ML20234C797
| ML20234C797 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/14/1987 |
| From: | Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FRN-52FR12921, RULE-PR-30, RULE-PR-40, RULE-PR-70 PR-870414, NUDOCS 8707060669 | |
| Download: ML20234C797 (67) | |
Text
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ym NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '87 APR 15 P2 3 :
10 CFR PARTS 30, 40, and 70 gg,
, li-l Emergency Preparedness for 00Ch ihn . '
s ;.tyy Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
SUMMARY
- In 1981, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued orders to require certain NRC fuel cycle and other radioactive material licensees to submit emergency plans to the NRC. The NRC is now proposing to amend its regulations to place a requirement for such emergency plans in its regulations. The proposed rule would require the approximately 30 licensees subject to the orders to revise their existing emergency plans which include, among other things, descriptions of the means and equip-ment to mitigate the consequences of an accident and to promptly notify offsite response organizations if an accident occurs that might result in a significant release of licensed radioactive material.
DATES: Comment period expires 7/20/s7 . Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given except as to comments received on or before this date.
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ADDRESSES: Submit written comments to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S . Nuclear. Regulatory 1 Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch.
A' free single copy of the draft Regulatory Analysis, including the enviromental assessment and finding of no significant impact (NUREG-1140),
may be obtained by writing to the Distribution Section, Document Control Branch, Division of Information Support Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.
Copies of NUREG-0762, -0767, -0810, -1179, -1189, and -1198, the technical reports referenced in this notice, may be purchased through th'e U.S. Government Printing Office by calling (202) 275-2060 or by writing to the U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O._ Box 37082, Washington, DC 20013-7082. Copies may also be purchased from the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.
Copies of the above NUREG reports and also comments received by the Commission on the proposed rule are available for inspection or copying for a fee in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW.,
Washington, DC 20555 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Stephen A. McGuire, Regulation Development Branch, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555 (telephone: (301) 443-7900).
1 Backoround During the Commission's deliberations concerning nuclear power plant emergency preparedness after the Three Mile Island accident, the Commis-sion directed the staff to evaluate the need to change the emergency 2
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preparedness regulations for fuel cycle and other radioactive material licensees.
In late 1980, the staff reevaluated previously submitted emergency plans for radioactive releases for fuel fabrication plants and found some )
4 apparent weaknesses. For example, some plans did not have arrangements )
for the prompt notification of offsite response organizations.
Upon noting-these weaknesses, the NRC staff prepared orders requiring 62 licensees to submit comprehens{ve onsite radiological contingency plans 1
(46 FR 12566). These orders, which were issued in February 1981, required i
some licensees, based on their licensed possession limits, to plan for j actions'that would be needed in the event of an accident. The actions '
i would be those necessary to: protect workers, limit the release of radio-active materials, and mitigate adverse consequences of the accident. The orders were issued to operators of fuel' processing and fabrication plants, UFs production plants,_and radioactive material users authorized to possess large quantities of radioactive materials in unsealed form. The licensees selected were those authorized to possess quantities of radioactive mate-rials that could as a result of a severe accident potentially result in a radiation exposure in excess of 1 rem effective dose equivalent to someone offsite. As a result of these orders, about half of the affected licensees l
reduced their authorized possession limits for radioactive material, thus j I
no longer requiring them to submit contingency plans to NRC. l On June 3, 1981, the Commission published in the Federal Register i (46 FR 29712) an advance notice of proposed rulemaking on emergency pre-paredness for certain fuel cycle and other radioactive material licensees.
In this advance notice, the Commission proposed to codify the radiological contingency planning requirements set forth in the Commission's orders, 1
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as well as consider requiring offsite emergency plans.
The Commission noted in the advance notice that it would use factors such as possession limits, potential for accidental criticality, chemical toxicity of radio-active materials, and potential radiation hazards for all of the NRC licensees whose radioactive material possession limits were such that severe accidents could result in offsite radiation doses exceeding the lower end of the protective action guides established by the EPA.
PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE ADVANCE NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING The Commission received 18 responses to its advance notice of proposed rulemaking. Comments were received from five Federal agencies, four State agencies, five corporations, one university, one laboratory, one nonprofit Federal corporation, and the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors. The following discussion summarizes the major comments and gives the Commission's response to each comment.
Comment Many commenters questioned the need for the suggested regulations.
One Agreement State said there is " ..little likelihood of a serious acci-dent; those incidents which have occurred have been handled adequately without pre-existing plans, using existing resources and guidelines."
Commenters said that many of the facilities that would be covered do not have the potential to exceed the EPA's protective action guide dose of 1 rem under any credible accident conditions. Uranium mills, UFe conver-sion plants, and low-level waste burial grounds were cited by commenters as examples. Another example where emergency plans were not considered l 4
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necessary was the _ case <in which t'he radioactive materials are spread among many different buildings so that release of a large proportion due to a.
single' event is not credible. Several commenters said NRC already requires them:to be adequately prepared to_ respond to an emergency, and that there is no need for additional regulations. The' Agreement States of New Mexico and Washington said they were'already adequately prepared for any_ credible accident and'saw no need for a regulation. On the other-hand, the State of New York saw a need to reevaluate the adequacy of its existing emergency planning.
One commenter said the need for the regulation should be tested against past accident experience to determine the urgency and realism of the proposal. Another commenter said that, compared to nuclear power
. plants, fuel cycle and byproduct material licensees have much less radio-active material, do not have a large energy source to act as a drivirg l 1
force and'do not concentrate their radioactive materials in a single loca-tion. Thus the consequence of an accident would be much smaller, and there would never be a need to evacuate or shelter people.
Response
The NRC has carefully analyzed accident source terms, potential release fractions, and radiation doses attributable to a range of accidents at fuel cycle and other radioactive material licensees. The details are given in "A Regulatory Analysis on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees," NUREG-1140. Specific conser-vative accident scenarios have been considered for specific types of licen-sees, and release fractions and doses have been calculated based on these scenarios. The accident history of different typer of facilities has been 5
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considered. As~a result of the analysis, some facilities, such.as uranium mills and depleted uranium metal processors, are excluded from needing an emergency plan for responding to a release.
On the other hand, the analysis does indicate that, at a few licensed facilities, offsite doses due to an accident might theoretically exceed the lower. end of the range of ' doses for which.the' EPA recommends that protective actions to protect the public be considered. In addition, in a few cases an accident could cause significant exposure to chemically toxic soluble uranium. The NRC would especially like to receive comments on the accident scenarios presented in the analysis. The NRC is particu-larly interested in comments concerning the' conservatism'in the analysis as it pertains to specific classes of facilities.
Comment A second major comment was that the need for emergency plans should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Several examples were given where the licensed possession limits might indicate the need for a plan, but the actual circumstances would make a large release impossible. For example, a radiopharmaceutical manufacturer said that it uses only a small quantity of its iodine-125 at one time. The rest is stored in lead containers in a fume hood, the air from which is filtered three times before release. Commenters said the remoteness of the site should be a factor taken into consideration. In the case of one uranium mill, the nearest residence is 22 miles away. The comment was made that case-by-case review of the need for plans is feasible because so few licensees would be affected.
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Response
i The proposed rule would allow licensees the opportunity to demon-strate that an emergency plan for responding to a release would not be l
needed because no reasonably forseeable accident could result in doses to the public approaching the protective action guides, i
Comment I Several commenters thought FEMA review of Sta.te and local emergency response capabilities was unnecessary because possible accidents would be so much smaller than at nuclear power plants. It was said that simpler, less complex review and evaluation processes were better. Several Agree-ment States objected to a FEMA review of their programs. Other commenters thought FEMA could make valuable contributions.
Response
The NRC has considered the nature and depth of the needed offsite coordination in the previously mentioned Regulatory Analysis and concluded that written site-specific State and local plans reviewed by FEMA are not needed because the accidents can be responded to as part of the community's general emergency response capabilities. These necessary capabilities (e.g., fire, ambulance, police support) are routinely used for emergencies of all sorts. The small potential doses, small areas affected, and small numbers of people involved are factors indicating that the community's ;
I normally existing emergency response capabilities are adequate and that additional response capabilities are not necessary.
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. Comment Some commenters thought failure of uranium mill tailing dams should-be included.
Response
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'The NRC has considered these events and concluded that they should
-not.be included because radiation doses associated with such accidents are so low that EPA protective action guides would not be exceeded even over a very long time (months or years), nor would the licensed materials present a chemical toxicity hazard. A complete explanation-is presented in "A Regulatory Analysis on Emergency' Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees," NUREG-1140.
Comment Many commenters. thought the NRC should provide a document describing the contents of the licensee's emergency plans and the nature of the pre-paredness needed.
Response ,
The NRC agrees and plans to revise its reports, NUREG-0762, " Standard 1
Format and Content for Radiological Contingency Plans for Fuel Cycle and Materials Licensees," and NUREG-0810, " Standard Review Plan for the Review
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of Radiological Contingency Plans for Fuel Cycle and Materials Facilities."
The revised reports will be published, possibly as Regulatory Guides, I l
concurrently with the final rule.
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1 Comment j I
Several commenters thought the suggested regulations would be burden- l I
some and expensive to both licensees and to States and that the cost would j l
greatly exceed the benefits. 1
Response
i The NRC believes that the rule will not be excessively expensive J l
or burdensome to States or local governments. States and 1 scal govern- I ments will not be expected to write specific plans for specific facili-ties or have other special emergency preparedness. The NRC believes that ,
l the normally available capabilities of States and local governments for responding to industrial emergencies and the normally available radiolo- )
gical health capabilities of States will be adequate to deal with accidents at fuel cycle and other radioactive material licensees.
