ML22314A093

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2A-3 Exam Administrative Items - Delay Release
ML22314A093
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/10/2022
From:
NRC/RGN-II
To:
Progress Energy Carolinas
References
50-400/22-301 50-400/OL-22
Download: ML22314A093 (1)


Text

Rev-0 1

Form 3.2-1 Administrative Topics Outline-RO Facility: HARRIS Date of Examination: 9/19/22 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 05000400/20220919 Administrative Topic (Step 1)

Activity and Associated K/A (Step 2)

Type Code (Step 3)

Conduct of Operations Determine the amount of RCS inventory that will be drained from RCS (GP-008)

(JPM ADM-070-b)

K/A G.2.1.25 2022 NRC RO A1-1 M, R Conduct of Operations Determine required boric acid flow (AOP-017, OP-107.01) (JPM ADM-081-a)

K/A G.2.1.23 2022 NRC RO A1-2 P, D, R Equipment Control Determine component powered by fuse, fuse location and system impact during fuse removal (AD-OP-ALL-0200)

K/A G.2.2.41 2022 NRC RO A2 N, R Radiation Control Perform channel check on RM-3502ASA following maintenance (OP-118) (JPM ADM-083-a)

K/A G.2.3.5 2022 NRC RO A3 N, S Emergency Plan NOT SELECTED FOR RO N/A ML22314A093

Rev-0 2

Instructions for completing Form 3.2-1, Administrative Topics Outline

1. For each license level, determine the number of administrative job performance measures (JPMs) and topic areas as follows:

Topic Number of JPMs RO*

SRO and RO Retakes Conduct of Operations 1 (or 2) 2 Equipment Control 1 (or 0) 1 Radiation Control 1 (or 0) 1 Emergency Plan 1 (or 0) 1 Total 4

5

2. Enter the associated knowledge and abilities (K/A) statement and summarize the administrative activities for each JPM.
3. For each JPM, specify the type codes for location and source as follows:

Location:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom Source and Source Criteria:

(P)revious two NRC exams (no more than one JPM that is randomly selected from last two NRC exams)

(D)irect from bank (no more than three for ROs, no more than four for SROs and RO retakes)

(N)ew or Significantly (M)odified from bank (no fewer than one)

  • Reactor operator (RO) applicants do not need to be evaluated on every topic (i.e., Equipment Control, Radiation Control, or Emergency Plan can be omitted by doubling up on Conduct of Operations), unless the applicant is taking only the administrative topics portion of the operating test (with a waiver or excusal of the other portions).

2022 NRC RO Administrative Topics Summary Rev-0 3

2022 NRC RO A1 Determine the amount of RCS inventory that will be drained from RCS during the performance of GP-008, Draining the RCS. (GP-008) (JPM ADM-070-b) --

MODIFIED K/A G2.1.25 - Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) RO 3.9 SRO 4.2 The applicant will be provided with initial plant conditions. The plant is shutdown for refueling and a RCS down is required to remove SG Nozzle dams. The RCS was initially drained down to -70 to install nozzle dams and then refilled to the vessel flange. They will be required to calculate the amount of RCS volume in gallons to drain down with unfilled SGs to -70 below the flange using GP-008 Attachment 5. The candidate will need to realize that refill to the Vessel flange will not refill the SG u-tubes.

NOTE: This JPM was modified by changing RCS drain down from an initial drain to a drain after nozzle dams were installed.

2022 NRC RO A1 Determine required boric acid flow using AOP-017 Attachment 4 and OP-107.01. (AOP-017, OP-107.01) (JPM ADM-081-a) - PREVIOUS K/A G2.1.23 - Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6) RO 4.3 SRO 4.4 The plant is in Mode 4 following an instrument air leak. The crew had entered and was working through AOP-017. VCT level is currently 16% and stable. The CRS directed the candidate perform a manual make to the VCT using AOP-017 Attachment 4. The candidate will be provided with initial data and then be required to obtain values from OP-107.01,, calculate the maximum makeup flow rate to achieve the required boron concentration in the VCT along with the required boric acid flow rate and dilution flow rate.

Used on 2020 NRC Exam.

2022 NRC RO A2 - Determine component powered by fuse, fuse location and system impact during fuse removal (AD-OP-ALL-0200) (JPM ADM-082-a) -- NEW K/A G2.2.41 - Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings (reference potential)

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13) RO 3.5 SRO 3.9 The plant was at 100% power. Based on a vendor advisory notice concerning degradation of fuses manufactured during a certain timeframe, fuse FU/273 must be removed for replacement. The candidate will be required to identify the FU/273 supports 1CS-182 A Charging Safety Injection Pump normal mini flow isolation valve. This valve is a motor operated valve that can be determined with the provided drawings CPL-2165-G-0805 and 2165-S-1305. The fuse location is determined to be MCC B35-SB Compt-4E. The affected equipment will be the A CSIP pump normal mini flow path.

2022 NRC RO Administrative Topics Summary Rev-0 4

2022 NRC RO A3 - Perform channel check on RM-3502ASA following maintenance (OP-118)

(JPM ADM-083-a) -- NEW K/A 2.3.5 - Ability to use RMSs, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms or personnel monitoring equipment (CFR: 41.11 / 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9) RO 2.9 SRO 2.9 Maintenance has just been completed minor work on Radiation monitor REM-01LT-3502ASA Containment RCS leak detection. The candidate will be directed to perform a channel check using OP-118 section 6.3.3 using the RMS computer in order to support returning the RM to operable status. The channel check will be using the RMS computer in the simulator. The candidate will need to navigate to required screens to perform the channel check. The candidate will discover that there is no sample flow and will need to report that the RM is not ready to be returned to serve.

Rev-0 1

Form 3.2-1 Administrative Topics Outline SRO Facility: HARRIS Date of Examination: 9/19/22 Examination Level:

RO SRO Operating Test Number: 05000400/20220919 Administrative Topic (Step 1)

Activity and Associated K/A (Step 2)

Type Code (Step 3)

Conduct of Operations Complete GP-002, Attachment 5 - Minimum Equipment List (MEL) for Entry into Mode 4 (GP-002) (JPM ADM-040-a-SRO)

K/A G.2.1.20 2022 NRC SRO A1-1 D, R Conduct of Operations During a loss of shutdown cooling, determine the time that the RCS will reach core boiling and core boil-off conditions (AOP-020) (JPM ADM-005-c-SRO)

K/A G.2.1.25 2022 NRC SRO A1-2 M, R Equipment Control Determine affected component, fuse location, actions to prevent system perturbations and Tech spec requirements for fuse removal (JPM ADM-082-a-SRO)

K/A G.2.2.41 & G.2.2.35 2022 NRC SRO A2 N, R Radiation Control Complete review and approval of OP-120.07, Attachment 3 Waste Gas Decay Tank Release Log (OP-120.07)

(JPM ADM-075-a-SRO)

K/A G.2.3.6 2022 NRC SRO A3 P, D, R Emergency Plan Determine Initial Protective Action Recommendations (AD-EP-ALL-0109) (JPM ADM-076-b-SRO)

K/A G.2.4.44 2022 NRC SRO A4 M, R

Rev-0 2

Instructions for completing Form 3.2-1, Administrative Topics Outline

1. For each license level, determine the number of administrative job performance measures (JPMs) and topic areas as follows:

Topic Number of JPMs RO*

SRO and RO Retakes Conduct of Operations 1 (or 2) 2 Equipment Control 1 (or 0) 1 Radiation Control 1 (or 0) 1 Emergency Plan 1 (or 0) 1 Total 4

5

2. Enter the associated knowledge and abilities (K/A) statement and summarize the administrative activities for each JPM.
3. For each JPM, specify the type codes for location and source as follows:

Location:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom Source and Source Criteria:

(P)revious two NRC exams (no more than one JPM that is randomly selected from last two NRC exams)

(D)irect from bank (no more than three for ROs, no more than four for SROs and RO retakes)

(N)ew or Significantly (M)odified from bank (no fewer than one)

  • Reactor operator (RO) applicants do not need to be evaluated on every topic (i.e., Equipment Control, Radiation Control, or Emergency Plan can be omitted by doubling up on Conduct of Operations), unless the applicant is taking only the administrative topics portion of the operating test (with a waiver or excusal of the other portions).

2022 NRC SRO Administrative Topics Summary Rev-0 3

2022 NRC SRO A1 Complete GP-002, Attachment 5 - Minimum Equipment List (MEL) for Entry into Mode 4 (GP-002) (JPM ADM-040-a-SRO) - DIRECT K/A G2.1.20 - Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) RO 4.6 SRO 4.6 The plant data for current conditions during a plant startup will be provided to the candidate.

The information provided will allow the candidate to complete Attachment 5 of GP-002, Normal Plant Heatup From Cold Solid To Hot Subcritical Mode 5 To Mode 3. The candidate must review the plant data provided and determine that three items (Boric Acid Tank, RCS/RHR Loops and Safety Related Electrical Buses) do NOT meet the minimum required for entry into Mode 4.

2022 NRC SRO A1 During a loss of shutdown cooling, determine the time that the RCS will reach core boiling and core boil-off conditions (AOP-020) (JPM ADM-005-c-SRO) - MODIFIED K/A G2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) RO 3.9 SRO 4.2 The candidate will be provided with initial plant conditions. A plant shutdown for refueling is in progress with the Reactor Vessel head off when a loss of RHR has occurred. The crew is implementing AOP-020, Loss of RCS Inventory or Residual Heat Removal While Shutdown.

The SRO candidates must first determine which of the four plant curves to use (H-X-8 through H-X-11) and then calculate the time the RCS will reach core boiling and core boil-off based on the figures.

NOTE: Modified by changing the dates and times of plant shutdown and values of the core thermocouples. These changes have made the calculated answer substantially different than the bank JPM answer.

2022 NRC SRO A2 - Determine component powered by fuse, fuse location, system impact during fuse removal and Tech. Spec. requirements. (JPM-ADM-082-a-SRO)

(AD-OP-ALL-0200) - NEW K/A G.2.2.41 Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13) RO 3.5 SRO 3.9 K/A 2.2.35 Ability to determine TS for mode of operation.

(CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13) RO 3.6 SRO 4.5 The plant was at 100% power. Based on a vendor advisory notice concerning degradation of fuses manufactured during a certain timeframe, fuse FU/273 must be removed for replacement. The candidate will be required to identify the FU/273 supports 1CS-182 (A Charging Safety Injection Pump normal mini flow isolation valve. This valve is a Motor operated that can be determined with the provided drawing CPL-2165-G-0805 and 2165-S-1305. The fuse location is determined to be MCC B35-SB Compt-4E. The affected equipment will be the A CSIP pump normal mini flow path. There will be three Tech Specs that will apply for the fuse replacement.

2022 NRC SRO Administrative Topics Summary Rev-0 4

2022 NRC SRO A3 - Complete review and approval of OP-120.07, Attachment 3 Waste Gas Decay Tank Release Log (OP-120.07) (JPM-ADM-075-a-SRO) - PREVIOUS K/A G 2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits (CFR: 41.13 / 43.4 / 45.10) RO 2.0 SRO 3.8 The candidate will be provided with the pre-release data provided by the RWCR AO and Shift Chemistry Technician along with the completed OP-120.07, Section 8.39 and for authorization to commence the release of a Waste Gas Decay tank. They must determine that three items (Estimated release duration, RCDT Vent position, and the RM-11 High (Max) Setpoint) dispositions are not correct and the release should not be approved to commence. Used on 2018 NRC Exam.

2022 NRC SRO A4 - Determine Initial Protective Action Recommendations (AD-EP-ALL-0109)

(JPM-ADM-076-b) - MODIFIED K/A G2.4.44 - Knowledge of emergency plan implementing procedures protective action recommendations (SRO Only) (CFR: 41.10 / 41.12 / 43.5 / 45.11) RO N/A SRO 4.4 Given a set of initial conditions and AD-EP-ALL-0109, the candidate must determine the initial Protective Action Recommendations for the event in progress. This JPM is time critical JPM (15 minutes.)

NOTE: Modified by changing plant conditions resulting in different Protective Action Recommendations.

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Facility:

Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination:

September 19, 2022 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U (Bold)

Operating Test Number:

05000400/20220919 Control Room Systems 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code Safety Function

a.

Initiate Emergency Boration Following a Reactor Trip (AOP-002) (JPM-CR-037-f)

K/A APE024 AA1.17 A, L, P, D, S 1

b.

Drain a Cold Leg Accumulator (OP-110) (JPM-CR-133-b)

K/A 006 A2.03 D, S 2

c.

Transfer to Hot Leg transfer (ES-1.4) (JPM-CR-066-e)

K/A EPE011 EK3.13 A, EN, L, M, S 3

d.

Align the RHR System for ECCS Mode (OP-111)

(JPM-CR-290-a)

K/A 005 A4.01 D, L, S 4P

e.

