ML20195B856

Opposition to Appeal of Util & NRC Request for Issuance of Amend to Extend Completion Date.No Basis for Good Cause Exists for Delay.Certificate of Svc & Related Documents Encl

ML20195B856
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	05/27/1986
From:	Ellis J, Roisman A Citizens Association for Sound Energy, GREGORY, M., TRIAL LAWYERS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, P.C.
To:	NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP)
References
CON-#286-314 CPA, NUDOCS 8605290567
Download: ML20195B856 (98)

Text

_ _ _ _ _ - _ _

l

/

ON \ ~\

e  %

tv\

\ . j' '}

s ,\i BEFORE THE I y .

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION N

/

k Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board'

'\g /

In the Matter of )

)

TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY, ) Dkt. Nos. 50-445-CPA et al. )

)

(Comanche Peak Steam Electric )

Station, Unit 1) )

1 CASE AND MEDDIE GREGORY'S OPPOSITION TO APPEAL OF TUEC AND NRC STAFF Anthony Z. Roisman Trial Lawyers for Public Justice 2000 P Street, NW, Suite 611 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202)463-8600 Counsel for Meddie Gregory Juanita Ellis President, CASE 1426 South Polk Dallas, TX 75224 (214)946-9446 Representative of CASE May 27, 1986 8605290567 860527 PDR ADOCK 05000445 C PDR

• TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i I. The Licensing Board's Acceptance of the Challenge to TUEC's Failure to Meet Its Burden of Proof Is Not Contested Here 1 II . The Appeal Board Is Without Jurisdiction To Consider Any Portion of the Appeal, Which, at This Time, If Granted, Would Not Result In Denial of the Hearing 3 III. The Licensing Board Was Correct in Allowing the Challenge Based Upon Establishing That the Real Cause for the Delay Was a Deliberate Invalid Purpose 4 A. Deliberate and Repated Refusals to Properly Design, Construct, and Inspect the Plant, Which Resulted in Delay in Completing Construction of CPSES, Do Not Justify an Unconditional Extension of Time to Complete Construction of CPSES S B. Adequate Basis Was Provided Such That TUEC and the Staff Know What They Will Have to Defend Against or Oppose 11 IV. The Licensing Board May Properly Impose Conditions on the Approval of an Extension of a Construction Permit 16 CONCLUSION 22

r-TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 4

_ Cases Page CASE v. U.S. N.R.C., C.A. No. 86-1169 (D.C.~ Circuit) 1 Administrative Decisions Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris, 1-4), ALAB-577,~11 NRC TB~(1980), reconsidered ALAB-581, 11 NRC 23 (1980), modified CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980) 18, 19 Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Zimmer),

CLI-82-33,~ 16 edk: 1489 (19327 19 Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek, Unit 1), ALAB-5357 9 NRC 377 (1979) 3 Houston Lighting ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542 & Power Co. (Allens Creek),

11, 13 Mississippi Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf Units 1 & 2), AL.TB-130, 6 AEC 423 (1973) 11 Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Unita 2 & 3), ALAB-216, 8 AEC 13 (1974) 11 Power Authority of the State of New York (Green County), ALAB-434, 6 NEd 47I'(1977)

~

3 Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook), CLI-84-6, I TN W 975 (1984) 6 Texas Utilities Peak Steam Electric Electric Co. (Comanche Station),

CLI .86-04,

, -- NRC (1986) 19 Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station), LBP-83-81, decided December 28, 1983 18 Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nos. 1& 2), CLI-82-29,~16 NRC 1221

~

(1982) 1, 5, 8, 9, 10, 20 Washington Public Power Supply System

~

(WPPSS No. 2), ALAB-722, 17 NRC 546 (1983) 5, 20, 21 6

. 1 Regulations 10 CFR $2.714a 18 10 CFR 52.714a(b) 3 10 CFR 52.714a(c) 3 10 CFR 650.55(b) 7 9

6 s,s l

s

BEFORE T11E UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board In the Matter of )

)

TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY, ) Dkt. Nos. 50-445-CPA

_e t _a l . )

(Comanche Peak Steam Electric )

Station, Unit 1) )

CASE AND MEDDIE GREGORY'S OPPOSITION TO APPEAL OF TUEC AND NRC STAFF l

I.

