IR 05000812/2010031

Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty in Amount of $100,000 Based on Violations Noted During Insps on 850812-1031

ML20212B384
Person / Time
Site:	Byron, 05000812
Issue date:	02/26/1987
From:	Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To:	COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
Shared Package
ML20212B371	List: IR 05000812/2010031 ML20212B368
References
EA-86-048, EA-86-48, NUDOCS 8703030543
Download: ML20212B384 (9)

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPMISSION

~In the Matter of -)

Docket No. 50-454 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY- -1 License No. NPF-37 (BYRON, UNIT 1)- ) EA 86-4 )

ORDER IMPOSING CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY I-Commonwealth Edison Company (licensee) is the holder of Operating License No. NPF-37 (license) issued by the Nuclear Reaulatory Commission (Commission /

NRC) on October 31, 1984. The. license authorizes the licensee to operate the Byron Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 in accordance with the conditions specified therei II NRC safety inspections of the licensee's activities were conducted Auaust--12 -

October 18 and October 2 - 31, 198 Durino these inspections, the NRC staff determined that the licensee had not conducted its activities in full compliance with NRC requirements. A written Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) was served upon the licensee by letter dated May 6, 1986. The Notice stated the nature of the violations, the provisions of the NRC's requirements that the licensee had violated, and the amount of the civil penalties proposed for the violations. The licensee was aranted an extension and responded to the Notice by letter dated July 3,198 B703030543 979ggg -

DR ADOCK 05000454-PDR

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-2-III After consideration of the licensee's response, which included payme t of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) for the violations in Section II of the Notice, and the statements of fact, explanation, and araument for denial of the occurrence of Violation I, classification of the event as a Severity Level III violation, and mitiaation of the proposed civil penalty contained therein, the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, has determined as set forth in the appendix to this Order, that the violation occurred as stated and that the penalty proposed for Violation I desianated in the Notice should be impose IV In view of the foreaoina and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Eneray Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

The licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) within 30 days of the date of this Order, by check, draft, or money order, payable to the Treasurer of the United States and mailed to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission, Washinaton, D.C. 2055 V The licensee may request a hearina within 30 days of the date of this Orde A request for a hearina shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Inspection

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-3-and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Reaulatory Comission, Washinaton, D.C. 2055 A copy of the hearina request also shall be sent to the Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Comission, .

Washinaton, D.C. 20555 and to the Reaional Administrator, Reaion III, 799 Roosevelt Road, Glen Ellyn, Illinois 6013 If a hearina is requested, the Comission will issue an Order desianatina the time and place of the hearina, If the licensee fails to request a hearina within 30 days of the date of this Order, the provisions of this Order shall be effective without further proceedina If payment has not been made by that time, the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collectio In the event the licensee requests a hearina as provided above, the issues to be considered at such hearina shall be:

(a) whether the licensee was in violation of the Comission's requirements as set forth in Section I of the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties referenced in Section II above and (b) whether, on the basis of such violation, this Order should be sustaine FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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. aw < f J .es M. Tayl ,, Director j fice of Ins,pection and Enforcement j Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, i

thisdQ_dayofFebruary198 !

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' APPENDIX EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION In a letter dated July 3,1986, the licensee responded to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) dated May 6,198 In its response the licensee (1) admitted the violations documented in Section II and (2) paid the Fifty Thousand Dollar ($50,000) civil penalty for these violations. However, with respect to the violation in Section I of the Notice, the licensee ~(1) denied that a violation occurred,-(2) >

disaareed with the Severity Level III classification of the violation, and (3) requested mitiaation of the civil penalty if the violation is uphel Provided below are (1) a restatement of the contested violation, (2) a summary of the licensee's response reaardina the violation, (3) the NRC's evaluation of the licensee's response to the violation, (4) a sunmary of the licensee's arauments in support of mitiaation of the proposed civil penalty, (5) the NRC's evaluation of the licensee's arauments in support of mitiaation of the proposed. civil penalty, and (6) the NRC's conclusion.-