Isolate Ruptured C SG (E-3)

(JPM-CR-105-a)

K/A 039 A4.01 A, N, L, S 4S

f.

Reduce Containment Spray Flow (ECA-1.1)

(JPM CR-233-e)

K/A 026 A4.01 M, EN, L, S 5

g.

Restoration of Offsite Power to Emergency Buses (EOP ECA-0.0) (JPM-CR-291-c)

K/A 055 EA1.07 A, P, D, S 6

h.

Restoring Control Room Area HVAC to Normal After a CRIS (OP-173) (JPM-CR-171-d)

K/A APE067 AA1.05 RO ONLY EN, M, S 8

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Rev-0 2

In-Plant Systems: 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 for SRO-U

i.

Lube oil fire (secure seal oil pumps) (AOP-047)

(JPM-IP-299-a)

K/A 045 G.2.1.30 A, E, N 4S

j.

Place a Safety Train Battery Charger on the Alternate Power Supply (OP-156.01) (JPM-IP-246)

K/A APE058 AA1.01 D, E, L 6

k.

Locally Isolate The Seal Water Return Heat Exchanger (AOP-014) (JPM-IP-288)

K/A 008 A2.02 D, E, R 8

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Rev-0 3

1. Determine the number of control room system and in-plant system job performance measures (JPMs) to develop using the following table:

License Level Control Room In-Plant Total Reactor Operator (RO) 8 3

11 Senior Reactor Operator-Instant (SRO-I) 7 3

10 Senior Reactor Operator-Upgrade (SRO-U) 2 or 3 3 or 2 5

2. Select safety functions and systems for each JPM as follows:

Refer to Section 1.9 of the applicable knowledge and abilities (K/A) catalog for the plant systems organized by safety function. For pressurized-water reactor operating tests, the primary and secondary systems listed under Safety Function 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core, in Section 1.9 of the applicable K/A catalog, may be treated as separate safety functions (i.e., two systems, one primary and one secondary, may be selected from Safety Function 4). From the safety function groupings identified in the K/A catalog, select the appropriate number of plant systems by safety functions to be evaluated based on the applicants license level (see the table in step 1).

For RO/SRO-I applicants: Each of the control room system JPMs and, separately, each of the in-plant system JPMs must evaluate a different safety function, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature.

For SRO-U applicants: Evaluate SRO-U applicants on five different safety functions. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function.

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Rev-0 4

3. Select a task for each JPM that supports, either directly or indirectly and in a meaningful way, the successful fulfillment of the associated safety function. Select the task from the applicable K/A catalog (K/As for plant systems or emergency and abnormal plant evolutions) or the facility licensees site-specific task list. If this task has an associated K/A, the K/A should have an importance rating of at least 2.5 in the RO column. K/As that have importance ratings of less than 2.5 may be used if justified based on plant priorities; inform the NRC chief examiner if selecting K/As with an importance rating less than 2.5.

The selected tasks must be different from the events and evolutions conducted during the simulator operating test and tasks tested on the written examination. A task that is similar to a simulator scenario event may be acceptable if the actions required to complete the task are significantly different from those required in response to the scenario event.

Apply the following specific task selection criteria:

At least one of the tasks shall be related to a shutdown or low-power condition.

Four to six of the tasks for RO and SRO-I applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures. Two to three of the tasks for SRO-U applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures.

At least one alternate path JPM must be new or modified from the bank.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall evaluate the applicants ability to implement actions required during an emergency or abnormal condition.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall require the applicant to enter the radiologically controlled area. This provides an excellent opportunity for the applicant to discuss or demonstrate radiation control administrative subjects.

If it is not possible to develop or locate a suitable task for a selected system, return to step 2 and select a different system.

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Rev-0 5

4. For each JPM, specify the codes for type, source, and location:

Code License Level Criteria Actual RO SRO-I SRO-U RO SRO-I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 4-6 2-3 5

5 3

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9

8 4

6 6

3 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1

1 1

3 3

3 (EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 1 1

1 3

2 1

(L)ow power/shutdown 1

1 1

6 6

2 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 2 2

1 5

4 2

(P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 3 3

2 2

2 1

(R)adiologically controlled area 1

1 1

1 1

1 (S)imulator

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary Rev-0 6

Simulator JPMs JPM a - Initiate Emergency Boration following a Reactor Trip (AOP-002)

(JPM-CR-037-f) SRO Upgrade - Alternate Path - DIRECT Previous from the 2018 Exam. (Randomly selected from the Simulator JPM bank)

K/A APE024 AA1.17, Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Emergency Boration: Emergency borate control valve (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) (4.1)

Evaluated position: Operator at the Controls (OATC) responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant was operating at 100% power when the A MFW pump tripped. The crew performed a manual Reactor Trip in accordance with AOP-010, Feedwater Malfunctions. The crew has completed the immediate actions of EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and have transitioned to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. RCS temperature has been stabilized in accordance with EOP-ES-0.1 step 4.

Task: Initiate Emergency Boration following a Reactor Trip after identifying that 2 or more control rods have not fully inserted.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will attempt to start a Boric Acid pump and determines that the pump has failed to start. The pump failure will require the candidate to establish an alternate flow path by opening either of the two RWST valves to the suction of the CSIP, shutting either of the two VCT outlet valves and then raise flow to > 90 gpm using a FCV with the flow rate indication on a meter on the MCB.

Alternate Path - YES - The only available Boric Acid Pump will fail when started requiring the candidate to utilize an alternate boration flow path and also establish a flow rate to the CSIP of > 90 gpm using FK-122.1 in manual.

JPM completion: After the candidate has established and verified at least 90 gpm charging flow from the RWST to the RCS on FI-122A.1, evaluation on this JPM is complete.

JPM b - Drain a Cold Leg Accumulator (Accumulator C) (OP-110)

(JPM-CR-133-b) - DIRECT K/A 006 A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Emergency Core Cooling System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: System leakage (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

(3.4, 3.5)

Evaluated position: Operator at the Controls (OATC) responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant is operating at 100% power steady state middle of life (MOL).

AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, has been entered due to a rise in RCS leakage. The C Cold Leg Accumulator level is 90 percent. The CRS has directed the OATC to lower the level in the C Cold Leg Accumulator to 84 percent in accordance with Safety Injection, Section 8.4.

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary Rev-0 7

Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM b (continued)

Task: Drain B Cold Leg Accumulator.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will be required to perform a valve lineup to reduce level in accordance with OP-110, Safety Injection, Section 8.4 while monitoring progress using MCB level indicators and computer screens (ERFIS).

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task JPM completion: When level has returned to normal the drain lineup will be secured and the SRO informed that the task is complete.

JPM c - Transfer to Hot Leg transfer (ES-1.4)

(JPM-CR-066-e) SRO Upgrade - Alternate Path - MODIFIED EPE011 EK3.13 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to a Large-Break LOCA: Hot-leg injection/recirculation (3.9)

Evaluated position: Operator at the Controls (OATC) responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant was operating at 100% power steady state middle of life (MOL) when a Large Break LOCA occurred. As a result of the LOCA, an automatic Reactor Trip / Safety Injection has occurred. 6.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> has elapsed since the event occurred. The ESF equipment is operating and presently aligned per EOP ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation. The CRS has directed the OATC to transfer the Cold Leg injection line up to the Hot Leg injection line up in accordance with EOP ES-1.4, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation. The A RHR pump tripped on the sequencer start and A Charging pump was secured for a major oil leak.

Task: Align the ECCS injection lineup from Cold Leg Recirc to Hot Leg Recirc.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will be required to perform valve position changes to establish a flow path from the existing ECCS injection flow path lineup to the Hot Legs.

They will have to realign flow to the Cold leg for the low head SI flow path due to the Hot leg valve failing to open. Also they will need to response to a high head SI valve that will be pressure locked. This will require them to start a CSIP and open valves that will allow the pressure locked valve to be opened.

Alternate Path - YES - Part one ALT path is realigning low head SI flow back to the cold legs. The second ALT path is during the valve alignment 1SI-86, High Head SI to Hot Leg will fail to open. This failure will require the operator to use RNO actions to reopen the previously shut BIT outlet valves 1SI-3 and 1SI-4 then restart the Train B CSIP and use to open 1SI-86 from a pressure locked condition.

JPM completion: When high head SI flow is aligned to the Hot legs via 1SI-86 and B CSIP is in operation.

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary Rev-0 8

Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM c (continued)

Modification: Modified by changing the affected High Head SI to Hot leg valve from 1SI-107 to 1SI-86. These changes require the candidate to complete step 2 of EOP-ES-1.4,, vice step 1 to open the pressure locked valve 1SI-86. Also, added failure of low head Hot leg injection valve to open.

JPM d - Align the RHR System for ECCS Mode (OP-111) (JPM-CR-290-a) - DIRECT 005 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Controls and indication for RHR pumps (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) (4.0)

Evaluated position: Balance of Plant (BOP) Operator responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant is in Mode 4. GP-002, Normal Plant Heatup from Cold Solid to Hot Subcritical Mode 5 to Mode 3 is in progress. Train A RHR is in cooldown mode and Train B RHR is in ECCS mode.

Task: The CRS has directed the BOP to align the A RHR train for ECCS Mode per OP-111 Section 7.2.2 starting at step 19. RHR Pump A-SA discharge temperature indication on ERFIS is < 140°F. Forced cooling of the suction line has been in progress for the last 30 minutes.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will secure a running RHR pump and then establish a valve lineup to change the flow path of the A RHR pump from a RCS cooldown lineup to the ECCS injection flow path lineup.

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task JPM completion: A Train RHR ECCS Mode alignment is completed prior to RCS temperature exceeding 350°F.

JPM e - Isolate Ruptured C SG (E-3) (JPM-CR-105-a) - Alternate Path - NEW 039 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: MSIVs and bypass valves (3.9)

Evaluated position: Balance of plant (BOP) responsibilities.

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary Rev-0 9

Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM e (continued)

Turnover: A Reactor trip and Safety Injection have occurred. EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, was entered and a transition has been made to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. EOP-E-3 has been implemented through Step 4.

The C SG has been identified as the ruptured SG. The CRS directs the BOP to continue implementing EOP-E-3 starting at step 5.

Task: C SG isolated per EOP-E-3 attachment 1 for main control room steps only.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will be required to perform valve manipulations and change a SG PORV opening setpoint to isolate the C SG. The C MSIV will fail to shut and require the candidate to implement Attachment 1 to isolate steam release paths.

Alternate Path - YES - The C MSIV will fail to shut and will require the candidate to perform the RNO steps to isolate steam release paths. This will involve shutting A and B SG MSIV and isolating valves on the Moisture Separator Reheater.

JPM completion: When the BOP directs the Radwaste control room operator to shut 1AS-244 the JPM is completed.

Modification: New JPM JPM f - Reduce Containment Spray Flow (ECA-1.1) (JPM-CR-233-e) - MODIFIED 026 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CSS controls (3.9)

Evaluated position: Operator at the Controls (OATC) responsibilities..

Turnover: A large break LOCA has occurred. Both RHR Pump breakers have tripped.

Maintenance is investigating. The RED on Integrity has been addressed and FR-P.1 was exited. The crew has transitioned to ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, and has completed Step 4.

Task: Start the non-running containment fan cooler and secure both CNMT Spray pumps to conserve RWST water.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will reset RWST auto swap over, start one CNMT fan cooler, secure both CNMT spray pumps and isolate discharge valves.

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task JPM completion: Once Containment Spray Pump flow reduced to no pumps running, evaluation on this JPM is complete.

Modification: Added steps to reset RWST switchover and to start one CNMT fan cooler.

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary Rev-0 10 Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM g - Restoration of Offsite Power to Emergency Buses (EOP-ECA-0.0)

(JPM-CR-291-c) Alternate Path - PREVIOUS Previous from the 2018 NRC Exam. (Randomly selected from the Simulator JPM bank) 055 EA1.07 Ability to operate and monitor as they apply to station blackout: Restoration of power from offsite (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) (4.3, 4.5)

Evaluated position: Balance of Plant (BOP) Operator responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant was operating at 100% power. A EDG is under clearance due to the generator field not flashing during OST-1013. The failure of a major line on the Duke grid resulted in the cascading trip of several units and low grid frequency. A loss of offsite power occurred. B EDG failed to start and the problem is being investigated. The crew is implementing EOP-ECA-0.0. The load dispatcher has stabilized the grid and has given permission to restore offsite power to 6.9 KV buses and to reset any tripped Start Up XFMR lockout relays (there are currently no lockout relays tripped).

Task: Energizing ONE Emergency Bus from the SUT (either the 1A-SA energized or 1B-SB energized).

Verifiable actions: The candidate will be manipulating electrical supply breaker switches on the MCB to restore power to the dead Emergency Bus.

