ML20195B206

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Submits Revised Physical Security Plan for Nuclear Energy Lab at UCLA as Required by 10CFR73.40
ML20195B206
Person / Time
Site: 05000142
Issue date: 01/20/1977
From: Catton I
CALIFORNIA, UNIV. OF, LOS ANGELES, CA
To: Rusche B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20155H438 List:
References
FOIA-85-196 NUDOCS 8806210334
Download: ML20195B206 (22)


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:. -- 1 UNIVEliSITY OF CALIFOllNIA. LOS ANGELES stPJ ELu

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  • 4 A N' F5 AACivCO S 4 NT 4 h uw m a. g g g y g c p g g SCHOOL oF ENGINEERING AND 4PPLIED SCIENCE LOS ANCELL5 CALIFORNI A 9002 4 January 20, 1977 s

Bernard C. Rusche Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Docket 50-142

Dear Sir:

Due to the sensitive nature of the_ contents of this letter, we request i that this document be withheld from public_ disclosure pursuant to Section 2.790 of 10 CFR Part 2. The physical security plan for the Nuclear Energy Laboratory at the University of California, Los Angeles as required by 10 CFR Part 73.40 is as follows: Introduction The Nuclear Energy Laboratory is located in the UCLA School of Engineering and Applied Science with the principal access via room 2567, Bociter Hall. Activities within the laboratory are varied arid include (1) the operation of a 100 kw Argonaut nuclear reactor, (2) undergraduate laboratory classes, (3) graduate student projects that are often NRC or ERDA supported by contract arrangements, (4) a major ERDA sponsored fusion research, and (5) supporting l functions performed in machine and electronics shops. l The various activities engage a staff of approximately 25, a number of faculty members with research and/or educational interests within the labor-atory, a number of graduate students conducting research, and the closely supervised and scheduled undergraduate student classes. 'lhe Nuclear Energy Laboratory presently has in its possession 9.0 kg ~ of Special Nuclear Material in the form of 93*. enriched uranium (fuel plates, fuel scraps and uranyl nitrate) and two 32 gm Pu-Be neutron sources. Of the j SNM in the exempt form, 3.6 kgs of U-235 is in the reactor and 0.7 kg is in the radioactive storage pits along with a 5 curie Co-60 radioisotope source. The 4.7 kgs of the SNM in the non-exempt form are stored in the radioactive storage room. The safeguarding of the reactor and these materials is the ominant consideration in providing a security.p1 880621033 800603 HERG 196 M MMMM - hN1 IV AN C ATTbi. Hu'* b>f NUCLE AR ENFRGY LABOR AToRY, l h-l

s I. Design Features A. Essential Equipment The materials described in the preceeding paragraph and the nuclear reactor comprise the essential equipment of the laboratory. The essential equipment is described in pages 1 through 5 of the Appendix. The reactor console is not considered essential equipment (see paragraph ICic). B. Security Areas 1. Security Areas (A-level) Security areas require A-level access or higher. These areas, the rec : tor room (1000) and the radioactive storage room (within room 1540) are ideatified in figures 6 through 8. Security areas are protected by an in-truaion alarm system, permit limited access, and present well defined physical boundaries to both in.ocent and overt intrusion. The alarm system is shown with the ultrasonic transmitter and receiver transducers identified by an "X", the magnetic door switches by a "Y", and the master control units by a "I". I I The radioactive storage room is located below ground level so that j all outside walls are backed by earth fill. The inside walls are two-foot-thick concrete block, and the two steel mesh doors provide the only access to the area. The inner door, #1 is backed by a steel plate and has two locks. One of the locks is keyed to "A" level, the Master level, and the other lock is a Sargent and Greenleaf combination padlock No. 3077A, which meets the specifications outlined in AEC Regulatory Guide 5.12. The outer door 82 is keyed to "A" level. The fuel plates and fuel scraps are stored in a Metal File Cabinet Safe, Model T-20, Serial No. 48727, made by Underwriters Labor-atory. It is secured to the north concrete wall and floor by 1x1x1/S angle iron. A separate key and combination are required to open it. One fuel bundle with attached thermocouples is stored in an 8 foot long 6 inch diameter steci schedule 40 pipe with a steel lid hinged and locked with a Sargent and Greenleaf combination padlock. The pipe is welded to the north concrete wall. All the bolts securing the safe and the schedule 40 pipe are welded to the angle iron to prevent easy removal. The two Pu-Bo neutron sources are kept in steel drums filled with paraffin, chained to the east wall, and secured with the same type of Sargent and Greenleaf Combination padlocks. The uranyl nitrate (250 gms) is stored in padlocked steel lockers at the south end of the room. For the purpose of radiological control and personnel safety, the sub-critical facility of room 1540 requires A-level access. Upon occasion, en-capsulated neutron sources may be lef t overnight in a suberitical assembly to provide sufficient neutron fluence for class demonstration purposes. That room houses a Kaman 1001-A neutron generator that is tritium contaminated and uses tritiated targets. Permissive entry by A-level access provides a prudent means of radiological control, but the security implications are regarded as negligible. 2 m -6 6NhW@Wu4

