclear Officer and President Nuclear Business Unit Public Service Electric & Gas Company Post Office Box 236 j
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038
SUBJECT:
NRC-EVALUATED EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE - COMBINED HOPE CREEK AND SALEM INSPECTION REPORT NOS 50-354/96-01, 50-272/96-02, AND 50-311/96-02 1
1 The enclosed report documents an inspection for public health and safety, led oy Mr. J. Laughlin at Artificial Island, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey, during the week of May 27, 1996. The inspection evaluated the performance of your emergency response organization during the May 29, 1996, Hope Creek full-participation exercise. The inspectors discussed the findings of this inspection with Mr. L. Storz and others of your staff on May 31, 1996.
Based on the results of this inspection, it was determined that the overall i
performance of the emergency response organization was good. Simulated events were accurately diagnosed, proper mitigation action was performed, emergency-declarations were timely and accurate, and off-site agencies were notified 1
within 15 minutes. The performance of personnel in the operations support center was assessed as excellent. No exercise weaknesses, safety concerns, or violations of NRC requirements were identified. No response to this letter is necessary.
l In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of 1
this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
l Sincerely, i
pWA - _/m Richar
. Keinig, Ch Emergency Preparedness and i
Safeguards Branch j
Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-354, 50-272, 50-311 i
Enclosure:
Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-354/96-01,50-272/96-02,and 50-311/96-02 i
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Mr. Leon R. Eliason 2
1 cc w/ encl:
l L. Storz, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations E. Simpson, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering E. Salowitz, Director - Nuclear Business Su C. Schaefer, External Operations - Nuclear,pport Delmarva Power & Light Co.
D. Garchow, General Manager - Sales Operations P. MacFarland Goelz, Manager, Joint Generation Atlantic Electric M. Bezilla, General Manager - Hope Creek Operations J. Benjamin, Director - Quality Assurance & Nuclear Safety Review D. Powell, Manager - Licensing and Regulation R. Kankus, Joint Owner Affairs A. C. Tapert, Program Administrator R. Fryling, Jr., Esquire M. J. Wetterhahn, Esquire i
Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate William Conklin, Public Safety Consultant, Lower Alloways Creek Township Public Service Commission of Maryland State of New Jersey l
State of Delaware Distribution w/ enc 1:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
L. Nicholson, DRP S. Barber, DRP G. Kelly, DRS 1
N. Della Greca, DRS D. Screnci, PA0 Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector K. Gallagher PUBLIC DRS Files (2)
Distribution w/ enc 1: (Via E-Mail)
W. Dean, OED0 D. Jaffe, Project Manager, NRR J. Stolz, PDI-2, NRR L. 01shan, NRR M. Callahan, OCA J. Zimmerman, NRR Inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS)
T. Essig, NRR/PERB D. Barss, NRR/PERB 1
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i U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Report Nos.
50-354/96-01, 50-272/96-02, 50-311/96-02 License Nos.
NPF-57, DPR-70, DPR-75 Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Facility:
Artificial Island Dates:
May 28-31, 1996 Inspectors:
J. Laughlin, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, Region I J. Lusher, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, Region I N. McNamara, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, Region I D. Silk, Senior Emergency Preparedness S)ecialist, Region I S. Morris, Resident Inspector, Hope Cree (
F. Kantor, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRR N. Stinson, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRR Approved by:
Richard R. Keimig, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Safety l
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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Exexutive Summary............................
iii Report Details 1
P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance..................
I a.
Exercise Evaluation Scope..................
I b.
Emergency Response Facility Observations and Critique....
I b.1 Simulator Control Room (SCR)
I b.2 Technical Support Center (TSC)
I b.3 Operations Support Center (OSC)............
2 b.4 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)..........
4 b.5 Licensee Exercise Critique 5
c.
Overall Exercise Conclusions 5
P8 Miscellaneous EP Issues......................
5 P8.1 (Closed) IFI 50-354 23-01......../94-21-01, 50-272/94-23-01 & 50-311/94-5 P8.2 (Closed) IFI 50-354/94-21-02, 50-272 23-02............... /94-23-02 & 50-311/94-5 (Closed) IFI 50-354 P8.3 23-03......./94-21-03, 50-272/94-23-03 & 50-311/94-
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5 P8.4 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Review.....
6 P8.5 In-Office Review of Licensee Procedure Changes 6
Management Meetings...........................
6 l
Partial List of Persons Contacted.....................