Alternate Path: - YES - During the lineup for power restoration on the A-SA Emergency Bus the supply breaker from offsite (Breaker 105) will fail to close. The candidate will be required to continue Attachment 1 using the guidance for the B-SB Emergency Bus to complete restoration of offsite power to a (one) AC emergency bus.

JPM completion: Emergency Bus 1B-SB is being powered via offsite power and the 480 V breakers powering emergency equipment is energized and the CRS is informed, evaluation on this JPM is complete.

JPM h - Restoring Control Room Area HVAC to Normal after a Control Room Isolation Signal (OP-173) (JPM-CR-171-d) - RO ONLY-MODIFIED APE 067 AA1.05 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to a Plant Fire on Site: Plant and control room ventilation systems (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) (3.5)

Evaluated position: Balance of Plant (BOP) Operator responsibilities.

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary Rev-0 11 Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM h (continued)

Turnover: The plant is at 100% power steady state Middle of Life (MOL). A fire occurred at the Emergency Shutdown Diesel Generator during testing. The smoke from the fire caused a Control Room Ventilation Isolation signal to occur (smoke detected at the normal intake Zone 1-150). The Fire Brigade has put the fire out and the smoke has been cleared. The CRS has directed the BOP to restore the Control Room Area HVAC System to NORMAL in accordance with OP-173, Control Room Area HVAC System, Section 8.4. The initial conditions of the OP section will be satisfied and the HVAC system will be in operation per section 8.1.

Task: Restore Control Room Area HVAC to normal in accordance with OP-173, Control Room Area HVAC System, Section 8.4 Verifiable actions: The candidate must reset the Control Room Ventilation isolation signal with a switch to allow the ventilation system to be placed in its normal configuration. They will open intake valves, shut dampers and start and stop exhaust fans.

Alternate Path - No JPM completion: Restoration of the Control Room Normal air supply and lineup is complete.

Modification: Removed alternate path of AH-15A tripping after opening a damper valve.

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary Rev-0 12 In-Plant JPMs JPM i - Lube oil fire (secure seal oil pumps) (AOP-047)

(JPM-IP-299-a) - Alternate Path - NEW K/A 045 G.2.1.30 Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls (4.4, 4.0)

Evaluated position: Safe Shutdown Operator (RAB watchstander)

Turnover: There is a lube oil fire in between the low pressure turbines. The MCR crew manually tripped the reactor and is currently in ES-0.1 and AOP-047 in parallel. The Fire brigade is currently fighting the fire on TB314. There is no smoke or fire on TB 261 or TB 286. You are the Safe Shutdown Operator. The CRS has directed you to perform local actions for AOP-047 to secure the Main Generator Hydrogen seal oil pumps. The Main Generator hydrogen pressure is reading ~1 psig.

Task: To secure Main Generator Seal Oil pumps.

Verifiable actions: Candidate will need to secure Main Generator seal oil pumps via local control switches and open up one supply power breaker for the Air Side Seal Oil pump that fails to secure with local control switch.

Alternate Path - YES - When the candidate tries to secure the Air Side Seal Oil pump, the pump will not secure. Therefore the RNO step will need to be completed by opening up the 250VDC power supply breaker.

JPM completion: Once candidate opens the breaker for the Air Seal Oil pump the JPM can be secured.

JPM j - Place a Safety Train Battery Charger on the Alternate Power Supply (OP-156.01)

(JPM-IP-246) - DIRECT APE 058 AA1.01 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Loss of DC Power: Alternate supply (3.6)

Evaluated position: Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) operator Turnover: The unit is in Mode 3 following a reactor trip due to a loss of offsite power and failure of the A and B EDGs to start. The crew entered EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of all AC Power. The Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator started, loaded, and is now supplying the 1D23 bus. You have an Ascom phone, radio, and a set of rounds keys.

Task: Align the A-SA or A-SB Battery Charger to the Alternate Power Supply and place the 1A-SA or 1A-SB Battery Charger in service. Which train will depend on what actuate charger is the protected train.

Verifiable actions: Candidate will need to manipulate switches on a transfer panel to realign power the battery charger to the alternate source. Then the required battery charger will be placed into service.

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary Rev-0 13 In-Plant JPMs (continued)

JPM j (continued)

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task.

JPM completion: Only battery charge indications are checked for proper operation the JPM can be secured.

JPM k - Locally Isolate the Seal Water Return Heat Exchanger (AOP-014)

(JPM-IP-288) - DIRECT 008 A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Component Cooling Water System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: High/low surge tank level (3.8, 3.7)

Evaluated position: Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) operator Turnover: The plant is at 100% power. ALB-005/6-1, CCW Surge Tank High-Low Level, has alarmed. CCW surge tank level is lowering. The CRS has entered AOP-014, Loss of Component Cooling Water.

Task: The CRS directs you to Locally Isolate the Seal Water Return Heat Exchanger in accordance with AOP-014.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will need to verify that seal return is aligned to the top of the VCT. Then the candidate will change locations and operate three manual valves to bypass and isolate RCP seal return heat exchanger.

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task.

JPM completion: Only RCP seal return heat exchanger is isolated the JPM can be secured.

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Facility:

Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination:

September 19, 2022 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U (Bold)

Operating Test Number:

05000400/20220919 Control Room Systems 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code Safety Function

a.

Initiate Emergency Boration Following a Reactor Trip (AOP-002) (JPM-CR-037-f)

K/A APE024 AA1.17 A, L, P, D, S 1

b.

Drain a Cold Leg Accumulator (OP-110) (JPM-CR-133-b)

K/A 006 A2.03 D, S 2

c.

Transfer to Hot Leg transfer (ES-1.4) (JPM-CR-066-e)

K/A EPE011 EK3.13 A, EN, L, M, S 3

d.

Align the RHR System for ECCS Mode (OP-111)

(JPM-CR-290-a)

K/A 005 A4.01 D, L, S 4P

e.

Isolate Ruptured C SG (E-3)

(JPM-CR-105-a)

K/A 039 A4.01 A, N, L, S 4S

f.

Reduce Containment Spray Flow (ECA-1.1)

(JPM CR-233-e)

K/A 026 A4.01 M, EN, L, S 5

g.

Restoration of Offsite Power to Emergency Buses (EOP ECA-0.0) (JPM-CR-291-c)

K/A 055 EA1.07 A, P, D, S 6

h.

Restoring Control Room Area HVAC to Normal After a CRIS (OP-173) (JPM-CR-171-d)

K/A APE067 AA1.05 RO ONLY EN, M, S 8

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Rev-0 2

In-Plant Systems: 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 for SRO-U

i.

Venting the Main Generator due to a loss of All AC Power K/A 045 G.2.1.30 D,E, L 4S

j.

Place a Safety Train Battery Charger on the Alternate Power Supply (OP-156.01) (JPM-IP-246)

K/A APE058 AA1.01 D, E, L 6

k.

Locally Isolate The Seal Water Return Heat Exchanger (AOP-014) (JPM-IP-288)

K/A 008 A2.02 D, E, R 8

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Rev-0 3

1. Determine the number of control room system and in-plant system job performance measures (JPMs) to develop using the following table:

License Level Control Room In-Plant Total Reactor Operator (RO) 8 3

11 Senior Reactor Operator-Instant (SRO-I) 7 3

10 Senior Reactor Operator-Upgrade (SRO-U) 2 or 3 3 or 2 5

2. Select safety functions and systems for each JPM as follows:

Refer to Section 1.9 of the applicable knowledge and abilities (K/A) catalog for the plant systems organized by safety function. For pressurized-water reactor operating tests, the primary and secondary systems listed under Safety Function 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core, in Section 1.9 of the applicable K/A catalog, may be treated as separate safety functions (i.e., two systems, one primary and one secondary, may be selected from Safety Function 4). From the safety function groupings identified in the K/A catalog, select the appropriate number of plant systems by safety functions to be evaluated based on the applicants license level (see the table in step 1).

For RO/SRO-I applicants: Each of the control room system JPMs and, separately, each of the in-plant system JPMs must evaluate a different safety function, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature.

For SRO-U applicants: Evaluate SRO-U applicants on five different safety functions. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function.

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Rev-0 4

3. Select a task for each JPM that supports, either directly or indirectly and in a meaningful way, the successful fulfillment of the associated safety function. Select the task from the applicable K/A catalog (K/As for plant systems or emergency and abnormal plant evolutions) or the facility licensees site-specific task list. If this task has an associated K/A, the K/A should have an importance rating of at least 2.5 in the RO column. K/As that have importance ratings of less than 2.5 may be used if justified based on plant priorities; inform the NRC chief examiner if selecting K/As with an importance rating less than 2.5.

The selected tasks must be different from the events and evolutions conducted during the simulator operating test and tasks tested on the written examination. A task that is similar to a simulator scenario event may be acceptable if the actions required to complete the task are significantly different from those required in response to the scenario event.

Apply the following specific task selection criteria:

At least one of the tasks shall be related to a shutdown or low-power condition.

Four to six of the tasks for RO and SRO-I applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures. Two to three of the tasks for SRO-U applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures.

At least one alternate path JPM must be new or modified from the bank.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall evaluate the applicants ability to implement actions required during an emergency or abnormal condition.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall require the applicant to enter the radiologically controlled area. This provides an excellent opportunity for the applicant to discuss or demonstrate radiation control administrative subjects.

If it is not possible to develop or locate a suitable task for a selected system, return to step 2 and select a different system.

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Rev-0 5

4. For each JPM, specify the codes for type, source, and location:

Code License Level Criteria Actual RO SRO-I SRO-U RO SRO-I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 4-6 2-3 5

4 3

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9

8 4

6 7

3 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1

1 1

3 3

3 (EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 1 1

1 3

4 1

(L)ow power/shutdown 1

1 1

6 6

2 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 2 2

1 5

4 2

(P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 3 3

2 2

2 1

(R)adiologically controlled area 1

1 1

1 1

1 (S)imulator

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary Rev-0 6

Simulator JPMs JPM a - Initiate Emergency Boration following a Reactor Trip (AOP-002)

(JPM-CR-037-f) SRO Upgrade - Alternate Path - DIRECT Previous from the 2018 Exam. (Randomly selected from the Simulator JPM bank)

K/A APE024 AA1.17, Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Emergency Boration: Emergency borate control valve (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) (4.1)

Evaluated position: Operator at the Controls (OATC) responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant was operating at 100% power when the A MFW pump tripped. The crew performed a manual Reactor Trip in accordance with AOP-010, Feedwater Malfunctions. The crew has completed the immediate actions of EOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and have transitioned to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. RCS temperature has been stabilized in accordance with EOP-ES-0.1 step 4.

Task: Initiate Emergency Boration following a Reactor Trip after identifying that 2 or more control rods have not fully inserted.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will attempt to start a Boric Acid pump and determines that the pump has failed to start. The pump failure will require the candidate to establish an alternate flow path by opening either of the two RWST valves to the suction of the CSIP, shutting either of the two VCT outlet valves and then raise flow to > 90 gpm using a FCV with the flow rate indication on a meter on the MCB.

Alternate Path - YES - The only available Boric Acid Pump will fail when started requiring the candidate to utilize an alternate boration flow path and also establish a flow rate to the CSIP of > 90 gpm using FK-122.1 in manual.

JPM completion: After the candidate has established and verified at least 90 gpm charging flow from the RWST to the RCS on FI-122A.1, evaluation on this JPM is complete.

JPM b - Drain a Cold Leg Accumulator (Accumulator C) (OP-110)

(JPM-CR-133-b) - DIRECT K/A 006 A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Emergency Core Cooling System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: System leakage (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

(3.4, 3.5)

Evaluated position: Operator at the Controls (OATC) responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant is operating at 100% power steady state middle of life (MOL).

AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, has been entered due to a rise in RCS leakage. The C Cold Leg Accumulator level is 90 percent. The CRS has directed the OATC to lower the level in the C Cold Leg Accumulator to 84 percent in accordance with Safety Injection, Section 8.4.

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary Rev-0 7

Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM b (continued)

Task: Drain B Cold Leg Accumulator.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will be required to perform a valve lineup to reduce level in accordance with OP-110, Safety Injection, Section 8.4 while monitoring progress using MCB level indicators and computer screens (ERFIS).

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task JPM completion: When level has returned to normal the drain lineup will be secured and the SRO informed that the task is complete.

JPM c - Transfer to Hot Leg transfer (ES-1.4)

(JPM-CR-066-e) SRO Upgrade - Alternate Path - MODIFIED EPE011 EK3.13 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to a Large-Break LOCA: Hot-leg injection/recirculation (3.9)

Evaluated position: Operator at the Controls (OATC) responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant was operating at 100% power steady state middle of life (MOL) when a Large Break LOCA occurred. As a result of the LOCA, an automatic Reactor Trip / Safety Injection has occurred. 6.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> has elapsed since the event occurred. The ESF equipment is operating and presently aligned per EOP ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation. The CRS has directed the OATC to transfer the Cold Leg injection line up to the Hot Leg injection line up in accordance with EOP ES-1.4, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation. The A RHR pump tripped on the sequencer start and A Charging pump was secured for a major oil leak.

