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Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
MONTHYEARML20217F9701999-10-14014 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating ARC for Axial Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking at Dented Tube Support Plate Intersections ML20217E4301999-10-12012 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Requirements for Containment Penetrations During Refueling Operations ML20211M7341999-08-30030 August 1999 Marked-up & Revised TS Pages,Providing Alternative to Requirement of Actually Measuring Response Times ML20211K1721999-08-30030 August 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Clarification to Current TS Requirements for Containment Isolation Valves ML20209B7731999-06-30030 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Updating Requirmements for RCS Leakage Detection & RCS Operational Leakage Specifications to Be Consistent with NUREG-1431 ML20196F2211999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages for Amend to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,allowing Use of Fully Qualified & Tested Spare Inverter in Place of Any of Eight Required Inverters ML20196G4701999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re Amends to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,revising TS to Be Consistent with Rev to ISTS Presently Submitted to NEI TSTF for Submittal as Rev to NUREG-1431 ML20196G7961999-06-22022 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Bases,Clarifying Proper Application of TS Requirements for Power Distribution Systems & Functions That Inverters Provide to Maintain Operability & Providing Updated Info on Cold Leg Injection Accumulators ML20195E9841999-06-0707 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Increasing Max Allowed Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 0.35 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 to 1.0 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 for Plant Cycle 10 (U2C10) Core ML20206E1391999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-03, Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys Versus Radiation Monitors. Changes Add LCOs 3.3.3.1 & 3.7.7 to Address Inoperability of Radiation Monitoring CREVS & NUREG-1431 Recommendations ML20206E1611999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-04, Auxiliary Suction Pressure Low Surveillance Frequency Rev. Change Deletes Surveillance ML20204H4081999-03-19019 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating TS 3.8.3.1,3.8.3.2,3.8.3.3 & Associated Bases Associated with Electrical Equipment Protective Devices to Technical Requirements Manual ML20207D6011999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Relocating TS 3.7.6, Flood Protection Plan & Associated Bases from TS to Plant TRM ML20207D6331999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Consistency When Exiting Action Statements Associated with EDG Sets ML20206S0131999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3.3.3.3, Seismic Instrumentation & Associated Bases,Relocated to Plant Technical Requirements Manual ML20199K6001999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New Action Statement to 3.1.3.2 That Would Eliminate Need to Enter TS 3.0.3 Whenever Two or More Individual RPIs Per Bank May Be Inoperable,While Maintaining Appropriate Overall Level of Protection ML20195H6111998-11-16016 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Revising EDG SRs by Adding Note That Allows SR to Be Performed in Modes 1,2,3 or 4 If Associated Components Are Already OOS for Testing or Maint & Removing SR Verifying Certain Lockout Features Prevent EDG Starting ML20154H7251998-10-0808 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Supplementing Proposed TS Change 96-08,rev 1 to Add CRMP to Administrative Controls Section & Bases of TS ML20238F1091998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Insertion of Limited Number of Lead Test Assemblies,Beginning W/Unit 2 Operating Cycle 10 Core ML20238F3001998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Replacing 72 H AOT of TS 3.8.1.1,Action b,w/7 Day AOT Requirement for Inoperability of One EDG or One Train of EDGs ML20236G5961998-06-29029 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Typed Pages for TS Change 95-19, Section 6 - Administrative Controls Deletions ML20249C6371998-06-26026 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Lowering Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 1.0 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131 to 0.35 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131,as Provided in GL 95-05 ML20248F0051998-05-28028 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs for Section 6, Administrative Controls Deletions ML20217N3511998-04-30030 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Modifying Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Change Mode Requirement to Allow PORV Stroke Testing in Modes 3,4 & 5 W/Steam Bubble in Pressurizer Rather than Only in Mode 4 ML20203J1681998-02-25025 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising EDG Surveillance