ML20138G990
| ML20138G990 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1992 |
| From: | Shedlock M Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138G636 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-96-351 SC.IC-GP.ZZ, SC.IC-GP.ZZ-000, SC.IC-GP.ZZ-0006Q, SC.IC-GP.ZZ-6Q, NUDOCS 9701030096 | |
| Download: ML20138G990 (121) | |
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SALFM'MAWD!J4AMCis Page L of _L SC.IC-Gl'.SZ-0006Q) - rJ N 7.
CONTROLS EQUII%IENT - TROUu':.4ciHOGTiNG USE CATEGORY :
I REVISION
SUMMARY
This is a MINOR REVISION.
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The following ACN/LR/OTSCs were evaluated for incorporation into cis 1:cvisiom None
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ADDED Precautions and Limitations step 3.14. This step cautions the insta'Jation of replacement parts as to incure the replacement part is verified again.ct ih oxoponent bei.ng replaced and to plant documentation IMPLEMENTATT.ON REQUtTUM.'2NTS j
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PfG!9L APPROVED:
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Maintenance Manager - Sdru 9701030096 961226 i
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0'NEILL96-351 PDR
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Sb.IC-GP.ZZ-0006(Q) l CONTROLS EQUIPMENT - TROUBLESHOOTING TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE
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2.0 PREREQUISITES.........
2 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS...........................
2 4.0 EQUIPMENT / MATERIAL REQUIRED..........................
4 5.0 PROCEDURE..........................................
5 6.0 RECORDS............................................
7 ATTACHMENTS, Troubleshooting Worksheet..................................
8, Jumper Log
...........................................12, Lifted Leads / Disconnected Piping............................. 13 Attaciunent 4, Instmment Valves........................................ 14 1
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', Completion Summary
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I Salem bommon Page 1 of 15 Rev. 2
Sb.IC-GP.ZZ@06(Q 1.0 PURPOSE C0005 1.1 To provide general guidelines for the troubleshooting of Control and Electrical installed C0037 plant equipment.
4 2.0 PREREOUISITES
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2.1 This procedure is classified CATEGORY II. All steps requiring a check will be checked off each time the procedure is refermd to.
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2.2 This procedure is applicable to Salem Units 1,2 and 3.
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2.3 This procedure is to be used during the performance of troubleshooting on controls equipment for which no specific procedure exists.
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2.4 If repair work is to performed which is within the skills of the controls technician to perform without a specific procedure (as determined by the Supervisor in charge of the work), then the work order shall be used to perform work. Examples of repair work within the skills of the technician are inspection, exercising of equipment, minor adjustment, etc.
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2.5 If repair work is to be perfonned for which there is a specific procedure, then the specific procedure shall be used to perform the work.
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2.6 If repair work is to be perfonned for which there is no specific procedure, then the appropriate vender manual shall be used in conjunction with this procedure or if the vendor's manual does not provide sufficient guidance, work shall not proceed until sufficient written guidance is available.
3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
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3.1 Ensure all test equipment used for troubleshooting is currently calibrated.
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3.2 Caution must be taken when working on energized equipment to minimize component damage due to grounding or shoiting of test leads.
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3.3 During troubleshooting or repairs of station equipment, DO NOT remove or override safety interlocks or remove protective covers unless other safety precautions are implemented to prevent electrocution or injury.
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Sb.IC-GP.ZZ-0006(Q)
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3.4 Any permanent wiring or piping connections which must be disturbed for troubleshooting shall be appropriately tagged and logged on the lifted leads /
disconnected piping data sheet (Attachment 3) so that they a e properly restored upon completion of work. Any temporary jumpers which are installed during troubleshooting shall be logged on the jumper data sheet (Attachment 2) to insure removal upon completion of work. Any jumpers or lifted leads that remain in any system upon completion of this procedure shall be documented in accordance with the Temporary Jumpers, Pumps, and Lifted Lead Program (AP-13). Any instrument valves which must be repositioned shall be logged on the instmment valves log,.
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3.5 Individuals performing this procedure shall ensure that all required safety precautions and tagging pmcedures have been complied with.
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3.6 When lifting or mlanding leads during circuit troubleshooting, all possible precautions will be taken to prevent shorting or gmunding of circuit, (i.e., use holding screwdriver, tape or sleeve exposed leads immediately after removal, etc.)
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3.7 When removing or replacing components in a live circuit, all possible precautions must be taken to prevent possible shorting or grounding of circuits, (i.e., Place insulating material between component and not circuit, remove interference as required to facilitate safe removal and reinstallation of component, etc.).
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3.8 All circuits which could be effected during the troubleshooting shall be analyzed to ensure that no inadvertent starts, trips or actuations of other equipment or circuits are caused by the lifting of leads, using jumpers, or removing / replacing fuses.
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3.9 When troubleshooting any equipment which provides an input to the solid state protection of Engineered Shfety Systems, the appropriate procedure for that channel must be used to ensure that the channel is removed from service and to ensuie that an inadvertent trip signal is not generated during troubleshooting. The specific procedure shall be specified before the integrity (Lifting of leads, removal of fuses, removal of PC boards or plugs, changes in switch line up, injection of a signal, etc.) of the channel is disturbed.
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3.10 When troubleshooting instrument channels which have process control functions, precautions shall be taken to prevent inadvertent actuation or disabling of control systems and/or devices. The Nuclear Control Operator shall be kept informed of any changes in channel integrity that will affect control of a process.
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3.11 If, at any time during the performance of this procedure, there is a reason to suspect that the test equipment being used may not be performing properly, a comparison check shall be performed with a similar device or the device shall be checked for calibration against a known standard. This shall be done prior to taking any other corrective action.
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Sb.IC-GP.ZZ-0006(Q)
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3.12 All adjustments, deficiencies, and cormctive actions taken during the performance of this procedure shall be documented in the description of work performed section of the work sheet and on the applicable work ortier.
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3.13 Post maintenance testing as per NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0009(Q) shall be documented on this procedure and on the applicable work order.
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3.14 Caution must be taken when installing replacement parts due to the similarity in appearance of many electrical components. Replacement components shall be verified against the component being replaced, MMIS (Bill of Material), and plant specific drawings. Discrepancies shall be brought to the attention of the Job Supervisor.
4.0 EOUIPMENT/ MATERIAL REOUIRED None l
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Salem bommon Page 4 of 15 Rev.2
Sb.IC-GP.ZZ@06(Q) l 5.0 PROCEDURE 1
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5.1 The work onier system as described in (NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0009(Q) shall be used to 4
t identify the pmblem. Each problem shall have a work order to cover the job.
l Appropriate documentation as required by the work order system and this pmcedure shall be completed.
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5.2 A worksheet shall be filled out, using the guidelines listed below, for each work order l
and shall be an attachment to the work order. The worksheet is to be utilized as an aid in troubleshooting, j
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5.3 The Technician shall:
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5.3.1 Fill in the Work Order No.
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5.3.2 Read and understand the Precautions, Limitation and Actions.
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5.3.3 Make a preliminary evaluation of the problem and document on the worksheet. (Power line up, as found indications, symptoms and other known j
data.)
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5.3.4 Write specific preliminary troubleshooting instructions to include test
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equipment hookups, any lifted leads / jumpers or injected signals, and actuations that could be affect: (i.e., alarms, indications or output functions.)
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5.4 The Supervisor shall review the preliminary instructions, change as necessary and provide additional work instructions as required to ensure adequate precautions are taken to pmtect plant equipment and ensure personnel safety.
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5.5 If during the course of the troubleshooting effort, the work instmetions are not adequate, the work will be stopped and the work supervisor consulted for additional written instmetions.
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5.6 Each individual involved in the performance of this procedure shall sign stating that they understand their involvement.
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5.7 The Nuclear Shift Supervisor and the Nuclear Contml Operator shall review and siga the worksheet to ensure overall plant safety and operational considerations.
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5.8 Notify Quality Assurance prior to the start of the work, if activity involves a Protection, ESF or Equipment trip function. Record the name, date and time of the person contacted on worksheet.
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Sb.IC-GP.ZZ-0006(Q)
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5.9 The individual performing the work must provide a detailed description of the work performed. This must be done prior to turnover or leaving the job, and on job completion. Determine the cause of the malfunction by recording as found data and comparing to the expected performance as derived from the procedures, ICD Cards, valve data cards or vendor manuals. Document any nonconformance of defective equipment as per the Nonconformance Program (NC.NA-AP.ZZ-00020(Q). Record "As Left" data and the resolution to the problem on the work order, worksbeet and ICD card (if required).
1 END OF PP.OCEDURE SECTION 1
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Sb.IC-csp.ZZ-0006(Q)
6.0 REFERENCES
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6.1 NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0013(Q), Ten.porary Modifications Control Program 1
6.2 NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0009(Q), Work Control Piecess 6.3 NC.NA-AP.ZZ-00020(Q), Nonconformance Program 1
l 6.4 C0005 - NSO INCI 89-508 6.5 C0037 - NSO LER 311/84-013-00
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ATTACHMENT 1 l
TROUBLESHOOTING WORKSHEET l
1.0 Work Order Number 2.0 Preliminary Work Review:
2.1 Affected Eautoment 1.
Control function Yes No 2.
Protection System function Yes No 3.
ESF function Yes No 4.
Alarm function Yes No 5.
Indication only function Yes No 6.
Equipment trip function Yes No 7.
If any of the above apply, describe the function below:
2.2 Does the equipment identified have a specific procedure covering its calibration, etc. If so, specify
. This procedure should be utilized, if possible, to put the equipment in a safe condition so that work may proceed.
2.3 Describe below the possible actuations and/or problems that could result during the course of the troubleshooting. (i.e, if power supply inadvertently shoned, possible control and or trip actuations.
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2.4 Preliminary Work Review 2.4.1 Preliminary evaluation of pmblem:
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l 2.4.2 Applicable Prints 1
2.4.3 Vendor Manuals (if requimd) 2.4.4 Work Locations 3.0 Preliminary Work Instmetions:
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1 Technician Salem bommon Page 9 of 15 Rev. 2
Sb.IC-GP.ZZ-0006(Q)
ATTACHMENT 1 (CONT'D)
TROUBLESHOOTING WORKSHEET 4.0 Additional Work Instructions:
Supervisor Review Signature 5.0 Individuals assigned to perform the work have read and understand all of the precautions, limitations and actions of this procedure and the instructions as set forth on this worksheet.
Signature /Date
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Signature /Date
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6.0 Review worksheet and instructions with The Nuclear Shift Supervisor and The Nuclear Control Operator.
NSS Signature /Date
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NCO Signature /Date
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7.0 Notify Quality Assurance prior to the start of work, if activity involves a Protection, ESF or Equipment trip function.
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Person Contacted Date Time 8.0 Describe work performed with As Found and As I. eft Data:
8.1 Work Performed:
Salem bommon Page 10 of 15 Rev.2
Sb.IC-GP.ZZ-0006(Q) l ATTACHMENT 1 (CONT'D)
TROUBLESHOOTING WORKSHEET 8.2 As Found data As Left data
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4 9.0 Post Maintenance Test Performed:
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Technician Signature Date
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Sb.IC-GP.ZZ-0006(Q)
ATTACHMENT 2 4
1 JUMPER LOG TERMINAL LOCATION INSTALLED REMOVED JUMPER FROM TO INSTALLED INDEPENDENT REMOVED INDEPENDENT NO.
BY VERIFICATION BY VERIFICATION TERM.
TERM.
TERM.
TERM.
BY BLOCK NO.
BLOCK.
NO.
BY Salem bommon Page 12 of 15 Rev.2
1 Sb.IC-GP.ZZ-0006(Q ATTACHMENT 3 LIFTED LEADS / DISCONNECTED PIPING LOCATION:
DISCONNECTED CABINET.TB#
CONNECTED RACK.ETC.
WIRE NO.