Task: Align the ECCS injection lineup from Cold Leg Recirc to Hot Leg Recirc.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will be required to perform valve position changes to establish a flow path from the existing ECCS injection flow path lineup to the Hot Legs.

They will have to realign flow to the Cold leg for the low head SI flow path due to the Hot leg valve failing to open. Also they will need to response to a high head SI valve that will be pressure locked. This will require them to start a CSIP and open valves that will allow the pressure locked valve to be opened.

Alternate Path - YES - Part one ALT path is realigning low head SI flow back to the cold legs. The second ALT path is during the valve alignment 1SI-86, High Head SI to Hot Leg will fail to open. This failure will require the operator to use RNO actions to reopen the previously shut BIT outlet valves 1SI-3 and 1SI-4 then restart the Train B CSIP and use to open 1SI-86 from a pressure locked condition.

JPM completion: When high head SI flow is aligned to the Hot legs via 1SI-86 and B CSIP is in operation.

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary Rev-0 8

Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM c (continued)

Modification: Modified by changing the affected High Head SI to Hot leg valve from 1SI-107 to 1SI-86. These changes require the candidate to complete step 2 of EOP-ES-1.4,, vice step 1 to open the pressure locked valve 1SI-86. Also, added failure of low head Hot leg injection valve to open.

JPM d - Align the RHR System for ECCS Mode (OP-111) (JPM-CR-290-a) - DIRECT 005 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Controls and indication for RHR pumps (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) (4.0)

Evaluated position: Balance of Plant (BOP) Operator responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant is in Mode 4. GP-002, Normal Plant Heatup from Cold Solid to Hot Subcritical Mode 5 to Mode 3 is in progress. Train A RHR is in cooldown mode and Train B RHR is in ECCS mode.

Task: The CRS has directed the BOP to align the A RHR train for ECCS Mode per OP-111 Section 7.2.2 starting at step 19. RHR Pump A-SA discharge temperature indication on ERFIS is < 140°F. Forced cooling of the suction line has been in progress for the last 30 minutes.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will secure a running RHR pump and then establish a valve lineup to change the flow path of the A RHR pump from a RCS cooldown lineup to the ECCS injection flow path lineup.

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task JPM completion: A Train RHR ECCS Mode alignment is completed prior to RCS temperature exceeding 350°F.

JPM e - Isolate Ruptured C SG (E-3) (JPM-CR-105-a) - Alternate Path - NEW 039 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: MSIVs and bypass valves (3.9)

Evaluated position: Balance of plant (BOP) responsibilities.

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary Rev-0 9

Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM e (continued)

Turnover: A Reactor trip and Safety Injection have occurred. EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, was entered and a transition has been made to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. EOP-E-3 has been implemented through Step 4.

The C SG has been identified as the ruptured SG. The CRS directs the BOP to continue implementing EOP-E-3 starting at step 5.

Task: C SG isolated per EOP-E-3 attachment 1 for main control room steps only.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will be required to perform valve manipulations and change a SG PORV opening setpoint to isolate the C SG. The C MSIV will fail to shut and require the candidate to implement Attachment 1 to isolate steam release paths.

Alternate Path - YES - The C MSIV will fail to shut and will require the candidate to perform the RNO steps to isolate steam release paths. This will involve shutting A and B SG MSIV and isolating valves on the Moisture Separator Reheater.

JPM completion: When the BOP directs the Radwaste control room operator to shut 1AS-244 the JPM is completed.

Modification: New JPM JPM f - Reduce Containment Spray Flow (ECA-1.1) (JPM-CR-233-e) - MODIFIED 026 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CSS controls (3.9)

Evaluated position: Operator at the Controls (OATC) responsibilities..

Turnover: A large break LOCA has occurred. Both RHR Pump breakers have tripped.

Maintenance is investigating. The RED on Integrity has been addressed and FR-P.1 was exited. The crew has transitioned to ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, and has completed Step 4.

Task: Start the non-running containment fan cooler and secure both CNMT Spray pumps to conserve RWST water.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will reset RWST auto swap over, start one CNMT fan cooler, secure both CNMT spray pumps and isolate discharge valves.

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task JPM completion: Once Containment Spray Pump flow reduced to no pumps running, evaluation on this JPM is complete.

Modification: Added steps to reset RWST switchover and to start one CNMT fan cooler.

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary Rev-0 10 Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM g - Restoration of Offsite Power to Emergency Buses (EOP-ECA-0.0)

(JPM-CR-291-c) Alternate Path - PREVIOUS Previous from the 2018 NRC Exam. (Randomly selected from the Simulator JPM bank) 055 EA1.07 Ability to operate and monitor as they apply to station blackout: Restoration of power from offsite (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) (4.3, 4.5)

Evaluated position: Balance of Plant (BOP) Operator responsibilities.

Turnover: The plant was operating at 100% power. A EDG is under clearance due to the generator field not flashing during OST-1013. The failure of a major line on the Duke grid resulted in the cascading trip of several units and low grid frequency. A loss of offsite power occurred. B EDG failed to start and the problem is being investigated. The crew is implementing EOP-ECA-0.0. The load dispatcher has stabilized the grid and has given permission to restore offsite power to 6.9 KV buses and to reset any tripped Start Up XFMR lockout relays (there are currently no lockout relays tripped).

Task: Energizing ONE Emergency Bus from the SUT (either the 1A-SA energized or 1B-SB energized).

Verifiable actions: The candidate will be manipulating electrical supply breaker switches on the MCB to restore power to the dead Emergency Bus.

Alternate Path: - YES - During the lineup for power restoration on the A-SA Emergency Bus the supply breaker from offsite (Breaker 105) will fail to close. The candidate will be required to continue Attachment 1 using the guidance for the B-SB Emergency Bus to complete restoration of offsite power to a (one) AC emergency bus.

JPM completion: Emergency Bus 1B-SB is being powered via offsite power and the 480 V breakers powering emergency equipment is energized and the CRS is informed, evaluation on this JPM is complete.

JPM h - Restoring Control Room Area HVAC to Normal after a Control Room Isolation Signal (OP-173) (JPM-CR-171-d) - RO ONLY-MODIFIED APE 067 AA1.05 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to a Plant Fire on Site: Plant and control room ventilation systems (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) (3.5)

Evaluated position: Balance of Plant (BOP) Operator responsibilities.

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary Rev-0 11 Simulator JPMs (continued)

JPM h (continued)

Turnover: The plant is at 100% power steady state Middle of Life (MOL). A fire occurred at the Emergency Shutdown Diesel Generator during testing. The smoke from the fire caused a Control Room Ventilation Isolation signal to occur (smoke detected at the normal intake Zone 1-150). The Fire Brigade has put the fire out and the smoke has been cleared. The CRS has directed the BOP to restore the Control Room Area HVAC System to NORMAL in accordance with OP-173, Control Room Area HVAC System, Section 8.4. The initial conditions of the OP section will be satisfied and the HVAC system will be in operation per section 8.1.

Task: Restore Control Room Area HVAC to normal in accordance with OP-173, Control Room Area HVAC System, Section 8.4 Verifiable actions: The candidate must reset the Control Room Ventilation isolation signal with a switch to allow the ventilation system to be placed in its normal configuration. They will open intake valves, shut dampers and start and stop exhaust fans.

Alternate Path - No JPM completion: Restoration of the Control Room Normal air supply and lineup is complete.

Modification: Removed alternate path of AH-15A tripping after opening a damper valve.

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary Rev-0 12 In-Plant JPMs JPM i - Venting the Main Generator due to a loss of All AC Power K/A 045 G.2.1.30 Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls (4.4, 4.0)

Evaluated position: Turbine Building AO Turnover: A loss of all AC power has occurred. The Control Room has entered EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. You are the TB AO. The Control Room directs you to locally vent main generator hydrogen and to secure the DC air side seal oil backup pump using OP-153.02, GENERATOR GAS SYSTEM, Section 8.5. Initial conditions are met (section 8.5.1). Another operator is available to perform control switch manipulations for steps 7a  7c.

Task: Main Generator vented and DC air side seal oil backup pump secured per OP-153.02.

Verifiable actions: Candidate will need to Isolate hydrogen supply, Opens vent path, Secures power to the DC Air Side Seal Oil Backup Pump.

Alternate Path - NO -

JPM completion: Once candidate shuts 1HY-88, H2 manifold vent, the JPM can be secured.

JPM j - Place a Safety Train Battery Charger on the Alternate Power Supply (OP-156.01)

(JPM-IP-246) - DIRECT APE 058 AA1.01 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Loss of DC Power: Alternate supply (3.6)

Evaluated position: Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) operator Turnover: The unit is in Mode 3 following a reactor trip due to a loss of offsite power and failure of the A and B EDGs to start. The crew entered EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of all AC Power. The Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator started, loaded, and is now supplying the 1D23 bus. You have an Ascom phone, radio, and a set of rounds keys.

Task: Align the A-SA or A-SB Battery Charger to the Alternate Power Supply and place the 1A-SA or 1A-SB Battery Charger in service. Which train will depend on what actuate charger is the protected train.

Verifiable actions: Candidate will need to manipulate switches on a transfer panel to realign power the battery charger to the alternate source. Then the required battery charger will be placed into service.

In-Plant JPMs (continued)

JPM j (continued)

2022 NRC RO/SRO Simulator & In Plant JPM Summary Rev-0 13 Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task.

JPM completion: Only battery charge indications are checked for proper operation the JPM can be secured.

JPM k - Locally Isolate the Seal Water Return Heat Exchanger (AOP-014)

(JPM-IP-288) - DIRECT 008 A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Component Cooling Water System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: High/low surge tank level (3.8, 3.7)

Evaluated position: Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) operator Turnover: The plant is at 100% power. ALB-005/6-1, CCW Surge Tank High-Low Level, has alarmed. CCW surge tank level is lowering. The CRS has entered AOP-014, Loss of Component Cooling Water.

Task: The CRS directs you to Locally Isolate the Seal Water Return Heat Exchanger in accordance with AOP-014.

Verifiable actions: The candidate will need to verify that seal return is aligned to the top of the VCT. Then the candidate will change locations and operate three manual valves to bypass and isolate RCP seal return heat exchanger.

Alternate Path - NO - There are no failures with this task.

JPM completion: Only RCP seal return heat exchanger is isolated the JPM can be secured.

Events and Evolution Checklist Form 3.4-1 Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: September 19, 2022 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2022301 A

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M(*)

CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P R

I U

RO-1 SRO-I SRO-U RX R6 R4 2

1 NOR 0

1 I/C I1,C3,C4 C2,C3 5

4 MAJ M7, M9 M7,M8 4

2 Man Ctrl MC1, MC3, MC4 MC2 5

1 TS 0

0 RO-2 SRO-I SRO-U RX R4 2

1 NOR 0

1 I/C C2,C5 I1,C5,C6 5

4 MAJ M7,M9 M7,M8 4

2 Man Ctrl MC2 MC1 2

1 TS 0

RO-3 SRO-I SRO-U RX R6 R4 2

1 NOR 0

1 I/C I1,C3,C4 C2,C3 5

4 MAJ M7, M9 M7,M8 4

2 Man Ctrl MC1, MC3, MC4 MC2 4

1 TS 0

0 RO-4 SRO-I SRO-U RX R4 1

1 NOR 0

1 I/C C2,C5 I1,C5,C6 5

4 MAJ M7,M9 M7,M8 4

2 Man Ctrl MC2 MC1 2

1 TS 0

RO-5 SRO-I SRO-U RX R6 R4 2

1 NOR 0

1 I/C I1,C3,C4 C2,C3 5

4 MAJ M7, M9 M7,M8 4

2 Man Ctrl MC1, MC3, MC4 MC2 4

1 TS 0

0

Events and Evolution Checklist Form 3.4-1 Form 3.4-1 Instructions for the Events and Evolutions Checklist

1.

Mark the applicant license level for each simulator operating test number.

2.

For the set of scenario columns, fill in the associated event number from Form 3.3 1, Scenario Outline, to show the specific event types being used for the applicant while in the assigned crew position for that scenario.

  • Minimums are subject to the instructions in Section C.2, License Level Criteria.

KEY: RX = Reactivity Manipulation; NOR = Normal Evolution; I/C = Instrument/Component Failure; MAJ = Major Transient; Man.