Requirements to Delete Requirement for 18-month Insp IAW Procedures Prepared in Conjunction W/Vendor Recommendations & Modify SRs Associated W/Verifying Capability of DGs ML20202J7601998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.7.9 Re Relocation of Snubber Requirements ML20202J7141998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New LCO That Addresses Requirements for Main Feedwater Isolation,Regulating & Bypass Valves ML20202J6961998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating MSIV Requirements to Be Consistent W/Std TS (NUREG-1431) ML20198T4311998-01-21021 January 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re New Position Title & Update of Description of Nuclear Organization ML20199K4571997-11-21021 November 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Adding one-time Allowance Through Operating Cycle 9 to Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Perform Stroke Testing of PORVs in Mode 5 Rather than Mode 4,as Currently Required ML20211A3191997-09-17017 September 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Pressure Differential Surveillance Requirements for Containment Spray Pumps ML20137T0871997-04-0909 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Elimination of Cycle 8 Limitation for SG Alternate Plugging Criteria ML20137M8581997-04-0101 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 2.1 Re Safety Limits & TS 3/4.2 Re Power Distribution Limits ML20137C8421997-03-19019 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Conversion from Westinghouse Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel ML20136J0381997-03-13013 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Section 5.6.1.2,revising Enrichment of Fuel for New Fuel Pit Storage Racks ML20134P8631997-02-14014 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Requesting Discretionary Enforcement for 48 Hours Which Is in Addition to 72 Hours Allowed Outage Time Provided by TS Action 3.8.1.1.b ML20134K9981997-02-0707 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Revising TS Change Request 96-01, Conversion from W Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel (MARK-BW-17), to Ensure That Core Analysis Computer Code Output Actions Are Consistent W/Hot Channel Factor SRs ML20134L9261996-11-0808 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Placing of Channel in Trip for Reactor Trip & Engineered Safety Feature Instrumentation Sys Solely to Perform Testing as Not Requiring Channel to Be Declared Inoperable ML20129D2661996-10-18018 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Removing Existing Footnotes That Limit Application of Apc for Plant S/G Tubes to Cycle 8 Operation for Both Units ML20129G7301996-09-26026 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.3.3 Re Fire Detection instrumentation,3/4.7.11 Re Fire Suppression Systems & 3/4.7.12 Re Fire Protection Penetrations ML20113G2691996-09-20020 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Change 96-09, Clarification of Work Shift Durations for Overtime Limits ML20117J3391996-08-28028 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Psv & MSSV Setpoint Tolerance from Plus or Minus 1% to Plus or Minus 3% ML20117D1651996-08-22022 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs of SQN Units 1 & 2,deleting Table 4.8.1, DG Reliability, & Revising Section 3.8.1 to Allow Once Per 18 month,7 Day AOT for EDGs ML20117D3121996-08-22022 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Lowering Minimum TS ice-basket Weight of 1,155 Lbs to 1,071 Lbs.Reduced Overall Ice Weight from 2,245,320 Lbs to 2,082,024 Lbs ML20117D3141996-08-21021 August 1996 Proposed TS 3.7.1.3 Re Condensate Storage Tank ML20117D3341996-08-21021 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Deletion of Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.b ML20112H0431996-06-0707 June 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Section 6, Administrative Controls, to Be More Closely Aligned W/Requirements of STSs ML20101N7071996-04-0404 April 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing Conversion from Westinghouse Fuel to Fuel Provided by Framatome Cogema Fuels ML20096B3761996-01-0404 January 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Extending Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Period Per GL 93-05 ML20096C2481996-01-0303 January 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Bases Section 3/4.7.1.2 to Indicate Current Operational Functions of turbine-driven AFW Level Control Valves Modified During Unit 1 Cycle 7 Refueling Outage 1999-08-30