These radiological emergencies would involve small (not life threatening) doses, 1
small areas, and small numbers of people. The potential risks are much J lower than the risks from accidents involving chemical plants or the shipping of hazardous chemicals, to which States and local governments ,
routinely respond. In other words, the response to radiological accidents at fuel cycle and other radioactive materials licensees can and should be {
l handled by State and local governments as part of their normal emergency l l
response capability without additional resources. Thus, an adequate level l of emergency preparedness should not be a financial burden to State and ]
local governments.
With regard to benefits, the benefits are admittedly small because q
of the low probability of exceeding protective action guide doses and the ]
l low probability that a dose of a few rems would have harmful consequences.
Although costs to licensees were found to exceed potential benefits I I
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(see Regulatory Analysis, Section 3), the Commission concludes that the protection provided by engineered safety features should be bolstered by the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident and reduce potential releases of radioactive materials.
1 Comment l l
Several commenters thought NRC should provide funding to States for j State planning, i
Response
The NRC sees no need for funding for State planning because a need for site-specific State planning beyond the emergency preparedness capabilities normally present has not been identified.
Comment l Several commenters objected to the way in which EPA's protective i action guides were applied. They said the whole body guide was actually I i
a 1 rem to 5 rem range, whereas the NRC arbitrarily selected 1 rem. '
Response
The NRC considers 1 rem as the point at which planning should begin.
The potential releases are relatively small, and the areas and numbers of people involved are small. Thus, it is practical to consider actions at the lower end of the protective action guide range.
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l Comment I Other commenters said that the ICRP Publication 26 methodology should !
be used to determine the protective action guides for radioactive materials that are inhaled and deposited in the body.
Response
J The ICRP Publication 26 methodology was used. j Comment One commenter said Part 72 spent fuel storage licensees should be covered under the regulation.
Response
The need for licensee emergency procedures for accidental releases by Part 72 licensees is being considered in a separate rulemaking published for public comment on May 27, 1986 (51 FR 19106).
Comment One commenter said sealed sources should be covered under this regulation.
Response
The NRC considers that there is no need to include most sealed sources in this rulemaking because sealed source accidents are already adequately dealt with in other parts of the regulations. (See, for example, S 20.402(a), S 20.403, S 30.33(a)(2), S 34.25, S 34.32(g) and (h), and S 70.60). In addition, based on the history of accidents 11
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involving sealed sources at licensed facilities, the NRC finds that
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additional emergency preparedness beyond that now existing at these i
facilities.is not warranted.
However, the NRC has included in its rulemaking foils, plated sources,. thin-window sealed sources (such as those sometimes used for americium-241)'and sealed sources'using low-melting temperature metal such as aluminum. The NRC is continuing to study this matter and speci-fically requests experimental information or other analyses on whether these types of sealed sources should be included in the rule.
Comment The comment was.made that a large number of byproduct material licensees do not list the specific radionuclides they will possess, but only a total curie limit for classes of nuclides, for example those with atomic numbers 3 through 83. (This approach is recommended in Regulatory ;
Guide 10.5, " Applications for Type A License of Broad Scope," Item 8A and Item 80.) This makes it impossible to determine, based on possession limits, whether extensive emergency preparedness is really appropriate.
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Response
The NRC will not require emergency plans for a facility unless a l significant accidental release of radioactive materials is credible. If I l
a licensee would be covered by the rule because the licensee is authorized I
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to possess material it does not possess and has no htention of possessing I 1
in the future, the solution is for the licensee to request a license amend-ment to reduce the licensed possession limit. If the licensee actually 12
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possesses or may possess in the future enough material to be covered by the regulation, but there are site-specific reasons why a 'significant release is not credible, the proposed rule would allow the licensee to demonstrate.this.
THE PROPOSED RULE The Commission is proposing amendments to 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70 on emergency preparedness. The proposed rule would cover fuel cycle and other. radioactive material licensees that may have the potential for a significant accidental release of NRC-licensed materials. These pro-posed regulations would require certain licensees to maintain emergency plans for responding to such accidents.
Licensees Needing Plans The criteria selected for establishing whether a licensed facility would be required to establish and maintain special emergency plans for significant accidental releases are whether a credible severe accident could theoretically deliver a radiation dose of 1 rem effective dose equivalent, 5 rems to the thyroid, or soluble uranium intake exceeding 2 milligrams to a member of the public.
The EPA recommends that actions to protect the public be considered if projected whole body doses due to an accident are in the range of 1 to 5 rems, taking into account the practicality of the actions that would be taken. The proposed rule uses the 1-rem low end of the dose range as 13
[7590-01) the criteria for establishing whether a licensed facility needs an emer-gency plan'for responding to a release. In addition, conservative assump-tions have been used to estimate the doses which could result from an accident. Doses that would result from an actual accident should realist-ically be far below the calculated doses on which the regulation in based.
The EPA's draft protective action guides apply to radiation received uniformly over the body. These guidelines are not applicable if the radia-tion dose is not uniform or if only some body organs receive the radiation dose. To account for radionuclides that are deposited nonuniformly in the body, such as those possessed by fuel cycle and other radioactive material licensees, the effective dose equivalent from these radionuclides is used l to replace the whole body dose equivalent.
The effective dose equivalent is defined as the sum of the external radiation dose equivalent plus the dose equivalent to each body organ due to radioactivity deposited within the body multiplied by a risk weighting factor'for the organ. The weighting factors are taken from "Recommenda-tions of the International Commission on Radiological Protection," ICRP Publication 26, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1977.
The conservative accident scenarios and dose calculations which form the technical basis for the proposed rule are described in detail in the previously mentioned " Regulatory Analysis of Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees," NUREG-1140.
Except for radiciodine doses, which are calculated for infants, doses are calculated for an average adult. Doses to infants and older children would be slightly different due to differences in their metabolisms.
Unfortunately, doses to age groups younger than adults have not been cal-culated for the modern ICRP Publication 26 dosimetric models except for a I
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[7590-01) few. radionuclides. The NRC considers the differences between adult doses and c'hild d'oses to be insignificant in comparison with the other uncer-tainties in the analysis. The NRC also considers that the inherent conservatism in its accident dose calculations and its use of the 1-rem ,
lower end of the range for protective action consideration provide an adequate margin of safety. Public comments on this item are specifically requested.
For most licensees who would be required to establish and maintain a plan, the degree of risk is small. For most licensees, even worst-case-doses to an individual'on the plume centerline resulting at any-distance are less than 5 or 10 rems. Realistically, actual doses that anyone would '
receive should be far lower. Finally, the probability of a serious radio-logical accident is small, less than 10 4/yr, and the probability of a serious accident simultaneous with highly adverse meteorology is less than 10 5/yr. Details are provided in the Regulatory Analysis, NUREG-1140, Sections 2.4, 2.5, and 3.
The rupture.of a large heated cylinder of UFc is an exception in that both the probability and the consequences due to the chemical toxicity of the release'd material could be of greater concern than the radiation doses from any plausible accident at fuel cycle or other radioactive material j facilities. As part of the analysis for this proposed rulemaking, the i rupture outdoors of a hot cylinder containing 14 tons of UFc was analyzed, and predictions were made concerning the consequences of such a rupture.
These predictions have been compared with the results of the actual release that occurred during the January 4, 1986, accident at the Sequoyah facility 1
(" Rupture of a Model 48Y ufo Cylinder and Release of Uranium Hexafluoride,"
NRC Report NUREG-1179, February 1986). The quantity and duration of the 15 l l
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release were quite close to what was predicted. Also, it appears that the actual onsite and offsite consequences were also quite close to what was predicted. (" Assessment of the Public Health Impact from the Accidental Release of UFc at the Sequoyah Fuels Corporation Facility at Gore, Oklahoma," NRC Report NUREG-1189, March 1986. )
Airborne releases due to a severe accident at these licensed facili-ties are likely to occur rapidly with little warning. The only types of accidents identified in NUREG-1140 for which protective action guide doses or the 2-milligram soluble uranium intake could theoretically be exceeded are a fire, a UFs cylinder rupture, and a criticality accident. Public input is sought on other types of accidents that might lead to significant releases of licensed materials. Releases from a fire could start even before the fire is detected or shortly thereafter. Plume travel time to nearby people is likely to be no more than a few minutes. Releases would usually end within half an hour to an hour when the local fire department has controlled the fire. As a result, protective actions must be taken very quickly to be effective.
In view of two factors--(1) realistically, radiation doses and soluble uranium intakes should generally be low compared to protective action guides and (2) the fast-moving nature of the accidents of concern--
evacuation planning is not necessary, appropriate, or feasible. In partic-ular, evacuation of neighborhoods before plume arrival will generally not be possible. Instead the emphasis of emergency preparedness should be on ending the accident as quickly as possible, reducing the quantity of mate-rial released, protecting workers onsite, and promptly restoring the facil-ity to a safe condition. Offsite, it would be appropriate for police and fire personnel to move people out of areas of dense smoke or fumes or get 16
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i them to' seek shelter' indoors. Such actions are routine for fires and chemical releases and.would be expected whether there were an emergency plan or not.
The proposed amendments to Parts 30, 40 and 70 would require that licensees authorized to possess in excess of certain quantities of by-product materials, source materials, and special nuclear materials must submit emergency plans for responding to releases or an evaluation that shows that offsite doses due to a release of radioactive materials under reasonable and plausible circumstances would not exceed 1 rem effective dose equivalent, a thyroid dose of 5 rems, or a soluble uranium intake exceeding 2 milligrams. The proposed rule would also cover any j future plutonium fuel fabrication plants.
The table of quantities in Part 30 that would require evaluation of the need for'an emergency plan was taken from "A Regulatory Analysis of Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees," NUREG-1140. The table lists quantities that'might theoret- l ically deliver an effective dose equivalent of 1 rem in the event of a severe accident. The quantities were calculated by assuming that the i
most. exposed member of the public would inhale a fraction of 10 6 of those materials. External doses from cloudshine and groundshine are then added to the internal dose. The 1-rem effective dose equivalent is a 50 year dose commitment calculated by the methods of ICRP Publications 26, 28, and 30.