7 List of Inspection Procedures Used....................
7 List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed 7
i List of Acronyms Used...'........................
8 Revised Licensee Documents (Attachment 1) l 11
a EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
i Artificial Island Full-Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation May 28-31, 1996 Inspection Report 50-354/96-01, 50-272/96-02, 50-311/96-02 This inspection evaluated the licensee's performance during its annual i
emergency preparedness exercise. The inspectors observed emergency facility i
staffing, procedure implementation, effectiveness of mitigation actions, l
communications, command and control, emergency classification, and off-site i
notification. The inspectors also assessed licensee activity pertaining to i
several items that were tracked as a result of discrepancies identified in previous exercises.
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The licensee's overall performance was good. The facilities were generally staffed and activated in a prompt manner, despite the fact that the plant page announcement for the alert (and site area emergency) classification was made i
approximately 20 minutes-following the declaratior,. The classification of the simulated events was timely and accurate. Off-site notifications were completed within 15 minutes. The protective action recommendations were a)propriate and timely. Good briefings and good command and control were osserved. There were many good discussions observed during the exercise 4
within individual facilities and among the facilities, The conduct of operations in the operations support center (OSC) was very I
good. Thirty-one teams were briefed, dispatched, and tracked. The simulation of obtaining a sample from the post-accident sampling system was very good.
The OSC coordinator demonstrated excellent command and control in directing the personnel and functions carried out in that facility. Overall, the OSC i
performance was excellent.
The emergency operations facility staff demonstrated exceptional teamwork.
Especially noteworthy was the tracking of plant conditions by the site support manager and the effective development of protective action recommendations.
The emergency response manager and his staff interacted well with the States of New Jersey and Delaware. Additionally, the radiological assessment staff performed well in tracking the plume.
The licensee's post-exercise critique was very thorough, identified all NRC findings, and was assessed by the NRC team as good.
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Report Details i
P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance a.
Exercise Evaluation Scone During this inspection, the inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's biennial full-participation exercise in the simulator control room (SCR), technical support center (TSC), operations support center (OSC), and the emergency operations facility (EOF). The inspectors assessed licensee recognition of abnormal plant conditions, 1
classification of emergency conditions, notification of off-site agencies, development of protective action recommendations, command and control, communications, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan.
In addition, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment of the exercise, b.
Emeraency Resoonse Facility Observations and Critiaue b.1 itaglator Control Room (SCR)
An alert declaration was made by the senior nuclear shift supervisor (SNSS), based upon confirmation of a seismic event (earthquake) exceeding the emergency action level criterion. The declaration was accurate and timely. All notifications to federal, state, and local officials were completed within the required time period.
The SNSS command and control of SCR activities was good, crew briefings were frequent, and work priorities were continuously evaluated.
Site-wide announcements were clear and accurate, althougn the announcement of the alert declaration in the plant over the plant page system was delayed by 20 minutes. The emergency operating procedures (EOPs) were effectively utilized for simulated degrading plant conditions, although the inspectors observed some delay in implementing contingency procedures necessary for manual rod insertion and additional attempts to scram withdrawn control rods. There were excellent discussions among the SCR crew members regarding accident mitigation strategies and recovery actions.
Interactions with the TSC and the EOF were effective.
The SCR operating crew quickly identified, evaluated and took appropriate action for simulated degraded plant conditions, with one exception; it was slow to recognize subtle indications of a stuck open safety relief valve. Recognition of the open valve position was prompted by exercise referees using a predefined contingency message.
This led to a minor delay in pursuing the mitigating actions of securing the reactor coolant system to primary containment release path, b.2 Technical Suonort Center (TSC)
The TSC was activated one hour and four minutes from the time that the alert declaration was made, slightly exceeding the one hour goal.
The activation time could have been reduced if the announcement of the alert declaration had been made over the plant page system immediately i
following the declaration by the SNSS, instead of 20 minutes later.
Notification of an alert declaration to the emergency response organization (ERO) is made via the ERO call out system (pagers).
Some individuals did not receive a pager message due
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2 to their location within the plant at the time of the pager signal.
Therefore, they were unaware of the declaration until it was made over the plant page system. A more timely announcement over the plant page 4
would have shortened their arrival time at the TSC. However, this did not adversely affect the exercise.
i Shortly after his arrival in the TSC, the emergency duty officer (EDO) l contacted the SNSS to obtain information necessary for him to take control of response activities. The EDO checked with the TSC lead i
responders to ensure that all of the necessary personnel were present i
and that the TSC was functional before declaring it activated. The ED0's briefings were timely and informative.