[Table view] Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20217F9701999-10-14014 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating ARC for Axial Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking at Dented Tube Support Plate Intersections ML20217E4301999-10-12012 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Requirements for Containment Penetrations During Refueling Operations ML20211M7341999-08-30030 August 1999 Marked-up & Revised TS Pages,Providing Alternative to Requirement of Actually Measuring Response Times ML20211K1721999-08-30030 August 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Clarification to Current TS Requirements for Containment Isolation Valves ML20209B7731999-06-30030 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Updating Requirmements for RCS Leakage Detection & RCS Operational Leakage Specifications to Be Consistent with NUREG-1431 ML20196F2211999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages for Amend to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,allowing Use of Fully Qualified & Tested Spare Inverter in Place of Any of Eight Required Inverters ML20196G4701999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re Amends to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,revising TS to Be Consistent with Rev to ISTS Presently Submitted to NEI TSTF for Submittal as Rev to NUREG-1431 ML20196G7961999-06-22022 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Bases,Clarifying Proper Application of TS Requirements for Power Distribution Systems & Functions That Inverters Provide to Maintain Operability & Providing Updated Info on Cold Leg Injection Accumulators ML20196G8071999-06-22022 June 1999 Revs to Technical Requirements Manual ML20195E9841999-06-0707 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Increasing Max Allowed Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 0.35 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 to 1.0 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 for Plant Cycle 10 (U2C10) Core ML20206E1611999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-04, Auxiliary Suction Pressure Low Surveillance Frequency Rev. Change Deletes Surveillance ML20206E1391999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-03, Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys Versus Radiation Monitors. Changes Add LCOs 3.3.3.1 & 3.7.7 to Address Inoperability of Radiation Monitoring CREVS & NUREG-1431 Recommendations ML20204E8501999-03-21021 March 1999 Plant,Four Yr Simulator Test Rept for Period Ending 990321 ML20204H4081999-03-19019 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating TS 3.8.3.1,3.8.3.2,3.8.3.3 & Associated Bases Associated with Electrical Equipment Protective Devices to Technical Requirements Manual ML20207D6331999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Consistency When Exiting Action Statements Associated with EDG Sets ML20207D6011999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Relocating TS 3.7.6, Flood Protection Plan & Associated Bases from TS to Plant TRM ML20206S0131999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3.3.3.3, Seismic Instrumentation & Associated Bases,Relocated to Plant Technical Requirements Manual ML20199K6001999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New Action Statement to 3.1.3.2 That Would Eliminate Need to Enter TS 3.0.3 Whenever Two or More Individual RPIs Per Bank May Be Inoperable,While Maintaining Appropriate Overall Level of Protection ML20195H6111998-11-16016 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Revising EDG SRs by Adding Note That Allows SR to Be Performed in Modes 1,2,3 or 4 If Associated Components Are Already OOS for Testing or Maint & Removing SR Verifying Certain Lockout Features Prevent EDG Starting ML20154H7251998-10-0808 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Supplementing Proposed TS Change 96-08,rev 1 to Add CRMP to Administrative Controls Section & Bases of TS ML20238F1091998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Insertion of Limited Number of Lead Test Assemblies,Beginning W/Unit 2 Operating Cycle 10 Core ML20238F3001998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Replacing 72 H AOT of TS 3.8.1.1,Action b,w/7 Day AOT Requirement for Inoperability of One EDG or One Train of EDGs ML20209J1631998-08-0707 August 1998 Rev 41 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Odcm ML20236G5961998-06-29029 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Typed Pages for TS Change 95-19, Section 6 - Administrative Controls Deletions ML20249C6371998-06-26026 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Lowering Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 1.0 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131 to 0.35 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131,as Provided in GL 95-05 ML20248F0051998-05-28028 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs for Section 6, Administrative Controls Deletions ML20217N3511998-04-30030 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Modifying Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Change Mode Requirement to Allow PORV Stroke Testing in Modes 3,4 & 5 W/Steam Bubble in Pressurizer Rather than Only in Mode 4 ML20203J1681998-02-25025 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising EDG Surveillance Requirements to Delete Requirement for 18-month Insp IAW Procedures Prepared in Conjunction W/Vendor Recommendations & Modify SRs Associated W/Verifying Capability of DGs ML20202J7651998-02-13013 February 1998 Technical Requirements Manual ML20202J7141998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New LCO That Addresses Requirements