The table in Part 30 includes all nuclides, except for I-129, listed
.on 20 or more of NRC's approximately 9,000 byproduct material licenses.
(I-129 was not included in the table because saturation would prevent the thyroid from absorbing enough I-129 to reach the 5-rem protective action 1
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.. guide for thyroid dose. Thus, I-129 is too weakly radioactive to be significant to emergency planning.) The table also includes all beta-gamma emitters listed on any license for which the quantity to deliver a 1 rem effective dose equivalent would be less than 10,000 curies. The table also includes all alpha emitters listed on any license for which the quantity to theoretically deliver a 1-rem effective dose equivalent would be less.than 2 curies.
The quantities in the table in Part 30 are different from quantities previously published in NUREG-0767, " Criteria for Selection of Fuel. Cycle and Major Materials Licensees Needing Radiological Contingency Plans,"
Federal Register Notices with Orders to Licensees (46 FR 12566), and an Advance Notice of Rulemaking (June 3, 1981; 46 FR 29712). The main rea-sons for the differences are: (1) dosimetric models from ICRP Publica-tions 26, 28, and 30 have been used instead of the older models from ICRP Publication 2; and (2) release fractions have changed as the result of further study. The intercept fraction remains 10 6 for nondepositing radionuclides. In addition, two new pathways, external' radiation from groundshine and from cloudshine, are included.
In Part 40, emergency plans would be required only for handling significant quantities of uranium hexafluoride. It was concluded in 1 NUREG-1140 that uranium and thorium in chemical forms less volatile than uranium hexafluoride would not require emergency plans because plausible releases could not cause doses exceeding 1 rem effective dose equivalent, ,
the threshold dose for requiring an emergency plan. The dose threshold would not be exceeded because the low volatility of uranium and thorium compounds, other than uranium hexafluoride, causes low release fractions l
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and because the low specific activities of uranium and thorium result in low doses.from a given weight of material,
.The chemical toxicity of' uranium and thorium are also not of concern except for the highly soluble uranium from a uraniu- hexafluoride release.
Other compounds of uranium or thorium would not cause as large an intake due to lower quantities' released and are not as acutely toxic as the very soluble uranium compound created by the uranium hexafluoride release.
In Part 70, plans would be required for potential releases of plutonium and releases.due to criticality accidents in addition to uranium hexafluoride releases. The analyses for criticality accidents and plu-tonium releases are included in NUREG-1140.
Hazardous Chemical Releases The NRC also considered requiring emergency planning for NRC-licensed facilities with nonradioactive hazardous chemicals. Certain NRC-licensed facilities that would be required to have an emergency plan for radio-active materials might also have nonradioactive hazardous chemicals, The -l issue of offsite emergency planning, preparedness, and response for release of hazardous chemicals is addressed by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-499, enacted October 17, 1
1986. (Single copies are available without charge by visiting or writing: 1 I
Senate Document Room, Hart Senate Office Bui.lding, Room B-04, Washington, DC 20510.) Title III of that Act, independently entitled, " Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986," establishes a comprehensive and detailed program under the auspices of EPA and FEMA for community involvement, planning, training, emergency notification, response, and enforcement in the event of an offsite release of hazardous, extremely 19 l
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hazardous, and toxic chemicals. All facilities with a threshold quantity of any of several hundred listed chemicals are subject to the Act. By interim final rule, the EPA' established threshold planning quantities and associated reportable quantities (November 17, 1986,.51 FR 41570).
The Act requires each State.to establish local emergency. planning committees in'each area with a facility possessing'in excess of the threshol'd quantities of hazardous chemicals. Facility operators are required to notify the. emergency coordinator of the local emergency committee immediately upon a release of a reportable quantity of a listed hazardous chemical. Notification to the local coordinator of the release of an unlisted chemical is required as well if the chemical is subject to the entirely separate' reportable quantities requirement of Superfund.
The Act is to be fully implemented by October 16, 1988. Failure to imme-diately report a release may cause the facility owner or operator to be subject to an EPA fine of up to $25,000 (and imprisoned for up to two years if the violation is willful).
The Act also requires that each local emergency planning committee prepare an emergency plan for facilities under its jurisdiction. Plans must include the following: "(1) Identification of facilities subject to the requirements... (2) Methods and procedures to be followed by facility owners and operators and local emergency and meaical personnel to respond )
J to any release... (3) Designation of a community response coordinator and facility emergency coordinators... (4) Procedures providing reliable, effective, and timely notification by the facility response coordinators and the community response coordinator to persons designated in the emer-gency plan and to the public that a release has occurred... (5) Methods for determining the occurrence of a release and the area or population to j 1
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1 be affected by such release... (6) A description of emergency equipment and. facilities in the community and at each facility... and identifica-tion of the persons responsible for such equipment and facilities...
1 (7) Evacuation plans...'(8) Training programs, including schedules for
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training of local emergency response and medical personnel...and (9) Methods and schedules for exercising the emergency-plan."
The Act requires facility owners and operators to promptly provide local emergency planning committees with any information the committees need to develop and implement the emergency plans. Failure to provide requested information may result in an EPA fine of no more than $25,000 per day.
The Act presently does not cover radioactive materials because these are not listed in the Statutory reference (Chemical Emergency Prepared-ness Program, USEPA, November 1985, Revision 1, 9223.9-1A, available from EPA). However, a comparison of the content of a licensee's radiological emergency plan as would be required by this proposed rule indicates that the information likely to be requested from facility owners and operators by local emergency response committees if radiological hazards were cov-ered would be contained in plans that meet the NRC's proposed rule.
A preliminary review of the EPA reference listed chemicals indicates that any NRC materials licensee that would be subject to radiological emergency planning for releases of radioactive materials will likely be subject to the new law. It is also highly likely that several hundred, if not thousands, of other materials licensees, that would not be subject to radiological emergency planning, will be subject to the new law. The new law is more comprehensive, detailed, and demanding than any program 21
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contemplated or recommended by the NRC staff for offsite emergency plan-ning for nonradiological chemical hazards. State and local participation in the emergency response program is mandatory, and the issuance of other permits and licenses to a chemical facility operator is not made contin-gent upon facility compliance. Rather, facility compliance is expected i Decause of heavy civil penalties for failure to abide by the recordkeeping, reporting and notification provisions of the Act.
The NRC staff, accordingly, believes that the obligation of NRC to ensure adequate emergency planning and response for releases offsite of hazardous chemicals can be met by requiring that applicants for licenses and for license renewals who would be subject to the radiological emer-gency plaaning requirements being proposed demonstrate and maintain sub-stantial compliance with the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986. Therefore, the proposed rule would require NRC licen-sees having the potential for significant offsite releases of radioactive materials to also demonstrate compliance with the requirements of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986 with respect to hazardous chemicals they may possess.
Licensees that would not be required by the rule to have an emergency plan for licensed material also would not be required to demonstrate to NRC compliance with the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986. The proposed rule is directed toward and would affect only those licensees with the potential for a significant release of licensed radioactive material, taking into account both the radiological and chemical toxicity of the licensed material. Undoubtedly, many NRC licensees who would not be covered by the proposed rule possess in excess of the threshold quantities of some hazardous chemical. The NRC in this )
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'rulemaking has not'made a finding that those hazardous chemicals do not f require emergency preparedness. Rather, the licensees are still required !
by EPA to comply with the requirements of the Emergency Planning and Com-munity Right-to-Know Act of 1986 and would be subject to severe civil and criminal penalties for failure to comply.
Uranium hexafluoride production facilities are covered by the Act because they possess hydrogen fluoride and fh.orine, both of which'are on the list'of hazardous chemicals. The local emergency planning committee for each area is required by the Act to decide, among other things, the area or population that could be affected by a release as well as proce-dures for timely notification of the public. NUREG-1140 recommended a distance of one mile from the release point as the area affected. This ]
distance is based on U.S. Department of Transportation criteria for releases of hazardous chemicals in transport accidents. The criteria are those used by the Johns Hopkins University Laboratory Applied Physics Laboratory to derive the emergency action distances given in " Hazardous Materials-Emergency Response Guidebook," U.S. Department of Transportation Report DOT-P5800.2, 1980. However, the local emergency planning commit-tees may select any distance or criteria they consider appropriate. In addition, the local emergency preparedness committees also select the means of notifying the public.
l Lessons t. earned from a Uranium Hexafluoride Release On January 4,1986, a cylinder filled considerably above its 14-ton capacity with uranium hexafluoride ruptured while being heated at the ]
Sequoyah Fuels Corporation facility in Gore, Oklahoma. One worker died and several other workers were injured. The death and injuries were 23
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caused by exposure to hydrogen fluoride, produced by a reaction of the uranium hexafluoride with airborne moisture.
After the accident the NRC formed a Lessons-Learned Group that {
reviewed the accident end recommended improvements. (See " Release of UFs l
from a Ruptured Model 48Y Cylinder at Sequoyah Fuels Corporation Facili-ty: Lessons-Learned Roport," NRC report NUREG-1198, June 1986.) A num-ber of the recommendations are relevant to this proposed rule and are discussed here. Readers wanting to know why the recommendations were made should refer to NUREG-1198.
Recommendation 3.1.1.2 (1)
' The individuals responsible for development, maintenance, updates, and implementation of the contingency plan (i.e., the emergency plan) should be clearly identified at both the corporate and site levels."
Resolution s
The recommendation was adopted in the proposed rule. The proposed rule would require each plan to describe the responsibilities of the licensee's personnel should an accident occur including responsibilities for developing, maintaining, and updating the plan.
I Recommendation 3.1.1.2_(2J ]
i
" Audits of contingency plan implementation should be conducted by individuals not having direct implementation responsibility, and the ,
l audits should include evaluation of the appropriateness of the plan, !
