ML20217D907

Insp Rept 70-7001/98-08 on 980331-0402.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Evaluation of Certificatee Performance During Plant Biennial Exercise of Emergency Plan

ML20217D907
Person / Time
Site:	07007001
Issue date:	04/22/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20217D892	List: ML20217D888 ML20217D907
References
70-7001-98-08, 70-7001-98-8, NUDOCS 9804270135
Download: ML20217D907 (13)

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l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lli e Docket No: 70-7001 Certificate No: GDP-1 Inspection Report: 70-7001/98008(DRS)

Facility Operator: United States Enrichment Corporation Facility Name: Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Location: 5600 Hobbs Road P.O. Box 1410 Paducah, KY 42001 Dates: March 31 - April 2,1998 Inspectors: J. Foster, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Analyst T. Ploski, Emergency Response Coordinator R. Jickling, Emergency Prc aredness Analyst D. Funk, Emergency Prepa;edness Analyst R. Castaneira, Physical Security Specialist Approved By: James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety 9804270135 980422 PDR C

ADOCK 07007001 PDR

l EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

United States Enrichment Corporation Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant NRC inspection Report 70-7001/98008(DRS)

This inspection consisteo of evaluation of the certificatee's performance during the plant's biennial exercise of their Emergency Plan. The inspection was conducted by regional emergency preparedness inspectors and a Headquarters inspector. No violations of NRC requirements were identified.

l Plant Suocort l Overall performance during the 1998 Emergency Preparedness exercise demonstrated that the onsite Emergency Plan (EP) was effective and the certificatee's staff was capable of implementing the EP by co.rectly classifying scenario emergencies, notifying offsite agencies of the classified event, activating emergency response personnel and facilities, providing protective action recommendations when warranted, and taking accident mitigation actions.

• Overall performance by Plant Control Facility (PCF) staff was very effective. Accident information was quickly passed to the PCF, and incident Commanders (ICs) rapidly responded to both accident scenes as they occurred. The scenario events were properly classified, and notifications made in a timely manner. The emergency response organization was promptly activated. The PCF handled two simultaneous I events well. (Section P4.b.1.1) e Command anc' control at the Building C-360 accident scene by an IC and Fire Captain was effective and on scene activities were well coordinated. Excellent teamwork was demonstrated among the response team members. (Section P4.b.2.1) e The USEC Emergency Operations Center (Bethesda, MD) staff properly and promptly responded to the simulated events, actively supporting plant efforts. There was good, continuous communication and information flow. (Section P4.b.3.1)

! e The onsite Emergency Operations Center management and staff performed well,

! appropriately responding to two simultaneous accidents, evaluating their impacts, and communicating with offsite authorities. (Section P4.b.4.1)

• The response teams, including medical responders, inplant response teams and firefighting personnel, performed very well. Their actions were well coordinated.

(Section P4.b.5.1) e Plant staff critiques were considered effective. (Section P4.b.6.1) e The scenario was challenging, with two simultaneous events and a uranium hexafluoride release. Very little simulation of activities was observed. No controller conduct problems were observed. (Section P4.b.7.1) 2

i Report Detalis 4 IV. Plant Support ,

P3 Emergency Preparedness Procedures and Documentation l

l P3,1 Review of Exercise Obiectives and Scenario (82302. 88050) 1 The inspectors reviewed the 1998 exercise objectives and scenario and determined that they acceptably exercised major elements of the certificatee's onsite emergency plan.

The scenario provided an adequately challenging framework to support demonstration of the certificatee's capabilities to implement its Emergency Plan. The scenario included I two simultaneous accidents, a large uranium hexafluoride (UF.) release and a fire with i multiple injured personnel at two accident scenes.

P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness P4.1 1998 Evaluated Biennial Emeraency Precaredness Exercise

a. Insoection Scoce (82301. 88050) l l

On April 1,1998, the certificatee conducted a biennial emergency preparedness exercise involving partial State participation and partial county participation. The onsite emergency response organization and emergency response facility were fully activated.