I ,d ' / The storage pits in the reactor high bay contain irradiated fuel elements and a 5 curie, Co-60 radioisotope source. Other radioactive materials may be stored within these pits as demanded by special circumstances. The storage pits are composed of cylindrical holes, 6.5 feet deep, set into the concrete floor. The cylinders are secured with a 4 foot long, 10 inch diameter, 380 pound steel lined concrete plug. The remainder of the enriched uranium is kept in the reactor. Due to its power history, the fuel is too hot to handle without cumbersome i shleiding. The crane, the handling cask, shielding and a great deal of time are required in order to remove it from the reactor and then from the facility. 2. Controlled Areas (B-level) Controlled areas require B level access or higher. These areas include the reactor control room, a classroom, and laboratory space. The classroom is used primarily for undergraduate instruction, the laboratory areas for undergraduate experiments and graduate or contract research. These areas, because of physical and administrative controls, serve as a buffer region or perimeter of the security areas, i l 3. Non-Security Areas (C-level) Non-security areas require C-level access or higher. These areas are peripheral areas of the laboratory and include the reception room, ad-jacent offices, a transformer vault, and the third floor penthouse. The areas, denoted C-level, are not within the scope of the security plan presented here. Figures 6 and 7 delineate these areas as parts of the laboratory without implying that they constitute a part of the plan. These areas are controlled only for the purpose of preventing, petty theft of office equipment, books, etc. 4 6 3 I

M ? / C. Security Systems 1.a. Locks and Keys Every door leading into the Nuclear Energy Laboratory and every door within the facility is under a lock and key system comprised of three levels: A, B, and C. A-level is deemed security, B-level is deemed controlled and C-level is deemed non-security. All locks are Corbin heavy duty cylindrical six pin locks. The key blanks are off master (east coast variety) and in the registrated key section of UCLA, meaning that no one may obtain or use this type of blank. This was done to reduce the possibility of compromise. The key level required for passage through the doors in this facility is shown by letters, A, B, or C ? in figures 6, 7, and S. The letter D means dummied lock, it cannot be un-locked by any key from the outside. The door can be opened only from the inside for emergency egress. f 1.b. Ultrasonic Intrusion Detection System The ultrasonic alarm system was manufactured by Walter Kidde and Co., l and was installed by the Physical Plant of UCLA. The type, model and part number of each piece of equipment for the system appears on page 9 of the Appendix. 4 4

