05000454/FIN-2015008-08
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Finding | |
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| Title | |
| Description | The team identified a finding of very-low safety significance and an associated NCV of TS 5.4, Procedures, for the failure to maintain emergency operating procedures (EOPs) for transfer to cold leg recirculation. Specifically, the EOPs for transfer to cold leg recirculation did not contain instructions for transferring the ECCS and CS systems to the recirculation mode that ensured prevention of potential pump damage when the RWST is emptied. The licensee captured this finding into their CAP to create a standing order instructing operators to secure all pumps aligned to the RWST when it is emptied, and implement long term corrective actions to restore compliance. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of procedure quality, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of mitigating systems to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In addition, it was associated with the Barrier Integrity cornerstone attribute of procedure quality, and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding screened as of very-low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of mitigating systems, represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, and involved an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. Specifically, the incorrect caution would only be used in the event that transfer to sump recirculation was not completed prior to reaching tank low-level, or if the RWST suction isolation valves fail to close. With respect to transfer to sump recirculation prior to reaching tank low-level, a review of simulator test results reasonably determined that operators reliably complete the transfer to sump recirculation prior to reaching this set point. With respect to the failure of the RWST suction isolation valves, a review of quarterly test results reasonably determined the valves would have isolated the tank when required. The team did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because it was not confirmed to reflect current performance due to the age of the performance deficiency. |
| Site: | Byron  |
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| Report | IR 05000454/2015008 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2015 (2015Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Della Grecab Palagi C Lipa D Betancourt J Leivo M Jones N Feliz-Adorno |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Byron - IR 05000454/2015008 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Byron) @ 2015Q3
Self-Identified List (Byron)
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