for Main Feedwater Isolation,Regulating & Bypass Valves ML20202J6961998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating MSIV Requirements to Be Consistent W/Std TS (NUREG-1431) ML20202J7601998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.7.9 Re Relocation of Snubber Requirements ML20198T4311998-01-21021 January 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re New Position Title & Update of Description of Nuclear Organization ML20199F8231997-11-30030 November 1997 Cycle 9 Restart Physics Test Summary, for 971011-971130 ML20199K4571997-11-21021 November 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Adding one-time Allowance Through Operating Cycle 9 to Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Perform Stroke Testing of PORVs in Mode 5 Rather than Mode 4,as Currently Required ML20211A3191997-09-17017 September 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Pressure Differential Surveillance Requirements for Containment Spray Pumps ML20203B9731997-08-0505 August 1997 Rev 1 to RD-466, Test & Calculated Results Pressure Locking ML20217J5581997-07-31031 July 1997 Cycle Restart Physics Test Summary, for Jul 1997 ML20210J1671997-04-30030 April 1997 Snp Unit 1 Cycle 8 Refueling Outage Mar-Apr 1997,Results of SG Tube ISI as Required by TS Section 4.4.5.5.b & Results of Alternate Plugging Criteria Implementation as Required by Commitment from TS License Condition 2C(9)(d) ML20137T0871997-04-0909 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Elimination of Cycle 8 Limitation for SG Alternate Plugging Criteria ML20137M8581997-04-0101 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 2.1 Re Safety Limits & TS 3/4.2 Re Power Distribution Limits ML20137C8421997-03-19019 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Conversion from Westinghouse Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel ML20136J0381997-03-13013 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Section 5.6.1.2,revising Enrichment of Fuel for New Fuel Pit Storage Racks ML20134P8631997-02-14014 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Requesting Discretionary Enforcement for 48 Hours Which Is in Addition to 72 Hours Allowed Outage Time Provided by TS Action 3.8.1.1.b ML20134K9981997-02-0707 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Revising TS Change Request 96-01, Conversion from W Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel (MARK-BW-17), to Ensure That Core Analysis Computer Code Output Actions Are Consistent W/Hot Channel Factor SRs ML20138F2581997-01-17017 January 1997 Rev 39 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Odcm ML20134L9261996-11-0808 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Placing of Channel in Trip for Reactor Trip & Engineered Safety Feature Instrumentation Sys Solely to Perform Testing as Not Requiring Channel to Be Declared Inoperable ML20129D2661996-10-18018 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Removing Existing Footnotes That Limit Application of Apc for Plant S/G Tubes to Cycle 8 Operation for Both Units ML20129G7301996-09-26026 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.3.3 Re Fire Detection instrumentation,3/4.7.11 Re Fire Suppression Systems & 3/4.7.12 Re Fire Protection Penetrations ML20134J9991996-09-23023 September 1996 Fuel Assembly Insp Program 1999-08-30
[Table view] |
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. . i 4-i ENCLOSURE 1 1R0 POSED TECHNICAL SPECITICATION CilANCE -f SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 ;
DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND $0-328 3 (TVA-SQN-TS-91-17) !
i
_ LIST OF AFFECTED PAGES.
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Unit 1 -i 3/4 8-4
.t Unit 2 !
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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)
- d. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by:
- 1. Subjecting the diesel to an inspeution in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations fer this class of standby service,
- 2. Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of greater then or equal to 600 kw while maintaining voltage within i gio3 10 percent of the initial pretest voltage and frequency at 60 + 1.2 Hz. At no time sna11 the transient voltage exceed 8276V.
- 3. Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of 4400 kw ut tripp5ng. The generator voltage shall lR68 eed
\20 -H4- ercent of the initial pretest voltage o wh'chever 31o3 ess during and following the load rejecti n
- 4. Simulating a loss 01 offsite power by itself, and:
a) Verifying de-energi:ation of the -hutdown boards and load shedding from the shutdown boards, b) Verifying the diesel starts on the tuto-start signal, energizes the shutdown brards with permanently connected loads within 10 seconds, energizes the auto-connected shutdown loads through the load sequencers and operates -
) for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator "---
is loaded with the shutdown loads. After energization, the steady state voltage and frequency of the shutdown boards shall be maintained at 6900 1 690 volts and 60 1 1.2 Hz during this test.