4 1.c. Reactor Operation Tamper Alarm in order to prevent unauthorited operation of the reactor during off hours, the reactor controls have been tied to the intrusion detection system. The actuation of an operations switch on the reactor console during a reactor startup would acuate the alarm switch thereby putting the intrusion detection system into the alarm position. The switch which connects the reactor console to the reactor alarm system is inside the reactor high bay. If experiments are in progress whereby this setup would hinder operation of the experiment, the control rod drive relays inside the reactor high bay would be disconnected for the duration of the experiment. 2. Communications 7 In the event of a security violation, the following communication system is used. The alarm system registers a security violation. A signal is sent along an isolated tamper proof telephone line to the 24 hour manned Honeywell Alarm Receiver WS40B,D located at the UCLA Police Station. At the station there is also a recorder which prints out the status on each and every alarra. The status categories are normal, alarm, and trouble. Trouble means tampering with the system and the appropriate action is to assume that it is an intrusion. An officer on duty then calls the patrol units on a two-way radio. If the officers are not in their cars, they still would have direct voice contact since they carry portable radios. The officer on duty then telephones the laboratory personnel listed in order on the Nuclear Energy Laboratory Emergency Procedure list until one is contacted. The contacted individual then proceeds to the laboratory to assist and to advise the police on the situation. e 5 p,- ,---,,-n e- ,m

i [I. Administrative Controls / i A. Organi:ation 1 1. Security Organi:ation The Director of the Laboratory is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the Security Plan. The Director shall appoint a Security Officer to maintain control of keys, key distribution records, and the Security log. The Security Officer shall also maintain updated personnel access lists and communicate with and provide limited training for campus police. He performs the annual review of the security system. There is a Security Committee consisting of the Director, the Security Officer, the Reactor Supervisor and two others familiar with the laboratory operations. Three committee members sh.:11 constitute a quorum. The Security Officer shall act es Secretary to the Committee. The purpose of the Security Committee is to advise the Director of the Laboratory in security related matters. The UCLA Police Department is responsible for detecting any intrusion during working and non-working hours, and for taking the appropriate action in the event of a security violation. The Police Department has at a minimum, 6 units (men) on duty at all times. Four units (worst case) would be able to respond to an in' trusion. At night between the hours of 1630 and 0130, there is in addition. a one man foot patrol around and through the Engineering Building, Boelter Hall. He checks the doors and looks to see if there is any unusual activity taking place. On a day-to-day basis, all A-level keyholders are responsible for observance of the Security Plan and for reporting security violations, in-fractions and the malfunction of any security related equipment, i.e. door locks, etc. 2. Local Law Enforcement Authorities The UCLA Police Department has as a back up the West Los Angeles Police Department. This is possible because of a mutual aid agreement between the two parties. 4 6

B. Access Control 1. Personnel A-level keys are issued only to employees of UCLA who work within the confines of the Nuclear Energy Laboratory. The distribution of A level level keys is limited to no more than 10 individuals intimately concerned with reactor operations and/or maintenance. This group includes the Director, Laboratory Manager, Laboratory Health Physicist, Reactor Supervisor, Develop-ment Engineers, Mechanicians and Electronic Technicians. The names of the individuals holding these titles are on file with the Laboratory Security Officer. B-level keys are issued to qualified individuals who have taken the laboratory health physicis course and who have passed the health physics and laboratory procedures test. This group includes faculty, staff, and students who work within the laboratory but do not need access to the reactor room. The custodian is also assigned a B-level key, i B-level keys are issued also to the UCLA Pc' ice Department to be used by the patrol and detective units. The personnel of these two units are given a condensed course on health physics, equipment, access points, and emergency procedures. They are not given an exam, but will receive the course on an annual basis. C-level keys provide access to the reception room, office space adjacent to the reception room, and to a machine room on the third floor. C-level keys are issued only on a temporary basis, to visitors temporarily occupying office spa.e, to students awaiting qualification, to maintenance personnel and to temporary office help. l l 7'

