ML22314A093

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2A-3 Exam Administrative Items - Delay Release
ML22314A093
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/10/2022
From:
NRC/RGN-II
To:
Progress Energy Carolinas
References
50-400/22-301 50-400/OL-22
Download: ML22314A093 (1)


Text

Form 3.2-1 Administrative Topics Outline-RO

Facility: HARRIS Date of Examination: 9/19/22

Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 05000400/20220919

Administrative Topic (Step 1) Activity and Associated K/A (Step 2) Type Code

(Step 3)

Determine the amount of RCS inventory that will be drained from RCS (GP-008)

(JPM ADM-070-b) M, R

Conduct of Operations K/A G.2.1.25

2022 NRC RO A1-1

Determine required boric acid flow (AOP-017, OP-107.01) (JPM ADM-081-a)

P, D, R Conduct of Operations K/A G.2.1.23

2022 NRC RO A1-2

Determine component powered by fuse, fuse location and system impact during fuse removal N, R (AD-OP-ALL-0200)

Equipment Control K/A G.2.2.41

2022 NRC RO A2

Perform channel check on RM-3502ASA following maintenance (OP-118) (JPM ADM-083-a)

Radiation Control K/A G.2.3.5 N, S

2022 NRC RO A3

Emergency Plan NOT SELECTED FOR RO N/A

Rev-0 1

Instructions for completing Form 3.2-1, Administrative Topics Outline

1. For each license level, determine the number of administrative job performance measures (JPMs) and topic areas as follows:

Number of JPMs Topic SRO and

  • Reactor operator (RO) applicants RO* RO do not need to be evaluated on Retakes every topic (i.e., Equipment Conduct of Control, Radiation Control, or Operations 1 (or 2) 2 Emergency Plan can be omitted by Equipment Control 1 (or 0) 1 doubling up on Conduct of Operations), unless the applicant is Radiation Control 1 (or 0) 1 taking only the administrative topics Emergency Plan 1 (or 0) 1 portion of the operating test (with a waiver or excusal of the other Total 4 5 portions).
2. Enter the associated knowledge and abilities (K/A) statement and summarize the administrative activities for each JPM.
3. For each JPM, specify the type codes for location and source as follows:

Location:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom

Source and Source Criteria:

(P)revious two NRC exams (no more than one JPM that is randomly selected from last two NRC exams)

(D)irect from bank (no more than three for ROs, no more than four for SROs and RO retakes)

(N)ew or Significantly (M)odified from bank (no fewer than one)

Rev-0 2

2022 NRC RO Administrative Topics Summary

2022 NRC RO A1 Determine the amount of RCS inventory that will be drained from RCS during the performance of GP-008, Draining the RCS. (GP-008) (JPM ADM-070-b) --

MODIFIED

K/A G2.1.25 - Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) RO 3.9 SRO 4.2

The applicant will be provided with initial plant conditions. The plant is shutdown for refueling and a RCS down is required to remove SG Nozzle dams. The RCS was initially drained down to -70 to install nozzle dams and then refilled to the vessel flange. They will be required to calculate the amount of RCS volume in gallons to drain down with unfilled SGs to -70 below the flange using GP-008 Attachment 5. The candidate will need to realize that refill to the Vessel flange will not refill the SG u-tubes.

NOTE: This JPM was modified by changing RCS drain down from an initial drain to a drain after nozzle dams were installed.

2022 NRC RO A1 Determine required boric acid flow using AOP-017 Attachment 4 and OP-107.01. (AOP-017, OP-107.01) (JPM ADM-081-a) - PREVIOUS

K/A G2.1.23 - Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6) RO 4.3 SRO 4.4

The plant is in Mode 4 following an instrument air leak. The crew had entered and was working through AOP-017. VCT level is currently 16% and stable. The CRS directed the candidate perform a manual make to the VCT using AOP-017 Attachment 4. The candidate will be provided with initial data and then be required to obtain values from OP-107.01, Attachment 7, calculate the maximum makeup flow rate to achieve the required boron concentration in the VCT along with the required boric acid flow rate and dilution flow rate.

Used on 2020 NRC Exam.

2022 NRC RO A2 - Determine component powered by fuse, fuse location and system impact during fuse removal (AD-OP-ALL-0200) (JPM ADM-082-a) -- NEW

K/A G2.2.41 - Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings (reference potential)

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13) RO 3.5 SRO 3.9

The plant was at 100% power. Based on a vendor advisory notice concerning degradation of fuses manufactured during a certain timeframe, fuse FU/273 must be removed for replacement. The candidate will be required to identify the FU/273 supports 1CS-182 A Charging Safety Injection Pump normal mini flow isolation valve. This valve is a motor operated valve that can be determined with the provided drawings CPL-2165-G-0805 and 2165-S-1305. The fuse location is determined to be MCC B35-SB Compt-4E. The affected equipment will be the A CSIP pump normal mini flow path.

Rev-0 3

2022 NRC RO Administrative Topics Summary

2022 NRC RO A3 - Perform channel check on RM-3502ASA following maintenance (OP-118)

(JPM ADM-083-a) -- NEW

K/A 2.3.5 - Ability to use RMSs, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms or personnel monitoring equipment (CFR: 41.11 / 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9) RO 2.9 SRO 2.9

Maintenance has just been completed minor work on Radiation monitor REM-01LT-3502ASA Containment RCS leak detection. The candidate will be directed to perform a channel check using OP-118 section 6.3.3 using the RMS computer in order to support returning the RM to operable status. The channel check will be using the RMS computer in the simulator. The candidate will need to navigate to required screens to perform the channel check. The candidate will discover that there is no sample flow and will need to report that the RM is not ready to be returned to serve.

Rev-0 4

Form 3.2-1 Administrative Topics Outline SRO

Facility: HARRIS Date of Examination: 9/19/22

Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 05000400/20220919

Administrative Activity and Associated K/A (Step 2) Type Code Topic (Step 1) (Step 3)

Complete GP-002, Attachment 5 - Minimum Equipment List (MEL) for Entry into Mode 4 (GP-002) (JPM ADM-040-a-SRO)

Conduct of K/A G.2.1.20 D, R

Operations 2022 NRC SRO A1-1 During a loss of shutdown cooling, determine the time that the RCS will reach core boiling and core boil-off conditions (AOP-020) (JPM ADM-005-c-SRO)

Conduct of M, R K/A G.2.1.25 Operations 2022 NRC SRO A1-2 Determine affected component, fuse location, actions to prevent system perturbations and Tech spec requirements for fuse Equipment removal (JPM ADM-082-a-SRO)

Control K/A G.2.2.41 & G.2.2.35 N, R

2022 NRC SRO A2 Complete review and approval of OP-120.07, Attachment 3 Waste Gas Decay Tank Release Log (OP-120.07)

(JPM ADM-075-a-SRO)

Radiation Control P, D, R K/A G.2.3.6

2022 NRC SRO A3 Determine Initial Protective Action Recommendations (AD-EP-ALL-0109) (JPM ADM-076-b-SRO)

Emergency Plan K/A G.2.4.44 M, R

2022 NRC SRO A4

Rev-0 1

Instructions for completing Form 3.2-1, Administrative Topics Outline

1. For each license level, determine the number of administrative job performance measures (JPMs) and topic areas as follows:

Number of JPMs Topic SRO and

  • Reactor operator (RO) applicants RO* RO do not need to be evaluated on Retakes every topic (i.e., Equipment Conduct of Control, Radiation Control, or Operations 1 (or 2) 2 Emergency Plan can be omitted by doubling up on Conduct of Equipment Control 1 (or 0) 1 Operations), unless the applicant is Radiation Control 1 (or 0) 1 taking only the administrative topics portion of the operating test (with a Emergency Plan 1 (or 0) 1 waiver or excusal of the other Total 4 5 portions).
2. Enter the associated knowledge and abilities (K/A) statement and summarize the administrative activities for each JPM.
3. For each JPM, specify the type codes for location and source as follows:

Location:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom

Source and Source Criteria:

(P)revious two NRC exams (no more than one JPM that is randomly selected from last two NRC exams)

(D)irect from bank (no more than three for ROs, no more than four for SROs and RO retakes)

(N)ew or Significantly (M)odified from bank (no fewer than one)

Rev-0 2

2022 NRC SRO Administrative Topics Summary

2022 NRC SRO A1 Complete GP-002, Attachment 5 - Minimum Equipment List (MEL) for Entry into Mode 4 (GP-002) (JPM ADM-040-a-SRO) - DIRECT

K/A G2.1.20 - Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) RO 4.6 SRO 4.6

The plant data for current conditions during a plant startup will be provided to the candidate.

The information provided will allow the candidate to complete Attachment 5 of GP-002, Normal Plant Heatup From Cold Solid To Ho t Subcritical Mode 5 To Mode 3. The candidate must review the plant data provided and determine that three items (Boric Acid Tank, RCS/RHR Loops and Safety Related Electrical Buses) do NOT meet the minimum required for entry into Mode 4.

2022 NRC SRO A1 During a loss of shutdown cooling, determine the time that the RCS will reach core boiling and core boil-off conditions (AOP-020) (JPM ADM-005-c-SRO) - MODIFIED

K/A G2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) RO 3.9 SRO 4.2

The candidate will be provided with initial plant conditions. A plant shutdown for refueling is in progress with the Reactor Vessel head off when a loss of RHR has occurred. The crew is implementing AOP-020, Loss of RCS Inventory or Residual Heat Removal While Shutdown.

The SRO candidates must first determine which of the four plant curves to use (H-X-8 through H-X-11) and then calculate the time the RCS will reach core boiling and core boil-off based on the figures.

NOTE: Modified by changing the dates and times of plant shutdown and values of the core thermocouples. These changes have made the calculated answer substantially different than the bank JPM answer.

2022 NRC SRO A2 - Determine component powered by fuse, fuse location, system impact during fuse removal and Tech. Spec. requirements. (JPM-ADM-082-a-SRO)

(AD-OP-ALL-0200) - NEW

K/A G.2.2.41 Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13) RO 3.5 SRO 3.9 K/A 2.2.35 Ability to determine TS for mode of operation.

(CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13) RO 3.6 SRO 4.5

The plant was at 100% power. Based on a vendor advisory notice concerning degradation of fuses manufactured during a certain timeframe, fuse FU/273 must be removed for replacement. The candidate will be required to identify the FU/273 supports 1CS-182 (A Charging Safety Injection Pump normal mini flow isolation valve. This valve is a Motor operated that can be determined with the provided drawing CPL-2165-G-0805 and 2165-S-1305. The fuse location is determined to be MCC B35-SB Compt-4E. The affected equipment will be the A CSIP pump normal mini flow path. There will be three Tech Specs that will apply for the fuse replacement.

Rev-0 3

2022 NRC SRO Administrative Topics Summary

2022 NRC SRO A3 - Complete review and approval of OP-120.07, Attachment 3 Waste Gas Decay Tank Release Log (OP-120.07) (JPM-ADM-075-a-SRO) - PREVIOUS

K/A G 2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits (CFR: 41.13 / 43.4 / 45.10) RO 2.0 SRO 3.8

The candidate will be provided with the pre-release data provided by the RWCR AO and Shift Chemistry Technician along with the completed OP-120.07, Section 8.39 and Attachment 3 for authorization to commence the release of a Waste Gas Decay tank. They must determine that three items (Estimated release duration, RCDT Vent position, and the RM-11 High (Max) Setpoint) dispositions are not correct and the release should not be approved to commence. Used on 2018 NRC Exam.