EX.:
EX.:
DISCONNECTED INDEPENDENT CONNECTED INDEPENDENT
/ PIPING [D TERMf'<AL TERMINAL BY VERIFICATION BY BY VERIFICATION BY BT.' >,*K NUMBER Salem bommon Page 13 of 15 Rev.2
Sb.IC-GP.ZZ-0006(Q)
ATTACIB1ENT 4 INSTRISIENT VALVES VALVE AS FOUND TEST CHANGED RESTORED RESTORED VERIFIED NUMBER POSITION
- POSITION
- BY POSITION
- BY BY INITIAL /
INITIAL /
INITIAL /
DATE DATE DATE **
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- O...OPEN, X... CLOSED, T... THROTTLED
- Q, F, or R Listed Only Salem bommon Page 14 of 15 Rev.2
sC.IC-GP.ZZ-0006(Q)
ATTACHMENT 5 COMPLETION
SUMMARY
10.0 Completion Summary:
10.0 REMARKS, i
10.2 I&C / Maintenance Supeivisor(s) Appmval:
This procedure has been myiewed to ensure all mquired initials /signatums, data and tolerance values have been obtained.
I&C / Maintenance Supervisor / Date Salem bommon Page 15 of 15 Rev.2
fff 7~ F M. N n
1.1 Ibd Control System Failure Overvim Solen thit 2 experlenced trultIple fallures of the Fbd Controf System (E) during startup folI ming the cycle 7 refueling outage. There have been five restart atterpts with the last one, on June 3, being successful. Hanever, on all previous fcur atteTpts the E failed to perform its function. The nest serious failure occurred during the second startup atteTpt on May 27, 1993, Wien during an atteTpt to wlthdr u shutdmn Bank A, the operator observed that the Individual Rod Position Indication (IPI) did not indicate that the 4
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4 control rods are being wlthdrau1. At that point the operator stopped l
atterpting to withdr e rods. The Group Dmund Indicator indicates the position of rods based on the derard f rorn the E.
The IW I provides the i
actual position of the rod in the core. 'the operator then atterpted to insert l
shutdonn Bank A to step 6.
Hyever, one control rod (1SA3) withdrm 8 steps i
Wille the Group demand indicater counted doAn frat)20 steps to 6 steps. The 4
operator then inserted the shutdonn bank to zero. At that tinn the IWI Indication for control rod 1SA3 Indicated 15 steps. At that point the Public Service Electric and Gas (the Iicensee) reroved the poner f ROT 1 the rod by pulIing fuses and rod 1SA3 dropped to zero position Wiich ves indicated by i
IWl.
4 The cause of this event is postulated to be a single failure in the M.
In addition to this failure, there have been rv.rrerous failures of electronic j
co1ponents in the E.
The Iicensee on June 4, 1993, decided to bring the unit 2 to lVbde 3.011t 1 continue to run at 100% poner. The licensee sutmitted I
a JCD for unit 1 Wilch ves accepted by NC. thit 1 tripped on June 10, 1993 21 4
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i due to the problemwith CirculatingVWter System. Wit 1 caTe back on line on June 10, 1993 af ter NC approval. All the rods are inserted in the core and j
the reactor trip breakers a re kept open to prevent any spurious rod withdrael.
Q1 June 22,1993, af ter the NC approval, the licensee turned the pcmer on for the E. During the test riore failures occurred in the E. Dese failures a re unrelated to the previous failures and probably a re caused by the technician vtille ho es installing and/or ratoving juTpers. 01 June 24,1993, the licensee had scrre problem with the carputer and IFPl. These probim wre external to the E cabinets. On June 30, 1993, the SaleT1 W it 2 u nt on line.
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3.0 lbd Cbntrol Svsten Initial StatusKhanoes i
During this refueling outage, the only design change to the R3 ms performed l
per Design Change M. 2EC-3136. By thIs design package the 1icensee replaced i
obsolete poner supply PS3 and PS4 (LaTbda Mxiel 2. IM261) with neu Larbda Nbdel 2. tJCS-A-24-6795 for all five poner supply cabinets.
In addition to i
this, the licensee has replaced existing daisy chain neutral wiring bete en j
LaTbda poner supplies PS1 to PS2 and PS3 to PS4 with individual neutral wire j
3 for each poner supply. This change u s done to minimize the risk of u lpping the reactor during renork or replaceTent of any poner supply.
i This change is similar to the change vhich as done at Salen thit 1 under Design Cbnt rol Change %.1BC-3113. thit 1 has beea operating with this change without any probienwith the R3. The tean also elked doAn the fleId l
changes rmde to the poAer cabinets under thIs design change. The tean did not identify any differences in the installation bete en L.hlt 1 and 2.
Based on this, the tean concludes that this design change has no irTpact on the failure of the FCS at thit 2.
In addition to the deslon change, the Iicensee had perfonTad nany nulntenance activitles with respect to the K S.
These activitles and e rk order (N/0) nos. are listed belou:
(1)
W/O 930301114 Problen:
N PI cabinet reIay Iight off.
Soln:
2 problen found.
Closed:
5/2
l G servation:No explanation in cIoseout package.
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W/O 931029004 Problem:
Perform cable check on 2. 2 control rod rischanism.
Soln:
Insulation resistance checked out okay.
Closed:
5/4 Observation:
during e rk a question e s raised about the IR betm en shield and ground. I-b^ever the closure did not provide the ansaer to the questlon.
(3)
W/O 930330102 Problan:
Repair / replace cracked outer insulation of CHM cable P-12 and P-8 for rod 2SA3 and 1B4.
Soln:
Cable for P12 - 2SG ms replaced wlth spare cable @lle cable for 184 ms repaired with fiberglass tape.
Closed:
5/12 Obeservatlon:
The u rk order asked the daTaged cable to be replaced or repaired with Raychem heat shrink. 14mever, the cable u s repaired with the fiberglass tape. M i
explanatlon u s provided in the closeout package.
J Af ter the tean requested the justifIcatlon, the Iicensee pravided the justification based on the verbal acceptance of the Mhstinghouse fIeId engineer.
No analysis u s done. The teat)questloned the WJstinghouse representative about this and he stated that it u s based on this judgeTent only. Although this shortccming has no inpact on the failure of the l
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I E, but it points out the shortcoming of the doctmentatlon needed for deviating f rom the erk order 2
instructlon.
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In other wrk order packages the team did not identify any problem except for the W/O # 930421129 in which the step counters are replaced. De l
problers with the step counters are discussed in Section 5.0.
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Concluslon: Frcm the reviav of design change and naintenance actlvitles l
perforned by the Iicensee on the E prfor to the fallures, the tean concludes that none of these activitles a re the cause of the E failures untiI the step counters a re replaced.
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11.0 Potential Generic Irmlication The inadvertant withdral of a single rod (1S43) during the Nby 27, 1993 startup of Salem 2, could have been caused by a single failure. This is in confIiet with the Salenlbdated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 15.3.5.1, vditch states that no single failure could cause a single Rod Control Cluster Assenrbly (RIA) withdral. Also 10CHEO Appendix A, General Design Criterion 25 requires that fuel design should not be affected by any single malfunction of a reactivity control systen.
The rod control systen installed at SaleT12 is used at all Mstinghouse designed plants except %ddan Neck. Hence the failure vdilch ocurred at Salen 2 is generic. NC has issued an Inforrmtion 2tice 93-46 on June 10, 1993 to inform Iicencees about the potential problenwithVWstinghouse designed ICS.
NC has also activated the Mstinghouse &ners Group WOG) Regulatory Response Group (ffG) to address the concerns. 01 June 11,1993Mstinghouse issued a Welear Safety Advisory Letter (hSAl.)93-007, to alI domstIcVWstinghouse nuclear pcmer plants. A rmeting ves also held with theV0G at NC headquarter to discuss their preliminary finding.
According tov 0G, the failure of FES at Salen 2 is a condition 111 event and not a condition 11 event and based on that a smil f raction of failed fuel is acceptable consequences for this event. Based on the analysis done by Vestinghouse, the V0G considers that IES tmets the ANS condition lII acceptance eriterla. NE staff has issued a Generic Letter 93-04 on June 21,1993 to all VWstinghouse plants for action and BM/ and C-E plants for inforrmtion. The staf f is requesting l icensee v4)o operates VWst inghouse designed plants to assess that the licensing basis for their plant is satisfled and provide a supporting discusslon for that assessTent. If
i licensing basis is not satisfied, then the licensees are requested to provide the short term and long term corrective actions. Thus the generic aspects of this events will be reviened by the NE for all Vestinghouse plants. NE is also evaluating if this event could also occur at B 8Nand C-E plants.
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12.0 Fran the revleu of the urk orders related to the rmintenance, the tean has concluded that the closure of the urk orders lack the engineering analysis needed to properly close the a rk orders.
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5.4 Suumry of Carponent Failures Attachrent 4 lists the rruitiple failures of cards in slots A113, A114, A713, l
and A714. This list us generated based on the Attactient 5, vtilch provided the Iist of alI fallures in the ITE af ter the caTpletlon of preventive treintenance activititles. Slots A113 and A114 are used for the Supervisory j'
Data Logging (50L) cards and slots A713 and A714 are used for the Slave cycler l
decoder (SCD) cards. Oi the EDL cards saTs chips, especially the chips Z2 and 23 mre reptaced trarry t Pres. The iIcensee's troubleshooting plan as to flx the failed cuiponents without analyzing the root cause of the failure. This approach tray be suitable for the cuiponent where the failure us caused by the aging or the root cause of the failure is internal to the corponent. Root cause evaluation beccTes trore critical vdien the saTu coTponent falls again and again. The licensee failed to assign any single individual responsible following the failures and determine the root cause in a systemtic m y until the AIT arrived at the Salem site.
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of M Ob (_ogyr.el 3 ys71e=M - FA fLsb cangeadertr ETAT US
- Clff, ALS6 PReVI.D$D 15 A
2433co48tc%
oF PES f a 's
'Pos tTo o r+
Fote.
Tk E orWH rrens f (P.o M TH E.
6!!8 NET iNG Tats ti-b
'F5Y 3
I Mg LAE AEow1TE A t40 M $;
6 A R.g,
risw M
i 0==I Ck
% y mefc l
l 1
h l
i 4/
d i
1 1%
~. -. - - - -.. -. - -
_. -. -.. ~ - -
t t
ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS i
DESCRIPTION WSN PRESENT MOST PROBABLE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR STATUS
&lNSTALLATION) t i
SUPERVISORY DATA 183 A114 FAILURE - HIGH 5/16/93 - REMOVED FROM LOGGING ELECTRICAL STRESS DUE A113. REPAIRED ???
(LOGIC CABINET)
TO DISCONNECT OF 5/31/93, 13:00 -
SURGE SUPPRESSION INSTALLED IN A114.
DIODE 13:30 - CBA GRP 2 NOT MOVING, REPLACED Z3.
REINSTALLED TO A114.
j 6/3/93 3:50 AM - P/A CONVERTER AND PLANT COMPUTER FAILED TO RETEST - BENCH TEST, INDICATED FOR CBB, SBB, l
ROD MOVEMENT REPLACED Z13. RETEST SAT.
j i
i i
- i i
)
t i
l l
PAGE 1 June 22,1993 f
i t
ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS DESCRIPT!ON WSN PRESENT MOST PROBABLE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR STATUS
& INSTALLATION)
SUPERVISORY DATA 216 l&C FAILURE - HIGH 5/16/93 - INSTALLED IN LOGGING SHOP ELECTRICAL STRESS DUE A114 REPLACED Z3.
(LOGIC CABINET)
TO DISCONNECT OF 5/27/93, 8:40AM -
SURGE SUPPRESSION REMOVED FROM A114, DIODE REPLACED Z2,Z5, Z3.
15:30 - REINSTALLED TO A114.
5/31/93,10:45 - REMOVED FROM A114 AND BENCH i
RETEST - STEPPING OF TESTED, REPLACED Z3.
CBB, CBD, AND SBB STEP i
COUNTERS, REMOVED I
FROM SYSTEM 5/31 r
i
[
PAGE 2 June 22,1993 l;
l
t ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS DESCRIPTION WSN PRESENT MOST PROBABLE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR STATUS
&lNSTALLATION)
SUPERVISORY DATA 217
???
FAILURE-HIGH 5/16/93 - INSTALLED IN LOGGING ELECTRICAL STRESS DUE A113. REPLACED Z8,29,
[
(LOGIC CABINET)
TO DISCONNECT OF Z12.
SURGE SUPPRESSION 5/24/93 - REMOVED FROM r
DIODE A113.
i REPAIR ????