1 The inspectors evaluated performance of emergency response personnel in the following areas:

i e Plant Control Facility (PCF) e Incident Commander (IC) and Command Post (CP) e Onsite Emergency Operations Center (EOC) e U.S. Enrichment Corp. Emergency Operations Center (Bethesda) (USEC EOC) e Field Response Teams The inspectors assessed the certificatee's recognition of abnormal plant conditions, classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of protective action recommendations, command and control, communications, conduct of field response teams, and overallimplementation of the Emergency Plan and procedures. In addition, the inspectors attended the post exercise critiques in each of these areas, to evaluate the self-assessment of exercise performance.

b. Emergency Resoonse Facility Observations and Findings b.1 Plant Control Facility (PCF)

Promptly after receiving a report of a uranium hexafluoride (UF.) release at Building C-360, an cperator in the PCF sounded the plant alarm and made a Public Address (PA) 3

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I announcement to dispatch emergency response organization personnel to the accident scene. The PA announcement properly included wind speed and direction information to aid the incident Commander (IC)in determining where to establish an upwind, on scene command post.

Within five minutes of arrival at the accident scene, the IC reported to the PCF staff that he was declaring a Site Area Emergency, making a Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) to advise persons within the plant's immediate Notification Zone (INZ) to perform in place sheltering, and ordering in place sheltering of personnel within nearby Building C-755. These decisions were procedurally correct and timely.

PCF operators provided valuable support to the IC by simulating the activation of the INZ's siren system, contacting appropriate offsite agencies responsible for oroadcasting the related Emergency Alerting System message, activating key responders' pagers in order to staff the onsite Emergency Operations Center (EOC), and by making follow up PA announcements as requested. Initial plant PA announcements associated with the Site Area Emergency declaration failed to include a reason for the declaration, as this was not required by procedure. Including this information will prevent individuals from contacting the PCF and distracting response efforts.

The PCF's Cascade Coordinator completed sufficiently detailed, initial notification messages to McCracken County, Commonwealth of Kentucky, and the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Oak Ridge Operations Office officials within the required 15 minutes of the Site Area Emergency declaration. Initici notifications to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the National Response Center, and the United States Enrichment Corporation's (USEC's) Headquarters were completed well within the 60 minute time limit.

While the response to the UF release was ongoing, PCF operators received initial reports of an unrelated explosion and fire within an onsite switchyard that involved injuries to several plant personnel. While a second IC and response personnel responded to the switchyard, requests were made for fire fighting and ambulance support from offsite agencies. PCF staff also began assessing the impact of the electrical power loss on variaus plant systems. As the scenario progressed, the EOC Director and an Assistant Plant Shift Superintendent often moved between the PCF and the adjacent EOC to facilitate information flow.

b.1.1 Conclusions Overall PCF performance was very effective. Accident information was quickly passed to the PCF, and ICs rapidly responded to both accident scenes as they occurred. The UF, release event was properly classified, and emergency notifications were made in a timely manner. The emergency response organization was promptly activated. The PCF handled two simultaneous events well.

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b.2 Incident Comman. der (IC) and Command Post (CP)

Response to the Building C-360 scene by the IC was rapid and effective. The IC received a report en route to the scene, from the Building C-360 Manager, that everyone had been evacuated from the building. The CP location was suitably established upwind of the UF release and a decontumination line was approprbtely setup for access to the building. Procedures were correctly used by the IC to declare the Site Area Emergency after evaluation of simulated emergency conditions.

The IC used radios to communicate information to the EOC's Crisis Manager during response to the emergency. Command and control of the scene by the Fire Captain was effective and he provided the IC with prompt, accurate, and concise information regarding current response activities. Effective communications by the response personnel included repeat-backs and acknowledgments.

Appropriate monitoring of the area, using survey meters, Drager tubes, and air samplers was observed by the inspectors. Emergency information was reported to the IC, who then effectively relayed the information to the EOC. An initial briefing was provided to the entry team and backup team prior to their dispatch. The briefing was appropriately detailed and included response priorities, personnel safety concerns, directions for patching the damaged UF cylinder, and instructions to search for personnelin the building who might not have evacuated.

When advised of the report of an explosion and fire at Switchyard C-531, the IC appropriately retained responsibility for the cylinder leak at Building C-360. Emergency response was effectively split, with the Safety Officer becoming the second IC at the switchyard scene. Sufficient personnel and equipment resources were retained for emergency response at Building C-360.

The NRC resident inspector arrived at the Building C-360 CP approximately four minutes after the IC arrived. The IC provided the resident inspector with a briefing on response activities and answered questions posed by the resident inspector.

Security Police Operations effectively coordinated with the IC at the Building C-360 scene. Access was controlled to both the immediate and downwind areas. Health Physics continuously monitored the CP for contamination.

The IC maintained a good overall picture of the emergency response at Building C-360.

After receiving the report that the cylinder leak was terminated, appropriate surveys of the building and area were requested. Equipment and personnel were made available for response to the C-531 Switchyard fire when it was determined the Building C-360 release had been halted and areas outside the building were not contaminated.