2022 NRC SRO A4 - Determine Initial Protective Action Recommendations (AD-EP-ALL-0109)

(JPM-ADM-076-b) - MODIFIED K/A G2.4.44 - Knowledge of emergency plan implementing procedures protective action recommendations (SRO Only) (CFR: 41.10 / 41.12 / 43.5 / 45.11) RO N/A SRO 4.4

Given a set of initial conditions and AD-EP-ALL-0109, the candidate must determine the initial Protective Action Recommendations for the event in progress. This JPM is time critical JPM (15 minutes.)

NOTE: Modified by changing plant conditions resulting in different Protective Action Recommendations.

Rev-0 4

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline

Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: September 19, 2022 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U (Bold) Operating Test Number: 05000400/20220919

Control Room Systems 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code Safety Function

a. Initiate Emergency Boration Following a Reactor Trip (AOP-002) (JPM-CR-037-f) A, L, P, D, S 1

K/A APE024 AA1.17

b. Drain a Cold Leg Accumulator (OP-110) (JPM-CR-133-b) D, S 2

K/A 006 A2.03

c. Transfer to Hot Leg transfer (ES-1.4) (JPM-CR-066-e)

K/A EPE011 EK3.13 A, EN, L, M, S 3

d. Align the RHR System for ECCS Mode (OP-111)

(JPM-CR-290-a) D, L, S 4P

K/A 005 A4.01

e. Isolate Ruptured C SG (E-3)

(JPM-CR-105-a) A, N, L, S 4S

K/A 039 A4.01

f. Reduce Containment Spray Flow (ECA-1.1)

(JPM CR-233-e) M, EN, L, S 5

K/A 026 A4.01

g. Restoration of Offsite Power to Emergency Buses (EOP ECA-0.0) (JPM-CR-291-c) A, P, D, S 6

K/A 055 EA1.07

h. Restoring Control Room Area HVAC to Normal After a CRIS (OP-173) (JPM-CR-171-d) EN, M, S 8

K/A APE067 AA1.05 RO ONLY

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline

In-Plant Systems: 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 for SRO-U

i. Lube oil fire (secure seal oil pumps) (AOP-047) A, E, N 4S (JPM-IP-299-a)

K/A 045 G.2.1.30

j. Place a Safety Train Battery Charger on the Alternate D, E, L 6 Power Supply (OP-156.01) (JPM-IP-246)

K/A APE058 AA1.01

k. Locally Isolate The Seal Water Return Heat Exchanger D, E, R 8 (AOP-014) (JPM-IP-288)

K/A 008 A2.02

Rev-0 2

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline

1. Determine the number of control room system and in-plant system job performance measures (JPMs) to develop using the following table:

License Level Control Room In-Plant Total

Reactor Operator (RO) 8 3 11 Senior Reactor Operator-Instant 7 3 10 (SRO-I)

Senior Reactor Operator-Upgrade 2 or 3 3 or 2 5 (SRO-U)

2. Select safety functions and systems for each JPM as follows:

Refer to Section 1.9 of the applicable knowledge and abilities (K/A) catalog for the plant systems organized by safety function. For pressurized-water reactor operating tests, the primary and secondary systems listed under Safety Function 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core, in Section 1.9 of the applicable K/A catalog, may be treated as separate safety functions (i.e., two systems, one primary and one secondary, may be selected from Safety Function 4). From the safety function groupings identified in the K/A catalog, select the appropriate number of plant systems by safety functions to be evaluated based on the applicants license level (see the table in step 1).

For RO/SRO-I applicants: Each of the control room system JPMs and, separately, each of the in-plant system JPMs must evaluate a different safety function, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature.

For SRO-U applicants: Evaluate SRO-U applicants on five different safety functions. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function.

Rev-0 3

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline

3. Select a task for each JPM that supports, either directly or indirectly and in a meaningful way, the successful fulfillment of the associated safety function. Select the task from the applicable K/A catalog (K/As for plant systems or emergency and abnormal plant evolutions) or the facility licensees site-specific task list. If this task has an associated K/A, the K/A should have an importance rating of at least 2.5 in the RO column. K/As that have importance ratings of less than 2.5 may be used if justified based on plant priorities; inform the NRC chief examiner if selecting K/As with an importance rating less than 2.5.

The selected tasks must be different from the events and evolutions conducted during the simulator operating test and tasks tested on the written examination. A task that is similar to a simulator scenario event may be acceptable if the actions required to complete the task are significantly different from those required in response to the scenario event.

Apply the following specific task selection criteria:

At least one of the tasks shall be related to a shutdown or low-power condition.

Four to six of the tasks for RO and SRO-I applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures. Two to three of the tasks for SRO-U applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures.

At least one alternate path JPM must be new or modified from the bank.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall evaluate the applicants ability to implement actions required during an emergency or abnormal condition.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall require the applicant to enter the radiologically controlled area. This provides an excellent opportunity for the applicant to discuss or demonstrate radiation control administrative subjects.

If it is not possible to develop or locate a suitable task for a selected system, return to step 2 and select a different system.

Rev-0 4

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline

4. For each JPM, specify the codes for type, source, and location:

Code License Level Criteria Actual RO SRO-I SRO-U RO SRO-I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 4-6 2-3 5 5 3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9 8 4 6 6 3 (E)mergency or abnormal in-1 1 1 3 3 3 plant (EN)gineered safety feature 1 1 1 3 2 1 (for control room system)

(L)ow power/shutdown 1 1 1 6 6 2 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank 2 2 1 5 4 2 (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM)

(P)revious two exams 3 3 2 2 2 1 (randomly selected)

(R)adiologically controlled 1 1 1 1 1 1 area (S)imulator

Rev-0 5

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary

Simulator JPMs

JPM a - Initiate Emergency Boration following a Reactor Trip (AOP-002)

(JPM-CR-037-f) SRO Upgrade - Alternate Path - DIRECT Previous from the 2018 Exam. (Randomly selected from the Simulator JPM bank)

K/A APE024 AA1.17, Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Emergency Boration: Emergency borate control valve (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) (4.1)

Evaluated position: Operator at the Controls (OATC) responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant was operating at 100% power when the A MFW pump tripped. The crew performed a manual Reactor Trip in accordance with AOP-010, Feedwater Malfunctions. The crew has completed the immediate actions of EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and have transitioned to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. RCS temperature has been stabilized in accordance with EOP-ES-0.1 step 4.

Task: Initiate Emergency Boration following a Reactor Trip after identifying that 2 or more control rods have not fully inserted.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will attempt to start a Boric Acid pump and determines that the pump has failed to start. The pump failure will require the candidate to establish an alternate flow path by opening either of the two RWST valves to the suction of the CSIP, shutting either of the two VCT outlet valves and then raise flow to > 90 gpm using a FCV with the flow rate indication on a meter on the MCB.

Alternate Path - YES - The only available Boric Acid Pump will fail when started requiring the candidate to utilize an alternate boration flow path and also establish a flow rate to the CSIP of > 90 gpm using FK-122.1 in manual.

JPM completion: After the candidate has established and verified at least 90 gpm charging flow from the RWST to the RCS on FI-122A.1, evaluation on this JPM is complete.

JPM b - Drain a Cold Leg Accumulator (Accumulator C) (OP-110)

(JPM-CR-133-b) - DIRECT

K/A 006 A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Emergency Core Cooling System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: System leakage (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

(3.4, 3.5)

Evaluated position: Operator at the Controls (OATC) responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant is operating at 100% power steady state middle of life (MOL).

AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, has been entered due to a rise in RCS leakage. The C Cold Leg Accumulator level is 90 percent. The CRS has directed the OATC to lower the level in the C Cold Leg Accumulator to 84 percent in accordance with Safety Injection, Section 8.4.

Rev-0 6

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary

Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM b (continued)

Task: Drain B Cold Leg Accumulator.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will be required to perform a valve lineup to reduce level in accordance with OP-110, Safety Injection, Section 8.4 while monitoring progress using MCB level indicators and computer screens (ERFIS).

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task

JPM completion: When level has returned to normal the drain lineup will be secured and the SRO informed that the task is complete.

JPM c - Transfer to Hot Leg transfer (ES-1.4)

(JPM-CR-066-e) SRO Upgrade - Alternate Path - MODIFIED

EPE011 EK3.13 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to a Large-Break LOCA: Hot-leg injection/recirculation (3.9)

Evaluated position: Operator at the Controls (OATC) responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant was operating at 100% power steady state middle of life (MOL) when a Large Break LOCA occurred. As a result of the LOCA, an automatic Reactor Trip / Safety Injection has occurred. 6.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> has elapsed since the event occurred. The ESF equipment is operating and presently aligned per EOP ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation. The CRS has directed the OATC to transfer the Cold Leg injection line up to the Hot Leg injection line up in accordance with EOP ES-1.4, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation. The A RHR pump tripped on the sequencer start and A Charging pump was secured for a major oil leak.

Task: Align the ECCS injection lineup from Cold Leg Recirc to Hot Leg Recirc.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will be required to perform valve position changes to establish a flow path from the existing ECCS injection flow path lineup to the Hot Legs.

They will have to realign flow to the Cold leg for the low head SI flow path due to the Hot leg valve failing to open. Also they will need to response to a high head SI valve that will be pressure locked. This will require them to start a CSIP and open valves that will allow the pressure locked valve to be opened.

Alternate Path - YES - Part one ALT path is realigning low head SI flow back to the cold legs. The second ALT path is during the valve alignment 1SI-86, High Head SI to Hot Leg will fail to open. This failure will require the operator to use RNO actions to reopen the previously shut BIT outlet valves 1SI-3 and 1SI-4 then restart the Train B CSIP and use Attachment 1 to open 1SI-86 from a pressure locked condition.

JPM completion: When high head SI flow is aligned to the Hot legs via 1SI-86 and B CSIP is in operation.

Rev-0 7

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary

Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM c (continued)

Modification: Modified by changing the affected High Head SI to Hot leg valve from 1SI-107 to 1SI-86. These changes require the candidate to complete step 2 of EOP-ES-1.4, Attachment 1, vice step 1 to open the pressure locked valve 1SI-86. Also, added failure of low head Hot leg injection valve to open.

JPM d - Align the RHR System for ECCS Mode (OP-111) (JPM-CR-290-a) - DIRECT 005 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Controls and indication for RHR pumps (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) (4.0)

Evaluated position: Balance of Plant (BOP) Operator responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant is in Mode 4. GP-002, Normal Plant Heatup from Cold Solid to Hot Subcritical Mode 5 to Mode 3 is in progress. Train A RHR is in cooldown mode and Train B RHR is in ECCS mode.

Task: The CRS has directed the BOP to align the A RHR train for ECCS Mode per OP-111 Section 7.2.2 starting at step 19. RHR Pump A-SA discharge temperature indication on ERFIS is < 140°F. Forced cooling of the suction line has been in progress for the last 30 minutes.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will secure a running RHR pump and then establish a valve lineup to change the flow path of the A RHR pump from a RCS cooldown lineup to the ECCS injection flow path lineup.

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task

JPM completion: A Train RHR ECCS Mode alignment is completed prior to RCS temperature exceeding 350°F.

JPM e - Isolate Ruptured C SG (E-3) (JPM-CR-105-a) - Alternate Path - NEW 039 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: MSIVs and bypass valves (3.9)

Evaluated position: Balance of plant (BOP) responsibilities.

Rev-0 8

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary

Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM e (continued)

Turnover: A Reactor trip and Safety Injection have occurred. EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, was entered and a transition has been made to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. EOP-E-3 has been implemented through Step 4.

The C SG has been identified as the ruptured SG. The CRS directs the BOP to continue implementing EOP-E-3 starting at step 5.

