ML20212Q972

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Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 831104 & 870121 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.2.1 & 3.2.2, Post-Maint Verification Testing
ML20212Q972
Person / Time
Site: Cooper Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 04/16/1987
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20212Q947 List:
References
GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8704240172
Download: ML20212Q972 (2)


Text

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  1. UNITED STATES

[ ~ ), ' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g S WASHINGTON, D, C. 20666

% **"') SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATING TO GENERIC LETTER 83-28 ITEMS 3.2.1 AND 3.2.2 POST MAINTENANCE VERIFICATION TEST (ALL OTHER SAFTEY-RELATED COMPONENTS)

NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT COOPER NUCLEAR STATION DOCKET NO. 50-298 i

1. INTRODUCTION On February 25, 1983, both the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system. This incident occurred during the plant startup and the reactor was. tripped manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal. The failure of the circuit breakers has been determined to be related to the sticking of the under voltage tris attachment. Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of tie Salem Nuclear Plant, an automatic trip signal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant startup. In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip. Following these incidents,.

on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations (EDO),

directed the staff to investigate and report on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of Salem Nuclear Power Plant.- The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem unit incidents are reported in NUREG-1000. " Generic Implications of ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant." As a result of this investigation, the Connission (NRC) requested (by Generic Letter 23-28 dated July 8, 1983) all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to certain generic concerns. These concerns are categorized into four areas: (1) Post-Trip Review. (2) Equipment Classification and Vendor Interface (3) Post-maintenance Testing, and (4) Reactor. Trip System Reliability Improvements.

The third action item, Postmaintenance Testing Verification consists of Action Items 3.1 and 3.2. This safety evaluation report (SER) addresses Action Items 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 "Postmaintenance Testing (All Other Safety-  !

Related Components)" only. l I

P 1

r II. REVIEW GUIDELINES The following review guidelines were developed after initial evaluation of the various utility responses _ to items 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 of Generic '

Letter 83-28 and incorporate the best features of these submittals. As such, these review guidelines in effect represent a " good practices" approach to postmaintenance testing. We have reviewed the licensee's response to-items against these guidelines:-

The licensee has submitted a statement indicating that he has reviewed plant test and maintenance procedures and Technical Specifications- to assure that postmaintenance operability testing of all safety-related components is required. A verification that vendor reconnended test guidance has been reviewed, evaluated, and where appropriate included in the test and maintenance procedures or the Technical specifications. An unambiguous connitment that postmaintenance testing will verify component capability t; perform all safety functions.

III. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION  ;

By letters dated November 4,1983 ano January 21, 1987, the licensee of Cooper Nuclear Station provided information regarding Postmaintenance Testing Verification (All Other Safety-Related Components). We have reviewed the licensee's response against the review guidelines as ,

described in Section II. A brief description of the licensee's response and the staff's evaluation of the response against the review guidelines is provided below:

The licensee stated that: A Work Item Tracking (WIT) Maintenance Program was instituted after review of other plant procedures which provides for proper safety-related and quality assurance classification of components /

systems requiring maintenance; through the Maintenance Work Request form scheduling, approval, performance, postmaintenance testing, and verification of maintenance and repair activities were controlled; procedures were periodically reviewed to assure that vendor recommended ,

test guidance was included; and postmaintenance testing verifies operability of safety-related equipment after maintenance by using relevant portions of existing surveillance procedures and additional postmaintenance testing requirements contained in certain maintenance procedures.  ;

Based on our review, we conclude that the licensee's response regarding Postmaintenance Testing Verification is acceptable. 4 Principal NRC Contributor: G. Pick

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