ML21321A039

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Submittal of ANUH-01.0150, Standardized Advanced NUHOMS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 11, and 10 CFR 72.48 Summary Report for the Period 3/13/21 to 11/17/21
ML21321A039
Person / Time
Site: 07201029
Issue date: 11/17/2021
From: Narayanan P
Orano TN Americas
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Shared Package
ML21321A038 List:
References
E-58497
Download: ML21321A039 (125)
v • d • e


Text

November 17, 2021 E-58497 Orano TN 7160 Riverwood Drive Suite 200 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Columbia, MD 21046 Attn: Document Control Desk USA One White Flint North Tel: 410-910-6900 Fax: 434-260-8480 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

Subject:

ANUH-01.0150, Standardized Advanced NUHOMS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Revision 11, and 10 CFR 72.48 Summary Report for the Period 3/13/21 to 11/17/21, Docket 72-1029

Reference:

Letter from Prakash Narayanan to NRC Document Control Desk, ANUH-01.0150, Standardized Advanced NUHOMS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Revision 10, and 10 CFR 72.48 Summary Report for the Period 3/13/19 to 3/12/21, Docket 72-1029, March 12, 2021 (E-57630)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 72.248, TN Americas LLC (TN) has updated ANUH-01.0150, the Standardized Advanced NUHOMS UFSAR, last updated by the referenced submittal, and herewith submits UFSAR Revision 11 replacement pages for docketing. This update incorporates changes implemented by TN for the time period of 3/13/21 to 11/17/21.

The changed areas are marked as follows:

x New or changed pages show Rev. 11 and 11/21 in the header.

x Changed areas are indicated using single revision bars in the margin.

x Newly inserted text is shown by italics.

UFSAR Revision 10 was the current UFSAR when the CoC 1029 renewal was approved on October 27, 2021. UFSAR Revision 11 incorporates those UFSAR changes that were associated with the renewal of CoC 1029 Amendments 0, 1, 3, and 4 as well as changes implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 72.48. Changes made due to CoC 1029 renewal are annotated as such. All other changes are made under the 72.48 process.

I certify that this submittal accurately presents changes made since the referenced submittal.

Enclosures transmitted herein contain SUNSI. When separated from enclosures, this transmittal document is decontrolled.

E-58497 Document Control Desk Page 2 of 2 This submittal includes proprietary information, which may not be used for any purpose other than NRC staff use of the UFSAR. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Enclosure 1 provides an affidavit specifically requesting that this proprietary information be withheld from public disclosure. This submittal also includes security-related information, which should be withheld under 10 CFR 2.390. The Proprietary version of the UFSAR replacement pages is provided as . The public version of the UFSAR replacement pages is provided as Enclosure 3.

In addition, TN Americas LLC hereby submits a 10 CFR 72.48 summary report pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2). The last 10 CFR 72.48 summary report was provided in the referenced submittal. Enclosure 4 provides a brief description of changes, tests, and experiments, including a summary of the 10 CFR 72.48 evaluation of each change implemented from 3/13/21 to 11/17/21 for the Standardized Advanced NUHOMS System, including indication as to whether the evaluations had associated UFSAR changes that were incorporated into the UFSAR.

Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please do not hesitate to contact Mr.

Douglas Yates at 434-832-3101, or by email at Douglas.Yates@orano.group.

Prakash Narayanan Chief Technical Officer cc: Christian Jacobs (NRC DFM)

Enclosures:

1. Affidavit Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
2. Replacement Pages for ANUH-01.0150, Standardized Advanced NUHOMS UFSAR, Revision 11 (Proprietary Version)
3. Replacement Pages for ANUH-01.0150, Standardized Advanced NUHOMS UFSAR, Revision 11 (Public Version)
4. Report of 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations Performed for the Standardized Advanced NUHOMS System for the Period 3/13/21 to 11/17/21

Enclosure 1 to E-58497 AFFIDAVIT PURSUANT TO 10 CFR 2.390 TN Americas LLC )

State of Maryland ) SS.

County ofB_a~timore )

I, Prakash Narayanan, depose and say that I am a Vice President of TN Americas LLC, duly authorized to execute this affidavit, and have reviewed or caused to have reviewed the information which is identified as proprietary and referenced in the paragraph immediately below. I am submitting this affidavit in conformance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.390 of the Commission ' s regulations for withholding this information.

The information for which proprietary treatment is sought is contained in Enclosure 2 and is listed below:

I have personal knowledge of the criteria and procedures utilized by TN Americas LLC in designating information as a trade secret, privileged or as confidential commercial or financial information.

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b) (4) of Section 2.390 of the Commission ' s regulations, the following is furnished for consideration by the Commission in determining whether the information sought to be withheld from public disclosure, included in the above referenced document, should be withheld.

1) The information sought to be withheld from public disclosure involves portions of the updated final safety analysis report, related to the design of dry spent fuel storage systems, which are owned and have been held in confidence by TN Americas LLC.
2) The information is of a type customarily held in confidence by TN Americas LLC, and not customarily disclosed to the public. TN Americas LLC has a rational basis for determining the types of information customarily held in confidence by it.
3) Public disclosure of the information is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of TN Americas LLC, because the information consists of descriptions of the design of dry spent fuel storage systems, the application of which provide a competitive economic advantage. The availability of such information to competitors would enable them to modify their product to better compete with TN Americas LLC, take marketing or other actions to improve their product' s position or impair the position of TN Americas LLC's product, and avoid developing similar data and analyses in support of their processes, methods or apparatus.

Further the deponent sayeth not.

Prakash Narayanan Chief Technical Officer R

Subscribed and sworn before me this $ day of November, 2021.

My Commission Expires D 7 130 I Zol3 Page 1 of I

Enclosure 2 to E-58497 Replacement Pages for ANUH-01.0150, Standardized Advanced NUHOMS UFSAR, Revision 11 (Proprietary Version)

Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390

Enclosure 3 to E-58497 Replacement Pages for ANUH-01.0150, Standardized Advanced NUHOMS UFSAR, Revision 11 (Public Version)

ANUH-01.0150 Revision 11 NON-PROPRIETARY UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FOR THE STANDARDIZED ADVANCED NUHOMS HORIZONTAL MODULAR STORAGE SYSTEM FOR IRRADIATED NUCLEAR FUEL By TN Americas LLC(1)

Columbia, MD November 2021 (1)

TN Americas LLC, formerly AREVA TN, and Transnuclear, Inc. (herein referred to as TN Americas LLC, AREVA TN, Transnuclear, Inc., Transnuclear, or TN)

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 7, 08/16 The proprietary notice is withheld from this public SAR version.

ANUH-01.0150 i

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 REVISION LOG SHEET UFSAR Date Record of Changes/FCNs Changed Pages Revision 0 3/19/03 None All FCNs 721029-39, 40, 62, 65, 81, 89, 92, 1 3/21/05 See List of Effective Pages 124, 126, 165, 169 & 175 FCNs 721029-182, 185, 103 R-1, 162 2 8/17/06 R-1, 166, 173 R-1, 176 R-1,177 and See List of Effective Pages 204 FCNs 721029-202, 205, 206, 208, 215, 3 8/15/08 See List of Effective Pages 220, 222 R1, 232, 239, 246, 257, 272 FCNs 721029-275, 280 R-1, 285, 294, 4 8/12/10 See List of Effective Pages 303, 311, 312 R-1, 316 FCNs 721029-339, 348 R-1, 351 R-1, 5 8/13/12 See List of Effective Pages 352, 353, 354, 356, 364 6 8/13/14 FCN 721029-385 See List of Effective Pages FCN 721029-374 R-1, 378 R-1, 7 8/11/16 386 R-1, 394, 407 R-1, 414, 415, See List of Effective Pages 416 R-1, 417 FCN 721029-418, 419 R-1, 420 R-1, 8 8/13/18 See List of Effective Pages 421, 422 9 3/12/19 FCN 721029-424 See List of Effective Pages 10 3/12/21 FCN 721029-423, 425, 426, 429 R-1 See List of Effective Pages 11 11/17/21 FCN 721029-432 R-0, 435 R-1 See List of Effective Pages ANUH-01.0150 ii

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Revision 2 of this UFSAR incorporates changes implemented due to the approval of CoC 1029 Amendment 1, effective May 16, 2005. It also incorporates modifications implemented per 10 CFR 72.48 from March 21, 2005 through August 15, 2006.

Revision 3 of this UFSAR incorporates modifications implemented per 10 CFR 72.48 from August 16, 2006 through August 15, 2008. This revision also includes a full list of effective pages.

Revision 4 of this UFSAR incorporates modifications implemented per 10 CFR 72.48 from August 16, 2008 through August 12, 2010.

Revision 5 of this UFSAR incorporates modifications implemented per 10 CFR 72.48 from August 13, 2010 through August 13, 2012.

Revision 6 of this UFSAR incorporates modifications implemented per 10 CFR 72.48 from August 14, 2012 through August 13, 2014.

Revision 7 of this UFSAR incorporates changes implemented due to the approval of CoC 1029 Amendment 3, effective February 23, 2015. It also incorporates modifications implemented per 10 CFR 72.48 from August 14, 2014 through August 11, 2016.

Revision 8 of this UFSAR incorporates modifications implemented per 10 CFR 72.48 from August 12, 2016 through August 13, 2018.

Revision 9 of this UFSAR incorporates changes implemented due to the approval of CoC 1029 Amendment 4, effective March 12, 2019.

Revision 10 of this UFSAR incorporates modifications implemented per 10 CFR 72.48 from March 13, 2019 through March 12, 2021.

Revision 11 of this UFSAR incorporates changes implemented due to the approval of renewed CoC 1029 Amendments 0, 1, 3, and 4, effective October 27, 2021. This revision also incorporates modifications implemented per 10 CFR 72.48 from March 13, 2021 through November 17, 2021.

ANUH-01.0150 v

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PROPRIETARY INFORMATION NOTICE ............................................................................. i REVISION LOG SHEET............................................................................................................. ii EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

......................................................................................................... iv LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................... vi TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................ ix LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................... xiii LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................xxiv LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES ....................................................................................... LOEP-1

1. GENERAL INFORMATION ........................................................................................... 1-1 1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1.1-1 1.2 General Description of the Advanced NUHOMS System ................................ 1.2-1 1.2.1 Advanced NUHOMS System Characteristics ....................................... 1.2-1 1.2.2 Operational Features ................................................................................ 1.2-4 1.2.3 24PT1-DSC Contents............................................................................... 1.2-8 1.2.4 Aging Management Program Requirements ............................................ 1.2-8 1.3 Identification of Agents and Contractors ............................................................. 1.3-1 1.4 Generic Cask Arrays .............................................................................................. 1.4-1 1.5 Supplemental Data ................................................................................................. 1.5-1 1.5.1 References ................................................................................................ 1.5-1 1.5.2 Drawings .................................................................................................. 1.5-1
2. PRINCIPAL DESIGN CRITERIA ............................................................................... 2.1-1 2.1 Spent Fuel to be Stored .......................................................................................... 2.1-1 2.1.1 Detailed Payload Description .................................................................. 2.1-1 2.2 Design Criteria for Environmental Conditions and Natural Phenomena ........ 2.2-1 2.2.1 Tornado and Wind Loadings ................................................................... 2.2-1 2.2.2 Water Level (Flood) Design .................................................................... 2.2-3 2.2.3 Seismic Design......................................................................................... 2.2-3 2.2.4 Snow and Ice Loadings ............................................................................ 2.2-4 2.2.5 Tsunami.................................................................................................... 2.2-4 2.2.6 Lightning .................................................................................................. 2.2-4 2.2.7 Combined Load Criteria .......................................................................... 2.2-4 2.2.8 Burial Under Debris ................................................................................. 2.2-5 2.2.9 Thermal Conditions ................................................................................. 2.2-5 2.3 Safety Protection Systems ...................................................................................... 2.3-1 2.3.1 General ..................................................................................................... 2.3-1 2.3.2 Protection by Multiple Confinement Barriers and Systems .................... 2.3-1 ANUH-01.0150 ix

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 2.3.3 Protection by Equipment and Instrumentation Selection......................... 2.3-3 2.3.4 Nuclear Criticality Safety ........................................................................ 2.3-3 2.3.5 Radiological Protection ............................................................................ 2.3-4 2.3.6 Fire and Explosion Protection .................................................................. 2.3-5 2.3.7 Acceptance Tests and Maintenance ......................................................... 2.3-6 2.4 Decommissioning Considerations ......................................................................... 2.4-1 2.5 Structures, Systems and Components Important to Safety ............................... 2.5-1 2.5.1 Dry Shielded Canister .............................................................................. 2.5-1 2.5.2 Advanced Horizontal Storage Module..................................................... 2.5-1 2.5.3 ISFSI Basemat and Approach Slabs ........................................................ 2.5-1 2.5.4 Transfer Equipment ................................................................................. 2.5-2 2.5.5 Auxiliary Equipment ................................................................................ 2.5-2 2.6 Supplemental Information..................................................................................... 2.6-1 2.6.1 References ................................................................................................ 2.6-1

3. STRUCTURAL EVALUATION ................................................................................... 3.1-1 3.1 Structural Design .................................................................................................... 3.1-1 3.1.1 Discussion ................................................................................................ 3.1-1 3.1.2 24PT1-DSC and AHSM Design Criteria ................................................. 3.1-5 3.2 Weights and Centers of Gravity............................................................................ 3.2-1 3.3 Mechanical Properties of Materials ...................................................................... 3.3-1 3.3.1 24PT1-DSC Material Properties .............................................................. 3.3-1 3.3.2 AHSM Material Properties ...................................................................... 3.3-2 3.3.3 Materials Durability ................................................................................. 3.3-2 3.4 General Standards for 24PT1-DSC and AHSM .................................................. 3.4-1 3.4.1 Chemical and Galvanic Reactions ........................................................... 3.4-1 3.4.2 Positive Closure ....................................................................................... 3.4-3 3.4.3 Lifting Devices......................................................................................... 3.4-4 3.4.4 Heat .......................................................................................................... 3.4-4 3.4.5 Cold .......................................................................................................... 3.4-6 3.5 Fuel Rods General Standards for 24PT1-DSC .................................................... 3.5-1 3.5.1 Fuel Rod Temperature Limits .................................................................. 3.5-1 3.5.2 Fuel Assembly Thermal and Irradiation Growth ..................................... 3.5-2 3.5.3 Fuel Rod Integrity During Drop Scenario ............................................... 3.5-2 3.5.4 Fuel Unloading......................................................................................... 3.5-5 3.6 Supplemental Data ................................................................................................. 3.6-1 3.6.1 24PT1-DSC Structural Analysis .............................................................. 3.6-1 3.6.2 Structural Analysis of the AHSM .......................................................... 3.6-11 3.6.3 References .............................................................................................. 3.6-58 ANUH-01.0150 x

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21

4. THERMAL EVALUATION ............................................................................................. 4-1 4.1 Discussion ................................................................................................................ 4.1-1 4.1.1 Overview and Purpose of Thermal Analysis ........................................... 4.1-1 4.1.2 Thermal Load Specification/Ambient Temperature ................................ 4.1-2 4.2 Summary of Thermal Properties of Materials .................................................... 4.2-1 4.3 Specifications for Components .............................................................................. 4.3-1 4.4 Thermal Evaluation for Normal Conditions of Storage and Transfer.............. 4.4-1 4.4.1 Overview of Thermal Analysis for Normal Conditions of Storage and Transfer ............................................................................................. 4.4-1 4.4.2 Thermal Model of the 24PT1-DSC Inside the AHSM ............................ 4.4-1 4.4.3 Thermal Model of 24PT1-DSC in the Transfer Cask .............................. 4.4-7 4.4.4 24PT1-DSC Basket Thermal Model ........................................................ 4.4-8 4.4.5 Test Model ............................................................................................. 4.4-12 4.4.6 Maximum Temperatures ........................................................................ 4.4-12 4.4.7 Minimum Temperatures......................................................................... 4.4-12 4.4.8 Maximum Internal Pressure ................................................................... 4.4-13 4.4.9 Maximum Thermal Stresses .................................................................. 4.4-14 4.4.10 Evaluation of System Performance for Normal Conditions of Storage and Transfer .............................................................................. 4.4-14 4.5 Thermal Evaluation for Off-Normal Conditions ................................................ 4.5-1 4.5.1 Overview of Off-Normal Analysis .......................................................... 4.5-1 4.5.2 Thermal Analysis Results ........................................................................ 4.5-1 4.5.3 Maximum Pressure .................................................................................. 4.5-1 4.5.4 Evaluation of System Performance for Off-Normal Conditions of Storage and Transfer ................................................................................ 4.5-2 4.6 Thermal Evaluation for Accident Conditions...................................................... 4.6-1 4.6.1 Accident Ambient Conditions.................................................................. 4.6-1 4.6.2 Blockage of AHSM Inlet and Outlet Vents ............................................. 4.6-1 4.6.3 Transfer Cask Loss of Neutron Shield and Sunshade .............................. 4.6-2 4.6.4 Fire Accident Evaluation ......................................................................... 4.6-3 4.6.5 Flood Accident ......................................................................................... 4.6-5 4.6.6 Maximum Pressure .................................................................................. 4.6-5 4.6.7 Evaluation of System Performance for Accident Conditions of Storage and Transfer ................................................................................ 4.6-5 4.7 Thermal Evaluation for Loading/Unloading Conditions.................................... 4.7-1 4.7.1 Vacuum Drying Thermal Analysis .......................................................... 4.7-1 4.7.2 Pressure During Unloading of Cask ........................................................ 4.7-2 4.7.3 Cask Heatup Analysis .............................................................................. 4.7-2 4.7.4 Pressure During Loading of Cask ............................................................ 4.7-3 4.8 Supplemental Information..................................................................................... 4.8-1 4.8.1 References ................................................................................................ 4.8-1 ANUH-01.0150 xi

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 4.8.2 Computer Code ........................................................................................ 4.8-3 4.8.3 Validation of the Thermal Analysis Methodology Using HEATING7 Model for 24PT1-DSC Basket ............................................ 4.8-3 4.8.4 Alternative Confirmatory Thermal Analysis of the 24PT1-DSC ............ 4.8-5

5. SHIELDING EVALUATION ........................................................................................... 5-1 5.1 Discussion and Results ........................................................................................... 5.1-1 5.2 Source Specification ............................................................................................... 5.2-1 5.2.1 Gamma Sources ....................................................................................... 5.2-3 5.2.2 Neutron Source ........................................................................................ 5.2-4 5.2.3 Evaluation of Effect of Uncertainty in Minimum Initial Enrichment ............................................................................................... 5.2-4 5.3 Model Specification ................................................................................................ 5.3-1 5.3.1 Description of the Radial and Axial Shielding Configurations ............... 5.3-1 5.3.2 Shield Regional Densities ........................................................................ 5.3-3 5.4 Shielding Evaluation .............................................................................................. 5.4-1 5.4.1 Computer Programs ................................................................................. 5.4-1 5.4.2 Flux-to-Dose-Rate Conversion ................................................................ 5.4-2 5.5 Supplemental Information..................................................................................... 5.5-1 5.5.1 References ................................................................................................ 5.5-1 5.5.2 Validation of Shielding Analysis ............................................................. 5.5-2 ANUH-01.0150 xii

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21

6. CRITICALITY EVALUATION .................................................................................... 6.1-1 6.1 Discussion and Results ........................................................................................... 6.1-2 6.2 Spent Fuel Loading ................................................................................................ 6.2-1 6.2.1 WE 14x14 SC Fuel Assemblies ............................................................... 6.2-1 6.2.2 WE 14x14 MOX Fuel Assemblies .......................................................... 6.2-1 6.3 Model Specification ................................................................................................ 6.3-1 6.3.1 Description of Criticality Analysis Model ............................................... 6.3-1 6.3.2 Neutron Absorber Panel Material Efficacy.............................................. 6.3-6 6.4 Criticality Calculation ............................................................................................ 6.4-1 6.4.1 Calculational Method ............................................................................... 6.4-1 6.4.2 Fuel Loading Optimization ...................................................................... 6.4-1 6.4.3 Criticality Results..................................................................................... 6.4-4 6.4.4 Evaluation of Effect of Uncertainty in Maximum Initial Enrichment ............................................................................................... 6.4-5 6.4.5 Effect of Fuel Parameter Tolerances on Reactivity ................................. 6.4-5 6.5 Critical Benchmark Experiments ......................................................................... 6.5-1 6.5.1 Benchmark Experiments and Applicability ............................................. 6.5-1 6.5.2 Results of the Benchmark Calculations ................................................... 6.5-2 6.6 Supplemental Information..................................................................................... 6.6-1 6.6.1 References ................................................................................................ 6.6-1 6.6.2 KENO Input Files .................................................................................... 6.6-2
7. CONFINEMENT............................................................................................................. 7.1-1 7.1 Confinement Boundary .......................................................................................... 7.1-1 7.1.1 Confinement Vessel ................................................................................. 7.1-1 7.1.2 Confinement Penetrations ........................................................................ 7.1-2 7.1.3 Seals and Welds ....................................................................................... 7.1-2 7.1.4 Closure ..................................................................................................... 7.1-2 7.1.5 Leak Testing Requirements ..................................................................... 7.1-2 7.2 Requirements for Normal Conditions of Storage ................................................ 7.2-1 7.2.1 Release of Radioactive Material .............................................................. 7.2-1 7.2.2 Pressurization of Confinement Vessel ..................................................... 7.2-1 7.3 Confinement Requirements for Hypothetical Accident Conditions .................. 7.3-1 7.3.1 Fission Gas Products ................................................................................ 7.3-1 7.3.2 Release of Contents.................................................................................. 7.3-1 7.4 Supplemental Data ................................................................................................. 7.4-1 7.4.1 Confinement Monitoring Capability ........................................................ 7.4-1 7.4.2 References ................................................................................................ 7.4-1 ANUH-01.0150 xiii

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21

8. OPERATING PROCEDURES ......................................................................................... 8-1 8.1 Procedures for Loading the 24PT1-DSC and Transfer to the AHSM .............. 8.1-1 8.1.1 Narrative Description ............................................................................... 8.1-1 8.2 Procedures for Unloading the 24PT1-DSC .......................................................... 8.2-1 8.2.1 24PT1-DSC Retrieval from the AHSM ................................................... 8.2-1 8.2.2 Removal of Fuel from the 24PT1-DSC ................................................... 8.2-2 8.3 Supplemental Information..................................................................................... 8.3-1 8.3.1 Other Operating Systems ......................................................................... 8.3-1 8.3.2 Operation Support System ....................................................................... 8.3-1 8.3.3 Control Room and/or Control Areas ........................................................ 8.3-1 8.3.4 Analytical Sampling................................................................................. 8.3-1 8.3.5 References ................................................................................................ 8.3-1
9. ACCEPTANCE TESTS AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM .................................. 9.1-1 9.1 Acceptance Criteria ................................................................................................ 9.1-1 9.1.1 Visual Inspection ..................................................................................... 9.1-1 9.1.2 Structural .................................................................................................. 9.1-1 9.1.3 Leak Tests and Hydrostatic Pressure Tests .............................................. 9.1-2 9.1.4 Components ............................................................................................. 9.1-2 9.1.5 Shielding Integrity ................................................................................... 9.1-3 9.1.6 Thermal Acceptance ................................................................................ 9.1-3 9.1.7 Neutron Absorber Tests ........................................................................... 9.1-3 9.2 Pre-Operational Testing and Maintenance Program ......................................... 9.2-1 9.2.1 Subsystems Maintenance ......................................................................... 9.2-1 9.2.2 Valves, Rupture Discs, and Gaskets on Confinement Vessel .................. 9.2-4 9.3 Training Program................................................................................................... 9.3-1 9.3.1 Program Description ................................................................................ 9.3-1 9.3.2 Retraining Program .................................................................................. 9.3-1 9.3.3 Administration and Records .................................................................... 9.3-2 9.4 Supplemental Information..................................................................................... 9.4-1 9.4.1 References ................................................................................................ 9.4-1 ANUH-01.0150 xiv

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21

10. RADIATION PROTECTION ..................................................................................... 10.1-1 10.1 Ensuring That Occupational Radiation Exposures Are As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) ...................................................................... 10.1-1 10.1.1 Policy Considerations ............................................................................ 10.1-1 10.1.2 Design Considerations ........................................................................... 10.1-1 10.1.3 Operational Considerations .................................................................... 10.1-3 10.2 Radiation Protection Design Features ................................................................ 10.2-1 10.2.1 Advanced NUHOMS System Design Features ................................... 10.2-1 10.2.2 Radiation Dose Rates ............................................................................. 10.2-1 10.2.3 AHSM Dose Rates ................................................................................. 10.2-4 10.2.4 ISFSI Array ............................................................................................ 10.2-4 10.3 Estimated Onsite Collective Dose Assessment ................................................... 10.3-1 10.3.1 Occupational Exposures......................................................................... 10.3-1 10.3.2 Public Exposure ..................................................................................... 10.3-2 10.4 Supplemental Information................................................................................... 10.4-1 10.4.1 References .............................................................................................. 10.4-1
11. ACCIDENT ANALYSES ................................................................................................ 11-1 11.1 Off-Normal Operations ........................................................................................ 11.1-1 11.1.1 Off-Normal Transfer Loads ................................................................... 11.1-1 11.1.2 Extreme Ambient Temperatures ............................................................ 11.1-2 11.1.3 Radiological Impact from Off-Normal Operations................................ 11.1-3 11.2 Postulated Accidents ............................................................................................ 11.2-1 11.2.1 Earthquake ............................................................................................. 11.2-2 11.2.2 Tornado Wind Pressure and Tornado Missiles .................................... 11.2-11 11.2.3 Flood .................................................................................................... 11.2-21 11.2.4 Fire/Explosion ...................................................................................... 11.2-23 11.2.5 Accidental Drop of the 24PT1-DSC Inside the Transfer Cask ............ 11.2-24 11.2.6 Lightning .............................................................................................. 11.2-27 11.2.7 Blockage of Air Inlet and Outlet Openings ......................................... 11.2-28 11.2.8 Accidental Pressurization of the 24PT1-DSC...................................... 11.2-28 11.2.9 Burial.................................................................................................... 11.2-29 11.2.10 Inadvertent Loading of a Newly Discharged Fuel Assembly .............. 11.2-29 11.3 Supplemental Information................................................................................... 11.3-1 11.3.1 References .............................................................................................. 11.3-1 ANUH-01.0150 xv

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21

12. OPERATING CONTROLS AND LIMITS ................................................................... 12-1 12.1.0 Technical Specifications ........................................................................... 12-1 12.2.0 Functional and Operating Limits .............................................................. 12-4 12.3.0 Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) and Surveillance Requirements (SR) Applicability .............................................................. 12-5 12.3.0 Surveillance Requirement (SR) Applicability .......................................... 12-8
13. QUALITY ASSURANCE ................................................................................................ 13-1 13.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 13.1-1 13.2 Important-to-Safety & Safety Related Advanced NUHOMS System Components .......................................................................................................... 13.2-1 13.3 Description of TN 10 CFR 72, Subpart G QA Program ................................... 13.3-1 13.3.1 Project Organization .............................................................................. 13.3-1 13.3.2 QA Program ........................................................................................... 13.3-1 13.3.3 Design Control ....................................................................................... 13.3-1 13.3.4 Procurement Document Control ............................................................ 13.3-2 13.3.5 Procedures, Instructions, and Drawings................................................. 13.3-2 13.3.6 Document Control .................................................................................. 13.3-2 13.3.7 Control of Purchased Items and Services .............................................. 13.3-2 13.3.8 Identification and Control of Materials, Parts, and Components........... 13.3-3 13.3.9 Control of Special Processes .................................................................. 13.3-3 13.3.10 Inspection ............................................................................................... 13.3-3 13.3.11 Test Control ........................................................................................... 13.3-3 13.3.12 Control of Measuring and Test Equipment ............................................ 13.3-3 13.3.13 Handling, Storage and Shipping ............................................................ 13.3-3 13.3.14 Inspection and Test Status ..................................................................... 13.3-4 13.3.15 Control of Nonconforming Items........................................................... 13.3-4 13.3.16 Corrective Action ................................................................................... 13.3-4 13.3.17 Records .................................................................................................. 13.3-4 13.3.18 Audits and Surveillances........................................................................ 13.3-4 13.4 Conditions of Approval Records ......................................................................... 13.4-1 13.5 Supplemental Information................................................................................... 13.5-1 13.5.1 References .............................................................................................. 13.5-1
14. DECOMMISSIONING ................................................................................................. 14.1-1 14.1 Decommissioning Considerations ....................................................................... 14.1-1 14.2 Supplemental Informational ............................................................................... 14.2-1 14.2.1 References .............................................................................................. 14.2-1 ANUH-01.0150 xvi

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21

15. AGING MANAGEMENT ................................................................................................. 15-1 15.1 Aging Management Review ..................................................................................... 15-1 15.2 Time-Limited Aging Analyses .................................................................................. 15-2 15.3 Aging Management Program................................................................................... 15-3 15.3.1 DSC Aging Management Program ........................................................... 15-3 15.3.2 HSM Aging Management Program ........................................................ 15-10 15.3.3 Basemat Aging Management Program ................................................... 15-16 15.3.4 High Burnup Fuel Aging Management Program ................................... 15-20 15.4 Supplemental Information ..................................................................................... 15-24 15.4.1 References ............................................................................................... 15-24 APPENDIX A (24PT4-DSC) See Separate Table of Contents in Appendix A APPENDIX B (32PTH2 DSC and AHSM-HS) See Separate Table of Contents in Appendix B ANUH-01.0150 xvii

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 LIST OF TABLES Page Table 1.2-1 Key Design Parameters of the Advanced NUHOMS System Components ................................................................................................... 1.2-9 Table 1.2-2 Known Fabricated NUHOMS Transfer Casks Licensed for Use Under CoC 1029 .......................................................................................... 1.2-9a Table 2.1-1 Spent Fuel Assembly Physical Characteristics .............................................. 2.1-4 Table 2.1-2 Spent Fuel Assembly Thermal and Radiological Characteristics .................. 2.1-5 Table 2.1-3 Non-Fuel Assembly Hardware Thermal and Radiological Characteristics ................................................................................................ 2.1-6 Table 2.5-1 Advanced NUHOMS System Major Components and Safety Classification.................................................................................................. 2.5-3 Table 3.1-1 Codes and Standards for the Fabrication and Construction of Principal Components .................................................................................. 3.1-14 Table 3.1-2 Summary of Stress Criteria for Components Evaluated Using Subsection NB ............................................................................................. 3.1-15 Table 3.1-3 Stress Criteria for Partial Penetration Pressure Boundary Welds ................ 3.1-16 Table 3.1-4 Summary of Stress Criteria for Components Evaluated Using Subsection NG ............................................................................................. 3.1-17 Table 3.1-5 24PT1-DSC Load Combinations and Service Levels .................................. 3.1-18 Table 3.1-6 24PT1-DSC Internal Pressure Loads ........................................................... 3.1-20 Table 3.1-7 24PT1-DSC External Pressure Loads .......................................................... 3.1-21 Table 3.1-8 24PT1-DSC Thermal Conditions................................................................. 3.1-22 Table 3.1-9 AHSM Ultimate Strength Reduction Factors .............................................. 3.1-23 Table 3.1-10 Concrete Structure - Load Combinations .................................................... 3.1-24 Table 3.1-11 Steel Structures Allowable Stress Design - Load Combinations ................ 3.1-25 Table 3.1-12 Structural Design Criteria for DSC Support Structure ................................ 3.1-26 Table 3.1-13 Overturning and Sliding - Load Combinations ........................................... 3.1-27 Table 3.1-14 ASME Code Exceptions for the 24PT1-DSC (NB) ..................................... 3.1-28 Table 3.1-15 ASME Code Exceptions for the 24PT1-DSC (NG/NF) .............................. 3.1-29 Table 3.2-1 Weights and Centers of Gravity of the 24PT1-DSC ...................................... 3.2-2 Table 3.3-1 ASME Code Material Properties for SA-240 Type 316 Stainless Steel ........ 3.3-3 Table 3.3-2 Material Properties for ASTM A36 Carbon Steel ......................................... 3.3-4 Table 3.3-3 ASME Code Material Properties for SA-240 Type 304 Stainless Steel ........ 3.3-5 Table 3.3-4 ASME Code Material Properties for SA-537 Class 2 Carbon Steel .............. 3.3-6 Table 3.3-5 ASME Code Material Properties for SA-564 Type 630 Steel ....................... 3.3-7 Table 3.3-6 Concrete Material Properties at Temperature ................................................ 3.3-8 Table 3.3-7 Reinforcing Steel Material Properties at Temperature .................................. 3.3-9 ANUH-01.0150 xviii

