ML20055E226

Exam Rept 50-454/OL-90-01 for Units 1 & 2 on 900528 & 0604. Exam Results:One Senior Reactor Operator Failed JPM Portion of Exam & Two Crews Failed Simulator Exams

ML20055E226
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	07/02/1990
From:	Burdick T, Damon D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20055E218	List: ML20055E217 ML20055E226
References
50-454-OL-90-01, 50-454-OL-90-1, NUDOCS 9007110181
Download: ML20055E226 (9)

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U.S.= NUCLEAR-REGULATORY COMMISSION

-REGION 111'-  ?!

Report No. 50-454/0L-90-01 p Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455 Licenses No. NPF-37; NPF-66 i Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company 1 o Post Office Box 767  ;

Chicago, IL .60690 l

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Facility Name: Byron Nuclear Power Station;

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[ Exaniination Administered At: Braidwood, IL and Byron, ~1L- l 1

' Examination Conducted: During the weeks of May 28 and June 4,1990

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' Chief Examiner: / -7 7 *)0 s D. D/. Damon Date  !

Approved Sy:/ Yh/ . 7/dhe. A T.: M. Burdick Da~te'

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Examination

Summary q Examination administered during the weeks of May 28 and June 4,1990 1

(Report No.- 50-454/0L-90-01)).- Written and. operating:requalification exams. 1 were-administered to 8. Reactor Operators and 15 Senior Reactor Operators l

coniprising"four ' operating crews and two staff crews.' .

Results: One Senior: Reactor' Operator failed the JPM portion of the . >

• f , examinations. Two crews' failed the simulator examinations. All other zindividuals.and crews. passed the' examinations.- -

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V REPORT DETAILS' 1 i

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E'xaminers

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~*D. Damon:

,, :K.'Faris?  !

0t Nickolaus }

R N. Maguire-Moffitt 4 1

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-2. Exit Meeting 1 N t M' 'On June 5; 1990,.the Chief' Examiner met with' members'of the Production Training- j p  ; Center staff-to discuss. items relating to simulator fidelity. ~The:following (

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K. D. Gerling, Simulator-Superv'isor, PTC 1> '

T. M. Chasensky, Senior Instructor, PTC - '!

M.;G.Olsen, Principal: Instructor,PTC i L.LE. Davis, Director - Operations Training, PTC g* D.- J. Damon, Chief: Examiner,. NRC s[

LTheLfollowing simulator fidelity; items were discussed: ,

g j w lduring one scenario,--the S1 reset switch. failed.- PTC personnel cleaned >  ;

the; switch contacts which resolved this-item, g n

-lwithione.faul.ted steam generator blowing down, all-other steam generator .,

pressures decreased as:esresult of the primary cooldown. This-modeling- -l

, 'was. called into; question by,the-NRCl examiners.. PTC personnel have;. i y 1

. agree d tolresearch:this matter, a'ndLeorrect the modeling,1f required. _,

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--at 100%' power,-a 40!gpm steam generator _ tube' leak was observable-on:the ti main feedwater strip charts. Based on the magnitude of the feedwater j m

4 flow to' leak rate,(this leak should-not be observable-.on the strip; chart.

PTC personne1'have_ agreed to correct'thisiitem. '

4 y* v > - during scenar_ios; involving'an ATWS cvent, iconics disp _ lay and RM-11 ]

( > 1 updates.are initially disabled. This21s a."real. time" simulation concern. tPTC. personnel explained that this item will:be. resolved with

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the: installation of a new. computer system for the simulator. ,

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=with i Auxiliary Feedwater throttle valves set to low?valu'es, auxiliary ,

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feedwater flow oscillates between 0 gpm and'50 gpm. ^This oscillation 1 1 4 continues to occur with up_to-12% demand on the throttle valves. PTC t W personnel have agreed to research this' item for possible'modeling

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kl7 h 3K L0n June 8i1990, memtiers of the, examination team met with members ^of the l B 'i 4 ,

facility staff;to discuss the examination process. The following persons were

.present.at;the meeting:

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F / ,K.LGraesser, General. Manager PWR-;0perations, Ceco  !

e Ri: Pleniewicz, Byron Station Manager, Ceco .!

y . A. Chernick,' Byron Training Supervisor', CECO 3

-E J. Kudalis, ~ Byron Services -Director, CECO

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O - G.; Schwartz, Byron Production Superintendent, . CECO e A;'Britton,N.Q.P,: Ceco- -

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J DL Brindle,LByron Admin Operations' Engineer, CECO .l p,  : D; Popkins, Byron Simulator. Supervisor,; CECO [

f L. Bunner, Byron Training,' Ceco b 4 -Ri-Kolo,LPTC Simulator Instructor, CECO 1' Ma

.L. Da_vis, PTC Director Operations Training,. Ceco

10. Damon,-Chief Examiner,~NRC r y :K. Faris, Examiner...NRC: }

g l' N4Maguire-Moffitt, Examiner, NRC; "

y3 "Ji'Nickolaus, Examiner,.NRC. j w  ;

h *a (Duringthe;meetingithefollowingitemswerebroughtupfordiscussion:  ;

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a. Final facility results and preliminary NRC results.for the

examinations were given. The results were as follows: ->

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~ Facility NRC >

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1 Crew 11- Pass  : Pass 4 Crew 2 , Pass Pass?