- 5. Verifying that on a ESF actuation test signal (without loss of of*:ite power) the diesel generator starts on the auto-start signal and operates on standby for greater than or equal to 5 minutes. Tha generator voltage and-frequency shall be 6900 1 690 volts and 60 1 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds after the auto-start signal; the steady state generator voltage and fre-quency shall be mM ntained within these limits during this test. R$3
- 6. Simulating a loss of offsite pow 2r in conjunction with an ESF actuation test signal, and a) Verifying de-energization of the shutdown boards and load shedding from the shutdown boards.
"I O b) Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal, energizes the shutdown boards with permanently ccnnected loads within 10 seconds, energizes the auto-connected emergency (accident) loads through the lodd sequencers and operates for greater than or equel to 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the emergency loads. After energization, the steady state voltage and frequency of the emergency busses shall be maintained at 6900 1 690 volts ('
and 60 1 1,2 Hz during this test. R141 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 8-4 Amendment No. 49, 64, 114, 137 April 27, 1990
l
.x -
, ELECTRICAL POWiR SYSTEMS' !
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMLA S (Continued) ;
- d. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by: l
- 1. ,$ubjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with _;
.procedores prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's '
recomiaendations for this class of standby service, ,
- 2. Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of greater than or equal to 600 kw while maintaining voltage at within i R88 i p 10 percent of the initial pretest voltage and frequency at -!
K 60 + 1.2 Hz. At no time shall the transient voltage exceed 8273V.
b 3. Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of 4400 kw R$6 f
t out tripping. The generator voltage shal need '
120 -H4 ercent of the initial pretest voltage 00 " wh chever R88 ess during and following the. load rejec o .N
- 4. Simulating a-loss of offsite power by itself, en : )
a) Verifying de-energization of the shutdown boards and load !
shedding from the shutdown boards.
]
b) Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal, energi7es the shutdown boards with permanently connected ,
loads within 10 seconds, energizes the auto-connected shutdown loads through the load sequencers and operates !
for greater than or equal to 5 miautes while its generator i
^
[. is loaded with the shutdown loads. After energization, the steady. state voltage and frequency of the shutdown >
boards shall be maintained at 6900 t 690 volts and 60_i 1.2 Hz during this test. ;
A 5._ - Verifying that on a ESF ac. > ' n test signal, without loss of-offsite power, the diesel v tor. starts on the auto-start r signal:and operates on stancg for greater than or equal to 5
. minutes. The generator voltage and frequency shall be
'6900 t 690 volts'and 60 1 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds after the i
, auto-start signal;_the steady state generator voltage aad frequency shall be maintained within these limits during this R41 test. :
-6. Simulating a less of offsite power in-conjunction with an ESF actuation test signal, and a) Verifying de energization of the shutdown boards and load l shedding from the shutdown boards, s -b). Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal, j energizes the shutdown: boards with permanently connected loads'within-10 seconds, energizes the auto-connected emergency (accident)-loads through-the load sequencers and t aperates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the emergency loads. After
- energization, the steady state voltage and frequency-of :
, the emergency busses shall be maintained at 6900 t 690 volts !
and 6011.2 Hz during this test.
L SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 8-4 gmegmpp,t b90 4
. a_.. . _ . . _ ._ _ .. _ .._.,_ _ _ . ._.. _ _ .... -. _ _ , , _ _ _ . _.s _ ,_
ENCLOSURE 2 FROPOSED T1.CilNICAL SPECIFl(. ATION CllANCE SEQUOYAll NUCLEAR PLANT LNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET N05, 50-327 AND 50-32a (TVA-SQN-TS-91-17)
DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR REVISION TO VOLTAGE OVERSil00T LIMITS FOR DIESEL GENERATOR LOAD REJECTION TEST
i I
'~
- - FNCLOS1;RE 2 l
l Description of Change TVA proposes to modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units 1 anil 2 technical' specifications (TSs) to revise Surveillance Requirement ,
(SR) 4.8.1.1.2.d.3 f rom the 114 percent of inicial pretest voltage limit for t voltage overshoot- on a total load rejection to 120 percent. The voltage limit of 8.276 volts (V) will also be increased to 8.712 V to correspond ;
with the increase to 120 percent described above. j Reason for Chang <
On October 7. 1991, the testing of the 1A-A diesel generator (D/G) for a I full load rejection resulted in.approxim tely 115 percent voltage overshoot [
from the initial pretest voltage. On October 9, 1991. t' same test for the 3 IB-B D/G resulted in approximately 119 percent voltage ourshoot. These
- results do not comply with the TS 4.8.1.1.2.d.'s requirement to not-exceed 114 percent voltage overshoot during a full load rejection. TVA requested ,
and was granted a waiver of compliance by Office of Nuclear Reacter i Regulations.on October 10, 1991. The reason for requesting emergency
- processing of this TS change is to allow continued full power operation of .