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 3.5-1 Fuel Rod Parameters Used to Determine Fuel Cladding Short and Long Term Temperature Limits..................................................................... 3.5-6 Table 3.5-2 Fuel Cladding Temperature Limits ................................................................ 3.5-7 Table 3.5-3 Summary of Fuel Assembly Thermal and Irradiation Growth Calculations.................................................................................................... 3.5-8 Table 3.5-4 Fuel Assembly Properties .............................................................................. 3.5-9 Table 3.5-5 Fuel Cladding Material Properties ............................................................... 3.5-10 Table 3.5-6 Fuel Assembly Loads .................................................................................. 3.5-11 Table 3.6-1 24PT1-DSC On-Site Load Combinations.................................................... 3.6-20 Table 3.6-2 24PT1-DSC Shell Assembly Normal and Off-Normal Operating Condition Maximum Stress Intensities ........................................................ 3.6-22 Table 3.6-3 24PT1-DSC Shell Assembly Accident Condition Maximum Stress Intensities ..................................................................................................... 3.6-23 Table 3.6-4 24PT1-DSC Shell Assembly Results for Normal and Off-Normal Load Combinations ...................................................................................... 3.6-24 Table 3.6-5 24PT1-DSC Shell Assembly Results for Accident Level C Load Combinations ............................................................................................... 3.6-25 Table 3.6-6 24PT1-DSC Shell Assembly Results for Accident Level D Load Combinations ............................................................................................... 3.6-26 Table 3.6-7 Summary of Spacer Disc Maximum Stress Ratios ...................................... 3.6-27 Table 3.6-8 Summary of Guidesleeve Assembly Maximum Stress Ratios .................... 3.6-28 Table 3.6-9 Summary of Results for Support Rod Assemblies ...................................... 3.6-29 Table 3.6-10 Summary of AHSM Design Loading .......................................................... 3.6-30 Table 3.6-11 Design Pressures for Tornado Wind Loading .............................................. 3.6-31 Table 3.6-12 AHSM Concrete Load Combinations .......................................................... 3.6-32 Table 3.6-13 AHSM Support Steel Structure Load Combinations ................................... 3.6-33 Table 3.6-14 Ultimate Capacities of Concrete Components ............................................. 3.6-34 Table 3.6-15 Comparison of Highest Combined Shear Forces/Moments with the Capacities ..................................................................................................... 3.6-35 Table 3.6-16 Maximum/Minimum Forces/Moments in the Rail Components in the Local System ................................................................................................ 3.6-37 Table 3.6-17 Maximum/Minimum Forces/Moments in the Rail Extension Plates in the Local System .......................................................................................... 3.6-38 Table 3.6-18 Maximum/Minimum Axial Forces in the Cross Member Components ...... 3.6-39 Table 3.6-19 Rail Component, Results of Evaluation ....................................................... 3.6-40 Table 3.6-20 Extension Plates and Cross Members, Results of Evaluation...................... 3.6-41 Table 3.6-21 Computed Forces and Capacities of Ties and Keys..................................... 3.6-42 Table 4.1-1 Ambient Temperatures and Insolations Considered in Thermal Analysis.......................................................................................................... 4.1-3 Table 4.1-2 Temperature Variation for Extreme Summer Ambient Conditions ............... 4.1-4 ANUH-01.0150 xix

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 4.1-3 Component Minimum and Maximum Temperatures in the Advanced NUHOMS System (Storage or Transfer Mode) for Normal Conditions ...................................................................................................... 4.1-5 Table 4.1-4 Component Minimum and Maximum Temperatures in the Advanced NUHOMS System (Storage or Transfer Mode) for Off-Normal Conditions ...................................................................................................... 4.1-6 Table 4.1-5 Component Minimum and Maximum Temperatures in the Advanced NUHOMS System (Storage and Transfer) for Accident Conditions ......... 4.1-7 Table 4.1-6 Limiting Canister Heat Loads for DSC Components .................................... 4.1-8 Table 4.4-1 Advanced NUHOMS System Bulk Air Temperatures ............................. 4.4-15 Table 4.4-2 Heat Generations Used in the Thermal Model of the 24PT1-DSC in the AHSM .................................................................................................... 4.4-16 Table 4.4-3 AHSM Thermal Analysis Results Summary ............................................... 4.4-17 Table 4.4-4 24PT1-DSC Shell Results, 16 and 14 kW at Hottest Cross Section............ 4.4-18 Table 4.4-5 24PT1-DSC Maximum Shell Temperatures at 24 kW ................................ 4.4-19 Table 4.4-6 24PT1-DSC Basket Temperature Results .................................................... 4.4-20 Table 4.4-7 Maximum Fuel Cladding Temperature Results, 16 kW .............................. 4.4-21 Table 4.4-8 Summary of Cases Considered for Thermal Stress Analysis ...................... 4.4-22 Table 4.4-9 Fuel Assembly Characteristics for Pressure Analysis ................................. 4.4-23 Table 4.4-10 Control Component Characteristics for Pressure Analysis .......................... 4.4-24 Table 4.4-11 24PT1-DSC Cavity Pressure Analysis Summary ........................................ 4.4-25 Table 4.4-12 Technical Specifications 5.2.5.b Temperature Monitoring Limits for the 24PT1-DSC .......................................................................................... 4.4-25a Table 4.7-1 Steady State Vacuum Drying Results ............................................................ 4.7-4 Table 4.7-2 Transient Vacuum Drying Results for the Spacer Disc ................................. 4.7-5 Table 4.7-3 Summary of Water Heatup Calculation ......................................................... 4.7-6 Table 4.8-1 Comparison of DSC Component Temperatures for NUHOMS-7P, Test Measurements vs Calculated from Appendix B of Reference

[4.17] .............................................................................................................. 4.8-4 Table 4.8-2 Comparison of 24PT1-DSC Component Temperatures, UFSAR Analysis vs. Confirmatory Analysis with Internal Convection ..................... 4.8-7 Table 4.8-3 Comparison of DSC Component Temperatures for NUHOMS-7P, Test Measurements vs. Confirmatory Analysis ............................................. 4.8-7 Table 5.1-1 Advanced NUHOMS System Shielding Materials ..................................... 5.1-2 Table 5.1-2 Summary AHSM Dose Rates ........................................................................ 5.1-3 Table 5.1-3 Transfer Cask (Loading/Unloading/Transfer Operations) Side Dose Rate Summary ................................................................................................ 5.1-4 Table 5.1-4 Transfer Cask (Loading/Unloading/Transfer Operations) Top End Dose Rate Summary ...................................................................................... 5.1-5 Table 5.1-5 Transfer Cask (Loading/Unloading/Transfer Operations) Bottom End Dose Rate Summary ...................................................................................... 5.1-6 ANUH-01.0150 xx

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 5.2-1 Flux Factor By Fuel Assembly Region .......................................................... 5.2-6 Table 5.2-2 WE 14x14 SC Assembly Materials and Masses ............................................ 5.2-7 Table 5.2-3 WE 14x14 MOX Assembly Materials and Masses ....................................... 5.2-8 Table 5.2-4 Thimble Plug Assemblies Materials and Masses........................................... 5.2-9 Table 5.2-5 RCCA Materials and Masses ....................................................................... 5.2-10 Table 5.2-6 Neutron Source Assembly Materials and Masses ........................................ 5.2-11 Table 5.2-7 CASK-81 Neutron and Gamma Group Structure ........................................ 5.2-12 Table 5.2-8 SAS2H Gamma Sources for 45 GWd/MTU, 10-Year Cooled WE 14x14 SC Fuel Per Fuel Assembly .............................................................. 5.2-13 Table 5.2-9 SAS2H Gamma Sources for 40 GWd/MTU, 10-Year Cooled WE 14x14 SC Fuel Per Fuel Assembly .............................................................. 5.2-14 Table 5.2-10 SAS2H Gamma Sources for 35 GWd/MTU, 10-Year Cooled WE 14x14 SC Fuel Per Fuel Assembly .............................................................. 5.2-15 Table 5.2-11 SAS2H Gamma Sources for 25 GWd/MTU, 20-Year Cooled WE 14x14 MOX Fuel Per Fuel Assembly .......................................................... 5.2-16 Table 5.2-12 Gamma Source Term for Thimble Assembly, Eleven Cycles Active Fuel, 10 Year Cooled Per Assembly ............................................................ 5.2-17 Table 5.2-13 Gamma Source Term for RCCA, Eleven Cycles Active Fuel, 10 Year Cooled Per Assembly ................................................................................... 5.2-18 Table 5.2-14 Gamma Source Term for Neutron Source Assemblies, Four Cycles Active Fuel, 10 Year Cooled Per Assembly ................................................ 5.2-19 Table 5.2-15 Design Basis Volumetric Gamma Source Terms ........................................ 5.2-20 Table 5.2-16 Calculated Total Neutron Sources per Fuel Assembly ................................ 5.2-21 Table 5.2-17 Design Basis Volumetric Neutron Source Term ......................................... 5.2-22 Table 5.2-18 Elemental Composition of LWR Structural Materials................................. 5.2-23 Table 5.2-19 Comparison of Design Basis Shielding Analysis Source Term to Fuel Qualification Table Source Terms ............................................................... 5.2-24 Table 5.3-1 Materials Composition and Atom Number Densities .................................... 5.3-5 Table 5.3-2 Density Calculations for Concrete ................................................................. 5.3-6 Table 5.3-3 Materials Composition and Atom Densities During Decontamination and Wet Welding Stage Calculation .............................................................. 5.3-7 Table 5.3-4 ANSI Standard-6.1.1-1977 Flux-to-Dose Factors ......................................... 5.3-8 Table 5.4-1 Normalized Conservative Burn-Up Shape on WE 1414 Fuel Assembly........................................................................................................ 5.4-3 Table 5.5-1 Comparison of DORT and MCNP Maximum and Averaged Dose Rate Values on Surfaces of AHSM ............................................................... 5.5-2 Table 5.5-2 Comparison of Calculated MCNP Dose Rates Verses Measured Dose Rates - No. 1 HSM ........................................................................................ 5.5-3 Table 5.5-3 Comparison of Calculated MCNP Dose Rates Verses Measured Dose Rates - No. 2 HSM ........................................................................................ 5.5-3 ANUH-01.0150 xxi

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 6.1-1 Summary of Limiting Criticality Evaluations for the WE 14x14 SC Fuel Assemblies and the WE MOX Fuel Assemblies ................................... 6.1-4 Table 6.2-1 Design Parameters for Criticality Analysis of the WE 14x14 SC Fuel Assemblies ..................................................................................................... 6.2-2 Table 6.2-2 Design Parameters for Criticality Analysis of the WE 14x14 MOX Fuel Assemblies ............................................................................................. 6.2-3 Table 6.3-1 Geometrical Parameters Used in the Criticality Analysis.............................. 6.3-8 Table 6.3-2 Design Parameters for WE 14x14 SC Fuel Assembly Criticality Analysis........................................................................................................ 6.3-11 Table 6.3-3 Design Parameters for WE 14x14 MOX Fuel Assembly Criticality Analysis........................................................................................................ 6.3-12 Table 6.4-1 Results for the WE 14x14 SC Fuel Assembly ............................................... 6.4-6 Table 6.4-2 Results for the WE 14x14 MOX Fuel Assembly........................................... 6.4-9 Table 6.4-3 Results for the Damaged Fuel Assemblies .................................................. 6.4-12 Table 6.4-4 Bounding Criticality Analysis Analyzed for 4.05 weight % U-235 ............ 6.4-14 Table 6.4-5 Clad OD Sensitivity Evaluation ................................................................... 6.4-14 Table 6.4-6 Clad Thickness Sensitivity Evaluation ........................................................ 6.4-15 Table 6.4-7 Pellet Diameter Sensitivity Evaluation ........................................................ 6.4-15 Table 6.5-1 Benchmark Results ........................................................................................ 6.5-3 Table 6.5-2 USL-1 Results ................................................................................................ 6.5-6 Table 6.5-3 Fuel Assembly Design Parameters Used in Criticality Benchmarks ............. 6.5-7 Table 6.5-4 Limiting Upper Subcritical Limit Based on Method 1 for the WE 14x14 SC Fuel Assemblies and the WE 14x14 MOX Fuel Assemblies ....... 6.5-8 Table 8.1-1 Instrumentation Used During Advanced NUHOMS System Loading Operations ...................................................................................... 8.1-11 Table 10.2-1 Dose Rates at Postulated Site Boundary from One AHSM ......................... 10.2-6 Table 10.2-2 Dose Rates at Postulated Site Boundary from One AHSM ......................... 10.2-7 Table 10.2-3 Dose Rates at Postulated Site Boundary from a Single AHSM................... 10.2-8 Table 10.2-4 Dose Rates at Postulated Site Boundary from a 2x10 Array of AHSMs ........................................................................................................ 10.2-9 Table 10.2-5 Dose Rates at Postulated Site Boundary from a 2x10 Array Of AHSMs ...................................................................................................... 10.2-10 Table 10.2-6 AHSM Gamma-Ray Spectrum Calculation Results .................................. 10.2-11 Table 10.2-7 AHSM Neutron Spectrum Calculations..................................................... 10.2-12 Table 10.2-8 Summary of AHSM Surface Activities ..................................................... 10.2-13 Table 10.2-9 ANISN Model Details................................................................................ 10.2-14 Table 10.3-1 Advanced NUHOMS System Operations Estimated Time for Occupational Dose Calculations .................................................................. 10.3-4 Table 11.2-1 Postulated Accident Loading Identification............................................... 11.2-32 Table 11.2-2 Summary of AHSM Sliding/Uplift Displacements ................................... 11.2-33 ANUH-01.0150 xxii

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 12-1 Cross-Reference Index of 24PT1 System Technical Specifications vs.

Historical UFSAR References ........................................................................ 12-2 Table 13.1-1 Matrix of 10 CFR72 Subpart G Criteria v/s TN QA Manual Implementing Sections................................................................................. 13.1-2 Table 15-1 DSC AMP Tollgate ....................................................................................... 15-26 Table 15-2 HBU AMP Tollgate ....................................................................................... 15-27 Table 15-3 Subcomponents Within Scope of DSC AMP ................................................. 15-28 Table 15-4 Subcomponents Within Scope of HSM AMP ................................................. 15-31 Table 15-5 Subcomponents Within Scope of Basemat AMP ........................................... 15-39 ANUH-01.0150 xxiii

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 LIST OF FIGURES Page Figure 1.1-1 Advanced NUHOMS System Horizontal Storage Module ......................... 1.1-3 Figure 1.1-2 Advanced NUHOMS System 24PT1-DSC ................................................. 1.1-4 Figure 1.2-1 Advanced NUHOMS System Components, Structures, and Transfer Equipment - Elevation View (Typical) ....................................................... 1.2-10 Figure 1.2-2 Advanced NUHOMS System Components, Structures, and Transfer Equipment - Plan View (Typical) ............................................................... 1.2-11 Figure 1.2-3 24PT1-DSC ASME Code Boundaries ......................................................... 1.2-12 Figure 1.4-1 Typical Double Module Row Advanced NUHOMS System ISFSI Layout ............................................................................................................ 1.4-2 Figure 1.4-2 Typical Single Module Row Advanced NUHOMS System ISFSI Layout ............................................................................................................ 1.4-3 Figure 1.4-3 Typical Combined Single and Double Module Row Advanced NUHOMS System ISFSI Layout ................................................................. 1.4-4 Figure 2.2-1 AHSM Base Input Horizontal Response Spectra for 1.5g ZPA .................... 2.2-8 Figure 2.2-2 AHSM Base Input Vertical Response Spectra for 1.0g ZPA ........................ 2.2-9 Figure 3.1-1 Advanced NUHOMS System 24PT1-DSC Canister Shell Assembly ....... 3.1-30 Figure 3.1-2 24PT1-DSC Pressure Boundary Location ................................................... 3.1-31 Figure 3.1-3 Advanced NUHOMS System 24PT1-DSC Canister Basket (Side View)............................................................................................................ 3.1-32 Figure 3.1-4 Advanced NUHOMS System 24PT1-DSC Canister Basket & Shell (Side and End View) .................................................................................... 3.1-33 Figure 3.1-5 Prefabricated AHSM -- Longitudinal Section ............................................. 3.1-34 Figure 3.1-6 Prefabricated AHSM -- Cross Section ......................................................... 3.1-35 Figure 3.1-7 Shop Fabricated 24PT1-DSC Support Structure ......................................... 3.1-36 Figure 3.2-1 Schematic Location of Center of Gravity of the 24PT1-DSC ....................... 3.2-3 Figure 3.2-2 Schematic Location of Center of Gravity of the 24PT1-DSC in the AHSM ............................................................................................................ 3.2-4 Figure 3.6-1 24PT1-DSC Shell Assembly Top End 90 ANSYS Model ........................ 3.6-43 Figure 3.6-2 24PT1-DSC Shell Assembly Bottom End 90 ANSYS Model ................... 3.6-44 Figure 3.6-3 24PT1-DSC Load Support for Shell and Spacer Disc Analyses ................. 3.6-45 Figure 3.6-4 24PT1-DSC Spacer Disc Side Drop ANSYS Model (Half Symmetry) ...... 3.6-46 Figure 3.6-5 24PT1-DSC Spacer Disc Side Drop ANSYS Model (Full Symmetry) ....... 3.6-47 Figure 3.6-6 24PT1-DSC Spacer Disc ANSYS Model for Axial Loads (Quarter Symmetry).................................................................................................... 3.6-48 Figure 3.6-7 ANSYS Model of the AHSM ...................................................................... 3.6-49 Figure 3.6-8 ANSYS Model of the DSC and the DSC Support Structure ....................... 3.6-50 ANUH-01.0150 xxiv

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Figure 3.6-9 ANSYS Model of the AHSM Base Storage Block for Thermal Stress Analysis........................................................................................................ 3.6-51 Figure 3.6-10 ANSYS Model of the AHSM Top Shield Block for Thermal Stress Analysis........................................................................................................ 3.6-52 Figure 3.6-11 Concrete Components in the Lower Base Storage Block ............................ 3.6-53 Figure 3.6-12 Concrete Components in the Upper Base Storage Block ............................ 3.6-54 Figure 3.6-13 Concrete Components in the Top Shield Block ........................................... 3.6-55 Figure 3.6-14 Symbolic Notations of Force and Moment Capacities (Also for Computed Forces and Moments) ................................................................. 3.6-56 Figure 3.6-15 Components of AHSM Support Structure ................................................... 3.6-57 Figure 4.4-1 Illustration of Air Flow Paths through AHSM ............................................ 4.4-26 Figure 4.4-2 AHSM HEATING7 Model; Cross Section Along x=0.0 ............................ 4.4-27 Figure 4.4-3 Details 1, 2 and 3 From AHSM HEATING7 Model ................................... 4.4-28 Figure 4.4-4 Sections A-A and B-B From AHSM HEATING7 Model ........................... 4.4-29 Figure 4.4-5 AHSM HEATING7 Model; 24PT1-DSC and Heat Shield ......................... 4.4-30 Figure 4.4-6 Cross Section of 24PT1-DSC Basket Model ............................................... 4.4-31 Figure 4.4-7 24PT1-DSC Basket Model; Fuel Regions 1 and 2 with Surrounding Regions ........................................................................................................ 4.4-32 Figure 4.4-8 Simplified Axial View of 24PT1-DSC Basket Model ................................. 4.4-33 Figure 4.6-1 OS197 Cask and 24PT1-DSC Response to Fire Accident............................. 4.6-6 Figure 4.7-1 Vacuum Drying Transient Response of Spacer Disc ..................................... 4.7-7 Figure 4.7-2 Results of the Water Heatup Calculations ..................................................... 4.7-8 Figure 4.8-1 Comparison of Predicted SINDA/FLUINT' Temperatures to KHI Test Results .................................................................................................... 4.8-8 Figure 4.8-2 Comparison of Predicted vs. Test Results (PNL-7327) for NUHOMS-7P............................................................................................... 4.8-9 Figure 4.8-3 General Flow Patterns Expected within Canister ........................................ 4.8-10 Figure 5.1-1 Advanced NUHOMS System Shielding Configuration .............................. 5.1-7 Figure 5.1-2 Dry Shielded Canister Shielding Configuration ............................................ 5.1-8 Figure 5.1-3 Right Elevation Cross Section View of AHSM ............................................. 5.1-9 Figure 5.1-4 Shielding Configuration of the OS197 Transfer Cask ................................. 5.1-10 Figure 5.4-1 NDORT R-Z Floor Model ............................................................................. 5.4-4 Figure 5.4-2 DORT R-Z Roof Model ................................................................................. 5.4-7 Figure 5.4-3 DORT X-Z Midplane Model ....................................................................... 5.4-10 Figure 5.4-4 Zone Number by Material in TC Model at Transfer-Storage Stage ............ 5.4-13 Figure 5.4-5 Zone Number by Material in TC Model at Decontamination Stage ............ 5.4-17 Figure 5.4-6 Zone Number by Material in TC Model at Wet Welding Stage .................. 5.4-18 Figure 5.4-7 Zone Number by Material in TC Model at Dry Welding Stage .................. 5.4-19 Figure 5.4-8 AHSM Roof DORT Shielding Analysis Model .......................................... 5.4-20 ANUH-01.0150 xxv

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Figure 5.4-9 AHSM Floor DORT Shielding Analysis Model .......................................... 5.4-21 Figure 5.4-10 AHSM Side DORT Shielding Analysis Model ........................................... 5.4-22 Figure 5.4-11 AHSM Front/Back DORT Shielding Analysis Model ................................ 5.4-23 Figure 5.4-12 OS197 DORT Shielding Analysis Model .................................................... 5.4-24 Figure 6.3-1 KENO Model of the 24PT1-DSC Basket .................................................... 6.3-13 Figure 6.3-2 Exploded View of KENO Model ................................................................. 6.3-14 Figure 6.3-3 Structure of KENO Model - UNIT 33 ........................................................ 6.3-15 Figure 6.3-4 Structure of KENO Model - UNIT 34 ........................................................ 6.3-16 Figure 6.3-5 Cross Section of the Design Basis WE 14x14 SC Fuel Assembly .............. 6.3-17 Figure 6.3-6 Cross Section of the Design Basis WE 14x14 MOX Fuel Assembly.......... 6.3-18 Figure 6.3-7 Guidesleeve and Fuel Assembly Cross Section .......................................... 6.3-19 Figure 6.3-8 Fuel Assemblies Located in the Inner Guidesleeve Corner Closest to the DSC Centerline (Assembly in Case) ...................................................... 6.3-20 Figure 6.3-9 The Fuel Assemblies Moved Radially Outwards from the Center of the DSC (Assembly Out Case) .................................................................... 6.3-21 Figure 6.3-10 The Fuel Assemblies Are Moved Towards the Upper Left Corner of Each Guidesleeve Assembly Upper Left Corner Case ................................ 6.3-22 Figure 6.4-1 Rod Pitch Study: Figure Shows Maximum Rod Pitch Allowed .................. 6.4-16 Figure 6.4-2 Single-Ended Rod Shear Example .............................................................. 6.4-17 Figure 6.4-3 Double-Ended Rod Shear Example ............................................................ 6.4-18 Figure 7.1-1 24PT1-DSC Confinement Boundary Welds .................................................. 7.1-3 Figure 8.1-1 Advanced NUHOMS System Loading Operations Flow Chart ............... 8.1-12 Figure 8.1-2 Cask Loading Operations ............................................................................. 8.1-15 Figure 8.2-1 Advanced NUHOMS System Retrieval Operations Flow Chart ................ 8.2-7 Figure 10.2-1 Total Annual Exposure from a Single AHSM as a Function of Distance...................................................................................................... 10.2-15 Figure 10.2-2 Total Annual Exposure from a 2x10 AHSM Array as a Function of Distance...................................................................................................... 10.2-16 Figure 11.2-1 LS-DYNA AHSM Seismic Stability Model .............................................. 11.2-34 Figure 11.2-2 Horizontal Time History H1, Set 1 (Taiwan, 1999) .................................. 11.2-35 Figure 11.2-3 Horizontal Time History H2, Set 1 (Taiwan, 1999) .................................. 11.2-36 Figure 11.2-4 Vertical Time History V, Set 1 (Taiwan 1999).......................................... 11.2-37 Figure 11.2-5 Horizontal Time History H1, Set 2 (Tabas 1978) ...................................... 11.2-38 Figure 11.2-6 Horizontal Time History H2, Set 2 (Tabas 1978) ...................................... 11.2-39 Figure 11.2-7 Horizontal Time History V, Set 2 (Tabas 1978) ........................................ 11.2-40 Figure 11.2-8 Horizontal Time History H1, Set 3 (Landers/Lucern 1992) ...................... 11.2-41 Figure 11.2-9 Horizontal Time History H2, Set 3 (Landers/Lucern 1992) ...................... 11.2-42 Figure 11.2-10 Vertical Time History V, Set 3 (Landers/Lucern 1992) ............................ 11.2-43 Figure 11.2-11 AHSM Sliding Response X-Direction ....................................................... 11.2-44 ANUH-01.0150 xxvi

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Figure 11.2-12 AHSM Sliding Response Y-Direction ....................................................... 11.2-45 Figure 11.2-13 AHSM Uplift Response Z-Direction ......................................................... 11.2-46 Figure 11.2-14 24PT1-DSC Stability Evaluation ............................................................... 11.2-47 Figure 11.2-15 AHSM Dimension for Missile Impact Stability Analysis ......................... 11.2-48 Figure 11.2-16 Analysis Case 2 (TH1-2): AHSM Sliding Response X-Direction ............ 11.2-49 Figure 11.2-17 Analysis Case 3 (TH2-1): AHSM Sliding Response X-Direction ............ 11.2-50 Figure 11.2-18 Analysis Case 4 (TH2-2): AHSM Sliding Response X-Direction ............ 11.2-51 Figure 13.1-1 Project Organization Chart .......................................................................... 13.1-3 ANUH-01.0150 xxvii

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date Title Page 11 November 2021 LOEP-22 11 11/21 i 8 08/18 LOEP-23 11 11/21 ii 11 11/21 LOEP-24 11 11/21 iii 7 08/16 iv 8 08/18 1-1 7 08/16 v 11 11/21 1-1a 11 11/21 vi 11 11/21 1.1-1 5 08/12 vii 11 11/21 1.1-2 5 08/12 viii 11 11/21 1.1-3 0 02/03 ix 11 11/21 1.1-4 0 02/03 x 11 11/21 1.2-1 5 08/12 xi 11 11/21 1.2-2 5 08/12 xii 11 11/21 1.2-3 7 08/16 xiii 11 11/21 1.2-4 5 08/12 xiv 11 11/21 1.2-5 0 02/03 xv 11 11/21 1.2-6 0 02/03 xvi 11 11/21 1.2-7 2 08/06 xvii 11 11/21 1.2-8 11 11/21 xviii 11 11/21 1.2-9 5 08/12 xix 11 11/21 1.2-9a 10 03/21 xx 11 11/21 1.2-10 0 02/03 xxi 11 11/21 1.2-11 0 02/03 xxii 11 11/21 1.2-12 0 02/03 xxiii 11 11/21 1.2-13 2 08/06 xxiv 11 11/21 1.3-1 7 08/16 xxv 11 11/21 1.4-1 5 08/12 xxvi 11 11/21 1.4-2 0 02/03 xxvii 11 11/21 1.4-3 0 02/03 1.4-4 0 02/03 LOEP-1 11 11/21 1.5-1 8 08/18 LOEP-2 11 11/21 DWG: (sh. 1 of 6) 6 7/18/18 LOEP-3 11 11/21 NUH-05-4010 LOEP-4 11 11/21 DWG: (sh. 2 of 6) 6 Not shown LOEP-5 11 11/21 NUH-05-4010 LOEP-6 11 11/21 DWG: (sh. 3 of 6) 6 Not shown LOEP-7 11 11/21 NUH-05-4010 LOEP-8 11 11/21 DWG: (sh. 4 of 6) 6 Not shown LOEP-9 11 11/21 NUH-05-4010 LOEP-10 11 11/21 DWG: (sh. 5 of 6) 6 Not shown LOEP-11 11 11/21 NUH-05-4010 LOEP-12 11 11/21 DWG: (sh. 6 of 6) 6 Not shown LOEP-13 11 11/21 NUH-05-4010 LOEP-14 11 11/21 DWG: (sh. 1 of 11) 9 11/5/21 LOEP-15 11 11/21 NUH-03-4011 LOEP-16 11 11/21 DWG: (sh. 2 of 11) 9 Not shown LOEP-17 11 11/21 NUH-03-4011 LOEP-18 11 11/21 DWG: (sh. 3 of 11) 9 Not shown LOEP-19 11 11/21 NUH-03-4011 LOEP-20 11 11/21 DWG: (sh. 4 of 11) 9 Not shown NUH-03-4011 LOEP-21 11 11/21 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-1