Restatement of Violation Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 requires that two independent emeroency core coolina system (ECCS) subsystems shall be operable with each subsystem comprised in part of one residual heat removal (RHR) pump and an operable flow path when in Modes 1, 2, or Technical Specification 3.0.3, which applies when -TS 3.5.2 is not met and if two RHR pumps are inoperable, requires that within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, the licensee shall initiate action to place the unit in a mode in which the specification does not apply by placina it, as applicable, in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, at least hot shutdown within the followina 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and at least cold shutdown within the subsequent 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> The definition of operability for the injection path for the ECCS is discussed in the Byron Unit 1 FSAR, Section 6.3 where it states that each RHR subsystem injects into all four cold leas of the reactor coolant syste Contrary to the above, on March 6,1985 for approximately 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />, March 7, 1985 for approximately 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />, April 20, 1985 for approximately 31 hours3.587963e-4 days <br />0.00861 hours <br />5.125661e-5 weeks <br />1.17955e-5 months <br />, April 23, 1985 for approximately six hours, May 20, 1985 for approximately 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />, May 21, 1985 for approximately five hours and on July 24, 1985 for three separate periods of approximately three hours, two hours cnd seven hours, while in' Mode 1, both RHR subsystems of the ECCS were rendered inoperable durina surveillance testina in that neither RHR pump was capable of injectina, as stated

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in the FSAR, into all four reactor coolant system cold leas due to the fact that i and valves IRH8716A and ISI8809A for RHR Pump A and valves IRH8716B and ISI8809B for RHR Pump B were closed while system performance was beina measure This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).

-Civil Penalty - $50,00 Summary of Licensee Response In its July 3,1986 response to the Notice, the licensee contends that the circumstances surroundina the violation neither constitute a Severity

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Appendix -2-Level III violation nor warrant a $50,000 civil penalty. The licensee states that durina the event an emeraency core coolina system (ECCS) subsystem was capable of performina its intended temperature control function while a portion of the RHR injection flow path was isolated, and therefore, the event did not involve a situation in which a system desianed to prevent or mitiaate a serious safety event was not able to perfonn its intended function under certain conditions. The licensee further states that the event did not constitute a sianificant violation of a technical specification limitina condition for operation (LCO) in that the RHR system valve alianment durina the event did not result in two inoperable subsystems of the ECCS and that an ECCS subsystem could still perform its intended function. Therefore, the licensee believes that there was no violation of a technical specification LC0 action statement durina the even The licensee's denial of a violation of technical specification requirements is based primarily on its disaareement with the NRC as to the definition of operability for the injection flow path for the ECCS. The licensee states that the specified function of the ECCS as documented in the FSAR shows that an ECCS subsystem is operable if it is capable of limitina peak claddina temperature to within specified limits followina a loss-of-coolina-accident (LOCA).

The licensee claims the operability of the ECCS subsystem flow path was demonstrated throuah an analysis conducted by Westinahouse. The licensee states that the analysis showed adequate flow would have been available durina a desian-basis LOCA such that the increase in peak claddina temperature was estimated to be less than 10 F and would remain well below the limit established in 10 CFR 50.4 The licensee disaarees with the NRC's interpretation that each RHR subsystem must inject into all four reactor coolant system (RCS) cold leas for the ECCS injection path to be considered operable. In addition, the licensee araues that Section 6.3 of the FSAR speaks only of injection "into" the RCS or deliverina flow "to" the cold leas and that FSAR Fiaure 6.3-2 only depicts the maximum safe-auards flow path available (not the minimum flow path necessary for operability).

The licensee also contends that the times stated in the Notice indicatina when both RHR subsystems were inoperable are not accurate and were revised in a letter from the NRC to the licensee on November 22, 1985. The licensee provided a summary of the approximate times that valves were closed; these times ranaed from 0.9 to 13.1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> NRC Evaluation While the NRC staff neither aarees with nor disputes the Westinahouse analysis, it is sianificant to note that the analysis was not presented to the licensee until after the violation was identified. The LOCA analysis assumino minimum safeauards available, at the time the violation was identified, modeled the RHR flow from one RHR pump to all four cold lea As described in the Licensee Event Report (LER 85-081-01) submitted to the NRC on September 23, 1985, the assumed flow path for the LOCA analysis was inconsistent with the actual RHR system alianment durina surveillance testina; only one RHR pump was available for injection into two RCS cold leas. The effect of this flow path chanae was described in the licenses's July 3,1986 response to the Notice "With this confiauration [ actual RHR system alianment