Task: C SG isolated per EOP-E-3 attachment 1 for main control room steps only.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will be required to perform valve manipulations and change a SG PORV opening setpoint to isolate the C SG. The C MSIV will fail to shut and require the candidate to implement Attachment 1 to isolate steam release paths.

Alternate Path - YES - The C MSIV will fail to shut and will require the candidate to perform the RNO steps to isolate steam release paths. This will involve shutting A and B SG MSIV and isolating valves on the Moisture Separator Reheater.

JPM completion: When the BOP directs the Radwaste control room operator to shut 1AS-244 the JPM is completed.

Modification: New JPM

JPM f - Reduce Containment Spray Flow (ECA-1.1) (JPM-CR-233-e) - MODIFIED 026 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CSS controls (3.9)

Evaluated position: Operator at the Controls (OATC) responsibilities..

Turnover: A large break LOCA has occurred. Both RHR Pump breakers have tripped.

Maintenance is investigating. The RED on Integrity has been addressed and FR-P.1 was exited. The crew has transitioned to ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, and has completed Step 4.

Task: Start the non-running containment fan cooler and secure both CNMT Spray pumps to conserve RWST water.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will reset RWST auto swap over, start one CNMT fan cooler, secure both CNMT spray pumps and isolate discharge valves.

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task

JPM completion: Once Containment Spray Pump flow reduced to no pumps running, evaluation on this JPM is complete.

Modification: Added steps to reset RWST switchover and to start one CNMT fan cooler.

Rev-0 9

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary

Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM g - Restoration of Offsite Power to Emergency Buses (EOP-ECA-0.0)

(JPM-CR-291-c) Alternate Path - PREVIOUS Previous from the 2018 NRC Exam. (Randomly selected from the Simulator JPM bank)

055 EA1.07 Ability to operate and monitor as they apply to station blackout: Restoration of power from offsite (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) (4.3, 4.5)

Evaluated position: Balance of Plant (BOP) Operator responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant was operating at 100% power. A EDG is under clearance due to the generator field not flashing during OST-1013. The failure of a major line on the Duke grid resulted in the cascading trip of several units and low grid frequency. A loss of offsite power occurred. B EDG failed to start and the problem is being investigated. The crew is implementing EOP-ECA-0.0. The load dispatch er has stabilized the grid and has given permission to restore offsite power to 6.9 KV buses and to reset any tripped Start Up XFMR lockout relays (there are currently no lockout relays tripped).

Task: Energizing ONE Emergency Bus from the SUT (either the 1A-SA energized or 1B-SB energized).

Verifiable actions: The candidate will be manipulating electrical supply breaker switches on the MCB to restore power to the dead Emergency Bus.

Alternate Path: - YES - During the lineup for power restoration on the A-SA Emergency Bus the supply breaker from offsite (Breaker 105) will fail to close. The candidate will be required to continue Attachment 1 using the guidance for the B-SB Emergency Bus to complete restoration of offsite power to a (one) AC emergency bus.

JPM completion: Emergency Bus 1B-SB is being powered via offsite power and the 480 V breakers powering emergency equipment is energized and the CRS is informed, evaluation on this JPM is complete.

JPM h - Restoring Control Room Area HVAC to Normal after a Control Room Isolation Signal (OP-173) (JPM-CR-171-d) - RO ONLY-MODIFIED

APE 067 AA1.05 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to a Plant Fire on Site: Plant and control room ventilation systems (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) (3.5)

Evaluated position: Balance of Plant (BOP) Operator responsibilities.

Rev-0 10 2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary

Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM h (continued)

Turnover: The plant is at 100% power steady state Middle of Life (MOL). A fire occurred at the Emergency Shutdown Diesel Generator during testing. The smoke from the fire caused a Control Room Ventilation Isolation signal to occur (smoke detected at the normal intake Zone 1-150). The Fire Brigade has put the fire out and the smoke has been cleared. The CRS has directed the BOP to restore the Control Room Area HVAC System to NORMAL in accordance with OP-173, Control Room Area HVAC System, Section 8.4. The initial conditions of the OP section will be satisfied and the HVAC system will be in operation per section 8.1.

Task: Restore Control Room Area HVAC to normal in accordance with OP-173, Control Room Area HVAC System, Section 8.4

Verifiable actions: The candidate must reset the Control Room Ventilation isolation signal with a switch to allow the ventilation system to be placed in its normal configuration. They will open intake valves, shut dampers and start and stop exhaust fans.

Alternate Path - No

JPM completion: Restoration of the Control Room Normal air supply and lineup is complete.

Modification: Removed alternate path of AH-15A tripping after opening a damper valve.

Rev-0 11 2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary

In-Plant JPMs

JPM i - Lube oil fire (secure seal oil pumps) (AOP-047)

(JPM-IP-299-a) - Alternate Path - NEW

K/A 045 G.2.1.30 Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls (4.4, 4.0)

Evaluated position: Safe Shutdown Operator (RAB watchstander)

Turnover: There is a lube oil fire in between the low pressure turbines. The MCR crew manually tripped the reactor and is currently in ES-0.1 and AOP-047 in parallel. The Fire brigade is currently fighting the fire on TB314. There is no smoke or fire on TB 261 or TB 286. You are the Safe Shutdown Operator. The CRS has directed you to perform local actions for AOP-047 to s ecure the Main Generator Hydrogen seal oil pumps. The Main Generator hydrogen pressure is reading ~1 psig.

Task: To secure Main Generator Seal Oil pumps.

Verifiable actions: Candidate will need to secure Main Generator seal oil pumps via local control switches and open up one supply power breaker for the Air Side Seal Oil pump that fails to secure with local control switch.

Alternate Path - YES - When the candidate tries to secure the Air Side Seal Oil pump, the pump will not secure. Therefore the RNO step will need to be completed by opening up the 250VDC power supply breaker.

JPM completion: Once candidate opens the breaker for the Air Seal Oil pump the JPM can be secured.

JPM j - Place a Safety Train Battery Charger on the Alternate Power Supply (OP-156.01)

(JPM-IP-246) - DIRECT APE 058 AA1.01 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Loss of DC Power: Alternate supply (3.6)

Evaluated position: Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) operator

Turnover: The unit is in Mode 3 following a reactor trip due to a loss of offsite power and failure of the A and B EDGs to start. The crew entered EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of all AC Power. The Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator started, loaded, and is now supplying the 1D23 bus. You have an Ascom phone, radio, and a set of rounds keys.

Task: Align the A-SA or A-SB Battery Charger to the Alternate Power Supply and place the 1A-SA or 1A-SB Battery Charger in service. Which train will depend on what actuate charger is the protected train.

Verifiable actions: Candidate will need to manipulate switches on a transfer panel to realign power the battery charger to the alternate source. Then the required battery charger will be placed into service.

Rev-0 12 2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary

In-Plant JPMs (continued)

JPM j (continued)

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task.

JPM completion: Only battery charge indications are checked for proper operation the JPM can be secured.

JPM k - Locally Isolate the Seal Water Return Heat Exchanger (AOP-014)

(JPM-IP-288) - DIRECT 008 A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Component Cooling Water System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: High/low surge tank level (3.8, 3.7)

Evaluated position: Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) operator

Turnover: The plant is at 100% power. ALB-005/6-1, CCW Surge Tank High-Low Level, has alarmed. CCW surge tank level is lowering. The CRS has entered AOP-014, Loss of Component Cooling Water.

Task: The CRS directs you to Locally Isolate the Seal Water Return Heat Exchanger in accordance with AOP-014.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will need to verify that seal return is aligned to the top of the VCT. Then the candidate will change locations and operate three manual valves to bypass and isolate RCP seal return heat exchanger.

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task.

JPM completion: Only RCP seal return heat exchanger is isolated the JPM can be secured.

Rev-0 13 Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline

Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: September 19, 2022 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U (Bold) Operating Test Number: 05000400/20220919

Control Room Systems 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code Safety Function

a. Initiate Emergency Boration Following a Reactor Trip (AOP-002) (JPM-CR-037-f) A, L, P, D, S 1

K/A APE024 AA1.17

b. Drain a Cold Leg Accumulator (OP-110) (JPM-CR-133-b) D, S 2

K/A 006 A2.03

c. Transfer to Hot Leg transfer (ES-1.4) (JPM-CR-066-e)

K/A EPE011 EK3.13 A, EN, L, M, S 3

d. Align the RHR System for ECCS Mode (OP-111)

(JPM-CR-290-a) D, L, S 4P

K/A 005 A4.01

e. Isolate Ruptured C SG (E-3)

(JPM-CR-105-a) A, N, L, S 4S

K/A 039 A4.01

f. Reduce Containment Spray Flow (ECA-1.1)

(JPM CR-233-e) M, EN, L, S 5

K/A 026 A4.01

g. Restoration of Offsite Power to Emergency Buses (EOP ECA-0.0) (JPM-CR-291-c) A, P, D, S 6

K/A 055 EA1.07

h. Restoring Control Room Area HVAC to Normal After a CRIS (OP-173) (JPM-CR-171-d) EN, M, S 8

K/A APE067 AA1.05 RO ONLY

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline

In-Plant Systems: 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 for SRO-U

i. Venting the Main Generator due to D,E, L 4S a loss of All AC Power

K/A 045 G.2.1.30

j. Place a Safety Train Battery Charger on the Alternate D, E, L 6 Power Supply (OP-156.01) (JPM-IP-246)

K/A APE058 AA1.01

k. Locally Isolate The Seal Water Return Heat Exchanger D, E, R 8 (AOP-014) (JPM-IP-288)

K/A 008 A2.02

Rev-0 2

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline

1. Determine the number of control room system and in-plant system job performance measures (JPMs) to develop using the following table:

License Level Control Room In-Plant Total

Reactor Operator (RO) 8 3 11 Senior Reactor Operator-Instant 7 3 10 (SRO-I)

Senior Reactor Operator-Upgrade 2 or 3 3 or 2 5 (SRO-U)

2. Select safety functions and systems for each JPM as follows:

Refer to Section 1.9 of the applicable knowledge and abilities (K/A) catalog for the plant systems organized by safety function. For pressurized-water reactor operating tests, the primary and secondary systems listed under Safety Function 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core, in Section 1.9 of the applicable K/A catalog, may be treated as separate safety functions (i.e., two systems, one primary and one secondary, may be selected from Safety Function 4). From the safety function groupings identified in the K/A catalog, select the appropriate number of plant systems by safety functions to be evaluated based on the applicants license level (see the table in step 1).

For RO/SRO-I applicants: Each of the control room system JPMs and, separately, each of the in-plant system JPMs must evaluate a different safety function, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature.

For SRO-U applicants: Evaluate SRO-U applicants on five different safety functions. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function.

Rev-0 3

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline

3. Select a task for each JPM that supports, either directly or indirectly and in a meaningful way, the successful fulfillment of the associated safety function. Select the task from the applicable K/A catalog (K/As for plant systems or emergency and abnormal plant evolutions) or the facility licensees site-specific task list. If this task has an associated K/A, the K/A should have an importance rating of at least 2.5 in the RO column. K/As that have importance ratings of less than 2.5 may be used if justified based on plant priorities; inform the NRC chief examiner if selecting K/As with an importance rating less than 2.5.

The selected tasks must be different from the events and evolutions conducted during the simulator operating test and tasks tested on the written examination. A task that is similar to a simulator scenario event may be acceptable if the actions required to complete the task are significantly different from those required in response to the scenario event.

Apply the following specific task selection criteria:

At least one of the tasks shall be related to a shutdown or low-power condition.