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date DWG: (sh. 5 of 11) 9 Not shown 3.1-7 5 08/12 NUH-03-4011 3.1-8 5 08/12 DWG: (sh. 6 of 11) 9 Not shown 3.1-9 5 08/12 NUH-03-4011 3.1-10 5 08/12 DWG: (sh. 7 of 11) 9 Not shown 3.1-11 0 02/03 NUH-03-4011 3.1-12 1 03/05 DWG: (sh. 8 of 11) 9 Not shown 3.1-13 0 02/03 NUH-03-4011 3.1-14 10 03/21 DWG: (sh. 9 of 11) 9 Not shown 3.1-15 0 02/03 NUH-03-4011 3.1-16 0 02/03 DWG: (sh. 10 of 11) 9 Not shown 3.1-17 0 02/03 NUH-03-4011 3.1-18 0 02/03 DWG: (sh.11 of 11) 9 Not shown 3.1-19 0 02/03 NUH-03-4011 3.1-20 0 02/03 3.1-21 0 02/03 2.1-1 7 08/16 3.1-22 5 08/12 2.1-1a 7 08/16 3.1-23 0 02/03 2.1-2 5 08/12 3.1-24 0 02/03 2.1-3 0 02/03 3.1-25 0 02/03 2.1-4 5 08/12 3.1-26 0 02/03 2.1-5 5 08/12 3.1-27 0 02/03 2.1-6 0 02/03 3.1-28 5 08/12 3.1-29 5 08/12 2.2-1 5 08/12 3.1-30 0 02/03 2.2-2 0 02/03 3.1-31 2 08/06 2.2-3 5 08/12 3.1-32 0 02/03 2.2-4 0 02/03 3.1-33 0 02/03 2.2-5 0 02/03 3.1-34 0 02/03 2.2-6 0 02/03 3.1-35 0 02/03 2.2-7 0 02/03 3.1-36 0 02/03 2.2-8 0 02/03 3.2-1 0 02/03 2.2-9 0 02/03 3.2-2 5 08/12 2.3-1 0 02/03 3.2-3 0 02/03 2.3-2 2 08/06 3.2-4 0 02/03 2.3-3 5 08/12 3.3-1 11 11/21 2.3-4 5 08/12 3.3-2 11 11/21 2.3-5 0 02/03 3.3-3 0 02/03 2.3-6 1 03/05 3.3-4 0 02/03 2.4-1 5 08/12 3.3-5 0 02/03 2.5-1 5 08/12 3.3-6 0 02/03 2.5-2 5 08/12 3.3-7 0 02/03 2.5-3 8 08/18 3.3-8 0 02/03 2.6-1 2 08/06 3.3-9 0 02/03 2.6-2 2 08/06 3.4-1 0 02/03 3.4-2 0 02/03 3.1-1 7 08/16 3.4-3 2 08/06 3.1-2 0 02/03 3.4-4 0 02/03 3.1-3 3 08/08 3.4-5 0 02/03 3.1-4 0 02/03 3.4-6 0 02/03 3.1-5 5 08/12 3.5-1 11 11/21 3.1-6 2 08/06 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-2

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date 3.5-2 11 11/21 3.6-40 0 02/03 3.5-2a 11 11/21 3.6-41 0 02/03 3.5-3 0 02/03 3.6-42 5 08/12 3.5-4 0 02/03 3.6-43 0 02/03 3.5-5 9 03/19 3.6-44 0 02/03 3.5-6 0 02/03 3.6-45 0 02/03 3.5-7 0 02/03 3.6-46 0 02/03 3.5-8 5 08/12 3.6-47 0 02/03 3.5-9 0 02/03 3.6-48 0 02/03 3.5-10 0 02/03 3.6-49 0 02/03 3.5-11 0 02/03 3.6-50 0 02/03 3.6-1 5 08/12 3.6-51 0 02/03 3.6-2 0 02/03 3.6-52 0 02/03 3.6-3 0 02/03 3.6-53 0 02/03 3.6-4 0 02/03 3.6-54 0 02/03 3.6-5 5 08/12 3.6-55 0 02/03 3.6-6 0 02/03 3.6-56 0 02/03 3.6-7 5 08/12 3.6-57 0 02/03 3.6-8 0 02/03 3.6-58 2 08/06 3.6-9 5 08/12 3.6-59 11 11/21 3.6-10 5 08/12 3.6-60 11 11/21 3.6-11 11 11/21 3.6-12 0 02/03 4-1 7 08/16 3.6-13 0 02/03 4.1-1 5 08/12 3.6-14 0 02/03 4.1-2 0 02/03 3.6-15 0 02/03 4.1-3 0 02/03 3.6-16 0 02/03 4.1-4 0 02/03 3.6-17 0 02/03 4.1-5 0 02/03 3.6-18 0 02/03 4.1-6 0 02/03 3.6-19 0 02/03 4.1-7 0 02/03 3.6-20 2 08/06 4.1-8 0 02/03 3.6-21 0 02/03 4.2-1 0 02/03 3.6-22 0 02/03 4.2-2 0 02/03 3.6-23 0 02/03 4.2-3 0 02/03 3.6-24 0 02/03 4.2-4 0 02/03 3.6-25 0 02/03 4.2-5 0 02/03 3.6-26 0 02/03 4.2-6 5 08/12 3.6-27 5 08/12 4.2-7 0 02/03 3.6-28 0 02/03 4.3-1 0 02/03 3.6-29 0 02/03 4.4-1 11 11/21 3.6-30 5 08/12 4.4-2 0 02/03 3.6-31 0 02/03 4.4-3 5 08/12 3.6-32 0 02/03 4.4-4 0 02/03 3.6-33 0 02/03 4.4-5 0 02/03 3.6-34 0 02/03 4.4-6 8 08/18 3.6-35 0 02/03 4.4-6a 1 03/05 3.6-36 0 02/03 4.4-7 8 08/18 3.6-37 0 02/03 4.4-8 0 02/03 3.6-38 1 03/05 4.4-9 8 08/18 3.6-39 0 02/03 4.4-10 8 08/18 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-3

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date 4.4-11 0 02/03 4.4-12 0 02/03 5-1 7 08/16 4.4-13 5 08/12 5.1-1 0 02/03 4.4-14 0 02/03 5.1-2 0 02/03 4.4-15 0 02/03 5.1-3 9 03/19 4.4-16 0 02/03 5.1-4 0 02/03 4.4-17 0 02/03 5.1-5 0 02/03 4.4-18 0 02/03 5.1-6 0 02/03 4.4-19 0 02/03 5.1-7 0 02/03 4.4-20 0 02/03 5.1-8 0 02/03 4.4-21 0 02/03 5.1-9 0 02/03 4.4-22 0 02/03 5.1-10 0 02/03 4.4-23 0 02/03 5.2-1 5 08/12 4.4-24 0 02/03 5.2-2 0 02/03 4.4-25 0 02/03 5.2-3 0 02/03 4.4-25a 9 03/19 5.2-4 5 08/12 4.4-26 0 02/03 5.2-5 0 02/03 4.4-27 0 02/03 5.2-6 5 08/12 4.4-28 0 02/03 5.2-7 5 08/12 4.4-29 0 02/03 5.2-8 5 08/12 4.4-30 0 02/03 5.2-9 0 02/03 4.4-31 0 02/03 5.2-10 5 08/12 4.4-32 0 02/03 5.2-11 5 08/12 4.4-33 0 02/03 5.2-12 0 02/03 4.5-1 8 08/18 5.2-13 0 02/03 4.5-2 0 02/03 5.2-14 0 02/03 4.6-1 0 02/03 5.2-15 0 02/03 4.6-2 8 08/18 5.2-16 0 02/03 4.6-3 8 08/18 5.2-17 5 08/12 4.6-4 0 02/03 5.2-18 5 08/12 4.6-5 0 02/03 5.2-19 5 08/12 4.6-6 0 02/03 5.2-20 5 08/12 4.7-1 9 03/19 5.2-21 0 02/03 4.7-2 9 03/19 5.2-22 5 08/12 4.7-3 8 08/18 5.2-23 0 02/03 4.7-4 0 02/03 5.2-24 0 02/03 4.7-5 0 02/03 5.3-1 0 02/03 4.7-6 0 02/03 5.3-2 10 03/21 4.7-7 0 02/03 5.3-3 0 02/03 4.7-8 0 02/03 5.3-4 0 02/03 4.8-1 5 08/12 5.3-5 5 08/12 4.8-2 2 08/06 5.3-6 0 02/03 4.8-3 0 02/03 5.3-7 5 08/12 4.8-4 0 02/03 5.3-8 0 02/03 4.8-5 0 02/03 5.4-1 0 02/03 4.8-6 0 02/03 5.4-2 0 02/03 4.8-7 5 08/12 5.4-3 0 02/03 4.8-8 0 02/03 5.4-4 0 02/03 4.8-9 5 08/12 5.4-5 0 02/03 4.8-10 0 02/03 5.4-6 0 02/03 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-4

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date 5.4-7 0 02/03 6.3-20 0 02/03 5.4-8 0 02/03 6.3-21 0 02/03 5.4-9 0 02/03 6.3-22 0 02/03 5.4-10 0 02/03 6.4-1 0 02/03 5.4-11 0 02/03 6.4-2 0 02/03 5.4-12 0 02/03 6.4-3 0 02/03 5.4-13 0 02/03 6.4-4 0 02/03 5.4-14 0 02/03 6.4-5 0 02/03 5.4-15 0 02/03 6.4-6 0 02/03 5.4-16 0 02/03 6.4-7 0 02/03 5.4-17 0 02/03 6.4-8 0 02/03 5.4-18 0 02/03 6.4-9 0 02/03 5.4-19 0 02/03 6.4-10 0 02/03 5.4-20 0 02/03 6.4-11 0 02/03 5.4-21 0 02/03 6.4-12 0 02/03 5.4-22 0 02/03 6.4-13 0 02/03 5.4-23 0 02/03 6.4-14 5 08/12 5.4-24 0 02/03 6.4-15 0 02/03 5.5-1 2 08/06 6.4-16 0 02/03 5.5-2 0 02/03 6.4-17 0 02/03 5.5-3 0 02/03 6.4-18 0 02/03 5.5-4 0 02/03 6.5-1 0 02/03 6.5-2 0 02/03 6.1-1 7 08/16 6.5-3 0 02/03 6.1-1a 7 08/16 6.5-4 0 02/03 6.1-2 5 08/12 6.5-5 0 02/03 6.1-3 0 02/03 6.5-6 0 02/03 6.1-4 0 02/03 6.5-7 0 02/03 6.2-1 0 02/03 6.5-8 0 02/03 6.2-2 0 02/03 6.6-1 2 08/06 6.2-3 0 02/03 6.6-2 0 02/03 6.3-1 5 08/12 6.6-3 0 02/03 6.3-2 0 02/03 6.6-4 0 02/03 6.3-3 0 02/03 6.6-5 0 02/03 6.3-4 0 02/03 6.6-6 0 02/03 6.3-5 0 02/03 6.6-7 0 02/03 6.3-6 0 02/03 6.6-8 0 02/03 6.3-7 11 11/21 6.6-9 0 02/03 6.3-8 0 02/03 6.6-10 0 02/03 6.3-9 0 02/03 6.6-11 0 02/03 6.3-10 0 02/03 6.6-12 0 02/03 6.3-11 0 02/03 6.6-13 0 02/03 6.3-12 0 02/03 6.6-14 0 02/03 6.3-13 0 02/03 6.6-15 0 02/03 6.3-14 0 02/03 6.6-16 0 02/03 6.3-15 0 02/03 6.6-17 0 02/03 6.3-16 0 02/03 6.6-18 0 02/03 6.3-17 0 02/03 6.6-19 0 02/03 6.3-18 0 02/03 6.6-20 0 02/03 6.3-19 0 02/03 6.6-21 0 02/03 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-5

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date 6.6-22 0 02/03 6.6-72 0 02/03 6.6-23 0 02/03 6.6-73 0 02/03 6.6-24 0 02/03 6.6-74 0 02/03 6.6-25 0 02/03 6.6-75 0 02/03 6.6-26 0 02/03 6.6-76 0 02/03 6.6-27 0 02/03 6.6-77 0 02/03 6.6-28 0 02/03 6.6-78 0 02/03 6.6-29 0 02/03 6.6-79 0 02/03 6.6-30 0 02/03 6.6-80 0 02/03 6.6-31 0 02/03 6.6-81 0 02/03 6.6-32 0 02/03 6.6-82 0 02/03 6.6-33 0 02/03 6.6-83 0 02/03 6.6-34 0 02/03 6.6-84 0 02/03 6.6-35 0 02/03 6.6-85 0 02/03 6.6-36 0 02/03 6.6-86 0 02/03 6.6-37 0 02/03 6.6-87 0 02/03 6.6-38 0 02/03 6.6-88 0 02/03 6.6-39 0 02/03 6.6-89 0 02/03 6.6-40 0 02/03 6.6-90 0 02/03 6.6-41 0 02/03 6.6-91 0 02/03 6.6-42 0 02/03 6.6-92 0 02/03 6.6-43 0 02/03 6.6-93 0 02/03 6.6-44 0 02/03 6.6-45 0 02/03 7.1-1 7 08/16 6.6-46 0 02/03 7.1-1a 7 08/16 6.6-47 0 02/03 7.1-2 5 08/12 6.6-48 0 02/03 7.1-2a 5 08/12 6.6-49 0 02/03 7.1-3 0 02/03 6.6-50 0 02/03 7.2-1 11 11/21 6.6-51 0 02/03 7.3-1 2 08/06 6.6-52 0 02/03 7.4-1 2 08/06 6.6-53 0 02/03 6.6-54 0 02/03 8-1 7 08/16 6.6-55 0 02/03 8.1-1 1 03/05 6.6-56 0 02/03 8.1-2 5 08/12 6.6-57 0 02/03 8.1-3 5 08/12 6.6-58 0 02/03 8.1-4 0 02/03 6.6-59 0 02/03 8.1-5 1 03/05 6.6-60 0 02/03 8.1-6 5 08/12 6.6-61 0 02/03 8.1-7 5 08/12 6.6-62 0 02/03 8.1-8 3 08/08 6.6-63 0 02/03 8.1-9 3 08/08 6.6-64 0 02/03 8.1-10 1 03/05 6.6-65 0 02/03 8.1-11 0 02/03 6.6-66 0 02/03 8.1-12 0 02/03 6.6-67 0 02/03 8.1-13 2 08/06 6.6-68 0 02/03 8.1-14 2 08/06 6.6-69 0 02/03 8.1-15 0 02/03 6.6-70 0 02/03 8.1-16 0 02/03 6.6-71 0 02/03 8.2-1 5 08/12 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-6

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date 8.2-2 9 03/19 11-1 7 08/16 8.2-3 9 03/19 11.1-1 0 02/03 8.2-4 0 02/03 11.1-2 0 02/03 8.2-5 0 02/03 11.1-3 0 02/03 8.2-6 0 02/03 11.2-1 5 08/12 8.2-7 0 02/03 11.2-2 0 02/03 8.2-8 0 02/03 11.2-3 0 02/03 8.2-9 0 02/03 11.2-4 0 02/03 8.3-1 0 02/03 11.2-5 0 02/03 11.2-6 0 02/03 9.1-1 7 08/16 11.2-7 0 02/03 9.1-1a 7 08/16 11.2-8 0 02/03 9.1-2 2 08/06 11.2-9 0 02/03 9.1-3 0 02/03 11.2-10 0 02/03 9.1-4 0 02/03 11.2-11 5 08/12 9.2-1 5 08/12 11.2-12 0 02/03 9.2-2 0 02/03 11.2-13 0 02/03 9.2-3 0 02/03 11.2-14 0 02/03 9.2-4 0 02/03 11.2-15 0 02/03 9.3-1 5 08/12 11.2-16 0 02/03 9.3-2 0 02/03 11.2-17 0 02/03 9.4-1 5 08/12 11.2-18 0 02/03 11.2-19 0 02/03 10.1-1 7 08/16 11.2-20 0 02/03 10.1-1a 7 08/16 11.2-21 11 11/21 10.1-2 5 08/12 11.2-22 0 02/03 10.1-3 5 08/12 11.2-23 0 02/03 10.2-1 2 08/06 11.2-24 5 08/12 10.2-2 5 08/12 11.2-25 5 08/12 10.2-3 0 02/03 11.2-26 5 08/12 10.2-4 5 08/12 11.2-27 9 03/19 10.2-5 5 08/12 11.2-28 0 02/03 10.2-6 0 02/03 11.2-29 0 02/03 10.2-7 0 02/03 11.2-30 5 08/12 10.2-8 0 02/03 11.2-31 0 02/03 10.2-9 0 02/03 11.2-32 0 02/03 10.2-10 0 02/03 11.2-33 0 02/03 10.2-11 0 02/03 11.2-34 0 02/03 10.2-12 0 02/03 11.2-35 0 02/03 10.2-13 0 02/03 11.2-36 0 02/03 10.2-14 5 08/12 11.2-37 0 02/03 10.2-15 0 02/03 11.2-38 0 02/03 10.2-16 0 02/03 11.2-39 0 02/03 10.3-1 5 08/12 11.2-40 0 02/03 10.3-2 5 08/12 11.2-41 0 02/03 10.3-3 5 08/12 11.2-42 0 02/03 10.3-4 2 08/06 11.2-43 0 02/03 10.3-5 2 08/06 11.2-44 0 02/03 10.4-1 0 02/03 11.2-45 0 02/03 11.2-46 0 02/03 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-7

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date 11.2-47 0 02/03 15-9 11 11/21 11.2-48 0 02/03 15-10 11 11/21 11.2-49 0 02/03 15-11 11 11/21 11.2-50 0 02/03 15-12 11 11/21 11.2-51 0 02/03 15-13 11 11/21 11.3-1 0 02/03 15-14 11 11/21 11.3-2 2 08/06 15-15 11 11/21 15-16 11 11/21 12-1 7 08/16 15-17 11 11/21 12-2 5 08/12 15-18 11 11/21 12-3 5 08/12 15-19 11 11/21 12-4 5 08/12 15-20 11 11/21 12-5 9 03/19 15-21 11 11/21 12-6 5 08/12 15-22 11 11/21 12-7 5 08/12 15-23 11 11/21 12-8 5 08/12 15-24 11 11/21 12-9 5 08/12 15-25 11 11/21 12-10 5 08/12 15-26 11 11/21 12-11 5 08/12 15-27 11 11/21 12-12 5 08/12 15-28 11 11/21 12-13 5 08/12 15-29 11 11/21 12-14 5 08/12 15-30 11 11/21 12-15 5 08/12 15-31 11 11/21 15-32 11 11/21 13-1 7 08/16 15-33 11 11/21 13.1-1 5 08/12 15-34 11 11/21 13.1-2 5 08/12 15-35 11 11/21 13.1-3 1 03/05 15-36 11 11/21 13.2-1 5 08/12 15-37 11 11/21 13.2-2 5 08/12 15-38 11 11/21 13.3-1 5 08/12 15-39 11 11/21 13.3-2 5 08/12 15-40 11 11/21 13.3-3 0 02/03 15-41 11 11/21 13.3-4 0 02/03 13.4-1 5 08/12 i 9 03/19 13.5-1 1 03/05 ii 9 03/19 iii 9 03/19 14.1-1 9 03/19 iv 9 03/19 14.1-2 9 03/19 v 9 03/19 14.1-3 0 02/03 vi 9 03/19 14.2-1 10 03/21 vii 9 03/19 viii 9 03/19 15-1 11 11/21 ix 9 03/19 15-2 11 11/21 x 9 03/19 15-3 11 11/21 xi 9 03/19 15-4 11 11/21 xii 9 03/19 15-5 11 11/21 xiii 9 03/19 15-6 11 11/21 xiv 9 03/19 15-7 11 11/21 xv 9 03/19 15-8 11 11/21 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-8

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date A.1.1-1 5 08/12 A.2.3-2 5 08/12 A.1.1-2 5 08/12 A.2.3-3 5 08/12 A.1.1-3 2 08/06 A.2.3-4 5 08/12 A.1.2-1 5 08/12 A.2.3-5 5 08/12 A.1.2-2 11 11/21 A.2.4-1 5 08/12 A.1.2-3 11 11/21 A.2.5-1 5 08/12 A.1.2-4 2 08/06 A.2.5-2 5 08/12 A.1.2-5 2 08/06 A.2.5-3 8 08/18 A.1.3-1 5 08/12 A.2.6-1 2 08/06 A.1.4-1 5 08/12 A.1.5-1 8 08/18 A.3.1-1 5 08/12 DWG: (sh. 1 of 8) 7 7/18/18 A.3.1-2 3 08/08 ANUH-01-4001 A.3.1-3 5 08/12 DWG: (sh. 2 of 8) 7 Not shown A.3.1-4 5 08/12 ANUH-01-4001 A.3.1-5 5 08/12 DWG: (sh. 3 of 8) 7 Not shown A.3.1-6 2 08/06 ANUH-01-4001 A.3.1-7 2 08/06 DWG: (sh. 4 of 8) 7 Not shown A.3.1-8 2 08/06 ANUH-01-4001 A.3.1-9 2 08/06 DWG: (sh. 5 of 8) 7 Not shown A.3.1-10 2 08/06 ANUH-01-4001 A.3.1-11 5 08/12 DWG: (sh. 6 of 8) 7 Not shown A.3.1-12 5 08/12 ANUH-01-4001 A.3.1-13 2 08/06 DWG: (sh. 7 of 8) 7 Not shown A.3.1-14 2 08/06 ANUH-01-4001 A.3.1-15 2 08/06 DWG: (sh. 8 of 8) 7 Not shown A.3.1-16 2 08/06 ANUH-01-4001 A.3.2-1 2 08/06 A.3.2-2 5 08/12 A.2.1-1 5 08/12 A.3.2-3 2 08/06 A.2.1-2 5 08/12 A.3.2-4 2 08/06 A.2.1-3 5 08/12 A.3.3-1 5 08/12 A.2.1-4 5 08/12 A.3.3-2 5 08/12 A.2.1-5 5 08/12 A.3.3-3 2 08/06 A.2.1-6 5 08/12 A.3.3-4 2 08/06 A.2.1-7 5 08/12 A.3.3-5 2 08/06 A.2.1-8 2 08/06 A.3.4-1 5 08/12 A.2.1-9 2 08/06 A.3.4-2 2 08/06 A.2.1-10 2 08/06 A.3.4-3 2 08/06 A.2.1-11 2 08/06 A.3.4-4 11 11/21 A.2.1-12 2 08/06 A.3.5-1 5 08/12 A.2.1-13 2 08/06 A.3.5-2 9 03/19 A.2.1-14 2 08/06 A.3.5-3 2 08/06 A.2.1-15 2 08/06 A.3.5-4 5 08/12 A.2.1-16 2 08/06 A.3.5-5 2 08/06 A.2.1-17 2 08/06 A.3.5-6 5 08/12 A.2.1-18 2 08/06 A.3.5-7 2 08/06 A.2.1-19 2 08/06 A.3.6-1 2 08/06 A.2.2-1 5 08/12 A.3.6-2 2 08/06 A.2.2-2 5 08/12 A.3.6-3 5 08/12 A.2.2-3 5 08/12 A.3.6-4 2 08/06 A.2.3-1 2 08/06 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-9

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date A.3.6-5 2 08/06 A.4.3-1 2 08/06 A.3.6-6 5 08/12 A.4.4-1 2 08/06 A.3.6-7 2 08/06 A.4.4-2 2 08/06 A.3.6-8 2 08/06 A.4.4-3 2 08/06 A.3.6-8a 2 08/06 A.4.4-4 2 08/06 A.3.6-9 2 08/06 A.4.4-5 9 03/19 A.3.6-10 2 08/06 A.4.4-6 2 08/06 A.3.6-11 2 08/06 A.4.4-7 2 08/06 A.3.6-12 2 08/06 A.4.4-8 2 08/06 A.3.6-13 2 08/06 A.4.4-9 2 08/06 A.3.6-14 2 08/06 A.4.4-10 2 08/06 A.3.6-15 2 08/06 A.4.4-11 2 08/06 A.3.6-16 5 08/12 A.4.4-12 2 08/06 A.3.6-17 5 08/12 A.4.4-13 2 08/06 A.3.6-17a 2 08/06 A.4.4-14 2 08/06 A.3.6-18 2 08/06 A.4.4-15 2 08/06 A.3.6-19 2 08/06 A.4.4-16 2 08/06 A.3.6-20 2 08/06 A.4.4-17 2 08/06 A.3.6-21 2 08/06 A.4.4-18 2 08/06 A.3.6-22 2 08/06 A.4.4-19 2 08/06 A.3.6-23 2 08/06 A.4.4-20 2 08/06 A.3.6-24 2 08/06 A.4.4-21 4 08/10 A.3.6-25 5 08/12 A.4.4-22 4 08/10 A.3.6-26 2 08/06 A.4.4-23 9 03/19 A.3.6-27 2 08/06 A.4.4-24 2 08/06 A.3.6-27a 2 08/06 A.4.4-25 2 08/06 A.3.6-27b 2 08/06 A.4.4-26 2 08/06 A.3.6-27c 2 08/06 A.4.4-27 2 08/06 A.3.6-27d 2 08/06 A.4.4-28 2 08/06 A.3.6-27e 2 08/06 A.4.4-29 2 08/06 A.3.6-28 2 08/06 A.4.4-30 2 08/06 A.3.6-29 2 08/06 A.4.4-31 2 08/06 A.3.6-30 2 08/06 A.4.4-32 2 08/06 A.3.6-31 2 08/06 A.4.4-33 2 08/06 A.3.6-32 2 08/06 A.4.4-34 2 08/06 A.3.6-33 2 08/06 A.4.4-35 2 08/06 A.3.6-34 2 08/06 A.4.4-36 2 08/06 A.3.7-1 5 08/12 A.4.4-37 2 08/06 A.3.7-2 2 08/06 A.4.4-38 2 08/06 A.4.4-39 2 08/06 A.4-1 5 08/12 A.4.4-40 2 08/06 A.4.1-1 2 08/06 A.4.4-41 2 08/06 A.4.1-2 2 08/06 A.4.4-42 2 08/06 A.4.1-3 2 08/06 A.4.4-43 2 08/06 A.4.1-4 2 08/06 A.4.4-44 2 08/06 A.4.1-5 2 08/06 A.4.4-45 2 08/06 A.4.2-1 2 08/06 A.4.4-46 2 08/06 A.4.2-2 2 08/06 A.4.4-47 2 08/06 A.4.2-3 2 08/06 A.4.4-48 2 08/06 A.4.2-4 2 08/06 A.4.4-49 2 08/06 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-10

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date A.4.4-50 2 08/06 A.4.10-13 2 08/06 A.4.4-51 2 08/06 A.4.10-14 2 08/06 A.4.5-1 2 08/06 A.4.10-15 2 08/06 A.4.6-1 2 08/06 A.4.10-16 2 08/06 A.4.6-2 2 08/06 A.4.10-17 2 08/06 A.4.6-3 2 08/06 A.4.10-18 2 08/06 A.4.6-4 2 08/06 A.4.10-19 2 08/06 A.4.6-5 2 08/06 A.4.10-20 2 08/06 A.4.6-6 2 08/06 A.4.11-1 5 08/12 A.4.6-7 2 08/06 A.4.11-2 5 08/12 A.4.7-1 9 03/19 A.4.11-3 9 03/19 A.4.7-2 2 08/06 A.4.11-4 9 03/19 A.4.7-3 2 08/06 A.4.11-5 9 03/19 A.4.7-4 2 08/06 A.4.11-6 9 03/19 A.4.7-5 2 08/06 A.4.11-7 9 03/19 A.4.7-6 5 08/12 A.4.11-8 9 03/19 A.4.7-7 2 08/06 A.4.11-9 9 03/19 A.4.7-8 2 08/06 A.4.11-10 9 03/19 A.4.7-9 5 08/12 A.4.11-11 9 03/19 A.4.7-10 2 08/06 A.4.11-12 9 03/19 A.4.7-11 2 08/06 A.4.11-13 9 03/19 A.4.7-12 2 08/06 A.4.11-14 9 03/19 A.4.7-13 2 08/06 A.4.11-15 9 03/19 A.4.7-14 2 08/06 A.4.11-16 9 03/19 A.4.7-15 2 08/06 A.4.11-17 9 03/19 A.4.7-16 2 08/06 A.4.11-18 9 03/19 A.4.7-17 2 08/06 A.4.11-19 9 03/19 A.4.7-18 5 08/12 A.4.11-20 9 03/19 A.4.8-1 2 08/06 A.4.11-21 9 03/19 A.4.9-1 5 08/12 A.4.11-22 9 03/19 A.4.9-2 2 08/06 A.4.11-23 9 03/19 A.4.9-3 2 08/06 A.4.11-24 9 03/19 A.4.9-4 2 08/06 A.4.9-5 5 08/12 A.5.1-1 5 08/12 A.4.9-6 2 08/06 A.5.1-2 2 08/06 A.4.9-7 2 08/06 A.5.1-3 5 08/12 A.4.9-8 2 08/06 A.5.1-4 11 11/21 A.4.9-9 2 08/06 A.5.1-5 11 11/21 A.4.10-1 2 08/06 A.5.1-5a 11 11/21 A.4.10-2 2 08/06 A.5.1-6 2 08/06 A.4.10-3 2 08/06 A.5.1-7 2 08/06 A.4.10-4 2 08/06 A.5.1-8 2 08/06 A.4.10-5 2 08/06 A.5.1-9 2 08/06 A.4.10-6 2 08/06 A.5.1-10 2 08/06 A.4.10-7 2 08/06 A.5.1-11 2 08/06 A.4.10-8 2 08/06 A.5.2-1 5 08/12 A.4.10-9 2 08/06 A.5.2-2 2 08/06 A.4.10-10 2 08/06 A.5.2-3 5 08/12 A.4.10-11 2 08/06 A.5.2-3a 2 08/06 A.4.10-12 2 08/06 A.5.2-4 5 08/12 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-11

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date A.5.2-5 2 08/06 A.5.5-16 2 08/06 A.5.2-6 2 08/06 A.5.5-17 2 08/06 A.5.2-7 5 08/12 A.5.5-18 2 08/06 A.5.2-8 2 08/06 A.5.5-19 2 08/06 A.5.2-9 5 08/12 A.5.5-20 2 08/06 A.5.2-10 2 08/06 A.5.5-21 2 08/06 A.5.2-11 5 08/12 A.5.5-22 2 08/06 A.5.2-12 5 08/12 A.5.5-23 2 08/06 A.5.2-13 2 08/06 A.5.5-24 2 08/06 A.5.2-14 2 08/06 A.5.5-25 2 08/06 A.5.2-15 2 08/06 A.5.5-26 2 08/06 A.5.2-16 2 08/06 A.5.5-27 2 08/06 A.5.2-17 5 08/12 A.5.5-28 2 08/06 A.5.2-18 5 08/12 A.5.5-29 2 08/06 A.5.3-1 11 11/21 A.5.5-30 2 08/06 A.5.3-2 10 03/21 A.5.5-31 2 08/06 A.5.3-3 2 08/06 A.5.5-32 2 08/06 A.5.3-4 5 08/12 A.5.5-33 2 08/06 A.5.3-5 5 08/12 A.5.5-34 2 08/06 A.5.3-6 5 08/12 A.5.5-35 2 08/06 A.5.3-7 5 08/12 A.5.5-36 2 08/06 A.5.3-8 2 08/06 A.5.5-37 2 08/06 A.5.4-1 2 08/06 A.5.5-38 2 08/06 A.5.4-2 2 08/06 A.5.5-39 2 08/06 A.5.4-3 2 08/06 A.5.5-40 2 08/06 A.5.4-4 2 08/06 A.5.5-41 2 08/06 A.5.4-5 2 08/06 A.5.5-42 2 08/06 A.5.4-6 2 08/06 A.5.5-43 2 08/06 A.5.4-7 2 08/06 A.5.5-44 2 08/06 A.5.4-8 2 08/06 A.5.5-45 2 08/06 A.5.4-9 2 08/06 A.5.5-46 2 08/06 A.5.4-10 2 08/06 A.5.5-47 2 08/06 A.5.4-11 2 08/06 A.5.5-48 2 08/06 A.5.4-12 2 08/06 A.5.5-49 2 08/06 A.5.4-13 2 08/06 A.5.5-50 2 08/06 A.5.5-1 2 08/06 A.5.5-51 2 08/06 A.5.5-2 11 11/21 A.5.5-52 2 08/06 A.5.5-3 2 08/06 A.5.5-53 2 08/06 A.5.5-4 2 08/06 A.5.5-54 2 08/06 A.5.5-5 2 08/06 A.5.5-55 2 08/06 A.5.5-6 2 08/06 A.5.5-56 2 08/06 A.5.5-7 2 08/06 A.5.5-57 2 08/06 A.5.5-8 2 08/06 A.5.5-58 2 08/06 A.5.5-9 2 08/06 A.5.5-59 2 08/06 A.5.5-10 2 08/06 A.5.5-60 2 08/06 A.5.5-11 2 08/06 A.5.5-61 2 08/06 A.5.5-12 2 08/06 A.5.5-62 2 08/06 A.5.5-13 2 08/06 A.5.5-63 2 08/06 A.5.5-14 2 08/06 A.5.5-64 2 08/06 A.5.5-15 2 08/06 A.5.5-65 2 08/06 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-12