Ctrl = Manual Control of Automatic Function; TS = Technical Specification Evaluation; RO = Reactor Operator; SRO-I or I = Instant Senior Reactor Operator; SRO-U or U = Upgrade Senior Reactor Operator; SRO = Senior Reactor Operator; ATC = At the Controls; and BOP = Balance of Plan

Events and Evolution Checklist Form 3.4-1 Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: September 19, 2022 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2022301 A

P P

L I

C A

N T

E V

E N

T T

Y P

E Scenarios 2

3 T

O T

A L

M I

N I

M U

M(*)

CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P R

I U

RO-1 SRO-I-1 SRO-U RX R6 R4 2

1 NOR 1

1 I/C I1,C2, C3,C4,C5 C2,C3 7

4 MAJ M7, M9 M7,M8 3

2 Man Ctrl MC2 1

1 TS TS2,TS3, TS4 3

2 RO-1 SRO-I-2 SRO-U RX R4 1

1 NOR 1

I/C C2,C5 I1,C2, C3, C5,C6 7

4 MAJ M7,M9 M7,M8 4

2 Man Ctrl MC2 1

1 TS

TS3, TS5 2

2 Form 3.4-1 Instructions for the Events and Evolutions Checklist

1.

Mark the applicant license level for each simulator operating test number.

2.

For the set of scenario columns, fill in the associated event number from Form 3.3 1, Scenario Outline, to show the specific event types being used for the applicant while in the assigned crew position for that scenario.

  • Minimums are subject to the instructions in Section C.2, License Level Criteria.

KEY: RX = Reactivity Manipulation; NOR = Normal Evolution; I/C = Instrument/Component Failure; MAJ = Major Transient; Man.

Ctrl = Manual Control of Automatic Function; TS = Technical Specification Evaluation; RO = Reactor Operator; SRO-I or I = Instant Senior Reactor Operator; SRO-U or U = Upgrade Senior Reactor Operator; SRO = Senior Reactor Operator; ATC = At the Controls; and BOP = Balance of Plan

Events and Evolution Checklist Form 3.4-1 Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: September 19, 2022 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2022301 A

P P

L I

C A

N T

E V

E N

T T

Y P

E Scenarios 2

3 T

O T

A L

M I

N I

M U

M(*)

CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P R

I U

RO-1 SRO-I SRO-U-1 RX R6 1

0 NOR 1

I/C I1,C2, C3,C4,C5 5

2 MAJ M7, M9 2

1 Man Ctrl 0

0 TS TS2,TS3, TS4 3

2 RO-1 SRO-I SRO-U-2 RX R6 1

0 NOR 1

I/C I1,C2, C3,C4,C5 5

2 MAJ M7, M9 2

1 Man Ctrl 0

0 TS TS2,TS3, TS4 3

2 Form 3.4-1 Instructions for the Events and Evolutions Checklist

1.

Mark the applicant license level for each simulator operating test number.

2.

For the set of scenario columns, fill in the associated event number from Form 3.3 1, Scenario Outline, to show the specific event types being used for the applicant while in the assigned crew position for that scenario.

  • Minimums are subject to the instructions in Section C.2, License Level Criteria.

KEY: RX = Reactivity Manipulation; NOR = Normal Evolution; I/C = Instrument/Component Failure; MAJ = Major Transient; Man.

Ctrl = Manual Control of Automatic Function; TS = Technical Specification Evaluation; RO = Reactor Operator; SRO-I or I = Instant Senior Reactor Operator; SRO-U or U = Upgrade Senior Reactor Operator; SRO = Senior Reactor Operator; ATC = At the Controls; and BOP = Balance of Plan

Events and Evolution Checklist Form 3.4-1 Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Exam: September 19, 2022 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2022301 A

P P

L I

C A

N T

E V

E N

T T

Y P

E Scenarios 1 (SPARE)

T O

T A

L M

I N

I M

U M(*)

CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S

R O

A T

C B

O P

R I

U RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 0

1 1 0 NOR N4 1

1 1 1 I/C C1,C2,I3,I5,I6 5

4 4

2 MAJ M7 1

2 2 1 Man Ctrl 0

1 1 0 TS TS1,TS3 2

0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 0

1 1 0 NOR 1

1 1 1 I/C C1,I3,I6 3

4 4 2 MAJ M7 1

2 2 1 Man Ctrl MC3 1

1 1 0 TS 0

0 2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 0

1 1 0 NOR N4 1

1 1 1 I/C C2,I5 2

4 4 2 MAJ M7 1

2 2 1 Man Ctrl MC5 1

1 1 0 TS 0

0 2 2 Form 3.4-1 Instructions for the Events and Evolutions Checklist

1.

Mark the applicant license level for each simulator operating test number.

2.

For the set of scenario columns, fill in the associated event number from Form 3.3 1, Scenario Outline, to show the specific event types being used for the applicant while in the assigned crew position for that scenario.

  • Minimums are subject to the instructions in Section C.2, License Level Criteria.

KEY: RX = Reactivity Manipulation; NOR = Normal Evolution; I/C = Instrument/Component Failure; MAJ = Major Transient; Man.

Ctrl = Manual Control of Automatic Function; TS = Technical Specification Evaluation; RO = Reactor Operator; SRO-I or I = Instant Senior Reactor Operator; SRO-U or U = Upgrade Senior Reactor Operator; SRO = Senior Reactor Operator; ATC = At the Controls; and BOP = Balance of Plan

YY 1

JPM # or title 2

Type (S/P/A) 3 ALT (Y/N) 4 LOD (1-5) 5 JPM Errors 6

U/E/S 7

Explanation LOD REF IC TSK CUE CS TL General comments: The action/step that fails to work that creates the alternate path is a critical step. The task standard must be concise to the activity the applicant is performing and the desired end state, if it contains and ALT path include a brief comment in the task standard describing the failed component.

a S

Y

>1, <5 E

Step 4 verifiable action drives the alt path.

Added as Critical step Updated Task standard b

S N

>1, <5 S

c S

Y

>1, <5 E

Step 16 verifiable action drives the alt path.

Added as Critical step Updated Task standard d

S N

>1, <5 S

e S

Y

>1, <5 E

Step 9 verifiable action drives the alt path.

Updated step 9 as critical f

S N

>1, <5 S

g S

Y

>1, <5 E

Steps 4-12(a/b) verifiable action drives the alt path Updated to show steps 4-12 a (b) critical h

S N

>1, <5 S

i P

Y

>1, <5 E

step 3 verifiable action drives the alt path Updated to show step 3 as critical.

J P

N

>1, <5 S

k P

N

>1, <5 S

S S

S S

S

Form 2.3-3 Operating Test Review Worksheet (JPMs)

RO A1-1 A

N

>1, <5 S

RO A1-2 A

N

>1, <5 S

RO A2 A

N

>1, <5 S

RO A3 A

N

>1, <5 S

Performed in simulator SRO A1-1 A

N

>1, <5 S

SRO A1-2 A

N

>1, <5 E

Performance step 4 appears incorrect Corrected step to reference H-X-11 SRO A2 A

N

>1, <5 S

Adds onto RO A2 for SRO task SRO A3 A

N

>1, <5 E

Cue: compete a review of the OP 120.07 and approval for release, (if unable to approve the release, note any problems in the space provided)

Updated Cue to You are the CRS complete a review of the OP-120.07 and approval for release, (if unable to approve the release, note any problems in the space provided)

SRO A4 A

N

>1, <5 E

The JPM is not marked as time critical,on pg 2, it is marked as such elsewhere UPDATED page 2 to Time Critical YES S

S S

Form 2.3-3 Instructions for Completing the Scenario Table

1. For each scenario, enter the scenario event names and descriptions.
2. Review the individual events contained in each scenario, and identify and mark event errors:

x The scenario guide event description is not realistic/credibleunsatisfactory (U).

x The scenario guide event description lacks adequate crew/operator performance standardsneeds enhancement (E).

x The scenario guide event description lacks verifiable actions for a credited normal event, reactivity event instrument/component malfunction, or technical specification (TS) event (or a combination of these) (U).

x The scenario guide event description incorrectly designates an event as a critical task (i.e., a noncritical task labeled as critical or a critical task labeled as noncritical). This includes critical tasks that do not meet the critical task criteria (i.e., the critical task does not have a measurable performance standard) (U).

x The scenario guide event description incorrectly designates entry into TS actions when not required or does not designate entry into TS actions when required (U).

3. Based on the outcome in step 2, mark the scenario event as unsatisfactory (U), satisfactory (S), or needs enhancements (E). An event is (U) if it has one or more (U) errors as determined in step 2. Examples of enhancements include formatting, spelling, or other minor changes.
4. Briefly describe any scenario event determined to be unsatisfactory (U) or needing enhancement (E). Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario event is marked by a satisfactory (S) resolution on this form.

Facility: Harris Scenario: 2 Exam Date: Sep 2022 1

Scenario Event ID/Name:

2 Scenario event errors 3

U/E/S 4

Explanation Realism/

Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 1

S 2#

S 3#

S 4

S 5#

E BOP may only be credited C or R for event 5/6 see ES 3.4 pg 6 item (8)

BOP will start the stby condenser vacuum pump.-satisfying the verifiable action.

6 E

7#

S 8#

S CT is preferred boundary condition 9

S CT is preferred boundary condition S

S resolved with comment for 5#

Facility: Harris Scenario: 3 Exam Date: Sep 2022 1

Scenario Event ID/Name:

2 Scenario event errors 3

U/E/S 4

Explanation Realism/

Credibility Performance Standards Verifiable Actions Critical Task TS 1

S 2#

S 3

S 4#

S 5#

S 6

S How is TS 3.4.1.1 applicable, the Rx would be tripped before RCP is secured?

Removed TS from scenario 7

S CT is preferred boundary condition 8#

S 9

S CT is preferred boundary condition

Form 4.1-1 Record of Rejected Knowledge and Abilities Refer to Examination Standard (ES)-4.2, Developing Written Examinations, Section B.3, for deviations from the approved written examination outline.

Tier/Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection 1/1 RO 9 K/A 055 EG2.1.23 Sample Plan correction made by Chief Examiner concerning duplication of generic K/As.

New K/A 055 EG2.1.19: Ability to use indications to evaluate plant system or component status (Station Blackout) 1/2 RO 24 K/A 078 AA1.07 Unable to create a question to K/A 078 AA1.07 due to plant design New K/A 078 AA1.03: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to a Reactor Coolant System Leak: ESFAS controls 1/2 RO 26 K/A WE 10EA2.10 Unable to write a question to K/A WE 10 EA2.10 due to ES-0.3 and ES-0.4 not utilizing SG parameters for actions to mitigate head voids.

New K/A WE 10 EA2.03: Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to Natural Circulation with Steam Void in the Vessel with/without the RVLIS: RCS pressure, temperature, and/or PZR level 2/1 RO 40 K/A 022 K2.02 Unable to create a question to K/A 022 K2.02 due to plant design New K/A 022 K2.01: Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: CCS fans 2/1 RO 42 K/A 055 EG2.1.23 Sample Plan correction made by Chief Examiner concerning duplication of generic K/As New K/A 039 G2.4.2: Knowledge of system setpoints, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with emergency and abnormal operating procedures (Main and Reheat Steam System) 2/1 RO 54 K/A 103 K3.04 Unable to create a question to K/A 103 K3.04 due to plant design New K/A 103 K1.08: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the Containment System and the following systems: ECCS 3 RO 65 K/A G2.1.46 ICS is typically associated with B/W plants, not applicable to plant design New K/A G2.1.1: Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements

The FINAL Sample plan is the combination of the DRAFT SAMPLE PLAN and incorporating the changes noted on the record of rejected KAs I

Form 2.3-1 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Facility:

Date of Examination:

Item Task Description (Y)es / (N)o a

b*

c#

WRITTEN

a. The outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with the instructions in Section B of ES-4.1, and all knowledge and ability (K/A) categories are appropriately sampled.
b. The outline does not overemphasize any systems, evolutions, or generic topics.
c. Justifications for deselected or rejected K/A statements are acceptable.

SIMULATOR

a. Using Form 3.4-1, Events and Evolutions Checklist, verify that the proposed scenario set contains the required number of normal evolutions, reactivity evolutions, instrument and component failures, manual control evolutions, technical specifications, and major transients.
b. There are enough scenarios (and spares) for the projected number and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule without compromising exam integrity. Ensure that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.

c.

Ensure that all scenarios are new or significantly modified in accordance with ES-3.4 and that no scenarios are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s).

d. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conforms with the qualitative and quantitative simulator set criteria specified on Form 2.3-2.

JPMS a.

Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified in the instructions on Form 3.2-1 and that no tasks are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s).

b.

Verify that the control room and in-plant systems outline meets the criteria specified in the instructions on Form 3.2-2 and that no tasks are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s).

c. Determine whether the number of job performance measures (JPMs) and JPM types is sufficient for the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.

GENERAL

a. Assess whether the appropriate exam sections cover plant-specific priorities (including probabilistic risk assessment and individual plant examination insights).
b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41, 10 CFR 55.43, and 10 CFR 55.45 sampling is appropriate.
c. Check whether K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are greater than or equal to 2.5.
d. Check for duplication and overlap across the exam and with the last two NRC exams.
e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage.
f. Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (reactor operator or senior reactor operator).

