ML20235U409

Temporary Mod Sheet to Rev 2 to Conduct of Operations Procedure 2.0.7, Plant Temporary Mod Control

ML20235U409
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	09/21/1987
From:	NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:
Shared Package
ML20235U383	List: ML20235U379 ML20235U393 ML20235U409 ML20235U422 ML20235U431
References
2.0.7, CNSS876103, NUDOCS 8710140079
Download: ML20235U409 (7)

Text

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COOPER NUCLEAR STATION OPERATIONS MANUAL 1

'AIIACIMENI "A" i

.. CONDUCT OF OPERATZONS PROCED11RE 2.0.7 PLANT TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS CONTROL CNSS876103 Enclosure 4 l

Page1of14

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TEMPORARY MODIFICATION SHEET DESCRIPTION Date: 9-21-87 Expected Duration: 6 months Number: PTM 87- O,ref' j Equipment / Functions Affected: Nain Steam Bypass Valve #3 (MS-Hot-BV3) l Reason: The hydraulic actuator ~on MS-HOV-BV3 is leaking and must be isolated for evaluation.

Reference Drawing / Procedure / Document: Westinghouse Drawing 721J120, Burns.and Roe Drawing 200 l

Gpecial Actions Or Instructions: - . r ELECTRICAL JUMPER - - I TAG EROM TO-i NUMBER LOCATION TERM BOARD TERMINAL LOCATION TERM BOARD 1

TERMINAL s a

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l LEAD DISCONNECTION FUSE REMOVAL 1

TAG NUMBER LOCATION TERM BOARD TERMINAL TAG NUMBER LOCATION FUSE BOARD i

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BLOCKED RELAY / BOOTED CONTACT l BREAKER TEST BLOCK / ACTUATOR LINK TAG NUMBER LOCATION RELAY POSITION TAG NUMBER LOCATION BREARER 8710140079 ADOCK O 8 298 PDR PDR S

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ovus t.n a v o ur.n n ornitun v e r.na s ivo o ruu= un u ATTACHMENT "A" .

CONDUCT OF OPERATTONS PROCEDURE - - -- -- --

2.0.7 PLANT TDfPORARY MODIFICATIONS CONTROL CNSS876103 Enclosure 4 as of 14 TEMPORARY MODIFICATION SHEET

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MECHANICAL JUMPER TAG FROM TO l MATERIAL, SIZE. TYPE NUMBER LOCATION l LINE/ VALVE LOCATION i LINE/ VALVE CONNECTION, PRESS RATING l MS-HO-BV3 T-903-S j Hydraulic N/A N/A Close the valve. l isolation I

Valve 1

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. 1 BLANK FLANGE TAG LINE/

NUMBER LOCATION RD10VED/

SYSTEM L MATERIAL, SI7.E. TYPE INSTALLED I I

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,0ther Temporary Modification:

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Requested By: (bM4h k Date: 7- 2 /~ b7

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h SAFETY EV LUATION Required: @ Yes No The safety evaluation for the temporary modification (s) will be fulfilled by completing a safety evaluation per CNS Engineering Procedure 3.3, Station Safety Evaluations. The completed evaluation is to be attached to this Temporary Modification Sheet.

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.'rocedure Number _ 2.0.7 Date o - U - 9 f, Revision 2 Page 2 Of 3 Pages

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• ATTAC101EUT "A" CONDUCT OF OPEPITIONS PROCEDURE 2.0.7 PLANT TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS CONTROL CNSS8?6103 Enclosure 4 '

Pag of 14 "

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TEMPORARY MODIFICATION SHEET INSTALLATION S0RC Approval Required: @ Yes O No

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.,. -SORC INITIALS - ~~~'-DATE"--- --INITIALS --DATE

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1NITIALS DATE Am -

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' SORC Approval-Received (If Required): - ---

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/ Shift Su'pervisor 's Initials

, i Shift Supervisor Approval: )/ [k Date: 6 - 2 / -J')

Inst 1 d By: W_ p-g -

Date: R-7 I-El Verified By: u _ - - -

Date [*e9/-7 7

_ RESTORATION

- - - . Shift Supervisor Approval:

Date:

Restored By: 1 Date: ,!