Unit 2. to minimir.e the additional D/G SR testing and associated unnecessary !
wear and teat because of the inoperability of these D/Gs and to maintain !
- critical' path work activities for the Unit 1 Cycle 5 refueling outage after {
- expiration of the waiver.- '
?
Justification for Change !
TVA proci:.ssed a TS change request in January 1989 to modify SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.3 i to the; acceptance voltage values listed above. The voltage' limit of 8.276 V 1 was based on-114 percent of the expected maximum plant operating voltage of-7,260 V.- The 114 percent of pretest voltage value was based on past test
.results that indicated approximately 112 percent voltage overshoot and was not-based on any criteria associated with equipment damage. -
Since the approval and implementation of amendrnents -f or Units 1 and .2 that .
incorporated these values. modifications have been implemented to the i
transient voltage response of the D/G. The modifications have been to the i generator exciter control ~ system that altered the excitation current transformer (CT) tap settings to provide a' boost of the: field current for a '
given D/G-kilovoltampere (kVA) load and addition-of the voltage overshoot reduction device (VORD) that shunts the iiuid current-to zero if-the transient. overshoot during the D/G loading sequence exceeds 103 percent of=
- nominal duric ischronous mode of operation.' -The VORD is not active in the D/G circuit during performance of the load rejection test that is' performed'
'in the droop mode. This_ is because the shutdown board's normal-voltage' '
range during-plant operation exceeds the 103 percent operating setpoint of the VORD.
In addition, procedural changes have bee- intly incorporated that require generator loading to-the design rating ( ,400 kilowatt and 5.000 kVN.
This change in testing was-incorporated o a result of industry operating enperience information (NRC Information Notice 91-13) and is more eon-e-,- ,,m-n,-.,.-_ wee.,vw--,..m.-.,,.-+,e..-swwr-rwwcr-, --.,-w-,w-er---m--,.-ww-m- w e - ---v,-w-w m ,-r w -e-e - c= r ir e ,- *-- t y--r t e :we- p g y yv ><vve-
_ _m . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __.
2 conservative than previous test conditicns. This change results in au increase in the internal generator voltage setpotut, which is required to ,
overexcite the generator to be able to obtain a rated kilovoltampere reactive (kVAR) output of approximately 2,375. This change also increases :
generator field current. Both the higher internal voltage and the l
additional field current tend to create a higher voltage overshoot when the :
rated load is suddenly removed. !
i An additional factor that contributed to identification of the overshoot was i tbc use of high-speed visicorder data to determine voltage overshoot.
Previously, voltage overshoot had typict.11y been determined from installed ,
panel gauge data. This panel instrumentation had significantly reduced capability for identifying high-speed, snort-duration transients.
The-described conditions that identified voltage overshoots in excess of TS limits and previously measured values are believed to have been caused by '
the combination of the revised procedural requirements to test at rated '
generator load (resulting f rem review of IEN 91-13), the CT modification, I and the.use of more accurate instrumentation capable of identifying f short-duration transients. The combined effect of these changes increases the voltage overshoot of the D/G during load rejections. The inoividual i contributions of each change are not known and would require additional D/G ,
testing that is not recommended for reliability considerations. However, it is considered that the chaages in test kVA loading are the driving .;
contributor to this condition. The-individual changes, as well as the ,
combined effect of these changes, were not applicable or were not expected I at the time of the TS change requested in 1969. Additionally, the effect of !
these changes could not be quantified at the time of initial implementation -
and-therefore was not identified until performance of the subject testing.