The Licensing Board's Acceptance of the Challenge to TUEC's Failure to Meet Its Burden of Proof Is Not Contested Here This is a proceeding for consideration of the issuance of an amendment to extend the completion date for Unit 1 of the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) owned by Texas 1

l Utilities Electric Company (TUEC) in Glen Rose, Texas. Pursuant to Section 185 of the Atomic Energy Act (42 USC 92235), 10 CFR

$50.55(b), and 10 CFR s2.732, the burden is on TUEC to demonstrate that it meets the requirements for issuance of the i

amendment. The Commission held in Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nos. 1 & 2), CLI-82-29, 16 NRC 1221, 1229 (1982):

In seeking an extension, a permit holder must put forth reasons,' founded in fact, that 1

Whether this hearing should precede or follow the decision on the requested amendment is one of the issues now pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in CASE v. U.S.N.R.C. (C.A. No. 86-1169).

explain why the delay occurred and those reasons must, as a matter of law, be sufficient to sustain a finding of good cause.

Contrary to these well established principles, Staff and (,

TUEC argue that the only possible valid contention which CASE and Meddie Gregory (Consolidated Intervenors) can present is to prove themselves that there is no good cause for the delay and the extension. However, the contention presented by Consolidated Intervonors is, inter alia, a challenge to the failure of TUEC to meet its burden of proof -- a challenge which neither TUEC nor v

the Staff have contested. Consolidated Intervenors contend that:

Applicants have not met their burden of proving that the delay in completion of construction was not caused by their own dilatory conduct.

In support of this contention, Consolidated Intervenors have alleged that:

Applicants have not given any reason for the existence of the delay. They only assert they need more time to complete a reinspection, redesign, and reconstruction program but they do not disclose the reason why such programs are needed or that the reason for delay was not intentional and without a valid purpose.

The basis for this allegation is TUEC's license amendment application (not the unsworn argument of its counsel) which contains only explanations for why TUEC needs more time for completion of Unit 1 but absolutely no basis for what good cause existed for the delay in the first place.

The Licensing Board held that Consolidated Intervenors presented an adequate basis for their allegation that TUEC had not met its burden of proof. Special Prehearing Conference

w Memorandum and_ Order, Slip Op. p. 10:

9 Petitioners appear to be correct in pointing  !

out that Applicants have not alleged the underlying cause of the delay in completing construction nor what valid purpose may explain that delay.

Thus, regardless of the outcome of this appeal, the decision of the' Licensing Board admitting that portion of Consolidated Intervenors' contention challenging the failure of TUEC to prove that it either did not deliberately cause the delay in completion of construction or if it did that it had a valid business purpgse for doing so will remain and a hearing on that issue will be. r held.

II.

The Appeal Board is Without Jurisdiction To Consider Any Portion of the Appeal, .

Which, at This Time, If Granted, Would Not Result in Denial _of the Hearing This Board lacks jurisdiction to hear any challenge to the grant of a petition to intervene except "on the '

question whether the petition and/or the request for a hearing should have been wholly denied." 10 CFR $2.714a(c). The Appeal Board has consistently applied the corollary of this doctrine to intervenors who sought to appeal the denial of some contentions where other contentions were admitted. See 10 CFR 62.714a(b),

r and see, e.g., Houston Lighting g Power Co. (Allens Creek, Unit 1), ALAB-535, 9 NRC 377, 384'(1979), and Power Authority of the State of New York (Green County), ALAB-434, 6 NRC 471 (1977).

As noted in I., supra, neither TUEC nor the Staff challenge the Licensing Board decision on the admissibility of the allegation that TUEC has failed to meet its burden of proof and I

I

=

j that issue will be litigated. Thus, since the challenges to the admissibility of Consolidated Intervenors' allegations regarding their view of the real reasons for delay would, even if accepted, not wholly dispose of the Petition to Intervene, this Board should not entertain those challenges.