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Appendix -3-durino testina], the RHR pump can deliver 190.lbs/sec. durina the core reflood .

phase rather than the 390 lbs/sec. flow currently modeled." This is a reduction of approximately 50 percent in RHR flow rate and is considered by .the NRC to be sianificant. It was not appropriate for the licensee to shut valves ~ preventina -

RHR flow to two of four RCS cold leas. Althouah it was fortuitous that later-analysis by the licensee appears to show the licensee's action to have a lower safety sianificance, it was not appropriate to contradict the desian-basis accident analysis assumptions without a proper evaluation of the consequence The NRC position continues to be that the licensee took actions which placed the RHR system in a confiauration inconsistent with the assumptions of the LOCA analysis. The NRC believes that with the RHR subsystem in a confiauration inconsistent with the LOCA analysis and not knowina whether or not the acceptance criteria in 10 CFR 50.46 would be satisfied, the licensee -should have declared

' the subsystem inoperable. An analysis showina system or subsystem operability

- after the fact is not considered by the NRC staff to justify the licensee's actions at the time the_ RHR injection valves were close The event was sionificant because, with the RHR system only able to inject ~ into two cold leas, the plant's known ability to adequately respond to a larae break LOCA was sianificantly dearaded. The NRC staff disaareas with the licensee in that the event did involve a situation in which a system designed to preven or mitiaate a serious safety question was not able (or was not known to be able) to perform its intended function under certain conditions and did constitute a sianificant violation of technical specification' requirements which were established to ensure the ECCS components were maintained in an operable condition. Since the licensee did not know whether system requirements could be met, the licensee should have declared the system inoperable. Therefore, the event is properly classified as a Severity Level III violatio If the licensee's analysis had shown that 10 CFR 50.46 requirements were not met durina the event, the NRC staff would have considered the event a Severity Level II violatio The licensee contends that Section 6.3 of the FSAR does not state nor depict RHR subsystem flow beina injected into all four RCS cold leas. While the NRC staff could dispute the licensee's interpretation of the statements and fiaure of the FSAR, the event in which a portion of the RHR flow path was isolated contradicted the larae break LOCA analysis in existence at that time. This contradiction was described in a September 23, 1985 LER and.in the licensee's July 3,1986 response to the Notice. It was for this contradiction of the LOCA analysis that the NRC staff believes that the RHR subsystems should have been declared inoperable and for which the violation of technical specification requirements was intende The licensee also contends that the times stated in the Notice durina which the violation occurred were inaccurate. The NRC staff aarees with the licensee and had previously revised these times in Inspection Report 50-454/8505 However, the revision of the times for which valves were closed does not :

affect the violation as written in that Technical Specification 3.0.3 required ;

certain actions within l' hour, within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />,'and within the followina 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. A violation of Technical Specifications 3.5.2 and 3.0.3 occurred for those times lonaer than 1.0 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> that the valves were closed and the licensee did not initiate the required action :

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Appendix -4-

Summary of Licensee Arauments for Mitiaation Even if the NRC believes the event is properly classified, the licensee believes there is an adequate basis for full mitiaation of the proposed civil penalt The licensee believes that full credit should be given for promptly identifyina the event at the first available opportunity and reportina the event to the NRC. The licensee states that throuah its industry monitorina proaram it identified a potential concern reaardina an incident at the Callaway Station and pursued further investiaation which led to the issuance of an LER. This LER resulted in the NRC review of this event and subsequent issuance of a violation in this are The licensee believes that it was unusually prompt and responsive in its corrective actions. Procedures and surveillances were reviewed and revised to prevent closina of the valves. Statements were added to procedures to address when the valves may be closed and the operating modes that appl Main control board _ switches were taaaed to advise reactor operators that certain

' valves were to remain open durina Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. In addition, operational auidance documents were issued to operatina personnel to indicate the modes in which the valves were required to be open. Also, an independent review of RCS and ECCS technical specification surveillances was conducted by the Westinahouse

