ML20236R226

Insp Rept 70-7001/98-12 on 980622-26.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operation,Maint & Surveillance & Plant Support

ML20236R226
Person / Time
Site:	07007001
Issue date:	07/14/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236R216	List: ML20236R214 ML20236R226
References
70-7001-98-12, NUDOCS 9807210308
Download: ML20236R226 (10)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lil Docket No: 70-7001 Certificate No: GDP-1 Report No: 70-7001/98012(DNMS)

Facility Operator: United States Enrichment Corporation Facility Name: Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Location: 5600 Hoobs Road P.O. Box 1410 Paducah, KY 42001 Dates: June 22 - 26,1998 Inspector- R. G. Krsek, Fuel Cycle Safety inspector {

l Approved By: Patrick L. Hiland, Chief Fuel Cycle Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety 9907210308 980714 PDR ADOCK 07007001 PDR l

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f EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

United States Enrichment Corporation Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant NRC inspection Report 70-7001/98012(DNMS)

Operations

. The inspector determined that the plant staff's response to two off normal events was in accordance with the appropriate procedures and management expectations. The l

inspector noted good communications among plant staff, effective management control l

i by the plant shift superintendent and other operations staff, and an effective use of off-normal response procedures (Section 01.1) l Maintenance and Surveillance

. The inspector reviewed some recent Building C-315 related Technical Safety Requirement and procedural aurveillances and determined that the surveillance were adequately implemented. In addition, the inspector noted no concems with the implementation of actions contained in a Confirmatory Order recently issued to the plant by the NRC. (Section M1.1)

Plant Support

. The inspector noted fire services emergency equipment inventories were well maintained and that fire services personnel performed the required equipment inventory surveillance. (Section P2.1)

. The inspector noted that the criticality accident alarm system assembly area signs were properly posted on the entrances of specific buildings onsite with the correct assembly point area information. However, the inspector identified a violation of minor significance, in that, the Site Access Handbook and General Employee Training Study Guide were not revised to reflect changes made in April 1998 to the criticality accident alarm system assembly point area list. (Section P3.1)

. The inspector noted no concems with E-Squad member training and concluded that an adequate program was implemented and tracked by emergency preparedness staff.

(Section PS.1) 2

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Report Details I. Operations 01 Conduct of Operat'ans 01.1 Operations Response to Off-Normal Events l a. Inspection Scope (Tl 2600/003)

The inspector observed the operations staff response to two off-normal events during the i

course of the inspection. The first off-normal event involved a Building C-360 overhead crane that failed to operate with a suspended load (solid uranium hexafluoride (UFe) cylinder). The second off-normal event involved the immediate shutdown of several cascade units in response to an unplanned loss of offsite power availability.

b. Observations and Findinas On June 23, the plant shift superintenderit's (PSS) notified the inspector that a solid UFe cylinder was suspended in the Building C-360 cylinder yard. The inspector arrived on the scene shortly after the assistant plant shift superintendent (APSS). The inspector observed the Building C-360 operations staff brief the APSS as to the sequence of events that preceded the current situation. The operations staff indicated that while lowering a solid UF, onto a flat bed trailer with the west overhead crane, the crane suddenly stopped operation with the load suspended approximately two feet above an empty section of the trailer. Once the load crane stopped working, operations staff immediately de-energized the crane and notified the building and front-line managers of the situation.

Subsequently, the APSS directed the building staff to rope-off the area around the overhead crane and trailer. The APSS also notified the systems engineer and the crane l maintenance staff of the off-normal event and discussed the incident with the cognizant i operations staff.