There is negligible safety significance associated with the subject voltage overshoot levels. The test rieficiencies were of very brief durat.lons (13 and 23 cycles for 1A-A and 1B-B respectively) and of small magnitude relative to equipment-consideratiers. The brief transient overvoltages (8,250 and 8,a20 V forLIA-A and 1B-B respectively) would not overstrcss the
, generators'. insulation system. Insulation-life is inversely proportional to [
voltage stress, but the dure. tion of these transients le so small that the effert'on insulation life would be negligible.- The generator manufacturer I has' determined that an acceptance criteria ~of 8,712 V f7r a maximun duration ,
of.30 cycles would not significantly reduce the qualified life of the
-generator. The D/G vendar has determined that the engine and/or' generator controls.would not experience detrimental effects for transient voltages up
.to 9,000 V. Accordin31y, it is considered that overshoot limits in excess of those.provided in either current SQN or standard TSs are technically adequate to prevent equipment damage or degradation following a full-load rejection. -In summary, while the_ testing results exceed the SQN TS overshoot value, the' subject voltage levels have not and.will not adversely affect D/G equipment or capability to perform the intended function.
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e Environmental impact Evaluation
- The proposed change request involves testing requirements for D/Gs .nd will not affect the functions or operation of any equipment such that an unreviewed environmental question would be involved because operation of SQN Unita 1 and 2 in accordance with this change would not!
. 1. Result in a significant increase in any adverse environmental impact
,, previously" evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement (FES) as modified by the Staff's testimony to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board,-supplements to the FES, environmental impact appraisals, or
- decisions-of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.
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- - 2.. Result-in a significant change in effluents or power levels.
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- 3. Result in matters not previously reviewed in the licenslag basis for SQN tuat may have a significant environmental impact.
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Enclosure 3 l
PROPOSED TECl!NICAf, SPECIFICATION CilANGE ,
SEQUOYAll NUC1. EAR PLANT UNITS. i- ANL) 2 ;
DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-3P.8 ;
i (TVA-SQN-T3-91-17) j DETERMINATION OF-NO SIGNIFICANT ilAZARDS C0FSID" RATION j f
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Significant Hazards Evaluation TVA has evaluated the proposed techniesi spectrication (TS) change and has ;
-determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration ;
based on criteria establisned in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Operation of Sequoyah !
Nuclear. Plant-(SQN) in accordance with the proposed amendment will nots :
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- 1. : Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an' i accident.previously evaluated. i This-request proposen a TS change for the Surveillance Requirement {
(SR) 4.8.1.1.2.d.3 to allow a voltage overshoot of 120 percent of pratest voltage orc 8.712 volts, whichever is less. .It has been determined that these increased values would not result in damnge to the ,
diesel generator.(D/G) and will continue to ensurs operability as _
discussed in the_ previous justifications. The revised limits will ,
-ensure that safety-related functions are adequately veriflod. ;
Therefore the D/Gs will continue to be verified to meet safety- '!
. requirements and_the subject changes will not increase the consequences !
ofran accident. In addition. the D/Gs are not postulated _to be the l source ofiany design basis accident and therefore cannot-increase-the i probability for an accident. j i
! 2'- - Create the possibility of a, new or dif ferent kind of accident f rom any- i
!previously analyzed.- ;
.This request only provides an increase in the-allowable voltage ,
overshoot on a total-D/GLload rejection. . This change.does not' create
.any new type of; accident because alteration of test requirements for tSe- !
-D/G or any other_D/G test or operation cannot create an accident. The- [
.D/Gs only_ provide accident mitigation functions. i t
3.- Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
f The revised voltage values will not result in damage to any D/G ,,
components and therefore=the D/G safety functions will be maintained.
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.Since the D/Gs will continue to provide full accident mitigation- t capabilities a margin of. safety will not be reduced.-
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