Four to six of the tasks for RO and SRO-I applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures. Two to three of the tasks for SRO-U applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures.

At least one alternate path JPM must be new or modified from the bank.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall evaluate the applicants ability to implement actions required during an emergency or abnormal condition.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall require the applicant to enter the radiologically controlled area. This provides an excellent opportunity for the applicant to discuss or demonstrate radiation control administrative subjects.

If it is not possible to develop or locate a suitable task for a selected system, return to step 2 and select a different system.

Rev-0 4

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline

4. For each JPM, specify the codes for type, source, and location:

Code License Level Criteria Actual RO SRO-I SRO-U RO SRO-I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 4-6 2-3 5 4 3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9 8 4 6 7 3 (E)mergency or abnormal in-1 1 1 3 3 3 plant (EN)gineered safety feature 1 1 1 3 4 1 (for control room system)

(L)ow power/shutdown 1 1 1 6 6 2 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank 2 2 1 5 4 2 (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM)

(P)revious two exams 3 3 2 2 2 1 (randomly selected)

(R)adiologically controlled 1 1 1 1 1 1 area (S)imulator

Rev-0 5

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary

Simulator JPMs

JPM a - Initiate Emergency Boration following a Reactor Trip (AOP-002)

(JPM-CR-037-f) SRO Upgrade - Alternate Path - DIRECT Previous from the 2018 Exam. (Randomly selected from the Simulator JPM bank)

K/A APE024 AA1.17, Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Emergency Boration: Emergency borate control valve (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) (4.1)

Evaluated position: Operator at the Controls (OATC) responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant was operating at 100% power when the A MFW pump tripped. The crew performed a manual Reactor Trip in accordance with AOP-010, Feedwater Malfunctions. The crew has completed the immediate actions of EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and have transitioned to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. RCS temperature has been stabilized in accordance with EOP-ES-0.1 step 4.

Task: Initiate Emergency Boration following a Reactor Trip after identifying that 2 or more control rods have not fully inserted.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will attempt to start a Boric Acid pump and determines that the pump has failed to start. The pump failure will require the candidate to establish an alternate flow path by opening either of the two RWST valves to the suction of the CSIP, shutting either of the two VCT outlet valves and then raise flow to > 90 gpm using a FCV with the flow rate indication on a meter on the MCB.

Alternate Path - YES - The only available Boric Acid Pump will fail when started requiring the candidate to utilize an alternate boration flow path and also establish a flow rate to the CSIP of > 90 gpm using FK-122.1 in manual.

JPM completion: After the candidate has established and verified at least 90 gpm charging flow from the RWST to the RCS on FI-122A.1, evaluation on this JPM is complete.

JPM b - Drain a Cold Leg Accumulator (Accumulator C) (OP-110)

(JPM-CR-133-b) - DIRECT

K/A 006 A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Emergency Core Cooling System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: System leakage (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

(3.4, 3.5)

Evaluated position: Operator at the Controls (OATC) responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant is operating at 100% power steady state middle of life (MOL).

AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, has been entered due to a rise in RCS leakage. The C Cold Leg Accumulator level is 90 percent. The CRS has directed the OATC to lower the level in the C Cold Leg Accumulator to 84 percent in accordance with Safety Injection, Section 8.4.

Rev-0 6

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary

Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM b (continued)

Task: Drain B Cold Leg Accumulator.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will be required to perform a valve lineup to reduce level in accordance with OP-110, Safety Injection, Section 8.4 while monitoring progress using MCB level indicators and computer screens (ERFIS).

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task

JPM completion: When level has returned to normal the drain lineup will be secured and the SRO informed that the task is complete.

JPM c - Transfer to Hot Leg transfer (ES-1.4)

(JPM-CR-066-e) SRO Upgrade - Alternate Path - MODIFIED

EPE011 EK3.13 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to a Large-Break LOCA: Hot-leg injection/recirculation (3.9)

Evaluated position: Operator at the Controls (OATC) responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant was operating at 100% power steady state middle of life (MOL) when a Large Break LOCA occurred. As a result of the LOCA, an automatic Reactor Trip / Safety Injection has occurred. 6.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> has elapsed since the event occurred. The ESF equipment is operating and presently aligned per EOP ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation. The CRS has directed the OATC to transfer the Cold Leg injection line up to the Hot Leg injection line up in accordance with EOP ES-1.4, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation. The A RHR pump tripped on the sequencer start and A Charging pump was secured for a major oil leak.

Task: Align the ECCS injection lineup from Cold Leg Recirc to Hot Leg Recirc.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will be required to perform valve position changes to establish a flow path from the existing ECCS injection flow path lineup to the Hot Legs.

They will have to realign flow to the Cold leg for the low head SI flow path due to the Hot leg valve failing to open. Also they will need to response to a high head SI valve that will be pressure locked. This will require them to start a CSIP and open valves that will allow the pressure locked valve to be opened.

Alternate Path - YES - Part one ALT path is realigning low head SI flow back to the cold legs. The second ALT path is during the valve alignment 1SI-86, High Head SI to Hot Leg will fail to open. This failure will require the operator to use RNO actions to reopen the previously shut BIT outlet valves 1SI-3 and 1SI-4 then restart the Train B CSIP and use Attachment 1 to open 1SI-86 from a pressure locked condition.

JPM completion: When high head SI flow is aligned to the Hot legs via 1SI-86 and B CSIP is in operation.

Rev-0 7

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary

Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM c (continued)

Modification: Modified by changing the affected High Head SI to Hot leg valve from 1SI-107 to 1SI-86. These changes require the candidate to complete step 2 of EOP-ES-1.4, Attachment 1, vice step 1 to open the pressure locked valve 1SI-86. Also, added failure of low head Hot leg injection valve to open.

JPM d - Align the RHR System for ECCS Mode (OP-111) (JPM-CR-290-a) - DIRECT 005 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Controls and indication for RHR pumps (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) (4.0)

Evaluated position: Balance of Plant (BOP) Operator responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant is in Mode 4. GP-002, Normal Plant Heatup from Cold Solid to Hot Subcritical Mode 5 to Mode 3 is in progress. Train A RHR is in cooldown mode and Train B RHR is in ECCS mode.

Task: The CRS has directed the BOP to align the A RHR train for ECCS Mode per OP-111 Section 7.2.2 starting at step 19. RHR Pump A-SA discharge temperature indication on ERFIS is < 140°F. Forced cooling of the suction line has been in progress for the last 30 minutes.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will secure a running RHR pump and then establish a valve lineup to change the flow path of the A RHR pump from a RCS cooldown lineup to the ECCS injection flow path lineup.

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task

JPM completion: A Train RHR ECCS Mode alignment is completed prior to RCS temperature exceeding 350°F.

JPM e - Isolate Ruptured C SG (E-3) (JPM-CR-105-a) - Alternate Path - NEW 039 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: MSIVs and bypass valves (3.9)

Evaluated position: Balance of plant (BOP) responsibilities.

Rev-0 8

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary

Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM e (continued)

Turnover: A Reactor trip and Safety Injection have occurred. EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, was entered and a transition has been made to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. EOP-E-3 has been implemented through Step 4.

The C SG has been identified as the ruptured SG. The CRS directs the BOP to continue implementing EOP-E-3 starting at step 5.

Task: C SG isolated per EOP-E-3 attachment 1 for main control room steps only.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will be required to perform valve manipulations and change a SG PORV opening setpoint to isolate the C SG. The C MSIV will fail to shut and require the candidate to implement Attachment 1 to isolate steam release paths.

Alternate Path - YES - The C MSIV will fail to shut and will require the candidate to perform the RNO steps to isolate steam release paths. This will involve shutting A and B SG MSIV and isolating valves on the Moisture Separator Reheater.

JPM completion: When the BOP directs the Radwaste control room operator to shut 1AS-244 the JPM is completed.

Modification: New JPM

JPM f - Reduce Containment Spray Flow (ECA-1.1) (JPM-CR-233-e) - MODIFIED 026 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CSS controls (3.9)

Evaluated position: Operator at the Controls (OATC) responsibilities..

Turnover: A large break LOCA has occurred. Both RHR Pump breakers have tripped.

Maintenance is investigating. The RED on Integrity has been addressed and FR-P.1 was exited. The crew has transitioned to ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, and has completed Step 4.

Task: Start the non-running containment fan cooler and secure both CNMT Spray pumps to conserve RWST water.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will reset RWST auto swap over, start one CNMT fan cooler, secure both CNMT spray pumps and isolate discharge valves.

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task

JPM completion: Once Containment Spray Pump flow reduced to no pumps running, evaluation on this JPM is complete.

Modification: Added steps to reset RWST switchover and to start one CNMT fan cooler.

Rev-0 9

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary

Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM g - Restoration of Offsite Power to Emergency Buses (EOP-ECA-0.0)

(JPM-CR-291-c) Alternate Path - PREVIOUS Previous from the 2018 NRC Exam. (Randomly selected from the Simulator JPM bank)

055 EA1.07 Ability to operate and monitor as they apply to station blackout: Restoration of power from offsite (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) (4.3, 4.5)

Evaluated position: Balance of Plant (BOP) Operator responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant was operating at 100% power. A EDG is under clearance due to the generator field not flashing during OST-1013. The failure of a major line on the Duke grid resulted in the cascading trip of several units and low grid frequency. A loss of offsite power occurred. B EDG failed to start and the problem is being investigated. The crew is implementing EOP-ECA-0.0. The load dispatch er has stabilized the grid and has given permission to restore offsite power to 6.9 KV buses and to reset any tripped Start Up XFMR lockout relays (there are currently no lockout relays tripped).

Task: Energizing ONE Emergency Bus from the SUT (either the 1A-SA energized or 1B-SB energized).

Verifiable actions: The candidate will be manipulating electrical supply breaker switches on the MCB to restore power to the dead Emergency Bus.

Alternate Path: - YES - During the lineup for power restoration on the A-SA Emergency Bus the supply breaker from offsite (Breaker 105) will fail to close. The candidate will be required to continue Attachment 1 using the guidance for the B-SB Emergency Bus to complete restoration of offsite power to a (one) AC emergency bus.

JPM completion: Emergency Bus 1B-SB is being powered via offsite power and the 480 V breakers powering emergency equipment is energized and the CRS is informed, evaluation on this JPM is complete.

JPM h - Restoring Control Room Area HVAC to Normal after a Control Room Isolation Signal (OP-173) (JPM-CR-171-d) - RO ONLY-MODIFIED

APE 067 AA1.05 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to a Plant Fire on Site: Plant and control room ventilation systems (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) (3.5)

Evaluated position: Balance of Plant (BOP) Operator responsibilities.

Rev-0 10 2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary

Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM h (continued)

Turnover: The plant is at 100% power steady state Middle of Life (MOL). A fire occurred at the Emergency Shutdown Diesel Generator during testing. The smoke from the fire caused a Control Room Ventilation Isolation signal to occur (smoke detected at the normal intake Zone 1-150). The Fire Brigade has put the fire out and the smoke has been cleared. The CRS has directed the BOP to restore the Control Room Area HVAC System to NORMAL in accordance with OP-173, Control Room Area HVAC System, Section 8.4. The initial conditions of the OP section will be satisfied and the HVAC system will be in operation per section 8.1.

Task: Restore Control Room Area HVAC to normal in accordance with OP-173, Control Room Area HVAC System, Section 8.4

Verifiable actions: The candidate must reset the Control Room Ventilation isolation signal with a switch to allow the ventilation system to be placed in its normal configuration. They will open intake valves, shut dampers and start and stop exhaust fans.