L j procedures, facilities, equipment (including location of f acilities and I l
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equipment), training, and periodic exercises in the spectrum of accidents or emergencies possible at the facility."
Resolution The recommendation was generally adopted in the proposed rule by requiring that exercises be evaluated by individuals not having direct implementation responsibility for the plan. Audits of exercises should provide a good indication of how well the plan would really work in an emergency.
Recommendation 3.1.2.2 (1)
"A systematic training program should be established to familiarize all plant personnel with the general contents of the contingency plan and appropriate response actions. Specific training should be provided to individuals (both site and corporate) who might be assigned specific response functions and responsibilities."
Resolution The recommendation was adopted in the proposed rule. The proposed rule would require the licensee to train workers how to respond in an i
emergency.
Recommendation 3.1.2.2 (2)
"Offsite organizations who might be requested to support an emergen-cy response should be invited to attend training specific to the response expected." l 25 I
1
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~
. Resolution.
The recommendation was adopted in the proposed rule. The proposed rule would require the licensee _to offer instruction and orientation tours to fire, police,. medical, and other offsite emergency personnel.
Recommendation 3.1.3.2 (1)
" Drills and exercises _ involving substantial staff response to a spectrum of' simulated emergency situations should be conducted periodi-cally. 'The simulated events should be based on prepared scenarios to demonstrate specific objectives, and they should be observed and cri-tiqued by qualified personnel. Any deficiencies observed should be eval-uated and' responsibility for' corrective action assigned and followed."
Resolution The recommendation was adopted in the proposed rule. The proposed rule would require quarterly communication checks and annual exercises to test response to simulated emergencies. Audits of exercises would be required by personnel having no direct implementation responsibility.
Deficiencies in the plan would have to be corrected.
Recommendation 3.1.3.2 (2)
" Drills and exercises should periodically include the offsite organ-izations which might be called upon for support (local police, civil defense, health departments, etc. ),_ as well as corporate personnel.
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Resolution The recommendation was adopted in the proposed rule. The proposed rule would require the licensee to invite offsite response organizations to participate in the licensee's exercises.
Recommendation 3.1.4.2 (1)
" Consider requiring a designated Emergency Operations Center (E0C) onsite and an alternate E0C either offsite or in another onsite location which is unlikely to be impacted by the incident. The E0C and alternate E0C should contain adequate communications capability and accommodations to provide for coordination of the onsite emergency response activities and notifications and coordination with offsite supporting organizations.
The E0C or alternate E0C should be accessible 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day."
Resolution The proposed rule would require a control point rather than an emer-gency operations center. The term emergency operations center was inten-tionally not used in the rule because that term has a specific meaning in nuclear power plant emergency preparedness that would be inappropriate for the smaller, less complex, and generally faster moving accidents that fuel cycle and other radioactive material licensees would have to respond ,
j to. The proposed rule would also require the ability to perform notifi- I cation and coordination even if parts of the facility were unusable due to the accident.
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t
, Recommendation 3.1.4.2 (2)
" Locations of emergency equipment and kits should be reviewed by the NRC and licensees so that in the event of an emergency in a given facili-ty location, or inaccessibility of a large portion of the facility, access to adequate emergency equipment and facilities, including emergency decon-tamination facilities, can be assured. Equipment caches should be in multiple locations."
Resolution The staff agrees with this recommendation and the proposed rule would require that notification of offsite response organizations and coordination of onsite response efforts be possible even if part of the facility or equipment is unavailable due to the accident. The proposed rule has no other specific requirements for multiple equipment caches, however. The exact locations of emergency equipment is appropriate for consideration when NRC reviews the licensee's submitted emergency plan.
Recommendation 3.1.4.2 (3)
" Consideration should be given to providing strategically placed
' air capsule escape units' to allow workers to escape from portions of a facility in which there exists a potential for exposure to toxic fumes !
l for more than a few moments."
Resolution l This recommendation was not specifically adopted in the proposed rule. The proposed rule would require means and equipment for mitigating I the consequences of accidents, including those provided to protect workers I
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, onsite. However, in general, air capsule escape units are not believed-to be useful or practical for accidents at fuel cycle and other radioactive material facilities. In most cases it is believed'that the quickest and best way to escape the accident is to leave the area as quickly as possible.
In the case of fires and explosions, attempted use of such capsules could' increase hazard. .Rather than adopt a' general requirement, the use of air capsule escape units could be considered on a case-by-case basis for spe-cial situations in which ordinary means of escape are not available.
Recommendation 3.1.4.2. (4)
"The facility communications system should include a radio system compatible with local police or other offsite responder communications systems. In addition, the licensee should attempt to identify beforehand to loca1'and state police, insofar as practical, offsite individuals who j would be called on for support in the event of an emergency at the site.
Radio' communications with police officials during an emergency can-resolve specific issues."
Resolution This recommendation was not specifically adopted in the proposed rule. The proposed rule would require the licensee to provide a means of notifying offsite response organizations, but whether that would include radios is appropriate for negotiation between the licensee and the off-site response organzations on a case-by-case basis. In general, the NRC would recommend radios but would consider other means of maintaining ade-quate communication. The rule also requires the licensee to provide 29
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. appropriate instructions to offsite response organizations. The question of lists of individuals who might be called to the site will be discussed in a guide on this subject.
Recommendation 3.2.1.2 (1)
"The events described in the radiological contingency plan required of certain NMSS licensees should be reviewed to develop a consistent analysis and classification of events. The resulting classification should be used in NRC decision criteria to initiate transition of the NRC from a normal mode to higher response modes."
Resolution This recommendation was adopted. The proposed rule includes a clas-sification system for accidents.
Recommendation 3.3.2.1.2 (1)
" Personnel of local agencies that might be called upon to respond to emergencies should be given training."
Resolution This recommendation was adopted in the proposed rule. The licensee would be required to offer to police, fire, medical and other offsite emergency personnel information on how to respond to an accident as well as orientation tours of the facility.
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Recommendation 3.3 3.2
" Hospital staff who might reasonably be expected to deal with inju-ries from a major accident should be trained to deal with all aspects of
'the injuries. Radiological plans and their use in drills are desirable."
l R,esolution This recommendation was adopted in the proposed rule. The rule would require the licensee to offer instructions and orientation tours to medical personnel and would require the licensee to invite medical per-sonnel to participate in the licensee's exercises. ,
Recommendation 3.3.4.2
Radiological contingency planning should include site control plans and methods for implementing site access control. Local law enforcement groups that might be called on in'an emergency should be trained."
Resolution
'The NRC agrees with this recommendation, and'the proposed rule would !
require means and equipment for mitigating the consequences of accidents. 1 Site access control plans would be one means of mitigating the consequences !
of accidents and would be contained in the licensee's plan, as appropriate, i
for the particular site. ;The rule would require the licensee to offer i I
instructions and orientation tours to police personnel. _
Proposed Requirements Licensees would be given the option of demonstrating that emergency
- f. plans for responding to accidental releases are not needed because doses 31
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~
would not exceed 1 rem effective' dose equivalent as a result of a credi-ble accident at their specific facility. The table of radionuclides in the proposed regulations was developed using conservative, pessimistic, l or " worst-case" assumptions. Each assumption is possible at some "gener-ic" facility, but may not be realistic for a specific actual facility.
Thus the licensee is given the option of analyzing accidents for the ac-tual' existing facility and determining site-specific maximum credible releases. If after the review, the NRC staff agrees that the resulting doses would be below 1 rem, an emergency plan for responding to the release would not be required.
The licensee also has the option of revising facility design, oper-ating procedures, or possession limits to reduce potential doses below 1 rem effective dose equivalent in lieu of preparing an emergency plan for responding to an accidental release.
If an emergency plan for responding to an accidental release is needed, it would include:
(1) Facility description. A brief description of the licensee's facility and area near the site. The purpose is to provide the reader with enough basic information to evaluate the licensee's plan. Signifi-cant nearby facilities, such as schools, should be included in the site area description.
(2) Types of accidents. An identification of each type of accident for which protective actions might be needed. Typically, the accidents of concern are fires involving radioactive materials, releases of large quantities of uranium hexafluoride, and criticalities involving high-enriched uranium or plutonium. Releases of hazardous chemicals that 32
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', could affect the radiological. safety of the facility and result in releases of or exposure to radioactive materials must also be considered.
(3) Classification of accidents. A classification system for clas-sifying accidents as site area emergencies or general emergencies. These classes are adopted from nuclear power plant emergency planning, but mod-ified for fuel cycle and other radioactive material licensees. A general emergency means releases that may cause doses offsite exceeding 1 rem effective dose equivalent or 5 rems to the thyroid have occurred, are in progress, or may occur. In this case, offsite actions may be needed. A site area emergency means events are in progress or have occurred that require a response from offsite organizations, but doses would not be expected to exceed 1 rem effective dose equivalent or 5 rems thyroid.
(4) Detection of accidents. Identification of the means of detect-ing each type of accident in a timely manner. The means of detection could include one or more of the following: fire alarms, criticality alarms, visual observation, stack monitors, or radiation monitors, as appropriate.
(5) Mitigation of consequences. A brief description of the means and equipment for mitigating the consequences of each type of accident, including those provided to protect workers onsite, and a description of the program for maintaining the equipment. Mitigating actions could include actions to reduce or stop the release and actions to protect work-ers such as evacuating the building or decontaminating personnel. Means for limiting releases could include sprinkler systems and other fire suppression systems, fire detection systems, physical separation of material, storage in fire-resistant containers, use of fire-resistant 33
. [7590-01]
. building materials,' fire-fighting capabilities, procedures prohibiting flammable materials in areas where radioactive materials are found, fil-ter systems, use of water sprays to knock-down UFe, and others.
Equipment might include respiratory protection equipment for employ-ees, evacuation alarms, and equipment possessed by the licensee to reduce or stop the release. It would not include equipment brought to the site by offsite response organizations.