Verified By:

Date:

Con:=ents: ,_

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?rocedure Number 2.0.7 Date 9 R /,

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Revision 2 Page 3 Of 3 PaSes!

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ATThCH21ENT "C" .ws . i v.. o . m.. u n o CONDUCT QF OPERATIONS PROCEDURE 2.0.7 \

PLANT TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS CONTROL l CNSS876103 Enclosure 4 Pag of 14 TEMPORARY MODIFICATION TECHNICAL REVIEW

( {4 TECHNICAL REVIEW YES NO 1.

Will the TM (including components, connections, and terminations) be inconsistent with design inputs such as pressure, temperature, fluid chemistry, voltage, current, material compatibility, or seismic, vind, thermal, and dynamic loading? X 2.

Could the TM possibily alter the environmental qualification of any safety-related component?

X 3.

Could system?

the TM increase the loading of a safety-related electrical X 4 4 \

Will the TM involve the pressure-retaining features of any code t

' Class 1, 2, or 3 components? -

J

_ .. X 5.

Will relatedthecomponent TM alter the performance characteristics of any safety-or system? i X  !

6.

- Will the TM be made to a safety actuation system within the .

isolation output buffers' of the ' system? - '-

X 7.

Could the TM or its failure affect more than one train of components (including separation criteria and common mode failure)?

X 8.

Will the TM create a condition beyond those conditions assumed in the fire hazards analysis?

X 9.

Will damage? the TM increase the potential for personnel or equipment X

10.

Is the ability of operators to control or monitor the plant or system significantly reduced?

j (Take credit for increased surveillance due to the TM.) X 11.

Will the TM create radioactivity? ~~ ~or

~~ increase the levels of radiation or airborne

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X 1

l If any are required. marked yes, a written technical review by the Technical Departmentis or show sketch (Useofcontinuation TM.): sheets if necessary to adequately describe the basis Engineering: , tw #

Date:

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?rocedure Number 2.0.7 Date Q - u _ 9 /,,

Revision 2 Page _ 1 Of 1 Pages I

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CNSS876103 '

. _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ , , , PTM 87- _

Enclosure 4 Page 5 of 14 SAFETY ANALYSIS I. PURPOSE C This PTM requires the closure of the hydraulic oil isolation valve on MS-H0-BV3. The hydraulic control unit of MS-HO-BV3 is currently I leaking DEH oil and needs to be isolated to evaluate repair of this )

leakage. Closure of the isolation valve will isolate DEH oil from j Bypass Valve #3 (BPV-3) and prevent the valve from opening during ,

normal or emergency conditions. I This safety analysis will address the consequences of BPV operation I with MS-HOV-BV3 closed during normal and transient conditions.

l II. SYSTEMS'AFFECTED A. The Turbine Bypass System is affected by this Temporary Modification.

B. 1) Westinghouse Drawing 721J120 identifies the isolation valve on MS-HO-BV3 to be closed.

2) Burns and Roe Drawing 2002 identifies BPV-3. l l C. Documents describing the Turbine Bypass System is as follows:

]

l USAR Volume IV,Section XI 5.0. I l

USAR Volume V, Sec' tion XIV 5.1.11, 5.1.2.1, 5.1.6 Technical Specification 1.1 Technical Specification 3.1 (Page 41) l III. EFFECTS ON SAFETY A. The USAR references listed above describe the system affect and do not indicate that the BPVs have a Safety Design Basis. l However, the failure of Bypass Valves during specific l transients is considered severe and these tranwients are thus '

analyzed to evaluate the ability of the plant to operate without undue hazard to the health and safety of the public.