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date A.5.5-66 2 08/06 A.6.1-2 5 08/12 A.5.5-67 2 08/06 A.6.2-1 5 08/12 A.5.5-68 2 08/06 A.6.2-2 5 08/12 A.5.5-69 2 08/06 A.6.3-1 5 08/12 A.5.5-70 2 08/06 A.6.3-2 5 08/12 A.5.5-71 2 08/06 A.6.3-3 5 08/12 A.5.5-72 2 08/06 A.6.3-4 5 08/12 A.5.5-73 2 08/06 A.6.3-5 5 08/12 A.5.5-74 2 08/06 A.6.3-6 11 11/21 A.5.5-75 2 08/06 A.6.3-7 2 08/06 A.5.5-76 2 08/06 A.6.3-8 2 08/06 A.5.5-77 2 08/06 A.6.3-9 2 08/06 A.5.5-78 2 08/06 A.6.3-10 5 08/12 A.5.5-79 2 08/06 A.6.3-11 3 08/08 A.5.5-80 2 08/06 A.6.3-12 2 08/06 A.5.5-81 2 08/06 A.6.3-13 5 08/12 A.5.5-82 2 08/06 A.6.3-14 2 08/06 A.5.5-83 2 08/06 A.6.3-15 2 08/06 A.5.5-84 2 08/06 A.6.3-16 2 08/06 A.5.5-85 2 08/06 A.6.3-17 2 08/06 A.5.5-86 2 08/06 A.6.3-18 2 08/06 A.5.5-87 2 08/06 A.6.4-1 5 08/12 A.5.5-88 2 08/06 A.6.4-2 5 08/12 A.5.5-89 2 08/06 A.6.4-3 5 08/12 A.5.5-90 2 08/06 A.6.4-4 5 08/12 A.5.5-91 2 08/06 A.6.4-5 5 08/12 A.5.5-92 2 08/06 A.6.4-6 5 08/12 A.5.5-93 2 08/06 A.6.4-7 2 08/06 A.5.5-94 2 08/06 A.6.4-8 5 08/12 A.5.5-95 2 08/06 A.6.4-9 5 08/12 A.5.5-96 2 08/06 A.6.4-10 5 08/12 A.5.5-97 2 08/06 A.6.4-11 5 08/12 A.5.5-98 2 08/06 A.6.4-12 5 08/12 A.5.5-99 2 08/06 A.6.4-13 5 08/12 A.5.5-100 2 08/06 A.6.4-14 5 08/12 A.5.5-101 2 08/06 A.6.4-15 5 08/12 A.5.5-102 2 08/06 A.6.4-16 5 08/12 A.5.5-103 2 08/06 A.6.4-17 5 08/12 A.5.5-104 2 08/06 A.6.4-18 5 08/12 A.5.5-105 2 08/06 A.6.4-19 5 08/12 A.5.5-106 2 08/06 A.6.4-20 5 08/12 A.5.5-107 2 08/06 A.6.4-21 2 08/06 A.5.5-108 2 08/06 A.6.4-22 2 08/06 A.5.5-109 2 08/06 A.6.4-23 2 08/06 A.5.5-110 2 08/06 A.6.4-24 5 08/12 A.5.5-111 2 08/06 A.6.4-25 2 08/06 A.5.5-112 2 08/06 A.6.4-26 2 08/06 A.6.4-27 2 08/06 A.6-1 5 08/12 A.6.4-28 2 08/06 A.6.1-1 5 08/12 A.6.4-29 2 08/06 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-13

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date A.6.4-30 2 08/06 A.6.6-32 2 08/06 A.6.4-31 2 08/06 A.6.6-33 2 08/06 A.6.4-32 2 08/06 A.6.6-34 2 08/06 A.6.4-33 2 08/06 A.6.6-35 2 08/06 A.6.4-34 2 08/06 A.6.6-36 2 08/06 A.6.4-35 2 08/06 A.6.6-37 2 08/06 A.6.4-36 2 08/06 A.6.6-38 2 08/06 A.6.4-37 2 08/06 A.6.6-39 2 08/06 A.6.4-38 2 08/06 A.6.6-40 2 08/06 A.6.4-39 2 08/06 A.6.6-41 2 08/06 A.6.4-40 2 08/06 A.6.6-42 2 08/06 A.6.5-1 5 08/12 A.6.6-43 2 08/06 A.6.5-2 2 08/06 A.6.6-44 2 08/06 A.6.5-3 2 08/06 A.6.6-45 2 08/06 A.6.5-4 2 08/06 A.6.6-46 2 08/06 A.6.5-5 2 08/06 A.6.6-47 2 08/06 A.6.5-6 2 08/06 A.6.6-48 2 08/06 A.6.5-7 5 08/12 A.6.6-49 2 08/06 A.6.5-8 5 08/12 A.6.6-50 2 08/06 A.6.6-1 2 08/06 A.6.6-51 2 08/06 A.6.6-2 2 08/06 A.6.6-52 2 08/06 A.6.6-3 2 08/06 A.6.6-53 2 08/06 A.6.6-4 2 08/06 A.6.6-54 2 08/06 A.6.6-5 2 08/06 A.6.6-55 2 08/06 A.6.6-6 2 08/06 A.6.6-56 2 08/06 A.6.6-7 2 08/06 A.6.6-57 2 08/06 A.6.6-8 2 08/06 A.6.6-58 2 08/06 A.6.6-9 2 08/06 A.6.6-59 2 08/06 A.6.6-10 2 08/06 A.6.6-60 2 08/06 A.6.6-11 2 08/06 A.6.6-61 2 08/06 A.6.6-12 2 08/06 A.6.6-62 2 08/06 A.6.6-13 2 08/06 A.6.6-63 2 08/06 A.6.6-14 2 08/06 A.6.6-64 2 08/06 A.6.6-15 2 08/06 A.6.6-65 2 08/06 A.6.6-16 2 08/06 A.6.6-66 2 08/06 A.6.6-17 2 08/06 A.6.6-67 2 08/06 A.6.6-18 2 08/06 A.6.6-68 2 08/06 A.6.6-19 2 08/06 A.6.6-69 2 08/06 A.6.6-20 2 08/06 A.6.6-70 2 08/06 A.6.6-21 2 08/06 A.6.6-71 2 08/06 A.6.6-22 2 08/06 A.6.6-72 2 08/06 A.6.6-23 2 08/06 A.6.6-73 2 08/06 A.6.6-24 2 08/06 A.6.6-74 2 08/06 A.6.6-25 2 08/06 A.6.6-75 2 08/06 A.6.6-26 2 08/06 A.6.6-76 2 08/06 A.6.6-27 2 08/06 A.6.6-77 2 08/06 A.6.6-28 2 08/06 A.6.6-78 2 08/06 A.6.6-29 2 08/06 A.6.6-79 2 08/06 A.6.6-30 2 08/06 A.6.6-31 2 08/06 A.7.1-1 5 08/12 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-14

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date A.7.1-2 5 08/12 A.10.2-12 2 08/06 A.7.1-3 5 08/12 A.10.2-13 5 08/12 A.7.1-4 2 08/06 A.10.2-14 2 08/06 A.7.2-1 5 08/12 A.10.2-15 2 08/06 A.7.3-1 5 08/12 A.10.3-1 5 08/12 A.7.4-1 5 08/12 A.10.3-2 2 08/06 A.10.3-3 5 08/12 A.8.1-1 5 08/12 A.10.3-4 2 08/06 A.8.1-2 2 08/06 A.10.3-5 2 08/06 A.8.1-3 5 08/12 A.10.4-1 11 11/21 A.8.1-4 2 08/06 A.8.1-5 2 08/06 A.11-1 5 08/12 A.8.1-6 5 08/12 A.11.1-1 5 08/12 A.8.1-6a 5 08/12 A.11.1-2 5 08/12 A.8.1-7 3 08/08 A.11.2-1 5 08/12 A.8.1-8 5 08/12 A.11.2-2 5 08/12 A.8.1-9 2 08/06 A.11.2-3 5 08/12 A.8.1-10 3 08/08 A.11.2-4 5 08/12 A.8.1-11 2 08/06 A.11.2-5 5 08/12 A.8.2-1 9 03/19 A.11.3-1 2 08/06 A.8.2-2 9 03/19 A.8.2-3 9 03/19 A.12-1 5 08/12 A.8.2-4 2 08/06 A.12-2 5 08/12 A.8.2-5 2 08/06 A.12-3 5 08/12 A.8.2-6 2 08/06 A.12-4 9 03/19 A.8.2-7 2 08/06 A.12-5 5 08/12 A.8.2-8 2 08/06 A.12-6 5 08/12 A.8.3-1 5 08/12 A.12-7 5 08/12 A.12-8 5 08/12 A.9.1-1 5 08/12 A.12-9 5 08/12 A.9.1-2 5 08/12 A.12-10 5 08/12 A.9.1-3 5 08/12 A.12-11 5 08/12 A.9.1-4 5 08/12 A.12-12 5 08/12 A.9.2-1 5 08/12 A.12-13 5 08/12 A.9.2-1a 5 08/12 A.12-14 5 08/12 A.9.3-1 5 08/12 A.9.4-1 2 08/06 A.13-1 2 08/06 A.10.1-1 5 08/12 A.14.1-1 9 03/19 A.10.2-1 11 11/21 A.14.1-2 9 03/19 A.10.2-2 5 08/12 A.14.1-3 2 08/06 A.10.2-3 11 11/21 A.14.2-1 10 03/21 A.10.2-4 11 11/21 A.10.2-5 11 11/21 B-i 7 08/16 A.10.2-6 2 08/06 B-ii 7 08/16 A.10.2-7 11 11/21 B-iii 7 08/16 A.10.2-8 2 08/06 B-iv 7 08/16 A.10.2-9 2 08/06 B-v 7 08/16 A.10.2-10 11 11/21 B-vi 7 08/16 A.10.2-11 2 08/06 B-vii 7 08/16 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-15

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date B-viii 7 08/16 DWG: (sh. 1 of 4) 0 8/9/16 B-ix 7 08/16 ANUH-01-4004 B-x 7 08/16 DWG: (sh. 2 of 4) 0 8/9/16 B-xi 7 08/16 ANUH-01-4004 B-xii 7 08/16 DWG: (sh. 3 of 4) 0 8/9/16 B-xiii 7 08/16 ANUH-01-4004 B-xiv 7 08/16 DWG: (sh. 4 of 4) 0 8/9/16 B-xv 7 08/16 ANUH-01-4004 B-xvi 7 08/16 DWG: (sh. 1 of 4) 0 8/9/16 B-xvii 7 08/16 ANUH-01-4005 B-xviii 7 08/16 DWG: (sh. 2 of 4) 0 8/9/16 B-xix 7 08/16 ANUH-01-4005 DWG: (sh. 3 of 4) 0 8/9/16 B.1-1 7 08/16 ANUH-01-4005 B.1.1-1 7 08/16 DWG: (sh. 4 of 4) 0 8/9/16 B.1.1-2 7 08/16 ANUH-01-4005 B.1.1-3 7 08/16 DWG: (sh. 1 of 1) 0 8/9/16 B.1.2-1 7 08/16 ANUH-01-4006 B.1.2-2 7 08/16 DWG: (sh. 1 of 14) 0 8/9/16 B.1.2-3 7 08/16 NUH-03-4012 B.1.2-4 7 08/16 DWG: (sh. 2 of 14) 0 8/9/16 NUH-03-4012 B.1.2-5 11 11/21 DWG: (sh. 3 of 14) 0 8/9/16 B.1.2-6 7 08/16 NUH-03-4012 B.1.2-7 7 08/16 DWG: (sh. 4 of 14) 0 8/9/16 B.1.2-8 7 08/16 NUH-03-4012 B.1.2-9 7 08/16 DWG: (sh. 5 of 14) 0 8/9/16 B.1.3-1 7 08/16 NUH-03-4012 B.1.4-1 7 08/16 DWG: (sh. 6 of 14) 0 8/9/16 B.1.4-2 7 08/16 NUH-03-4012 B.1.4-3 7 08/16 DWG: (sh. 7 of 14) 0 8/9/16 B.1.5-1 7 08/16 NUH-03-4012 B.1.5-2 7 08/16 DWG: (sh. 8 of 14) 0 8/9/16 DWG: (sh. 1 of 6) 0 8/9/16 NUH-03-4012 ANUH-01-4002 DWG: (sh. 9 of 14) 0 8/9/16 DWG: (sh. 2 of 6) 0 8/9/16 NUH-03-4012 ANUH-01-4002 DWG: (sh. 10 of 14) 0 8/9/16 DWG: (sh. 3 of 6) 0 8/9/16 NUH-03-4012 ANUH-01-4002 DWG: (sh. 11 of 14) 0 8/9/16 DWG: (sh. 4 of 6) 0 8/9/16 NUH-03-4012 ANUH-01-4002 DWG: (sh. 12 of 14) 0 8/9/16 DWG: (sh. 5 of 6) 0 8/9/16 NUH-03-4012 ANUH-01-4002 DWG: (sh. 13 of 14) 0 8/9/16 DWG: (sh. 6 of 6) 0 8/9/16 NUH-03-4012 ANUH-01-4002 DWG: (sh. 14 of 14) 0 8/9/16 DWG: (sh. 1 of 3) 0 8/9/16 NUH-03-4012 ANUH-01-4003 DWG: (sh. 1 of 6) 0 8/9/16 DWG: (sh. 2 of 3) 0 8/9/16 NUH-03-4013 ANUH-01-4003 DWG: (sh. 2 of 6) 0 8/9/16 DWG: (sh. 3 of 3) 0 8/9/16 NUH-03-4013 ANUH-01-4003 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-16

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date DWG: (sh. 3 of 6) 0 8/9/16 B.3.1-13 7 08/16 NUH-03-4013 B.3.1-14 7 08/16 DWG: (sh. 4 of 6) 0 8/9/16 B.3.1-15 7 08/16 NUH-03-4013 B.3.1-16 7 08/16 DWG: (sh. 5 of 6) 0 8/9/16 B.3.1-17 7 08/16 NUH-03-4013 B.3.1-18 7 08/16 DWG: (sh. 6 of 6) 0 8/9/16 B.3.1-19 7 08/16 NUH-03-4013 B.3.1-20 7 08/16 B.3.1-21 7 08/16 B.2.1-1 7 08/16 B.3.1-22 7 08/16 B.2.1-2 7 08/16 B.3.1-23 7 08/16 B.2.1-3 7 08/16 B.3.1-24 7 08/16 B.2.1-4 7 08/16 B.3.1-25 7 08/16 B.2.1-5 7 08/16 B.3.1-26 7 08/16 B.2.1-6 7 08/16 B.3.1-27 7 08/16 B.2.1-7 7 08/16 B.3.1-28 7 08/16 B.2.1-8 7 08/16 B.3.1-29 7 08/16 B.2.1-9 7 08/16 B.3.1-30 7 08/16 B.2.1-10 7 08/16 B.3.1-31 7 08/16 B.2.1-11 7 08/16 B.3.1-32 7 08/16 B.2.1-12 7 08/16 B.3.1-33 7 08/16 B.2.1-13 7 08/16 B.3.1-34 7 08/16 B.2.1-14 7 08/16 B.3.1-35 7 08/16 B.2.1-15 7 08/16 B.3.1-36 7 08/16 B.2.2-1 7 08/16 B.3.1-37 7 08/16 B.2.2-2 7 08/16 B.3.1-38 7 08/16 B.2.2-3 7 08/16 B.3.1-39 7 08/16 B.2.2-4 7 08/16 B.3.1-40 7 08/16 B.2.3-1 7 08/16 B.3.1-41 7 08/16 B.2.3-2 7 08/16 B.3.2-1 7 08/16 B.2.3-3 7 08/16 B.3.2-2 7 08/16 B.2.3-4 7 08/16 B.3.2-3 7 08/16 B.2.4-1 7 08/16 B.3.2-4 7 08/16 B.2.5-1 7 08/16 B.3.3-1 7 08/16 B.2.5-2 7 08/16 B.3.3-2 7 08/16 B.2.5-3 8 08/18 B.3.3-3 7 08/16 B.2.6-1 7 08/16 B.3.3-4 7 08/16 B.2.6-2 7 08/16 B.3.3-5 7 08/16 B.3.3-6 7 08/16 B.3.1-1 7 08/16 B.3.3-7 7 08/16 B.3.1-2 7 08/16 B.3.3-8 7 08/16 B.3.1-3 7 08/16 B.3.3-9 7 08/16 B.3.1-4 7 08/16 B.3.4-1 7 08/16 B.3.1-5 7 08/16 B.3.4-2 7 08/16 B.3.1-6 7 08/16 B.3.4-3 7 08/16 B.3.1-7 7 08/16 B.3.4-4 7 08/16 B.3.1-8 7 08/16 B.3.4-5 7 08/16 B.3.1-9 7 08/16 B.3.4-6 7 08/16 B.3.1-10 7 08/16 B.3.4-7 7 08/16 B.3.1-11 7 08/16 B.3.4-8 7 08/16 B.3.1-12 7 08/16 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-17

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date B.3.4-9 7 08/16 B.3.6-18 7 08/16 B.3.4-10 7 08/16 B.3.6-19 7 08/16 B.3.4-11 7 08/16 B.3.6-20 7 08/16 B.3.4-12 7 08/16 B.3.6-21 7 08/16 B.3.4-13 7 08/16 B.3.6-22 7 08/16 B.3.4-14 7 08/16 B.3.6-23 7 08/16 B.3.4-15 7 08/16 B.3.6-24 7 08/16 B.3.4-16 7 08/16 B.3.6-25 7 08/16 B.3.4-17 7 08/16 B.3.6-26 7 08/16 B.3.5-1 7 08/16 B.3.6-27 7 08/16 B.3.5-2 7 08/16 B.3.6-28 7 08/16 B.3.5-3 7 08/16 B.3.6-29 7 08/16 B.3.5-4 7 08/16 B.3.6-30 7 08/16 B.3.5-5 7 08/16 B.3.6-31 7 08/16 B.3.5-6 7 08/16 B.3.6-32 7 08/16 B.3.5-7 7 08/16 B.3.6-33 7 08/16 B.3.5-8 7 08/16 B.3.6-34 7 08/16 B.3.5-9 7 08/16 B.3.6-35 7 08/16 B.3.5-10 7 08/16 B.3.6-36 7 08/16 B.3.5-11 7 08/16 B.3.6-37 7 08/16 B.3.5-12 7 08/16 B.3.6-38 7 08/16 B.3.5-13 7 08/16 B.3.6-39 7 08/16 B.3.5-14 7 08/16 B.3.6-40 7 08/16 B.3.5-15 7 08/16 B.3.6-41 7 08/16 B.3.5-16 7 08/16 B.3.6-42 7 08/16 B.3.5-17 7 08/16 B.3.6-43 7 08/16 B.3.5-18 7 08/16 B.3.6-44 7 08/16 B.3.5-19 7 08/16 B.3.6-45 7 08/16 B.3.5-20 7 08/16 B.3.6-46 7 08/16 B.3.5-21 7 08/16 B.3.6-47 7 08/16 B.3.5-22 7 08/16 B.3.6-48 7 08/16 B.3.5-23 7 08/16 B.3.6-49 7 08/16 B.3.5-24 7 08/16 B.3.6-50 7 08/16 B.3.6-1 7 08/16 B.3.6-51 7 08/16 B.3.6-2 7 08/16 B.3.6-52 7 08/16 B.3.6-3 7 08/16 B.3.6-53 7 08/16 B.3.6-4 7 08/16 B.3.6-54 7 08/16 B.3.6-5 7 08/16 B.3.6-55 7 08/16 B.3.6-6 7 08/16 B.3.6-56 7 08/16 B.3.6-7 7 08/16 B.3.6-57 7 08/16 B.3.6-8 7 08/16 B.3.6-58 7 08/16 B.3.6-9 7 08/16 B.3.6-59 7 08/16 B.3.6-10 7 08/16 B.3.6-60 7 08/16 B.3.6-11 7 08/16 B.3.6-61 7 08/16 B.3.6-12 7 08/16 B.3.6-62 7 08/16 B.3.6-13 7 08/16 B.3.6-63 7 08/16 B.3.6-14 7 08/16 B.3.6-64 7 08/16 B.3.6-15 7 08/16 B.3.6-65 7 08/16 B.3.6-16 7 08/16 B.3.6-66 7 08/16 B.3.6-17 7 08/16 B.3.6-67 7 08/16 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-18

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date B.3.6-68 7 08/16 B.4.4-16 7 08/16 B.3.6-69 7 08/16 B.4.4-17 7 08/16 B.3.6-70 7 08/16 B.4.4-18 7 08/16 B.3.6-71 7 08/16 B.4.4-19 7 08/16 B.3.6-72 7 08/16 B.4.5-1 7 08/16 B.3.6-73 7 08/16 B.4.5-2 7 08/16 B.3.6-74 7 08/16 B.4.5-3 7 08/16 B.3.6-75 7 08/16 B.4.5-4 7 08/16 B.3.6-76 7 08/16 B.4.5-5 7 08/16 B.3.6-77 7 08/16 B.4.5-6 7 08/16 B.3.6-78 7 08/16 B.4.5-7 7 08/16 B.3.6-79 7 08/16 B.4.5-8 7 08/16 B.3.6-80 7 08/16 B.4.5-9 7 08/16 B.3.6-81 7 08/16 B.4.5-10 7 08/16 B.3.6-82 7 08/16 B.4.5-11 7 08/16 B.3.7-1 7 08/16 B.4.5-12 7 08/16 B.3.7-2 7 08/16 B.4.5-13 7 08/16 B.3.7-3 7 08/16 B.4.5-14 7 08/16 B.3.7-4 7 08/16 B.4.5-15 7 08/16 B.4.5-16 7 08/16 B.4-1 7 08/16 B.4.5-17 7 08/16 B.4.1-1 7 08/16 B.4.5-18 7 08/16 B.4.1-2 7 08/16 B.4.5-19 7 08/16 B.4.1-3 7 08/16 B.4.5-20 7 08/16 B.4.1-4 7 08/16 B.4.5-21 7 08/16 B.4.1-5 7 08/16 B.4.5-22 7 08/16 B.4.2-1 7 08/16 B.4.5-23 7 08/16 B.4.2-2 7 08/16 B.4.5-24 7 08/16 B.4.2-3 7 08/16 B.4.5-25 7 08/16 B.4.2-4 7 08/16 B.4.5-26 7 08/16 B.4.2-5 7 08/16 B.4.5-27 7 08/16 B.4.2-6 7 08/16 B.4.5-28 7 08/16 B.4.2-7 7 08/16 B.4.5-29 7 08/16 B.4.3-1 7 08/16 B.4.5-30 7 08/16 B.4.3-2 7 08/16 B.4.5-31 7 08/16 B.4.4-1 7 08/16 B.4.5-32 7 08/16 B.4.4-2 7 08/16 B.4.5-33 7 08/16 B.4.4-3 7 08/16 B.4.5-34 7 08/16 B.4.4-4 7 08/16 B.4.5-35 7 08/16 B.4.4-5 7 08/16 B.4.5-36 7 08/16 B.4.4-6 7 08/16 B.4.5-37 7 08/16 B.4.4-7 7 08/16 B.4.5-38 7 08/16 B.4.4-8 7 08/16 B.4.5-39 7 08/16 B.4.4-9 7 08/16 B.4.5-40 7 08/16 B.4.4-10 7 08/16 B.4.5-41 7 08/16 B.4.4-11 7 08/16 B.4.5-42 7 08/16 B.4.4-12 7 08/16 B.4.5-43 7 08/16 B.4.4-13 7 08/16 B.4.6-1 7 08/16 B.4.4-14 7 08/16 B.4.6-2 7 08/16 B.4.4-15 7 08/16 B.4.6-3 7 08/16 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-19

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date B.4.6-4 7 08/16 B.4.6-54 7 08/16 B.4.6-5 7 08/16 B.4.6-55 7 08/16 B.4.6-6 7 08/16 B.4.6-56 7 08/16 B.4.6-7 7 08/16 B.4.6-57 7 08/16 B.4.6-8 7 08/16 B.4.6-58 7 08/16 B.4.6-9 7 08/16 B.4.6-59 7 08/16 B.4.6-10 7 08/16 B.4.6-60 7 08/16 B.4.6-11 7 08/16 B.4.6-61 7 08/16 B.4.6-12 7 08/16 B.4.6-62 7 08/16 B.4.6-13 7 08/16 B.4.6-63 7 08/16 B.4.6-14 7 08/16 B.4.6-64 7 08/16 B.4.6-15 7 08/16 B.4.7-1 7 08/16 B.4.6-16 7 08/16 B.4.7-2 7 08/16 B.4.6-17 7 08/16 B.4.7-3 10 03/21 B.4.6-18 7 08/16 B.4.7-4 7 08/16 B.4.6-19 7 08/16 B.4.7-5 7 08/16 B.4.6-20 7 08/16 B.4.7-6 7 08/16 B.4.6-21 7 08/16 B.4.7-7 7 08/16 B.4.6-22 7 08/16 B.4.7-8 7 08/16 B.4.6-23 7 08/16 B.4.8-1 9 03/19 B.4.6-24 7 08/16 B.4.8-2 7 08/16 B.4.6-25 7 08/16 B.4.9-1 7 08/16 B.4.6-26 7 08/16 B.4.9-2 7 08/16 B.4.6-27 7 08/16 B.4.9-3 7 08/16 B.4.6-28 7 08/16 B.4.9-4 7 08/16 B.4.6-29 7 08/16 B.4.9-5 7 08/16 B.4.6-30 7 08/16 B.4.9-6 7 08/16 B.4.6-31 7 08/16 B.4.9-7 7 08/16 B.4.6-32 7 08/16 B.4.10-1 7 08/16 B.4.6-33 7 08/16 B.4.10-2 7 08/16 B.4.6-34 7 08/16 B.4.10-3 7 08/16 B.4.6-35 7 08/16 B.4.6-36 7 08/16 B.5-1 7 08/16 B.4.6-37 7 08/16 B.5-2 7 08/16 B.4.6-38 7 08/16 B.5.1-1 7 08/16 B.4.6-39 7 08/16 B.5.1-2 7 08/16 B.4.6-40 7 08/16 B.5.2-1 7 08/16 B.4.6-41 7 08/16 B.5.2-2 7 08/16 B.4.6-42 7 08/16 B.5.2-3 7 08/16 B.4.6-43 7 08/16 B.5.2-4 7 08/16 B.4.6-44 7 08/16 B.5.2-5 7 08/16 B.4.6-45 7 08/16 B.5.2-6 7 08/16 B.4.6-46 7 08/16 B.5.2-7 7 08/16 B.4.6-47 7 08/16 B.5.2-8 7 08/16 B.4.6-48 7 08/16 B.5.2-9 7 08/16 B.4.6-49 7 08/16 B.5.2-10 7 08/16 B.4.6-50 7 08/16 B.5.2-11 7 08/16 B.4.6-51 7 08/16 B.5.3-1 7 08/16 B.4.6-52 7 08/16 B.5.3-2 7 08/16 B.4.6-53 7 08/16 B.5.3-3 7 08/16 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-20

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date B.5.4-1 7 08/16 B.5.5-44 7 08/16 B.5.4-2 7 08/16 B.5.5-45 7 08/16 B.5.4-3 7 08/16 B.5.5-46 7 08/16 B.5.4-4 7 08/16 B.5.5-47 7 08/16 B.5.4-5 7 08/16 B.5.5-48 7 08/16 B.5.4-6 7 08/16 B.5.5-49 7 08/16 B.5.4-7 7 08/16 B.5.5-50 7 08/16 B.5.5-1 7 08/16 B.5.5-51 7 08/16 B.5.5-2 7 08/16 B.5.5-52 7 08/16 B.5.5-3 7 08/16 B.5.5-53 7 08/16 B.5.5-4 7 08/16 B.5.5-54 7 08/16 B.5.5-5 7 08/16 B.5.5-55 7 08/16 B.5.5-6 7 08/16 B.5.5-56 7 08/16 B.5.5-7 7 08/16 B.5.5-57 7 08/16 B.5.5-8 7 08/16 B.5.5-58 7 08/16 B.5.5-9 7 08/16 B.5.5-59 7 08/16 B.5.5-10 7 08/16 B.5.5-60 7 08/16 B.5.5-11 7 08/16 B.5.5-61 7 08/16 B.5.5-12 7 08/16 B.5.5-62 7 08/16 B.5.5-13 7 08/16 B.5.5-63 7 08/16 B.5.5-14 7 08/16 B.5.5-64 7 08/16 B.5.5-15 7 08/16 B.5.5-65 7 08/16 B.5.5-16 7 08/16 B.5.5-66 7 08/16 B.5.5-17 7 08/16 B.5.5-67 7 08/16 B.5.5-18 7 08/16 B.5.5-68 7 08/16 B.5.5-19 7 08/16 B.5.5-69 7 08/16 B.5.5-20 7 08/16 B.5.5-70 7 08/16 B.5.5-21 7 08/16 B.5.5-71 7 08/16 B.5.5-22 7 08/16 B.5.5-72 7 08/16 B.5.5-23 7 08/16 B.5.5-73 7 08/16 B.5.5-24 7 08/16 B.5.5-74 7 08/16 B.5.5-25 7 08/16 B.5.5-75 7 08/16 B.5.5-26 7 08/16 B.5.5-76 7 08/16 B.5.5-27 7 08/16 B.5.5-77 7 08/16 B.5.5-28 7 08/16 B.5.5-78 7 08/16 B.5.5-29 7 08/16 B.5.5-79 7 08/16 B.5.5-30 7 08/16 B.5.5-80 7 08/16 B.5.5-31 7 08/16 B.5.5-81 7 08/16 B.5.5-32 7 08/16 B.5.5-82 7 08/16 B.5.5-33 7 08/16 B.5.5-83 7 08/16 B.5.5-34 7 08/16 B.5.5-84 7 08/16 B.5.5-35 7 08/16 B.5.5-85 7 08/16 B.5.5-36 7 08/16 B.5.5-86 7 08/16 B.5.5-37 7 08/16 B.5.5-87 7 08/16 B.5.5-38 7 08/16 B.5.5-88 7 08/16 B.5.5-39 7 08/16 B.5.5-40 7 08/16 B.6-1 7 08/16 B.5.5-41 7 08/16 B.6.1-1 7 08/16 B.5.5-42 7 08/16 B.6.2-1 7 08/16 B.5.5-43 7 08/16 B.6.3-1 7 08/16 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-21

