05000454/FIN-2014005-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Liquid Penetrant Testing Procedure Did Not Meet ASME Code |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX, Control of Special Processes, for the failure to perform a Liquid Penetrant Test (PT) in accordance with the American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code while performing a surface examination on reactor coolant pump (RCP) flywheel 2A/D483. The vendor conducted a demonstration in an attempt to show the differences in bleed-out between the two dwell times, to demonstrate continued functionality of the flywheel. The results showed little if any difference in the growth of the bleed-out given the additional time. The licensee was developing an action plan to address the non-conformance and restore compliance. The issue was entered into the licensees CAP as IR 02393595 and IR 02399248. The inspectors determined that this issue was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because the inspectors answered "Yes" to the More-than-Minor question, If left uncorrected, would the performance deficiency have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern? Specifically, since the liquid penetrant testing developer minimum dwell time may not have been met, the liquid penetrant examination was not assured to accurately measure a rejectable flaw. Absent NRC intervention, the potential would exist for a rejectable flaw to remain in service, affecting the operability of affected systems. In accordance with Table 2, Cornerstones Affected by Degraded Condition or Programmatic Weakness, of IMC 609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors checked the box under the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone because failure of the RCP flywheel could degrade core decay heat removal. The inspectors determined this finding was of very-low safety significance (Green) using Part A of Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, in IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued on June 19, 2012. Specifically, the issue did not result in the actual loss of the operability or functionality of a safety system; and therefore the inspectors answered "Yes" to the screening question If the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, does the SSC maintain its operability or functionality? The vendor subsequently performed demonstrations to show that the bleed-out from an indication would not change appreciably when implementing the additional dwell time. The licensee was still evaluating its planned corrective actions. However, the inspectors determined that the continued non-compliance did not present an immediate safety concern because the licensee/vendor reasonably determined the RCP flywheel remained functional. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Change Management in the area of Human Performance (IMC 0310 H.3) in that leaders failed to use a systematic process for evaluating and implementing change so that nuclear safety remains an overriding priority. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the vendor changed its procedure to reflect the requirements of the current edition of the ASME Code adopted by the licensee. |
| Site: | Byron  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000454/2014005 Section 1R08 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2014 (2014Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.08 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Thompson J Cassidy J Draper J Ellegood J Mcghee M Bielby M Holmberg R Baker R Jickling T Bilik |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion IX |
| CCA | H.3, Change Management |
| INPO aspect | LA.5 |
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Finding - Byron - IR 05000454/2014005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Byron) @ 2014Q4
Self-Identified List (Byron)
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