2. Control The lock and key system is under the control of the Laboratory Security Officer, who keeps a written and signed record of the individuals possessing keys. All key issuance and changes in the lock and key system must be reviewed by the Laboratory Security Officer and approved by the Director of the Laboratory. The reactor Figh bay can be opened only with an A-level key. A-level personnel are authori:ed to activate and deactivate the intruder detection system of the reactor high bay. I Access to the radioactive storage room requires (1) an A-1cvel key, (2) knowledge of the combination to the Sargent S Greenleaf combi-nation lock, and (3) knowledge of a code to the police station that permits deactivation of the alarm system covering that area. The police department is instructed to comply with deactivation requests only during the normal working hours of 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM on university working days. Only two A-level personnel possess items (1) through (3). The Director of the Laboratory appoints these two individuals from among the A-level keyholders, exclusive of himself and the Reactor Supervisor. Access to the safe containing the reactor fuel requires (1) access to the room, (2) knowledge of the combination to the safe, and (3) a key to the safe. The two individuals having access to the room also possess the combination, but not the key to the safe. The Director and the Reactor Supervisor possess the only keys to the safe. Accordingly, access to the safe requires the mutual consent of at least two distinct individuals, each possessing part of the total access requirement. 6 8 l

o s' / C. Surveillance 1. Working Hours There are two separate alarm systems a.'d each alarm system can be deactivated only by specified individuals. All A-level personnel are authori:ed to deactivate the alarm system of the reactor high bay by tele-phoning the University Police Department, stating his name, waiting for recognition and permission, and then properly deactivating the system at the master control unit. While the system is deactivated, the surveillance is done by the working personnel holding A-level keys and by students, staff and faculty who are in the facility. All A-level personnel are authori:ed to reactivate the system by first telephoning the University Police Department, stating his name and intention, reactivating the alarm system at the master control unit, and then again telephoning the University Police Department to see if the alarm system has cleared and that the system is functioning properly. Two individuals appointed oy the trector of the Laboratory are authori:ed to deactivate the alara sys er, at the radioactive storage room. t Their names and an entry code are on cile with the UCLA Police Department. Legal entry can only be effected betteen the hours of 0800 and 1700 on university working days. The normal sm;uence of events for entry into the radioactive storage room is for one of the above two individuals to call the police, wait for recognition, state his name, his intent, and the entry code. Upon recognition, he estimates the probable duration of the entry. Upon entry, he deactivates the alarm at the master control. Upon departure, he reactivates the alarm, secures the door, calls the police department, gives his name, states that the area is secured, and asks for confirmation of the alarm system reactivation and condition of non-alarm. This alarm system is rare?y deactivated, but when it is, at least one of the four authori:ed individuals will remain in this room during the entire period. Normally, this alarm system is kept on and surveillance of this area is accomplished by the working personnel, the lock and key system and the ultrasonic alarm system. Backing up these sys tems are the UCLA Police Department and the West Los Angeles Police Department.

2. 'Non-Working Hours During non-working hours, the lock, key system and the alarm system provide the surveillance of the security areas.

A special foot patrol also offers s,ome surveillance between the hours of 1630 and 0130. His rounds are such that he can see and check the outer doors of the facility at least once every one and one-half hours. The UCLA Police Department and the West Los Angeles Police Department back up these systems. 9

D. Procedures 1. Response to Detected Unauthorized Intrusions The silent alarm sends a signal via the isolated telephone line to the UCLA Police Station. The signal registers on the 24 hour on-site manned Hone >Nell Alarm Receiver. Notification is then sent via two-way radio for two units to converge immediately on this facility to take the appropriate action. Since the police have portable radios, a minimum of two other units would be able to respond to the alarm -Se situation warranted it. In case the problem is too great for them andle, the UCLA Police Department could call as a back up, the West Los Angeles Police Department. 2. Security Violations by Authorized Personnel For the Reactor High Bay, there are no provisions for security p violations by authori:ed personnel other than proper screening during hiring. However, the SNM is of the exempt form, being highly radioactive. If anyone were to remove this material from the high bay, he would need time and would risk rocciving a lethal dose of radiation in removing the material from the facility. The Radioactive storage area can be entered only by the individuals i mentioned previously. Entry is impossible during non-working hours. If entry is attempted, the police will assume that the entry was unauthorized, and will take appropriate action. A security violation (entry) is limited to two individuals and a security violation involving the safe would require a minimum of two individuals acting in concert. 3. Bomb Threats In the event of a bomb threat, the laboratory would be secured and evacuated. The standard emergency procedures would be followed. The emer-gency procedures are given on page 10 of the Appendix. Subsequent procedures to be followed are on file with the Laboratory Security Officer and posted in certain locations within the Laboratory. 10