RETEST - STEPPING ALL 1
RODS TO 228 STEPS, REMOVED F, ROM SYSTEM 5/24 1-I t
PAGE 3 June 22,1993
i i
ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS i
DESCRIPTION WSN PRESENT MOST PROBABLE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR STATUS
&lNSTALLATION)
SUPERVISORY DATA 6014 A113 FAILURE - HIGH 5/24/93 - INSTALLED IN l
LOGGING ELECTRICAL STRESS DUE A113
[
(LOGIC CABINET)
TO DISCONNECT OF 5/26/93 - REMOVED FROM SURGE SUPPRESSION A113 DIODE REPLACED Z3 & 26.
l INSTALLED BACK TO A113.
i REPLACED Z2, Z5 & Z8.
REINSTALLED TO A113.
REMOVED FROM A113, REPLACED Z2, Z5 & 26.
REINSTALLED TO A113.
REMOVED FROM A113 AND I
TAKEN TO TRAINING j
l RETEST - STEPPING OF CENTER FOR TESTING.
STEP COUNTERS TO 228, FOUND Z3 BAD. REPLACED l
B.O. TEST, RETEST WITH Z3, RETEST SAT.
i ROD MOVEMENT 6/3 5/27/93 - INSTALLED IN I
A113. RETEST SAT.
MOVE CBA, CBC GRP1 NO l
PULSE. REPLACED Z3 &
Z6. REINSTALLED TO A113.
i 1
5/31/93, 10:45 REMOVED j
FROM A113 AND BENCH i
TESTED, REPLACED Z3 &
PAGE 4 June 22,1993 i
l
~
.7
.=
t ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS DESCRIPTION WSN PRESENT MOST PROBABLE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR STATUS
& INSTALLATION) l i
SUPERVISORY DATA 0039 l&C FAILURE - HIGH 5/26/93 - INSTALLED IN t
LOGGING SHOP ELECTRICAL STRESS DUE A113. REMOVED FROM l
(LOGIC CABINET)
TO DISCONNECT OF A113, REPLACED Z3, Z2, i
SURGE SUPPRESSION Z8. INSTALLED IN A113
~
DIODE AGAIN. REPLACED Z2.
Fall AGAIN, REPLACED Z2 4
& Z3. INSTALLED IN A113, REMOVED FROM A113 AND TAKEN TO TRAINING CENTER FOR TESTING, i
REMOVED FROM SYSTEM FOUND Z3 BAD. REPLACED
[
5/14 Z3, RETEST SAT.
5/27/93 - REINSTALLED IN
[
A113.
I FAILED AGAIN, REMOVED FROM A113 REPLACED 23.
INSTALLED IN A114, MOVE l
ROD FOR CBS NO PULSE, REPLACED Z3. RETEST SAT.
15:30 - REMOVED FROM A114, REPLACED Z3.
l t
t PAGE 5 June 22,1993 i
l i
i I
- A
i i
i l
ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS
{
DESCRIPTION WSN PRESENT MOST PROBABLE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR STATUS
& INSTALLATION) 1/O RELAY DRIVERS (LOGIC 132 l&C FAILURE-HIGH 5/16/93 - REMOVED FROM CABINET)
SHOP ELECTRICAL STRESS DUE A713.
i TO DISCONNECT OF 5/28/93 - BENCH TESTED SURGE SUPPRESSION FOUND CR1, CR5, & CR9 t
DIODE SHORTED. REPLACED THE l
i SHORTED DIODES, RETEST l
-SAT.
REMOVED FROM SYSTEM t
5/14 l/O RELAY DRIVER (LOGIC 139 l&C FAILURE - HIGH 5/16/93 - REMOVED FROM l
CABINET)
SHOP ELECTRICAL STRESS DUE A714.
TO DISCONNECT OF 5/28/93 - BENCH TESTED l
SURGE SUPPRESSION FOUND CR1 SHORTED -
DIODE REPLACED CR1, RETEST -
SAT.
[
i REMOVED FROM SYSTEM l
l 5/14 l
l l
I i
t PAGE 6 June 22,1993 i
i
)
.l
.-[
i ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS f
s i
DESCRIPTION WSN PRESENT MOST PROBABLE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR STATUS
& INSTALLATION)
I/O RELAY DRIVER (LOGIC 120 l&C FAILURE - HIGH 5/16/93 - INSTALLED IN CABINET)
SHOP ELECTRICAL STRESS DUE A713.
i TO DISCONNECT OF 5/26/93 - REMOVED FROM l
SURGE SUPPRESSION A713.
DIODE 23:50 - INSTALLED IN l
A713.
5/27/93 5:00 AM -
[
l REMOVED FROM A713.
SUSPECTED BAD INPUT i
DIODE.
5/28/93 - BENCH TESTED l
1 REMOVED FROM SYSTEM FOUND CR1, CR9, CR17 5/27 SHORTED. REPLACED SHORTED DIODES, RETEST
-SAT.
?
f
?
l I
i PAGE 7 June 22,1993 i
i
ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS i
I DESCRIPTION WSN PRESENT-MOST PROBABLE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR STATUS
&lNSTALLATION) 1/O RELAY DRIVER (LOGIC 133 I&C FAILURE - HIGH 5/16/93 - INSTALLED IN CABINET)
SHOP ELECTRICAL STRESS DUE A714.
TO DISCONNECT OF 5/26/93 - REMOVED FROM i
SURGE SUPPRESSION A714.
DIODE SUSPECTED BAD INPUT DIODE.
6/9/93 - BENCH TESTED REMOVED FROM SYSTEM FOUND Q10 OPEN.
5/26 t
l PAGE 8 June 22,1993
_ - -... ~... - -.... - - -.......... -.. - -.. - -
.~
..l l
ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS DESCRIPTION WSN PRESENT MOST PROBABLE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR i
l STATUS
&lNSTALLATION) l l
I/O RELAY DRIVER (LOGIC 695 I&C FAILURE-HIGH 5/26/93, 2:OOAM - NEW CABINET)
SHOP ELECTRICAL STRESS DUE FROM FOLIO, INSTALLED
{
TO DISCONNECT OF TO A714.
SURGE SUPPRESSION 8:00 AM - REMOVED FROM DIODE A714.
i INSTALLED IN A714.
23:50 - REMOVED FROM i
A714.
l SUSPECTED BAD INPUT DIODE.
j 5/28/93 - BENCH TESTED REMOVED FROM SYSTEM FOUND CR1 SHORT, 5/26 REPLACED CR1 - RETEST i
SAT.
i i
i l
3 1
PAGE 9 June 22,1993 l
l l
l
[
I i
ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS I
DESCRIPTION WSN PRESENT MOST PROSABLE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR STATUS
&lNSTALLATION)
I/O RELAY DRIVER (LOGIC 681 I&C FAILURE - HIGH 5/26/93 - NEW FROM CABINET)
SHOP ELECTRICAL STRESS DUE FOLIO, INSTALLED TO TO DISCONNECT OF A714.
SURGE SUPPRESSION SWAPPED WITH S/N 695 -
DIODE NO CHANGE. RESTORED TO A714.
i REMOVED FROM A714 AND r
INSTALLED IN A713.
23:50 - INSTALLED IN REMOVED FROM SYSTEM A714.
l 5/27 5/27/93, 5:00 AM -
l REMOVED FROM A714.
SUSPECT BAD INPUT DIODE.
i 5/28/93 - BENCH TESTED FOUND CRS, CR17 d
SHORTED. REPLACED CRS, l
CR17 - RETEST SAT.
}
I I
j l
i PAGE 10 June 22,1993 l
t
.___-____.m._______
t i
ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS DESCRIPTION WSN PRESENT MOST PROBABLE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR STATUS
&lNSTALLATION) t i
f 1/O RELAY DRIVER (LOGIC 701 I&C FAILURE-HIGH 5/26/93, 8:00 AM - NEW CABINET)
SHOP ELECTRICAL STRESS DUE FROM FOLIO, INSTALLED TO DISCONNECT OF TO A713.
SURGE SUPPRESSION REMOVED FROM A713.
DIODE SUSPECTED BAD INPUT l
DIODE.
5/28/93 - BENCH TESTED FOUND CR1 SHORT.
REPLACED CR1, RETEST REMOVED FROM SYSTEM SAT.
5/26 1/O RELAY DRIVER (LOGIC 345 A713 FAILURE - HIGH RETRIEVED FROM TRAINING I
CABINET)
ELECTRICAL STRESS DUE CENTER, AND INSTALLED l
4 TO DISCONNECT OF TO A713.
SURGE SUPPRESSION DIODE
[
REMOVED FROM SYSTEM 5/31 i
PAGE 11 June 22,1993
i
~
ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS DESCRIPTION WSN PRESENT MOST PROBABLE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR STATUS
&lNSTALLATION)
[
I SLAVE CYCLER 0079 TB2 FAILURE-HIGH 5/28/93 2:26 AM -
l STATIONARY DECODER -
ELECTRICAL STRESS DUE REMOVED FROM A501, l
GO2 TO VOLTAGE TRANSIENT TESTED BAD ON TEST RIG.
(LOGIC CABINET)
ASSOCIATED WITH STEP l
COUNTER BACK EMF WESTINGHOUSE t
ANALYSIS SHOWED RESISTIVE SHORT 200 OHMS - Z2 PIN 9 TO GND (SUBSTRATE FAILURE) l Z1 SHOWED 2uA @10v BETWEEN PIN 5 TO GND f
i (5 MEGOHMS).
i SPECIFICATIONS ARE 2uA
}
AT 16v (8 MEGOHMS).
j i
?
i i
PAGE 12 June 22,1993 I
l t
J ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS
}
4 DESCRIPTION WSN PRESENT MOST PROBABLE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR STATUS
& INSTALLATION)
~
SLAVE CYCLER MOVABLE 0080 TB2 FAILURE-HIGH 5/28/93 - REMOVED FROM i
i l
DECODER GO3 ELECTRICAL STRESS-DUE A511, TESTED BAD ON (LOGIC CAB)
TO VOLTAGE TRANSIEl4T TEST RIG.
I SIMILAR TO ELECTROSTATIC l
DISCHARGE t
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS l
FROM MOTOROLA (6/16 PM) SHOWS A FAILURE ON PIN 1 OF Z2 I
FIRING CARD 0395 l&C INTERMITTENT FAULT, 5/30/93 - REMOVED FROM i
(POWER CAB)
SHOP TP5 INDICATED NO SLOT D1 OF POWER l
" PUSH" OF A PUSH-PULL CABINET. INTERMITTENT l
l AMPLIFIER. BENCH FAILURE.
l l
TESTED SAT, COULD NOT l
DUPLICATE FAILURE j
l REGULATION CIRCUlT 297 I&C SOLDER RUN 5/30/93 - REMOVED FROM l
l GRIPPER SHOP DEGRADATION SLOT F1. PART OF THE l
l (POWER CAB)
SHORTING THREE INTERMITTENT FAILURE t
TRACES TOGETHER CIRCUIT. REPLACED FOR f
(Vcoil - Vdemand - Verr)
RELIABILITY.
l PAGE 13 June 22,1993 1
i
ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS l
DESCRIPTION WSN PRESENT MOST PROBABLE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR STATUS
& INSTALLATION) l t
i l
I/O AC AMPLIRER 144 A803 -
FAILURE - SHORT 5/30/93, 2:45 AM - BENCH (LOGIC CAB)
A814 BETWEEN 100V POWER TESTED SAT. INSTALLED SUPPLY AND -15VDC IN A803.
POWER SUPPLY 19:51 - REMOVED FROM A803, REPLACED Q13, Q14
- STILL DEFECTIVE.
i RETEST - BENCH TEST, REPAIRED ???
ROD MOVEMENT SINCE
[
5/31 I
1/O AC AMPLIFIER 142 A814 -
FAILURE - SHORT 5/30/93 - BENCH TESTED l
(LOGIC CAB)
A813 BETWEEN 100V POWER FOUND DEFECTIVE, i
SUPPLY AND -15VDC REPAIRED.
POWER SUPPLY l
RETEST - BENCH TEST,
[
ROD MOVEMENT SINCE j
5/31 l
l
?
r PAGE 14 June 22,1993 i
i
..j I
ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS l
l L
DESCRIPTION WSN PRESENT MOST PROBA8LE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR STATUS
& INSTALLATION) l l
t 1/O AC AMPLIFIER 147 A808 -
FAILURE - SHORT 5/30/93 - BENCH TESTED l
(LOGIC CAB)
SPARE BETWEEN 100V POWER FOUND DEFECTIVE, SUPPLY AND -15VDC REPAIRED.