III.

The Licensing Board was correct In Allowing The Challenge Based Upon Establishing That the Real Cause For the_ Delay Was a Deliberate Invalid Purpose The other aspect of Consolidated Intervenors' contention, which TUEC and the Staff do attack, is the allegation regarding the real cause for the delay in constructing the plant. Two issues are raised on appeal by these attacks: (1) whether it is relevant, in deciding if TUEC should be granted the unconditional extension of its construction permit that it is seeking, that the cause for the delay in completion of construction was a deliberato disregard of the admonitions of the NRC staff, outside auditors, and the Licensing Board, for which no valid business purpose exists; and (2) whether, as a matter of law, reference to the documents that demonstrate repeated warnings to TUEC about its failure to properly design, construct, and inspect CPSES Unit 1 and the failure of TUEC either to explain its refusal or tc give a valid business purpose for the refusal are sufficient bases to support this aspect of the contention.

A. Deliberate and Repeated Refusals to Properly

. Design, Construct, and Inspect the Plant, Which Resulted in Delay in Completing Construction of CPSES, Do Not Justify an Unconditional Extension of Time to Complete Construction of CPSES.

In CLI-82-29, the Commission, after analyzing the question of what issues may be raised in a construction permit extension proceeding, concluded, contrary to the thrust of TUEC's pleading, that there are permissible bases for challenging a construction permit extension (Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS,;

Nos. 1& 2), supra, 16 NRC at 1230):

An intervenor is thus always free to challenge a request for a permit extension by seeking to prove that, on balance, delay was caused by circumstances that do not constitute " good cause." (footnote omittedJ In that opinion the Commission also framed the central issue to be addressed in a construction permit extension proceeding (Id.):

We believe that the most " common sense" approach to the interpretation of section 185 and 10 CFR 950.55 is that the scope of a construction permit extension proceeding is limited to direct challenges to the permit holder's asserted reasons that show " good cause" justificatica for the delay.

This articulation of the relevant legal issue was refined by the Appeal Board in Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS No. 2), ALAB-722, 17 NRC 546, 553 (1983):

In this connection, we note that the ultimato " good cause" determination called for by Section 185'of the Atomic Energy Act is whether good cause exists to extend the construction completion date. The statutory focus is not so much (or at least, not exclusively) on an applicant's past conduct, but rather on the future. Plainly then, that ultimato " good cause" determination is expected to encompass a judgment about why the plant shouuld be comleted and is not to r

rest solely upon a judgment as to the i

applicant's fault for delay.

We recognize that the Commission's implementing does not trackregulation, 10 CFR 950.55(b),

the statute in all respects

and focuses on whether the applicant was responsible for the delay. But as we i discern the Commission's intent, its regulation and guidance suggest that, unless the applicant was responsible for the delays

! and acted in a dilatory manner (i.e.,

intentionally and without a valid purpose), a ,

i contested construction permit extension '

proceeding is not to be undertaken at all.

Moreover, even if a properly framed contention proven true,leads to such a proceeding and is the statute and implementing ,

t regulations extending thedopermit.

not erect an absolute bar to A judgment must still be made should as to whether nonetheless continued construction be allowed. .

Thus TUEC must show both that the delay was not caused intentionally or was for a valid business purpose and that there is good cause for the extension.

In Public Ser_vice Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook), CLI-84-6, 19 NRC 975 (1984),

the Commission endorsed the Appeal Board's refinement of the standards applicable to a construction permit extension proceeding.

Consolidated Intervenors contended and the Licensing Board agreed that if, in the face of continuing criticism, TUEC deliberately and repeatedly refused to design, construct, and i inspect its plant properly and that refusal was the cause for the i

! delay in completion of construction, then it could not constitute a valid business purpose for the delay. TUEC challenges this position by arguing, in essence, that deliberately and repeatedly refusing to design, construct, and inspect its plant properly is a valid business purpose for delay in completing construction of

the plant.