Alternate Path - No

JPM completion: Restoration of the Control Room Normal air supply and lineup is complete.

Modification: Removed alternate path of AH-15A tripping after opening a damper valve.

Rev-0 11 2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary

In-Plant JPMs

JPM i - Venting the Main Generator due to a loss of All AC Power K/A 045 G.2.1.30 Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls (4.4, 4.0)

Evaluated position: Turbine Building AO

Turnover: A loss of all AC power has occurred. The Control Room has entered EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. You are the TB AO. The Control Room directs you to locally vent main generator hydrogen and to secure the DC air side seal oil backup pump using OP-153.02, GENERATOR GAS SYSTEM, Section 8.5. Initial conditions are met (section 8.5.1). Another operator is available to perform control switch manipulations for steps 7a 7c.

Task: Main Generator vented and DC air side seal oil backup pump secured per OP-153.02.

Verifiable actions: Candidate will need to Isolate hydrogen supply, Opens vent path, Secures power to the DC Air Side Seal Oil Backup Pump.

Alternate Path - NO -

JPM completion: Once candidate shuts 1HY-88, H2 manifold vent, the JPM can be secured.

JPM j - Place a Safety Train Battery Charger on the Alternate Power Supply (OP-156.01)

(JPM-IP-246) - DIRECT APE 058 AA1.01 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Loss of DC Power: Alternate supply (3.6)

Evaluated position: Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) operator

Turnover: The unit is in Mode 3 following a reactor trip due to a loss of offsite power and failure of the A and B EDGs to start. The crew entered EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of all AC Power. The Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator started, loaded, and is now supplying the 1D23 bus. You have an Ascom phone, radio, and a set of rounds keys.

Task: Align the A-SA or A-SB Battery Charger to the Alternate Power Supply and place the 1A-SA or 1A-SB Battery Charger in service. Which train will depend on what actuate charger is the protected train.

Verifiable actions: Candidate will need to manipulate switches on a transfer panel to realign power the battery charger to the alternate source. Then the required battery charger will be placed into service.

In-Plant JPMs (continued)

JPM j (continued)

Rev-0 12 2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task.

JPM completion: Only battery charge indications are checked for proper operation the JPM can be secured.

JPM k - Locally Isolate the Seal Water Return Heat Exchanger (AOP-014)

(JPM-IP-288) - DIRECT 008 A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Component Cooling Water System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: High/low surge tank level (3.8, 3.7)

Evaluated position: Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) operator

Turnover: The plant is at 100% power. ALB-005/6-1, CCW Surge Tank High-Low Level, has alarmed. CCW surge tank level is lowering. The CRS has entered AOP-014, Loss of Component Cooling Water.

Task: The CRS directs you to Locally Isolate the Seal Water Return Heat Exchanger in accordance with AOP-014.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will need to verify that seal return is aligned to the top of the VCT. Then the candidate will change locations and operate three manual valves to bypass and isolate RCP seal return heat exchanger.

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task.

JPM completion: Only RCP seal return heat exchanger is isolated the JPM can be secured.

Rev-0 13 Events and Evolution Checklist Form 3.4-1

Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: September 19, 2022 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2022301 A E Scenarios P V 2 3 T M P E O I L N CREW POSITION CREW POSITION N I T T I C S A B S A B A M A T R T O R T O L U N Y O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RO-1 RX R6 R4 2 1 NOR 0 1 SRO-I I/C I1,C3,C4 C2,C3 5 4

SRO-U MAJ M7, M9 M7, M8 4 2 Man Ctrl MC1, MC 3, MC4 MC2 5 1

TS 0 0 RO-2 RX R4 2 1 NOR 0 1 SRO-I I/C C2,C5 I1,C5,C6 5 4

SRO-U MAJ M7, M9 M7, M8 4 2 Man Ctrl MC2 MC1 2 1 TS 0 RO-3 RX R6 R4 2 1 NOR 0 1 SRO-I I/C I1,C3,C4 C2,C3 5 4

SRO-U MAJ M7, M9 M7, M8 4 2 Man Ctrl MC1, MC 3, 1 MC4 MC2 4 TS 0 0 RO-4 RX R4 1 1 NOR 0 1 SRO-I I/C C2,C5 I1,C5,C6 5 4

SRO-U MAJ M7, M9 M7, M8 4 2 Man Ctrl MC2 MC1 2 1 TS 0

RO-5 RX R6 R4 2 1 NOR 0 1 SRO-I I/C I1,C3,C4 C2,C3 5 4

SRO-U MAJ M7, M9 M7, M8 4 2 Man Ctrl MC1, MC 3, MC2 4 1 MC4 TS 0 0

Events and Evolution Checklist Form 3.4-1

Form 3.4-1 Instructions for the Events and Evolutions Checklist

1. Mark the applicant license level for each simulator operating test number.
2. For the set of scenario columns, fill in the associated event number from Form 3.3 1, Scenario Outline, to show the specific event types being used for the applicant while in the assigned crew position for that scenario.
  • Minimums are subject to the instructions in Section C.2, License Level Criteria.

KEY: RX = Reactivity Manipulation; NOR = Normal Evolution; I/C = Instrument/Component Failure; MAJ = Major Transient; Man.

Ctrl = Manual Control of Automatic Function; TS = Technical Specification Evaluation; RO = Reactor Operator; SRO -I or I = Instant Senior Reactor Operator; SRO-U or U = Upgrade Senior Reactor Operator; SRO = Senior Reactor Operator; ATC = At the Controls; and BOP = Balance of Plan

Events and Evolution Checklist Form 3.4-1

Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: September 19, 2022 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2022301 A E Scenarios P V 2 3 T M P E O I L N CREW POSITION CREW POSITION N I T T I C S A B S A B A M A T R T O R T O L U N Y O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RO-1 RX R6 R4 2 1 NOR 1 1 SRO-I -1 I/C I1,C2, C2,C3 7 4 C3,C4,C5 MAJ M7, M9 M7, M8 3 2 SRO-U Man Ctrl MC2 1 1 TS TS2,TS3, 3 2 TS4 RO-1 RX R4 1 1 NOR 1 SRO-I -2 I/C I1,C2, C2,C5 C3, 7 4 C5,C6 SRO-U MAJ M7, M9 M7, M8 4 2 Man Ctrl MC2 1 1 TS TS3, 2 2 TS5 Form 3.4-1 Instructions for the Events and Evolutions Checklist

1. Mark the applicant license level for each simulator operating test number.
2. For the set of scenario columns, fill in the associated event number from Form 3.3 1, Scenario Outline, to show the specific event types being used for the applicant while in the assigned crew position for that scenario.
  • Minimums are subject to the instructions in Section C.2, License Level Criteria.

KEY: RX = Reactivity Manipulation; NOR = Normal Evolution; I/C = Instrument/Component Failure; MAJ = Major Transient; Man.

Ctrl = Manual Control of Automatic Function; TS = Technical Specification Evaluation; RO = Reactor Operator; SRO-I or I = Instant Senior Reactor Operator; SRO-U or U = Upgrade Senior Reactor Operator; SRO = Senior Reactor Operator; ATC = At the Controls; and BOP = Balance of Plan

Events and Evolution Checklist Form 3.4-1

Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: September 19, 2022 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2022301 A E Scenarios P V 2 3 T M P E O I L N CREW POSITION CREW POSITION N I T T I C S A B S A B A M A T R T O R T O L U N Y O C P O C P M(*)

T P E R I U RO-1 RX R6 1 0 NOR 1 SRO-I I/C I1,C2, C3,C4,C5 5 2 SRO-U -1 MAJ M7, M9 2 1 Man Ctrl 0 0 TS TS2,TS3, 3 2 TS4 RO-1 RX R6 1 0 NOR 1 SRO-I I/C I1,C2, C3,C4,C5 5 2 SRO-U -2 MAJ M7, M9 2 1 Man Ctrl 0 0 TS TS2,TS3, 3 2 TS4 Form 3.4-1 Instructions for the Events and Evolutions Checklist

1. Mark the applicant license level for each simulator operating test number.
2. For the set of scenario columns, fill in the associated event number from Form 3.3 1, Scenario Outline, to show the specific event types being used for the applicant while in the assigned crew position for that scenario.
  • Minimums are subject to the instructions in Section C.2, License Level Criteria.

KEY: RX = Reactivity Manipulation; NOR = Normal Evolution; I/C = Instrument/Component Failure; MAJ = Major Transient; Man.

Ctrl = Manual Control of Automatic Function; TS = Technical Specification Evaluation; RO = Reactor Operator; SRO -I or I = Instant Senior Reactor Operator; SRO-U or U = Upgrade Senior Reactor Operator; SRO = Senior Reactor Operator; ATC = At the Controls; and BOP = Balance of Plan

Events and Evolution Checklist Form 3.4-1

Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: September 19, 2022 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2022301

A E Scenarios P V T M P E 1 (SPARE)

L N O I I T CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N C A I A T S A B L M N Y U T P R T O M(*)

E O C P R I U

RO RX 0 1 1 0 SRO-I NOR N4 1 1 1 1 I/C C1,C2,I3,I5,I6 5 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ M7 1 2 2 1 Man Ctrl 0 1 1 0 TS TS1,TS3 2 0 2 2 RO RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C C1,I3,I6 3 4 4 2

SRO-U MAJ M7 1 2 2 1 Man Ctrl MC3 1 1 1 0 TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 0 1 1 0 NOR N4 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C C2,I5 2 4 4 2

SRO-U MAJ M7 1 2 2 1 Man Ctrl MC5 1 1 1 0 TS 0 0 2 2

Form 3.4-1 Instructions for the Events and Evolutions Checklist

1. Mark the applicant license level for each simulator operating test number.
2. For the set of scenario columns, fill in the associated event number from Form 3.3 1, Scenario Outline, to show the specific event types being used for the applicant while in the assigned crew position for that scenario.
  • Minimums are subject to the instructions in Section C.2, License Level Criteria.

KEY: RX = Reactivity Manipulation; NOR = Normal Evolution; I/C = Instrument/Component Failure; MAJ = Major Transient; Man.

Ctrl = Manual Control of Automatic Function; TS = Technical Specification Evaluation; RO = Reactor Operator; SRO-I or I = Instant Senior Reactor Operator; SRO-U or U = Upgrade Senior Reactor Operator; SRO = Senior Reactor Operator; ATC = At the Controls; and BOP = Balance of Plan

Form 4.1-1 Record of Rejected Knowledge and Abilities

Refer to Examination Standard (ES)-4.2, Developing Written Examinations, Section B.3, for deviations from the approved written examination outline.

Tier/Group Randomly Reason for Rejection Selected K/A 1/1 RO 9 K/A 055 EG2.1.23 Sample Plan correction made by Chief Examiner concerning duplication of generic K/As.

New K/A 055 EG2.1.19: Ability to use indications to evaluate plant system or component status (Station Blackout) 1/2 RO 24 K/A 078 AA1.07 Unable to create a question to K/A 078 AA1.07 due to plant design New K/A 078 AA1.03: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to a Reactor Coolant System Leak: ESFAS controls 1/2 RO 26 K/A WE 10EA2.10 Unable to write a question to K/A WE 10 EA2.10 due to ES-0.3 and ES-0.4 not utilizing SG parameters for actions to mitigate head voids.