POWER SUPPLY e
RETEST - BENCH TEST,
[
ROD MOVEMENT SINCE i
l 5/31 1/O AC AMPLIFIER 149 A812 -
FAILURE - SHORT 5/30/93 - REMOVED FROM (LOGIC CAB)
A808 BETWEEN 100V POWER A812 BENCH TESTED i
SUPPLY AND -15VDC FOUND DEFECTIVE,
[
POWER SUPPLY REPAIRED.
[
i RETEST - BENCH TEST, ROD MOVEMENT SINCE l
5/31 i
f I
j PAGE 15 June 22,1993 i
f i
t
r I
..i i
ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS i
DESCRIPTION WSN PRESENT MOST PROBABLE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR i
STATUS
&lNSTALLATION)
I/O AC AMPLIFIER 150 A813 -
FAILURE - SHORT 5/30/93 - REMOVED FROM (LOGIC CAB)
SPARE BETWEEN 100V POWER A813, BENCH TESTED SUPPLY AND -15VDC FOUND DEFECTIVE,
[
POWER SUPPLY REPAIRED.
RETEST - BENCH TEST, ROD MOVEMENT SINCE l
5/31 1
1/O RECEIVER 28 A809 FAILURE - SHORT 5/30/93 - REMOVED FROM
~
i (LOGIC CAB)
BETWEEN 100V POWER A809, BENCH TESTED SUPPLY AND -15VDC FOUND DEFECTIVE, POWER SUPPLY REPLACED Q12.
I REINSTALLED TO A809.
I RETEST - BENCH TEST, ROD MOVEMENT SINCE 5/31 t
t t
PAGE 16 June 22,1993 l
1
. _.. _ _ _... _ _... _. _.. _ -. _.. _ _ _. _ _. _.. _ ~. _. _. _ _ _.. _ _ _. _. _..
i ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS l
DESCRIPTION WSN PRESENT MOST PROBABLE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR STATUS
&lNSTALLATION) i l
1 i
i SLAVE CYCLER LOGIC 80 I&C FAILURE - SHORT 5/31/93 21:35 - REMOVED (LOGIC CAB)
SHOP BETWEEN 100V SUPPLY FROM A514, BENCH j
AND -15VDC SUPPLY TESTED UNSAT FOUND
(-15V ON THE 1/O AC PIN 8 LOW, St )ULD BE AMP)
HIGH (12.5 - 15 VDC).
RETEST - BENCH TEST,
{
ROD MOVEMENT SINCE 5/31 P/O BANK OVERLAP LOGIC 14 l&C LIFE CYCLE FAILURE 6/01/9319:10 - REMOVED (LOGIC CAB)
SHOP FROM A207, BENCH i
RETEST - BENCH TEST, TESTED UNSAT. FOUND ROD MOVEMENT SINCE PIN 9 LO SHOULD BE H!GH 5/31 (12.5 - 15 VDC).
j R1 IN THE POWER CABINET WRONG R1 REPLACED 120VAC WITH 39 OHM (25 l
l GROUP A MULTIPLEXING LIGHT WATT) RESISTOR YlELDS CIRCUlT SOCKET 3.07 AMPS. 367 WATTS i
i INSTALL ON THE 25 WATT RESISTOR BLOWS IT UP i
c l
i PAGE 17 June 22,1993 1
i
8 t
ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS i
DESCRIPTION WSN PRESENT MOST PRO 8A8LE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR STATUS
& INSTALLATION) 4 76 %.
- v.j%.j 100 POWER SUPPLY REPLACED 100V POWER 5/26/93 - REPLACED (LOGIC CAB)
SUPPLY BECAUSE ITWAS 100VDC AUX POWER READING 113V AS SUPPLY PROACTIVE STEP i
i FUSES FAILURE - SHORT 5/30/93 - REPLACED 2 l
l (POWER CABINET)
BETWEEN 100V POWER FUSES, F11, F6.
l SUPPLY AND -15VDC 6/9/93 - BENCH TESTED POWER SUPPLY INCONCLUSIVE.
AUCTIONEER DIODE FAILURE - SHORT 5/30/93 - REPLACED 1 (LOGIC CAB)
BETWEEN 100V POWER NEGATIVE 15 VDC SUPPLY AND -15VDC AUCTIONEER DIODE POWER SUPPLY (SHORTED).
6/9/93 - BENCH TESTED i
FOUND AUCTIONEER DIODE l
SHORTED.
l i
LOW VOLTAGE POWER REPLACED AS A 5/30/93 - REPLACED 2 i
SUPPLY FILTERS PRECAUTIONARY FILTERS, A16 FL1 & FL2 MEASURE l
i a
PAGE 18 June 22,1993 l
As s
ROD CONTROL SYSTEM - FAILED COMPONENTS STATUS DESCRIPTION WSN PRESENT MOST PROBABLE CAUSE REMARKS (REPAIR STATUS
&lNSTALLATION) 2
~
f STEP COUNTER OPERATI WORK ORDER MISSED 10 STEPS ON 6/3 MISSTEPPING ONAL 930603076 DETERMINED MECHANICAL BINDING CTR RESET, RETEST WITH ROD MOVEMENT l
PAGE 19 June 22,1993 1
4/W95 j y u lf /-(slin (F6& %>~1-S M' l
1 xW WA % bt W-a'/p M
.f(M yu n u - w c - e
,a,, m e n I
a
> /2A Y "D h ht& h n)V TC& 3 SJ J yCl49 S
- FM /A4 h 44 pC~M Qo%
nwM
% + / w *. fr' v4: Cpvi)'
~ W """"'**P W
\\
- 72 44 &
//Pr H s 4 Y a y A g.
-7A-
.A a
- %G M L <<# au-y w/ vf A~rt.
i 7l
- F A
s i~,
~
x fb'F 75 Ar x+.tt 9 e, 9 z., ti r, w fct
/Cah,.<, CC., AM6, f Cry,htR.
& c.tA r,1-.a d y :
7 7.
is&
-y
- W f.1/
fgf
+ T & $ y'+;tV
/ s >s~~P
-/
955 Y-
'.> bT;, /fi F
- Aas :
/ 5 s,fz o, 2 7 c,/t r p
/ 1, C C,i W 6, CR
% */9 W~5-
~
/C. 9 ; f '3 cp_. % H kJ
/f.o 1
79 j
/RS~
- >s* M W /76
/SfL*5
1 i
t MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT i
4
+
SERT CHARTER i
l i
INVESTIGATE ROOT CAUSES FOR ONGOING FLRCS j
i PROBLEMS PRUDENCE OF STARTUP DECISIONS 1
i i
l 4
i
'nA f
1 SERT OBJECTIVES l
+
DEVELOP SEQUENCE OF EVENTS / CAUSAL FACTORS CHART AND IDENTIFY FAILED BARRIERS
+
INVESTIGATE WESTINGHOUSE CARD TESTING SERVICES AND OTHER OUTAGE ACTIVITIES
+
ASSESS OPERATOR RESPONSE TO DROPPED RODS AND ISA3 ANOMALY
+
ASSESS MANAGEMENT CONTROL OF TROUBLESHOOTING 4
ASSESS USE OF OPERATING EXPERIENCE AND ADEQUACY OF PM i
i ADDITIONAL AREAS EXAMINED:
+
RELAY ROOM VENTILATION
+
DESIGN CHANGES 1
+
PROCUREMENT
+
SOLDERING
+
TRAINING j
MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT 4
FINDINGS / CONCLUSION PRELIMINARY
+
FLRCS WAS NOT ASSESSED AS A DESIGN BASIS CONCERN
+
CONTROL OFTROUBLESHOOTING WAS LESS THAN ADEQUATE
+
REPETITIVE AND SM.iB COMPONENT FAILURES DID NOT INITI?.Tri SEARCH FOR COMMON FAILURE MODE RESTART DECISIONS WERE MADE WITHOUT ROOT CAUSE RESOLUTION
+
CONTROL ROOM RESPONSE WAS CONSERVATIVE AND IN 1
ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES
+
SALEM WAS NOT AN INDUSTRY OUTLIER IN FLRCS PROBLEMS
+
VENDOR SUPPLIED INFORMATION DID NOT DENOTE COIL j
RESISTANCE DIFFERENCES FOR SAME MODEL STEP COUNTERS
+
PM DID NOT ACTIVELY OR PASSIVELY CONTRIBUTE TO FLRCS i
PROBLEM
+
WESTINGHOUSE CARD TESTER DOES NOT TEST ALL CIRCUIT DIODES WHICH COMPLICATED TROUBLESHOOTING
+
PIN CONNECTIONS / CONTACTS PROBLEMS EXISTED ATTHREE (3) OTHER WESTINGHOUSE SITES 4
+
OTHER PARTS PROCUREMENT OUTAGE COMPLETION INFLUENCE VENDOR CONTROLS / COMPLIANCE
~*
i POSTULATIONS FOR SHUTDOWN BANK A RESPONSE l
O TIMING
)
i
+
LIFT AND MOVABLE ENERGIZE TOGETIIER
+
MOVABLE IS LIFTED BEFORE IT CAN ENGAGE 1
O FRICTION
+
STATIONARY AND MOVABLE GRIPPERS ENERGIZED TOGETHER WITH LIFT CURRENT.
+
ROD UNDER TENSION l
+
STATIONARY LtTCH FAILS TO RELEASE FRICTION IN LINKAGES DESIGN TOLERANCES -
CRUD BUILD UP ETC,ETC.
O TRAINING CENTER MOCK-UP TESTS 2
)
[
t
..P i
~',o'f.L WHY MORE THAN EXPECTED URGENT ALARMS DURING TESTING OF THE SCD POWER CABINET During testing of the SCD Power Cabinets, many more than expected Urgent Alarms were received and recorded by the Beta alarm system (Attachment 1).
The purpose of this report is to provide an basis i
for the numerous Urgent Alarms received by the Beta system but not to provide an exact accounting of each Urgent Alarm received.
l The following discussion is provided with the condition that j
transistor 09 on the Signal Process card has failed.
The Q9 transistor on the Signal Process card provides a current path for the card edge indicators and for alarm seal-in.
Transistor Q9 does not affect the circuit which provides the Urgent Alarm signal to the Beta alarm system.
With transistor Q9 open collector-to-emitter, card edge indicators will not light nor will alarms seal-in.
This results in a Beta alarm response when an alarm occurs and clears immediately when the Urgent Alarm condition no longer exists.
Sequence of Events At completion of testing of the 2AC Power Cabinet (approximately 2300 6/22/92), the Failure Detector cards of the 2AC Power Cabinet are pulled and a jumper from pins 1 to 3 is installed satisfying the card interlock circuitry for Power Cabinet 2AC.
In the SCD Power Cabinet, the bus duct switches were opened (Urgent Alarm; Regulation Failure, asking for reduced current and receiving none) and dummy coils are installed.
The card interlock jumpers are removed-(Urgent Alarm, Card Interlock) in the SCD Power Cabinet and the Failure Detector cards are installed (Card Interlock clear).
The bus duct switches are closed (Regulation Failures clear, Phase Failures may occur dependent upon were in the 360 degree AC cycle the switch is closed, in any case the Phase Failures will clear approximately 50 milliseconds later).
The Phase Failure alarm circuitry is only enabled when demanded current values are changed.
(Beta recognizes signals lasting a minimum of 50 milliseconds.)
Current traces were then taken for group A.
At this point, Forced Current and Card Indicator Alarm Verification, was began.
The stationary bus duct switches are opened (Regulation Failure).
A bus duct fuse is removed.
The bus duct switch is closed (Regulation Failure clears, Phase Failures occur and clear).
The RESET switch is then operated demanding full current for the stationary coils for 160 milliseconds.
Stationary current is then profiled back to reduced current. Upon operating the RESET switch, Phase Failures occur when current is rising to full current and clear upon reaching near steady-state full current.
Stationary current is then profiled to reduced initiating another Phase Failure alarm which again clears upon approaching the steady-state Page 1 of 2 W,L
/
a l
4 e
2 ' ),
4 reduced current value.
Note, this sequence will reoccur each time the RESET switch is operated.
The RESET switch was operated repeatedly.
The bus duct switches were operated repeatedly.
The Failure Detector cards were pulled (Urgent Alarm, Card Interlock) repeatedly. Testing proceeded to the moving circuitry with similar results.
In conclusion:
1.
The transistor Q9 failure affects only the card edge indicators and alarm seal-in.