' Whatever else constitutes a valid business purpose before the NRC, such deliberate and repeated refusal to do the job right cannot qualify.

A central source of the controversy between TUEC and i

' Consolidated Intervenors arises because we do not have the same view of what delay should be the focus of the inquiry. TUEC i argues that delay refers to the additional time now needed to j

complete design, construction, and inspection and that completing that work will delay completion of Unit 1. Consolidated ,;

Intervenors and the Licensing Board focus on the delay in building the plant properly in the first instance.

That this latter view correctly defines the delay to which the regulation i refers is clear from 10 CFR 650.55(b), which lists several examples of delay that could constitute good cause:

The Commission will recognize, among other things, developmental problems attributable to the experimental nature of the facility or fire, flood, domestic violence,explosion, strike, sabotage, enemy action, an act of the elements, and other acts beyond the control of the permit holder, as a basis for extending the completion date.

All of these are factors which address why more time is needed to complete construction and not whether more time is needed to complete construction.

Thus, in this proceeding, where there is a tacit admission that Unit 1 was not properly built, 2 the focus 2

Exchange TUEC Commission recently conceded that it in'a filing to the Securities and (8-K Filing with SEC, 4/18/86):

now expects that modifications (most of which are minor) will be required on approximately i thirty percent of the pipe supports in Unit 1 and has also directed the replacement of containment electrical penetrations in such I

H of the inquiry is: why wan it not properly built initially, was TUEC responsible, and was its reason for not building it properly

~

a good cause for the delay?

Based on its invalid analysis of what delay is the focus of the inquiry, TUEC arguea that in CLI-82-29 the Commission intended to rule that every application for an extension of a construction permit that had as its purpose completion of construction by correction of past deficiencies would be grant d regardless of why it was necessary to have more time to complete

. proper construction and why the original construction permit time limits were insufficient. TUEC Brief, pp. 20-25. That argument is severely flawed in several crucial respects, all of which demonstrate the fallacy in focussing on the delay necessitated by having to engage in corrective actions rather than the delay in building the plant properly in the first instance.

First, using TUEC's argument, all contentions in the WPPSS case should have been rejected regardless of the reason for the delay in completing lawful construction, since the WPPSS case undeniably involved a request for more time to correct Unit. While this construction effort is expected to be completed before the end of 1986, due to uncertainties regarding further reinspections and rework and the nature and extent of the hearing process before the

. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board thereafter, Electric company is unable at this time to predict how much additional time will be required to obtain license approval to permit the operation of Unit 1 or the extent to which presently estimated construction costs will be exceeded.

construction deficiencies. See particularly TUEC Brief, p. 22.

Of course, that is not what occurred in the WPPSS case and the Commission remanded to the Licensing Board one contention as to which it concluded (CLI-82-29, supra at 1231):

This leaves only joint contention 2 supporting CSP's hearing request, which charges that " delays in construction have been under the full control of WPPSS management." To the extent CSP is seeking to show that WPPSS was both responsible for the delays and that the delays were dilatory and thus without " good cause" this contention, if properly particularized and supported, would be .

litigable. See 10 CFR 92.714.

This holding directly contradicts TUEC's claim that whenever a utility needs more time for correcting construction deficiencies the Commission " created ... a flat exception to the rule on

' dilatory;' this exception is a separate rule excluding a class of contentions on a ger se basis." TUEC Brief, p. 22.

Second, the portion of CLI-82-29 to which TUEC refers is a limited articulation of reasoning applicable to the facts then before the Commission -- facts importantly different from the facts presented here. Significantly, in WPPSS, the intervenor alleged in the first contention relating to WNP-2 that solely because there were construction deficiencies and those deficiencies were the cause for the delay, the delay was not for a good cause. The Commission rejected such an analysis and decided that the mere existence of deficiencies could not prove the absence of a good cause but rather a subjective test focussing on the motive for the delay was required, i.e., was the delay dilatory? Consolidated Intervenors, unlike the WPPSS intervenor, here allege that the motive for the delay was the deliberate and repeated refusal'to build the plant properly in the face of external audits and investigations consistently warning TUEC over a ten-year period.