The TSC engineering staff was very proactive in addressing the prioritized mitigation actions such as, inserting the three stuck control rods into the core, reducing the hydrogen concentration in the i
dry well, establishing and maintaining core cooling, and stopping the i
release of radiation to the environment. The TSC engineers also cautioned the EDO of the potential for water in the torus exceeding its i
design load and causing damage if another seismic event occurred.
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However, the inspectors noted that the priorities assigned to OSC repair i
team tasks did not always reflect the significance of the task relative to protecting public health and safety. Specifically, closing the stuck o>en safety relief valve was not the highest priority, despite the fact t1at the open valve represented a breach in one of the fission product barriers resulting in a release pathway of radiation to the environment.
Instead, efforts to close the valve were conducted in parallel with i
other mitigation activities.
f b.3 Ooerations Suncort Center (OSC) l The OSC was staffed and activated 27 minutes after the alert declaration was announced over the plant page system. The OSC personnel referenced and used procedures and checklists to set up and activate the facility.
I The facility was properly equipped to support the functions of the OSC.
Radiological conditions were monitored every 30 minutes for habitability concerns.
I Good command and control was demonstrated by the OSC cocrdinator (OSCC) and the maintenance supervisors. Frequent briefings were conducted on a timely basis to keep all OSC personnel informed of plant conditions and task priorities. The OSCC and the supervisors frequently reminded repair teams to be aware of possible dangers caused by the seismic 1
event, the carbon dioxide leak from a ruptured pipe and the radiological release. The OSCC effectively utilized personnel. For example, he ensured that only one equipment operator (EO) was on each team so that a
EOs would be available for other teams. He also directed dispatched teams to perform plant status checks in the area of their assignment before returning to the OSC. The OSC supervisors arranged to procure a 4
stand:y iiquid control (SLC) pump from a nearby nuclear utility and monitor *.d its location and status during the exercise. The OSC supervisors also effectively planned contingencies associated with the
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carbon dioxide arriving from off-site to replace what was lost as a result of the ruptured pipe.
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3 There was good oversight and control of the repair teams.
There were a total of 31 teams dispatched during the exercise. All of the teams were effectively and methodically briefed with the aid of the OSC team 4
i briefing checklist.
Immediately >rior to being dispatched, the teams would report to the OSC clerk to >e recorded on a status board. The clerk would ensure that the teams were properly briefed, had radios for communications, and reminded them to call in every 15 minutes and to provide a debrief upon their return. All teams were dispatched in a timely manner.
If a change in slant status occurred after the teams were dispatched, the 050C and tie supervisors would promptly determine the location of the teams and inform them to take action commensurate with the change in plant status. During various events (e.g., carbon dioxide leak, fire and radiological release), concern for the safety of the repair teams was demonstrated.
The inspectors accompanied re> air teams into the plant to observe their actions pertaining to the car >on dioxide leak, standby liquid control (SLC) pumps, and the post-accident sampling system (FASS). The teams performed (simulated) their tasks effectively. Exercise controllers provided appropriate information to the teams to accomplish their tasks.
Minor discrepancies were noted when the simulated PASS sample was obtained. The radiation protection technician was unfamiliar with the operation of the PASS, rarely asked the controller for radiation dose rates and demonstrated poor health physics techniques (e.g., performed surveys with no gloves and was hesitant in providing HP direction). The chemistry technicians had difficulty diluting the gas sample due to laboratory equipment failures and lacked knowledge in the operation of the gamma spectroscopy system for analyzing a PASS sample on the gamma detector. The PASS sample analysis was provided to the TSC within minutes of the three-hour requirement in accordance with the licensee's emergency plan.
Good communications were noted within the OSC.
In addition to the briefings, players frequently provided input to discussions regarding the various events.
Information was verified or clarified by OSC staff members. An individual was added to the OSC (for this exercise) to monitor telephone communications between the SCR, TSC, and the EOF to provide current information to the OSC regarding plant status. This addition was effective in providing timely and accurate information.
The OSC maintained radio contact with the teams to verify location and status of task completion. Maintenance personnel in the Ready Room received periodic formal briefings in addition to listening to the radio communications between the OSC and the repair teams.