2.
The transistor Q9 failure does not affect the alarm signal path to the Logic Cabinet and the Beta alarm system.
3.
With no alarm seal-in, the Beta system will respond to an alarm signal, and clear when the alarm condition clears.
4.
Most test events, ie.
operation of the RESET switch or operating of the bus duct switch, initiate multiple alarm conditions and subsequent alarm clearing conditions.
5.
The Beta alarm response printout is not abnormal given the transistor 09 open on the Signal Process card and the testing sequence.
Page 2 of 2
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i INDEPENDANCE: SEPERATION OF POWER AND LOGIC CABINETS Two failures have been discovered and repaired in the SCD Power Cabinet.
Both failures are transistor (2N1711) failures. These two failures are well isolated from the Logic Cabinet when considering signals and power supplies.
This isolation is accomplished with I/O AC Amplifier cards, Firing cards, and " distance" in circuitry from where the signal is developed and where the faults have occurred.
This isolation does not allow one to postulate that a Logic Cabinet fault could have induced the Power Cabinet Faults.
POWER SUPPLY ISOLATION l
The Logic Cabinet and Pcswer CaJinet power supplies are also isolated.
The Logic Cabinet has six DC power supplies, two redundant 100v, two redundant +15v, and two redundant -15v power supplies.
These power supplies are referenced to Ov bus located in the Logic Cabinet.
This Ov bus is referenced to the chassis ground (plant ground) via a 500 ohm 50 watt resistor and a parallel capacitor located in the Logic Cabinet.
The Power Cabinet DC power supplies consist of two redundant +24v power supplies and two redundant -24v power supplies. These power supplies are referenced to a Ov bus which is referenced to rod control MG neutral via a 50 ohm resistor located in a MG set control cabinet.
POWER CABINET TO POWER CABINET ISOLATION Power Cabinets signals are highly isolated from other Power Cabinets.
Power Cabinets do not share any signals.
All Power Cabinet signals orginate at the Logic Cabinet.
Logic Cabinet signals which may orginate on the same Logic Cabinet circuit utilize different circuits of that same circuit card.
At this
- point, the signals are routed to different Power Cabinets via different Firing cards located in different Power Cabinets.
For a Power Cabinet fault to affect another Power Cabinet, the fault would have to travel " backwards" through a Firing card, through an I/O AC Amplifier to the I/O AC Amplifier's input and then be routed to this different Power Cabinet.
4 Page 1 of 4
'e.. s,4 LOGIC CABINET TO POWER CABINET SIGNAL ISOLATION i
Signal Process Card Failure The first failure discovered is the Q9 transistor located on the Signal Process card.
The Q9 transister is located in the " reset" circuitry.
Reset can originate from either the Logic Cabinet or the Power Cabinet.
If originating from the Logic Cabinet, the signal is processed through an I/O AC Amplifier (figure 3-130 and discussed on pages 139, 140) located in the Logic Cabinet.
The signal is routed through an isolating transformer (T6) on the stationary A Firing card (discussed on pages 26, 27; figure 3-22).
The center tap of T6 develops the Reset signal on the Signal Process card across R2 (discussed on pages 30, 31; figure 3-33).
l A normal, non-reset condition of the transistors illustrated on l
figure 3-33 is Q2 on, Q4 on, Q6 of f, Q7 of f, Q9 on, Q14 on, and Q15 off.
Upon RESET, Q2, Q4, Q14, and Q15 change state.
This demands full current for the rods associated with the three stationary groups.
A short time later (160 milliseconds), C3 has charged to a potential turning on Q6.
Now, Q6, Q7 turn on, Q9 off, Q14 on, and Q15 off.
Q9 shutting off interrupts the current path for the card edge indicators and the alarm seal-in circuits.
The alarm is cleared.
If the alarm condition is still present, the card edge indicators reenergize.
The Q9 transister fault on the Signal Process card was discovered when testing the Phase Failure Detector circuit.
The technician induces a phase failure by removing a Bus Duct fuse.
(Phase failure detection circuitry is discussed on pages 36 through 38.)
The card edge indicator never illuminated.
This is explained by the fact Q7 and Q9 are not conducting (Q7 for normal non-reset condition, and Q9 is not conducting because of the emitter-to-collector open).
In essence, a constant reset is being applied to the card edge indicators.
The detection of the second failure occurred when the technician operated the RESET switch.
Upon operating the switch, he noticed 4
that the card edge indicator illuminated when depressed, and deenergized when released. This is explained by the f act that when RESET is operated, Q7 conducts, Q9 is still not conducting (Q9 is open emitter-to-collector).
With Q7 conducting a current path for the card edge indicator exists via Q7, the base-to-omitter short of i
Q9, and the transistor driving the phase failure card edge indicators.
Page 2 of 4
....s Alarm Card Failure After repair of the Signal Process card, testing proceeded to the checking of the Logic Error Detector circuit.
A Logic Error was introduced but the card edge indicator did not illuminate.
A Logic Error is a situation where a simultaneous zero current order for the moving and stationary coils exists.
The current orders from the Logic Cabinet originate with the Slave Cycler Decoder cards (figure 3-59).
The signals pass through the I/O AC Amplifiers (figure 3-130),
Firing card isolating transformers (figure 3-22) and developed on the Regulation card (figure 3-5).
This Regulation card reference circuit is discussed on pages 12 through 14.
The SA signal is renamed Rz and developed across R75 with SB renamed as Rr and developed across R60.
The circuit of figure 3-5 functions as a voltage divider developing three different voltage levels (named Vref) for the three different current levels, zero, reduced, and full.
The voltage levels are 0, 6.1, and 11.5 volts corresponding to zero,
- reduced, and full current.
Each of the three stationary regulation cards are performing the voltage division along with the moving regulation card.
Each of these cards send a Vref signal to the Alarm card (figure 3-41).
The Alarm card is described on pages 38 through 43.
The Vref signale enter the Alarm card via diodes.
Normally a positive potential is on the base of Q9 turning it on, Q10, Q11, and Q12 are off.
When a Logic Error condition occurs, zero volts from Vref of I
the moving and at least one of the stationary Regulation cards turns off Q9.
Ultimately, Q11 turns on sending the signal to the Urgent Alarm section of the Alarm Card.
012 turns on illuminating the card edge indicator via Q9 of the Signal Process card (R Reset).
The failure of Q9 on the Alarm card (10 kilo-ohms emitter-to-collector) results in keeping Q10, Q11, Q12 off and unable to respond to Logic Error conditions.
Page 3 of 4
4
- s s
., a 4
Conclusions 1.
The Logic Cabinet power supplies are isolated from the Power Cabinet power supplies.
2.
Power Cabinets are isolated from other Power Cabinets by the Logic Cabinet.
3.
The Logic Cabinet is isolated from Q9 failure on the Signal Process card by an I/O AC Amplifier, the Firing card isolation circuitry, and four transistors and associated circuitry on the Signal Process card.
4.
The Logic Cabinet is isolated from Q9 failure on the Alarm card by an I/O AC Amplifier, the Firing card isolation circuitry, the Regulation card reference circuitry, and the Alarm card input circuitry.
Therefore, the failures of the Signal Process and Alarm' card in the SCD Power Cabinet cannot be related to any of the previously experienced Rod Control failure experienced during the 2R7 outage and also could not introduce any failures back to the Logic Cabinet.
Page 4 of 4 l
l
_ _. ~. _.... _. _. _ _. _
4 A ' ss 1
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SALEM GENERATING STATION ROD CONTROL SYSTEM OETA! LED DESCRIPTION s,
)
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14135:4 FOR TRAINING ONLY
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.i Last Day Briefing w/PSE & G I.
Purpose of the AIT:
j A.
Verify the circumstances and unte the significance of the following event: The Salem Unit 2 rod con system failures w/ cause not completely understood i
B.
The Charter gives the scope of the inspection. This scope included detailed fact-finding, identification of potential generic issues, determination of causes of component failures andithe' associated root,causes, and examination of PSE&G vendor oversight, maintenance and troubleshooting activites, and restart.
4 i
II..
The inspection included document review, upwards of 2 dozen interviews, observation 4 of equipment in the field, discuisl6'~i~with the RCS vendor, review of test and n
troubleshooting records, and observation of a demonstration in the training center.
III.
A number of the individual failures were likely caused by the group step rs that
! h)[/
n were installed on about 5/20 due to abnormal pulses reflected back thro the +15 volt power supply. Barr will f/u on Mon and Tues on the procuremen
- ues including a I
detailed EC&F look. --Y61u"have'd5m..?
rovide a detailed list of your cause q,
r determination for each failed component - ready b ed? Other "causes" have rot been 7,l g
]
completely ruled out, including card wiskers.
.i...,..o IV.
Did not find an impact due to the power supply mod.
V.
Safety implications were found WRT the potential single failure - GDC 25 irsue - basis d
i for single failure question still open.. WOG.RRG mtg on Mon.
i No significant (-) for maintenanch practices for PSE&G.
VI.
4 i
' VII.
Troubleshooting appeared to get the right resources applied and procedures appear appropriate. Overall rigor of root cause determination for hardware failures was less than adequate. Appears to be no' policy for..when root cause must be determined and l
how to test those causes against the facts. i
.4 j
VIII. Clear standards for th work were not applied and communication protocol not delineated.
CJ4.t (A7s cc'_T). -
IX.
Restart process - procedures were followedj appearred that their was adequate 4
management involvement but see above comments on root cause. JCO process and j
current treatment of issues appropriate; i
j Your staff provided outstanding support during a d,ifficult and protracted s/u an review. I and Gene will be back Wed while Barr will be here Mon and Tues. Exit TBD. Inspection still ongoing.
i 1
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SALEM UNIT 2 ROD CONTROL SYSTEM CORRECTIVE ACTIONS I,
i
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I IMMEDIATE i
i i
e OPERATIONAL (CONTINUED) 1
-OPERATORS TRAINED AT SIMUL.ATOR FOR UNEXPECTED ROD MOTION COMPLETE i
= CONTINUE NOTIFICATION TO THE f
INDUSTRY OF THE SALEM INCIDENT ONGOING l
- MODIFICATIONS
- INSTALLATION OF SUPRESSION DIODES i
FOR BOTH UNITS IN PROGRESS 1
- REPLACE ROD CONTROL LOGIC CARDS - UNIT 2 BEFORE STARTUP 4
2 j
-IMPLEMENT STATIC CHARGE CARD HANDLING GUIDANCE COMPLETE
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f l-j SALEM UNIT 2
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ROD CONTROL SYSTEM j
/
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ii/
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LONG TERM I
e MANAGEMENT ISSUES i
l
- COMPLETE SERT EVALUATION AND IMPLEMENT APPROVED RECOMMENDATIONS j
- PROVIDE IMPROVED GUIDANCE FOR THE CONDUCT AND l
CONTROL OF MAINTENANCE TROUBLESHOOTING l
ACTIVITIES i
- PARTICIPATE WITH WOG FOR RESOLUTION OF GENERIC 1
ISSUES j
- ESTABLISH A " LESSONS LEARNED" TEAM BETWEEN
{
WESTINGHOUSE AND PSE&G FOR CONTRACTOR SERVICES j
- PROVIDE PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE FOR ROOT CAUSE 1
ADEQUACY
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- MODIFICATIONS I
- CHANGE MECHANICAL STEP COUNTERS TO DIGITAL 4
STEP COUNTERS
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i SALEM UNIT 2 i
l l
ROD CONTROL SYSTEM i,
SUMMARY
CONCLUSIONS i
i j
i i
e SIGNIFICANCE OF SINGLE ROD WITHDRAWAL AS A FUNCTION i
OF A SINGLE FAILURE NOT IDENTIFIED SOON ENOUGH l
RESULTING IN INAPPROPRIATE DECISION TO RESTART 1
0 SUBSEQUENT TO RECOGNITION OF SIGNIFICANCE, j
COMPREHENSIVE TROUBLE SHOOTING, REPAIR, ROOT CAUSE
)
EVALUATION
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e CONSERVATIVE ACTION TO SHUYDOWN UNIT 2 AND MAINTAIN i
j UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN FOLLOWING TRIP
~ e COMPREHENSIVE SAFETY ASSESSMENT PERFORMED i
l 0 COMPENSATORY ACTIONS IN PLACE TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ASSURANCE l
e THOROUGH CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN/ UNDERWAY
)
e CONTINUING DETAILED SELF ASSESSMENT BY SERT O MODIFICATIONS TO ROD CONTROL SYSTEMS IN PROCESS f
e MANAGEMENT ISSUES IDENTIFIED AND BEING ADDRESSED J
- PSE&G ACTIVELY SUPPORTING LONG TERM RESOLUTION WITH I
W.O.G.