The inspectors observed good teamwork among the entry teams, Fire Captain, security officers, Safety Officer, and the IC. Communications were effective and repeat-backs and acknowledgments were used by the IC during radio and cellular phone communications. Response personnel demonstrated a crisp, professional response.

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i b.2.1 Conclusions l Command and control of the Building C-360 accident scene by the IC and Fire Captain was effective and activities were well coordinated. Excellent teamwork was demonstrated among the response team members.

l b.3 United States Enrichment Corooration Emeraency Ooerations Center (USEC EOC)

The USEC EOC is located at the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC) headquarters in l Bethesda, Maryland. The purpose of the facility is to provide support should an accident occur at any USEC facility.

l The Corporations communicator notified the on-duty officer of the decir.md Site Area Emergency at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) and that P . EOC had been activated. The USEC PA system was inoperative and individuo were notified by phone to report to the EOC. The facility was efficiently activated after the Duty Officer called individuals into the USEC EOC.

l The on duty officer assured the USEC EOC was properly equipped, procedures were in l appropriate notebooks, everyone responding signed in, and assured the USEC EOC was correctly staffed. The Technical Srpport Coordinator stayed online with PGDP during the event and was kept current on emergency events as they were occurring. On occasion, the Emergency Coordinator asked the Technical Support Coordinator for a summary of the event, for the benefit of the entire USEC EOC. The status board was kept updated on the event. There was good continuous communication and information l flow.

I USEC personnel asked PGDP personnel questions regarding the UF release and  ?

related plume information. They were also asked if confirmation had been made of any re! ease offsite.

NRC, the Department of Energy and appropriate state and local officials were notified of l the emergency. A list was maintained on a board of which agencies had been notified.

Press releases were released periodically. Public affairs personnel, in conjunction with site Public Information Officers, kept the media notified.

b.3.1 Conclusions USEC EOC staff properly and promptly responded to the simulated events, actively supporting plant efforts. There was good, continuous communication and information flow.

b.4 Emeroency Ooerations Center (EOC)

The Crisis Manager (CM), EOC Cadre, and other EOC staff successfully demonstrated their capabilities to effectively respond to two serious, unrelated emergencies that began within 20 minutes of each other. The EOC was sufficiently staffed, within approximately 6

15 minutes of the Site Area Emergency declaration, so that the CM could declare this facility operational and ready to support the ICs already controlling responses at both i accident scenes. {

Throughout the exercise, the CM demonstrated very effective command 3 nd control of (

the activities of EOC personnel. The CM, Assistant CM (ACM), and Strategist j frequently met to confer on current issues, to prioritize tasks, and to develop and '

manage the evolving accident mitigation strategies as new information became available from the ICs.

The CM, ACM, and Strategist benefitted from having EOC status boards that were maintained ir a timely, accurate, and detailed manner. Valuable status board information included: major events; higher priority tasks and their completion status; j status of accident victims; equipment affected by the loss of power; status of the UF. i release; status of onsite protective actions; status of required initial and follow-up )

notifications to offsite agencies. Chemical plume model projections and their related modeling assumptions were also centrally posted. This status board information was readily visible to the EOC Cadre and to personnel maintaining open line communications with the NRC's Operations Center and DOE's Oak Ridge Office's response center. The CM supplemented the status boards'information with accurate and concise update briefings at 20 minute intervals. Inputs for the briefings were requested from the Cadre.

The fire in Switchyard C-531 caused power losses or degradations to several onsite areas and plant systems. The CM conservatively ordered a " site wide" accountability of all onsite personnel to better ensure their safety as a result of the power losses. The EOC Director kept the CM informed of the status of completion of the accountability process. Plant PA announcements made by a PCF operator were effective in reducing the small number of apparently missing personnel. 'Ihe CM was informed that all onsite personnel were successfully accounted for whNo 30 minutes of the decision to implement this prudent protective action.

The initial chemical plume projection was conservatively assumed to be an instantaneous release from a 14 ton heated cylinder of UF . As further information became available from the IC at the Building C-360 accident scene, the subsequent  ;

plume projection was revised to be based on a maximum release duration of 60  ;

minutes. Late in the exercise, initial field monitoring reports of the plume's postulated l impact were posted on the status board, which depicted the plume's projected impact area to facilitate assessment of projected versus measured impact data.