B. Three abnormal operational transients involving Bypass Valve l Failure are discussed in the USAR Volume V,Section XIV 5.1.1, l

" Generator Load Reject Without Bypass", 5.1.2, " Turbine Trip 1

Without Bypass", and 5.1.6, "Feedwater Controller Failure". l

1. The Turbine Bypass System is designed to control reactor pressure: (1) during reactor heatup to rated pressure, (2) while the turbine is brought up to speed and synchronized, (3) during power operation when the reactor steam generation exceeds the transient turbine steam requirements and limitations, and (4) when cooling down

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.I the reactor. 1 l

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. i CNSS876'103 l Enclosure 4 ,

PTM 87- I P:ge 6 of 14

2. The Turbine Bypass System capacity is based on 25% of the l turbine design flow.

( 3. Additional consideration is the feedwater controller failure underwhich credit is taken for BPV operation.

However, based on the attached General Electric Technical l

Evaluation, maintaining the operating MCPR 2,1.35 will D gjg ll provide sufficient margin for all previously evaluated CNS abnormal operational transients.

C. Isolation of BPV-3 will affect B.1 and B.2 above and limit total BPV capacity, but has no effect on natural phenomena, ]

such as seismic classification, E.Q., HELB, etc. j The pressure control design function is affected in that only two valves will provide the pressure control capability while l

the third valve is isolated.

D. The isolation of BPV #3 will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the USAR.

The evaluation in the USAR assumes; "The turbine bypass valve 1 system is failed in the closed position". (reference to USAR Volume V,Section XIV 5.1.11(5) and 5.1.2.1). Only one BPV will be isolated and the remaining two BPVs will be in normal operating status fully capable of normal operation in emergency or transient conditions.

( E. The activity will not create a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different' type than previously evaluated in the USAR.

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Load Reject without Bypass Transient has been fully evaluated l and analyzed in the USAR and is a more severe transient then a scram with one BPV isolated. Thus, this PTM is fully bounded l by the Load Reject Without Bypass and no new accident or  ;

malfunction is created.

l Feedwater controller failure has been evaluated by General [g2,<yh Electric and limiting MCPR,2,1.35 will not create a possibility

_. - for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the USAR.

F. This activity does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification or violate any Technical Specification. Generator load reject and turbine trip without bypass valve operation results in MCPR limits as defined in the USAR Volume V,Section XIV 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 and i the General Electric Report #23A4781, " Supplemental Reload '

Licensing Submittal", dated May, 1986.

The required operating limit MCPR's at steady state operating conditions as specified in Technical Specification 3.11C are derived from the established fuel cladding integrity Safety

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Limit and an analysis of abnormal operational transients (G.E. Report #23A4781). For any abnormal operating transient 2 of 3 c_. _ _ . _ _ - _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ -

'ONSS87.6103 Enclos'ure 4 '

Page 7 of 14, PTM 87-analysis evaluation with the initial condition of the reactor being at the steady state operating limit it is required that the resulting MCPR does not decrease below the Safety Limit

( MCPR at any time during the transient assuming instrument trip setting given in Technical Specification 2.1.

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To assure'that the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is not exceeded during any anticipated abnormal operational transient, the more limiting transients have been analyzed to determine l which results in the largest reduction in critical power ratio j (CPR).  !

The above licensing submittal indicates the fuel cladding Safety Limit is not exceeded on load reject with bypass. It is thus concluded the isolation of only one valve (BPV-3) with the ,

other two remaining bypass valves operable, will not result in i a safety limit violation.

I G. This change is only temporary and will thus not require a permanent change to the USAR.

IV.

SUMMARY

i This PTM will close the hydraulic oil supply to MS-HO-BV3 and will result in the isolation of BPV-3 during normal and emergency operation of the plant.

The safety analysis concludes that this PTM does not constitute an unreviewed safety question and does not require Technical C Specification change. 1 l

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