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date B.6.3-2 7 08/16 B.6.6-33 7 08/16 B.6.3-3 7 08/16 B.6.6-34 7 08/16 B.6.4-1 7 08/16 B.6.6-35 7 08/16 B.6.4-2 7 08/16 B.6.6-36 7 08/16 B.6.4-3 7 08/16 B.6.6-37 7 08/16 B.6.4-4 7 08/16 B.6.6-38 7 08/16 B.6.4-5 7 08/16 B.6.6-39 7 08/16 B.6.4-6 7 08/16 B.6.6-40 7 08/16 B.6.4-7 7 08/16 B.6.6-41 7 08/16 B.6.4-8 7 08/16 B.6.6-42 7 08/16 B.6.4-9 7 08/16 B.6.6-43 7 08/16 B.6.4-10 7 08/16 B.6.6-44 7 08/16 B.6.4-11 7 08/16 B.6.6-45 7 08/16 B.6.4-12 7 08/16 B.6.6-46 7 08/16 B.6.4-13 7 08/16 B.6.6-47 7 08/16 B.6.4-14 7 08/16 B.6.6-48 7 08/16 B.6.5-1 7 08/16 B.6.6-49 7 08/16 B.6.5-2 7 08/16 B.6.6-50 7 08/16 B.6.6-1 7 08/16 B.6.6-51 7 08/16 B.6.6-2 7 08/16 B.6.6-52 7 08/16 B.6.6-3 7 08/16 B.6.6-53 7 08/16 B.6.6-4 7 08/16 B.6.6-54 7 08/16 B.6.6-5 7 08/16 B.6.6-55 7 08/16 B.6.6-6 7 08/16 B.6.6-56 7 08/16 B.6.6-7 7 08/16 B.6.6-57 7 08/16 B.6.6-8 7 08/16 B.6.6-9 7 08/16 B.7.1-1 7 08/16 B.6.6-10 7 08/16 B.7.1-2 7 08/16 B.6.6-11 7 08/16 B.7.2-1 7 08/16 B.6.6-12 7 08/16 B.7.3-1 7 08/16 B.6.6-13 7 08/16 B.7.4-1 7 08/16 B.6.6-14 7 08/16 B.6.6-15 7 08/16 B.8-1 7 08/16 B.6.6-16 7 08/16 B.8.1-1 7 08/16 B.6.6-17 7 08/16 B.8.1-2 7 08/16 B.6.6-18 7 08/16 B.8.1-3 7 08/16 B.6.6-19 7 08/16 B.8.1-4 7 08/16 B.6.6-20 7 08/16 B.8.1-5 8 08/18 B.6.6-21 7 08/16 B.8.1-6 8 08/18 B.6.6-22 7 08/16 B.8.1-7 7 08/16 B.6.6-23 7 08/16 B.8.1-8 7 08/16 B.6.6-24 7 08/16 B.8.1-9 7 08/16 B.6.6-25 7 08/16 B.8.1-10 7 08/16 B.6.6-26 7 08/16 B.8.1-11 7 08/16 B.6.6-27 7 08/16 B.8.1-12 7 08/16 B.6.6-28 7 08/16 B.8.1-13 7 08/16 B.6.6-29 7 08/16 B.8.1-14 7 08/16 B.6.6-30 7 08/16 B.8.2-1 9 03/19 B.6.6-31 7 08/16 B.8.2-2 9 03/19 B.6.6-32 7 08/16 B.8.2-2a 9 03/19 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-22

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date Page or description Rev. Date B.8.2-3 9 03/19 B.10.4-1 7 08/16 B.8.2-4 9 03/19 B.8.2-5 7 08/16 B.11-1 7 08/16 B.8.2-6 7 08/16 B.11.1-1 7 08/16 B.8.2-7 7 08/16 B.11.1-2 7 08/16 B.8.3-1 7 08/16 B.11.1-3 7 08/16 B.8.3-2 8 08/18 B.11.2-1 7 08/16 B.11.2-2 7 08/16 B.9-1 7 08/16 B.11.2-3 7 08/16 B.9.1-1 7 08/16 B.11.2-4 7 08/16 B.9.1-2 7 08/16 B.11.2-5 7 08/16 B.9.1-3 7 08/16 B.11.2-6 7 08/16 B.9.1-4 7 08/16 B.11.2-7 7 08/16 B.9.1-5 7 08/16 B.11.2-8 7 08/16 B.9.1-6 7 08/16 B.11.2-9 7 08/16 B.9.1-7 7 08/16 B.11.2-10 7 08/16 B.9.1-8 7 08/16 B.11.2-11 7 08/16 B.9.1-9 7 08/16 B.11.2-12 7 08/16 B.9.1-10 7 08/16 B.11.2-13 7 08/16 B.9.2-1 7 08/16 B.11.2-14 7 08/16 B.9.3-1 7 08/16 B.11.2-15 7 08/16 B.9.4-1 7 08/16 B.11.2-16 7 08/16 B.9.4-2 7 08/16 B.11.2-17 7 08/16 B.11.2-18 7 08/16 B.10.1-1 7 08/16 B.11.2-19 7 08/16 B.10.1-2 7 08/16 B.11.2-20 7 08/16 B.10.1-3 7 08/16 B.11.2-21 7 08/16 B.10.2-1 7 08/16 B.11.2-22 7 08/16 B.10.2-2 7 08/16 B.11.2-23 7 08/16 B.10.2-3 7 08/16 B.11.2-24 7 08/16 B.10.2-4 7 08/16 B.11.2-25 7 08/16 B.10.2-5 7 08/16 B.11.2-26 7 08/16 B.10.2-6 7 08/16 B.11.2-27 7 08/16 B.10.2-7 7 08/16 B.11.2-28 7 08/16 B.10.2-8 7 08/16 B.11.2-29 7 08/16 B.10.2-9 7 08/16 B.11.2-30 7 08/16 B.10.2-10 7 08/16 B.11.2-31 7 08/16 B.10.2-11 7 08/16 B.11.2-32 7 08/16 B.10.2-12 7 08/16 B.11.2-33 7 08/16 B.10.2-13 7 08/16 B.11.2-34 7 08/16 B.10.2-14 7 08/16 B.11.3-1 7 08/16 B.10.2-15 7 08/16 B.10.2-16 7 08/16 B.12-1 7 08/16 B.10.2-17 7 08/16 B.12-2 7 08/16 B.10.2-18 7 08/16 B.12-3 7 08/16 B.10.3-1 7 08/16 B.12-4 7 08/16 B.10.3-2 7 08/16 B.12-5 9 03/19 B.10.3-3 7 08/16 B.12-6 7 08/16 B.10.3-4 7 08/16 B.12-7 7 08/16 B.10.3-5 7 08/16 B.12-8 7 08/16 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-23

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 List Of Effective Pages Page or description Rev. Date B.12-9 7 08/16 B.12-10 7 08/16 B.12-11 7 08/16 B.12-12 7 08/16 B.12-13 7 08/16 B.12-14 7 08/16 B.12-15 7 08/16 B.12-16 7 08/16 B.12-17 7 08/16 B.12-18 7 08/16 B.12-19 7 08/16 B.13-1 7 08/16 B.14.1-1 9 03/19 B.14.1-2 9 03/19 B.14.1-3 7 08/16 B.14.2-1 7 08/16 ANUH-01.0150 LOEP-24

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 support higher seismic loads and by substantially reducing radiation dose rates. Details of the system design, analyses, operation, and margins are provided in the remainder of this UFSAR.

Definitions of key terms used in this UFSAR are provided in Section 12.1.1.

Chapters 1 through 14 of this UFSAR address the 24PT1-DSC payload containing WE 14x14 spent fuel assemblies. Appendix A to this UFSAR addresses the 24PT4-DSC payload containing CE 16x16 spent fuel assemblies.

NOTE: CoC 1029 was originally licensed for 20 years. On 10/27/21, the NRC approved renewal of CoC 1029 for an additional 40 years. The aging management activities (AMA) associated with this renewal apply to the previously approved amendments, and future amendments will include an aging management review (AMR) and any resultant, required AMA.

The current aging management results are detailed in Chapter 15.

ANUH-01.0150 1-1a All changes on this page are Renewal.

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 1.2.2.3.2 Chemical Safety There are no chemical safety hazards associated with operations of the Advanced NUHOMS System. The coating materials used in the design of the 24PT1-DSC are chosen to minimize hydrogen generation. Hydrogen monitoring is required during sealing operations to ensure hydrogen concentration levels remain within acceptable limits.

1.2.2.3.3 Operation Shutdown Modes The Advanced NUHOMS System is a totally passive system so that consideration of operation shutdown modes is unnecessary.

1.2.2.3.4 Instrumentation The Advanced NUHOMS System is a totally passive system. No safety-related instrumentation is necessary. The maximum temperatures and pressures are conservatively bounded by analyses.

Therefore, there is no need for monitoring the internal cavity of the 24PT1-DSC for pressure or temperature during normal operations. The 24PT1-DSC is conservatively designed to perform its confinement function during all worst case normal, off-normal, and accident conditions.

AHSM thermal monitoring is provided to meet the requirements of Chapter 12.

1.2.2.3.5 Maintenance and Surveillance All maintenance and surveillance tasks are described in Chapter 9.

1.2.3 24PT1-DSC Contents The 24PT1-DSC is designed to store up to 24 intact PWR Westinghouse 14x14 (WE 14x14) fuel assemblies with or without Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (RCCAs), Neutron Source Assemblies (NSAs), or Thimble Plug Assemblies (TPAs). The 24PT1-DSC is also designed for storage of up to 20 intact fuel assemblies plus four damaged fuel assemblies in specially designed failed fuel cans. A description of the fuel assemblies including the damaged fuel assemblies is provided in Chapter 2. The maximum allowable initial enrichment of the fuel to be stored is 4.05 weight % U-235 and the maximum burnup is 45,000 MWd/MTU. The fuel must be cooled at least 10 years prior to storage. The 24PT1-DSC design limits WE 14x14 fuel assemblies to a maximum heat load of 0.583 kW per assembly for a total of 14 kW per 24PT1-DSC. This limitation is required to ensure that the heat load per foot of 24PT1-DSC length does not exceed that analyzed in this UFSAR for the short length fuel.

The criticality control features of the Advanced NUHOMS System are designed to maintain the neutron multiplication factor k-effective (including uncertainties and calculational bias) at less than 0.95 under normal, off-normal, and accident conditions.

The quantity and type of radionuclides in the SFAs are described and tabulated in Chapter 5.

Chapter 6 covers the criticality safety of the Advanced NUHOMS System and its parameters.

These parameters include rod pitch, rod outside diameter, material densities, moderator ratios, and geometric configurations. The maximum pressure buildup in the 24PT1-DSC cavity is addressed in Chapter 4.

1.2.4 Aging Management Program Requirements Aging management program (AMP) requirements for use of the 24PT1 DSC and AHSM during the period of extended storage operations are contained in Section 15.3.

ANUH-01.0150 1.2-8 All changes on this page are Renewal.

Proprietary and Security Related Information for Drawing NUH-03-4011, Rev. 9 Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 3.3 Mechanical Properties of Materials 3.3.1 24PT1-DSC Material Properties The principal materials of construction for the Advanced NUHOMS 24PT1-DSC are stainless and carbon steel. The 24PT1-DSC cylindrical shell and cover plates are constructed from SA-240 Type 316 stainless steel. The shield plugs are constructed from ASTM A36 carbon steel.

The 24PT1-DSC basket assembly guidesleeve and oversleeve assemblies are constructed from SA-240 Type 304 stainless steel. The support rods and spacer sleeves are fabricated from SA-564 Type 630 precipitation hardened martensitic stainless steel. The spacer discs are fabricated from SA-537 Class 2 carbon steel. The neutron absorber plates are constructed from boron carbide/aluminum metal matrix composite material. The carbon steel top shield plug and the spacer discs are coated with electroless nickel.

Table 3.3-1 contains the ASME Code material properties for SA-240 Type 316 stainless steel material. Material properties for the A36 carbon steel shield plugs are contained in Table 3.3-2.

ASME Code material properties for the SA-240 Type 304 stainless steel guidesleeves and oversleeves are contained in Table 3.3-3. ASME Code material properties for the SA-537 Class 2 carbon steel spacer discs are contained in Table 3.3-4. ASME Code material properties for the SA-564 Type 630 support rods and spacer sleeves are contained in Table 3.3-5.

3.3.1.1 Radiation Effects on 24PT1-DSC Materials Gamma radiation has no significant effect on metals. The effect of fast neutron irradiation of metals is a function of the integrated fast neutron fluence, which is on the order of 5.2x1015 neutrons/cm2 inside the 24PT1-DSC after 100 years [3.41]. Studies on fast neutron damage in stainless steel, and low alloy steels rarely evaluate damage below 1017 n/cm2 because it is not significant [3.40]. Extrapolation of the data available down to the 1015 range confirms that there will be no measurable neutron damage to any of the 24PT1-DSC metallic components.

3.3.1.2 Weld Material Welding processes, welders and welding materials used for the welding of the 24PT1-DSC meet the requirements of the appropriate ASME Section III subsections and Section IX. Non-Code welds meet the provisions of Section IX of the ASME Code or AWS D1.1 [3.38] or D1.6 [3.39].

Weld metal material properties meet the requirements of Section II of the ASME Code or associated AWS requirements.

3.3.1.3 Brittle Fracture Brittle fracture is not a concern for the stainless steel components. For the SA-537 Class 2 carbon steel spacer discs, a TNDT of less than or equal to -80 °F is specified in accordance with the requirements of NUREG/CR-1815 for 10 CFR Part 71 transportation [3.37].

ANUH-01.0150 3.3-1 All changes on this page are Renewal.

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 3.3.2 AHSM Material Properties The temperature dependent material properties for concrete and reinforcing steel are provided in Table 3.3-6 and Table 3.3-7. The material properties of the Type 304 Stainless Steel rails are identical to the ASME Code properties listed in Table 3.3-3.

3.3.2.1 Radiation Effects on AHSM Concrete The accumulated neutron flux and gamma dose over a 100 year service life of the AHSM is estimated to be 1.8x1015 neutrons/cm2 and 2.9x109 Rad, respectively [3.41]. These values are less than the 1x1019 n/cm2 neutron fluence and 1x1010 Rad value used in NUREG-2214 [3.42]

as the fluence below which concrete structures are regarded as being sound.

3.3.3 Materials Durability As shown in Table 3.3-1 through Table 3.3-7, all materials meet the appropriate requirements of the ASME Code, ACI Code, and ASTM Standards. The durability of the steel components is well beyond the design life of the applicable components. The specifications controlling the mix of concrete, specified minimum concrete strength requirements, and fabrication control ensure durability of the materials for this application.

ANUH-01.0150 3.3-2 All changes on this page are Renewal.

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 3.5 Fuel Rods General Standards for 24PT1-DSC This section provides the temperature criteria used in the 24PT1-DSC thermal evaluation for the safe storage and handling of SFAs in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72 in order to ensure a very low probability of rod failure during long term storage and to protect against gross failures during short term events. Short term events include transfer operations, off-normal conditions, accident conditions, and other short term operational events. These acceptance criteria apply for the following fuel types: Westinghouse 14x14 stainless steel clad and Westinghouse 14x14 MOX Zircaloy clad fuel assemblies.

This section also contains the analysis of the thermal and irradiation growth of the fuel assemblies to ensure adequate space exists within the 24PT1-DSC cavity for the fuel assemblies to grow thermally under all conditions.

In addition, this section provides an evaluation of the fuel rod stresses and critical buckling loads due to accident drop loads.

3.5.1 Fuel Rod Temperature Limits 3.5.1.1 Westinghouse 14x14 MOX Zircaloy Clad Fuel 3.5.1.1.1 Temperature Limit for Long Term Storage The peak cladding temperature limit at the beginning of long term storage is determined according to PNL-6189 [3.29] for Zircaloy clad fuel. The peak clad temperature limit at the beginning of storage shall apply to the long term 70 °F ambient case for 24PT1-DSC storage in the AHSM. This is the maximum lifetime average ambient temperature of the ISFSI site. The curves of cladding stress limit vs. dry storage cladding temperature limits for Zircaloy clad fuel were obtained using the methodology given in PNL-6189 [3.29].

The Zircaloy clad MOX fuel has the parameters given in Table 3.5-1.

The temperature limit for the Zircaloy clad fuel was determined graphically by plotting the midwall hoop-stress equation given in PNL-6189 [3.29] on the Commercial Spent Fuel Management Program (CSFM) generic limit curves. The acceptable long term average temperature limit is given in Table 3.5-2. This limit is derived based on a 50-year design life in accordance with the PNL-6189 methodology and is applicable only to the long term average temperature condition (70 °F ambient temperature). While these clad temperature limits were based on a 50-year storage design life, the methodology used pre-dates the current accepted limit for low burnup fuel in ISG-11 [3.44], i.e., 752 °F. Since the fuel clad temperature limits applied to the fuel stored in the 24PT1 DSC are less than, i.e., more restrictive than, the limit in ISG-11, they remain valid for the period of extended operation and demonstrate that the cladding will continue to perform its intended safety function through the end of the period of extended operation (PEO).

3.5.1.1.2 Temperature Limit for Short Term Events Since the maximum burnup of the MOX fuel rods is below that of the rods which were tested to 1058 °F in PNL-4835 [3.32] the results of PNL-4835 can be applied to the MOX assemblies for short term events. Fuel cladding temperatures are therefore maintained below 1,058 °F for the short term events defined in Section 3.1.

ANUH-01.0150 3.5-1 All changes on this page are Renewal.

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 3.5.1.2 Westinghouse 14x14 Stainless Steel Clad Fuel 3.5.1.2.1 Temperature Limit for Long Term Storage The peak cladding temperature limit at the beginning of long term storage for WE 14x14 stainless steel clad fuel is determined according to EPRI TR-106440 [3.30]. The failure mechanisms detailed in Reference [3.29] were evaluated to determine the bounding failure mechanism. The bounding failure mechanism which gave the lowest temperature limit was determined to be creep failure. The temperature limit to prevent creep failure over the design life was determined by using a steady state shear strain rate for irradiated fuel rods from curves for shear stress vs. temperature for a 50-year time to failure from Reference [3.30]. While these clad temperature limits were based on a 50-year storage design life, the methodology used pre-dates the current accepted limit for low burnup fuel in ISG-11 [3.44], i.e., 752 °F. Since the fuel clad temperature limits applied to the fuel stored in the 24PT1 DSC are less than, i.e., more restrictive than, the limit in ISG-11, they remain valid for the period of extended operation and demonstrate that the cladding will continue to perform its intended safety function through the end of the period of extended operation (PEO).

The temperature limit for the stainless steel clad fuel was derived using the conservative parameters given in Table 3.5-1. The resulting long term average temperature limit is given in Table 3.5-2.

3.5.1.2.2 Temperature Limit for Short Term Events The stainless steel cladding temperature limit for short term events is conservatively assumed to be 806 °F. This is based on data given Reference [3.30] for the sensitization of stainless steel at elevated temperatures in a non-inert environment. The 24PT1-DSC is inerted with helium for storage and transfer, so the use of a non-inert temperature limit is conservative.

3.5.2 Fuel Assembly Thermal and Irradiation Growth The thermal and irradiation growth of the fuel assemblies were calculated to ensure there is adequate space for the fuel assemblies to grow within the 24PT1-DSC cavity. The reference temperature for material properties is assumed to be 70 °F.

The thermal growth is calculated based on the fuel assembly parameters given in Table 3.5-3.

The length of the 24PT1-DSC cavity requires that stainless steel spacers be placed above and below each fuel assembly, with a total length as shown in Table 3.5-3. The 24PT1-DSC minimum cavity length assumed for the calculation is given in Table 3.5-3. Thermal expansion coefficients for the materials considered are given in Chapter 4.

Based on the results shown in Chapter 4, the vacuum drying case produces the highest fuel cladding temperatures coupled with relatively low 24PT1-DSC shell temperatures due to the water-filled cask annulus. Therefore, this case results in the bounding thermal growth for all operating conditions. Component temperatures calculated using steady state results from Chapter 4 for 16 kW heat are conservatively used.

There is adequate space within the 24PT1-DSC cavity for thermal and irradiation growth of the fuel assemblies and spacers. The minimum gaps calculated are given in Table 3.5-3.

ANUH-01.0150 3.5-2 All changes on this page are Renewal.

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 3.5.3 Fuel Rod Integrity During Drop Scenario The purpose of this section is to calculate WE 14x14 stainless steel clad (SC) and WE 14x14 Zircaloy clad Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel rod stresses and critical buckling loads due to cask side ANUH-01.0150 3.5-2a All changes on this page are Renewal.

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 The fuel spacers are evaluated for normal and off-normal load combinations using the criteria of Subsection NG. Loads considered include fuel weight and handling loads.

There is no constrained thermal expansion in the fuel spacers and they are not affected by insertion/retrieval loads.

The fuel spacers are evaluated for a conservative 120g equivalent side drop (horizontal) acceleration. The maximum fuel spacer stresses due to lateral loads are due to the self weight of the material and result in a maximum axial stress of 0.4 ksi and a panel bending stress of 6.0 ksi.

The critical design basis axial load applied to the fuel spacer is the weight of the fuel assembly plus the opposite fuel spacer times the maximum postulated axial acceleration of 60g. This results in an applied axial load of 84 kips. Analyzing the fuel spacer as a pinned-pinned column in accordance with Paragraph F-1334.3(b)(1) of Appendix F to Section III, Division I of [3.11]

results in an axial stress of 8.0 ksi. The Service Level D allowable stress at a very conservative 700 °F temperature is 15.7 ksi, which results in a stress ratio of 0.51. This results in a large margin of safety against initial buckling of the fuel spacer and ensures the fuel locations assumed in the criticality analysis are maintained.

3.6.1.3 Fatigue Evaluation The 24PT1-DSC shell has been evaluated for fatigue in accordance with the rules of NB-3222.4 to show that a detailed fatigue evaluation is not required [3.43].

3.6.2 Structural Analysis of the AHSM 3.6.2.1 Introduction to AHSM The reinforced concrete, 24PT1-DSC support steel, structural welds, miscellaneous components and embedments of the AHSM are important to safety. Consequently, they are designed and analyzed to perform their intended functions under the extreme environmental and natural phenomena specified in 10 CFR 72.122 [3.1] and ANSI-57.9 [3.9].

Table 3.6-10 summarizes the design loads for the AHSM system components. The table also presents the applicable codes and standards for development of these loads. The extreme environmental and natural phenomena design criteria discussed below comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 72.122 and ANSI 57.9.

3.6.2.2 Loads and Load Combinations 3.6.2.2.1 Dead Loads (DW)

Dead load includes the weight of the AHSM concrete structure, and the steel structure (the 24PT1-DSC weight is considered as a live load rather than a dead load). Creep and shrinkage reduce the thermal stresses. Therefore, for the evaluation of the concrete structure, creep and shrinkage forces are conservatively neglected.

ANUH-01.0150 3.6-11 All changes on this page are Renewal.

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21

[3.17] Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Safety Evaluation Report of Safety Analysis Report for the Standardized NUHOMS Horizontal Modular Storage System for Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, December 1994, USNRC Docket Number 72-1004.

[3.18] Croff, A. G, et al., Revised Uranium-Plutonium Cycle PWR and BWR Models for ORIGEN Computer Code, ORNL/TM-6051, September 1978.

[3.19] W.C. Young, Roarks Formulas for Stress and Strain, Sixth Edition, McGraw Hill, New York, N.Y., (1989).

[3.20] American Concrete Institute, "Building Code Requirement for Reinforced Concrete,"

ACI-318, 1989 (92).

[3.21] American Institute of Steel Construction, (AISC), "Specification for Structural Steel Buildings," 1989, Chicago, Illinois.

[3.22] Swanson Analysis Systems Inc., ANSYS Engineering Analysis System User's Manual, Version 5.3, Swanson Analysis Systems Inc., Pittsburgh, PA.

[3.23] Not Used.

[3.24] Not Used.

[3.25] Handbook of Concrete Engineering, Van Nostraund Reinhold Company, edited by Mark Fintel, September 1974.

[3.26] G. Wranglen, An Introduction to Corrosion and Protection of Metals, Chapman and Hall, 1985, pp. 109-112.

[3.27] A. J. McEvily, Jr., ed., Atlas of Stress Corrosion and Corrosion Fatigue Curves, ASM International, 1995, p. 185.

[3.28] TNW Document No. 31-B9604.97-003, dated December 19, 1997; Addendum to TNW Document No. 31-B9604.0102, Rev. 2., An Assessment of Chemical, Galvanic and Other Reactions in NUHOMS Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Casks.

[3.29] Levy, Chin, Simonen, Beyer, Gilbert and Johnson, Recommended Temperature Limits for Dry Storage of Spent Light Water Reactor Zircaloy-Clad Fuel Rods in Inert Gas, May 1987, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, PNL Document PNL-6189.

[3.30] M. Cunningham, E. Gilbert and A. Johnson, Jr., M. A. McKinnon, Evaluation of Expected Behavior of LWR Stainless Steel-Clad Fuel in Long-Term Dry Storage, April, 1996, Electric Power Research Institute, EPRI Document TR-106440.

[3.31] Rancho Seco Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 0, November 2000, USNRC Docket Number 72-11.

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Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21

[3.32] Johnson, A. B. and E. R. Gilbert, Technical Basis for Storage of Zircaloy-Clad Spent Fuel, September 1983, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, PNL Document PNL-4835.

[3.33] Not used.

[3.34] UCID - 21246, Dynamic Impact Effects on Spent Fuel Assemblies, October 20, 1987.

[3.35] Consolidated Safety Analysis Report for IF-300 Shipping Cask, NEDO-10084, Vectra Technologies, Inc., Revision 4, March, 1995.

[3.36] Not used.

[3.37] Holman, W.R., Langland, R. T., Recommendations for Protecting Against Failure by Brittle Fracture in Ferritic Steel Shipping Containers up to Four Inches Thick, NUREG/CR-1815, August 1981.

[3.38] AWS D1.1-98, Structural Welding Code-Steel.

[3.39] AWS D1.6-99, Structural Welding Code-Stainless Steel.

[3.40] Regulatory Guide 1.99, Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials, Revision 2, May 1988.

[3.41] Time-Limited Aging Analysis for Boron Depletion and Radiation Fluence for CoC 1029 License Renewal, Calculation Number 503821-TLAA03, Revision 0.

[3.42] NRC NUREG-2214, Managing Aging Process in Storage (MAPS) Report Final Report, July 2019 (ML19214A111).

[3.43] Fatigue Evaluation of Dry Shielded Canisters for CoC 1029, Calculation Number 503821-TLAA02, Revision 0.

[3.44] NRC Interim Staff Guidance No. 11, ISG-11, Rev. 3, Cladding Considerations for the Transportation and Storage of Spent Fuel, November 2003.

ANUH-01.0150 3.6-60 All changes on this page are Renewal.

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 4.4 Thermal Evaluation for Normal Conditions of Storage and Transfer 4.4.1 Overview of Thermal Analysis for Normal Conditions of Storage and Transfer This section of the UFSAR describes the thermal analysis of the AHSM and 24PT1-DSC. The analytical models of the AHSM, the 24PT1-DSC, and the transfer cask are described and the calculation results are summarized below. The thermophysical properties of the Advanced NUHOMS System components used in the thermal analysis are listed in Section 4.2. The following evaluations are performed for the Advanced NUHOMS System:

1. Thermal Analysis of the 24PT1-DSC in the AHSM (Section 4.4.2),
2. Thermal Analysis of the 24PT1-DSC in the Transfer Cask (Section 4.4.3),
3. Thermal Analysis of the 24PT1-DSC basket (Section 4.4.4).

4.4.2 Thermal Model of the 24PT1-DSC Inside the AHSM For normal condition of storage, the Advanced NUHOMS System components are evaluated for a range of design basis ambient temperatures. The system components are evaluated for the average ambient temperatures given in Table 4.1-1. Ambient temperatures within this range are assumed to occur for a sufficient duration to cause a steady-state temperature distribution in the Advanced NUHOMS System components. The lifetime average ambient temperature is taken as 70 °F. The stress-free temperature for material properties is also 70 °F.

The AHSM is cooled by a natural draft of air entering through the air inlet opening located in the lower front wall of the AHSM, and exiting through the air outlet opening located in the top of the AHSM. Cooler air at the prevailing ambient conditions is drawn into the AHSM. The cooler air flows from the bottom of the AHSM along the outer 24PT1-DSC surface where it is warmed by the decay heat of the spent fuel inside the 24PT1-DSC. The warmed air flows along the ceiling of the AHSM and exits through the air outlet opening. The AHSM vent geometries and flow paths for ventilation air are illustrated in Figure 4.4-1.

The AHSM roof and front wall are the primary concrete surfaces conducting heat to the outside environment. For the analytical purpose of calculating maximum temperatures, an AHSM centered in a group of AHSMs, each loaded with a 24PT1-DSC, is assumed. Rows of modules are assumed to exist back to back for this model. For the analytical purpose of calculating maximum concrete temperature gradients, an AHSM alone, with no adjacent modules or rear shield wall, is assumed.

A metal heat shield is placed around the upper half of the 24PT1-DSC to shield the AHSM concrete surfaces above and to the side of the 24PT1-DSC from thermal radiation effects. The location and geometry of the heat shield is shown in Figure 4.4-6 and on the AHSM drawings contained in Chapter 1. The heat shield protects the AHSM surfaces above and to the side of the 24PT1-DSC from direct thermal radiation emanating from the 24PT1-DSC surface and significantly increases the combined surface area for convection cooling inside the AHSM. The ANUH-01.0150 4.4-1 All changes on this page are Renewal.

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Aluminum reacts with water to produce hydrogen (H2) and an impervious tightly adhering layer of hydrated aluminum oxide (Al2O33H2O) called bayerite which protects the surface from further attack.

When the 24PT1-DSC basket is initially submerged in the spent fuel pool, aluminum in the panels will react with water to form a small amount of hydrogen gas and a stable bayerite layer on all surfaces of the panel. The bayerite layer formed on the panel during pool immersion persists through 24PT1-DSC drying, sealing, storage, and eventual shipping; preventing further corrosion or hydrogen production.

