ML20149J439

Predecisional Enforcement Conference Rept 97-7001/97-05 on 970716.Major Areas Discussed:Five Apparent Violations Noted in Insp Rept.W/Viewgraphs

ML20149J439
Person / Time
Site:	07007001
Issue date:	07/23/1997
From:	Jkeith Everly NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
To:
Shared Package
ML20149J423	List: ML20149J418 ML20149J439 ML20149J455
References
70-7001-97-05, 70-7001-97-5, NUDOCS 9707280219
Download: ML20149J439 (34)

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i U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF FACILITIES AND SECURITY j Report No. 70-7001/97006(DFS)

Certificate No. GDP-1 Docket No. 70-7001

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Certificate Holder: U.S. Enrichment Corporation Two Democracy Center 6903 Rockledge Drive Bethesda, Maryland 20817 l Predecisional Enforcement Conference Conducted at: Rockville. MD Predecisional Enforcement Conference Conducted on: July 16.1997 ,

Prepared by: J. Keith Everly, Senior Facilities Security Specialist Approved by: Raymond J. Brady, Director Division of Facilities and Security i Office of Administration i

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SUMMARY

U.S. Enrichrnent Corporation Predecisional Enforcement Conference Report On July 16,1997, a predecisional enforcement conference was held at NRC Headquarters, Rockville, Maryland, to discuss five apparent violations identified in inspection Report No. 70-7001/97005(DFS). The certificate holder disputed two of the five violations cited in their entirety, and the other three violations in part . The certificate holder described the corrective actions undertaken to correct the items of non-compliance, and discussed the application of lessons learned to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future.

REPORT DETAILS On July 16,1997, a predecisional enforcement conference was held at NRC Headquarters, Rockville, Maryland. The conference prov. led an opportunity for the U.S. Enrichment Corporation to discuss five apparent violations and to provide corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

In the opening statement, the Acting Director of the Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, Region Ill, stated the reasons for the predecisional enforcement conference as it related to the ,

number of examples of violations found during the May 5-9,1997, security inspection of the  !

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The Director explained that this meeting would provide the U.S. Enrichment Corporation the opportunity to discuss the circumstances surrounding the apparent violations identified during the May 5-9,1997, security inspection; to acknowledge or deny the apparent violations; and to provide identification and correction of root causes for such apparent violations. The NRC primary concern was the programmatic issues, the lessons learned, and the application of those lessons thrcughout USEC's operation so as to preclude recurrence of similar events at the facility.

The NRC Enforcement Coordinator summarized the NRC's Enforcement Policy conceming the

apparent violations. The discussion included the purpose of the predecisional enforcement conference and the enforcement process before the NRC makes the final enforcement decision for this inspection.

l The Deputy Director, Division of Facilities and Security, discussed the five apparent violations l identified in the Inspection Report which included:

1) In seventeen instances, the certificate holder failed to implement the security plan in )

accordance with the certificate of compliance;

2) The certificate holder improperly marked records of combinations to classified security containers as SECRET-National Security Information;

3) In four instances, the certificate holder failed to provide the Commission complete and occurate information;

. 4) The certificate holder failed to establish and provide to the NRC a Telecommunications Operations Plan;

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5) In four instances, the certificate holder failed to comply with the Paducah plant's classified computer security plans.

The certificate holder discussed its perspective of the apparent violations. The presentation included the results of the root cause analysis and provided a detailed review of the corrective actions already planned and completed. USEC management understood its responsibility for the apparent violations and acknowledged the need for strengthening and maintaining management oversight and tonducting effective self-assessments to ensure complete and accurate information is being submitted to the Commission.

The certificate holder disagreed with the second and fourth violations. The certificate holder stated that it was marking records of classified combinations in accordance with NRC/ DOE approved classification guidance and that the information it submitted in its approved classified matter plan met the requirement for submitting a Telecommunications Operations Plan. In addition, the certificate holder disagreed with some of the examples in violations 1,3, and 5 and committed to providing the NRC a letter that describes its disagreements, the basis of its views, and milestones for completing corrective actions delineated above. This letter was received by the NRC on July 18,1997. (See enclosure 3).

In the closing statement, the Acting Director of the Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, Region ill, reminded the certificate holder that the apparent violations discussed are subject to further review and may be subject to change prior to any resulting NRC response. The certificate holder was also reminded that any NRC comments or lack thereof, at the predecisional enforcement conference, should not be construed as the NRC final action concerning this matter.