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Site Enaineerina Team. For these reasons, the licensee contends that the civil penalty should be reduced by 50 percen Regardina past performance, the licensee views its prior performance in this area to be acod and does not agree that the events leading to the June 5,1985 Severity Level IV Notice of Violation were relevant. The corrective actions to that event, includina review and revision of all operatina procedures involving ECCS systems which could affect technical specification LC0's, were taken to ensure that operators would follow procedures. In the current event, procedures

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were followed; therefore, the past corrective actions were not relevant to this event for which followina instructions led to an improper valve alianmen In addition, licensee personnel understood the particular RHR system valve alianment to be acceptable, consistent with other utilities, and as a recommended method by Westinchouse for performina some RHR system surveillances. The licensee contends that a contributina factor to its belief that the surveillance was acceptable was that previous NRC review and witnessina of the surveillance had verified that the LC0 was beina me The licensee also believes that the factors of prior notice and multiple occurrence should not be considered for escalation of the civil penalty.

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NRC Evaluation The NRC staff considered the licensee's prompt identification and reportina of the violation at the first available opportunity and its prompt and extensive corrective actions. However, the NRC staff disaarees with the licensee's assertion that the corrective actio7s for the previous Severity Level IV violation, described in the June 5,1985 letter and involvino the safety injection pumps, would not have been expected to identify the concern with the RHR system valve alignment. The NRC staff recoanizes that the cause of the safety injection pump violation was the failure of personnel to follow procedures; however, the corrective actions for that violation included a review of ECCS

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- operatina procedures that could impact technical specification requirement This review was done by licensed personnel at the senior reactor operator leve The NRC staff expects personnel at that level to be knowledaeable of, amono ~

other thinas, a system's desian bases, the significant assumptions of applicable desian-bases accident analyses, and the appropriate system alianment for normal and test conditions. Therefore, the NRC staff expects that the previous ECCS procedure review would have identified the inconsistency between the surveillance procedures and the desian-bases accident analyses for the RHR I system. While the licensee's personnel felt that the RHR system alianment was consistent with that of other utilities and Westinahouse system descriptions, this does'not excuse plant personnel from their lack.of understandina of th basis on which the RHR system was desianed and analyzed. Althouah the licensee points out previous NRC reviews of the surveillance procedure found it r satisfactory and feels that this contributed to the belief that the surveillance was acceptable, this does not imply that the NRC has performed a complete review of the procedure and that subsequent NRC or licensee reviews will not identify ad tional deficiencies and if the deficiencies are deemed to be sianificant, enforcement action could be take The NRC staff still believes that the civil penalty escalation factors for prior notice and multiple occurrences are not appropriate in this case; therefor ~

these are not discusse In summary, althouah the NRC staff still considers it appropriate to aive credit for the licensee's prompt identification and reportina of the violation and its prompt and extensive corrective actions, the NRC staff believes,.on balance, this is offset by the licensee's failure to correct the RHR surveillance procedure based on the corrective actions taken for a previous violatio Conclusion The NRC staff concludes that the violation of technical specification LC0 3.5.2 and 3.0.3 did occur in that at the times the violation occurred, as revised, the RHR injection paths, as described in the FSAR and larae-break LOCA analyses, were rendered inoperable durina surveillance testina. .It was durina this surveillance testina that certain valves were closed which contradicted the assumed flow paths for a desian-basis accident. Operability proven after the fact cannot be used to justify the actions taken at the time the valves were closed. The NRC staff considers this violation cause for sianificant concern and appropriately classified as a Severity Level III violatio The mitiaation and escalation factors in the Enforcement Policy were carefully considered. The NRC staff determined that althouah there were arounds for mitiaation of the civil penalty for prompt identification and reportina of the violation and for the licensee's prompt and extensive corrective actions, there were also arounds for escalation of the civil penalty for prior poor performance in that the licensee failed to properly implement previous corrective actions for a similar problem which was cited as a Severity Level IV violation. Therefore, overall the NRC staff considers it appropriate to impose the base civil penalt Accordinaly, the civil penalty in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000)

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Commonwealth Edison Company FE8 3 6198T .

DISTRIBUTION:

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