New K/A WE 10 EA2.03: Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to Natural Circulation with Steam Void in the Vessel with/without the RVLIS: RCS pressure, temperature, and/or PZR level 2/1 RO 40 K/A 022 K2.02 Unable to create a question to K/A 022 K2.02 due to plant design New K/A 022 K2.01: Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: CCS fans 2/1 RO 42 K/A 055 EG2.1.23 Sample Plan correction made by Chief Examiner concerning duplication of generic K/As New K/A 039 G2.4.2: Knowledge of system setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with emergency and abnormal operating procedures (Main and Reheat Steam System)

2/1 RO 54 K/A 103 K3.04 Unable to create a question to K/A 103 K3.04 due to plant design New K/A 103 K1.08: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the Containment System and the following systems: ECCS 3 RO 65 K/A G2.1.46 ICS is typically associated with B/W plants, not applicable to plant design New K/A G2.1.1: Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements

The FINAL Sample plan is the combination of the DRAFT SAMPLE PLAN and incorporating the changes noted on the record of rejected KAs

I Draft Sample Plan

Form 2.3-1 Examination Outline Quality Checklist

Facility: Date Shearon Harris of Examination: 9/19/2022

Item Task Description (Y)es / (N)o a b* c#

a. The outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with the Y instructions in Section B of ES-4.1, and all knowledge and ability (K/A) categories are <

appropriately sampled.

b. The outline does not overemphasize any systems, evolutions, or generic topics. Y <
c. Justifications for deselected or rejected K/A statements are acceptable. Y <
a. Using Form 3.4-1, Events and Evolutions Checklist, verify that the proposed scenario set contains the required number of normal evolutions, reactivity evolutions, instrument and component failures, manual control evolutions, technical specifications, and major transients.
b. There are enough scenarios (and spares) for the projected number and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule without compromising exam integrity. Ensure that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.
c. Ensure that all scenarios are new or significantly modified in accordance with ES-3.4 and that no scenarios are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s).
d. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conforms with the qualitative and quantitative simulator set criteria specified on Form 2.3-2.
a. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified in the instructions on Form 3.2-1 and that no tasks are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s).
b. Verify that the control room and in-plant systems outline meets the criteria specified in the instructions on Form 3.2-2 and that no tasks are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s).
c. Determine whether the number of job performance measures (JPMs) and JPM types is sufficient for the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.
a. Assess whether the appropriate exam sections cover plant-specific priorities (including Y <

probabilistic risk assessment and individual plant examination insights).

b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41, 10 CFR 55.43, and 10 CFR 55.45 sampling is Y <

appropriate.

c. Check whether K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are greater Y <

than or equal to 2.5.

d. Check for duplication and overlap across the exam and with the last two NRC exams. Y <
e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage. Y <
f. Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (reactor operator or senior Y <

reactor operator).

Jason D. Bundy 11/10/2021Printed Name/Signature Dateme/Signature

a. Author ____________________________________________________________________________ ______
b. Facility Reviewer (*) Not Applicable_______________________________________________________________
c. NRC Reviewer (#) _________________________________________________________Mark Bates 11/10/2021________________0DUN$ %DWHV______

NRC Chief Examiner ___________________________________________________Jason D. Bundy 11/10/2021______________________________

NRC Supervisor _________________________________________________________________________________Digitally signed by Gerald J. McCoy _______

Date: 2021.11.10 16:04:30 -05'00'

  • The facility licensee signature is not applicable for NRC-developed tests.
  1. An independent NRC reviewer performs the steps in column c. This may be the NRC Chief Examiner if he/she did not develop the outline under review.

Draft Exam Sample Plan Form 4.1-PWR Pressurized-Water Reactor Examination Outline

Facility: Shearon Harris K/A Catalog Rev. 3 Rev. 0 Date of Exam: 09/19/2022

RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G Tota Tot 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4

  • l A2 G* al

1 3 2 3 3 4 3 18 3 3 6 1.

Emergency and 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 8 2 2 4 Abnormal Plant Evolutions Tier Totals 4 4 4 5 5 4 26 5 5 10

1 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 28 3 2 5 2.

Plant 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 1 1 1 3 Systems Tier Totals 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 37 5 3 8

CO EC RC EM CO EC RC EM

3.

Generic Knowledge and 2 2 1 1 6 2 2 1 2 Abilities Categories 7

Reactor Theory Thermodynamics

4. Theory 6 3 3

Notes: CO Conduct of Operations; EC = Equipment Control; RC = Radiation Control;

Emergency Procedures/Plan EM

  • These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample when Revision 2 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.
    • These systems/evolutions are only included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 2 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.

ES-4.1-PWR Shearon Harris

Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO/ SRO)

Item E/APE # / Name / K K K A A

  1. Safety Function 1 2 3 1 2 G* K/A Topic(s) IR Q#

1 (000007) (EPE 7; X (000007) (EPE 7; BW E02 & E10; CE E02) Reactor Trip, 4 76 BW E02 & E10; Stabilization, Recovery (G2.1.29) CONDUCT OF CE E02) Reactor OPERATIONS: Knowledge of how to conduct system Trip, lineups, such as valves, breakers, or switches (CFR:

Stabilization, 41.10 / 45.1 / 45.12)

Recovery

2 (000008) (APE 8) X (000008AK3.05) Knowledge of the reasons for the following 3.9 1 Pressurizer Vapor responses and/or actions as they apply to (APE 8)

Space Accident PRESSURIZER VAPOR Space Accident (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 /

45.6 / 45.13): ECCS termination or throttling criteria

3 (000009) (EPE 9) X (000009) (EPE 9) Small Break LOCA (G2.4.6) EMERGENCY 3.7 2 Small Break PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of emergency and LOCA abnormal operating procedures major action categories (CFR:

41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

4 (000011) (EPE X (000011EA2.05) Ability to determine and/or interpret the 4.1 77

11) Large Break following as they apply to (EPE 11) LARGE-Break LOCA LOCA (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13): Significance of ECCS pump operation

5 (000015) (APE X (000015AA2.15) Ability to determine and/or interpret the 3.8 78

15) Reactor following as they apply to (APE 15) REACTOR COOLANT Coolant Pump Pump Malfunctions (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13): Natural Malfunctions circulation flow

6 (000022) (APE X (000022AA2.03) Ability to determine and/or interpret the 3.6 79

22) Loss of following as they apply to (APE 22) LOSS OF REACTOR Reactor Coolant Coolant Makeup (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13): Failures of Makeup flow control valve or controller

7 (000025) (APE X (000025AK1.02) Knowledge of the operational implications 4.2 3

25) Loss of and/or cause and effect relationships of the following Residual Heat concepts as they apply to (APE 25) LOSS OF RESIDUAL Removal System Heat Removal System (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8): Core cooling

8 (000026) (APE X (000026AK2.01) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE 3.6 4

26) Loss of 26) LOSS OF Component Cooling Water and the following Component systems or components (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3): CVCS Cooling Water

9 (000027) (APE X (000027AA2.08) Ability to determine and/or interpret the 3.3 5

27) Pressurizer following as they apply to (APE 27) PRESSURIZER Pressure Control PRESSURE Control System Malfunction (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /

System 45.13): Letdown flow indication Malfunction 10 (000029) (EPE X (000029EK3.08) Knowledge of the reasons for the following 3.7 6

29) Anticipated responses and/or actions as they apply to (EPE 29)

Transient Without ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS)

Scram (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13): Closing the MSIVs

11 (000038) (EPE X (000038) (EPE 38) Steam Generator Tube Rupture 4.6 80

38) Steam (G2.1.20) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to interpret Generator Tube and execute procedure steps (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Rupture

12 (000040) (APE X (WE12EA1.07) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following 3.5 7 40; BW E05; CE as they apply to (W E12) UNCONTROLLED E05; W E12) DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS Steam Line (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8): RVLIS Rupture -

Excessive Heat Transfer 13 (000054) (APE X (000054AK2.10) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE 3.8 8 54; CE E06) Loss 54) LOSS OF Main Feedwater and the following systems or of Main components (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3): RCS Feedwater 14 (000055) (EPE X (000055) (EPE 55) Station Blackout (G2.1.23) CONDUCT OF 4.3 9

55) Station OPERATIONS: Ability to perform general and/or normal Blackout operating procedures during any plant condition (CFR: 41.10 /

43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6)

15 (000056) (APE X (000056AK1.06) Knowledge of the operational implications 3.7 10

56) Loss of and/or cause and effect relationships of the following Offsite Power concepts as they apply to (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8): Under voltage/degraded voltage effects on electrical loads

16 (000057) (APE X (000057AA2.04) Ability to determine and/or interpret the 3.6 11

57) Loss of Vital following as they apply to (APE 57) LOSS OF VITAL AC AC Instrument ELECTRICAL NSTRUMENT BUS (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13):

Bus ESF system panel alarm annunciators and channel status

17 (000058) (APE X (000058AA2.02) Ability to determine and/or interpret the 3.6 12

58) Loss of DC following as they apply to (APE 58) LOSS OF DC Power Power (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13): 125-V DC bus voltage

18 (000062) (APE X (000062AK3.02) Knowledge of the reasons for the following 3.9 13

62) Loss of responses and/or actions as they apply to (APE 62) LOSS OF Nuclear Service SERVICE WATER (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13): The Water automatic actions (alignments) within the service water resulting from the actuation of the ESFAS

19 (000065) (APE X (000065AK1.03) Knowledge of the operational implications 3.7 14

65) Loss of and/or cause and effect relationships of the following Instrument Air concepts as they apply to (APE 65) LOSS OF Instrument Air (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8): Failure modes of air-operated equipment

20 (000077) (APE X (000077AA2.08) Ability to determine and/or interpret the 4.2 15

77) Generator following as they apply to (APE 77) GENERATOR VOLTAGE Voltage and AND ELECTRIC Grid Disturbances (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /

Electric Grid 45.13): Criteria to trip the turbine or reactor Disturbances 21 (W E04) LOCA X (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment (G2.2.2) EQUIPMENT 4.6 16 Outside CONTROL: Ability to manipulate the console controls as Containment required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels (CFR: 41.6 / 41.7 / 45.2)

22 (W E11) Loss of X (WE11EA1.04) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following 3.9 17 Emergency as they apply to (W E11) LOSS OF EMERGENCY Coolant Coolant Recirculation (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8): ESFAS Recirculation 23 (W E11) Loss of X (W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation 4.3 81 Emergency (G2.1.39) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Knowledge of Coolant conservative decision-making practices (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 Recirculation / 45.12)

24 (BW E04; W E05) X (WE05EA1.14) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following 3.2 18 Inadequate Heat as they apply to (W E05) Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (CFR:

Transfer - Loss of 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8): RHRS Secondary Heat Sink

K/A Category Totals: 3 2 3 3 7 6 Group Point Total: 18/6 ES-4.1-PWR Shearon Harris Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO/SRO)

Item E/APE # / Name / K K K A A

  1. Safety Function 1 2 3 1 2 G* K/A Topic(s) IR Q#

25 (000003) (APE 3) X (000003AA1.09) Ability to operate and/or monitor the 3.8 19 Dropped Control following as they apply to (APE 3) DROPPED Control Rod Rod (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8): NIS

000024 (APE 24)

Emergency Boration / 1

26 (000028) (APE X (000028AK2.10) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE 3.7 20

28) Pressurizer 28) PRESSURIZER (PZR) Level Control Malfunction and the (PZR) Level following systems or components (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3):

Control Normal PZR level instrumentation Malfunction 000032 (APE 32)

Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation /

7 27 (000033) (APE X (000033AK2.03) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE 3.8 21

33) Loss of 33) LOSS OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE Nuclear Intermediate Instrumentation and the following systems or components Range Nuclear (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3): RPS Instrumentation

28 (000036) (APE X (000036AK1.05) Knowledge of the operational implications 3.7 22 36; BW/A08) and/or cause and effect relationships of the following Fuel-Handling concepts as they apply to (APE 36) FUEL HANDLING Incidents INCIDENTS (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8): Damage to irradiated fuel in the fuel storage building