Leaching of the boron carbide along the unsealed edges of the panels is expected to occur to an insignificant degree. There are three reasons why this is anticipated to be insignificant. First, the panel core is a sintered Al/B4C material. Only the boron carbide particles exposed by saw cut are available for leaching. Second, the immersion environment is relatively benign and the time is brief (a few hours or days). The material has been commonly used in the United States spent fuel racks for many years and in fact, has gained a reputation for not leaching. And third, direct experimental observations of accelerated aging tests performed at the University of Michigan

[6.10] showed no indications of boron degradation. The test specimens were exposed to high neutron and gamma irradiation in a reactor pool environment for over nine years. Subsequent neutron radiography showed no signs of reduced neutron attenuation anywhere on the test specimens.

Depletion of the B10 in the neutron poison plates is evaluated below. Although the license period of the cask is 60 years, actual storage time could be much longer. Using the total calculated scalar flux of 5.0x105 n/cm2-s at the center of the basket, and the thermal neutron cross section for B10 is 3837 barn [6.9] the fraction of the original B10 depleted after 1000 years would be:

5x105n/cm2-s x (3837x10-24 cm2) x 3.156x107 s/year x (1000 year) = 1.1x10-6 which is negligible. Therefore, the continued efficacy of the neutron poison is assured.

ANUH-01.0150 6.3-7 All changes on this page are Renewal.

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 7.2 Requirements for Normal Conditions of Storage The 24PT1-DSC shell is designed and tested to be leaktight to prevent the leakage of radioactive materials. No discernable undetected leakage is credible and the dose at the controlled area boundary from atmospheric release is negligible.

7.2.1 Release of Radioactive Material Analyses for determining the annual dose equivalent to an individual located at the site boundary or outside the controlled area resulting from releases of radioactive material are not required as defined by NRC Spent Fuel Project Office Interim Staff Guidance-5 (ISG-5) [7.3], since the 24PT1-DSC is designed to be leaktight. Analyses required for determining the annual dose equivalent based on direct radiation for normal, off-normal, and accident conditions are discussed in Chapter 10.

7.2.2 Pressurization of Confinement Vessel The design provides for drying and evacuation of the 24PT1-DSC interior as part of the loading operations. The design is acceptable for the pressures that may be experienced during these operations as discussed in Chapter 4. On completion of fuel loading, the gas fill of the 24PT1-DSC interior is at a pressure level that will maintain a non-reactive environment for the storage life of the 24PT1-DSC interior under normal, off-normal, and accident conditions.

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Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Displacement at top of AHSM =222*tan(0.25) =0.97. The maximum uplift at one edge =

173*tan(0.25) = 0.76. However, this tipping displacement is prevented by the seismic ties and keys, which connect the AHSM to the adjacent module.

11.2.2.3 Accident Dose Calculations Each exposed component of the Advanced NUHOMS System is specifically designed to withstand tornado-generated missiles as discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Loss of structural bending strength of the shield or transition wall(s) due to tornado missile impact, should it occur, is acceptable and does not affect the safe operation of the AHSM. Recovery from this event can be performed in a planned and deliberate manner to replace the shield or transition wall(s). This requires temporary shielding during removal and replacement of the wall(s), or removal of the AHSM from service. At no time is there a danger of a release of radioactive materials to the general public.

11.2.2.4 Corrective Actions Evaluation of AHSM damage as a result of a tornado is to be performed to assess the need for temporary shielding and AHSM repairs to return the AHSMs to pre-tornado design conditions.

11.2.3 Flood 11.2.3.1 Cause of Accident Flooding conditions (such as tsunami and seiches) simulating a range of flood types, as specified in 10 CFR 72.122(b) are considered. In addition, floods resulting from other sources, such as high water from a river or a broken dam, are postulated as the cause of the accident.

11.2.3.2 Accident Analysis Because the source of flooding is site specific, the exact source, or quantity of flood water, should be established by the licensee. However, for this generic evaluation of the 24PT1-DSC and AHSM, flood conditions are specified that envelope those postulated for most plant sites.

As described in Section 3.1.2.2 the design basis flood load is specified as a 50-foot static head of water and a maximum flow velocity of 15 feet per second. Each licensee should confirm that this represents a bounding design basis for their specific ISFSI site.

11.2.3.2.1 AHSM Flooding Analysis Because the AHSM is open to the atmosphere, static differential pressure due to flooding is not a design load.

The maximum drag force, F, acting on the AHSM due to a 15-fps flood water velocity is calculated as follows [11.12]:

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Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21

15. AGING MANAGEMENT 15.1 Aging Management Review The aging management review (AMR) of the Standardized Advanced NUHOMS System contained in the application for initial Certificate of Compliance (CoC) renewal [15.1] provides an assessment of aging effects that could adversely affect the ability of in-scope structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to perform their intended safety functions during the extended storage period. Aging effects, and the mechanisms that cause them, were evaluated for the combinations of materials and environments identified for the subcomponent of the inscope SSCs based on a review of the Managing Aging Processes in Storage (MAPS) Report [15.2].

Aging effects that could adversely affect the ability of the in-scope SSCs to perform their safety function(s) require an aging management activity (AMA) to address potential degradation that may occur during the extended storage period. The AMA may consist of a time-limited-aging-analysis (TLAA) or an aging management program (AMP). TLAAs and AMPs that are credited with managing aging effects during the extended storage period are discussed in Sections 15.2 and 15.3, respectively.

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Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 15.2 Time-Limited Aging Analyses A comprehensive review to identify the TLAAs for the in-scope SSCs of the Standardized Advanced NUHOMS System was performed to determine the analyses that could be credited with managing aging effects over the extended storage period. The TLAAs identified involved the in-scope SSCs, considered the effects of aging, involved explicit time-limited assumptions, are relevant in making a safety determination, provided conclusions regarding the capability of an SSC to perform its intended safety function through the operating term, and were contained or incorporated in the design basis. The identified TLAAs were dispositioned by demonstrating that the pre-renewal analysis remains valid for the PEO or the analysis was updated. The identified TLAAs were:

x Boron depletion in the BORAL plates in the 24PT1 and 24PT4 dry shielded canisters (DSCs) - the pre-renewal analysis in Sections 6.3.2 and A.6.3.2 remain valid for the PEO x Creep analysis for aluminum components in the 32PTH2 basket - the pre-renewal analysis in Section B.3.6.1.2.8 remains valid for the PEO x Fatigue analyses for the 24PT1, 24PT4, and 32PTH2 DSC shells - the pre-renewal evaluation in Section B.3.6.1.1.8 for the 32PTH2 remains valid for the PEO, the evaluations in Sections 3.6.1.3 and A.3.6.1.3 for the 24PT1 and 24PT4 were updated x Irradiation embrittlement of metals in the 24PT1, 24PT4, and 32PTH2 DSCs - the pre-renewal analysis in Section B.3.3.1.1 for the 32PTH2 remains valid for the PEO, the analyses in Sections 3.3.1.1 and A.3.3.1.1 for the 24PT1 and 24PT4 were updated x Irradiation effects on the concrete in the AHSM and AHSM-HS - the pre-renewal analysis in Section B.3.3.3.1 for the AHSM-HS remains valid for the PEO, the analysis in Sections 3.3.2.1 and A.3.3.2.1 for the AHSM was updated x Establishment of cladding temperature limits for fuel stored in the 24PT1 DSC - the pre-renewal fuel cladding limits in Sections 3.5.1.1.1 and 3.5.1.2.1 remain valid for the PEO ANUH-01.0150 15-2 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 15.3 Aging Management Program Aging effects that could result in the loss of in-scope SSCs intended safety function(s) are managed during the extended storage period. Many aging effects are adequately managed for the extended storage period using TLAA, as discussed in Section 15.2. An AMP is used to manage those aging effects that are not managed by TLAA. The AMPs that manage each of the identified aging effects for all in-scope SSCs include the following:

x DSC Aging Management Program x HSM Aging Management Program x Basemat Aging Management Program x High Burnup Fuel Aging Management Program 15.3.1 DSC Aging Management Program 15.3.1.1 DSC AMP - Scope of Program This program visually inspects and monitors the external surfaces of the DSC (the term DSC applies to the 24PT1, 24PT4, and 32PTH2 DSC types) subcomponents listed in Table 15-3. The table also lists the material and environments for each subcomponent along with the aging mechanisms and aging effects to be managed. The following aging effects and mechanism will be managed via this AMP:

x Stainless Steel

 Loss of material due to pitting, crevice, and galvanic corrosion

 Cracking due to stress corrosion cracking 15.3.1.2 DSC AMP - Preventive Actions The program is a condition-monitoring program that does not include preventive actions.

15.3.1.3 DSC AMP - Parameters Monitored or Inspected The DSC AMP consists of visual inspections to monitor for material degradation. There are no accessible areas of the DSC available for direct visual inspection since it is sheltered inside the HSM.

The following normally non-accessible areas will undergo remote visual inspection for loss of material and cracking:

x Portions of the DSC surfaces, welds and heat affected zones (HAZs), and crevice locations near the DSC support rails are inspected for discontinuities and imperfections.

Localized corrosion (e.g., pitting and crevice corrosion), cracking, or discolorations, if any, are documented. Appearance and location of atmospheric deposits on the DSC surfaces are recorded.

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Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 x Portions of the outer top cover plate, closure welds, and HAZ.

x Portions of the outer bottom cover plate, grapple ring assembly, and their welds and HAZ.

x Portions of the DSC shell bottom surface (including edge of DSC support rails and HAZ).

The inaccessible areas of the DSC include:

x The upper surface of the DSC Shell (i.e., where atmospheric particulates may settle).

x Majority of outer top cover plate, welds, and HAZ.

x Majority of outer bottom cover plate, grapple ring assembly, and their welds and HAZ.

x The DSC shell crevice locations (i.e., where shell rests on DSC support rail).

The inspections of the HAZ will extend to a distance of at least two inches on either side of the welds.

15.3.1.4 DSC AMP - Detection of Aging Effects This program manages the DSC aging effects using visual inspection. Visual examinations follow procedures consistent with the ASME B&PV Code,Section XI [15.5], Subarticle IWA-2210.

15.3.1.4.1 DSC AMP - Selection of DSC(s) for Inspection A minimum of one DSC will be selected for the baseline and subsequent inspections. The selection is to be based on the following considerations/criteria:

A. Time in service: Storage duration (time in service) is related to surface temperature and deposition of contaminants. The DSC selected for inspection is to be from the group of DSCs with longest time in service.

B. Initial heat load: The DSC selected for inspection is to be from a group of DSCs with low initial heat loading that result in low DSC shell surface temperatures, thus increasing relative humidity inside the HSM and promoting incubation of ambient contaminants.

C. DSC fabrication and design considerations: A review of the design drawings and DSC fabrication package is to be performed to further screen-in the DSC from the pool of candidates selected based on (A) and (B). Fabrication weld maps are to be reviewed to identity locations of the circumferential and longitudinal welds, location and disposition of welded attachments, and external configurations of the inner bottom cover-to-shell weld.

D. HSM array configuration relative to climatological and geographical features: DSCs inside HSMs oriented such that the vent openings face the prevalent wind direction are to be considered for inspection, particularly if the wind direction is in the path of potential sources of contaminants (e.g., industrial plant, co-located coal power plant, if present).

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Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 15.3.1.4.2 DSC AMP - Inspection Methods Visual Exams Visual examinations follow procedures consistent with the ASME B&PV Code,Section XI

[15.5] , Subarticle IWA-2210. ASME B&PV Code,Section XI NDE standard is chosen since the DSC is designed to ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Division 1, Subsection NB [15.6] and

[15.7] criteria. ASME B&PV Code,Section XI [15.5] , Subarticle IWA-2213 VT-3 visual examinations detect discontinuities and imperfections on the surface of components, including corrosion. A general visual exam will be performed on normally non-accessible portions of the DSC surface that do not receive the VT-3 exam. VT-3 visual examinations are initially performed on normally non-accessible portions of the DSC surfaces within two inches of a weld.

Supplemental VT-1 visual examinations are performed as described in the acceptance criteria when indicated by the assessment of the VT-3 results, subject to the following provisions. For areas where the access and available technology preclude the execution of a qualified VT-3 or VT-1 inspection, a technique equivalency test will be conducted in a mockup. The equivalency test is intended to show how capable the equipment and procedures are in being able to read an approved VT-3 or VT-1 acuity card in the general lighting conditions and at the approximate distance and angle expected on the actual DSC.

Within the HSM cavity, certain surface areas of the DSC may be inaccessible for remote inspection. This AMP addresses detection of aging effects for inaccessible areas indirectly by monitoring the inspection findings in normally non-accessible areas.

Therefore, inaccessible area inspections are only performed if the licensees corrective action program determines it is necessary to ensure that the components intended safety function is maintained during the PEO.

Augmented Examination An augmented examination is performed on a DSC when the visual exams indicate the presence of major corrosion (see Section 15.3.1.6 below for what constitutes a major corrosion indication) within two inches of a weld. These examinations will follow procedures consistent with the ASME B&PV Code,Section XI [15.5] , Subarticles IWA-2220 and IWA-2230 for surface and volumetric examinations with personnel qualified per IWA-2300.

x A volumetric examination is performed of cracking indications and the surrounding volume within one inch of the indication.

x A surface examination (a volumetric exam may be performed in lieu of the surface exam) is performed of the regions (plus one inch of the extent of the indication) of major corrosion.

x Locations inspected using surface or volumetric examination do not need to receive a VT-3 or VT-1 inspection.

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Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 15.3.1.4.3 DSC AMP - Inspection Timing and Frequency The baseline AMP visual inspection is to be conducted within two years prior to 20 years of the first loaded DSC being placed in storage. Subsequent inspections are to be conducted every 5 years +/- 1 year or when an engineering evaluation predicts an identified crack will reach 75%

through-wall, whichever is less, following the baseline inspection.

15.3.1.5 DSC AMP - Monitoring and Trending The inspections and monitoring activities in this AMP are performed periodically in order to identify areas of degradation. Conditions adverse to quality that are noted during the inspection and monitoring activities, such as non-conformances, failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, and deviations, are entered into the licensees corrective action program. Visual inspections appropriately consider cumulative operating experience (OE) from previous inspections and assessments in order to monitor and trend the progression of aging effects over time. Data taken for these inspections is to be monitored by comparison to past site data taken, as well as comparison to industry OE, including data gathered by the Aging Management Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Database (AMID) as discussed in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 14-03 [15.4].

As described in Section 15.3.1.4.1, a minimum of one DSC is to be selected for the baseline inspection and subsequent inspections. If the baseline DSC is not available for subsequent inspections (e.g., has been shipped off-site), another DSC is to be selected for a new baseline inspection following the considerations/criteria in Section 15.3.1.4.1.

15.3.1.6 DSC AMP - Acceptance Criteria The acceptance criteria for this AMP follows the guidance provided in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Report 3002008193 [15.8], which focuses on chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC). This report states that CISCC has been identified as the most likely and limiting degradation mechanism that could lead to through-wall penetration of the austenitic stainless steel canister during storage. Thus, other atmospheric corrosion mechanisms (e.g.,

pitting) are conservatively addressed by these acceptance criteria. There are three tiers of acceptance criteria:

x Visual examination criteria - visual examination results are evaluated using this criteria x Augmented examination criteria - surface or volumetric examinations are evaluated using this criteria x Flaw evaluation criteria - used if cracking is detected 15.3.1.6.1 DSC AMP - Visual Examination Criteria Criteria are provided below to classify the indication as a major corrosion indication, a minor corrosion indication, or an insignificant corrosion indication.

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Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 The presence of a major corrosion indication within two inches of a weld, will receive an augmented surface or volumetric examination for the presence of cracking and will be entered into the licensees corrective action program. The presence of a major corrosion indication more than two inches from a weld will be entered into the licensees corrective action program.

A minor corrosion indication within two inches from a weld will receive a supplemental VT-1 exam (a surface or volumetric exam may be performed in lieu of the VT-1 exam) to demonstrate that there is no attack of the metal under the corrosion indication. Note that the area does not need to be cleaned if there is confidence that the VT-1 exam will be able to detect pitting, cracking, under-deposit corrosion, or general attack. If it is determined there is an attack of the metal under the corrosion indication, then the condition will be entered into the licensees corrective action program. A minor corrosion indication more than two inches from a weld is acceptable without further action other than noting the indication.

Major corrosion indications:

If a corrosion indication meets any of the following, it will be considered a major corrosion indication:

x Cracking of any size x Corrosion products having a linear appearance, except light corrosion indicative of iron contamination x Corrosion products having a branching appearance x Evidence of pitting corrosion, under-deposit corrosion, or etching with measurable depth (removal/attack of material by corrosion) x In a 10 cm by 10 cm region, corrosion product is present in 25% or more of the surface with evidence of attack into the DSC x Evidence of water intrusion that runs into a crevice location with rust staining at the edge of the crevice x Corrosion product deposit present at the mouth of an occluded region that includes a portion of the DSC shell weld Minor corrosion indications:

If a corrosion indication is not a major corrosion indication and it meets any of the following, it will be considered a minor corrosion indication:

x Evidence of water intrusion stained the color of corrosion products x Areas of light corrosion that follow a fabrication feature or anomaly (e.g., scratch or gouge) - such indications are indicative of iron contamination x In a 10 cm by 10 cm region, corrosion product is present in 10% to 25% of the canister surface ANUH-01.0150 15-7 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 x Corrosion product greater than 2 mm in diameter Insignificant corrosion indications:

Corrosion indications that do not meet the criteria for being a major corrosion indication or the criteria for being a minor corrosion indication are considered insignificant corrosion indications.

Insignificant corrosion indications are acceptable without further action other than noting the indications.

15.3.1.6.2 DSC AMP - Augmented Examination If a surface examination is performed, no further actions are required if any of the following apply:

x If a surface examination confirms the absence of flaws x If the detected flaw is a rounded indication, and if no corrosion products or masking deposits are present x If the detected flaw is a linear indication, if no corrosion products or masking deposits are present, and if the linear indication is determined not to have a crack-like morphology If none of the above surface examination bullets apply, then a volumetric exam is to be performed.

If a volumetric examination is performed (whether as an initial, supplemental, or augmented exam), no further actions are required if any of the following apply:

x If a volumetric examination confirms the absence of planar flaws x If an indication is detected and it is determined to not be connected to the exterior of the DSC (i.e., not associated with the outside surface) x If the entirety of the detected flaw is in an area that is confirmed to have no corrosion products present, and if the indication is determined to not have a crack-like morphology x If the detected indication was recorded prior to being mitigated or remediated, and there has been no measurable increase in the flaw size after being remediated If none of the above volumetric examination bullets apply, the detected indication is an outside surface-connected planar flaw and is considered material cracking. In this case, an engineering evaluation is performed to demonstrate the acceptability of the cracking using flaw evaluation.

15.3.1.6.3 DSC AMP - Flaw Evaluation If a crack is identified, an engineering evaluation will be performed to determine when the flaw will reach 75% of the through-wall thickness [15.8]. See Section 5.3.2 of EPRI Report 3002008193 [15.8] for an acceptable approach for performance of this evaluation.

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Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 If the flaw is measured to be greater than 75% through-wall, or if it is not feasible to perform an additional inspection prior to the timeframe the engineering evaluation determined the flaw will reach 75% through-wall, the condition will be addressed in accordance with the licensees corrective action program.

15.3.1.7 DSC AMP - Corrective Actions Site QA procedures, review and approval processes, and administrative controls are implemented according to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. The licensees corrective action program ensures that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected, including root cause determination and prevention of recurrence. Deficiencies are either corrected or are evaluated to be acceptable for continued service through engineering analysis, which provides reasonable assurance that the intended safety function is maintained consistent with current licensing basis conditions. Evaluations performed to assess conditions associated with aging should utilize the same methodology used in the licensing and design basis calculations, which are maintained by the CoC holder, as much as practical to ensure intended safety functions are maintained through the PEO. Extent of condition investigation per the licensees corrective action program may cause additional inspections through means of a different method, increased inspection frequency, and/or expanded inspection sample size.

15.3.1.8 DSC AMP - Confirmation Process The confirmation process will be commensurate with the general licensee QA program approved under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. The QA program ensures that the confirmation process includes provisions to verify that appropriate corrective actions have been completed and are effective. It also contains provisions to preclude repetition of significant conditions adverse to quality.

15.3.1.9 DSC AMP - Administrative Controls Administrative controls under the CoC holder or licensees QA procedures and corrective action program provide a formal review and approval process. Administrative controls are implemented in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and will continue for the PEO. Licensees and CoC holder use the 10 CFR Part 72 regulatory requirements to determine if a particular aging-related degradation condition or event identified via OE, research, monitoring, or inspection is reportable to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Individual events and conditions not rising to the level of NRC reportability based on the criteria in 10 CFR Part 72 are communicated to the CoC holder as outlined in NEI 14-03 [15.4].

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Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 15.3.1.10 DSC AMP - Operating Experience Appendix 3C documents the review of various sources of OE relevant to the Standardized Advanced NUHOMS System. This review included inspections of NUHOMS System SSCs that have been in service for several years. While the review identified several conditions that were age-related, no incidents were identified where aging effects led to the loss of intended safety functions of a NUHOMS System SSC. This OE review supports the conclusion that the effects of aging will be managed adequately so that the SSCs intended safety functions will be maintained during the PEO.

This AMP will be updated, as necessary, to incorporate new information on degradation due to aging effects identified from plant-specific inspection findings, related industry OE, and related industry research. Future plant-specific and industry aging management and age-related OE are captured through the licensees OE review process. The ongoing review of both plant-specific and industry OE will continue through the PEO to ensure that this AMP continues to be effective in managing the identified aging effects.

In addition to the ongoing OE review, this AMP requires periodic written evaluations (as described in Table 15-1) of the aggregate impact of aging-related DSCs OE, research, monitoring, and inspections on the intended safety functions of the in-scope DSCs subcomponents (i.e., tollgates). While licensees and TN Americas LLC assess new information relevant to aging management in accordance with normal corrective action and OE programs, tollgates are an opportunity to seek other information that may be available and to perform an aggregate assessment. Tollgate assessments are not stopping points. No action, other than performing an assessment and addressing relevant findings in the licensees corrective action program, is required to continue Standardized Advanced NUHOMS dry storage system operation. Tollgate assessment reports are not required to be submitted to the NRC, but are available for inspection. Appendix A of NEI 14-03 [15.4] provides guidance on the performance criteria for the tollgate assessments.

15.3.2 HSM Aging Management Program 15.3.2.1 HSM AMP - Scope of Program This program visually inspects the surfaces of the HSM (the term HSM applies to the Advanced Horizontal Storage Modules (AHSM) and AHSM-HS designs) subcomponents listed in Table 15-4. The table also lists the material and environments for each subcomponent along with the aging mechanisms and aging effects to be managed. The following aging effects/mechanisms will be managed via this AMP:

x Steel

 Loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and galvanic corrosion x Stainless Steel

 Loss of material due to pitting, and crevice corrosion ANUH-01.0150 15-10 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21

 Cracking due to stress corrosion cracking x Concrete

 Loss of material due to freeze-thaw, aggressive chemical attack, corrosion of reinforcing steel, and salt scaling

 Cracking due to freeze-thaw, reaction with aggregates, differential settlement, aggressive chemical attack, and corrosion of reinforcing steel

 Loss of strength due to reaction with aggregates, aggressive chemical attack, corrosion of reinforcing steel, and leaching of calcium hydroxide

 Reduction of concrete pH due to aggressive chemical attack and leaching of calcium hydroxide

 Loss of concrete/steel bond due to corrosion of reinforcing steel

 Increase in porosity and permeability due to leaching of calcium hydroxide 15.3.2.2 HSM AMP - Preventive Actions The program is a condition-monitoring program that does not include preventive actions.

15.3.2.3 HSM AMP - Parameters Monitored or Inspected The HSM AMP consists of visual inspections to monitor for material degradation.

The following accessible areas of the HSMs will undergo direct visual inspection for the aging effects listed in Table 15-4:

x The external concrete surfaces of the HSM roof and walls x External surfaces of the HSM access door x External attachment hardware The following normally non-accessible areas of HSM will undergo remote visual inspection for the aging effects listed in Table 15-4:

x Portions of the concrete front, back, and sides of the base unit x Portions of the DSC support structure and attachment hardware The inaccessible areas of the HSM include:

x The internal surface of the HSM blocked from view due to the heat shields x Heat shields at internal surface of the roof and side walls x Portions of the concrete front, back, and sides of the base unit ANUH-01.0150 15-11 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 x Portions of the DSC support structure and attachment hardware x External surfaces of the base units side and rear walls x Components embedded in concrete 15.3.2.4 HSM AMP - Detection of Aging Effects A minimum of one HSM will be selected for the baseline and subsequent inspections. The selection is to be based on the time in service or the DSC selected for aging management inspections.

As appropriate, direct or remote visual inspections utilizing ACI 349.3R [15.11], Section 3.6.1 are conducted for HSM concrete in both outdoor and sheltered environments, allowing for detection of aging effects from Table 15-4. Direct or remote visual inspections are utilized for general inspections for HSM steel components depending on whether these components are accessible or normally non-accessible, respectively. Visual examinations are performed for steel surfaces, detecting aging effects from Table 15-4 while identifying and assessing discontinuities and imperfections on the surface of components. As much of the HSM steel surfaces as can be reasonably accessed is examined to ascertain their general condition.

Inspection of the normally, non-accessible internal surfaces of the HSM concrete may be performed using a video camera, fiber-optic scope, or other remote inspection technology via existing access points of the HSM. The remote inspection system is qualified and demonstrated to have sufficient resolution capability and enhanced lighting to resolve the acceptance criteria identified in Section 15.3.2.6.

For HSM concrete, crack maps are developed. Dimensioning is documented in photographic records by inclusion of a tape measure/crack gauge, a comparator, or both.

Within the HSM cavity, certain surface areas may be inaccessible for direct visual and remote inspection. This AMP addresses detection of aging effects for inaccessible areas indirectly by monitoring the inspection findings within accessible and normally non-accessible areas.

Therefore, inaccessible area inspections may only be necessitated because of the licensees corrective action program to ensure the aging effect is adequately managed and that the components intended safety function is maintained during the PEO.

The baseline AMP visual inspection is to be conducted within two years prior to 20 years of the first loaded DSC being placed in storage. Subsequent inspections are to be conducted every 5 years +/- 1 year following the baseline inspection.

ANUH-01.0150 15-12 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 15.3.2.5 HSM AMP - Monitoring and Trending The inspections and monitoring activities in this AMP are performed periodically in order to identify areas of degradation. Conditions adverse to quality that are noted during the inspection and monitoring activities, such as non-conformances, failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, and deviations, are entered into the licensees corrective action program. Visual inspections appropriately consider cumulative OE from previous inspections and assessments in order to monitor and trend the progression of aging effects over time. Data taken for these inspections is to be monitored by comparison to past site data taken, as well as comparison to industry OE, including data gathered by the AMID as discussed in NEI 14-03 [15.4].

For HSM concrete, crack maps are monitored and trended as a means of identifying progressive growth of defects that may indicate degradation due to specific aging effects, such as rebar corrosion. Crack maps and photographic records are compared with those from previous inspections to identify accelerated degradation of the concrete during the PEO.

As described in Section 15.3.2.4, a minimum of one HSM is to be selected for the baseline inspection and subsequent inspections. If the baseline HSM is not available for subsequent inspections or is no longer in service (e.g., the stored DSC has been shipped off-site), another HSM is to be selected for a new baseline inspection.

15.3.2.6 HSM AMP - Acceptance Criteria The criteria below are derived from design basis codes and standards that include ACI 349.3R

[15.11]. The criteria are directed at the identification and evaluation of degradation that may affect the ability of the HSM to perform its intended safety function. Licensees who are not committed to ACI 349.3R, and elect to use site-specific criteria for concrete structures, should describe the criteria and provide a technical basis for deviations from those acceptance criteria in ACI 349.3R. Should the inspection acceptance criteria be exceeded, the identified issue requires further evaluation and is entered into the licensees corrective action program.

x Steel

 Loss of material due to general, pitting, crevice, and galvanic corrosion x Stainless Steel

 Loss of material due to pitting and crevice corrosion

 Cracking due to stress corrosion cracking Metallic Components Visual inspections are utilized for general inspections for HSM steel components. For metallic surfaces, any of the following indications of relevant degradation detected are evaluated:

x General, pitting, crevice, and galvanic corrosion (loss of material) x Corrosion stains on adjacent components and structures (indicating loss of material)

ANUH-01.0150 15-13 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 x Surface cracks (cracking)

If any of the above items are identified by the inspection, further evaluation is required through the licensees corrective action program.

Concrete HSM structure:

Concrete acceptance criteria from ACI 349.3R [15.11] represent acceptable conditions for observed degradation that has been determined to be inactive. These criteria are termed second-tier for structures possessing a concrete cover in excess of the minimum requirements of ACI 349. Inactive degradation can be determined by the quantitative comparison of current observed conditions with that of prior inspections. If there is a high potential for progressive degradation or propagation to occur at its present or an accelerated rate, the disposition should consider more frequent evaluations of the specific structure or initiation of repair planning.

The following findings from a visual inspection are considered acceptable:

x Absence of leaching and chemical attack x Absence of signs of corrosion in the steel reinforcement x Drummy areas that cannot exceed the cover concrete thickness in depth x Popouts and voids less than 50 mm (2 in.) in diameter or equivalent surface area x Scaling less than 30 mm (1.125 in.) in depth x Spalling less than 20 mm (0.75 in.) in depth and 200 mm (8 in.) in any dimension x Absence of corrosion staining of undefined source on concrete surfaces x Passive cracks less than 1 mm (0.04 in.) in maximum width x Passive settlement or deflections within the design basis (serviceability limits) x Absence of visible signs of deterioration from alkali-aggregate reaction such as excessive out-of-plane expansion or other cement/aggregate reaction If any of the above acceptance criteria are not met, further evaluation is required through the licensees corrective action program.

ANUH-01.0150 15-14 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 15.3.2.7 HSM AMP - Corrective Actions Site QA procedures, review and approval processes, and administrative controls are implemented according to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. The licensees corrective action program ensures that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected, including root cause determination and prevention of recurrence. Deficiencies are either corrected or are evaluated to be acceptable for continued service through engineering analysis, which provides reasonable assurance that the intended safety function is maintained consistent with current licensing basis conditions. Evaluations performed to assess conditions associated with aging should utilize the same methodology used in the licensing and design basis calculations as much as practical to ensure intended safety functions are maintained through the PEO. Extent of condition investigation per the licensees corrective action program may cause additional inspections through means of a different method, increased inspection frequency, and/or expanded inspection sample size.

15.3.2.8 HSM AMP - Confirmation Process The confirmation process will be commensurate with the general licensee QA program approved under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. The QA program ensures that the confirmation process includes provisions to verify that appropriate corrective actions have been completed and are effective. It also contains provisions to preclude repetition of significant conditions adverse to quality.

15.3.2.9 HSM AMP - Administrative Controls Administrative controls under the CoC holder or licensees QA procedures and corrective action program provide a formal review and approval process. Administrative controls are implemented in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and will continue for the PEO. Licensees and CoC holder use the 10 CFR Part 72 regulatory requirements to determine if a particular aging-related degradation condition or event identified via OE, research, monitoring, or inspection is reportable to the NRC. Individual events and conditions not rising to the level of NRC reportability based on the criteria in 10 CFR Part 72 are communicated to the CoC holder as outlined in NEI 14-03 [15.4].