This item is not intended to require backfits'or design changes.
Plant design is subject to a more complete safety review when the license application is reviewed.
(6) Assessment of releases. A brief description of the methods and equipment to assess releases of radioactive materials.
This does not mean real-time assessment. It means measurements made after the. release has occurred to determine how much material was released.
The NRC does not believe that real-time estimates. of releases are gener-ally possible for the types of accidents of concern. Significant releases are not likely to occur by way of monitored release paths. Monitored paths would generally contain filters that would reduce any release to
% 1igib V levels. Furthermore, if a release were detected from a moni-tored' release path there would generally be no way to determine that addi-tional material was not being released by way of unmonitored paths. In addition, even if one could assure that the entire release were monitored so that a release rate could be determined, there would be no way to know the duration of the release or whether the release rate would subsequently rise or fall greatly. This situation is different from that at nuclear j power plants where the containment can be sampled and therefore the entire l
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inventory subject to release can be calculated. Beyond this, measurements of releases would generally be made much too late to be of any usefulness during the emergency response. The recommended approach therefore is to estimate source terms for each accident type in'the planning and then de-cide in the_ planning what recommendations would be made to offsite re-sponse organizations for each accident type. In summary, one cannot wait until a potential accident is underway to decide what-recommendations should'be made. There is not enough time during_the accident.
(7) Responsibilities. A brief description of the responsibilities of. licensee personnel should an accident occur, including the identifica-tion of personnel responsible for promptly notifying offsite response organizations and the NRC; also responsibilities for developing, main-taining, and updating the plan. In general, responsibilities should be described for the position rather than by naming individuals so that personnel changes do not require amending the emergency plan. Offsite response organizations would generally include fire, police, medical, state radiological safety organizations, and perhaps other emergency per-sonnel. (Agreement State licensees would notif.y the State rather than the NRC.)
(8) Notification and coordination. A commitment to and a brief description of the means to promptly notify offsite response organizations and request offsite assistance, including medical assistance for the-treatment of contaminated injured onsite workers when appropriate. A control point must be established. The means of notification and coordi-nation must be planned so that unavailability of some personnel, parts of the facility, and some equipment will not prevent the notification and 35
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I
', coordination. The licensee shall also commit to notify NRC'immediately-after notification of-the appropriate offsite response organizations and )
I not later than one hour after the licensee declares an emergency.
In general, the licensee would be expected to be able to contact the
-local police by radio so that adequate.two-way communication could be j maintained throughout'the accident. In a few cases, the licensee _may want to seek assistance from the Department of Energy under the Federal Radiological Emergency' Response Plan (see 50 FR.46524; November 8,.1985).
(9) Information to be communicated. A brief description of the types of information on facility status, radioactive releases, and recommended actions, if necessary, to be given to off site response organ-izations and to the NRC.
(10) Training. A brief description of the training the licensee will prov.ide workers on how to respond to an emergency and any special instructions and orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire, police, medical, and other emergency personnel.
Instructions on how to deal with the radiation release should be appropriate for the personnel and should clearly state the specific actions expected of them and things they should and should not do. After the more ' comprehensive initial training, refresher briefings are sug-gested annually. A desirable time would be soon after the exercise has been conducted so that training deficiencies can be corrected and recom-mendations of the audits relevant to training can be implemented.
Refresher briefings for offsite response organizations should be conducted !
at a frequency considered appropriate by those organizations.
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(11) Recovery. A brief description of the means of restoring the facility to a safe condition after an accident. Detailed procedures are not appropriate because the exact nature of the accident cannot be forseen. Instead general criteria are appropriate.
(12) Exercises and audits. Provisions for conducting quarterly com-munications checks with offsite response organizations and annual onsite exercises to test response to simulated emergencies. The licensee shall invite offsite response organizations to participate in the annual exer-cises. Exercises must use scenarios not known to exercise participants. )
An Audit of each exercise must be conducted by individuals not having direct implementation responsibility for the plan. Audits of exercises must evaluate the appropriateness of the plan, emergency procedures, facilities, equipment, training of personnel, and overall effectiveness of the response. Deficiencies found by the audits must be corrected.
The exercises are for the purpose of familiarizing the licensee per-sonnel with the emergency plan, training them in the use of site-specific response procedures, and for identifying and correcting deficiencies in the plan. All deficiencies in the plan must be corrected, including problems with procedures, training, staffing, equipment, etc. Partici-pation by offsite personnel is not required. Annual means once each cal-endar year, at any time during the year.
The NRC would like comments specifically on whether exercises should be required annually or once every two years. The issue is whether the increased practice would improve the quality of the response sufficiently to make annual exercises worth their cost.
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", .The case in favor of annual exercises can be summarized as follows.
Exercises are: valuable-training opportunities that not only help to train personnel, but help identify deficiencies in emergency response plans and procedures. Since it is generally impracticable to exercise all portions of a program during each exercise, it is important to conduct exercises often enough to eventually cr r all aspects of a program over a reason-able time period. Exercising annually is sufficient to meet this need.
Experience has taught that by conducting exercises, portions of the plan and procedures that were thought to be adequate can be found to be defi-cient. For example, during the December 17, 1986 exercise at Allied Chemical, an emergency action' level that initiates a general emergency was determined to be inappropriate and had to be revised. If not for the opportunity to actually use the emergency action levels during the exer-cise, this inconsistency could have persisted for many years undetected.
Therefore, it is important to have annual exercises as a method to identify problem areas. In addition, personnel need these opportunities to actually demonstrate their capabilities. With several people trained to fill each emergency response position, an individual could go several years before having an opportunity to participate, even with an annual exercise frequency. With a two year frequency this could lead to person-nel not having an opportunity to participate in an exercise for a consid-erable. number of years.
The case in favor of less than annual exercises, for example, biennual exercises can be summarized as follows. While nuclear power plants exercise annually, the potential hazard from a radioactive materi-als facility is enormously lower and the complexity of the needed 38
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t response is much less. Therefore, having the same exercise frequency as j nuclear power plants is not justified in terms of the potential hazard nor needed to maintain an adequate level of preparedness. In addition, annual exercises could place an excessive burden on offsite response organizations. This burden may be difficult for them to meet especially considering that they may have to participate in many other exercises required by the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986.
(13) Hazardous chemicals. A description sufficient to demonstrate the' applicant's compliance with the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Title III, Public Law 99-499, if applicable to the applicant's activities at the proposed place of use of the radio- ,
active material. This should include a summary of the information provided to the local emergency committee and to whom and when the information was sent.
In brief, the licensee is required to give prompt notification to appropriate offsite response organizations, providing these organizations with information on the situation and recommended actions, and assuring ,
that these officials have been offered instruction in advance. In addi- ;
i tion, in order to assure that offsite response organizations expected to respond to an accident have been consulted in the formulation of the plan, the licensee must allow such offsite organizations 60 days to com-ment on the plan and must provide these comments to the NRC.
The NRC has also considered the need for: (1) formal public infor-mation programs.for people living close to licensed facilities who might be advised to take' protective actions if an accident occurred; and (2) formal notification of the potentially affected public in the event i 39
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of an accident. The NRC has concluded that the need for any actions of this type are best left to the local offsite emergency response organiza-tions and officials who have jurisdiction and responsibility for protect-ing the people in the vicinity of the facility. This approach has been adopted for hazardous chemicals in the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986. The NRC will encourage State and local auth-orities to consider the need for such actions and to work with the licensee on a case-by-case basis.
Most, if not all, of the licensees who would be required to submit an emergency plan by this regulation have already submitted onsite Radio-logical Contingency Plans under the orders issued in 1981. Those plans already include essentially the same information that would be required under the new regulation, but most of the plans are likely to require some changes to meet the new rule. The NRC plans to allow licensees who have submitted Radiological Contingency Plans one year to make the neces-sary changes. Alternatively, these licensees could submit an evaluation showing that an emergency plan is not necessary. The changes or evalua-tion would then have to be submitted to the Commission as provided for in the proposed rule. The NRC would not expect those licensees to resub-mit their entire plans when submitting changes. Rather, at the time of renewal of their licenses, licensees would resubmit their entire plan revised to conform to the new rule as a part of their renewal application.
Licensees covered by the rule who have not submitted Radiological Contin-gency Plans would be allowed one year to submit either an emergency plan or an evaluation showing that an emergency plan is not needed.
The NRC will consult with FEMA as appropriate under the terms of the FEMA-NRC memorandum of understanding. Agreement States receiving plans 40
[7590-01) would also be free to consult FEMA if they desired. NRC encourages licensees to work with State governments to develop comprehensive emergency plans for other hazards.
The staff identified about 60 NRC licensees who would be covered by the rule as proposed. The staff estimated, however, that about 15 of those licensees would probably lower their possession limits so they would not be covered and that about 15 would probably demonstrate that the 1-rem dose is not plausible. Realistically, probably no more than about 30 licensees would actually submit an emergency plan. Perhaps about 5 to 10 Agreement State licensees would also eventually be covered because the new requirements would be a matter of compatability with Agreement States.
FINDING 0F NO SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: AVAILABILITY The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule, if adopted, would not be a major Fed-eral action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and therefore an environmental impact statement is not required. The ;
rule would not affect the probability or the size of accidental radio-active releases. It might in some cases reduce the doses people near the facility site could receive. The environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact on which this determination is based are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street NW. , Wash-ington, DC. The environmental assessment and finding of no significant 41
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impact are contained in Section 4.3 of "A Regulatory Analysis for Emer-gency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licen-sees," NUREG-1140. Single copies are available without charge upon written request from NRC Distribution Section, Office of Information Resources Management, USNRC, Washington, DC 20555.
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT This proposed rule amends information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et s e q .- ) . This rule has been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for review and approval of these requirements.