The meeting was then adjourned.

Attendees U.S. Enrichment Corocration George Rifakes, Executive Vice President of Operations James Miller, Vice President of Production Steve Polston, Paducah General Manager Dale Allen, Portsmouth General Manager John Adams, Safety and Health Assurance and Policy Manager Charles Hicks, Paducah Site and Facilities Support Manager Jean Parker, Portsmouth Site and Facilities Support Manager Bill Sykes, Paducah Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Manager Ron Gaston, Portsmouth Nuciear Regulatory Affairs Manager Russ Wells, USEC-HQ Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Associate Bem Stapleton, USEC-HQ Security Associate Elizabeth Stuckle, USEC Communications Man 3ger

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3 i NflC Jim Lieberman, Director, Office of Enforcement Roy Canlano, Acting Director, Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, Rlli Liz Ten Eyck, Director, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards William Brach, Deputy Director, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards 4

Phillip Ting, Chief, Operations Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards Robert Pierson, Chief, Special Projects Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards Lisa Clark, Attorney, Office of the General Counsel 4

George Messenger, Director, Financial Management, Computer Security

and Administrative Support Staff i Joe DelMedico, Senior Enforcement Specialist, Office of Enforcement ,

Richard Dopp Deputy Director, Division of Facilities and Security Ken O'Brien, Senior Resident inspector at Paducah ,

Neder Mamish, Enforcement Coordinator, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

! J. Keith Everly, Senior Facilities Security Specialist, Division of Facilities and Security i Bill Troskoski, Senior Chemical Engineer, Operations Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards ,

Louis Numkin, Senior Computer Security Specialist, Financial Management, Computer i i Security and Administrative Support Staff l Wayne Bumside, Senior Information Security Specialist, Division of Facilities and Security A. Lynn Silvious, Chief, Information Security Branch, Division of Facilities and Security Robert Skelton, Senior Facilities Security Specialist, Division of Facilities and Security Nancy Fontaine, Information Security Specialist, Division of Facilities and Security Merri Horn, Environmental Engineer, Special Projects Bianch, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards Other Meetina Attendees Wayne Yoder, Safeguards and Security, Department of Energy j i

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USEC A Global Energy Company UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORPORATION PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT PRE-DECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE l

JULY 16,1997 l

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AGENDA A. Introduction J. Miller /

S. Polston B. Summary of Apparent Violations C. Hicks .

C. Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Actions C. Hicks D. Enforcement Assessment B. Stapleton E. Generic Implications of Security Findings -

S. Polston F. Closing Remarks J. Miller

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LIST OF ATTENDEES George Rifakes, Executive Vice President of Operations Jim Miller, Vice President of Production Steve Polston, PGDP General Manager

, Dale Allen, PORTS General Manager John Adams, Safety and Health Assurance and Policy Manager

' Charles Hicks, PGDP Site and Facilities Support Manager i

Jean Parker, PORTS Site and Facilities Support Manager o

Bill Sykes, PGDP Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Manager Ron Gaston, PORTS Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Manager Bem Stapleton, USEC-HQ Security fUSEC ""~"""~~'""~~"

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SUMMARY

OF APPARENT VIOLATIONS USEC failed to:

1. Provide complete and accurate information in Security Plans.

2. Implement Security Plans in accordance with the Certificate.

3. Comply with the plant's classified computer Security Plans.

4. Properly mark records of combinations to classified security containers.

5. Establish and provide a Telecommunications Operations Plan.

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COMMON ROOT CAUSE The lack of a fully effective management system is the root cause of the apparent violations I,2, and 3.

We did not have in place the necessary elements of a strong management system to achieve meticulous attention to detail and high standards of compliance.

These elements are:

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR COMMON ROOT CAUSE

- The Site and Facilities Manager reinforced his expectations for total procedural adherence, rigorous attention to detail, and complete regulatory compliance.

Site and Facilities Support Manager assembled a team of Subject Matter Experts to concurrently review the three security plans for accuracy, consistency, and completeness.

Took immediate actions to bring PGDP into compliance with Plan

- Plans are being revised

- Proceduralizing the process utilized during review to ensure consistent plan review and change implementation .