Overall, OSC performance was excellent.
b.4 Emeraency Onerations Facility (EOF)
Staffing of the EOF was initiated upon the dech ration of the alert at 4:21 p.m.
The emergency response manager (ERM) was among the first to arrive because his normal work location is in the building where the EOF is located. The EOF staff was in place and ready to activate at about 5:50 p.m.
When the site area emergency (SAE) was declared at 5:56 p.m.
by the EDO in the TSC, the ERM and lead EOF staff members were already
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i very involved in reacting to plant events and interacting with their TSC j
counterparts. The ERM proceeded in a deliberate fashion to implement i
EPIP 401, " Emergency Response Manager Response," and, upon assurance i
that each EOF functional group was ready to support EOF activation, he i
declared the EOF activated at 6:35 p.m. and assumed the position of emergency coordinator. The EOF activation time was well within the one-hour goal for activatit,n of the EOF following the declaration of a SAE.
4 i
The ERM demonstrated effective command and control of the EOF staff, i
which functioned well as a team. Especially noteworthy was the monitoring of plant conditions by the site support manager (SSM) and the emphasis on plant conditions, as well as radiological conditions, in t
i developing protective action recommendations (PARS). The ERM and E0F j
section leads utilized the implementing procedures and event i
i classification guides in responding to, and projecting the consequences of, plant events. Following the second seismic event at 8:25 p.m...the ERM and SSM quickly and accurately determined that the emergency action i
levels for a general emergency had been met based on an evaluation of fission product barrier status. The PARS were appropriately developed l
in accordance with the flow charts shown in EPIP 404, " Protective Action Recommendations," and timely notifications of the off-site agencies were made.
i The ERM frequently consulted with the EOF lead staff and periodic i
i briefings were held, in accordance with the EOF briefing checklist in EPIP 401. The emergency news center was included in these briefings via j
speaker phone. Periodic briefings were also provided by the ERM to the j
entire EOF staff to keep them apprised of plant conditions and priority I
items.
Licensee dose assessment personnel demonstrated their ability to communicate with and control off-site field teams exceptionally well.
e Communications with the off-site field teams were frequent and effective in assessing radiological data. The radiological assessment staff coordinator (RASC) was cognizant of the surrounding road construction conditions in directing the off-site teams to locations for sample readings. The RASC provided prompt and frequent briefings of off-site radiological conditions to the radiological support manager. Dose l
assessment personnel effectively utilized the MIDAS computer to perform off-site dose projection calculations to support PAR decisions.
The ERM and staff made a concerted effort to ensure that the state representatives from the New Jersey Bureau of Nuclear Engineering (BNE) and the Delaware Emergency Management Agency were kept informed of plant and radiological conditions. The licensee and state representatives coordinated closely in the development and issuance of protective actions. The protective actions agreed reasonably well and the rea:,ons for any differences were discussed and understood. The state representatives were included in all. E0F lead staff briefings where information on licensee PARS, and state protective action implementation was exchanged.
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5 b.5 Licensee Exercise Critiaue Immediately following the exercise, the licensee began its critique i
process. Players, as well as referees, assembled in their assigned i
facility and commented on their performance and observations. These l
findings were collected and presented to the NRC on May 31, 1996. The inspectors noted that the licensee identified issues in addition to the ones identified by the inspectors. Positive and negative items were identified, and issues of concern will be tracked until resolution. The critique was thorough and appropriately self-critical. Overall, the i
critique process and content was assessed as good, c.
Overall Exercise Conclusions The licensee's overall performance was good. The facilities were generally staffed and activated in a prompt manner. Good command and control was observed at all of the facilities. The three classifications of the simulated events were timely and accurate and off-site notifications were completed within 15 minutes. The PARS were appropriate and timely. There were many good discussions observed during the exercise within individual facilities and among the facilities.
P8 Miscellaneous EP Issues P8.1 (Closed) IFI 50-354/94-21-01. 50-272/94-23-01 & 50-311/94-23-01:
status boarr' updates and information content. This ites was opened during the previous exercise when status boards in the TSC were not changed as equipment became inoperable or as major plant parameters changed nor did it indicate why equipment was out of service. During this exercise, the administrative and technical staff maintained the status boards current t
and accurate. States boards in the other facilities were also well maintained.
j P8.2 (Closed) IFI 50-354/94-21-02. 50-272/94-23-02 & 50-311/94-23-02:
inadequate OSC coordinator command and control. This item was opened during the previous exercise, because the OSC coordinator did not effectively utilize various OSC resources. During this exercise, the OSC coordinator ensured that repair teams were being closely tracked, conducted frequent and informative briefings, maintained order in the facility, and encouraged input from the OSC staff regarding mitigation actions.