15.3.2.10 HSM AMP - Operating Experience Appendix 3C documents the review of various sources of OE relevant to the Standardized Advanced NUHOMS System. This review included inspections of NUHOMS System SSCs that have been in service for several years. While the review identified several conditions that were age-related, no incidents were identified where aging effects led to the loss of intended safety functions of a NUHOMS System SSC. This OE review supports the conclusion that the effects of aging will be managed adequately so that the SSCs intended safety functions will be maintained during the PEO.

ANUH-01.0150 15-15 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 This AMP will be updated as necessary to incorporate new information on degradation due to aging effects identified from plant-specific inspection findings, related industry OE, and related industry research. Future plant-specific and industry aging management and age-related OE are captured through the licensees OE review process. The ongoing review of both plant-specific and industry OE will continue through the PEO to ensure that this AMP continues to be effective in managing the identified aging effects.

15.3.3 Basemat Aging Management Program 15.3.3.1 Basemat AMP - Scope of Program This program visually inspects the surfaces of the basemat subcomponents listed in Table 15-5.

The table also lists the material and environments for each subcomponent along with the aging mechanisms and aging effects to be managed. The following aging effects/mechanisms will be managed via this AMP:

x Steel

 Loss of material due to general, pitting, and crevice corrosion x Concrete

 Loss of material due to freeze-thaw, aggressive chemical attack, corrosion of reinforcing steel, delayed ettringite formation 1, salt scaling, and microbiological degradation

 Cracking due to freeze-thaw, reaction with aggregates, differential settlement, aggressive chemical attack, corrosion of reinforcing steel, and delayed ettringite formation 1

 Loss of strength due to reaction with aggregates, aggressive chemical attack, corrosion of reinforcing steel, leaching of calcium hydroxide, delayed ettringite formation 1, and microbiological degradation

 Reduction of concrete pH due to aggressive chemical attack, leaching of calcium hydroxide, and microbiological degradation

 Loss of concrete/steel bond due to corrosion of reinforcing steel

 Increase in porosity and permeability due to leaching of calcium hydroxide and microbiological degradation 15.3.3.2 Basemat AMP - Preventive Actions The program is a condition-monitoring program that does not include preventive actions.

1 Delayed ettringite formation may be ruled out as a credible aging mechanism by the general licensee based on an ISFSI-specific evaluation.

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Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 15.3.3.3 Basemat AMP - Parameters Monitored or Inspected The Basemat AMP consists of visual inspections to monitor for material degradation.

The following accessible areas of the basemat will undergo direct visual inspection for the aging effects listed in Table 15-5:

x The aboveground exposed surface of the basemat The inaccessible areas of the basemat include:

x Below-grade surfaces off the basemat x External surfaces of the basemat under the HSM base unit walls x Components embedded in concrete 15.3.3.4 Basemat AMP - Detection of Aging Effects Direct visual inspections utilizing ACI-349.3R [15.11], Section 3.5.1 are to be conducted of the above-grade portions of the concrete basemat, allowing for detection of aging effects from Table 15-5.

For basemat concrete, crack maps are developed. Dimensioning is documented in photographic records by inclusion of a tape measure/crack gauge, a comparator, or both.

Potential degradation of the below-grade portion of the concrete pad is assessed by results of groundwater sampling at a minimum of three locations in the area of the ISFSI.

The baseline AMP visual inspection and groundwater sampling is to be conducted within two years prior to 20 years of the first loaded DSC being placed in storage. Subsequent inspections are to be conducted every 5 years +/- 1 year following the baseline inspection.

15.3.3.5 Basemat AMP - Monitoring and Trending The inspections and monitoring activities in this AMP are performed periodically in order to identify areas of degradation. Conditions adverse to quality that are noted during the inspection and monitoring activities, such as non-conformances, failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, and deviations are entered into the licensees corrective action program. Visual inspections appropriately consider cumulative OE from previous inspections and assessments in order to monitor and trend the progression of aging effects over time. Data taken for these inspections is to be monitored by comparison to past site data taken, as well as comparison to industry OE, including data gathered by the AMID as discussed in NEI 14-03 [15.4].

For basemat concrete, crack maps are monitored and trended as a means of identifying progressive growth of defects that may indicate degradation due to specific aging effects, such as rebar corrosion. Crack maps and photographic records are compared with those from previous inspections to identify accelerated degradation of the concrete during the PEO.

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Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 15.3.3.6 Basemat AMP - Acceptance Criteria Concrete acceptance criteria from ACI 349.3R [15.11] represent acceptable conditions for observed degradation that has been determined to be inactive. These criteria are termed second-tier for structures possessing a concrete cover in excess of the minimum requirements of ACI 349. Inactive degradation can be determined by the quantitative comparison of current observed conditions with that of prior inspections. If there is a high potential for progressive degradation or propagation to occur at its present or an accelerated rate, the disposition should consider more frequent evaluations of the specific structure or initiation of repair planning.

The following findings from a visual inspection are considered acceptable:

x Absence of leaching and chemical attack, including microbiological chemical attack x Absence of signs of corrosion in the steel reinforcement x Drummy areas that cannot exceed the cover concrete thickness in depth x Popouts and voids less than 50 mm (2 in.) in diameter or equivalent surface area x Scaling less than 30 mm (1.125 in.) in depth x Spalling less than 20 mm (0.75 in.) in depth and 200 mm (8 in.) in any dimension x Absence of corrosion staining of undefined source on concrete surfaces x Passive cracks less than 1 mm (0.04 in.) in maximum width x Passive settlement or deflections within the design basis (serviceability limits) x Absence of visible signs of deterioration from alkali-aggregate reaction such as excessive out-of-plane expansion, delayed ettringite formation, or other cement/aggregate reaction If any of the above acceptance criteria are not met, further evaluation is required through the licensees corrective action program.

The acceptance criteria for the groundwater chemistry-sampling program are:

x S+

x &KORULGHVSSP x 6XOIDWHVSSP If any of the above acceptance criteria are not met, further evaluation is required through the licensees corrective action program.

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Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 15.3.3.7 Basemat AMP - Corrective Actions Site QA procedures, review and approval processes, and administrative controls are implemented according to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. The licensees corrective action program ensures that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected, including root cause determination and prevention of recurrence. Deficiencies are either corrected or are evaluated to be acceptable for continued service through engineering analysis, which provides reasonable assurance that the intended safety function is maintained consistent with current licensing basis conditions. Evaluations performed to assess conditions associated with aging should utilize the same methodology used in the licensing and design basis calculations as much as practical to ensure intended safety functions are maintained through the PEO. Extent of condition investigation per the licensees corrective action program may cause additional inspections through means of a different method, increased inspection frequency, and/or expanded inspection sample size.

15.3.3.8 Basemat AMP - Confirmation Process The confirmation process will be commensurate with the general licensee QA program approved under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. The QA program ensures that the confirmation process includes provisions to verify that appropriate corrective actions have been completed and are effective. It also contains provisions to preclude repetition of significant conditions adverse to quality.

15.3.3.9 Basemat AMP - Administrative Controls Administrative controls under the CoC holder or licensees QA procedures and corrective action program provide a formal review and approval process. Administrative controls are implemented in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and will continue for the PEO. Licensees and CoC holder use the 10 CFR Part 72 regulatory requirements to determine if a particular aging-related degradation condition or event identified via OE, research, monitoring, or inspection is reportable to the NRC. Individual events and conditions not rising to the level of NRC reportability based on the criteria in 10 CFR Part 72 are communicated to the CoC holder as outlined in NEI 14-03 [15.4].

15.3.3.10 Basemat AMP - Operating Experience Appendix 3C documents the review of various sources of OE relevant to the Standardized Advanced NUHOMS System. This review included inspections of NUHOMS System SSCs that have been in service for several years. While the review identified several conditions that were age-related, no incidents were identified where aging effects led to the loss of intended safety functions of a NUHOMS System SSC. This OE review supports the conclusion that the effects of aging will be managed adequately so that the SSCs intended safety functions will be maintained during the PEO.

ANUH-01.0150 15-19 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 This AMP will be updated, as necessary, to incorporate new information on degradation due to aging effects identified from plant-specific inspection findings, related industry OE, and related industry research. Future plant-specific and industry aging management and aging-related OE are captured through the licensees OE review process. The ongoing review of both plant-specific and industry OE will continue through the PEO to ensure that this AMP continues to be effective in managing the identified aging effects.

15.3.4 High Burnup Fuel Aging Management Program 15.3.4.1 HBU AMP - Scope of Program Fuel stored in a 24PT4 DSC is limited to an assembly average burnup of 60 GWd/MTU and fuel stored in a 32PTH2 DSC is limited to 62.5 GWd/MTU. The 24PT1 DSC is not authorized to store high burnup fuel. The cladding materials for the high burnup (HBU) fuel are zirconium-based, and the fuel is stored in a dry helium environment. The program relies on the joint EPRI and Department of Energy (DOE) HBU Dry Storage Cask Research and Development Project (HDRP) [15.13], conducted in accordance with the guidance in Appendix D of NUREG-1927, Revision 1 [15.3] as a surrogate demonstration program for monitoring the performance of HBU fuel in dry storage. The HDRP is a program designed to collect data from a spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage system containing HBU fuel in a dry helium environment. The program entails loading and storing an AREVA TN-32B bolted lid cask (the Research Project Cask) at Dominion Virginia Powers North Anna Power Station with intact HBU fuel (of nominal burnups ranging between 53 GWd/MTU and 58 GWd/MTU). The fuel to be used in the program includes four kinds of cladding (Zircaloy-4, low-tin Zircaloy-4, ZIRLO', and M5').

The research project cask is licensed to the temperature limits contained in Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) 11, Revision 3 [15.14], and loaded in such a way that the fuel cladding temperature is as close to the limit as practicable.

The parameters of the surrogate demonstration program are applicable to the design-bases HBU fuel, as; x maximum allowed burnup of the design-bases HBU fuel (i.e., 62.5 GWd/MTU) is on the order of the nominal burnup of the fuel in the surrogate demonstration program (i.e., 58 GWd/MTUtu),

x the cladding type of the design-bases HBU fuel (i.e., zirconium-based) is the same as the surrogate demonstration program, and x the cladding temperature of the HBU fuel is limited to the values in ISG-11 and the cladding temperature in the surrogate demonstration program is as close to the ISG-11 limits as practicable.

ANUH-01.0150 15-20 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 15.3.4.2 HBU AMP - Preventive Actions During the initial loading operations of the cask/canister, the design and CoC 1029 Technical Specifications (TS) require that the fuel be stored in a dry inert environment. TS 3.1.1 demonstrates that the cask/canister cavity is dry by maintaining a cavity absolute pressure less than or equal to 3 Torr for at least 30 minutes with the cask/canister isolated from the vacuum pump. TS 3.1.2 requires that the DSC then be backfilled with helium. These two TS requirements ensure that the HBU fuel is stored in an inert environment, thus preventing cladding degradation due to oxidation mechanisms. The cask/canister is loaded in accordance with the criteria of ISG 11, Revision 3 [15.14].

15.3.4.3 HBU AMP - Parameters Monitored or Inspected The parameters monitored or inspected are as described in the HDRP [15.13].

While the research project cask is on the storage pad, these parameters include temperature measurements at various locations within the cask. Temperature is the key driver for hydride-induced embrittlement and thermal creep.

It is anticipated that eventually the research project cask will be transported to an off-site fuel examination facility, where the cask will be reopened and the fuel visually examined for changes that occurred during drying and storage.

15.3.4.4 HBU AMP - Detection of Aging Effects This AMP relies on the HDRP [15.13] as a surrogate demonstration program for monitoring the performance of HBU fuel in dry storage. The program calls for monitoring cask internal temperatures during the drying process and while the cask is in storage on the ISFSI pad.

Temperature is the key driver for hydride-induced embrittlement and thermal creep.

After approximately 10 years of storage at the ISFSI site, it is anticipated that the research project cask will be transported to an off-site fuel examination facility. At the fuel examination facility, the cask will be reopened and the fuel visually examined for changes that occurred during drying and storage. Rods will be extracted from the HBU assemblies and nondestructive and destructive examinations will be performed. It is anticipated that these nondestructive and destructive exams will include cladding profilometry (for creep evaluation), rod internal gas pressure, hydride content and orientation, and cladding mechanical testing (i.e., ductility testing).

These examinations will be a direct indication of the susceptibility of high burnup fuel to hydride-induced embrittlement and thermal creep.

15.3.4.5 HBU AMP - Monitoring and Trending As information/data from a surrogate demonstration program or from other sources (such as testing or research results and scientific analyses) become available, the licensee will monitor, evaluate, and trend the information via its operating experience program and/or its corrective action program to determine what actions should be taken.

ANUH-01.0150 15-21 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Formal evaluations of the aggregate information from a surrogate demonstration program and other available domestic or international operating experience (including data from monitoring and inspection programs, NRC-generated communications, and other information) will be performed at specific points in time during the PEO, as delineated in Section 15.3.4.10.

15.3.4.6 HBU AMP - Acceptance Criteria The following acceptance criteria are to be applied to the data obtained from the HDRP [15.13].

If any of the following fuel performance criteria are not met, the condition will be addressed in accordance with licensees corrective action program:

x Cladding Temperature: The maximum cladding temperature measured is less than or equal to that predicted by the thermal analysis. A benchmarked thermal model against the demonstration test data may be used for the as-loaded configuration to show that calculated maximum cladding temperature is greater than the demonstrations measured maximum cladding temperature.

x Cladding Creep: Total creep strain extrapolated to the total approved storage duration based on the best fit to the data, accounting for initial condition uncertainty, shall be less than 1%.

x Confirmation that hydride reorientation has not compromised the ability to retrieve the spent fuel on a single-assembly basis.

15.3.4.7 HBU AMP - Corrective Actions Site QA procedures, review and approval processes, and administrative controls are implemented according to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. The licensees corrective action program ensures that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected, including root cause determination and prevention of recurrence. Deficiencies are either corrected or are evaluated to be acceptable for continued service through engineering analysis, which provides reasonable assurance that the intended safety function is maintained consistent with current licensing basis conditions. Evaluations performed to assess conditions associated with aging should utilize the same methodology used in the licensing and design basis calculations as much as practical to ensure intended safety functions are maintained through the PEO. Extent of condition investigation per the licensees corrective action program may cause additional inspections through means of a different method, increased inspection frequency, and/or expanded inspection sample size.

15.3.4.8 HBU AMP - Confirmation Process The confirmation process will be commensurate with the general licensee QA program approved under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. The QA program ensures that the confirmation process includes provisions to verify that appropriate corrective actions have been completed and are effective. It also contains provisions to preclude repetition of significant conditions adverse to quality.

ANUH-01.0150 15-22 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 15.3.4.9 HBU AMP - Administrative Controls Administrative controls under the CoC holder or licensees QA procedures and corrective action program provide a formal review and approval process. Administrative controls are implemented in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and will continue for the PEO. Licensees and CoC holder use the 10 CFR Part 72 regulatory requirements to determine if a particular aging-related degradation condition or event identified via OE, research, monitoring, or inspection is reportable to the NRC. Individual events and conditions not rising to the level of NRC reportability based on the criteria in 10 CFR Part 72 are communicated to the CoC holder as outlined in NEI 14-03 [15.4].

15.3.4.10 HBU AMP - Operating Experience Short-term testing (i.e., laboratory scale testing up to a few months) and scientific analyses examining the performance of HBU fuel have provided a foundation for the technical basis that storage of HBU fuel in the PEO may be performed safely and in compliance with regulations.

However, there has been relatively little OE to date with dry storage of HBU fuel. Therefore, the HDRP is used as a surrogate program to monitor and assess data regarding HBU fuel performance to confirm there is no degradation of HBU fuel that would result in an unanalyzed configuration during the PEO.

This AMP will be updated as necessary to incorporate new information on degradation due to aging effects identified from plant-specific inspection findings, related industry OE, and related industry research. Future plant-specific and industry aging management and age-related OE are captured through the licensees OE review process. The ongoing review of both plant-specific and industry OE will continue through the PEO to ensure that this AMP continues to be effective in managing the identified aging effects.

In addition to the ongoing OE review, this AMP requires periodic written evaluations as described in Table 15-2 of the aggregate impact of aging-related HBU fuel OE, research, monitoring, and inspections on the intended safety functions of the in-scope HBU fuel subcomponents (i.e., tollgates). While licensees and TN Americas LLC assess new information relevant to aging management in accordance with normal corrective action and OE programs, tollgates are an opportunity to seek out other information that may be available and to perform an aggregate assessment. Tollgate assessments are not stopping points. No action, other than performing an assessment and addressing relevant findings in the licensees corrective action program, is required to continue Standardized Advanced NUHOMS dry storage system operation. Tollgate assessment reports are not required to be submitted to the NRC, but are available for inspection. Appendix A of NEI 14-03 [15.4] provides guidance on the performance criteria for the tollgate assessments.

ANUH-01.0150 15-23 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 15.4 Supplemental Information 15.4.1 References

[15.1] Letter E-56990 from Prakash Narayanan (TN Americas LLC) to Document Control Desk (NRC), Response to Request for Additional Information for the Technical Review of the Application for Renewal of the Certificate of Compliance No. 1029 (Docket No. 72-1029, CAC/EPID Nos. 001028/L-2019-RNW-0014), dated July 10, 2020

[15.2] NRC NUREG-2214, Managing Aging Process in Storage (MAPS) Report Final Report, July 2019 (ML19214A111)

[15.3] NUREG-1927, Standard Review Plan for Renewal of Specific Licenses and Certificates of Compliance for Dry Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, Revision 1, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 2016 (Adams Accession Number ML16179A148).

[15.4] NEI 14-03, Format, Content, and Implementation Guidance for Cask Storage Operations-Based Aging Management, Revision 2, Nuclear Energy Institute, December 2016.

[15.5] American Society of Mechanical Engineers, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Processing Plants, 2017 Edition.

[15.6] American Society of Mechanical Engineers, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 1, 1992 Edition, with 1994 Addenda, including exceptions allowed by Code Case N-595-1.

[15.7] American Society of Mechanical Engineers, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 1, 2010 Edition.

[15.8] Electric Power Research Institute, Aging Management Guidance to Address Potential Chloride-Induced Stress Corrosion Cracking of Welded Stainless Steel Canisters, EPRI-TR-3002008193, March 2017.

[15.9] ACI-201.1R, Guide for Conducting a Visual Inspection of Concrete in Service, American Concrete Institute, 2008.

[15.10] Not Used.

[15.11] ACI-349.3R, Evaluation of Existing Nuclear Safety Related Concrete Structures, American Concrete Institute, 2018.

[15.12] Not Used.

ANUH-01.0150 15-24 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21

[15.13] Electric Power Research Institute, High Burnup Dry Storage Cask Research and Development Project: Final Test Plan, Revision 0, DE-NE-0000593, February 27, 2014.

[15.14] NRC Spent Fuel Project Office, Interim Staff Guidance 11, Cladding Considerations for the Transportation and Storage of Spent Fuel, Revision 3, November 17, 2003.

ANUH-01.0150 15-25 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Proprietary Information on Pages 15-26 and 15-27 Withheld Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390 ANUH-01.0150 15-26 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 15-3 Subcomponents Within Scope of DSC AMP (3 Pages)

Intended Subcomponent Safety Material Credible Aging Parts Function(s) (1) Group Environment (2) Mechanism Aging Effect Cylindrical Shell Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material CO, SH, SR, Stainless (E) Sheltered Galvanic Corrosion Loss of Material TH, RT Steel Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Outer Bottom Stainless SH, SR, TH, RT (E) Sheltered Galvanic Corrosion Loss of Material Cover Plate Steel Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking Pitting & Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Grapple Ring and Stainless SR, RT Sheltered Support Steel Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking ANUH-01.0150 15-28 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 15-3 Subcomponents Within Scope of DSC AMP (3 Pages)

Intended Subcomponent Safety Material Credible Aging Parts Function(s) (1) Group Environment (2) Mechanism Aging Effect Shear Key Stainless Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material SR Sheltered Steel Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Outer Top Cover CO, SH, SR, Stainless Plate and Test (E) Sheltered TH, RT Steel Port plug Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Bottom Shield Stainless SH, SR, TH (E) Sheltered Galvanic Corrosion Loss of Material Plug Steel Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking ANUH-01.0150 15-29 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 15-3 Subcomponents Within Scope of DSC AMP (3 Pages)

Intended Subcomponent Safety Material Credible Aging Parts Function(s) (1) Group Environment (2) Mechanism Aging Effect Inner Bottom Cover Plate Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Stainless CO, SH, SR, TH (E) Sheltered Galvanic Corrosion Loss of Material Steel Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking Notes:

1. The Intended Safety Functions are: Confinement (CO), Radiation Shielding (SH), Sub-Criticality Control (CR), Structural Integrity (SR), Heat Removal Capability (TH), Retrievability (RT). Note that not all of the subcomponents in a group have all of the listed intended safety functions for that group.
2. (I) refers to an internal (or towards the interior of the DSC) environment and (E) refers to an external (or towards the exterior of the DSC) environment.

ANUH-01.0150 15-30 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 15-4 Subcomponents Within Scope of HSM AMP (8 Pages)

Intended Subcomponent Safety Material Credible Aging Parts Functions (3) Group Environment Mechanism Aging Effect Embedded in General Corrosion Loss of Material Steel Concrete Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Cracking Freeze-Thaw Loss of Material Cracking Reaction with Aggregates Loss of Strength Differential Settlement Cracking Cracking Loss of Strength Base Walls, Roof, Aggressive Chemical Attack Loss of Material Door Concrete SH, SR, TH, RT Reduction of Core Air-Outdoor Concrete Concrete pH Sheltered Loss of Concrete/Steel Bond Corrosion of Reinforcing Steel Loss of Material Cracking Loss of Strength Loss of Strength Leaching of Calcium Increase in Hydroxide Porosity and Permeability ANUH-01.0150 15-31 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 15-4 Subcomponents Within Scope of HSM AMP (8 Pages)

Intended Subcomponent Safety Material Credible Aging Parts Functions (3) Group Environment Mechanism Aging Effect Reduction of Concrete pH Salt Scaling Loss of Material Cracking Reaction with Aggregates Loss of Strength Differential Settlement Cracking Loss of Strength Increase in Leaching of Calcium Porosity and Hydroxide Permeability Reduction of Concrete pH Embedded in General Corrosion Loss of Material Steel Concrete Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Outlet Vent Cracking Freeze-Thaw Cover, End Loss of Material Walls, Rear Cracking Walls, Lower SH, SR, TH Reaction with Aggregates Vent Cover, Loss of Strength Concrete Air-outdoor Transition Roof, Differential Settlement Cracking Transition Walls Cracking Aggressive Chemical Attack Loss of Strength Loss of Material ANUH-01.0150 15-32 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 15-4 Subcomponents Within Scope of HSM AMP (8 Pages)

Intended Subcomponent Safety Material Credible Aging Parts Functions (3) Group Environment Mechanism Aging Effect Reduction of Concrete pH Loss of Concrete/Steel Bond Corrosion of Reinforcing Steel Loss of Material Cracking Loss of Strength Loss of Strength Increase in Leaching of Calcium Porosity and Hydroxide Permeability Reduction of Concrete pH Salt Scaling Loss of Material General Corrosion Loss of Material Sheltered Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material DSC Support Steel Galvanic Corrosion Loss of Material Structure SR Embedded in General Corrosion Loss of Material Assembly Hardware Concrete Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Stainless Steel Sheltered Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking ANUH-01.0150 15-33 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 15-4 Subcomponents Within Scope of HSM AMP (8 Pages)

Intended Subcomponent Safety Material Credible Aging Parts Functions (3) Group Environment Mechanism Aging Effect Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material DSC Support Structure SR, TH, RT Stainless Steel Sheltered Assembly Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking General Corrosion Loss of Material Steel Sheltered Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Adjustable DSC SR Galvanic Corrosion Loss of Material Axial Retainer Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Stainless Steel Sheltered Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking Embedded in General Corrosion Loss of Material Concrete Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Heat Shield Steel General Corrosion Loss of Material Assemblies SR Sheltered Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Attachment Hardware Galvanic Corrosion Loss of Material Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Stainless Steel Sheltered Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking ANUH-01.0150 15-34 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 15-4 Subcomponents Within Scope of HSM AMP (8 Pages)

Intended Subcomponent Safety Material Credible Aging Parts Functions (3) Group Environment Mechanism Aging Effect Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Heat Shields SH, TH Stainless Steel Sheltered Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking Embedded in General Corrosion Loss of Material Rear Wall and Concrete Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Shield Door Steel General Corrosion Loss of Material Attachment SR Air-Outdoor Embedment Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Hardware Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Stainless Steel Air-Outdoor Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking General Corrosion Loss of Material Air-Outdoor Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Galvanic Corrosion Loss of Material Steel General Corrosion Loss of Material Shield Door Sheltered Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Attachment SR Hardware Galvanic Corrosion Loss of Material Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Air-Outdoor Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking Stainless Steel Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Sheltered Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking ANUH-01.0150 15-35 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 15-4 Subcomponents Within Scope of HSM AMP (8 Pages)

Intended Subcomponent Safety Material Credible Aging Parts Functions (3) Group Environment Mechanism Aging Effect General Corrosion Loss of Material Steel Sheltered Shield Door Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material SH, SR backing Plate Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Stainless Steel Sheltered Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking General Corrosion Loss of Material Deformed Bar Anchors, Embedded in SR Steel Mechanical Concrete Splice, Rebar Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material General Corrosion Loss of Material Air-Outdoor Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Upper and Lower Steel Galvanic Corrosion Loss of Material Vent Cover SR Embedded in General Corrosion Loss of Material Attachment Hardware Concrete Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Stainless Steel Air-Outdoor Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking ANUH-01.0150 15-36 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 15-4 Subcomponents Within Scope of HSM AMP (8 Pages)

Intended Subcomponent Safety Material Credible Aging Parts Functions (3) Group Environment Mechanism Aging Effect General Corrosion Loss of Material Air-Outdoor Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Galvanic Corrosion Loss of Material Steel General Corrosion Loss of Material Module-to Module-Wall Sheltered Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material SR Attachment Galvanic Corrosion Loss of Material Hardware Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Air-Outdoor Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking Stainless Steel Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Sheltered Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking General Corrosion Loss of Material AHSM Roof Steel Air-Outdoor Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Attachment SR Galvanic Corrosion Loss of Material Hardware Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Stainless Steel Air-Outdoor Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking AHSM-HS Roof Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Connection SR Stainless Steel Sheltered Hardware Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking AHSM Liner Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material SH, TH Stainless Steel Sheltered Plates Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking ANUH-01.0150 15-37 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 15-4 Subcomponents Within Scope of HSM AMP (8 Pages)

Intended Subcomponent Safety Material Credible Aging Parts Functions (3) Group Environment Mechanism Aging Effect Transition Wall Pitting and Crevice Corrosion Loss of Material Attachment SR Stainless Steel Sheltered Hardware Stress Corrosion Cracking Cracking Notes:

1. UFSAR Drawing NUH-03-4011 does not assign a part number to these subcomponents; however, the drawing does call them out and specifies the design and construction standards (i.e., Note 1 on Drawing NUH-03-4011).
2. UFSAR Drawings NUH-03-4012 and NUH 03-4013 do not assign a part number to these subcomponents; however, the drawings do show them.
3. The Intended Safety Functions are: Confinement (CO), Radiation Shielding (SH), Sub-Criticality Control (CR), Structural Integrity (SR), Heat Removal Capability (TH), Retrievability (RT). Note that not all of the subcomponents in a group have all of the listed intended safety functions for that group.

ANUH-01.0150 15-38 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 15-5 Subcomponents Within Scope of Basemat AMP (3 Pages)

Intended Credible Subcomponent Safety Material Aging Parts Function(s) (2) Group Environment Mechanism Aging Effect General Loss of Material Corrosion Embedded in Steel Pitting and Concrete Crevice Loss of Material Corrosion Cracking Freeze-Thaw Loss of Material Reaction Cracking with Aggregates Loss of Strength Differential Cracking Settlement Cracking Aggressive Loss of Strength Chemical Loss of Material Attack Reduction of Basemat SR, RT Concrete pH Loss of Concrete/Steel Concrete Air-Outdoor Corrosion of Bond Reinforcing Loss of Material Steel Cracking Loss of Strength Loss of Strength Increase in Leaching of Porosity and Calcium Permeability Hydroxide Reduction of Concrete pH Delayed Loss of Material Ettringite Loss of Strength Formation (1) Cracking Salt Scaling Loss of Material ANUH-01.0150 15-39 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 15-5 Subcomponents Within Scope of Basemat AMP (3 Pages)

Intended Credible Subcomponent Safety Material Aging Parts Function(s) (2) Group Environment Mechanism Aging Effect Reaction Cracking with Aggregates Loss of Strength Differential Cracking Settlement Loss of Strength Increase in Sheltered Leaching of Porosity and Calcium Permeability Hydroxide Reduction of Concrete pH Delayed Loss of Material Ettringite Loss of Strength Formation (1) Cracking Cracking Freeze-Thaw Loss of Material Reaction Cracking with Aggregates Loss of Strength Differential Cracking Settlement Cracking Groundwater/ Aggressive Loss of Strength Soil Chemical Loss of Material Attack Reduction of Concrete pH Loss of Concrete/Steel Corrosion of Bond Reinforcing Loss of Material Steel Cracking Loss of Strength ANUH-01.0150 15-40 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table 15-5 Subcomponents Within Scope of Basemat AMP (3 Pages)

Intended Credible Subcomponent Safety Material Aging Parts Function(s) (2) Group Environment Mechanism Aging Effect Loss of Strength Increase in Leaching of Porosity and Calcium Permeability Hydroxide Reduction of Concrete pH Loss of Strength Loss of Material Microbiologi Increase in cal Porosity and Degradation Permeability Reduction of Concrete pH Delayed Loss of Material Ettringite Loss of Strength Formation (1) Cracking Salt Scaling Loss of Material Notes:

1. Delayed ettringite formation may be ruled out as a credible aging mechanism by the general licensee based on an ISFSI-specific evaluation.
2. The Intended Safety Functions are: Confinement (CO), Radiation Shielding (SH), Sub-Criticality Control (CR),

Structural Integrity (SR), Heat Removal Capability (TH), Retrievability (RT).

ANUH-01.0150 15-41 Chapter 15 is newly added as a part of CoC 1029 Renewal

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 A.1.2.1.2 Advanced Horizontal Storage Module (AHSM)

The AHSM design for the 24PT4-DSC is the same as that for the 24PT1-DSC with the elimination of a spacer at the back of the DSC support rails which is not needed for the longer 24PT4-DSC. The AHSM is designed to be placed next to the AHSM-HS in an array if required at a given ISFSI. In such cases, a transition wall is designed to be placed between an existing AHSM module arrays and AHSM-HS modules. Without adjoining AHSM-HS installed, the transition wall has to function as an end shield wall (end wall).

The analysis of the AHSM in Chapter 4 supports the 24 kW heat load of the 24PT4-DSC.

A.1.2.1.3 Transfer Systems A.1.2.1.3.1 On-Site Transfer Cask No change to the On-Site Transfer Cask section as described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1.3.1 of the UFSAR.

A.1.2.1.3.2 Transfer Equipment No change to the Transfer Equipment section as described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1.3.2 of the UFSAR.