- Required increased field monitoring by Security Management to ensure regulatory commitments ,,

are met via strict procedural adherence

- Will perform independent assessments and self-assessments of plan implementation using NRC inspection criteria as a guide

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COMPLETE AND ACCURATE INFORMATION Examples of Violation USEC failed to provide the Commission with complete and accurate information in four instances:

A. Reference to the DOE security representative for the ROA;

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Description of the Barrier Lab; C. Status of the COMSEC account; and .

D. Listing of equipment comprising PGDP's secure telecommunications systems.

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COMPLETE AND ACCURATE INFORMATION Contributing Causes

- Plans were submitted without requiring verification of accuracy by subject matter experts from supporting groups.

• Inattention to detail in that security plans were not compared for consistency. ,

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COMPLETE AND ACCURATE INFORMATION Corrective Actions to Achieve Compliance:

1. Organizational Manager reinforced his expectations to the Security staff for the necessity of attention to detail and complete and accurate information. -

2 Completed review of all three Security Plans with involvement by subject matter experts from supporting groups.

3. Will revise plans in accordance with regulatory requirements.

4. Will submit plan revisions requiring NRC approval.

5. Will complete procedure revisions to conform to approved plans.

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4 COMPLETE AND ACCURATE INFORMATION Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence .

1. Security Plan review requirements and expectations will be captured in procedure including Subject Matter Expert coordination and detailed verification.

2.' Plant Change Review process is now in place. This process did not exist when Security Plans were originally developed. This process requires verification of regulatory requirements and commitments.

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IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY PLANS Apparent Violation USEC failed to fully implement Security Plans in the following instances:

A,. Identification of the Controlled Access Area barrier, B. Training for Police Operations personnel; C. Periodic security response exercises; D. Initialjob qualification training for all Police Operations personnel; E. Number of Police Operations patrols; ii F. Conducting patrols in a random manner, d """""-*"--"'--"-

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IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY PLANS Apparent Violation (cont.)

G. Required number of gas masks for Police Operations force; H. Key and lock program procedures; I. Correct individual for coordinating railroad access to the plant site; J. Plant procedures for the escort of mutual aid responders; K. Correct organization for coordinating classified visits; L. Storage of badge materials in accordance with approved plan; '

M. Use of approved classified mailing / shipping address; N. Operations in accordance with the organization cheas; ,

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IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY PLANS Apparent Violation (cont 3 O. Perform physical check of area control room classified safe; P. Affix SF-702 forms to a classified material storage area; and

. Q. Plant notification procedures consistent with approved plan.

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IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY PLANS Contributing Causes

- Management did not hold personnel adequately accountable for plan and procedure adherence. .

Management did not ensure appropriately conservative requirements were being implemented.

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IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY PLANS Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence

1. Organizational Manager reinforced his expectations for attention to detail, procedure adherence, and personal accountability to the Security staff.

2; Increased field monitoring by Security management to ensure regulatory commitments are met via strict procedural adherence.

3. Security plans were reviewed to verify implementation.

4. Initiated procedure revisions to implement approved plan changes.

5. Revising Classified Matter Protection procedure to clarify process for protecting classified material. ,,

6. Performing self-assessments of Security Plans implementation.

7. Will perform independent assessments of Security Plans.

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IMPLEMENTATION OF CLASSIFIED COMPUTER SECURITY PLANS Anoarent Violation .

i USEC failed to implement the Classified Computer Security Plan in the following four instances: .

A. Separation of classified computer from unclassified data communication line; I. Training for primary user of a classified computer; C. Classification labels for classified computer and plan; i D. Separation of classified and unclassified computer hardware.

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IMPLEMENTATION OF CLASSIFIED COMPUTER SECURITY PLANS -

Contributing Cause

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• Lack of attention to detail and procedure adherence.

Dorrective Actions to Achieve Compliance

1. Classified computers relocated to meet spacing requirements. Proper spacing of others verified.

2. Training for computer security officers completed.

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COMBINATION RECORDS FOR SECURITY CONTAINERS Apparent Violation USEC failed to mark Secret Restricted Data combination records at the highest classification level and category.

Requirement 10 CFR 95.25(d) states that " Records of combinations: Records of combinations shall be classi/ led, marked and safeguarded in a manner appropriate for the highest classification of the matter authorized to be stored in the security container."

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TELECOMM'UNICATIONS OPERATIONS PLAN Apparent Violation USEC failed to provide a copy of the Paducah Telecommunications Operations Plan.