The CM maintained "as needed" communications with the ICs at both the Building C-360 and the Switchyard C-531 accident scenes to share information and information needs, which included requests for additional support from offsite organizations. The CM, Public Affairs Officer, and other EOC Cadre members demonstrated proper sensitivity for ensuring that the relatives of all accident victims had been notified before detailed information on the victims' status was made available to the media.

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A dedicated communicator maintained an "open line" with the NRC's Operations Center following a request to do so. This communicator provided detailed information based on status board entries, the CM's periodic briefings, and responded to questions posed by the NRC Operations Center's communicator. An Event Historian generated an "EOC Log" based on the status boards and briefings and transmitted the "EOC Log" to preplanned offsite locations.

Public Information Officers (PlOs)in the EOC developed several press releases, which the CM and USEC EOC staff approved during the exercise. The EOC's PIOS also maintained communications with counterparts in the Joint Public Information Center, located at the Information Age Park in Paducah, Kentucky, and in the USEC EOC.

The press releases contained accurate information with two minor exceptions. The time of the erplosion and fire in the switchyard was incorrectly stated as 9:15 a.m. rather than 8:50 a.m. The switchyard was incorrectly identified as a building. The second press release also did not indicate that the accident in Switchyard C-531 was unrelated to the earlier accident at Building C-360.

Once the CM received verification that there was no further potential for a UF, release and that the fire in the switchyard was extinguished, the CM, ACM, and Strategist focused more attention on transitionir.g from responding to a Site Area Emergency situation to initiating onsite Recovery Phase activities. Per procedure, the CM solicited and soon obtained concurrences from County staff, Commonwealth of Kentucky officials, and DOE officials before entering the onsite Recovery Phase. The need for the DOE's concurrence was unclear since the toxic chemical rdense originated in a plant area that was regulated by the NRC.

The ACM was appointed as the Recovery Manager (RM). The RM used the EOC's PA system to broadcast an acceptably detailed list of major onsite recovery tasks and the name of the individual appointed as the lead for each major task. The exercise was terminated before this initial onsite recovery strategy was shared with offsite groups.

b.4.1 Conclusions EOC management and staff performed well, appropriately responding to two simultaneous accidents, evaluating their impacts, and communicating with offsite authorities.

b.5 Field Resoonse Teams Building C-360 UF. Release j The emergency response staff responded rapidly to the accident scene in assisting the l IC in establishing the CP. Response was initiated by an alarm from Building C-360 l indicating the release of UF.. The initial plant-wide announcement was clearly heard on l the PA speaker outside Building C-360.

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Two victims with simulated hydrogen fluoride (HF) burns evacuated themselves from the building and walked up the access road until they were intercepted by ambulance and fire brigade (FB) response personnel. The victims were initially questioned by FB personnel, while being treated by medical team members, and indicated that a cylinder containing liquid UF, had ruptured. This information was immediately communicated to the IC. The two victims were immediately decontaminated by a combination of medical and FB personnel by removing their clothing and hosing them with water. The victims were placed in an ambulance and transported to a medical facility within 12 minutes of the incident.

The initial two person entry team for Building C-360 arrived at the CP in full level one chemical suits for a briefing prior to building entry. The team appropriately simulated isolating the water supply outside the building due to the restricted access to the basement as a result of the limitations induced by the level one chemical suits. The i team then creatively used the Building C-360 carbon dioxide fire unit to freeze the UF3 ,  ;

and successfully stopped the leak by the use of a stiffening ring seal. The team then I mitigated any further release by covering the UF. cylinder with a tarp. The team exited the building to retrieve an air sampler at the decontamination / entry control point and retumed to set up the air sampler before exiting again. A second entry team was dispatched into the building to retrieve and replace the initial air sample filter. Backup entry teams were consistently observed to be ready before primary entry teams were dispatched. Good communications between the entry teams, IC and FB commander were observed throughout the exercise.

Reentry teams exiting the contaminated area were effectively processed through decontamination control with one minor problem regarding surveying. The inspectors observed that on numerous occasions during surveys of reentry teams Health Physics technicians allowed the surface of the pancake probe to come in contact with potential contaminated clothing or equipment. Contaminating a probe would have had negligible impact, requiring the use of readily available alternate survey probes.

C-531 Fire Scene The Switchyard C-531 fire scene was effectively simulated with two smoke generators and four simulated victims. Fire response personnel quickly set up simulated covering water spray for the victims. As the fire was simulated, some exercise artificiality existed, making it difficult for responding firefighters to determine the intensity of the fire.

i Medical triage was conducted on the simulated victims, identifying that one victim was dead. There was some delay in attending to the victims, apparently due to concerns relative to fighting the increasingly intense fire and the need to call in additional firefighting equipment. Concern was expressed for the explosion potential of a nearby asynchronous condenser containing hydrogen gas. A portable compressor and " jaws of life" were utilized to remove a simulated heavy piece of metal from atop one victims' leg.