Based upon an initial review of the situation, the systems engineer noted that the mechanical continuity monitor (MCM) lights had not illuminated during the initial operations evolution. The systems engineer, crane maintenance staff and the APSS discussed and planned actions to gather further information from the MCM alarm box, located on the overhead crane, in an attempt to determine the cause for the cylinder hang-up. The inspector noted that the APSS focused on safety-related issues during the planning of a course of action, the systems engineer utilized the proper fall restraint system during execution, and that the APSS implemented the required actions of the procedure during the execution of planned actions. Upon retrieving the data from the MCM alarm box and following staff discussions regarding the possible causes of the cylinder hang up, the crane safety systems were reset and the solid UF cylinder was safely lowered onto the trailer. Upon restoring the system to a safe condition, the west crane was declared inoperable and tagged out in accordance with plant procedures. The inspector noted during the entire evolution that the required steps of Procedure CP4-CO-ON3021,

• Operations Overhead Crane Failure to Operate," were implemented. In addition, the APSS, systems engineer, and operations and crane maintenance staff responded rapidly and remained focused on safety throughout the 3

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l entire event. At the end of the inspection, the exact cause of the failure was still unknown; however, the systems engineer indicated that one of two probable causes was suspected and that the event investigation would determine the root cause of the event.

l The plant also experienced a severe power shortage due to a decrease in the availability cf offsite power. As a result, on June 25, the cascade coordinator directed that several units in the cascade be immediately shutdown, in order to decrease the total onsite power i

consumption to 450 megawatts. (This was the second time, since the plant began I

operation in 1952, that total onsite power consumption was dropped to 450 megawatts.)

The inspector was in the Building C-337 Area Control Room (ACR) when the cascade controller requested that operations immediately shutdown Unit 2 in Building C-337 and observed the evolution. Procedure CP4-CO-ON3023, " Power Load Reduction," specified the required actions to be taken to immediately shutdown an operating unit. The inspector noted that operations staff communicated effectively during the evolution, performed all the required actions of Procedure CP4-CO-ON3023, and subsequently initiated the actions of the procedure for a unit isolation and evacuation as required. The inspector later followed-up and noted that ACR operations staff recorded the cell pressure, temperature and coolant temperature readings hourly in the ACR log as required. In addition, ACR operations staff h3d documented the manually initiated cell trips and isolation as required by Procedure CP4-CO-CN6078, " Technical Safety Requirement Surveillance - ACR Motor Stop Button and Cell Valve Operation."

c. Conclusions The inspector determined that the plant staff's response to two off-normal events was in accordance with the appropriate procedures and management expectations. The inspector noted good communications among plant staff, effective management control by the plant shift superintendent and other operations staff, and an effective use of off-normal response procedures.

II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance and Surveillance Activities M1.1 Review of Routine Technical Safety Requirement Surveillance in Buildina C-315

a. Inspection Scope (88025)

The inspector reviewed the implementation of several Technical Safety Requirement and procedural surveillance required for the tails withdrawal operations in Building C-315. In l addition, the inspector reviewed the implementation of actions contained in a l Confirmatory Order issued by the NRC to the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, as a l result of seismic concems with the liquid UF, accumulators in Building C-315. The  ;

inspection consisted of observations of ongoing ACR activities, interviews with operations staff and reviews of surveillance records.

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b. Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed the implementation of Surveillance Requirements 2.3.4.1,2.3.4.2, 2.3.4.4, and 2.3.4.5 of the Technical Safety Requirements, for the low and high voltage UF, detection systems. The inspector reviewed the past two quarterly surveillance for randomly selected UF, detectors in Building C-315, and reviewed Procedures CP4-CO-CN6040c, " Technical Safety Requirement Surveillance - Low Voltage UF Detection Systems Test for C-310 and C-315," and CP4-CO-CN6020s, " Technical Safety Requirement Surveillance - Quarterly Testing of PYR-A-l. ARM Type 1, High Voltage UFe Detection Systems in C-310, C-310A, and C-315," with operations staff. The inspector noted no concems in the review of the procedure, end noted that the surveillance were performed within the required time period for the UF, detectors reviewed. The inspector also noted that the twice-a-shift surveillance required by Technical Safety Requirement 2.3.4.4 for the high voltage UF detectors, was also performed as required.

The inspector observed the performance of this surveillance by operations staff and no concems were identified. The quarterly crane emergency shutdown button test, required by Procedure CP4-CO-CA2004, for overhead cranes used to handle liquid UF, was also reviewed and no concems were identified.