Requirement

'10 CFR 95.39(d) requires in part "... other persons who may require a secure telecommunications system shall submit a telecommunication plan as part of their request for NRC security facility approval as outlined in @95.15, or as an amendment to their existing security plan for the protection of National Security Information or Restricted Data." .

How Requirement Was Met

- Section 18 of the Security Plan Format and Content for the Protection of Classified Matter for NRC Licensee, Certificate Holder, and Related Organizations provides NRC Guidance on ,;

Requisite content to comply with 10 CFR 95.39(d).

- Chapter 18 of Classified Matter Plan has information required by this NRC content guidance.

- Classified Matter Plan was submitted to the NRC for approval.

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TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS PLAN (CONTD.)

USEC Response USEC submitted its telecom.munications plan as part ofits Classified Matter Protection Plan, which encompasses our program for protection ofNational Security Information (NSI) and Restricted Data (RD). Chapter 18 of this plan discusses " Telecommunications of Classified Information (10 CFR 95.39)" per the NRC guidance.

This information on how this requirement was met was not adequately communicated by plant staff at the time of the inspection. The members of our plant staffinvolved with the inspectors were not fully familiar with the plan in order to correctly respond to the NRC inspector.

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ENFORCEMENT ASSESSMENT Two instances where cited requirement was satisfied.

Reviewed remaining apparent violations against criteria on applicable supplements in NUREG 1600.

Not willful No deliberate attempt to falsify or provide inaccurate information.

- No careless disregard for NRC requirements.

- Apparent violations identified do not indicate a breakdown in the security program.

Program remains effective in protecting classified information.

- No significant events resulting from identified examples.

. The inaccuracies in the Security Plans, while more than minor significance, would likely not have resulted in a reconsideration of a regulatory position or a substantial further inquiry.

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ENFORCEMENT ASSESSMENT (CONTD.)

'. Have taken prompt and comprehensive corrective action i 45% corrected before NRC left site l

Thorough, comprehensive corrective actions to address security plans at site Appropriate consideration of broader implications a

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GENERIC IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITY FINDINGS Actions Company-Wide .

We examined both past and present including:

- Previous USEC issues comparable to the Security apparent violations

- Assessment of today's generic implications beyond Security

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GENERIC IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITY FINDINGS (CONTD.)

Actions Company-Wide There were prior examples found comparable to Security:

- Packaging and Transportation Certificate procedures weren't fully implemented An NMC&A Compliance Plan Action Step description was not complete and accurate

- Fire Protection Sprinkler description was not fully complete and accurate

- Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) procedures were not fully implemented it 29 UnindSuns Enrichment Corporwqlon A Global Energy Company

GENERIC IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITY FINDINGS (CONTD.)

Actions Company-Wide

- USEC is fully assessing today's generic Security implications A sampling survey ofNRC requirements has been completed We are performing 100% assessments in selected requirement areas Ii

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GENERIC IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITY FINDINGS (CONTD.)

Actions Conapany-Wide PGDP and PORTS NRC Application Sampling Survey results:

- In Volumes 1,2, and 3 at PGDP we found two failures to implement a requirement

.- At PORTS, there were four similar failures to implement a requirement.

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GENERIC IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITY FINDINGS (CONTD.)

Actions Company-Wide l

Areas of 100% Assessment:

- Selected areas such as Security Plans, TSRs, and Compliance Plan JCOs are being 100%

assessed.

- Overall, these assessments are approximately 50% complete.

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GENERIC IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITY FINDINGS (CONTD.)

Actions Company-Wide Preliminary findings from assessments:

- Management Systems were not fully effective in achieving and demonstrating meticulous attention to detail and high standards of compliance.

- Self-Assessment Program failed to detect problems in Security and NMC&A.

- Application review was not fully adequate causing lack of complete and accurate statements.

- Lack ofidentification of all requirements Less than adequate corrective actions.

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GENERIC IMPLICATIONS OF SECURITY FINDINGS (CONTD.)

Actions Company-Wide Summary of Generic Implications

- USEC has completed the sampling survey

- Approximately half of the "100% assessment" areas remain to be completed.

- No pervasive issues have been found in the sample survey or in the 100% assessments.

Company-wide assessments improved plant stafTknowledge.

While we have not yet met my expectations, we are making progress as evidenced by:

Self-identified Fire Protection issues

.i Self-identified NCS deficiencies j - Recent dramatic drop in TSR violations .

l Company-wide assessment results described today were encouraging ,

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