j i l i \\ 1 1 4 Acts of Civil Disorder For acts of civil disorder, the eme mney procedures would be 1 followed and the UCLA police department contacted. 5. Miscellaneous Procedures Procedures of the following nature are also on file with the Laboratory Security Officer, Key request and approval a. Police or emergency call in of NEL employees during off hours b. Security violations and corrective actions c. d. Lost or compromised keys l E. Security Program Review The security program will be reviewed every twelve months by the Laboratory Security Officer. He will also conduct a key inventory and I.D. check on a semi-annual basis. We hope that this security plan meets-7)th your approval. / Sin erely, /' / f W $ '" -{ % Ivan Catton, Director Nuclear Energy Laboratory j IC/CEA/NCO/v1

Enclosures:

Appendix CC: Chief Boyd Lynn - UCLA Police Department C. E. Ashbaugh - Laboratory security Officer u 11

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  • If 3 out of 6 radiation alarms trip off scale (high) from an undetermined cause, this constitutes a nuclear hazard:

2 High Bay area monitors, Argon-41 and effluent inonitors, and 4 channels of 2-hand and foot counters. For immediate action upon observance of a bomb threat either to the reactor, the labor-atory or to the School of Engineering in general, evacuate and notify the UCLA Police. .A

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If alarm in 1540 BH (suberitical and radioactive storage area) is sounding, evacuate area i. and proceed directly to Step E-6. t PROCEED TO: 1. Scram reactor, set off alarm, announce evacuation. 2. Shut off ventilation and cooling systems. 3. Take reactor key, health physics suitcase, and available radiation instruments with you. 4. Proceed directly to Boelter Hall 2000 level patio, securing all doors behind you. 5. After gross personal contamination check, follow health physics procedures. 6. Call official personnel in order on list until relieved by one of the following: Chuck Ashbaugh 348-6559 19. NRC Region V Operations Jack Hornor. 839-2130 Robert H. Engleken Maurice Thelia 466-8886 82-9-486-3141 or 415-486-3141 Neill Ostrander 342-8969 20. ERDA Safety 6 SNM Div: Manley Wu Ron Bolek 785-2620 82-9-273-7963 or 415-273-7963 Ivan Catton 348-5477 21. 24 Hr. Calif. Statewide Radiological Tony Zane 714-549-3695 Assistance Program 916-391-7716 Dave Graves 782-6260 22. Joe Karbus, L.A. Co. Health Environmental Radiological Div. 974-7891 Health 6 Safety 825-7147 24 hr. - 974-1234 ' John Kaufman 825-6900,825-7928 23. State Police 620-5821 John Evraets 475-1358 24. NEL-PIA Liability Engineering Dept. Nuclear Energy Liability / Property 776-6008'1491 Insurance Association, The Exchange, Harold Brown

i. UCLA Police 35, 825-UCLA Physical Plant 825-1391-Building 3 Loft A, Suite 323, Los Angeles Police Emergency 478-0841 Farmington Av/Farmington, Conn. 06032 203-677-7715 Les Angeles Fire Dept.(Veteran)473-1155 Los Angeles Sheriff Dept.(WLA) 456-6652 s.

NRC Region V Security: 82-9 486-3141 Doug Schuster or 415-486-3141 A .dl / / ~ ~ f . 4MbY ku.-<_ A k. 77 "OmWU( M '2 a /8 M 'actorSuperftsoW Dat'e Laboratory Director Date 10 _}}