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Crew 3- Pass Pass l

Crew 4: Pass'. Fail m Crew.5 Fail Fail- 3 g, W  :; Crew ~ 6 . .

Pass . -Pass i Kb Individual Simulator ;All Pass: All Pass

• db' JJPM' Question All: Pass- .A11cPass w JPM.Walkthrough- 1 Fail 1 Fail ~ l 22 Pass 22' Pass j i

a h% For' the crews that failed the NRC grading-for simulator scenarios,. the' a Lfacility-was- asked to remove the' crews: from shif t duties until .  ;

- remedial action has been' completed. The facilityLagreed to remediate 4 , the crews in question.:

,s 4 t b .; . Crew weaknesses were. discussed. The weaknesses included:

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(1) crews 'were generally reluctant to enter: procedure BEP-3 on- .

j indication of a, steam generator tube _ rupture unless a radiation

• w ' 4 monitor was'in an alarm condition.to confirm the diagnosis.

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(2) crews were generally reluctantt to terminate auxiliary, feedwater -d

flow toca steam generator with indicated level'in the narrow 4- range, in accordance with various steps Lin the emergency J h procedures. In some cases .this resulted in feeding steam . -1 e , generators to obove the range specified in the emergency 3 procedures. The facility explained that the reason tv  ;

maintaining auxiliary feedwater flow was th'at' crewt u.

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concern about maintaining adequate flow to cool ths auxi i a-feedwater pumps, and that terminating flow may resu d ia p. e

n. damage if the auxiliary feedwater system recirculation f.c%r . [

does not function properly.

% .(3) there was a discussion between NRC and facility evaiuttors:as to- i the definition of " uncontrolled depressurization of all steam ,1 generators" during a decision point in the emergency procedures.. i The facility maintained that tie RCS cooldown and'resulting

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depressurization of' intact steam generators with-one faulted steam generator blowing down constituted uncontrolled ,

depressurization of.all steam generators. One crew determined that a transition based on uncontrolled depressurization was warranted in this case, while two other crews did not. The NRC i examination-team explained that the same methodology must be  !

i used by all crews to determine transition points in the emergency t procedures. The. f acility evaluators -did 'not agree. The facility is asked.to provide to the NRC guidance on how they train.and evaluate the operators on " uncontrolled depressurization of all' steam generators" so that future examinations may-be graded ,

< consistently between NRC and facility evaluators. -l

'i Ec. Simulator.; fidelity items were' discussed. These items were identical ,

t ito those discussed in the June 5 meeting. 4 l

t .d. l Performance of facility evaluators was discussed. Facility evaluators. .t were considered satisfactory, although weaknesses were observed..

' Specific' items are describedsin paragraph 3.e. 4 Program Evaluation 4 33 x

Reference Materials ai

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h Reference materials and test items submitted by the facility for NRC 4 review were considered satisfactory. The facility explained that a feedback mechanism has been employed to make improvements in the  ;

4 materials based on lessons learned from the Braidwood and Zion requalification examinations. The utility is encouraged to continue this practice.

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During the review week..there was. discussion between.the NRC and the

[i, , , facility-evaluators concerning the-definition of-an Individual O - Simulator Critical Task (ISCT) during simulator scenarios. The.

N  : facility had intended to implement a definition of ISCT as provided by NUMARC and considered for inclusion-into Revision 6 of HUREC 1021.

llowever, the NRC had not yr agreed to implement the change. The facility is urged to- keep clot e contact with the NRC regarding changes to the_ exam process before implementing the changes for NRC administered exams,

b. Simulator-Evaluations Facility evaluators generally made observations and decisions that were consistent with the' corresponding NRC observations and. decisions.

5 There was one instance.of facility evaluators not adequately documenting the non-performance of an ISCT.-'This instance is explained further in paragraph 3.e.