Finally the inspector verified the actions required in a Confirmatory Order issued by the NRC to the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant for seismic concems associated with the liquid UF, accumulators in Building C-315 were implemented. The inspector noted that the required actions were implemented by operations staff through Long-Term Order No.98-004, Revision 6. Operations staff were readily knowledgeable of the requirements of the Order, and the inspector noted adequate implementation of the Order during the observation of ACR activities.

c. Conclusions The inspector reviewed some recent Building C-315 related Technical Safety Requirement and procedural surveillance and determined that the surveillance were adequately implemented. In addition, the inspector noted no concems with the implementation of actions contained in a Confirmatory Order recently issued to the plant by the NRC.

IV. Plant Support P2 Status of Emerge ncy Preparedness Facilities, Equipment, and Resources I P2.1 Feview of Fire Services Emeroency Preparedness Eauipment and Routine Surveillance

a. Inspection Scope (88050)

The status of emergency equipment and supplies were reviewed for the Fire Services Department at the plant. The inspector reviewed the emergency equipment which was i available, interviewed fire services staff, and toured the fire services facilities. l l

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b. Observations and Findinas Procedure CP2-EP-EP5053,

• Maintenance of Emergency Facilities and Equipment,"

prescribed the minimum inventories required for emergency equipment onsite, and the content and frequency of routine audits of emergency equipment. The inspector reviewed selected aspects of the current equipment inventories for Squads 1 and 2 of the Fire Services Department and noted that the minimum required inventories were present.

The quarterly inventones of the Fire Services Equipment were noted as complete, as well as the required inventory checks of emergency equipment after each use of the emergency vehicles. No concerns were noted by the inspector.

The inspector also noted that all radiological instrumentation was functionally tested and within the required calibration frequency. Fire services staff were also interviewed regarding precautionary measures which would be taken in the event that an injured, radiologically contaminated employee needed offsite medical attention. Contingencies were in place for such an event, and fire services staff were knowledgeable of the required actions.

c. Conclusions The inspector noted fire services emergency equipment inventories were well maintained and that fire services personnel performed the required equipment inventory surveillance.

P3 Emergency Preparedness Procedures and Documentation P3.1 Criticality and Radiation Emeraency Assembfv Points

a. Inspection Scope (88050)

The inspector reviewed the directions for plant staff's response to an unplanned criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) activation. The inspection consisted of reviews of applicable documents and procedures, verification of required assembly point signs, and interviews with emergency preparedness and operations staff.

b. Observations and Findinas Procedure CP2-EP-EP5038, ' Criticality and Radiation Emergencies," prescribed the actions plant staff were required to take in the event of a CAAS activation. Upon activation of the CAAS, plant staff were required to immediately evacuate an area according to the specific building action plan and proceed to designated assembly points, as identified in Appendix B of Procedure CP2-EP-EP5038. Signs documenting the assembly points for a specific building were required to be posted on the access doors to the specific building. The inspector conducted a random sampling of assembly point signs posted on building entrances during the course of the inspection. No con 7ms were identified, and the inspector noted that the assembly point signs on building l entrances were present and consistent with the assembly point location information in Procedure CP2-EP-EP5038. The inspector also determined through interviews, that plant staff were knowledgeable of the assigned assembly point location.

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The inspector then reviewed the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Site Access Orientation Handbook, and General Employee Training (GET) Study Guide. The Plant Access Orientation Handbook was required to be read by all visitors entering the plant, and GET was required for all employees upon initiation of employment and e /ery 24 months thereafter for the duration of employment. Both documents provided the Paducah Plant assembly point list (Appendix B of Procedure CP2-EP-EP5038) for the visitor's and employee's review and use; however, the inspector noted that the assembly I

point list was not consisbr.t with Revision G of Procedure CP2-EP-EP5038, last revised I