P8.3 (Closed) IFI 50-354/94-21-03. 50-272/94-23-03 & 50-311/94-23-03:
ensuring general emergency / protective action recommendation basis understood by New Jersey. This item was opened during the previous 1
exercise when the State of New Jersey implemented a protective action that differed from the PAR issued by the licensee, because EOF management did not ensure that the State understood the basis of the licensee's decision. During this exercise, the ERM and his staff made a concerted effort to ensure that the State representatives from the New Jersey BNE and the Delaware Emergency Management Agency were kept
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informed of plant and radiological conditions. The state i
representatives were included in all EOF lead staff briefings where information on licensee PARS and state protective actions 1
implementation was exchanged. The protective actions agreed reasonably well and the reasons for any differences were discussed and understood.
)
P8.4 11gda.ted Final Safety Analysis Reoort (UFSAR) Review A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the UFSAR description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures, and/or parameters to the UFSAR or the emergency plan. - During this exercise, the inspectors observed the licensee's compliance with the Plan regarding ERO structure, facility activation and usage, classification of simulated events, and notification of off-site agencies.
P8.5 In-Office Review of Licensee Procedure Chanaes An in-office review of revisions to the Plan and its implementing procedures submitted by the licensee was completed. A list of the specific revisions reviewed are included in Attachment 1 to this report.
The inspector concluded that the revisions did not reduce the effectiveness of the emergency plan and were acceptable.
V.
Management Meetings X.1 Exit Meeting The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on May 31, 1996. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's findings.
7 PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee C. Banner Administrator - On-site Emergency Preparedness T. Cellmer Radiation Protection Manager - Hope Creek M. Meltzer Chemistry Manager - Hope Creek J. Pollock Hope Creek Quality Assurance Manager J. Polyak Manager - Radiological Safety L. Storz Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations G. Warren General Manager Hope Creek Operations INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 82301: Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors 82302: Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened.
None Closed IFI 50-354/94-21-01, 50-272/94-23-01 & 50-311/94-23-01:
Status board updates and information content.
l IFI 50-354/94-21-02, 50-272/94-23-02 & 50-311/94-23-02:
Inadequate OSC coordinator comani and control.
IFI 50-354/94-21-03, 50-272/94-23 03 & 50-311/94-23-03:
Ensuring general emergency /protet.tive action recommendation basis understood by New Jersey.
8 LIST OF ACRONYMS USED BNE Bureau of Nuclear Engineering EAL Emergency Action Level EDO Emergency Duty Officer E0 Equipment Operator EOF Emergency Operations Facility E0P Emergency Operating Procedure EP Emergency Preparedness ERF Emergency Response Facility ERO Emergency Response Organization ERM Emergency Response Manager IFI Inspector Followup Item NRC Nuclear Regulatory Comission OSC Operations Support Center OSCC Operations Support Center Coordinator PAR Protective Action Recommendation PASS Post-Accident Sampling System RASC Radiological Assessment Staff Coordinator SAE Site Area Emergency l
SCR Simulator Contrcl Room SLC Standby Liquid Control SNSS Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor SSM Site Support Manager TSC Technical Support Center UFSAR Update Final Safety Analysis Report i
ATTACHMENT 1 Revised Licensee Documents Administrative Procedures Document Document Title Revision (s)
EPIP 1001 Revision and Development of PLAN /EPIPs/ECG 1,2 EPIP 1002 D'istribution of PLANS /EPIPs/ECG 1
EPIP 1003 Review and Approval of PLAN /EPIPs/ECG 9,10 EPIP 1004 Format of PLAN /EPIPs/ECG 3,4 EPIP 1005 Emergency Preparedness Deficiency / Revision 3
Tracking EPIP 1006 Emergency Equipment Inventory (Radiation 15,16 Protection)
EPIP 1007 EOF / ENC Supply & Locker Inventory 13,14 EPIP 1008 Emergency Communications Drills 12 EPIP 1009 Emergency Response Callout Test Procedure 9