29 (000037) (APE X (000037AK3.07) Knowledge of the reasons for the following 4 23

37) Steam responses and/or actions as they apply to (APE 37) STEAM Generator Tube Generator Tube Leak (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13):

Leak Actions contained in EOPs for S/G tube leak

30 (000051) (APE X (000051) (APE 51) Loss of Condenser Vacuum (G2.3.14) 3.8 82

51) Loss of RADIATION CONTROL: Knowledge of radiation or Condenser contamination hazards that may arise during normal, Vacuum abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities, such as analysis and interpretation of radiation and activity readings as they pertain to administrative, normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures or to analysis and interpretation of coolant activity, including comparison to emergency plan or regulatory limits (SRO Only) (CFR:

43.4 / 45.10)

000059 (APE 59)

Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release / 9

31 (000060) (APE X (000060AA2.08) Ability to determine and/or interpret the 3.8 83

60) Accidental following as they apply to (APE 60) ACCIDENTAL Gaseous GASEOUS Radwaste Release (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13):

Radwaste TS and/or TRM actions for accidental release (as Release applicable)

000061 (APE 61)

Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms /

7 000067 (APE 67)

Plant Fire On Site

/ 8 32 (000068) (APE X (000068AA2.10) Ability to determine and/or interpret the 3.7 84 68; BW A06) following as they apply to (APE 68) Control Room Control Room Evacuation (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13): Source range count Evacuation rate

000069 (APE 69; W E14) Loss of Containment Integrity / 5

000074 (EPE 74; W E06 & E07)

Inadequate Core Cooling / 4

000076 (APE 76)

High Reactor Coolant Activity /

9 33 (000078) (APE X (000078AA1.07) Ability to operate and/or monitor the 3.2 24 78*) RCS Leak following as they apply to (APE 78) REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8): Low-pressure SWS activity monitor

(W E01 & E02)

Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3

(W E13) Steam Generator Overpressure / 4

34 (W E15) X (W E15) Containment Flooding (G2.3.11) RADIATION 4.3 85 Containment CONTROL: Ability to control radiation releases (CFR:

Flooding 41.11 / 43.4 / 45.10)

(W E16) High Containment Radiation /9

(BW A01) Plant Runback / 1 (BW A02 & A03)

Loss of NNI-X/Y/7 (BW A04) Turbine Trip / 4 (BW A05)

Emergency Diesel Actuation /

6 (BW A07)

Flooding / 8 (BW E03)

Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4

35 (BW E08; W E03) X (BW E08; W E03) LOCA Cooldown - Depressurization 4.6 25 LOCA Cooldown (G2.1.37) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Knowledge of

- procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity Depressurization management (CFR: 41.1 / 41.5 / 41.10 / 43.6 / 45.6) 36 (BW E09; CE X (WE10EA2.10) Ability to determine and/or interpret the 3.5 26 A13**; W E09 & following as they apply to (W E10) NATURAL CIRCULATION E10) Natural WITH STEAM VOID IN VESSEL WITH/WITHOUT THE Circulation RVLIS (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13): S/G level, pressure, and/or feedwater flow (BW E13 & E14)

EOP Rules and Enclosures

(CE A11**; W E08) RCS Overcooling -

Pressurized Thermal Shock /

4 (CE A16) Excess RCS Leakage / 2 (CE E09)

Functional Recovery

(CE E13*) Loss of Forced Circulation /

LOOP / Blackout /

4

K/A Category Totals: 1 2 1 2 3 3 Group Point Total: 8/4 ES-4.1-PWR Shearon Harris Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 2/Group 1 (RO/ SRO)

Item K K K K K K A A A A

  1. System / Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 G* K/A Topic(s) IR Q#

37 (003) (SF4P X (003A2.01) Ability to (a) predict 4 27 RCP) REACTOR the impacts of the following on COOLANT PUMP the (SF4P RCP) REACTOR SYSTEM COOLANT PUMP SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6):

Problems with RCP seals, especially seal leakoff rates

38 (004) (SF1; SF2 X (004K4.04) Knowledge of (SF1; 3.5 28 CVCS) SF2 CVCS) CHEMICAL AND CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM VOLUME design features and/or interlocks CONTROL that provide for the following SYSTEM (CFR: 41.7): Manual/automatic transfers of control

39 (004) (SF1; SF2 X (004) (SF1; SF2 CVCS) 4.1 86 CVCS) CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CHEMICAL AND CONTROL SYSTEM (G2.2.12)

VOLUME EQUIPMENT CONTROL:

CONTROL Knowledge of surveillance SYSTEM procedures (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 /

45.13)

40 (005) (SF4P X (005A1.08) Ability to predict 3.7 29 RHR) RESIDUAL and/or monitor changes in HEAT REMOVAL parameters associated with SYSTEM operation of the (SF4P RHR)

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.5 /

45.5): RHR temperature

41 (006) (SF2; SF3 X (006A1.08) Ability to predict 3.1 30 ECCS) and/or monitor changes in EMERGENCY parameters associated with CORE COOLING operation of the (SF2; SF3 SYSTEM ECCS) EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5): ECCS temperatures

42 (006) (SF2; SF3 X (006K5.15) Knowledge of the 3.5 31 ECCS) operational implications or cause EMERGENCY and effect relationships of the CORE COOLING following concepts as they apply SYSTEM to the (SF2; SF3 ECCS)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (CFR: 41.5 / 45.3):

ECCS piping gas accumulation

43 (007) (SF5 PRTS) X (007K4.04) Knowledge of (SF5 3.7 32 PRESSURIZER PRTS) PRESSURIZER RELIEF/QUENC RELIEF/QUENCH TANK H TANK SYSTEM SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following (CFR:

41.7):PRT/quench tank rupture disk 44 (007) (SF5 PRTS) X (007) (SF5 PRTS) 4.3 87 PRESSURIZER PRESSURIZER RELIEF/QUENC RELIEF/QUENCH TANK H TANK SYSTEM (G2.4.5) EMERGENCY SYSTEM PROCEDURES/PLAN:

Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures network for normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

45 (008) (SF8 CCW) X (008A2.02) Ability to (a) predict 3.8 33 COMPONENT the impacts of the following on COOLING the (SF8 CCW) COMPONENT WATER SYSTEM COOLING WATER SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6):

High/low surge tank level

46 (008) (SF8 CCW) X (008A2.07) Ability to (a) predict 3.1 88 COMPONENT the impacts of the following on COOLING the (SF8 CCW) COMPONENT WATER SYSTEM COOLING WATER SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR:

41.5 / 45.6): Consequences of high/low CCW flow rates

47 (010) (SF3 PZR X (010) (SF3 PZR PCS) 3 34 PCS) PRESSURIZER PRESSURE PRESSURIZER CONTROL SYSTEM PRESSURE (191002K1.11) SENSORS AND CONTROL DETECTORS (CFR: 41.7):

SYSTEM (PRESSURE) Effects of operating environment (pressure, temperature, and/or radiation)

48 (010) (SF3 PZR X (010K2.01) Knowledge of 3.4 35 PCS) electrical power supplies to the PRESSURIZER following (CFR: 41.7): (SF3 PZR PRESSURE PCS) PRESSURIZER CONTROL PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM SYSTEM PZR heaters

49 (012) (SF7 RPS) X (012A4.05) Ability to manually 3.8 36 REACTOR operate and/or monitor the (SF7 PROTECTION RPS) REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM SYSTEM in the control room (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8):

Channel defeat controls

50 (013) (SF2 X (013A1.13) Ability to predict 4.1 37 ESFAS) and/or monitor changes in ENGINEERED parameters associated with SAFETY operation of the (SF2 ESFAS)

FEATURES ENGINEERED SAFETY ACTUATION FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.5 /

45.5): ECCS flow 51 (013) (SF2 X (013K6.06) Knowledge of the 3.0 38 ESFAS) effect of the following plant ENGINEERED conditions, system malfunctions, SAFETY or component malfunctions on FEATURES the (SF2 ESFAS) ENGINEERED ACTUATION SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM ACTUATION SYSTEM (CFR:

41.7 / 45.7): IAS

52 (022) (SF5 CCS) X (022A3.01) Ability to monitor 4.2 39 CONTAINMENT automatic features of the (SF5 COOLING CCS) CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.7 /

45.7): Initiation of ESFAS mode of operation

53 (022) (SF5 CCS) X (022K2.02) Knowledge of 2.8 40 CONTAINMENT electrical power supplies to the COOLING following (CFR: 41.7): (SF5 CCS)

SYSTEM CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM Chillers

025 (SF5 ICE)

ICE CONDENSER SYSTEM 54 (026) (SF5 CSS) X (026K4.08) Knowledge of (SF5 3.9 41 CONTAINMENT CSS) CONTAINMENT SPRAY SPRAY SYSTEM SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following (CFR: 41.7): Automatic features of the CSS valves that provide injection and/or recirculation

55 (039) (SF4S X (039) (SF4S MSS) MAIN AND 3.7 42 MSS) MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM REHEAT STEAM (G2.4.6) EMERGENCY SYSTEM PROCEDURES/PLAN:

Knowledge of emergency and abnormal operating procedures major action categories (CFR:

41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*)

INTEGRATED CONTROL SYSTEM 56 (059) (SF4S X (059K6.12) Knowledge of the 3.6 43 MFW) MAIN effect of the following plant FEEDWATER conditions, system malfunctions, SYSTEM or component malfunctions on the (SF4S MFW) MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM (CFR:

41.7 / 45.7): S/G controller logic for MFW regulating valve

57 (061) (SF4S X (061K5.06) Knowledge of the 3.8 44 AFW) AUXILIARY operational implications or cause

/ EMERGENCY and effect relationships of the FEEDWATER following concepts as they apply SYSTEM tothe (SF4S AFW)

AUXILIARY/EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (CFR:

41.5 / 45.3): Natural circulation flow 58 (062) (SF6 ED X (062K3.02) Knowledge of the 4.4 45 AC) AC effect that a loss or malfunction of ELECTRICAL the (SF6 ED AC) AC DISTRIBUTION ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters (CFR: 41.7 / 45.4):

EDG

59 (063) (SF6 ED X (063A3.03) Ability to monitor 3.3 46 DC) DC automatic features of the (SF6 ELECTRICAL ED DC) DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, SYSTEM including (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7):

Inverter swap to backup

60 (063) (SF6 ED X (063A4.02) Ability to manually 3.6 47 DC) DC operate and/or monitor the (SF6 ELECTRICAL ED DC) DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM in the SYSTEM control room (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8): Load shedding

61 (064) (SF6 EDG) X (064A3.06) Ability to monitor 3.6 48 EMERGENCY automatic features of the (SF6 DIESEL EDG) EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR GENERATOR SYSTEM, SYSTEM including (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7): Stop

62 (073) (SF7 PRM)X (073K1.04) Knowledge of the 3.4 49 PROCESS physical connections and/or RADIATION cause and effect relationships MONITORING between the (SF7 PRM)

SYSTEM PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM and the following systems (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8): S/GB

63 (073) (SF7 PRM) X (073A2.01) Ability to (a) predict 3.1 89 PROCESS the impacts of the following on RADIATION the (SF7 PRM) PROCESS MONITORING RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6): PRM component failures

64 (076) (SF4S SW) X (076A4.02) Ability to manually 3.7 50 SERVICE operate and/or monitor the (SF4S WATER SYSTEM SW) SERVICE WATER SYSTEM in the control room (CFR: 41.7 /