Thus here the crucial missing ingredient in WPPSS --

the bad motive for the delay --

has been alleged.

Third, the policy applicable i.e.,

to the analysis in CLI-82-29, not discouraging a permit holder from reporting and correcting deficiencies, is not applicable in this case. The refusal to build Unit 1 properly was in the face of repeated warnings from, among others, the NRC and the Licensing Baord and not until the NRC Technical Review Team (TRT)actually found a system-wide QA/0C breakdown and construction and design deficiencies in the allegedly completed plant did TUEC agree ot address these problems.

TUEC did not agree to take the time to correct its past errors until it was forced to do so by the NRC staff, which conditioned its further review of the proposed operating license on TUEC's addressing the problems identified by the TRT.

Surely where the problems whose correction necessitates the extension of time are well known by the NRC staff before th e applicant either acknowledges them or agrees to address them ,

where staff approval of the requested operating license is conditioned on addressing those problems, and where the problems were well known by TUEC for ten years but it did nothing to correct them, there is no opportunity to " discourage permit holders from disclosing and correcting improper construction " .

CLI-82-29 supra at 1231.

What Consolidated Intervonors allege occurred is that TUEC had a policy that it would not obey the procedures for building Unit 1 properly where following those procedures would result in an immediate substantial delay in completing construction. TUEC hoped that it could evade the consequences of such illegal activity (1) by avoiding detection, (2) by post hoc engineering analyses, and/or (3) by seeking an exemption from the regulatory requirement. TUEC knew or should have known that if this scheme did not work there would be a substantial delay, but decided to take the risk. Consolidated Intervenors are entitled to have the opportunity promised by the regulation, the Commission, the

. Appeal Board, and the Licensing Board to prove their allegations since such conduct could not possibly constitute good cause for the delay in completing proper construction of Unit 1.

B. Adequate Basis Was Provided Such That TUEC and the Staff Know What They Will Have to Defend Against or Oppose.

3 In what is the most recent seminal case on the issue of what is an adequate " basis" to support a contention, the Appeal Board reiterated that the standard for deciding whether suf ficient basis exista is whether " applicant and the staf f were supplied with enough 'no that they will know at least generally j what they will have to defend against or oppose.'" Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542, 549 n.

10, quoting from Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Units 2

& 3), ALAB-216, 8 AEC 13, 20 (1974). Neither the Staff nor TUEC

~

3 The original seminal decision was Mississippi Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf

• Units 1 & 2), ALAB-130, 6 AEC 423 (19737, wnich the licensing board and the parties in Allens Creek ignored.

a have claimed or could claim that they do not know what they will have to defend against or oppose in this proceeding.

Perhaps in their initial pleadings in this proceeding Consolidated Intervenors too readily assumed that the Staff and TUEC would appreciate pleadings which were reasonably concise and free of. excess verbiage. Since all parties had been in the operating license proceeding for some time, since all were parties to the proceeding initiated by TUEC's January 29th request for an amendment, and4 since all were appearing before She same licensing board members, Consolidated Intervenors felt confident that TUEC and the Staff would know precisely what documents were referenced in the contentions, and assuredly they do.

During oral argument, we made this even clearer by referencing Appendix B attached to the CASE Request to the Commission in this proceeding when a hearing on TUEC's amendment T~

" serendipitous coincidence," respectively.TUEC and the Staff refel TUEC Brief at p. 26:

Staff Brief at p. 8.

Actually CASE specifically asked for appointment include many of ofsame the thefacts.

same board as was sitting on the oper Fine, Suspension of Construction Activities, CASE Request for Imposition of and Hearing on Application to Renew Construction Permit (1/31/86), p. 14 (hereinafter " CASE Request").