Printed Name/Signature Date

a. Author
b. Facility Reviewer (*)
c. NRC Reviewer (#)

NRC Chief Examiner NRC Supervisor

  • The facility licensee signature is not applicable for NRC-developed tests.
  1. An independent NRC reviewer performs the steps in column c. This may be the NRC Chief Examiner if he/she did not develop the outline under review.

9/19/2022 Shearon Harris me/Signature 0DUN$%DWHV Draft Sample Plan Not Applicable Jason D. Bundy 11/10/2021 Jason D. Bundy 11/10/2021 Y

Y Y

Y Y

Y Y

Y Y

Mark Bates 11/10/2021 Digitally signed by Gerald J. McCoy Date: 2021.11.10 16:04:30 -05'00'

Form 4.1-PWR Pressurized-Water Reactor Examination Outline Facility:

Shearon Harris K/A Catalog Rev. 3 Rev.

0 Date of Exam:

09/19/2022 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K

1 K

2 K

3 K

4 K

5 K

6 A

1 A

2 A

3 A

4 G

Tota l

A2 G*

Tot al

1.

Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1

3 2

3 3

4 3

18 3

3 6

2 1

2 1

2 1

1 8

2 2

4 Tier Totals 4

4 4

5 5

4 26 5

5 10

2.

Plant Systems 1

2 3

2 3

2 2

3 2

3 3

3 28 3

2 5

2 1

0 1

0 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

9 1

1 1

3 Tier Totals 3

3 3

3 3

3 4

3 4

4 4

37 5

3 8

3.

Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories CO EC RC EM 6

CO EC RC EM 7

2 2

1 1

2 2

1 2

4. Theory Reactor Theory Thermodynamics 6

3 3

Notes: CO

=

EM =

Conduct of Operations; EC = Equipment Control; RC = Radiation Control; Emergency Procedures/Plan These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample when Revision 2 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.

These systems/evolutions are only included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 2 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.

Draft Exam Sample Plan

ES-4.1-PWR Shearon Harris Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

Item E/APE # / Name /

Safety Function K

1 K

2 K

3 A

1 A

2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR Q#

1 (000007) (EPE 7; BW E02 & E10; CE E02) Reactor

Trip, Stabilization, Recovery X

(000007) (EPE 7; BW E02 & E10; CE E02) Reactor Trip, Stabilization, Recovery (G2.1.29) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Knowledge of how to conduct system lineups, such as valves, breakers, or switches (CFR:

41.10 / 45.1 / 45.12) 4 76 2

(000008) (APE 8)

Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident X

(000008AK3.05) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to (APE 8)

PRESSURIZER VAPOR Space Accident (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 /

45.6 / 45.13): ECCS termination or throttling criteria 3.9 1

3 (000009) (EPE 9)

Small Break LOCA X

(000009) (EPE 9) Small Break LOCA (G2.4.6) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of emergency and abnormal operating procedures major action categories (CFR:

41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 3.7 2

4 (000011) (EPE

11) Large Break LOCA X

(000011EA2.05) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (EPE 11) LARGE-Break LOCA (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13): Significance of ECCS pump operation 4.1 77 5

(000015) (APE

15) Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions X

(000015AA2.15) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 15) REACTOR COOLANT Pump Malfunctions (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13): Natural circulation flow 3.8 78 6

(000022) (APE

22) Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup X

(000022AA2.03) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 22) LOSS OF REACTOR Coolant Makeup (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13): Failures of flow control valve or controller 3.6 79 7

(000025) (APE

25) Loss of Residual Heat Removal System X

(000025AK1.02) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to (APE 25) LOSS OF RESIDUAL Heat Removal System (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8): Core cooling 4.2 3

8 (000026) (APE

26) Loss of Component Cooling Water X

(000026AK2.01) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE

26) LOSS OF Component Cooling Water and the following systems or components (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3): CVCS 3.6 4

9 (000027) (APE

27) Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction X

(000027AA2.08) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 27) PRESSURIZER PRESSURE Control System Malfunction (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /

45.13): Letdown flow indication 3.3 5

10 (000029) (EPE

29) Anticipated Transient Without Scram X

(000029EK3.08) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to (EPE 29)

ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13): Closing the MSIVs 3.7 6

11 (000038) (EPE

38) Steam Generator Tube Rupture X

(000038) (EPE 38) Steam Generator Tube Rupture (G2.1.20) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.6 80 12 (000040) (APE 40; BW E05; CE E05; W E12)

Steam Line Rupture -

Excessive Heat Transfer X

(WE12EA1.07) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to (W E12) UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8): RVLIS 3.5 7

13 (000054) (APE 54; CE E06) Loss of Main Feedwater X

(000054AK2.10) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE

54) LOSS OF Main Feedwater and the following systems or components (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3): RCS 3.8 8

14 (000055) (EPE

55) Station Blackout X

(000055) (EPE 55) Station Blackout (G2.1.23) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to perform general and/or normal operating procedures during any plant condition (CFR: 41.10 /

43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6) 4.3 9

15 (000056) (APE

56) Loss of Offsite Power X

(000056AK1.06) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to (APE 56) Loss of Offsite Power (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8): Under voltage/degraded voltage effects on electrical loads 3.7 10 16 (000057) (APE

57) Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus X

(000057AA2.04) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 57) LOSS OF VITAL AC ELECTRICAL NSTRUMENT BUS (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13):

ESF system panel alarm annunciators and channel status 3.6 11 17 (000058) (APE

58) Loss of DC Power X

(000058AA2.02) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 58) LOSS OF DC Power (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13): 125-V DC bus voltage 3.6 12 18 (000062) (APE

62) Loss of Nuclear Service Water X

(000062AK3.02) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to (APE 62) LOSS OF SERVICE WATER (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13): The automatic actions (alignments) within the service water resulting from the actuation of the ESFAS 3.9 13 19 (000065) (APE

65) Loss of Instrument Air X

(000065AK1.03) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to (APE 65) LOSS OF Instrument Air (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8): Failure modes of air-operated equipment 3.7 14 20 (000077) (APE

77) Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances X

(000077AA2.08) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 77) GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRIC Grid Disturbances (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /

45.13): Criteria to trip the turbine or reactor 4.2 15 21 (W E04) LOCA Outside Containment X

(W E04) LOCA Outside Containment (G2.2.2) EQUIPMENT CONTROL: Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels (CFR: 41.6 / 41.7 / 45.2) 4.6 16 22 (W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation X

(WE11EA1.04) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to (W E11) LOSS OF EMERGENCY Coolant Recirculation (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8): ESFAS 3.9 17 23 (W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation X

(W E11) Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation (G2.1.39) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Knowledge of conservative decision-making practices (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5

/ 45.12) 4.3 81 24 (BW E04; W E05)

Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink X

(WE05EA1.14) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to (W E05) Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (CFR:

41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8): RHRS 3.2 18 K/A Category Totals:

3 2

3 3

7 6

Group Point Total:

18/6

ES-4.1-PWR Shearon Harris Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO/SRO)

Item E/APE # / Name /

Safety Function K

1 K

2 K

3 A

1 A

2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR Q#

25 (000003) (APE 3)

Dropped Control Rod X

(000003AA1.09) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to (APE 3) DROPPED Control Rod (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8): NIS 3.8 19 000024 (APE 24)

Emergency Boration / 1 26 (000028) (APE

28) Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction X

(000028AK2.10) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE

28) PRESSURIZER (PZR) Level Control Malfunction and the following systems or components (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3):

Normal PZR level instrumentation 3.7 20 000032 (APE 32)

Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation /

7 27 (000033) (APE

33) Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation X

(000033AK2.03) Knowledge of the relationship between (APE

33) LOSS OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE Nuclear Instrumentation and the following systems or components (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3): RPS 3.8 21 28 (000036) (APE 36; BW/A08)

Fuel-Handling Incidents X

(000036AK1.05) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to (APE 36) FUEL HANDLING INCIDENTS (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8): Damage to irradiated fuel in the fuel storage building 3.7 22 29 (000037) (APE

37) Steam Generator Tube Leak X

(000037AK3.07) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses and/or actions as they apply to (APE 37) STEAM Generator Tube Leak (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13):

Actions contained in EOPs for S/G tube leak 4

23 30 (000051) (APE

51) Loss of Condenser Vacuum X

(000051) (APE 51) Loss of Condenser Vacuum (G2.3.14)

RADIATION CONTROL: Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities, such as analysis and interpretation of radiation and activity readings as they pertain to administrative, normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures or to analysis and interpretation of coolant activity, including comparison to emergency plan or regulatory limits (SRO Only) (CFR:

43.4 / 45.10) 3.8 82 000059 (APE 59)

Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release / 9 31 (000060) (APE

60) Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release X

(000060AA2.08) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 60) ACCIDENTAL GASEOUS Radwaste Release (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13):

TS and/or TRM actions for accidental release (as applicable) 3.8 83 000061 (APE 61)

Area Radiation Monitoring System Alarms /

7 000067 (APE 67)

Plant Fire On Site

/ 8

32 (000068) (APE 68; BW A06)

Control Room Evacuation X

(000068AA2.10) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 68) Control Room Evacuation (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13): Source range count rate 3.7 84 000069 (APE 69; W E14) Loss of Containment Integrity / 5 000074 (EPE 74; W E06 & E07)

Inadequate Core Cooling / 4 000076 (APE 76)

High Reactor Coolant Activity /

9 33 (000078) (APE 78*) RCS Leak X

(000078AA1.07) Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to (APE 78) REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8): Low-pressure SWS activity monitor 3.2 24 (W E01 & E02)

Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 (W E13) Steam Generator Overpressure / 4 34 (W E15)

Containment Flooding X

(W E15) Containment Flooding (G2.3.11) RADIATION CONTROL: Ability to control radiation releases (CFR:

41.11 / 43.4 / 45.10) 4.3 85 (W E16) High Containment Radiation /9 (BW A01) Plant Runback / 1 (BW A02 & A03)

Loss of NNI-X/Y/7 (BW A04) Turbine Trip / 4 (BW A05)

Emergency Diesel Actuation /

6 (BW A07)

Flooding / 8 (BW E03)

Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 35 (BW E08; W E03)

LOCA Cooldown Depressurization X

(BW E08; W E03) LOCA Cooldown - Depressurization (G2.1.37) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management (CFR: 41.1 / 41.5 / 41.10 / 43.6 / 45.6) 4.6 25 36 (BW E09; CE A13**; W E09 &

E10) Natural Circulation X

(WE10EA2.10) Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to (W E10) NATURAL CIRCULATION WITH STEAM VOID IN VESSEL WITH/WITHOUT THE RVLIS (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13): S/G level, pressure, and/or feedwater flow 3.5 26 (BW E13 & E14)

EOP Rules and Enclosures (CE A11**; W E08) RCS Overcooling -

Pressurized Thermal Shock /

4

(CE A16) Excess RCS Leakage / 2 (CE E09)

Functional Recovery (CE E13*) Loss of Forced Circulation /

LOOP / Blackout /

4 K/A Category Totals:

1 2

1 2

3 3

Group Point Total:

8/4

ES-4.1-PWR Shearon Harris Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

Item System / Name K

1 K

2 K

3 K

4 K

5 K

6 A

1 A

2 A

3 A

4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR Q#

37 (003) (SF4P RCP) REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SYSTEM X

(003A2.01) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF4P RCP) REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6):

Problems with RCP seals, especially seal leakoff rates 4

27 38 (004) (SF1; SF2 CVCS)

CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM X

(004K4.04) Knowledge of (SF1; SF2 CVCS) CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following (CFR: 41.7): Manual/automatic transfers of control 3.5 28 39 (004) (SF1; SF2 CVCS)

CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM X

(004) (SF1; SF2 CVCS)

CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (G2.2.12)

EQUIPMENT CONTROL:

Knowledge of surveillance procedures (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 /

45.13) 4.1 86 40 (005) (SF4P RHR) RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM X

(005A1.08) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the (SF4P RHR)

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.5 /

45.5): RHR temperature 3.7 29 41 (006) (SF2; SF3 ECCS)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM X

(006A1.08) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the (SF2; SF3 ECCS) EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5): ECCS temperatures 3.1 30 42 (006) (SF2; SF3 ECCS)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM X

(006K5.15) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (SF2; SF3 ECCS)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (CFR: 41.5 / 45.3):

ECCS piping gas accumulation 3.5 31 43 (007) (SF5 PRTS)

PRESSURIZER RELIEF/QUENC H TANK SYSTEM X

(007K4.04) Knowledge of (SF5 PRTS) PRESSURIZER RELIEF/QUENCH TANK SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following (CFR:

41.7):PRT/quench tank rupture disk 3.7 32

44 (007) (SF5 PRTS)

PRESSURIZER RELIEF/QUENC H TANK SYSTEM X

(007) (SF5 PRTS)

