05000483/FIN-2011006-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Adequately Design the Emergency Diesel Generator Ground Fault Protection Circuitry |
Description | The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, that Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, when designing the bypass circuitry for the emergency diesel generator ground fault trip function, the licensee failed to ensure that the associated electrical components were adequately designed for the continuous duty they would have to withstand under bypassed trip conditions. This could result in an ignition source and subsequent fire in the area under these conditions. This finding was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program as Condition Report 201102064. The team determined that the failure to analyze the suitability of the emergency diesel generator components when protection features were bypassed was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the inadequate design of these components could have prevented continued operation of the emergency diesel generator underground fault conditions with the trip signal bypassed. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. Specifically, the licensee revised the associated procedures to include these components in the combustible material exclusion zone. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance. |
Site: | Callaway ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000483/2011006 Section 1R21 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
Inspectors (proximate) | T Farnholtz J Adams W Sifre F Baxter S Makor M Bloodgood |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2011006 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Callaway) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
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