One of those efficiencies is that without unnecessary duplication.all parties and the board have a history th Apparently the Chairman of the ASLB Panel accepted CASE's reasoning and assigned the same judges to hear this proceeding. proceeding as are sitting in the operating license coincidental but That decision was neither fortuitous nor the culmination of CASE's strategy. Were we to strategy, " sagacious"an adjective to describe the result of this immodestly choose

" fortuitous" or " serendipitous coincidence."would seem far more appropriate than 1

. 1 l

application was requested. Appendix B (attached in its entirety to this pleading for the convenience of this Board) consists of 57 pages of summaries of findings and excerpts from more than twenty documents which disclose a long history of repeated warnings about recurring improper practices, and finally confirmation that these practices had in fact led to significant deficiencies in the as-built plant. Consolidated Intervenors have also attached to this Brief references to findings and decisions related to TUEC's failure to properly design the plant and failure to correct design errors.

There really cannot be any serious doubt that this meets and far exceeds the " basis" test laid down by the Appeal Board.

Consolidated Intervenors not only provided the reasoning behind their contention (Houston Lighting i Power Co. (Allens Creek),

supra at p. 548) -- i.e., that the consistent and repeated refusal to follow proper procedures was the cause for the delay in constructing a properly built plant and that was a deliberate decision by TUEC which could not be a valid business purpose --

but also provided extensive and detailed references to some of the evidence upon which they relied for their position (id. at pp. 548-9 and n. 10, and cases cited there).

Apparuntly what TUEC is really objecting to in the failure of Consolidated Intervenors to produce the " smoking gun" -- the memo from a TUEC official confessing that TUEC had the policy it is alleged to have had. Concededly, at least until we have the full discovery to which we are entitled, we will not have such a document or oral confession, and there is no legal requirement that we do so.

That is the crucial difference between providing

=

the reasoning that forms the basis for a contention and providing the evidence to support that reasoning.

However, Consolidated Intervenors do have a wealth of data from which at least a reasonable inference can be drawn that (1)

TUEC deliberately and repeatedly chose not to build its plant properly -- i.e., the ten years of documents warning it that it was ignoring proper procedures and its late (1985) and reluctant (only after the Staff decided to hold up its review pending completion of a reinspection, redesign, and reconstruction effort) agreement to start listening to and doing something about the problems; and (2) TUEC did not have a valid business purpose for its failure to complete the proper construction of the plant in the time allowed by its permit.

Among these documents are the opinions of experts who examined the design, inspection, and construction process at Comancho Peak from time to time and who conclude that TUEC did have the devious and invalid purpose for its conduct that Consolidated Intervenors attribute to it. These opinions are cited in Appendix B to the CASE Request to the Commission, which is attached to this Brief. A few of these expert opinions are reproduced here to illustrate the point (CASE Summary of NRC Inspections and Independent Audits From 1976 to January 1985, pp.

1-2):

In 1976 an internal NP.C trend analysis of Comanche Peak stated:

During the early part of 1976, it became apparent to the principal inspector that the effectivenese, of the licensee's QA/QC Program was in a state of degradation as a result of a domineering and over-powering control by the i

~

contractor's site construction management.

. (NRC Trend Analysis 1976, Staff Exhibit 184,

p. 1, Items 3, f, and 9.)

In 1979 the NRC found that the QA/QC program was ineffective because the Applicant has been led down a poor path by Brown and Root during past years. It appears to [the RRI] that Brown and Root has, in many instances, provided construction procedures to fulfill Appendix B that provide a minimum amount of direction to the construction force and yet comply to the words, if not the spirit of Appendix B.

What I have begun to see, but have difficulty c proving is that the Brown and Root construction philosophy is to build something anyway they want to and then put it up to the engineer to document and approve the "as built" condition. If the engineer refuses, he is blamed for being too conservative and not responsive to the client's needs and thus the driving force behind my request for a special engineering audit of site operations.

4 In 1980, the first annual Systematic Assessment of Licensing Performance report (IE Report #80-25, NRC Staff Exhibit 181), continued to report problems with the QA/QC program, unqualified personnel, and attitude toward regulations.