PRESSURIZER RELIEF/QUENCH TANK SYSTEM (G2.4.5) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN:

Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures network for normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 4.3 87 45 (008) (SF8 CCW)

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM X

(008A2.02) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF8 CCW) COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6):

High/low surge tank level 3.8 33 46 (008) (SF8 CCW)

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM X

(008A2.07) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF8 CCW) COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR:

41.5 / 45.6): Consequences of high/low CCW flow rates 3.1 88 47 (010) (SF3 PZR PCS)

PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM (010) (SF3 PZR PCS)

PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM (191002K1.11) SENSORS AND DETECTORS (CFR: 41.7):

(PRESSURE) Effects of operating environment (pressure, temperature, and/or radiation) 3 34 48 (010) (SF3 PZR PCS)

PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM X

(010K2.01) Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following (CFR: 41.7): (SF3 PZR PCS) PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM PZR heaters 3.4 35 49 (012) (SF7 RPS)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM X

(012A4.05) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF7 RPS) REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM in the control room (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8):

Channel defeat controls 3.8 36 50 (013) (SF2 ESFAS)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM X

(013A1.13) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the (SF2 ESFAS)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.5 /

45.5): ECCS flow 4.1 37 X

51 (013) (SF2 ESFAS)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM X

(013K6.06) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the (SF2 ESFAS) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM (CFR:

41.7 / 45.7): IAS 3.0 38 52 (022) (SF5 CCS)

CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM X

(022A3.01) Ability to monitor automatic features of the (SF5 CCS) CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.7 /

45.7): Initiation of ESFAS mode of operation 4.2 39 53 (022) (SF5 CCS)

CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM X

(022K2.02) Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following (CFR: 41.7): (SF5 CCS)

CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM Chillers 2.8 40 025 (SF5 ICE)

ICE CONDENSER SYSTEM 54 (026) (SF5 CSS)

CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM X

(026K4.08) Knowledge of (SF5 CSS) CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following (CFR: 41.7): Automatic features of the CSS valves that provide injection and/or recirculation 3.9 41 55 (039) (SF4S MSS) MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM X

(039) (SF4S MSS) MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM (G2.4.6) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN:

Knowledge of emergency and abnormal operating procedures major action categories (CFR:

41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 3.7 42 053 (SF1; SF4P ICS*)

INTEGRATED CONTROL SYSTEM 56 (059) (SF4S MFW) MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM X

(059K6.12) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the (SF4S MFW) MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM (CFR:

41.7 / 45.7): S/G controller logic for MFW regulating valve 3.6 43 57 (061) (SF4S AFW) AUXILIARY

/ EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM X

(061K5.06) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (SF4S AFW)

AUXILIARY/EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM (CFR:

41.5 / 45.3): Natural circulation flow 3.8 44

58 (062) (SF6 ED AC) AC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM X

(062K3.02) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SF6 ED AC) AC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters (CFR: 41.7 / 45.4):

EDG 4.4 45 59 (063) (SF6 ED DC) DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM X

(063A3.03) Ability to monitor automatic features of the (SF6 ED DC) DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7):

Inverter swap to backup 3.3 46 60 (063) (SF6 ED DC) DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM X

(063A4.02) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF6 ED DC) DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM in the control room (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8): Load shedding 3.6 47 61 (064) (SF6 EDG)

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEM X

(064A3.06) Ability to monitor automatic features of the (SF6 EDG) EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7): Stop 3.6 48 62 (073) (SF7 PRM)

PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM X

(073K1.04) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the (SF7 PRM)

PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM and the following systems (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8): S/GB 3.4 49 63 (073) (SF7 PRM)

PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM X

(073A2.01) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF7 PRM) PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6): PRM component failures 3.1 89 64 (076) (SF4S SW)

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM X

(076A4.02) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF4S SW) SERVICE WATER SYSTEM in the control room (CFR: 41.7 /

45.5 to 45.8): Valves 3.7 50 65 (076) (SF4S SW)

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM X

(076) (SF4S SW) SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (G2.1.23)

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS:

Ability to perform general and/or normal operating procedures during any plant condition (CFR:

41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6) 4.3 51

66 (078) (SF8 IAS)

INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM X

(078K1.02) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the (SF8 IAS)

INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM and the following systems (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8): Station air system 3.1 52 67 (078) (SF8 IAS)

INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM X

(078K2.01) Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following (CFR: 41.7): (SF8 IAS)

INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM Instrument air compressor 3.3 53 68 (103) (SF5 CNT)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEM X

(103K3.04) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SF5 CNT) CONTAINMENT SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters (CFR: 41.7 / 45.4):

Shield building vent system 3

54 69 (103) (SF5 CNT)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEM X

(103A2.08) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF5 CNT) CONTAINMENT SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6): CPS malfunctions 3.1 90 K/A Category Totals:

2 3

2 3

2 2

3 5

3 3

5 Group Point Total:

28/5

ES-4.1-PWR Shearon Harris Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 2/Group 2 (RO/SRO)

Item System / Name K

1 K

2 K

3 K

4 K

5 K

6 A

1 A

2 A

3 A

4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR Q#

70 (001) (SF1 CRDS)

CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM X

(001A3.09) Ability to monitor automatic features of the (SF1 CRDS) CONTROL ROD DRIVE SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.7 /

45.7): Rod speed and direction 4

55 71 (002) (SF2; SF4P RCS) REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM X

(002) (SF2; SF4P RCS)

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (G2.1.8) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to coordinate personnel activities outside the control room (CFR:

41.10 / 43.1 / 45.5 / 45.12 /

45.13) 3.4 56 011 (SF2 PZR LCS)

PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM 72 (014) (SF1 RPI)

ROD POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM X

(014A2.03) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF1 RPI) ROD POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR:

41.5 / 45.6): Dropped rod 4

57 015 (SF7 NI)

NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTAT ION SYSTEM 73 (016) (SF7 NNI)

NONNUCLEAR INSTRUMENTAT ION SYSTEM X

(016A2.02) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF7 NNI) NONNUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations (CFR:

41.5 / 45.6): Loss of power supply 3.3 91 74 (017) (SF7 ITM)

IN CORE TEMPERATURE MONITOR SYSTEM X

(017K3.02) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SF7 ITM) IN CORE TEMPERATURE MONITOR SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters (CFR: 41.7 / 45.4):

Plant computer 3.2 58 027 (SF5 CIRS)

CONTAINMENT IODINE REMOVAL SYSTEM 028 (SF5 HRPS)

HYDROGEN RECOMBINER AND PURGE CONTROL SYSTEM

75 (029) (SF8 CPS)

CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM X

(029A4.05) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF8 CPS) CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM in the control room (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8):

Manual isolation of the CPS 3.1 59 033 (SF8 SFPCS)

SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM 76 (034) (SF8 FHS)

FUEL HANDLING EQUIPMENT SYSTEM X

(034K6.07) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the (SF8 FHS)

FUEL HANDLING EQUIPMENT SYSTEM (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7):

RHRS 2.7 92 035 (SF4P SG)

STEAM GENERATOR SYSTEM 77 (041) (SF4S SDS) STEAM DUMP/TURBINE BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM X

(041K5.07) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (SF4S SDS) STEAM DUMP/TURBINE BYPASS CONTROL SYSTEM (CFR: 41.5

/ 45.3): Reactivity feedback effects 3.9 60 045 (SF4S MTG)

MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR SYSTEM 050 (SF9 CRV*)

CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION 78 (055) (SF4S CARS)

CONDENSER AIR REMOVAL SYSTEM X

(055K1.04) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the (SF4S CARS)

CONDENSER AIR REMOVAL SYSTEM and the following systems (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8): S/G 2.8 61 056 (SF4S CDS)

CONDENSATE SYSTEM 79 (068) (SF9 LRS)

LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEM X

(068A1.03) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the (SF9 LRS)

LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEM, including (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5): LRS discharge rate 3.1 62

80 (071) (SF9 WGS)

WASTE GAS DISPOSAL SYSTEM X

(071K6.01) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the (SF9 WGS) WASTE GAS DISPOSAL SYSTEM (CFR: 41.7

/ 45.7): Waste gas discharge release valve 3.2 63 072 (SF7 ARM)

AREA RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM 81

  6) &: 

&,5&8/$7,1*

$7(56<67(0 X

4

93 079 (SF8 SAS**)

STATION AIR SYSTEM 086 (SF8 FPS)

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM K/A Category Totals:

1 0

1 0

1 2

1 2

1 1

2 Group Point Total:

9/3

(6)$50)$5($5$',$7,21

021,725,1*6<67(0  

.QRZOHGJHRISUHDQGSRVW

PDLQWHQDQFHRSHUDELOLW\\

UHTXLUHPHQWV &)5

Form 4.1-COMMON Common Examination Outline ES-4.1-COMMON COMMON Examination Outline (Shearon Harris)

Facility:

Shearon Harris Date of Exam:

09/19/2022 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) (RO/SRO)

Category K/A #

Topic RO SRO-Only Item #

IR Q#

IR Q#

1.

Conduct of Operations G2.1.3 2

(G2.1.32) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to explain and apply system precautions, limitations, notes, or cautions (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12) 82 4

95 G2.1.6 (G2.1.6) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to manage the control room crew during plant transients (SRO Only) (CFR:

43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13) 83 4.8 94 G2.1.4 3

(G2.1.43) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to use an online power distribution monitoring system and/or procedures to determine the effects on reactivity of plant changes, such as RCS temperature, secondary plant, or fuel depletion 84 4.1 64 G2.1.4 6

(G2.1.46) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS: Ability to use integrated control systems to operate plant systems or components (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13) 85 4

65 Subtotal N/A 2

N/A 2

2.

Equipment Control G2.2.3 5

(G2.2.35) EQUIPMENT CONTROL: Ability to determine TS for mode of operation (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13) 86 3.6 66 G2.2.4 0

(G2.2.40) EQUIPMENT CONTROL: Ability to apply TS with action statements of less than or equal to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (CFR: 41.10 /

43.2 / 43.5 / 45.3) 87 3.4 67 G2.2.4 1

(G2.2.41) EQUIPMENT CONTROL: Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings (reference potential) (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13) 88 3.9 96 G2.2.2 3

(G2.2.23) EQUIPMENT CONTROL: Ability to track TS limiting conditions for operation (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 43.13 )

89 4.6 97 Subtotal N/A 2

N/A 2

3.

Radiation Control G2.3.5 (G2.3.5) RADIATION CONTROL: Ability to use RMSs, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms or personnel monitoring equipment (CFR: 41.11 / 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9) 90 2.9 68 G2.3.6 (G2.3.6) RADIATION CONTROL: Ability to approve liquid or gaseous release permits (CFR: 41.13 / 43.4 / 45.10) 91 3.8 98 Subtotal N/A 1

N/A 1

4.

Emergency Procedures /

Plan G2.4.2 0

(G2.4.20) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of the operational implications of emergency and abnormal operating procedures warnings, cautions, and notes (CFR:

41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 92 3.8 69 G2.4.1 4

(G2.4.14) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of general guidelines for emergency and abnormal operating procedures usage (CFR: 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13) 93 4.5 99 G2.4.5 2

(G2.4.52) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of the lines of authority during implementation of the emergency plan, emergency plan implementing procedures, emergency operating procedures, or severe accident guidelines (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) 94 4

100 Subtotal N/A 1

N/A 2

Tier 3 Point Total N/A 6

N/A 7

Form 4.1-COMMON Common Examination Outline ES-4.1-COMMON COMMON Examination Outline (Shearon Harris)

Facility:

Shearon Harris Date of Exam:

09/19/2022 Theory (Tier 4) (RO)

Category K/A #

Topic RO Item #

IR Q#

Reactor Theory 192002 (192002K1.10) NEUTRON LIFE CYCLE (CFR: 41.1): Define SDM 95 3.6 70 192007 (192007K1.04) FUEL DEPLETION AND BURNABLE POISONS (CFR: 41.1): Describe how and why boron concentration changes over core life 96 3.4 71 192008 (192008K1.15) REACTOR OPERATIONAL PHYSICS (CFR:

41.1): (INTERMEDIATE RANGE OPERATION) Explain characteristics to look for when the POAH is reached 97 3.4 72 Subtotal N/A 3

Thermodynamic s

193004 (193004K1.15) THERMODYNAMIC PROCESS (CFR: 41.14):

(THROTTLING AND THE THROTTLING PROCESS) Determine the exit conditions for a throttling process based on the use of steam and/or water 98 2.8 73 193007 (193007K1.06) HEAT TRANSFER (CFR: 41.14): Explain methods of calculating core thermal power 99 3.3 74 193009 (193009K1.09) CORE THERMAL LIMITS (CFR: 41.14):

Describe the effects of quadrant power tilt (symmetric offset),

including long-range effects 100 3.2 75 Subtotal N/A 3

Tier 4 Point Total N/A 6

Form 2.3-5 Written Examination Review Worksheet Q#

1.