i l
SAFE, CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO REACTOR SAFETY LEAD TO DETAILED SAFETY ANALYSIS TO ADDRESS GENERIC ISSUE S3MW 3-33 i
R j
SALEM UNIT 2 ROD CONTROL SYSTEM I
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i
l j
IMMEDIATE i
j
- OPERATIONAL l
- DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT SAFETY l
EVALUATION FOR CONTINUED SAFE COMPLETE I
OPERATION i
- STANDING ORDERS IN EFFECT COMPLETE i
l fl
- CURRENT TRACES WILL BE PERFORMED PRIOR TO EACH STARTUP COMPLETE l
" FOR UNIT 2 INCREASED SURVEILLANCE j
TESTING FOR IRPl VERIFICATION COMPLETE
- APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN l
REVIEWED FOR ADEQUACY TO j
IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS ABNORMAL
(
COMPLETE
)
ROD MOVEMENT i
- ESTABLISH IMPROVED PRACTICE (S)
BEFORE S/2 CARD FOR CARD REMOVAL / INSTALLATION REPLACEMENT J
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Copynght O Kepner Tregoe. loc All Agms Reserved ET E10 001b
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Len Rajkowski From:
S. Karimian l
4 D. Best M. Woloski
Subject:
Analysis of Transistor Failures on Signal Processing and Alarm Circuitry Cards Date:
June 27,1993 Introduction l
1 During Westinghouse testing of the CRD power cabinets, failures were noted on the above-referenced cards. Diagnostic tests were performed and a single transistor on each card was determined to be the source of the failure. A root cause investigation performed by E&PB determined that the most probable cause of the failures was due to technician error.
Description of Incident Westinghouse personnel were executing Westinghouse Procedure Number NSID-EIS-85-11, Full Length Rod Control System Maintenance. In preparation fo'r testing, two Failure Detector cards were removed from slots J1 and I2 for all five power cabinets per procedure step 9.1.1.2. Two jumpers were then installed on pins one and three on the card edge connectors of both slots in all power cabinets per procedure step 9.1.1.3. The purpose of adding these two jumpers is to simulate the failure detector cards being installed in their appropriate slots; thus defeating the card interlock alarm. It is important to note that the removal of the Failure Detector cards and the installation of the j
jumpers are only part of the Westinghouse maintenance service and is not part of PSE&G rod control system surveillance testing.
Westinghouse had completed procedure steps for three of the five power cabinets-1BD,2BD and 2AC. Prior to testing the SCD cabinet, the interlock jumpers were removed and the Failure Detector cards reinstalled in the SCD power cabinet. Current traces were taken on the SCD cabinet with dummy coils. The stationary coil bus duct switches were opened and one phase fuse was pulled. The stationary bus duct switch was then closed and the reset switch was depressed. This should have generated three stationary phase failures.
It was noted that the stationary phase failures did not occur. Similar testing was then performed on the moveable circuitry with similar results. Diagnostics was performed and it was determined that the Signaling Process card had failed. The card was repaired (transistor Q9 replaced) and reinstalled. The phase failure, regulation failure and urgent alarms then became operable.
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CARDFAILDOC 1
06/27/93
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l Testing then continued and a logic error indicator was found inoperable. An Alarm Circuitry card was determined to be the cause. The card was repaired (transistor Q9 replaced) and reinstalled. The logic error indicator then became operable as well.
i Analysis of Fsilures i
The Signaling Process card which failed was located in slot J2; the Alarm Circuitry card which failed was located in slot Kl. Both cards are located in the SCD cabinet. It is important to note that the cards that failed were located immediate:y to the i
right of the locations where the Failure Detector cards were removed and the jumpers i
were installed. The traces, on the non-component side of the failed cards, are not insulated and are exposed to the technicians that tried to install or remove the test jumpers.
I E&PB has reviewed the work method associated with the installation of the jumpers. The method used by Westinghouse to install or remove the jumpers involves the technician placing his hand in a " hand-shaking" position. The jumper is then placed between two of the fingers. The technician then places his hand in the empty slot where the Failure Detector card was located, between two existing cards, and attempts to position the jumper on the appropriate two pins. Because the workplace is confined, the risk of connecting two of the wrong pins or shorting out traces on an adjacent card is possible. The potential for a mishap exists during the installation or removal of the tett jumpers. Therefore, E&PB has concluded that, during installation or removal of the jumpers, in two separated occasions, pins on the cage connectors or traces on the
)
exposed card were momentarily cross-connected resulting in specific transistor failures.
u The most probable cause of failure of the Q9 transistor on the Signaling Process card was due to the inadvenent contact shoning of pins 5 and 6 on the Failure Detector
)
card cage connector or the corresponding traces on the Signal Process card, while removing the jumper from pins I and 3 on the Failure Detector card cage connector (see i
attachment 1). Approximately 24 VDC was momentarily applied directly to the collector of the Q9 transistor on the Signal Processing card while Q9 was turned on. This caused the collector-emitter current to exceed the rating of the transistor because there was no j
current limiting resistor, thus resulting in the failure. Wiring between the Failure Detector card and the Signaling Process card can be found on attachment 2, 1
The most probable cause of failure of the Q9 transistor on the Alarm Circuitry card was due to the inadvenent cross-connection of traces on that card (see attachment 3).
4
. The 24 VDC bus trace and the trace for the anode of CR27 were momentarily shoned on the Alarrr. Creuitiy card with the Q9 transistor turned on (see ;tttachment 4). This caused the ba.se-entter current to exceed the rating of the transistor because there is no current i
limiting resistor between the 0.47 mfd capacitor and the Q9 transistor. Even after the capacitor is discharged, there is only an 11 ohm resistor limiting the current to Q9 under a shoned condition. This resulted in the failure, t
CARDFAIL. DOC 2
i 06/27/93 I
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Other probable scenarios were considered but none had the potential for causing l
the seen damage to the two Q9 transistors.
An independent root cause analysis was also performed by Westinghouse Corporation. Westinghouse arrived at the same conclusions as evidenced by the letter sent to PSE&G as found in attachment 5.
Analysis of Failed Components The failed components have been sent to a testing laboratory experienced in transistor failure analysis. They have inspected and tested the failed components using X-raying, Particle Impact Testing, Hermeticity Testing, Curve tracing and high power microscopic visualinspection.
' Their findings (see telecon in attachment 6) show that the failure of the transistors was attributed to a high current fault through the device. Since only the emitter wire and the silicon die was damaged, the fault in both components could have come from either a high collector-to-emitter current or a high base-to-emitter current. This type of damage is not considered the result of aging or degradation. Attachment 7 shows photographs of the damage internal to the transistors. Transistor #1 is from the Signaling Process card and transistor #2 is from the Alarm Circuitry card.
Validation of the Failures Two tests were performed to validate the failures seen on the two cards. Circuits I
were created which duplicated the equivalent circuits under the fault conditions. Six 2N1711. transistors were used. Three transistors were used to validate the Alarm Circuitry i
card failure with a collector-to-emitter short for Test #1. Then three transistors were used to validate the Signaling Process card failure with a base-to-emitter current limited fault for test #2.
In all cases, the transistors under test failed lending further credence to the L
proposed failure scenarios. A summary cf both tests can be found in Attachments 8 and 9.
Imonet on Other Eauipment Review of the wiring found in attachment 2 and 5 shows that the faults created by the inadvertent shorting Pins 5 and 6 on the Failure Detector card cage connector or the corresponding traces on the Signal Process card (attachment 1), Alarm Circuitty l
Card (attachment 4), Multiplex Error Detector card (attachr.ent 10) and the 24 VDC supplies. Damage occurred only to the Signaling Process card because all other cards have IN4148 blocking diodes. Therefore only the Signaling Process card is affected.
i l
The 24 VDC supplies are Lambda Model Number LME-24 which are high quality linear regulated supplies. Since these supplies are fuse protected and current limited, no' 4
CARDFAIL. DOC 3
06/27/93
.~,
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damage occurred to the supplies. However, the supplies are not current limited enough to protect the transistors from exceeding their specifications. Damage is limited to only the Q9 transistors on these specific cards.
The shorting of the traces on the Alarm Circuitiy card only affected the card itself.
A path was created from the +24 VDC through the Q9 transistor directly to ground.
l Therefore no other cards were affected.
l BED. min. tad.ed2s.tlen l
l Based on the above, E&PB recommends that only the Signal Processing and Alarm Circuitry Cards in SCD panel be replaced with new cards from folio. If any of those cards are not available from folio, E&PB recommends that the transistors on the existing cards be replaced with new transistors.
Note: As a conservative measure, Maintenance has replaced 13 of the 20 Power Cabinet circuit cards. The five Firing cards and the two Simulator cards were not replaced as they would not be affected by the original postulated event.
Lena Term Recommendations l
Based on E&PBs review, this represents an isolated incident. However, a recommendation is being made that extender cards be used for access to all rear connectors and board components. This will limit component exposure to transients, shorts and inadvertent connections. Furthermore, where possible, connections made as a part of DCP implementation and general testing should be accomplished with power to the cabinets turned off.
Safety Sinnificance The failure of the Signaling Process card noted will block Urgent alarm signals to the card edge indicators. Alarms to the Main Control Room and Power Cabinet red Urgent Alarm light will operate. Also, with this failure, the seal-in function is lost.
Therefore the Urgent Alarm will clear without the operator depressing the reset push-button.
The failure of the Alarm Circuitry card noted will not allow logic error detection.
In either of the above cases, the failure is with the alarm detection circuitry only j
and will not, by itself, cause failure of the Control Rod System. The protective trip function of the Control Rod System is always available for automatic or operator action.
l CARDFAIL. DOC 4
j 06/27/93
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CARDFAIL. DOC 9
06/27/93
yo: 1.en Rajkowski PsE40 Subjects Transistor Q9 Failure on Alarra circuitry Card (6050013001) and signal Process Card (6050317 col 1
SI/ SPA (93)-160 Based on the events that have been forwarded for Power Cabinet SCD fatlures at sales Unit #2 during alarm performance checks, and a
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postulation that transistor 99 is burned out on the Alarm card, a best estimate of cause for the damage is that a momentary short occured frosa the +24 VDC (on card) to the anode of CR27. The reasoning is that the solder runs for the +24 VDc and anode of ca27 parallel eneh other for approximately 4-1/2 inches at a spacing of.1 inch. The short could possibly have been caused when a jumper used during system functional i
testing was removed from the card edge connector at the backplane. Due to the configuration of the jumper and the confined space available for removing the jumper, potentist exists for a short to occur at the solder rune mentioned. Many other scenarios were considered without having the potential for causing the darnage postulated.
When the short is first applied, very high current is present due to energy stored in C7 (.47 microf arad charged to 24 VDC). The current will quickly decrease to abeut 2.2 arnperes which will probably burn out Q9.
Resistor RS3 limits the final power supply current to 2.2 amperes.
j Por the Signal Process card, it is reasonable to postulate that if the shorting jumper discussed above mesentarily connected pins 5 & 6 when e
being inserted into the railure Detector card edge connector en the backplane, 24 VDC oculd be applied directly to the collector of 99 causing damage to 09.
It is believed that the above postulations will be supported by failure analysis.
If not, further consultation would be available.
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Telephone Conversation Record
Participants:
PSE&G General Testine LaboratoMSunnyvale. CA)
M. L. Bursztein B. Townsend S. Karimian N. Derkovits l
A. Kapp(in Sunnyvale, CA) l M. Woloski
Subject:
Failure Analysis of Two 2NI711 Transistors from Signal Processing and Alarm Circuitry Cards Date: June 26,1993 Time: 1:15 P.M.
t Phone Number: (408) 245-7100 Discussion Details A telephone conversation was held between the above parties to get a status of the analysis of the two failed transistors. These transistors were hand carried to the testing lab by Mr. A. Kapp who also participated in this discussion. Mr. Townsend stated that the two transistors had been X rayed, undergone particle impact testing, hermiticity tested l
(fine leak and gross leak), had been placed on curve tracer and had undergone visual inspection. The visual inspection involved careful removal of the transistor can and i
inspection of the die under a stereo-zoom and high power optical microscope.