REGULATORY ANALYSIS The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis (NUREG-1140) on this proposed regulation. The analysis examines the accident scenarios considered by the Commission (see Section 2) as well as the costs and benefits of actions considered (see Section 3). The analysis is avail-able for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW.,
Washington, DC. Single copies of the analysis (NUREG-1140) may be obtained without charge upon written request from: Distribution Section, Office of Information Resources Management, USNRC, Washington, DC 20555.
As indicated previously, the Commission is particularly interested in receiving public comments on the regulatory analysis. Comments on the analysis may be submitted to the NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES
} heading.
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', REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b),
the Commission certifies that this rule, if adopted, will not have a sig-nificant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities.
The proposed rule would require the development and implementation of emergency plans by licensees who are authorized to possess significant amounts of radioactive material. These companies do not fall within the definition of a small business found in the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C.
632, or within the small business size standards set forth in 13 CFR Part 121. The proposed rule affects about 60 out of some 9,000 licensees.
However, the staff believes that about 15 of these licensees could amend their licenses to reduce quantities of material they are authorized to possess and about 15 could perform an evaluation showing no need to be covered by the rule. Realistically, probably no more than about 30 li-censees would actually submit emergency plans. These 30 licensees are essentially identical to those issued orders to require onsite contin-gency plans in 1981. An additional 5 to 10 Agreement State licensees might have to submit emergency plans because the rule would be made an item of compatability with Agreement State programs.
Thus, the prop.osed rule would not impose a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, as defined in the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980.
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Any small entity affected by this regulation which determines that, because of its size, it is likely to bear a disproportionate adverse eco-nomic 1mpact, should notify the Commission of this in a comment that indicates the following:
-(a) 'The small entity's size in terms of annual income or revenue and number of employees; (b) How the proposed regulation would result in a significant eco- ,
nomic burden upon the small entity as compared to that on a larger entity; (c) How the proposed regulations could be modified to take into account the entity's diffe-ing needs or capabilities.
The comments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, ATTN: Docket-ing and Service Branch.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF COMMISSIONERS ASSELSTINE AND CARR Commissioner Asselstine stated, "I approve this proposed rule as far as it goes. However, I believe that in light of the fast-moving nature of the accidents of concern for the types of facilities covered by this pro-posed rule, the Commission shoald give further consideration to requiring a formal notification system for promptly alerting the public within an appropriate emergency planning zone (EPZ) in the event of an accident.
Staff studies and experience from the January 4, 1986 accident at the Sequoyah Fuels Corporation facility demonstrate the necessity for quick decisions and prompt actions in the case of an emergency. The regulatory 44 ,
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analysis prepared in support of this rule (NUREG-1140) states that 'The goal should be to make decisions on protective actions and start imple-menting these decisions within 5 or 10 minutes of discovering'the acci- ;
dent.' Releases are expected to end within half an hour to an hour. It appears to me that in view of these circumstances, prompt notification of
.the affected public to enable individuals to take appropriate and timely protective actions is a sensible approach which the Commission should requi re. Along with requiring a prompt notification system, I believe provisions for annual dissemination of information to the public located within an EPZ relating to notification methods and protective actions is also necessary."
"I would appreciate comments on these suggestions."
Commissioner Carr stated, "I agree that the proposed rulemaking should be published for public comment, but I am concerned about the conservatism used by the staff in its accident dose calculations and its use of the 1-rem lower end of the range for protective action given the Commission policy (1985 Policy and Planning Guidance) that emergency planning should be based on realistic assumptions."
Commissioner Carr requests public comments on these concerns.
LIST OF SUBJECTS FOR 10 CFR PARTS 30, 40, AND 70 Part 30 - Byproduct material, Government contracts, Intergovernmen-tal relations, Isotopes, Nuclear materials, Penalty, Radiation protec-tion, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
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Part 40 - Government contracts, Hazardous materials - transportation, Nuclear materials, Penalty, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Source material, Uranium.
Part 70 - Hazardous materials - transportation, Material control and accounting, Nuclear materials, Packaging and containers, Penalty, Radia-tion protection, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Scientific equipment, Security measures, Special nuclear material.
Under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Enengy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC is proposing to adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70.
PART 30 - RULES OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY TO DOMESTIC LICENSING OF BYPRODUCT MATERIAL
- 1. The authority citation for Part 30 is revised to read as follows:
AUTHORITY: Secs. 81, 82, 161, 182, 183, 186, 68 Stat. 935, 948, 953, 954, 955, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2111, 2112, 2201, 2232, 223?, 2236, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846).
Section 30.7 also issued under Pub. L.95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat.
2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). Section 30.34(b) also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Section 30.61 also issued under sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2237).
For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2273); SS 30.3, 30.34(b), (c), and (f), 30.41(a) and (c), and 30.53 are 46
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issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); and SS 30.6, 30.36, 30.51, 30.52, 30.55, and 30.56(b) and (c) are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).
- 2. In S 30.4, all definitions are alphabetized, the lettering sys-tem for the definitions is deleted, and three new definitions are added to read as follows:
S 30.4 Definitions.
" Effective dose equivalent" means the sum of the products of the dose equivalent to the organ or tissue and the weighting factors applicable to each of the body organs or tissues that are irradiated.
Weighting factors are: 0.25 for gonads, 0.15 for breast, 0.12 for red bone marrow, 0.12 for lungs, 0.03 for thyroid, 0.03 for bone surface, and 0.06 for each of the other five organs receiving the highest dose equivalent.
" General emergency" means events may occur, are in progress, or have ,
occurred that could cause the release of radioactive materials sufficient to cause doses offsite exceeding 1 rem effective dose equivalent or 5 rems to the thyroid or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble uranium.
" Site area emergency" means events may occur, are in progress, or have occurred that require offsite response but are not expected to cause a release of radioactive materials sufficient to cause doses offsite to exceed 1 rem effective dose equivalent or 5 rems to the thyroid or an ;
intake of 2 milligrams of soluble uranium. j
= * * *
- l 47 l i
i k
[7590-01]
', 3. In S 30.32, a new paragraph (g) is added to read as follows:
S 30.32 Application for Specific Licenses.
- .e * * *
(g)(1) Each application to possess radioactive materials in unsealed form, on-foils or plated sources, or sealed in glass in excess of the quantities in S 30.72, " Schedule C - Quantities of Radioactive Materials Requiring Consideration of the Need for an Emergency Plan for Responding to a Release," must contain either:
(i) An evaluation showing that the maximum dose to a person offsite due to a release of radioactive materials under reasonable and plausible circumstances would not exceed 1 rem effective dose equivalent or 5 rems to the thyroid; or (ii) An emergency plan for responding to a release of radioactive material.
(2) One or more of the following factors may be used to support an evaluation submitted under paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this section:
(i) The radioactive material is physically separated so that only a portion could be involved in an accident; (ii) All or part of the radioactive material is not subject to release during an accident because of the way it is stored or packaged; (iii) The release fraction in the respirable size range would be lower than the release fraction shown in S 30.72 due to the chemical or physical form of the material; (iv) The solubility of the radioactive material would reduce the dose received; 48
[7590-01]
(v) Facility design or engineered safety features in the facility would cause the release fraction to be lower than shown in 6 30.72; (vi) Operating restrictions or procedures would prevent a release fraction as large as that shown in S 30.72; or (vii) Other factors appropriate for the specific facility.
(3) An emergency plan for responding to a release of radioactive material submitted under paragraph (g)(1)(ii) of this section must include the following information:
(i) Facility description: A brief description of the licensee's facility and area near the site.
(ii) Types of accidents: An identification of each type of accident for which protective actions may be needed.
(iii) Classification of accidents: A classification system for clas-sifying accidents as site area emergencies or general emergencies.
(iv) Detection of accidents: Identification of the means of detect-ing each type of accident in a timely manner.
(v) Mitigation of consequences: A brief description of the means and equipment for mitigating the consequences of each type of accident, including those provided to protect workers onsite, and a description of the program for maintaining the equipment.
(vi) Assessment of releases: A brief description of the methods and equipment to assess releases of radioactive materials.
(vii) Responsibilities: A brief description of the responsibilities of licensee personnel should an accident occur, including identification of personnel responsible for promptly notifying offsite response organ-izations and the NRC; also responsibilities for developing, maintaining, and updating the plan.
49
[7590-01]
(viii) Notification and coordination: A commitment to and a brief description of the means to promptly notify offsite response organizations and request offsite assistance, including medical assistance for the treatment of contaminated injured onsite workers when appropriate. A control point must be established. The notification and coordination must be planned so that unavailability of some personnel, parts of the facility, and some equipment will not prevent the notification and coordination. The licensee shall also commit to notify NRC immediately after notification of the appropriate offsite response organizations and not later than one hour after the licensee declares an emergency.
(ix) Information to be communicated: A brief description of the types of information on facility status, radioactive releases, and recom-mended actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite response organiza-tions and to the NRC.
(x) Training: A brief description of the training the licensee will provide workers on how to respond to an emergency and any special instructions and orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire, police, medical and other emergency personnel.
(xi) Safe shutdown: A brief description of the means of restoring the facility to a safe condition after an accident.
(xii) Exercises and audits: Provisions for conducting quarterly com-munications checks with offsite response organizations and annual onsite exercises to test response to simulated emergencies. Quarterly commun1-cations checks with offsite response organizations shall include the check and update of all necessary telephone numbers. The licensee shall invite offsite response organizations to participate in the annual exercises, l
50
[7590-01]
Participation of offsite response organizations in annual exercises although strongly recommended is not required. Exercises must use scenar-ios not known to exercise participants. The licensee shall conduct an audit of each exercise using individuals not having direct implementation responsibility for the plan. Audits of exercises must evaluate the appro-priateness of the plan, emergency procedures, facilities, equipment, training of personnel, and overall effectiveness of the response. Defi-ciencies found by the audits must be corrected.