EPIP 1011 Maintenance of Emergency Response Organization 6,7 EPIP 1012 Administration of Emergency Drills and 4
Exercises EPIP 1013 Emergency Response Personnel Telephone List 29,30,31,32,33 EPIP 1015 PC Dose Assessment Software Control 5
EPIP 1016 Test Procedures for EOF Backup Generator, 1
Vent System and HVAC Filter Replacement
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3 Emeraency Ooeration Facility Procedures D.9slarat Document Title Revision (s)
EPIP 401 Emergency Response Manager Response 3,4 EPIP 402 Site Support Manager / Staff Response 2
EPIP 403 Public Information Liaison - EOF 3,4 EPIP 501 EOF - Integrated Engineering Response 3,4,5 EPIP 601 Radiological Support Manager and Radiological 8
Assessment Staff Response EPIP 602 Radiological Dose Assessment 15 EPIP 603 Field Monitoring 12,13 EPIP 604 Helicopter P.lume Tracking 3,4 EPIP 701 Administrative Support Manager Response 6
Salem Emeraency Plan Imolementina Procedures Document Document Title Revision (s)
EPIP 201S TSC - Integrated Engineering Team 7,8
Response
EPIP 202S OSC Activation and Operations 14 EPIP 204S Emergency Response Callout/ Personnel 27,28,29,30,31,32 Recall EPIP 305S Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking 5
EPIP 308S Personnel / Vehicle Survey and 6
Decontamination EPIP 310S OPEN 3
EPIP 311S OPEN 4
EPIP 312S Radiation Protection Supervisor-4 Off-site and Field Monitoring Team Response EPIP 313S Control Point - Chemistry Response 3
EPIP 314S Chemistry Supervisor - TSC Response 3
f 4
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Hone Creek Emeraency Plan Imolementina Procedures Document Document Title Revision (s)
EPIP 201H TSC - Integrated Engineering Team 8
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Response
EPIP 202H OSC Activation and Operations 14 i
EPIP 204H Emergency Response Callout/ Personnel 27,28,29,30,31,32 Recall EPIP 302H Radiological Assessment Coordinator 15
Response
i EPIP 303H Control Point - Radiation Protection /
12 Chemistry Response EPIP 304H OSC - Radiation Protection Response 11 EPIP 305H Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking 5
EPIP 306H Emergency Grab Air Sampling 10 EPIP 307H Plant Vent Sampling FRVSV 3
EPIP 308H Personnel / Vehicle Survey and 6
Decontamination EPIP 310H OPEN 3
EPIP 311H OPEN 4
EPIP 312H Radiation Protection Supervisor-5,6 Off-site and Field Monitoring Team Response EPIP 313H Control Point - Chemistry Response 4
EPIP 314H Chemistry Supervisor - TSC Response 4
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5 Salem Event Classification Guide Document Document Title Revision (s)
Unusual Event 14,15,16 Alert 8
Site Area Emergency 8
General Emergency 7
CM1 Log (UE/A/SAE) 20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27 CM1 Log (GE) 19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26 CH2 Log 13,14,15 Non-Emergency Notifications 18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25 Reference 2 One Hour Report - NRC/0PS 3 3 Four Hour Report - Contamination 0
Event 4 Four Hour Report - NRC/0PS 4 6 Spill / Discharge Reporting 6 3 Written Reports /LERS/0thers 4
Section 7 Radiological Releases /0ccurrences 5,6 Section 9 Electrical Power Failure 3
Section 10 Loss of Instrumentation /
5 Annunciation / Communications Section 13 Site Hazards (Aircraft Crash, 2,3 Missiles, Explosions,etc.)
Section 14 Fire 1
Section 17 Public Interest Items 8,9 Section 18 Tech Specs / Plant Status Changes 10,11
6 Hoce Creek Event Classification Guide Eggment Document Title Revision (s) f Unusual Event 13,14,15 Alert 8
i Site Area Emergency 9
General Emergency 8
CM1 Log (UE/A/SAE) 19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26 CMI Log (GE) 19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26 CH2 Log 14,15,16 Non-Emergency Notifications 18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25, Reference 26 2 One Hour Report - NRC/0PS 4
l 3 Four Hour Report - Contamination 0
l Event
' 4 Four Hour Report - NRC/0PS 3
Section i Introduction 3
Section 11 Cross Reference - Event to 3,4 Requirement i
Section iii Cross Reference - Attachment to 8
Events Section 7 Radiological Releases / Occurrences 6
Section 9 Electrical Power Failure 4
Section 13 Site Hazards (Aircraft Crash, 2
Missiles, Explosions,etc.)
Section 14 Fire 4
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