Mr. Townsend informed us that the original conclusion, based on the X-ray, that the collector had failed, was incorrect. The visual inspection revealed that both transistors had undergone severe electrical stress in the form of an overcurrent condition.
This was evidenced by the vaporization of the gold emitter wire which ties the emitter post to metalized emitter pad. Mr. Townsend funher stated that this condition can be caused by any overcurrent condition such as excessive collector-to-emitter current or excessive base-to-emitter current. When this type of overcurrent condition exists, the weakest link in the transistor current path will fail.
Furthermore, both transistor failures were caused by an incident external to the components. The components did not fail due to aging or some internal degradation.
By: Mark E. Woloski 1
I l
TELCON02. DOC
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Transistor damage photographs
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Alarm Circuitry Card Q9 Transistor failure validation CARDFAIL. DOC 12 06/27/93
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Validation of Transistor Failures on Alarm Circuitry Card introduction During Westinghouse testing of the CRD power cabinets, a failure was noted on the above-referen.ced card. Diagnostic tests were performed and the Q9 transistor was determined to be the source of the failure.
The potential cause of failure of the Q9 transistor on the Alarm Circuitry card was due to the inadvertent jumpering of traces on that card. The 24 VDC bus trace and the trace for the anode of CR27 was momentarily shorted on the Alarm Circuitry card with the Q9 transistor turned on. This caused the base emitter current to exceed the rating of the transistor.
This report describes the test used to validate the failure on the Alarm Circuitry caid. This test was performed on June 26,1993.
Test Setun Figure A shows the test circuit which was used to validate the Alarm Circuitry Card failure. The Alarm Circuitry Card equivalent circuit is conservative because the actual circuit card has a 0.47 mfd capacitor at the output of the 11 ohm resistor which upon shoning provided much higher current at the initial stages of the fault. Also, a 10 ohm resistor was used for test purposes.
The test setup used a Lambda power supply model LME-24 which is a 24 VDC supply equivalent to the supply installed in the power cabinet. The test was performed three times. Thus three transistors were used to validate the Alarm Circuitry Card failure.
All resistance measurements were taken using a Fluke Model 45 multi-meter, Serial Number 565003 last calibrated 12/3/92. No other test equipment was required.
All testing was performed under the auspices of S. Karimian of PSE&G.
l l
l
Test Baseling Initially, the six transistors were baselined. This was because three transistor were used for l
t the Alarm Circuitry card failure validation and three transistors were used for the
[
l Signaling Process card failure validation. The baseline data was as follows:
Junction Transistor Transistor Transistor Transistor Transistor Transistor
- 1(Ohms)
- 2(Ohms)
- 3(Ohms)
- 4(Ohms)
- 5(Ohms)
- 6(Ohms)
B.E 4.3M 4.3 M 4.6M 4.3M 4.3M 4.3M B-C 4.35M 4.3 M 4.5M 4.0M 4.lM
- 4. lM
.t E-B High High High High High High E-C High High High High High High CB High High High High High High C-E High High High High High High A high indicates resistance so high it is off scale of the meter.
Transistors I through 3 were used for the Alarm Circuitry card test and transistors 4 i
through 6 were used for the Signaling Process card test.
Alarm Circuitry Card Failure Validation i
This test was performed by setting up the circuit shown in Figure A. To valid ate the short that occurred in the field, the wire from the ten ohm resistor was brushed against the base of the transistor for each of the three test cases. The following were the results of this test:
i Junction Test Test Test Transistor #1 Transistor #2 Transistor #3 (Ohms)
(Ohms)
(Ohms)
B-E High High High B-C High I.6M 4.12M C-E High High High E-C High High High E-B High High High C-B High High High 1
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Test Conclusions All transistors failed during the validation test. This is readily seen by comparing the test results with the baseline data taken prior to the testing. It is important to note that this gives credibility to the proposed failure scenario.
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CARDFAIL. DOC 13 06/27/93
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Validation of Transistor Failures l
on Signal Processing Card Lnjroduction n
During Westinghouse testing of the CRD power cabinets, a failure was noted on the above-referenced card. Diagnostic tests were performed and the Q9 transistor was determined to be the source of the failure.
The most probable cau:e of failure of Q9 on the Signaling Process card was due to the inadvertent jumpering of pins 5 and 6 on the failure Detector card cage connector (see attachments 1 and 2). Approximately 24 VDC was momentarily applied directly to the collector of Q9 on the Signal Processing card while Q9 was turned on. This caused the collector-emitter current to exceed the rating of the transistor because there was no current limiting resistor, thus resulting in the failure.
l This report describes the test used to validate the failure on the Signaling Process card.
This test was performed on June 26.1993.
j 1
Test Setu.D Figure A shows the test circuit which was used to validate the Signaling Process Card failure. The Signaling Process Card equivalent circuit is the same as the circuit on the card during the postulated fault condition.
i The test setup used a Lambda power supply model LME 24 which is a 24 VDC supply equivalent to the supply installed in the power cabinet. The test was performed three times. Thus three transistors were used to validate the Signaling Process Card failure.
All resistance measurements were taken using a Fluke Model 45 multi-meter, Serial Number 565003 last calibrated 12/3/92. No other test equipment was required.
All testing was performed under the auspices of S. Karimian ofPSE&G.
1 I
l l
Test Baseline l
l Initially, the six transistors were baselined. This was because three transistor were used for the Alarm Circuitry card failure validation and three transistors were used for the
, Signaling Process card failure validation. The baseline data was as follows:
Junction Transistor Transistor Transistor Transistor Transistor Transistor
- 1(Ohms)
- 2(Ohms)
- 3(Ohms)
- 4(Obms)
- 5(Ohms)
- 6(Ohms)
BE 4.3M 4.3M 4.6M 4.3 M 4.3 M 4.3M l
B-C 4.35M 4.3M 4.5M 4.0M 4.lM
- 4. l M
~
EB High High High
$igh High High E-C High High High High High High C.B High High High High High High CE High High High High High High A high indicates resistance so high it is off scale of the meter.
Transistors I through 3 were used for the Alarm Circuitry card test and transistors 4 through 6 were used for the Signaling Process card test.
Siennline Process Card Failure Validation This test was performed by setting up the circuit shown in Figure A. To validate the short that occurred in the field, the wire from the -24VDC supply was brushed against the emitter of the transistor for each of the three test cases. Note that this is equivalent to the technician jumpering +24VDC to the collector of the transistor which is what happened in the field. The following were the tesults of this test:
Junction Test Test Test Transistor #4 Transistor #5 Transistor #6 (Ohms)
(Ohms)
(Ohms)
B-E High High Hi2h B-C High 13.3 6.3 C-E High 13.3 6.3 E-C High High High E-B High High High C-B High High High Test Conclusions All transistors failed during the validation tests. This is readily seen by comparing the test results with the baseline data taken prior to the validation testing. It is importsnt to note i
that this gives credibility to the proposed failure scenarios.
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J.A.
Fest Assistant to the G.M.-Salem Operations 1
From:
J.A.Nichols Manager-Reliability and Assessment
Subject:
1994 OEF Effectiveness Review Reliability and Assessment trended Salem Incident Report causal factors during the period and determined that drawing configuration problems, piping and instrument drawings (P&ID),
were resulting in repeated incident reports as a most common causal factor grouping. Corrective actions to the individual reports were to have Nuclear Engineering correct the individual drawing errors.
Since the problem continued to occur R&A performed an effectiveness review of the process and provided the results in the attached report.
A second causal factor area that was indicating an adverse trend was in the equipment " Erratic Performance" area. The incident reports associated with this category were also evaluated: however, the causal factors were changed for most of the events. Root cause analysis became the focal area since the evaluators had difficulty in determining accurate root cause from the lack of information recorded in the incident reports. The root cause analysis process has received increased attention recently and changes are currently being made to Administrative Prcedure NC>NA-AP.ZZ-0006 " Incident Report / Reportable Event Program" to improve the direction and expectativ.3 for determining root cause.
These analyses were performed with the intent of determining the cause of the lack of effectiveness in corrective actions associated with adverse trends as part of the internal OEF program.
In addition, performance indicators (attached) have been developed to provide a mechanism for on-going monitoring of events caused by human error, all human error events in the same causal factor category and significant human error events repeating in the same causal factor category.
This approach to an effectiveness review was taken as a result of the lessons learned from the 1993 effectiveness review. The 1993 review was pe;ceived to be somewhat deficient by not providing specific causes of concern where management could focus their attention. We expect that the combination of the above activities would direct management's attention to the areas of concern so that corrective action would be implemented to improve performance. The corrective action effectiveness measurement is determined by the specific area of causal factor concern not reappearing month to month.
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4 1I/10/94 Salem Unit 1 & 2 Incident Reports with Common Cause q
Adverse Trends liasic Cause Direct Cause Keyword 1992 1993 1994 Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Average Averste Average.
Written Procedure and Drawings Config (P&ID) 4.5 4
10.6 Documents Work ?ractices Documents not Followed (Various) e.g.
2.5 4.25 5
l Correctly Maintenance, Tagging Practices Plant / System Operation Erratic Performance (Various) 5.5 4
11.6
)
Instnamentation, Relief Valves 4
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Static / Improving Trends Work Organization / Planning Job Scoping did not (Various) e.g.
1.75 2.25 2.33
{
Identify Special Troubleshooting, Circumstances / Conditions Concurrent Activities Plant / System Operation Inaccurate Indication (Various) e.g.
3.75 2.75 i
Control Rods /APgnment, Nuclear Instrumentation Plant! System Operation Degraded Subcomponent (Various) e.g. Valve 21.5 15.5 14.6 Contributed to Failure inoperability, Chemical Spills, Fuses Percentage of All Incident Reports 35.3 %
42.6 %
42.97c Nde Salem Stataisi Ngan system waldowns to verih drawings in August '94. his contributed to the higher number of drawing rclated incident reports m 1994. After m61*. ;
ths 3rd Qtr. dai.a the Quarterly average increased to 10 frain an averags of 6 per Qtr. m the first two quarters of 1994
Investigation of Fundamental Causes of Salem Station
~
Configuratio 1/ Drawing Errors To detennine the fundamental cause(s) of an undesirable condition in condguration/ drawing incident reports this investigation performed a detailed review of all incident repons that have this common causal factor.
Observation #1:
Eighty seven configuration / drawing errors have been identified in incident repons since 1/1/92 at Salem Units 1 & 2.
The rate at which configuration / drawing error incident repons are occurring has remained relatively constant since then.
Discussion:
Configuration / drawing errors are not always detected during modification closeout and drawing revision peer review. Twenty three of the eighty seven incident repons related to drawing errors resulted from inadequate drawing revision. Several of the remaining 64 drawing errors may also have resulted from drawing revisions however, root cause analysis included in the incident report was insufficient to determine the cause of the errors.
Specific examples include incident repons94-126,94-170, and 94-174 that resulted in pan from an incorrectly indicated power supply for various ponions of the Fire Protection System.
Drawing #231928 and five other related drawings incorrectly identify bkr. 36 for loads that are PageI
/
i actually supplied from bkr. 21. DCP's ISC-2160,2161 & 2SC-2160,2161 rerouted loads from bkr. 36 to 21. This was not reflected on all drawings identified in the package. An in-field verification of OWD's revised by these DCP's would have identified that breaker 21MAC21 was the actual power supply instead of 21MAC36 breaker.
Most plant modifications are implemented during outages. Drawing revisions are a pan of the requirements that must be met for DCP (Part A) closure and marked up OWD's must be j
received by the Work Control Center and Control Room prior to declaring the system operable.
With the large number of DCP closures Salem experiences during a typical outage there is a higher potential for mistakes.
i Conclusion #1:
A post modification in field verification of revised drawings would have identified ercors that I
later led to an incident repon. It may be pnident to conduct in-field revised drawing verification i
to reduce the rate of configuration / drawing error incident repon occurrence.
Observation #2:
When a drawing error is discovered during routine operations the error is not always investigated and subsequently corrected in a timely manner. Historic drawing error correction times range from 90 days to greater than one year. On several occasions a repeat incident occurred prior to drawing revision.