Ambulance personnel stabilized the simulated victims and appropriately secured them in the ambulance for transport. The medical condition of the victims was properly the s

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l l focus of the response, with little concern for possible low-level contamination. Health Physics personnel accompanied the ambulances to deal with any contamination concerns at the local hospital.

Firefighters evaluated the intensity of the simulated fire and requested additional l firefighting equipment. A resourceful firefighter directed the manual activation of the installed deluge equipment. This action was properly halted by an exercise controller as l not allowed by the exercise scenario. The NRC Senior Resident arrived at the scene and observed response activities.

l b.5.1 Conclusions The response teams, including medical responders, inplant response teams and firefighting personnel, performed very well. Their actions were well coordinated.

b.6 Cntiaues Critiques were held in each facility immediately following the exercise. Participants remained in the facility, and were actively encouraged to identify positive and negative issues. Critique sheets were provided for written comments. A controller critique was conducted following the participant critiques. A public critique was held the evening of April 1,1998 at the Information Age Resource Building in Paducah, Ky.

Certificatee findings were consistent with the findings of the NRC evaluation team, and also identified additionalitems not observed by the NRC.

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b.6.1 Conclusions Plant staff critiques were considered effective.

b.7 Exercise Control The ruptured cylinder mock up was effective. Use of smoke generators provided additional realism, and controller messages properly provided additionalinformation by indicating the duration and density of the HF plume. No controller conduct problems were observed.

b.7.1 Conclusions The scenario was challenging, with two simultaneous events and a UF, relcase. Very little simulation of activities was observed. No controNer conduct problems were observed.

P4. c. Overall Exerc;se Conclusions The exercise was a successful demonstration of the certificatee's capabilities to implement its Emergency Plan and procedures. Event classification was correct and 10

timely. Offsite notifications were timely and adequately detailed. Transfers of command and control were appropriately coordinated. Response teams were well coordinated.

V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of the plant staff and management at the conclusion of the inspections on April 2,1998. The plant staff acknowledged the findings presented. The certificatee did not identify any of the information discussed as proprietary.

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l PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED l

United States Enrichment Corooration (USEC)

• J. Labarraque, Safety, Safeguards and Quality Manager

• N. Romano, Safety, Safeguards & Quality Lockheed Martin Utility Services (LMUS)

• D. Elrod, Emergency Management

• R. Everett, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs t

• A. Fisk, Emergency Management

• L. Jackson, Manager. Nuclear Regulatory Affairs

• M. Maurer, Shift Operations

• J. Millsfield, Emergency Management l *P. Musser, Shift Operations

• D. Page, Plant Shift Superintendent

• S. Polston, Plant General Manager

• M. Redden, Emergency Management

• S. Shell, Environmental Safety & Health Manager

• D. Stadler, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs '

• R. Wright, Emergency Management

• S. Zimmerman, Public Affairs

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• Denotes those present at tha April 2,1998 exit meeting. Other members of the plant staff l were also contacted during the inspection.

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 82301* Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors IP 82302* Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors IP 88050 Emergency Preparedness

• Used as guidance enly to focus evaluation resources effectively.

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSGD Ooened  !

None GQSfid None.

Discussed l None.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ACM Assistant Crisis Manager APSS Assistant Plant Shift Superintendent CFR Code of Federal Regulations CM Crisis Manager l CP Command Post l

DNMS Division of Nuclear Materials Safety DOE Department of Energy l EAL Emergency Action Level l EOC Emergency Operations Center EPA Environmental Protection Agency l EPIP Emergency Plan implementing procedure l FB Fire Brigade GDP Gaseous Diffusion Plant HF Hydrogen Fluoride l lC Incident Commander l&C Instrumentation and Control 1 IFl Inspection Followup Item j

INZ Immediate Notification Zone l lP inspection Procedure

! JPIC Joint Public Information Center LMUS Lockheed Martin Utility Services NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PA Public Address PAG Protective Action Guideline PAR Protective Action Recommendation PCF Plant Control Facility PDR Public Document Room PGDP Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant PIO Public Information Officer PSS Plant Shift Superintendent PWS Public Warning System RM Recovery Manager UF, Uran'um Hexafluoride USEC United States Enrichment Corporation 13 m