(xiii) Hazardous chemicals: A description sufficient to demonstrate the applicant's compliance with the Emercjncy Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Title III, Public Law 99-499, if applicable to the applicant's activities at the proposed place of use of the byproduct material.
(4) The licensee shall allow the offsite response organizations expected to respond in case of an accident 60 days to comment or the licensee's emergency plan before submitting it to NRC. The licensee shall provide any comments received within the 60 days to the NRC with the emergency plan.
- 4. In S 30.34, a new paragraph (f) is added to read as follows:
S 30.34 Terms and conditions of licenses.
l (f) Licensees required to submit emergency plans by 6 30.32(g) shall follow the emergency plan approved by the Commission. The licensee may change the approved plan without Commission approval only if the )
changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plan. The licensee 51
[7590-01]
shall furnish the change to the appropriate NRC Regional Office seecified in S 30.6 within six nionths af ter the change is made. Proposed changes that decrease, or potentially decrease, the effectiveness of the approved emergency plan shall not be implemented without prior application to and prior approval by the Commission.
A- * * * *
- 5. A new 6 30.72 is added to read as follows:
J S 30.72 Schedule C - Quantities of radioactive materials requiring consideration of the need for an emergency plan for responding to a release.
Radioactive Release Quantity Material 1 Fraction (Curies)
H-3 .5 20,000 C-14 .5 1,000 Na-22 .01 9,000 Na-24 .01 10,000 P-32 .5 100 P-33 .5 1,000 5-35 .5 900 Cl-36 .01 5,000 K-42 .01 9,000 Ca-45 .01 20,000 Sc-46 .01 3,000 Ti-44 .01 100 V-48 .01 7,000 C r-51 .01 300,000 Mn-56 .01 60,000 Fe-55 .01 40,000 Fe-59 .01 7,000 Co-60 Ni-63
.001
.01 5,000 20,000
)j Cu-64 .01 200,000 1 Zn-65 .01 5,000 Ge-68 .01 2,000 Se-75 .01 10,000 52
[7590-01]
Radioactive Release Quantity Material 1 Fraction (Curies)
Kr-85 1. 0 6,000,000 Sr-89 .01 3,000 Sr-90 .01 90 Y-91 .01 2,000 Zr-93 .01 400 Zr-95 .01 5,000 Nb-94 .01 300 Mo-99 .01 30,000 l Tc-99 .01 10,000 Tc-99m .01 400,000 Ru-106 .01 200 ,
Ag-110m .01 1,000 Cd-109 .01 1,000 Cd-113 .01 80 In-114m .01 1,000 Sn-113 .01 10,000 Sn-123 .01 3,000 Sn-126 .01 1,000 ;
Sb-124 .01 4,000 Sb-126 .01 6,000 Te-127m .01 5,000 Te-129m .01 5,000 1-125 .5 7 '
I-131 .5 5 Xe-133 1.0 900,000 Cs-134 .01 2,000 Cs-137 .01 3,000 Ba-133 .01 10,000 Ba-140 .01 30,000 Ce-141 .01 10,000 Ce-144 .01 300 Pm-145 .01 4,000 Pm-147 .01 4,000 Sm-151 .01 4,000 Eu-152 .01 500 Eu-154 .01 400 Eu-155 .01 3,000 Gd-153 .01 5,000 Tb-160 .01 4,000 Ho-166m .01 100 Tm-170 .01 4,000 Hf-172 .01 400 Hf-181 .01 7,000 Ir-192 .001 40,000 Au-198 .01 30,000 Hg-203 .01 10,000 Pb-210 .01 8 -
53 )
1 mm
[7590-01] l a
Radioactive Release Quantity Material 1 Fraction (Curies)
Bi-207 .01 5,000 Bi-210 .01 600 Po-210 .1 1 Ac-228 .001 4,000 Np-237 .001 2 Am-241 .001 2 Am-242 .001 2 Am-243 .001 2 Cm-242 .001 60 Cm-243 .001 3 Cm-244 .001 4 Cm-245 .001 2 l Cf-252 .0019 9(20 mg) 1 Any other bets gamma emitter .01 10,000 Mixed fission products .01 1,000 Mixed corrosion products .01 10,000 Contaminated equipment beta gamma .001 10,000 Irradiated material, any form other than solid noncombustible .01 1,000 Irradiated material, solid noncombustible .001 10,000 Mixed radioactive waste, beta gamma .01 1,000 Package mixed waste, beta gamma 2 .001 10,000 l Any other alpha emitter .001 2 Contaminated equipment, alpha .0001 20 i Packaged waste, alpha 2 .0001 20 Combinations of radioactive materials listed abovel I1 IFor combinations of radioactive materials, consideration of the need for an emergency plan is required if the sum of the ratios of the quantity of each radioactive material authorized to the quantity listed for that material in Schedule C exceeds one. !
2 Waste packaged in Type B containers does not require an emergency plan. l 54 )
j
[7590-01)
', PART 40 - DOMESTIC LICENSING OF SOURCE MATERIAL
- 6. The authority citation for Part 40 is revised to read as follows:
AUTHORITY: Secs. 62, 63, 64, 65, 81, 161, 182, 183, 186, 68 Stat.
932, 933, 935, 948, 953, 954, 955, as amended, secs. 11e(2), 83, 84, Pub.
L.95-604, 92 Stat. 3033, as amended, 3039, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2014(e)(2), 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2111, 2113, 2114, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2282); sec. 274, Pub. L.86-373, 73 Stat. 688 (42 U.S.C. 2021); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); sec. 275, 92 stat. 3021, as amended by Pub. L.97-415, 96 Stat. 2067 (42 U.S.C. 2022).
Section 40.7 also issued under Pub. L.95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat.
2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). Section 40.31(g) also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Section 40.46 also issued under sec 184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Section 40.71 also issued under sec. 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2237).
For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2273); SS 40.3, 40.25(d)(1)-(3), 40.35(a)-(d) and (f), 40.41(b) and (c),
40.46, 40.51(a) and (c), and 40.63 are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat.
948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); and SS 40.5, 40.25(c) and (d)(3) and (4), 40.26(c)(2), 40.35(e), 40.42, 40.61, 40.62, 40.64, and 40.65 are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).
55
[7590-01] I
- 7. In S 40.4, all definitions are alphabetized, the lettering system for the definitions is deleted, and two new definitions are added to read as follows- I l
6 40.4 Definitions.
" General emergency" means events may occur, are in progress, or have occurred that could cause the release of radioactive materials sufficient to cause doses offsite exceeding 1 rem effective dose equivalent or 5 rems to the thyroid or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble uranium.
" Site area emergency" means events may occur, are in progress, or have occurred that require offsite response but are not expected to cause a release of. radioactive materials sufficient to cause doses offsite to exceed 1 rem effective dose equivalent or 5 rems to the thyroid or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble uranium.
- 8. A new paragraph (i) is added to S 40.31 to read as follows:
S 40.31 Applications for specific licenses.
I (i)(1) Each application to possess uranium hexafluoride in excess of 50 kilograms in a single container or 1000 kilograms total must contain either:
(i) An evaluation showing that the maximum intake of uranium by a !
member of the public due to a release under reasonable and plausible circumstances would not exceed 2 milligrams; or 56
[7590-01)
(ii) An emergency plan for responding to the. radiological hazards of an accidental release of source material and to any associated chemi-cal hazards directly incident thereto.
(2) One or more of the following factors may be used to support an evaluation submitted under paragraph (i)(1)(i) of this section:
(i) All or part of the radioactive material is not subject to release during an accident because of the way it is stored or packaged; (ii) Facility design or engineered safety features in the facility would reduce the amount of the release; or (iii) Other factors appropriate for the specific facility.
(3) An emergency plan submitted under paragraph (i)(1)(ii) of this section must include the following:
(i) Facility description: A brief description of the licensee's facility and area near the site.
(ii) Types of accidents: An identification of each type of accident-for which protective actions may be needed.
(iii) Classification of accidents: A classification system for clas-sifying accidents as site area emergencies or general emergencies.
(iv) Detection of accidents: Identification of the means of detect-ing each type of accident in a timely manner.
(v) Mitigation of consequences: A brief description of the means and equipment for mitigating the consequences of each type of accident, including those provided to protect workers onsite, and a description of the program for maintaining the equipment.
1 (vi) Assessment of releases: A brief description of the methods and i equipment to assess releases of radioactive materials.
57
[7590-01]
(vii) Responsibilit'ies: A brief description of the responsibilities of licensee personnel should an accident occur, including identification of personnel responsible for promptly notifying offsite response organ-izations and the NRC; also responsibilities for developing, maintaining, and updating the plan.
(viii) Notification and coordination: A commitment to and a brief description of.the means to promptly notify offsite response organiza-tions and request offsite assistance, including medical assistance for the treatment of contaminated injured onsite workers when appropriate.
A control point must be established. The notification and coordination must be planned so that unavailability of some personnel, parts of the facility, and some equipment will not prevent the notification and coord-ination. The licensee shall also commit to notify NRC immediately after notification of the offsite response organizations and not later than one hour after the licensee declares an emergency.
(ix) Information to be communicated: A brief description of the types of information on facility status, radioactive releases, and recom-mended actions, if necessary, to be given to of.fsite response organiza-tions and to the NRC.
(x) Training: A brief description of the training the licensee will provide workers on how to respond to an emergency and any special instructions and orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire, I police, medical and other emergency personnel.
(xi) Safe shutdown: A brief description of the means of restoring the facility to a safe condition after an accident.