LOK (F/H)

2.

LOD (1-5)

3. Psychometric Flaws
4. Job Content Flaws
5. K/A Use Flaws
6. Source (B/M/N)
7. Status (U/E/S)
8. Explanation Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred.

Dist.

Partial Job Link Minutia

  1. /Units Logic Q-K/A License Level Generic Comments:

Please submit questions for draft review with a stand alone exam file (without answers selected on the question page or without the KA, basically a format that is like we provide to the applicants)

Early submittal did not have LOK on the pedigree page - Question Cognitive Level, please include for draft submittal, I see that they are in the question title, this may be okay but would like to discuss Bold-early submittal Form 2.3-4 did not identify item 5 for how duplication was handled for the audit - Corrected 1

H

>1, <5 B

S Ensure background document does not allow for temperature rise to be a partially correct answer Validated per the WOG background document for ES-1.2. Minimum subcooling criteria is established to account for the expected reduction in RCS pressure after one CSIP is stopped.

2 H

>1, <5 B

S 3

H

>1, <5 B

S 4

H

>1, <5 B

S 5

H

>1, <5 B

S 6

L

>1, <5 B

S Bank 2003 Catawba 7

L

>1, <5 N

S The RNO for starting the B RCP if it does not work also states to start RCPs A AND C Correct as stated per the step 34.e RNO.

8 H

>1, <5 N

E S

Concern for bounding of 5 degF as correct answer, since 2 is within that band.

Possible fix - the AOP directs it just needs to have an overt link to the procedure Linked to the AOP 9

H

>1, <5 B

E Is bullet 2 in the stem controller setpoint the same as the item discussed in choice D?

S Yes, This is the same item.

B is incorrect because the valves are already full open?

Yes. These valves are normally full open at power since they do not receive auto open signals upon actuation unlike the MDAFW pump FCVs which do.

C be more specific suggest: Open one (1) SG PORV to lower SG pressure to Less Than 500 PSIG Added 500 psig to C distractor along with expected SG pressures of 1100 psig to stem. Re-ordered choices shortest to longest.

Question modified, SAT 10 H

>1, <5 B

E S

There is not a direct tie to 84% and 557 in the procedure.

Suggest:

removing last bullet in the stem remove : to maintain 557degF Removed last bullet in stem. Reworded question to ask what the required SG PORV controller setpoint is to maintain SG pressure 1092 psig and which SG PORVs are initially available for dumping steam.

Testing same concepts but more in line with the direction provided in ES-0.1.

Question modified, SAT 11 H

>1, <5 N

S 12 L

>1, <5 B

E S

Clarify where the low DC volt alarm is Question now reads:

A Low DC Volt alarm on Battery Charger 1B-SA...

Question modified, SAT 13 L

XXX X

B U

A,C,D all seem to be partially correct answers, the bounding of major concern does not seem to clarify Replaced with BANK question which matches K/A.

Question asks position of SW orifice bypass isolation valves following an SI actuation and the reason per the step deviation and design basis documents for the SW booster pumps

S starting along with the repositioning of these valves.

Interplay between the question concept makes choices B and C not credible Either 1, or 2 without the other part is fine, but combined the interplay is the issue Replaced part 2 to alleviate interplay issue.

Changed question origin to MODIFIED.

Question modified, SAT 14 L

>1, <5 N

S 15 H

>1,,5 B

S 16 H

>1, <5 B

S 17 H

>1, <5 B

S 18 H

>1, <5 X

N E

S Should, is a weak distractor.

Suggest are are NOT required to be stopped Question revised per the suggestion above.

Question modified, SAT 19 H

>1, <5 SMB S

B: Comanche Peak 2012 modified 20 H

>1, <5 SMB S

B: NA 2009 modified 21 H

>1, <5 N

S 22 L

>1, <5 X

N E

S (1)

Storage location for both choices is safe, partially correct, but modified with Preferred as used in the procedure Suggest just asking if the upender is /is NOT a safe storage location Revised per the suggestion above. Part 1 of question now tests whether or not the upender is a safe storage location per AOP-013 for the damage fuel assembly.

Question modified, SAT

23 L

>1, <5 B

S 24 H

>1, <5 B

S SAT 25 L

>1, <5 X

B E

S A(2) there is no bounding on the duration of the cooldown Suggest the sample will be complete by XXXX such that the xenon is accounted for in that window of time only Stated in the stem that the samples for RCS boron concentration are expected to be completed within the next 30 minutes. Given the LOCA occurred last hour, this will bound the xenon transient to a period where it will be increasing during the RCS cooldown until RCS boron concentration is known.

Question modified, SAT 26 H

>1, <5 B

S 27 H

>1, <5 X

X B

U S

Distractors C/D are weak.

Could also be seen as a collection of true and false statements Suggest: ask (1) the reactor is / is NOT required to be tripped.

If the #1 seal were FAILED, the RCP will be secured before or after implementing E-0.

Revised per the suggestion above.

Question modified, SAT 28 L

>1, <5 B

S Harris 2018 29 H

>1, <5 B

S 30 H

>1, <5 B

S 31 H

>1, <5 B

S 32 H

>1, <5 B

S 33 H

>1, <5 N

S 34 H

>1, <5 N

S

35 L

>1, <5 N

S 36 L

>1, <5 N

S 37 H

>1, <5 B

S 38 L

>1, <5 N

S 39 L

>1, <5 B

S Harris 2018 40 L

>1, <5 B

S 41 H

>1, <5 X

B E

S B(2) C(2) interplay, non credible distractors Replaced part 2 of question with RWST level when automatic alignment of the Containment Spray system will occur. This alleviates the interplay issue. Changed origin from BANK to MODIFIED with introduction of a new knowledge element (RWST low-low level).

Question modified Add the units for (2) %

Added % (units) to part 2.

Question modified, SAT 42 H

>1, <5 N

E S

Concern this question could/does teach, other questions (when presented with the whole exam), the question is SAT in isolation Suggest asking if choice B / D do or do not cause a Rx trip, this removes Lpzr and Pressure from answer choices Questions modified and SAT on Draft 43 H

>1, <5 B

S 44 H

>1, <5 X

B E

S Indications of Tavg are not in the stem, therefore B has low distractor credibility Added Tavg with trend to stem and re-formatted to provide all RCS temperatures and trends in one location.

Question modified SAT

45 H

>1, <5 B

S 46 H

>1, <5 B

S 47 L

>1, <5 N

S 48 H

>1, <5 B

S 49 L

>1, <5 N

S 50 H

>1, <5 B

S 51 L

>1, <5 N

S 52 L

>1, <5 B

S Harris 2018 53 L

>1, <5 N

S 54 H

>1, <5 B

S 55 H

>1, <5 N

S The instrument photo is a reference, is the instrument on the same page as the question sufficiently easy to read, comparable in size to the real instrument in the control room?

Created separate document of instrument to provide candidates. Noted this a reference provided.

56 L

>1, <5 B

S 57 H

>1, <5 N

S The instrument photo is a reference Created separate document of instrument to provide candidates. Noted this a reference provided.

58 H

>1, <5 B

S 59 L

>1, <5 N

S 60 H

>1, <5 B

S Seabrook 2013 61 L

>1, <5 N

S

62 L

>1, <5 N

S 63 L

>1, <5 P - B S

Harris 2020 (last 2) 64 L

>1, <5 N

S 65 L

>1, <5 B

S McGuire 2020 66 L

>1, <5 SMB S

Modified from 2018 Harris NEW question developed to alleviate overlap issue with SRO Q92.

Overlap issue with 36, can we remove from RCS temo from Q36?, otherwise the new question is SAT RCS temperature removed from Q36.

67 L

>1, <5 SMB S

Modified from 2018 Harris 68 L

>1, <5 N

S 69 L

>1, <5 X

N U

S Tier 3, plant wide generic, the presented question is focused on a very specific emergency evolution, not a plant wide generic concept. For example what are /

notes / cautions used for IAW EOP rules of usage Facility submitted new question, SAT 70 L

>1, <5 B

S NRC GFE P127 Per subsequent discussion with Chief Examiner, NEW question developed to examine HNP specific Tech Spec definition of Shutdown Margin.

Question changed SAT 71 L

>1, <5 B

S Curve is site specific NRC GFE P1563 72 L

>1, <5 B

S NRC GFE P569 73 H

>1, <5 B

S NRC GFE P337 74 L

>1, <5 B

S NRC GFE P5044 75 H

>1, <5 N

S SAT

SRO 76 L

>1, <5 B

S Harris 2018 77 H

>1, <5 X

B E

S With RWST level not below /at the transfer point, the applicants are given more then 1 way to get the correct answer, this reduces the discriminatory value of EOP-ES-1.3 as a distractor Suggest: phrasing the ES1.3 transition such that when level reaches the required level, the procedure would be implemented. (however given the other information evaluated that would not be the correct procedure)

Replaced transition to ES-1.3 with remain in E-1 and brief the transfer to cold leg recirculation.

Revising the MCB indications provided such that at least one train of RHR is available for cold leg recirculation would make this distractor correct.

Question modified SAT 78 H

>1, <5 N

S 79 H

>1, <5 B

S SAT, could be called High Cog for the procedure selection understanding 80 L

>1, <5 B

S 81 H

>1, <5 B

S 82 H

>1, <5 N

S 83 H

>1, <5 B

S 84 L

>1, <5 X

X B

U 2 issues,

1) time is not provided or a cue for establishing safety functions, the SAE criteria
2) use of the word Minimum in the EAL call, the applicant must identify the HIGHEST EAL level for the event, or the way the question is framed this is negative training.

Add a note: do not use ED judgement distractor analysis also discusses partial correct answer

S Replaced EAL call with time critical action for transferring controls from the MCB to the ACP.

This is required per NFP-805 which meets 10 CFR Part 55 Content - 43(b)(1), Conditions and Limitations in the Facility License. CFR Part 55 Content - 43(b)(5) would also apply as the question cannot be answered solely from systems knowledge, knowing immediate operator actions, knowing entry conditions for the AOP, or knowing the purpose, overall sequence of events, or overall mitigating strategy of the procedure. Coded cog level LOW.

Question modified SAT 85 L

>1, <5 B

S 86 H

>1, <5 N

S 87 H

>1, <5 N

S 88 H

>1, <5 N

S 89 H

>1, <5 N

S 90 H

>1, <5 N

S 91 H

>1, <5 N

E S

Suggest asking something to the effect of what the HIGHEST mode the plant can be in IAW TSs if the maintenance is completed at 15 hrs This would still hit SRO level with required actions of the spec There is currently a time and interplay issue with (2) for the answer choices Facility modified the question, SAT 92 H

>1, <5 N

E S

E due to Overlap for Q66, 140deg F is the correct answer for both Suggest modifying Q66 for another mode 3 or 4, do not have 140 as a distractor Replaced RO Q66 with new question to alleviate overlap issue.

Question 66 modified, overlap issue resolved, SAT 93 L

>1, <5 N

S

94 H

>1, <5 M

S Ginna 2017 95 L

>1, <5 N

S 96 H

>1, <5 N

S 97 H

>1, <5 B

S 98 L

>1, <5 N

S 99 H

>1, <5 B NRC S

P:Harris 2020 100 L

>1, <5 B

S Form 2.3-4, method of audit exam control was not documented on the draft submittal

Form 2.3-5 Instructions for Written Examination Review Worksheet Refer to ES-4.2 for the definitions of terms used in this worksheet for the written examination.

Review each question (Q) as submitted and as subsequently revised and document the following in the associated worksheet columns:

1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) from 1 (easy) to 5 (difficult); mark direct lookup questions (applicant can directly determine the answer from the provided reference) as LOD 1. A question is (U)nsatisfactory if it is LOD 1 or LOD 5.
3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:

Stem Focus: The stem lacks enough focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

Cues: The stem or one or more answer choices contains cues (e.g., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

T/F: All of the answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements. This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

Cred. Dist.: The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors require (E)nhancement, and more than one noncredible distractor in the same question results in an (U)satisfactory question.

Partial: One or more distractors are partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by the stem). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

4. Check the appropriate box if a job content flaw is identified:

Job Link: The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid knowledge or ability (K/A) but, as written, is not operational in content). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

Minutia: The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed-reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

  1. /Units: The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons). This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

Logic: The question requires backward or reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements. This is an (U)nsatisfactory question.

5. Check the first box if a K/A mismatch flaw exists. Check the second box if the question is flawed because it is written at the wrong license level. Either condition results in an (U)nsatisfactory question.
6. Enter the questions source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Verify that (M)odified questions meet the criteria of ES-4.2.
7. Based on the review performed in steps 2-5, mark the question as (U)nsatisfactory, in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory.
8. Fully explain the reason for any (U) in column 7 (e.g., how the psychometric attributes are not being met).
9. Save the initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound question is marked by an (S) on this form.