45.5 to 45.8): Valves

65 (076) (SF4S SW) X (076) (SF4S SW) SERVICE 4.3 51 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (G2.1.23)

WATER SYSTEM CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS:

Ability to perform general and/or normal operating procedures during any plant condition (CFR:

41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6) 66 (078) (SF8 IAS)X (078K1.02) Knowledge of the 3.1 52 INSTRUMENT physical connections and/or AIR SYSTEM cause and effect relationships between the (SF8 IAS)

INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM and the following systems (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8): Station air system

67 (078) (SF8 IAS) X (078K2.01) Knowledge of 3.3 53 INSTRUMENT electrical power supplies to the AIR SYSTEM following (CFR: 41.7): (SF8 IAS)

INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM Instrument air compressor

68 (103) (SF5 CNT) X (103K3.04) Knowledge of the 3 54 CONTAINMENT effect that a loss or malfunction of SYSTEM the (SF5 CNT) CONTAINMENT SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters (CFR: 41.7 / 45.4):

Shield building vent system

69 (103) (SF5 CNT) X (103A2.08) Ability to (a) predict 3.1 90 CONTAINMENT the impacts of the following on SYSTEM the (SF5 CNT) CONTAINMENT SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6): CPS malfunctions

K/A Category Totals: 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 5 3 3 5 Group Point Total: 28/5 ES-4.1-PWR Shearon Harris Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 2/Group 2 (RO/SRO)

Item K K K K K K A A A A

  1. System / Name 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 G* K/A Topic(s) IR Q#

70 (001) (SF1 X (001A3.09) Ability to monitor 4 55 CRDS) automatic features of the (SF1 CONTROL ROD CRDS) CONTROL ROD DRIVE DRIVE SYSTEM SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.7 /

45.7): Rod speed and direction

71 (002) (SF2; SF4P X (002) (SF2; SF4P RCS) 3.4 56 RCS) REACTOR REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COOLANT (G2.1.8) CONDUCT OF SYSTEM OPERATIONS: Ability to coordinate personnel activities outside the control room (CFR:

41.10 / 43.1 / 45.5 / 45.12 /

45.13) 011 (SF2 PZR LCS)

PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM 72 (014) (SF1 RPI) X (014A2.03) Ability to (a) predict 4 57 ROD POSITION the impacts of the following on INDICATION the (SF1 RPI) ROD POSITION SYSTEM INDICATION SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR:

41.5 / 45.6): Dropped rod

015 (SF7 NI)

NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTAT ION SYSTEM

73 (016) (SF7 NNI) X (016A2.02) Ability to (a) predict 3.3 91 NONNUCLEAR the impacts of the following on INSTRUMENTAT the (SF7 NNI) NONNUCLEAR ION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR:

41.5 / 45.6): Loss of power supply

74 (017) (SF7 ITM) X (017K3.02) Knowledge of the 3.2 58 IN CORE effect that a loss or malfunction of TEMPERATURE the (SF7 ITM) IN CORE MONITOR TEMPERATURE MONITOR SYSTEM SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters (CFR: 41.7 / 45.4):

Plant computer

027 (SF5 CIRS)

CONTAINMENT IODINE REMOVAL SYSTEM 028 (SF5 HRPS)

HYDROGEN RECOMBINER AND PURGE CONTROL SYSTEM 75 (029) (SF8 CPS) X (029A4.05) Ability to manually 3.1 59 CONTAINMENT operate and/or monitor the (SF8 PURGE SYSTEM CPS) CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM in the control room (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8):

Manual isolation of the CPS

033 (SF8 SFPCS)

SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM 76 (034) (SF8 FHS) X (034K6.07) Knowledge of the 2.7 92 FUEL effect of the following plant HANDLING conditions, system EQUIPMENT malfunctions, or component SYSTEM malfunctions on the (SF8 FHS)

FUEL HANDLING EQUIPMENT SYSTEM (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7):

RHRS

035 (SF4P SG)

STEAM GENERATOR SYSTEM

77 (041) (SF4S X (041K5.07) Knowledge of the 3.9 60 SDS) STEAM operational implications or cause DUMP/TURBINE and effect relationships of the BYPASS following concepts as they apply CONTROL to the (SF4S SDS) STEAM SYSTEM DUMP/TURBINE BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM (CFR: 41.5

/ 45.3): Reactivity feedback effects

045 (SF4S MTG)

MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR SYSTEM

050 (SF9 CRV*)

CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION 78 (055) (SF4S X (055K1.04) Knowledge of the 2.8 61 CARS) physical connections and/or CONDENSER cause and effect relationships AIR REMOVAL between the (SF4S CARS)

SYSTEM CONDENSER AIR REMOVAL SYSTEM and the following systems (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8): S/G

056 (SF4S CDS)

CONDENSATE SYSTEM

79 (068) (SF9 LRS) X (068A1.03) Ability to predict 3.1 62 LIQUID and/or monitor changes in RADWASTE parameters associated with SYSTEM operation of the (SF9 LRS)

LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5): LRS discharge rate 80 (071) (SF9 WGS) X (071K6.01) Knowledge of the 3.2 63 WASTE GAS effect of the following plant DISPOSAL conditions, system malfunctions, SYSTEM or component malfunctions on the (SF9 WGS) WASTE GAS DISPOSAL SYSTEM (CFR: 41.7

/ 45.7): Waste gas discharge release valve

81 0072 (SF7 ARM) X 4 93( 6) $50 )$5($5$',$7,21

AREA 021,725,1*6<67(0 

RADIATION.QRZOHGJHRISUH DQGSRVW MONITORING PDLQWHQDQFHRSHUDELOLW\\

SYSTEM UHTXLUHPHQWV &)5   

 6)  &: 

&,5&8/$7,1*

$7(56<67(0

079 (SF8 SAS**)

STATION AIR SYSTEM

086 (SF8 FPS)

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM K/A Category Totals: 1 0 1 0 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 Group Point Total: 9/3 Form 4.1-COMMON Common Examination Outline

ES-4.1-COMMON Examination Outline (Shearon Harris)

COMMON Facility: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: 09/19/2022 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) (RO/SRO)

RO SRO-Only Category K/A # Topic Item # IR Q# IR Q#

G2.1.3 (G2.1.32) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to explain 2 and apply system precautions, limitations, notes, or 82 495 cautions (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12)

(G2.1.6) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to manage the G2.1.6 control room crew during plant transients (SRO Only) (CFR: 83 4.894 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13)

1. (G2.1.43) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to use an Conduct of G2.1.4 online power distribution monitoring system and/or procedures Operations 3 to determine the effects on reactivity of plant changes, such as 84 4.1 64

RCS temperature, secondary plant, or fuel depletion

G2.1.4 (G2.1.46) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to use 6 integrated control systems to operate plant systems or 85 4 65 components (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13)

Subtotal N/A 2 N/A 2 G2.2.3 (G2.2.35) EQUIPMENT CONTROL: Ability to determine TS for 86 3.6 66 5 mode of operation (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13)

G2.2.4 (G2.2.40) EQUIPMENT CONTROL: Ability to apply TS with 0 action statements of less than or equal to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (CFR: 41.10 / 87 3.4 67 43.2 / 43.5 / 45.3)

2. (G2.2.41) EQUIPMENT CONTROL: Ability to obtain and Equipment G2.2.4 interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings 88 3.996 Control 1 (reference potential) (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13)

G2.2.2 (G2.2.23) EQUIPMENT CONTROL: Ability to track TS 89 4.697 3 limiting conditions for operation (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 43.13 )

Subtotal N/A 2 N/A 2 (G2.3.5) RADIATION CONTROL: Ability to use RMSs, such as G2.3.5 fixed radiation monitors and alarms or personnel monitoring 90 2.9 68

3. equipment (CFR: 41.11 / 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9)

Radiation G2.3.6 (G2.3.6) RADIATION CONTROL: Ability to approve liquid or 91 3.898 Control gaseous release permits (CFR: 41.13 / 43.4 / 45.10)

Subtotal N/A 1 N/A 1 (G2.4.20) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of G2.4.2 the operational implications of emergency and abnormal 92 3.8 69 0 operating procedures warnings, cautions, and notes (CFR:

41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

G2.4.1 (G2.4.14) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of

4. 4 general guidelines for emergency and abnormal operating 93 4.599 Emergency procedures usage (CFR: 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13)

Procedures /

Plan (G2.4.52) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of G2.4.5 the lines of authority during implementation of the 2 emergency plan, emergency plan implementing 94 4100 procedures, emergency operating procedures, or severe accident guidelines (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Subtotal N/A 1 N/A 2 Tier 3 Point Total N/A 6 N/A 7 Form 4.1-COMMON Common Examination Outline

ES-4.1-COMMON Examination Outline (Shearon Harris)

COMMON Facility: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: 09/19/2022 Theory (Tier 4) (RO)

RO Category K/A # Topic Item # IR Q#

192002 (192002K1.10) NEUTRON LIFE CYCLE (CFR: 41.1): Define 95 3.670 SDM

(192007K1.04) FUEL DEPLETION AND BURNABLE POISONS Reactor Theory 192007 (CFR: 41.1): Describe how and why boron concentration 96 3.4 71 changes over core life

(192008K1.15) REACTOR OPERATIONAL PHYSICS (CFR:

192008 41.1): (INTERMEDIATE RANGE OPERATION) Explain 97 3.4 72 characteristics to look for when the POAH is reached

Subtotal N/A 3 (193004K1.15) THERMODYNAMIC PROCESS (CFR: 41.14):

193004 (THROTTLING AND THE THROTTLING PROCESS) Determine 98 2.8 73 the exit conditions for a throttling process based on the use of steam and/or water

Thermodynamic 193007 (193007K1.06) HEAT TRANSFER (CFR: 41.14): Explain 99 3.3 74 s methods of calculating core thermal power

(193009K1.09) CORE THERMAL LIMITS (CFR: 41.14):

193009 Describe the effects of quadrant power tilt (symmetric offset), 100 3.2 75 including long-range effects Subtotal N/A 3 Tier 4 Point Total N/A 6

Form 2.3-5 Instructions for Written Examination Review Worksheet

Refer to ES-4.2 for the definitions of terms used in this worksheet for the written examination.

Review each question (Q) as submitted and as subsequently revised and document the following in the associated worksheet columns:

1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) from 1 (easy) to 5 (difficult); mark direct lookup questions (applicant can directly determine the answer fr om the provided reference) as LOD 1. A question is (U)nsatisfactory if it is LOD 1 or LOD 5.
3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:

Stem Focus: The stem lacks enough focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

Cues: The stem or one or more answer c hoices contains cues (e.g., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

T/F: All of the answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements. This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

Cred. Dist.: The distractors are not credi ble; single implausible distractors require (E)nhancement, and more than one noncredible distractor in the same question results in an (U)satisfactory question.

Partial: One or more distractors are partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by the stem). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

4. Check the appropriate box if a job content flaw is identified:

Job Link: The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid knowledge or ability (K/A) but, as written, is not operational in content). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

Minutia: The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed-reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

  1. /Units: The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

Logic: The question requires backward or reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements. This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

5. Check the first box if a K/A mismatch flaw exists. Check the second box if the question is flawed because it is written at the wrong license level. Either condition results in an (U)nsatisfactory question.
6. Enter the questions source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Verify that (M)odified questions meet the criteria of ES-4.2.
7. Based on the review performed in steps 2-5, mark the question as (U)nsatisfactory, in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory.
8. Fully explain the reason for any (U) in column 7 (e.g., how the psychometric attributes are not being met).
9. Save the initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound question is marked by an (S) on this form.