(xii) Exercises and audits: Provisions for conducting quarterly com-munications checks with offsite response organizations and annual onsite
}
58 ]
l i
i
[7590-01]
exercises to te st response to simulated emergencies. Quarterly communi-cations checks with offsite response organizations shall include the check and update of all necessary telephone numbers. The licensee shall invite offsite response organizations to participate in the annual exer-cises. Participation of offsite response organizations in annual exer-cises although strongly recommended is not required. Exercises must use scenarios not known to exercise participants, The licensee shall conduct an audit of each exercise using individuals not having direct implemen-tation responsibility for the plan. Audits of exercises must evaluate the appropriateness of the plan, emergency procedures, facilities, equip-ment, training of personnel, and overall effectiveness of the response.
Deficiencies found by the audits must be corrected.
(xiii) Hazardous chemicals: A description sufficient to demonstrate the applicant's compliance with the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Title III, Public Law 99-499, if applicable to the applicant's activities at the proposed place of use of the source material.
(4) The licensee shall allow the offsite response organizations expected to respond in case of an accident 60 days to comment on the licensee's emergency plan before submitting it to the NRC. The licensee shall provide any comments received within the 60 days to the NRL with the emergency plan.
- 9. In S 40.35, a paragraph (f) is added to read as follows:
59
[7590-01]
1 S 40.35 Conditions of specific licenses issued pursuant to S 40.34 (f) Licensees required to submit emergency plans by S 40.31(i) shall follow the emergency plan approved by the Commission. The licensee j may change the plan without Commission approval if the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plan. The licensee shall furnish the change to the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, within six months after the change is made. Proposed changes that decrease the effective-ness of the approved emergency plan shall not be implemented without pri-or application to and prior approval by the Commission.
PART 70 - DOMESTIC LICENSING 0F SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
- 10. The authority citation for Part 70 continues to read as follows:
AUTHORITY: Secs. 51, 53, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 948, 953, 954, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2282); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 204, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1245, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5845, 5846).
Section 70.7 also issued under Pub. L.95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat.
2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). Section 70.21(g) also issued under sec. 122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Section 70.31 also issued under sec. 57d, Pub. L.93-377, 88 Stat. 475 (42 U.S.C. 2077). Sections 70.36 and 70.44 also issued under sec. 184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234).
60
[7590-011 Section 70.61 also issued under secs. 186, 187, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C.
2236, 2237). Section 70.62 also issued under sec. 108, 68 Stat. 939, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2138).
For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2273); SS 70.3,.70.19(c), 70.21(c), 70.22(a), (b), (d)-(k), 70.24(a) and (b), 70.32(a)(3), (5), (6), (d), and (i), 70.36, 70.39(b) and (c),
70.41(a), 70.42(a) and (c), 70.56, 70.57(b), (c), and (d),
70.58(a)-(g)(3), and (h)-(j) are issued unde, sec. 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); SS 70.7, 70.22a(a) and (d), 70.20b(c) and (e), 70.21(c), 70.24(b), 70.32(a)(6), (c), (d), (e), and (g), 70.36, 70.51(c)-(g), 70.56, 70.57(b) and (d), and 70.58(a)-(g)(3) and (h)-(j) are issued under sec. 161i, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i));
and SS 70.5, 70.20b(d) and (e), 70.38, 70.51(b) and (i), 70.52, 70.53, 70.54, 70.55, 70.58(g)(4), (k), and (1), 70.59 and 70.60(b) and (c) are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).
- 11. In S 70.4, all definitions are alphabetized, the lettering sys- I tem for the definitions is deleted, and three new definitions are added to read as follows:
S 70.4 Definitions.
- * *
- x i
" Effective dose equivalent" means the sum of the products of the dose equivalent to the body organ or tissue and the weighting factors applicable to each of the body organs or tissues that are irradiated. l l
Weighting factors are: 0.25 for gonads, 0.15 for breast, 0.12 for red bone marrow, 0.12 for lungs, 0.03 for thyroid, 0.03 for bone surface, 61
1
[7590-01]
l
. i l
and 0.06 for each of the other five organs receiving the highest dose
)
equivalent. j
" General emergency" means events may occur, are in progress, or have occurred that could cause the release of radioactive materials sufficient to cause doses offsite exceeding 1 rem effective dose equivalent or 5 rems to the thyroid or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble uranium.
" Site area emergency" means events may occur, are in progress, or have occurred that require offsite response but are not expected to cause a release of radioactive materials sufficient to cause doses offsite to exceed 1 rem effective dose equivalent or 5 rems to the thyroid or an 1
intake of 2 milligrams of soluble uranium.
]
- 12. In S 70.22, paragraph (i) is revised to read as follows:
S 70.22 Contents of applications.
(i)(1) Each application to possess enriched uranium or plutonium in quantities such that a criticality accident alarm system is required, uranium hexafluoride in excess of 50 kilograms in a single container or 1000 kilograms total, or in excess of 2 curies of plutonium in unsealed form or on foils or plated sources, must contain either:
(i) An evaluation showing that the maximum dose to a member of the public offsite due to a release of radioactive materials under reasonable i l
and plausible circumstances would not exceed 1 rem effective dose equiva-lent or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble uranium, or 62 l
i
[7590-01]
l
, (ii) An emergency plan for responding to the radiological hazards ,
l of an accidental release of special nuclear material and to any associated I chemical hazards directly incident thereto.
(2) One or more of the following factors may be used to support an evaluation submitted under paragraph (i)(1)(i) of this section:
(i) The radioactive material is physically separated so that only a portion could be involved in an accident; (ii) All or part of the radioactive material is not subject to release during an accident or to criticality because of the way it is stored or packaged; (iii) In the case of fires or explosions, the release fraction would be lower than 0.001 due to the chemical or physical form of the material; (iv) The solubility of the material released would reduce the dose received; (v) The facility design or engineered safety features in the facil-ity would cause the release fraction to be lower than 0.001; (vi) Operating restrictions or procedures would prevent a release large enough to cause a member of the public offsite to receive a dose exceeding 1 rem effective dose equivalent; or (vii) Other factors appropriate for the specific facility.
(3) Emergency plans submitted under paragraph (i)(1)(ii) of this section must include the following information:
(i) Facility description: A brief description of the licensee's facility and area near the site, i
(ii) Types of accidents: An identification of each type of accident for which protective actions may be needed.
63 i 1
- ------ _- U
[7590-01]
1 (iii) Classification of accidents: A classification system for clas- )
1 sifying accidents as site area emergencies or general emergencies.
-(i v) Detection of accidents: Identification of the means of detect- i 1
ing each type of accident in a timely manner. i (v) Mitigation of consequences: A brief description of the means l and equipment for mitigating the consequences of each type of accident, including those provided to protect workers onsite, and a description of the program for maintaining the equipment.
(vi) Assessment of releases: A brief description of the methods and equipment to assess releases of radioactive materials. ;
(vii) Responsibilities: A brief description of the responsibilities '
of licensee personnel should an accident occur, including identification of personnel responsible for promptly notifying offsite response organ- i izations and the NRC; also responsibilities for developing, maintaining, ,
and updating the plan.
(viii) Notification and coordination: A commitment to and a brief description of the means to promptly notify offsite response organizations and request offsite assistance, including medical assistance for the treatment of contaminated injured onsite workers when appropriate. A control point must be established. The notification and coordination j must be planned so that unavailability of some personnel, parts of the facility, and some equipment will not prevent the notification and coordination. The licensee shall also commit to notify NRC immediately after notification of the appropriate offsite response organizations and not later than one hour after the licensee declares an emergency.
64
. [7590-01]
, (ix) Information to be communicated: A brief description of the types of information on facility status, radioactive releases, and recom-mended actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite response organiza-tions and to the NRC.
(x) Training: A brief description of the training the licensee will provide workers on how to respond to an emergency and any special instructions and orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire, police, medical and other emergency personnel.
(xi) Safe shutdown: A brief description of the means of restoring the facility to a safe condition after an accident.
(xii) Exercises and audits: Provisions for conducting quarterly com-munications checks with offsite response organizations and annual onsite exercises to test response to simulated emergencies. Quarterly communi-cations checks with offsite response organizations shall include the check and update of all necessary telephone numbers. The licensee shall invite offsite response organizations to participate in the annual exercises.
Participation of offsite response organizations in annual exercises although strongly recommended is not required. Exercises must use scenar-ios not known to exercise participants. The licensee shall conduct an audit of each exercise using individuals not having direct implementation responsibility for the plan. Audits must evaluate the appropriateness of the plan, emergency procedures, facilities, equipment, training of person- '
nel, and overall effectiveness of the response. Deficiencies found by the audits must be corrected.
(xiii) Hazardous chemicals: A description sufficient to demonstrate the applicant's compliance with the Emergency Planning and Community 65
[7590-01]
Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Title III, Public Law 99-499, if applicable to the applicant's activities at the proposed place of use of the special nuclear material.
(4) The licensee shall allow the offsite response organizations expected to respond in case of an accident 60 days to comment on the licensee's emergency plan before submitting it to NRC. The licensee shall provide any comments received within the 60 days to the NRC with the emergency plan.
6 70.22 [ Amended]
- 13. In 6 70.22 (a)(i), footnote 3 is removed.
S 70.23 [ Amended]
I
- 14. In S 70.23 (a)(11), footnote 2 is removed.
- 15. In S 70.32, paragraph (i) is revised to read as follows:
6 70.32 Conditions of Licenses L I
- *
- a w (i) Licensees required to submit emergency plans in accordance with S 70.22(i) shall follow the emergency plan approved by the Commission.
The licensee may change the approved plan without Commission approval if the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plan. The licensee shall furnish the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, l i
4 l
66 A
[7590-01]
l l .
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, with a copy to the appropriate NRC Regional Office specified in Appendix D, Part 20 of this chapter, a copy of each change within six months after the change is made. Proposed changes that decrease the effectiveness of the approved emergency plan shall not be implemented wi out prior application to and prior approval by the Commission.
Dated at b'& ,b[,this/ day of , 1987. i j '
s For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
b John %. Hoyle ,
Actin'g Secretary of the Commission l
l l
67
- _ ________________ ________ _ _____ _____________ _ ______