on April 23,1998. The emergency preparedness manager took immediate action to correct the issue through notification of a modification to the training organization. The training organization was responsible for the coordination and upkeep of both the Site Access Handbook, and GET Study Guide. In discussions with the training manager, the inspector noted that a process existed for other organizations to notify training when procedural or policy changes required the revision of either the handbook or study guide; however, such a process did not exist for the emergency preparedness program. The training manager also initiated actions during the inspection to further investi0 ate and enhance the effectiveness of the process surrounding the upkeep and revision of the handbook and study guide. The inspector also noted that the issue of the upkeep and revision of the handbook and study guide were previously raised (not regarding the specific issue identified during this inspection) during the NRC observation period, prior to NRC assuming regulatory oversight of the plant on March 3,1997. Criterion 5 of the Quality Assurance Program requires the certificate to maintain procedures including the Site Access Orientation Handbook, and General Employee Training Guide current. f The failure to revise the Site Access Handbook and GET Study Guide to reflect the most current revision of the assembly point list contained in Appendix B of Procedure CP2-EP-EP5038 is a Violation of Minor Significance not subject to formal enforcement action, consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NUREG-1600, Revision 1). (CER 70-7001/98012-01)

c. Conclusions The inspector noted that CAAS assembly area signs were properly posted on the l entrances of specific buildings onsite with the correct assembly point area information.

However. the inspector identified a minor violation, in that, the Site Access Handbook and GET Study Guide were not revised to reflect changes made in April 1998 to the CAAS assembly point area list.

P5.0 Staff Training and Qualification in Emergency Preparedness P5.1 Mandatory Trainina for Members of the Plant Emeraency Sauad

a. Inspection Scope (88050 and 88010)

The inspector reviewed selected aspects of the training program for Emergency Squad (E-Squad) members through document reviews and interviews with members of the plant E-Squad.

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b Observations and Findinas The inspector reviewed the training requirements for staff assigned to the plant's Local and Plant E-Squads. The minimum training requirements and a training matrix for E-Squad members was documented in Procedure CP2-EP-EP5051, " Emergency Response Training." Interviews with emergency preparedness staff revealed that emergency preparedness and response training was primarily tracked and coordinated through the emergency preparedness organization, independent of the training organization onsite. The Plant E-Squad was divided into seven major categories of responsibilities which included the following: incident commanders; safety officers; production supervisors; production nonsupervisors; health physics / industrial hygiene; fire operations; and, police operations. Plant E-Squad teams were composed of individuals from respective shifts, and inspector verified contingency plans were in place in the event of multiple E-Squad activations within the same given time period. Local E-Squad members were trained on localized protective action procedures, the use of fire extinguishers, and support of the Plant E-Squad.

The inspector reviewed training records for randomly selected incident commanders, production supervisors, production nonsupervisors, and fire services staff. In addition, Plant E-Squad staff were interviewed about Plant E-Squad training received. Plant staff interviewed were knowledgeable of the responsibilities pertinent to the respective position on the Plant E-Squad, and no concems were identified with the training.

c. Conclusions 1 l

The inspector noted no concems with E-Squad member training and concluded that an adequate program was implemented and tracked by emergency preparedness staff.

V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of the plant staff and management at the conclusion of the inspections on June 26,1998. Plant staff acknowledged the findings presented at the meeting. The inspector asked the plant staff whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Lockheed Martin Utility Services A. Canterbury, Maintenance Manager S. Childers, Production Support Manager L. Jackson, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Manager S. Penrod, Enrichment Plant Manager H. Pulley, Plant General Manager l R. Starkey, Training Manager R. Wright, Emergency Management Manager United States Enrichment Corporation J. Labarraque, Safety, Safeguards and Quality Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED Tl 2600/003: Operational Safety Review IP 88010: Operator Training and Re-Training IP 88025 : Maintenana and Surveillance Testing IP 88050: Emergency Preparedness ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED Opened None Closed CER 70-7001/98012-01 Minor violation conceming update of site access and GET guide for CAAS assembly point information Discussed None 9

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ACR Area Control Room APSS Assistant Plant Shift Superintendent CAAS Criticality Accident Alarm System CFR Code of Federal Regulations DNMS Division of Nuclear Materials Safety E-Squad Emergency Squad GET General Employee Training MCM Mechanical Continuity Monitor NMSS Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PSS Plant Shift Supervisor UF. Uranium Hexafluoride USEC United States Enrichment Corporation i

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