I Page 2 i
l
Discussion:
"'The stations do not have a mechanism in place that alerts a user to the fact that an t
unsubmitted/under-investination error has been discovered on the working copy of the drawing they are using. As a result of this deficiency,24 incident repons were repeats of previously identified configuration / drawing discrepancies.
Additional contributors to repeat incident repons are: failure to check the other units drawings, failure to attribute the error to a modification (historically this has been the primary source of repeat errors due to a failure to check other ponions of the system (s) changed by the modification) and a failure to check related drawings for the same deficiency.
Data used during this investigation indicates that even with the complete elimination of future dinwing revision errors, configuration / drawing error incident repons will continue to occur at roughly the same rate, for some undefinable time into the future. This is due to existing, i
undiscovered as-built configuration / drawing errors and past drawing revision deficiencies.
I
'" This is not to be confused with the mechanism currently in place that identifies outstanding drawing evisions.
1 A
Paga 3 l
4 Conclusion #2:
In order to expedite drawing revisions and in the interest of personnel safety, a procedure / procedure revision should be implemented that provides guidance on configuration / drawing correction priority.
It should also address interim discrepancy identification to heighten awareness to the fact that a drawing is suspected or known not to reflect actual plant configuration. This procedure should also include requirements to check related drawings, check the other unit's drawings, detennine if a modification is the source of the error (s) and investigate additional areas of the drawing (s) surrounding the identified discrepancy.
I i
i Page 4
+.
4 Summary of Incident Report Corrective Action:
l Thiny of the 87 Incident Reports have corrective action assigned. Twenty three of'these 30 l
corrective actions revise the affected drawing. None of the corrective actions address the cause l
i of the errors. Cause analysis does not consistently document the source of the errors and is a l
l key contributor to the symptomatic corrective actions that focused on changing the identified i
drawing discrepancy only.
?
l Corrective action due to the review of external industry related to this investigation topic was researched as a pan of this analysis. No applicable operating experience documents were found.
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Recommendations:
{'
To minimize the introduction of configuration / drawing errors and reduce the impact of pending configuration / drawing deficiencies on personnel safety, plant operations, and manhours expended as a result of repetitive drawing errors the following recommendations are being implemented i
l by the Engineering Department.
1.
Revise an applicable DE-AP to require a DCP Part-A closure revised OWD walkdown to verify revision accuracy.
t 2.
Implement a
procedure / procedure revision that provides guidance on configuration / drawing error investigation and correction.
Include the following 5 elements in the procedure that will govern drawing error correction:
1)
Appoint a single point of contact that is responsible for all OWD error corrections from the day of detection to final revision of the drawing. Ensure responsibilities are clearly defined in the procedure.
2)
Establish a schedule for OWD error investigation and subsequent revision such that a revised OWD is issued for use within 5 working days from the date of the error discovery.
Page 6 l
l i
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- - - =
l 3)
Develop a process that alens a user to the fact that an error exists on an OWD an is under investigation. This process is applicable to OWDs' that can not be l
corrected within 5 working days or are suspected to have errors in addition to the initial error identified in CADB. Define the additional amount of time allowed l.
m these cases (recommendation is an additional 5 working days).
l 4)
Document the cause(s) of the error (s) as well as the working conditions they were l
discovered under. This information will be used to trend future drawing error correction effectiveness and provide an indicators for design change related drawing revision accuracy.
5)
Provide procedural guidance on perfonning drawing error investigation. This guidance should not limit the investigator to a checklist, but should incit.de examples of past investigation omissions:
1 a.
Check related drawings b.
Check the other unit's drawings for the same or related errors.
Detennine if a modification is the source of the error and investigate i
c.
additional areas of the drawing (s) as appropriate.
1 I
Page 7
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Poraonnel Porformance
~
Incident Reports Nuclear Business Unit is focusing on reducing the occurrence of plant incidents through improved human performance. This graph shows the number of significant personnel performance incident reports that were reported in the NRC daily status report (1 & 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> reports per 50.72), Licensee Event Reports (per 50.73), designated Significant by the NRC, designated Noteworthy or Significant by INPO, or resulted in an intemal Significant Event Response Team (SERT).
._ Dettu..
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Target: 0 Incidents 12
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I Responsible Manager: J. Summers, R. Hovey Analysis:
Data Source: John Nichols December:
Salem unit 1-2nd SEC made inoperable, personnel error.
Hope Creek - Failure to obtain 24 hr grab samples rad monitoring system.
Corrective Actions:
Communication of management's expectations has been intensified to all NBU employees both formally and informally through Nuclear Today, FYl's, supervisors dialogues, rolldowns and memos. Also supervision has been reinforcing that work is to be stopped and procedures corrected before work continues.
RE3M 1-5
Repeat Causo incident Reports Nuclear Busin~ess Unit Nuclear Business Unit is focusing on reducing the occurrence of plant incidents through improved human performance. This graph shows the number of repeat personnel performance incident reports where the primary causal factor and the sub-casual factor are the same and has recurred within a 2 year period. An adverse trend is based on the number of events between quarters.
l 22 Detter 20
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Target: 0 Incidents u
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~l 1992 1992 J
F M
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A S
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O Salem 1 Salem 2 Hope Creek IEE:2 umas u
Responsible Manager: J. Summers, B. Hovey Data Source: John Nichols Analysis:
Salem unit 1; Personnelinattention to detail-8, unauthorized substitution of materials -6.
unit 2; Personnelinattention to detail-5, unauthorized substitution of materials -4, less than adequate job scoping -11, inadequate coordination between departments -6.
Installation of wrong fuse is example of' substitution'. The majority of Unit 2 events occurred during 2R11.
Hope Creek; Repeat cause-procedure non-compliance.
Corrective action:
Salem; Station management focus is concentrating on personnel performance with emphasis on the STAR program and effective communication.
Hope Creek; Adherence to procedures has been strongly reinforced with emphasis on self reporting.
Tiiis upward trend shows this heightened awareness with a need to monitor closely to ensure the behavior is improving. A letter from the GM-Hope Creek personally addressed to every employee clearly articulated expectations for strict compliance. Appropriate disciplinary action has been taken for these events. The enhanced emphasis is expected to show improvement in the indicator within the next few quarters.
Ropeat Causo Incident Reports Nuclear Business Unit Nuclear Business Unit is focusing on reducing the occurrence of plant incidents through improved human performance. This graph shows the number of repeat significant personnel performance incident reports that were reported in the NRC daily status report (1 & 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> reports per 50.72), Licensee Event Reports (per 50.73), designated Significant by the NRC, designated Noteworthy or Significant by INPO, or resulted in an intemal Significant Event Response Team (SERT). A repeat incident is one where the primary causal factor and the sub-casual factor are the same and has recurred within a 2 year period.
_ _ eew 12 Target: 0 Incidents l
10
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Responsible Manager J. Summers, B. Hovey Data Source: John Nichols Analysis:
Salem; Repeat cause-Job scoping.11 events were out of a total of 24 ' job scoping' during the 3 year period.
Hope Creek; Repeat cause-procedure non-compliance.
Corrective action:
Salem; Station management focus is concentrating on personnel performance with emphasis on the STAR program and efective communication.
Hope Creek; Adherence to procedures has been strongly reinforced with emphasis on self reporting.
This upward trend shows this heightened awareness with a need to monitor closely to ensure the behavior is improving. A letter from the GM-Hope Creek personally addressed to every employee clearly articulated expectations for strict compliance. Appropriate disciplinary action has been taken for these events. The enhanced emphasis is expected to show improvement in the indicator within the next few quarters.
RE3RY1 1-5
Repoat Equipmont Problems ~
Hope Creek. Station l
l This indicator is the number of components that had a failure of the component in the indicated month and a failure within the past 18 months. The repeat may not be the same part. The data was generated from standard NPRDS failure reports submitted to INPO. There is a lag of about 1 month for the previous month failures to be evaluated.
I 20 Better
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~
Target: 0 repeat failures 16
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1994 Responsible Manager: Jim Clancy I
" " ' " * " ~
Data Source: John Nichols Analysis:
There were no repeat failures for November and December.
Main turbine CIV failures - 2 unrelated failures on different subcomponents, action taken to improve reliability on hydraulic shutoff valves.
EHC panel-failures on 2 different circuit boards. Specific reliability improvements initiated. Overall system review in progress.
l l
'A' SLC pump relief valve drift - 2 drifts on same valve. No root cause because of extent of l
maintenance. IST engineer will observe next surveillance performance.
MS equalizer valve - reuse of component caused 2nd failure. problem :.1derstood. Corrections in progress. Leak repair will prevent reoccurrence until refueling.
52RH I*20
m _ _
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. 4Ho og UNITED STATES
[
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
's ij REGloN i O
4 475 ALLENDALII ROAD
,o*
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-1415 June 9, 1995 CAL No. 1-95-009 Mr. Leon Eliason i-President-Nuclear Business Unit and Chief Nuclear Officer Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey
SUBJECT:
CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER
Dear Mr. Eliason:
j On May 16, 1995, you shutdown Salem Unit 1, as required by Technical Specifications, due to Nos.12 and 13 switchgear room supply fans being inoperable. On June 7,1995, you commenced shutdown of Salem Unit 2, as required by Technical Specifications, due to both trains of the RHR system being inoperable. During the shutdown process, Unit 2 tripped due to apparent problems experienced with electrical breakers associated with the 500 KV switchyard, resulting in loss of power to some vital and non-vital buses. The unit was stabilized and shutdown, but the operators experienced several challenges that required their intervention due tc the unexpected loss of power and long-standing equipment performance issues.
In both cases, your staff's performance relative to timely recognition and resolution of the specific safety and technical concerns, prior to your decision to shutdown the units, was deficient ~.
In a telephone discussion on June 9,1995, you committed to maintain the Salem units in shutdown condition pending the completion of the following:
1.
The performance of a Significant Event Response Team (SERT) review of the circumstances leading to, and causing the Salem Unit 2 reactor trip, and communication of your findings to the NRC.
2.
The performance of a special team review of long-standing equipment reliability and operability issues, including corrective maintenance and operator work-arounds; the effectiveness and quality of the nianagement oversight and review of these matters; and communication of your findings to the NRC.
3.
A meeting at the Salem facility with NRC representatives to describe, discuss and gain NRC agreement on the scope and comprehensiveness of your plan for the performance of a operational readiness review in support of startup of each Salem unit, including the description of the issues that are required to be resolved prior to restart.
4.
The performance of an operational readiness review at each Salem unit.
'(/
W o w w eto SPP' D
s 1
Mr. Leon Eliason 2
5.
Meetings with NRC representatives to describe the outcome and conclusions of the operational readiness review for each Salem unit; and to gain my agreement that each Salem unit is sufficiently prepared to restart.
Pursuant to Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, you are required to:
1 1)
Notify me immediately if your understanding differs from that set forth above; l
2)
Notify me in writing when you have completed the actions addressed in l
this Confirmatory Action Letter.
Issuance of this Confirmatory Action Letter does not preclude issuance of an order formalizing the above commitments or requiring other actions on the part l
of the licensee; nor does it preclude the NRC from taking enforcement action for violations of NRC requirements that may have prompted the issuance of this l
1etter.
In addition, failure to take the actions addressed in this Confirmatory Action Letter may result in enforcement action.
The responses directed by this letter are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.96-511.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and your subsequent response (s) will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response (s) should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the POR without redaction. However, if you find it necessary to include such information, you should clearly indicate the specific information that you desire not to be placed in the PDR, and provide the legal basis to support your request for withholding the information from the public.
l Sincerely, Thomas T. Martin Regional Administrator Docket No.
50-272; 50-311 License No. DPR-70; DPR-75 l
l m-
d Mr. Leon Eliason 3
a
/-
cc:
J. J. Hagan, Vico President-Operations E. Simpson, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering C. Schaefer, External Operations - Nuclear, Delmarva Power & Light Co.
R. Burricelli, General Manager - Informations Systems & External Affairs J. Summers, General Manager - Sales Operations J. Benjamin, General Manager - Quality Assurance *. Nuclear Safety Review F. Thomson, Manager, Licensing and Regulation R. Kankus, Joint Owner Affairs A. Tapert, Program Administrator R. Fryling, Jr., Esquire M. Wetterhahn, Esquire P. MacFarland Goelz, Manager, Joint Generation Atlantic Electric Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate William Conklin, Public Safety Consultant, Lower Alloways Creek Township Public Service Commission of Maryland State of New Jersey State of Delaware i
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