A.1.2.2 Operational Features No change to the Operational Features section as described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2 of the UFSAR.

A.1.2.2.1 Dry Run Operations No change to the Dry Run Operations section as described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2.1 of the UFSAR.

A.1.2.2.2 Spent Fuel Assembly (SFA) Loading Operations The sequence of operations to be performed in loading fuel into this 24PT4-DSC is presented in Chapter A.8.

A.1.2.2.3 Identification of Subjects for Safety and Reliability Analysis A.1.2.2.3.1 Criticality Prevention Criticality is controlled by utilizing the fixed borated neutron absorbing material, Boral, in the 24PT4-DSC basket. Also, when more than four damaged assemblies are stored in the 24PT4-DSC in combination with specific maximum fuel enrichment levels, poison rodlets may be required in the inner intact assemblies for criticality control. During storage, with the cavity dry and sealed from the environment, criticality control measures within the installation are not necessary because water cannot enter the 24PT4-DSC during storage.

ANUH-01.0150 A.1.2-2

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 A.1.2.2.3.2 Chemical Safety No change to the Chemical Safety section as described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2.3.2 of the UFSAR.

A.1.2.2.3.3 Operation Shutdown Modes No change to the Operation Shutdown Modes section as described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2.3.3 of the UFSAR.

A.1.2.2.3.4 Instrumentation No change to the Instrumentation section as described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2.3.4 of the UFSAR.

A.1.2.2.3.5 Maintenance and Surveillance No change to the Maintenance and Surveillance section as described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2.3.5 of the UFSAR.

A.1.2.3 24PT4-DSC Contents The 24PT4-DSC is designed to store up to 24 intact CE 16x16 PWR fuel assemblies. The 24PT4-DSC is also designed for storage of up to 12 damaged fuel assemblies in specially designed Failed Fuel Cans with the balance being loaded with intact fuel. Storage of NFAH is not allowed in the 24PT4-DSC. A description of the fuel assemblies including the damaged fuel assemblies is provided in Chapter A.2. The maximum allowable initial enrichment of the fuel to be stored is 4.85 wt. % U-235 and the maximum burnup is 60,000 MWd/MTU. The fuel must be cooled at least 5 years prior to storage.

The 24PT4-DSC design may store PWR fuel assemblies in any one of the three alternate heat load configurations with a maximum decay heat load of 1.26 kW/assembly and a maximum heat load of 24 kW per DSC as described in Chapter A.2.

The criticality control features of the Advanced NUHOMS System are designed to maintain the neutron multiplication factor, k-effective (including uncertainties and calculational bias), at less than 0.95 under normal, off-normal, and accident conditions.

The quantity and type of radionuclides in the fuel assemblies are described and tabulated in Chapter A.5. Chapter A.6 covers the criticality safety of the Advanced NUHOMS System and its parameters. These parameters include rod pitch, rod outside diameter, material densities, moderator ratios, and geometric configurations.

A.1.2.4 Aging Management Program Requirements Aging management program (AMP) requirements for use of the 24PT4 DSC during the period of extended storage operations are contained in Section 15.3.

ANUH-01.0150 A.1.2-3 All changes on this page are Renewal.

Updated Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 A.3.4.4.3.2 Basket Assembly The stress analyses results for the basket assembly are summarized in Table A.3.6-7, Table A.3.6-8 and Table A.3.6-9. Table A.3.6-7 presents a summary of the calculated maximum stress intensities obtained for the spacer discs for the controlling load combinations.

Table A.3.6-8 presents a summary of the maximum stress intensities for the guidesleeves.

Table A.3.6-9 presents a summary of the highest interaction ratios for the support rod assemblies.

The support rods are preloaded to a compressive load of up to 10 kips to assist in the assembly of the basket components and into the DSC shell assembly. As shown in Table A.3.6-9, the maximum support rod interaction ratio is calculated to be 0.36. For axial end drops the deceleration load reduces the support rod pre-stress, resulting in net compression while the maximum stress interaction ratio for the spacer sleeves for the accident conditions is 0.90.

The analyses presented in Section A.3.6 demonstrate that even in the extremely unlikely hypothetical accident scenarios, there is sufficient margin to ensure that the basket components perform their intended function.

A.3.4.4.3.3 AHSM There is no change to the AHSM results presented in Section 3.4.4.3.3 since the calculations are based on an enveloping weight of 85,000 lb, which bounds the loaded weight of the 24PT4-DSC.

Evaluation of the Transition Wall between AHSM and AHSM-HS Arrays The AHSM-HS is designed to be placed next to the AHSM in an array if required at a given ISFSI. In such cases, a transition wall is designed to be placed between an existing AHSM module arrays and AHSM-HS modules. The evaluation for the transition wall is provided in Appendix B, Section B.3.6.2.4.6.

A.3.4.4.4 Comparison with Allowable Stresses The stresses for each of the major components of the 24PT4-DSC are compared to their allowables in Table A.3.6-4 through Table A.3.6-9.

A.3.4.5 Cold The AHSM and 24PT4-DSC have been designed for operation at daily average ambient temperatures as low as -40 °F. The permanent AHSM and DSC shielding materials are all solids, so there is no concern over freezing.

The SA-240 Type 316 stainless steel is not subject to brittle fracture for the range of operating temperatures of the 24PT4-DSC.

ANUH-01.0150 A.3.4-4

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table A.5.1-1 Advanced NUHOMS System Shielding Materials AHSM Components Thickness/Material Modeled Side Walls 1 concrete Side Shield/Transition Wall 3 concrete Roof 5 concrete Rear Wall Minimum thickness 1 concrete Rear Shield Wall 3 concrete Front Door/Front Wall 2 thick concrete 24PT4-DSC Components Thickness/Material Modeled Bottom Shield Plugs/Cover 3.88 Steel Plates 3 Lead Top Shield Plugs/Cover 3.74 Steel*

Plates 3.5 Lead Cylindrical Shell 0.53 Steel 28 Steel Spacer Discs, 1.25 Basket (main components) thick each, and 24 Steel Guide Tubes with Boral Sheets

  • Design thickness is 4.75.

OS197H Transfer Cask Components Thickness/Material Modeled Top Cover Plate 2 NS3 and 3.25 Steel Bottom Cover Plate 2.25 NS3 and 2.75 Steel Radial Walls:

Inner Shell 0.5 Steel Lead Gamma Shield 3.56 Lead Structural Shell 1.5 Steel Neutron Shield 3 Water Skin 0.19 Steel ANUH-01.0150 A.5.1-4

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table A.5.1-2 Summary of AHSM Dose Rates Dose Rate Dose Rate (mrem/hr)

Surface Component Maximum Average Gamma 143.881 +/- 15.5%(a)

Rear End of the Neutron 0.207 +/- 4.3% N/A TSBA(b)

Total 144.088 +/- 15.5%

Gamma 1.115 +/- 4.2% 0.085 +/- 3.3%

Back of the Rear Neutron 0.008 +/- 1.4% 1.05E-3 +/- 1.6%

Shield Wall(b)

Total 1.123 +/- 4.1% 0.086 +/- 3.3%

Gamma 44.318 +/- 5.3% 2.154 +/- 2.9%

Front(c) Neutron 0.838 +/- 1.1% 0.138 +/- 7.7%

Total 45.156 +/- 5.2% 2.292 +/- 2.8%

Gamma 149.298 +/- 4.5% 0.011 +/- 2.7%

Roof(d) Neutron 0.279 +/- 1.6% 0.001 +/- 7.5%

Total 149.577 +/- 4.5% 0.012 +/- 2.6%

Gamma 6.657 +/- 6.8% 0.474 +/- 5.6%

AHSM Top(e) Neutron 0.016 +/- 1.8% 1.56E-3 +/- 1.5%

Total 6.673 +/- 6.8% 0.476 +/- 5.6%

Gamma 1.790 +/- 3.3% 0.309 +/- 2.0%

Side(f) Neutron 0.074 +/- 3.6% 1.06E-2 +/- 1.4%

Total 1.865 +/- 3.1% 0.319 +/- 1.9%

Gamma 3.172 +/- 2.3% 0.463 +/- 1.4%

Transition wall Neutron 0.116 +/- 2.3% 1.50E-02 +/- 1.2%

Total 3.288 +/- 2.2% 0.478 +/- 1.4%

(a) Statistical one standard deviation uncertainty in the Monte Carlo calculation.

(b) The maximum gamma dose rates on the rear concrete surface (of top model) but below the roof elevation are less than 0.2 mrem/hr and the maximum gamma dose rates on this surface above the roof level are about 1.12 mrem/hr; i.e., the dose rate above the roof drops off very rapidly with distance in x from the vent (note the dose rate near the edge of the vent is 144.1 mrem/hr).

(c) These maximum dose rates on the front of the AHSM are based on the results calculated just in front of the entrance of the bottom air inlet. The maximum dose rate around the door is 4.453 mrem/hr (gamma dose rate 3.909 mrem/hr and neutron dose rate 0.544 mrem/hr) from the top MCNP model as shown in Figure A.5.4-3.

(d) The dose rates are calculated on top of the AHSM roof. The maximum dose rates on the roof are based on the dose rates just at the roof vent opening. Knowing dose rates just above the roof vent opening is important, since this area must be accessed to clean the vent screens, if debris accumulates on the screens. For dose rates in front of the Top Shield Block Assembly (TSBA), the Roof maximum dose rate is below 1.0 mrem/hr.

The average dose rates are calculated over the roof segment in front of the TSBA (before its -x side).

(e) The dose rates are calculated on the plane enveloping the AHSM from the top. The average dose rate is calculated over the entire plane enveloping the AHSM from the top.

This dose rate is used for the site dose rate analysis. The location of the maximum dose rate is near the rear end of the TSBA (its +x side, the side facing rear of the AHSM).

(f) Side surface dose rate represents an end wall.

ANUH-01.0150 A.5.1-5

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Note: Gamma results include the dose rates from gammas produced from neutrons in the neutron calculation. These partial gamma dose rates and the neutron dose rates have been multiplied by [1/(1-k)=1/(1-0.45)=1.82] to conservatively include neutron multiplication from induced fissions in the source region containing damaged fuel rods.

Note: The averaged dose rates are calculated over the planes enveloping the AHSM geometry, while peak dose rates are for localized areas. The average dose rates are needed for the site dose rate analysis.

ANUH-01.0150 A.5.1-5a

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 A.5.3 Model Specification The neutron and gamma dose rates on the surface of the AHSM, and on the surface, and at 1 and 3 feet from the surface of the TC are evaluated with the Monte Carlo transport code MCNP-4C2 and MCNP5 Version 1.40 [A5.8], [A5.16]. In addition, the flux-to-dose conversion factors specified by the ANSI/ANS 6.1.1-1977, Table A.5.3-3, are used [A5.9].

A.5.3.1 Description of the Radial and Axial Shielding Configurations Figure A.5.1-1 is a sketch of an AHSM with a cut away through the AHSM at its mid-vertical plane. Figure A.5.1-3 is also a cut through the vertical mid-plane of an AHSM with the 24PT4-DSC shown in phantom lines, and the front door at the left hand side. The rear wall of the AHSM has a minimum thickness of 1 foot. A 3-foot shield wall is placed along the rear and sides of the AHSM array, as shown in Figure A.5.1-1.

MCNP computer models are built to evaluate the dose rate along the front wall surface, the rear shield wall surface, the vent openings, the roof surface, and on the side shield walls.

Figure A.5.1-4 shows the shielding configuration of the TC.

A.5.3.1.1 Storage Configuration The geometry of nearly all components of the AHSM is Cartesian, except for the 24PT4-DSC, which is cylindrical. All relevant features of the AHSM are modeled explicitly in MCNP. In the MCNP coordinate system, the AHSM/24PT4-DSC length is in the X direction, the width is in the Y direction, and the height is in the Z direction.

Two general classes of models are developed, one for the top of the AHSM and the other for the bottom of the AHSM. The models make use of symmetry by using reflective boundary conditions and modeling only 1/4 of the 24PT4-DSC in each model. A total of four models are developed: top neutron, bottom neutron, top gamma, and bottom gamma. The geometry is shown in Figure A.5.4-1 through Figure A.5.4-4.

A.5.3.1.2 Loading/Unloading Configurations The dose rates on the surface, and at 1 and 3 feet from the surface of the 24PT4-DSC/ Transfer Cask are evaluated with MCNP. Three different configurations representing the 3 stages in the loading/unloading of the spent fuel are analyzed. These stages are (1) cask decontamination, (2) wet welding, and (3) dry welding.

Definition of Transfer Cask and 24PT4-DSC Loading Stages Cask decontamination - The 24PT4-DSC and the Transfer Cask are completely filled with water, including the region between 24PT4-DSC and cask, which is referred to as the Cask/24PT4-DSC annulus. The 24PT4-DSC outer top cover plate and temporary shielding in ANUH-01.0150 A.5.3-1

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21

[A5.12] MD DeHart and OW Hermann, An Extension of the Validation of SCALE (SAS2H)

Isotopic Predictions for PWR Spent Fuel, ORNL/TM-13317, September 1996.

[A5.13] OW Hermann, SM Bowman, MC Brady, CV Parks, Validation of the SCALE System for PWR Spent Fuel Isotopic Composition Analyses, ORNL/TM-12667, March 1995.

[A5.14] Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, Technical Development on Burn-up Credit for Spent LWR Fuels, JAERI-Tech 2000-071, September 21, 2000.

[A5.15] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Nuclide Importance to Criticality Safety, Decay Heating, and Source Terms Related to Transport and Interim Storage of High Burnup LWR Fuel, NUREG/CR-6700, Published January 2001, ORNL/TM-2000/284.

[A5.16] MCNP/MCNPX - Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code System Including MCNP5 1.40 and MCNPX 2.5.0 and Data Libraries, CCC-730, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, RSICC Computer Code Collection, January 2006.

ANUH-01.0150 A.5.5-2

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 neutron and gamma irradiation in a reactor pool environment for over nine years. Subsequent neutron radiography showed no signs of reduced neutron attenuation anywhere on the test specimens.

Depletion of the B-10 in the neutron poison plates is evaluated below. Although the license period of the cask is 60 years, actual storage time could be much longer. Using an estimated scalar flux of 5.0x105 n/cm2-s at the center of the basket, and the thermal neutron cross section for B-10 of 3837 barn [A6.9], the fraction of the original B-10 depleted after 1000 years would be:

5x105n/cm2-s x (3837x10-24 cm2) x 3.156x107 s/year x (1000 year) = 1.1x10-6 which is negligible. Therefore, the continued efficacy of the neutron poison is assured.

ANUH-01.0150 A.6.3-6 All changes on this page are Renewal.

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 A.10.2 Radiation Protection Design Features A.10.2.1 Advanced NUHOMS System Design Features The Advanced NUHOMS System has design features which ensure a high degree of integrity for the confinement of radioactive materials and reduction of direct radiation exposures to ALARA. These features are described below:

  • The fuel will not be unloaded nor will the 24PT4-DSCs be opened at the ISFSI unless the ISFSI is specifically licensed for these purposes.
  • The fuel is stored in a dry inert environment inside the 24PT4-DSCs so that no radioactive liquid is available for leakage.
  • The 24PT4-DSCs are sealed with a helium atmosphere to prevent oxidation of the fuel. The confinement design features are described in Chapter A.7.
  • The 24PT4-DSCs are heavily shielded to reduce external dose rates. The shielding design features are discussed in Chapter A.5.
  • No radioactive material will be discharged during storage since the 24PT4-DSC is designed and fabricated to be leaktight.

Geometric attenuation, enhanced by air and ground dispersion, provides additional shielding for distant locations at restricted area and site boundaries. However, the contribution of the sky shine dose rate must be considered for distant locations. The total dose rate estimation, including sky shine, is provided in the following section.

A.10.2.2 Radiation Dose Rates Calculated dose rates in the immediate vicinity of the Advanced NUHOMS System are presented in Chapter A.5, which provides a detailed description of source term configuration, analysis model and expected dose rates. Dose rates for longer distances (off site doses) are presented in this section for the design basis fuel load.

The Monte-Carlo computer code MCNP [A10.1] and [A10.5] is used to calculate the dose rates at the required locations around the AHSM.

The assumptions used to generate the geometry of the AHSM and shield walls for the MCNP runs are summarized below.

  • A single AHSM is modeled as a box enveloping the AHSM and 3 foot shield walls on the back and two sides. Source particles are then started on the surfaces of the box. A discussion of the source assumptions is provided below.

ANUH-01.0150 A.10.2-1

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 group is the product of the flux and the flux-to-dose factor [A10.4]. The "MCNP Input Current" column of Table A.10.2-6 is simply half the roof flux in each group, divided by the total dose rate and represents the roof current normalized to one mrem per hour. The total current for a one mrem/hr average surface dose rate is then 4.139x102 /cm2s. Similar calculations for neutrons are shown in Table A.10.2-7. The total neutron current for a one mrem/hr average surface dose rate is 2.898x101 n/cm2s.

The AHSM modeled in MCNP is approximated by a box that envelops the individual AHSM and shield walls. The dimensions of the box also include the width of the AHSM end and back shield walls. As is discussed above, the total activity of each face of the box is calculated by multiplying the flux per mrem/hr by the average dose rate of the face and by the area of the face.

The dimensions of an AHSM are:

AHSM Width (without End Shield Wall)...................................101 inches End Shield Wall Thickness ............................................................ 36 inches Transition Wall Thickness .............................36 inches (31.75 at keyways)

AHSM Height ..............................................................................247 inches Depth (Front-to-Back) (with Rear Shield Wall) .........................235 inches The source area of the front and back is, A front / back = [(247 )(101 + 2(36) )](2.54)2 (1)

= 275,683 cm 2 The total gamma activity for the front is 2.458x108 /s and the total neutron activity is 1.111x106 n/s. The total gamma activity for the back is 9.710x106 /s and the total neutron activity is 8.389x103 n/s.

The source area of the roof is, Aroof = [(235 + 36)(101 + 2(36) )](2.54)2 (2)

= 302,470 cm 2 The total gamma activity for the array roof is 5.934x107/s and the total neutron activity is 1.368x104 n/s.

The source area of the side is, Aside = [(235 + 36)(247 )](2.54)2 (3)

= 431,851 cm 2 The total gamma activity for each side is 5.523x107 /s and the total neutron activity is 1.327x105 n/s.

The AHSM surface activities are summarized in Table A.10.2-8.

ANUH-01.0150 A.10.2-3

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 24PT4-DSC dose rates were calculated for distances of 6.1 meters (20 feet) to 600 meters from a single AHSM at the front, side and back of the AHSM. The results of the single AHSM analyses (with 3-foot shield walls on sides and back of module, as described in Chapter A.1) are presented in Table A.10.2-1, Table A.10.2-2 and Table A.10.2-3. The total annual dose (direct + sky shine) as a function of distance from the surfaces of the AHSM for a single AHSM is shown in Figure A.10.2-1.

A.10.2.3 AHSM Dose Rates An array of 2x10 modules (back-to-back) is also considered. In this case, the rear shield walls are removed and the end shield walls are present only on the outermost modules. The dimensions for the 2x10 array are provided in the following list:

AHSM Width (without the End Shield Wall) ................................................. 101 inches End Side Shield Wall Thickness ........................................................................ 36 inches Transition Wall Thickness .................................................. 36 inches (31.75 at keyways)

AHSM Height ................................................................................................... 247 inches Depth (Front-to-Front of Back-to-Back Module) (without Rear Wall) .........470 Inches The source area of the front and front is, A front / front = [(247 )((10)(101) + 2(36) )](2.54)2 (4)

= 1,724,216 cm 2 Therefore, the total gamma activity for the array front is 1.537x109 /s and the total neutron activity is 6.946x106 n/s. For the back-to-back array the total gamma and neutron activity on the front is the same on the back.

The source area of the roof is, Aroof = [(470)((101)(10) + 2(36) )](2.54)2 (5)

= 3,280,897 cm 2 Therefore, the total gamma activity for the array roof is then 6.436x108/s and the total neutron activity is 1.483x105 n/s.

The source area of the side is, Aside = [(470)(247 )](2.54)2 (6)

= 748,966 cm 2 Finally, the total gamma activity for each side is then 9.578x107 /s and the total neutron activity is 2.301x105 n/s. The total activities for the 2x10 array are summarized in Table A.10.2-8.

ANUH-01.0150 A.10.2-4

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table A.10.2-4, Table A.10.2-5, and Figure A.10.2-2 provide dose rates for the 2x10 array.

For a single AHSM containing design basis fuel, a minimum distance of approximately 60 meters is necessary to meet the 10 CFR 72.104 [A10.2] limit of 25 mrem per year, assuming an exposure of 8,760 hours0.0088 days <br />0.211 hours <br />0.00126 weeks <br />2.8918e-4 months <br /> per year from the front of the AHSM (AHSM doses are highest at the front of the AHSM due to radiation through the air inlet opening). For a 2 x 10 array without any site specific shielding, a distance of approximately 150 meters from the front and back of the AHSMs is required to ensure doses are less than the 10 CFR 72.104 limits.

A.10.2.4 ISFSI Array The dose rates from a typical ISFSI are evaluated by the licensee in a 10 CFR 72.212 evaluation to address the site-specific ISFSI layout and its time phased installation.

Dose rates at the site boundary will depend on specific ISFSI parameters such as storage array configuration, number of stored 24PT4-DSCs, characteristics of stored fuel, fuel loading patterns, site geography, etc. Berms, walls, removable shields or preferential loading of cooler fuel in the outer cells of the 24PT4-DSC may be used to keep the site boundary dose rate within the 10 CFR 72.104 limits. Shields located within ten feet of the perimeter of the ISFSI modules or attached to the modules must be analyzed to confirm that they do not adversely impact the design basis of the AHSM. Shields attached to the AHSM must be evaluated for their potential impact on all normal, off-normal and accident scenarios to ensure that they do not introduce an unreviewed safety question as part of the site analysis performed as required by 10 CFR 72.104 and 10 CFR 72.212.

ANUH-01.0150 A.10.2-5

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table A.10.2-2 MCNP Side Detector Dose Rate Results for a Single AHSM Gamma Gamma Neutron Neutron Total Combined Distance Dose Rate MCNP 1 Dose Rate MCNP 1 Dose Rate MCNP 1 (meters)

(mrem/hr) error (mrem/hr) error (mrem/hr) error 6.1 4.53E-02 0.14% 2.48E-03 0.61% 4.77E-02 0.14%

10 2.12E-02 0.20% 1.24E-03 0.90% 2.25E-02 0.20%

20 6.18E-03 0.34% 4.14E-04 2.58% 6.60E-03 0.36%

30 2.84E-03 0.48% 2.16E-04 2.62% 3.06E-03 0.48%

40 1.63E-03 0.84% 1.28E-04 2.99% 1.75E-03 0.81%

50 1.04E-03 0.84% 9.30E-05 16.75% 1.13E-03 1.58%

60 7.17E-04 0.72% 5.55E-05 2.74% 7.72E-04 0.70%

70 5.22E-04 1.04% 4.32E-05 4.66% 5.65E-04 1.02%

80 3.92E-04 1.67% 3.26E-05 3.69% 4.25E-04 1.57%

90 3.07E-04 1.13% 2.51E-05 4.46% 3.32E-04 1.10%

100 2.36E-04 0.95% 1.98E-05 5.10% 2.56E-04 0.96%

200 4.74E-05 5.75% 3.81E-06 5.85% 5.12E-05 5.34%

300 1.40E-05 8.54% 1.41E-06 14.28% 1.54E-05 7.87%

400 4.07E-06 3.99% 4.20E-07 3.39% 4.49E-06 3.63%

500 1.60E-06 3.87% 2.77E-07 14.49% 1.88E-06 3.93%

600 9.28E-07 25.79% 7.38E-08 4.54% 1.00E-06 23.89%

Total Combined Distance Dose Rate MCNP 1 (meters)

(mrem/yr) error 6.1 418 0.14%

10 197 0.20%

20 58 0.36%

30 27 0.48%

40 15 0.81%

50 10 1.58%

60 7 0.70%

70 5 1.02%

80 4 1.57%

90 2.9 1.10%

100 2.2 0.96%

200 0.4 5.34%

300 0.14 7.87%

400 0.04 3.63%

500 0.016 3.93%

600 0.009 23.89%

Note: If transition wall is used as an end shield wall, the dose rates will be increased by a factor of 1.5.

ANUH-01.0150 A.10.2-7

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 Table A.10.2-5 MCNP Side Detector Dose Rate Results for a 2x10 ISFSI Gamma Gamma Neutron Neutron Total Combined Distance Dose Rate MCNP 1 Dose Rate MCNP 1 Dose Rate MCNP 1 (meters)

(mrem/hr) error (mrem/hr) error (mrem/hr) error 6.1 7.26E-02 0.22% 5.56E-03 1.36% 7.81E-02 0.23%

10 3.94E-02 0.34% 3.54E-03 2.12% 4.29E-02 0.36%

20 1.41E-02 0.37% 1.73E-03 4.39% 1.58E-02 0.58%

30 7.55E-03 0.58% 1.02E-03 3.80% 8.57E-03 0.68%

40 4.83E-03 0.70% 6.77E-04 2.91% 5.50E-03 0.71%

50 3.38E-03 0.81% 4.89E-04 5.22% 3.87E-03 0.97%

60 2.52E-03 1.18% 3.60E-04 3.58% 2.88E-03 1.13%

70 1.94E-03 1.22% 2.75E-04 3.64% 2.21E-03 1.16%

80 1.54E-03 1.06% 2.38E-04 9.88% 1.78E-03 1.61%

90 1.28E-03 1.44% 1.92E-04 5.82% 1.47E-03 1.46%

100 1.04E-03 1.61% 1.61E-04 8.20% 1.20E-03 1.78%

200 2.12E-04 1.71% 2.96E-05 4.94% 2.42E-04 1.62%

300 6.43E-05 5.23% 1.28E-05 28.81% 7.70E-05 6.47%

400 2.40E-05 6.12% 4.31E-06 18.24% 2.83E-05 5.89%

500 7.70E-06 3.19% 1.78E-06 11.38% 9.48E-06 3.36%

600 3.41E-06 9.46% 7.01E-07 4.60% 4.11E-06 7.88%

Total Combined Distance Dose Rate MCNP 1 (meters)

(mrem/yr) error 6.1 684 0.23%

10 376 0.36%

20 139 0.58%

30 75 0.68%

40 48 0.71%

50 34 0.97%

60 25 1.13%

70 19 1.16%

80 15.6 1.61%

90 12.9 1.46%

100 10.5 1.78%

200 2.1 1.62%

300 0.67 6.47%

400 0.25 5.89%

500 0.083 3.36%

600 0.036 7.88%

Note: If transition wall is used as an end shield wall, the dose rates will be increased by a factor of 1.5.

ANUH-01.0150 A.10.2-10

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 A.10.4 Supplemental Information A.10.4.1 References

[A10.1] MCNP 4C2- Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code System, CCC-701, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, RSICC Computer Code Collection, June 2001.

[A10.2] Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 72, Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste.

[A10.3] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 8.34, Monitoring Criteria and Methods to Calculate Occupational Radiation Doses, July 1992.

[A10.4] American Nuclear Society, American National Standard Neutron and Gamma-Ray Flux-to-Dose Rate Factors. ANSI/ANS-6.1.1-1977, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois, March 1977.

[A10.5] MCNP/MCNPX - Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code System Including MCNP5 1.40 and MCNPX 2.5.0 and Data Libraries, CCC-730, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, RSICC Computer Code Collection, January 2006.

ANUH-01.0150 A.10.4-1

Advanced NUHOMS System Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Rev. 11, 11/21 B.1.2.2.3.5 Maintenance and Surveillance No change to the Maintenance and Surveillance section as described in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2.3.5.

B.1.2.3 32PTH2 DSC Contents The 32PTH2 DSC is designed to store up to 32 intact, including up to 16 damaged, CE 16x16 class spent fuel assemblies with or without control components. The fuel that may be stored in the 32PTH2 DSC is presented in Chapter B.2.

Chapter B.3 provides the structural analysis. Chapter B.4 includes the thermal analysis. The quantity and type of radionuclides in the fuel assemblies are described and tabulated in Chapter B.5 which provides the shielding analysis. Chapter B.6 covers the criticality safety of the 32PTH2 system and its contents, listing material densities, moderator ratios, and geometric configurations.

B.1.2.4 Aging Management Program Requirements Aging management program (AMP) requirements for use of the 32PTH2 DSC and AHSM-HS during the period of extended storage operations are contained in Section 15.3.

ANUH-01.0150 B.1.2-5 All changes on this page are Renewal.

Enclosure 4 to E-58497 REPORT OF 72.48 EVALUATIONS PERFORMED FOR THE STANDARDIZED ADVANCED NUHOMS SYSTEM FOR THE PERIOD 3/13/21 to 11/17/21 LR 721029-435 Rev. 1 - (incorporated into UFSAR Revision 11)

Change Description This change involves qualifying the transition walls, which were originally designed and licensed to be installed between the existing advanced horizontal storage module (AHSM) array and new AHSM-HS, as end walls on the AHSM back-to back-array.

Background

The AHSM-HS is designed to be placed next to the AHSM in an array if required at a given independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI). In such cases, a transition wall is designed to be placed between an existing AHSM module array and AHSM-HS modules. When the adjoining AHSM-HS modules are not installed, the transition walls must act as end walls for the AHSM array.

The transition wall extends 13 inches beyond the front of the AHSM. In order to allow for docking the transfer trailer, a saw cut is proposed for the right front and left front transition wall to address the interference with the transfer trailer and skid.

Evaluation Without the AHSM-HSs installed, the transition wall has to function as an end shield wall (end wall).

The transition wall provides a biological shielding and protects the DSC from any missile impact when the DSC is loaded into the AHSM. The proposed change does not impact the thermal, criticality and confinement design functions. The proposed change affecting the structural and shielding design functions is evaluated.

The transition wall extends beyond the AHSM base and the portion being removed provides no design function for the AHSM. The area where the cutout is being done is in front of the AHSM where tornado missile protection is provided by the base and the door. The transition wall, when serving as an end wall, provides missile protection to the AHSM base side wall, but the side wall remains fully covered by the transition wall under the presence of the cutout. Therefore, no further evaluation is required for missile loading in the cutout area for the transition wall. The transition wall, 31.5 inches thick, was evaluated for local and global structural response for the tornado missile loading.

Qualification of the transition wall as an end wall and the proposed modifications are structurally adequate and meets the structural design functions described in the UFSAR.

A shielding analysis was performed for the proposed change. Dose rates were computed for the side of the AHSM when a transition wall is used in lieu of an end wall. The shielding calculation was performed using the MCNP5 version 1.40 computer code. The shielding analysis was performed by replacing an end wall with a transition wall. The transition wall was modeled as a 36-inch thick concrete wall with reduced thickness area along the exposed AHSM-HS keyways. The effect on the maximum dose rates remains well within the 10 CFR 72.104 and 10 CFR 72.106 limits where such limits apply at the controlled area boundary defined at a distance of 100 meters minimum. Therefore, qualification of transition wall as an end wall and the proposed modifications meets the shielding design functions described in UFSAR.

The evaluation of the safety functions resulting from this change demonstrate that the eight 72.48 evaluation criteria are met.

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