P There was'one . instance of facility evaluators passing a crew, while the NRC evaluators failed the same crew. Specifically, with one s steam generator faulted, the other steam generators depressurized

.due to the RCS cooldown through the faulted steam generator. The;SR0 misdiagnosed the cause.of the depressurization of the intact steam generators,. and transitioned f rom BEP-2, " Faulted Steam Generator - l Isolation", to BCA-2.1, " Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam i Generators"., Owners Group background documents for the BCA-2.1. parent a procedure state'that entry into this procedure is limlted to the case  :

where all-steam generator pressure boundaries are not intact. In this '

case. 3 of 4 M m generator pressure boundaries were-intact. Prior  ?

to the transitic, c auxiliary feedwater flow to the faulted steam generator had been isolated. The SROLstated to the' crew that he would c exit.BCA-2.1 upon the-first indication that pressure was recovering 3 in one of the'non-faulted steam-generators. During the performance-of 1 BCA-2.1,-auxiliary feedwater flow'was re-initiated to the faulted i

. steam generator.' The consequences of this. action are possible 3 continued uncontrolled cooldown and depressurization of the RCS; and J possible degradation of the RCS aressure boundary, specifically the'  ;

steam generator tubes. During t1e re-initiation of auxiliary -  !

feedwater flow to the faulted steam generator, at least one crew 1 member questioned the wisdom of this action. The response from the SRO was to the effect that if the procedure required an action, the action must be performed, in a discussion after.the fact, the facility agreed with this view, t

. The NRC teom' evaluated the crew as unsatisfactory because of misdiagnosis of the event, which resulted in an inappropriate .,

control manipulation based on.the misdiagnosis. '

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The facility evaluators made the same observations as the NRC evaluators, and the f acility agreed on evaluation of the individuals associated with the crew. The facility also agreed that the crew in question required remediation before returning to shift duties.

Therefore, the f acility requalification program was not considered unsatisfactory per the criterion of NUREG 1021, ES-601.D.1.c(2)(c)1.

c. JPM Evaluations JPM grading by facility evaluators was generally consistent with HRC grading. There were two documented cases of f acility grading that was less conservative than the corresponding NRC grading.- One case involved a clerical oversight, which was corrected by the f acility.

The other involved a clear breakdown on the part of the facility evaluator when grading the answer on a JPM question. This was a single, isolated case,

d. Written Evaluations Facility grading of the written examinations was generally consistent with, or more conservative than the corresponding NRC grading,

e. Facility Evaluators During si'nulator scenarios, there were several instances of facility evaluators giving prompts. These prompts included items such as patting.an examinee on the shoulder when the evaluator considered the examinee's performance satisfactory; and carrying on a conversation with the examinee until the next event was inninent, at which time all conversation stopped. Facility evaluators must strive to maintain an

" arms length" approach to evaluation.

During the simulator scenarios, there was one instance of facility evaluators not adequately detecting and documenting the non-performance of a critical task. Facility evaluators based their observation on a single simulator indicator, whereas the NRC evaluators based their observation on multiple simulator indicators and on examinee behavior and verbali:ations. Due-to the possible simulator modeling deficiency concerning auxiliary feedwater flow, the indicator chosen by the facility gave conflicting data from second to second. Facility evaluators must take advantage of all data and ino4cctors in' order to make a fully informed decision as to crew and individtal perfor aance.

During JPM examinations, there was one instance of a facility evaluator telling the examinee that he was going to be failed on that JPM. This was contrary to the statement read to the examinees before performance of the JPM's, when it was explained that the results of the examination would not be revealed to the examinee until all

% results had been compiled.

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4 y. .i L l 'During JPM examinationsb there were several instances of prompting by 1 0 1!:

• lthe facility evaluators. Examples-include: asking an-examinecito  :

, repeat a step if thetstep had been completed incorrectly; or'asking.' l i4 4an examinee to repeat the answer to a question if the answer given 3^

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was incorrtet. _Neither of- these examples are prompts.in' and of -

.themselves; however, these, practices must be used consistently

4 throughout the examinations in order to not be considered prompts.

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.There were two examples.of JPM grading where the facility made F

evaluation decisions that were less conservative-than-the; '

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-SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT.  :

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l Facility Licensee: Byron' l

.s a Facility Licensee Docket No. 50 454/455 l i

' Operating Tests Administered At:

Braidwood, IL j

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j I, ;During the. conduct of the simulator portion of the operating tests, the j following items were observed' '

,": -. ITEM ' DESCRIPTION -

1 During one scenario, the 51 reset switch failed. =

-l 2 With one faulted steam generator blowing down, RCS cooldown ,

. - results in all other steam generator pressures decreasing. ~!

Westinghouse claims that stratification in the steam generators l f, should result in pressure being maintained in the non-foulted t b steam generators. Modeling may be wrong for non-faulted steam f

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ll:. 3; At 100%' power, a 40 gpm steam generator tube leak is observed as a

, decrease in main feedwater flow. With the magnitude of feed flow 1 to tube! leak rate, this- decrease in feedwater flow should not be i observable. ,

j; 4' During.an ATWS situation, the_iconics display is initially disabled. 'i This is a "real time" concern. 4 C

i ~5- -During'an ATWS situation, the RM-11 radiation monitoring system is  !

g, 4 initially disabled._ This is a real ' time" concern.-  ;

6 With auxiliary feedwater flow control valves throttled shut... l auxiliary feedwater flow oscillates between 0 and 50 gpm.: This j 4 ' ' oscillation continues with up to approximately 12% demand on the 1 e throttle-valves.  :

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