The report concludes the following about the effectiveness and attitudes of licensing personnel in complying with NRC requirements:

Licensee construction and engineering management -- the NRC personnel stated that it appears there is a continuing tendency to engineer away construction problems rather than enforce compliance to drawings and specifications.

It was this arrogance and obstinance by TUEC that Consolidated Intervenors allege led to the failure to properly build the plant within the time provided. TUEC was taking a calculated risk that it was expediting construction by deliberately short-cutting proper procedures (and continuing to J

4 do so even after numerous warnings) and hoping it would get away with this scheme. It is a fair inference that TUEC knew, or should have known, that if its scheme did not work it could experience a massive delay in completing construction. TUEC's decision.to take the gamble is a legitimate issue to explore in the context of determining whether TUEC had a valid business purpose for the delay in building its plant properly.

IV.

The Licensing Board May Properly Impose Conditions .

On the Approval of An Extension of a Construction Permit Consolidated Intervenors' objective in this proceeding is to prevent TUEC from continuing t~ design, construct, and inspect Unit 1 of Comanche Peak improperly.

Staff and TUEC assert that this objective cannot be achieved in this proceeding because of the limited scope of the jurisdiction delegated to the licensing board and/or because of the Licensing Board ruling that it would not admit the Consolidated Intervenors' contention, which sought, irrespective of the-finding of good cause for the delay, to f impose conditions on the issuance of a construction permit extension.

Staff and TUEC are wrong on both counts.

First, the issue in this proceeding is, at a minimum, whether the extension sought by TUEC should be granted.

Consolidated Intervenors have made clear that the extension requested (an extension without conditions) should be denied.

They have also made clear that there is an extension that they would not oppose -- i.e.,

an extension with certain conditions attached. In short, we have put forth a settlement offer, which l

TUEC may accept on reject. If the extension request it seeks is rejected, it can abandon Unit 1 or seek an extension that will

]

not be opposed. We feel it is important to make this clear at the outset.

Second, the Licensing Board recognized that it could impose ,

conditions on the approval of an extension of the Unit 1 construction permit. What the Board held on pages 11-12 of its Order is that the only conditions that can be imposed on the extension would be conditions that are not independent of the .

admitted contention. Conditions that are related to the admitted contention, which addresses dilatoriness, are litigable. Thus,

.for instance, if the Licensing Board found that TUEC had been dilatory in completing construction of Unit 1 because, inter alia, it deliberately refused, after repeated warnings, to have design changes reviewed and approved by Gibbs & Hill (the plant architect / engineer) before they were implemented, the licensing board could and should impose a condition on the extension that in the future TUEC must implement design changs's only after they have been fully approved. Conversely, if Consolidated Intervenors sought to impose a condition that was unrelated to reasons for the delay, the Licensing Board has decided that such 5

conditions cannot be imposed. .

5 We believe the Licensing Board has too narrowly construed the scope of its' authority and that implicit in the jurisdiction to grant or deny an extension is the jurisdiction to impose conditions on the extension which the Licensing Board determines are essential to assure compliance with NRC regulations. It is not good law or good policy to conclude that in deciding whether to grant a privilege to a party the decision-maker is precluded from taking the steps necessary to assure that the privilege, if granted, is not abused. However, because of the limitations

. _17-m N }

Third, the Licensing Board has the authority and jurisdiction to impose conditions that arise out of the admitted contention on dilatoriness. There cannot be any serious dispute that Licensing Boards have the power to impose conditions, and this happens in virtually every decision on issuance of a construction permit or an operating license. In addition, the Licensing Board can impose conditions that must be met as a necessary (but not sufficient) precedent to the issuance of approval of a license. Such conditions were imposed in this case when the Licensing Board on December 28, 1983, issued its Memorandum and Order (Quality Assurance for Design) and held (LBP-83-81, Slip op. p. 1):

The record before us casts doubt on the design quality of the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (Comanche Peak), both because the Texas Utilities Generating Company, et al. (applicant) has not demonstrated the existence of a system that promptly corrects design deficiencies and because our record is devoid of a satisfactory explanation for several design questions rsised by the Citizens Association for Sound Energy (CASE). We suggest that there is a need for an independent design review and we require applicant to file a plan that may help to resolve our doubts.

In Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris, 1-4), ALAD-577, 11 NRC 18, 29 (1980), reconsidered ALAB-581, 11 NRC 23 (1980), modified CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980), the Appeal Board stated the operative principle as follows:

True enough, in carrying out its adjudicatory responsibilities, a licensing board has broad authority to impose imposed by 10 CFR 92.714a, this issue is not now ripe for review.

conditions on the sought permit or license

, which require that certain measures be taken relating to plant construction or operation in the interest of safety or the preservation of environmental values.

In fact, conditions such as those which Consolidated Intervenors seek here were imposed by the Commission in Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Zimmer), CLI-82-33, 16 NRC 1469, w

1497-90.

However, while the power to impose conditions does exist, it is still not exercisable by a Licensing Board unless it has been delegated the authority to impose such conditions. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris, 1-4), supra. In this proceeding, the authority of the Licensing Board is set forth in CLI-86-04, Slip Op. at p. 11:

we refer CASE's request for a hearing to the Chairman of the ASLBP for designation of a hearing board and further proceedings in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G.

However, the scope of the proceeding is limited to challenges to TUEC's effort to show " good cause" for the extension.

Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Piojects Nos. 1 and 2), CLI-82-29; 16 NRC 1221, 1229 (1982).

A review of page 1229 of the WPPSS decision indicates that the scope of the proceeding here was intended to be the same as the scope of any extension proceeding -- no less, no more -- since page 1229 addresses the generic principles for such a proceeding.

There is nothing in the delegation of the authority to a

-Licensing Board in any construction permit extension hearing, including this one, that limits the authority of the licensing board to impose any condition that the Commission could impose.

Rather, TUEC and the Staff appear to argue that since the only

question before the Licensing Board is whether there is " good cause" for an extension, it follows that the type of an extension to be granted is not an issue. But that reasoning would also apply to the issuance of a construction permit or an operating license where the only issue, narrowly viewed, is whether to grant what the applicant has requested. In theory, were that approach followed, hearings could become perpetual as applicants kept proposing licenses with applicant-crafted conditions in which they hoped to find the right combination of conditions that would be acceptable. Fortunately a saner approach has prevailed and Licensing Boards regularly issue decisions with conditions which an applicant must accept if it wants a license. Of course, the applicant is always free to reject the license conditions and thus reject the license.

The development of the construction permit extension proceeding principles also supports this analysis. In Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS No. 2), supra, 17 NRC at 553, the Appeal Board divided the " good cause" inquiry into two separate questions: first, is there good cause for the delay as articulated by the Commission in CLI-82-297 Second, is there good cause for the extension? This latter inquiry "is expected to encompass a judgment about why the plant should be completed."

Id. In order to conduct this inquiry, the Licensing Board must necessarily examine what it is the utility proposes to do and not merely how much time is needed to do it.

In this proceeding, TUEC asserts that it needs more time in order to conduct reinspections and reanalyses of various structures, systems, and components in response to concerns r ,

raised by the NRC's TRT, the Licensing Board, and other external sources, and to demonstrate the safety of the plant. Letter William Counsil to Harold Denton (1/29/86), pp. 1-2. Surely these asserted reasons for why additional time is needed are subject to challenge in order to determine, inter alia, whether what is proposed will be useful for accomplishing the stated purpose and, if not, what TUEC would have to do to make its future activities useful. The " judgment about why the plant should be completed" necessarily includes a judgment about whether what an applicant seeks to do will be reasonably likely to result in the licensable plant it seeks. For instance, in this proceeding, if Consolidated Intervenors can prove that TUEC's reinspection program is seriously flawed such that it will not be able to establish whether Unit I was or was not properly built, then there cannot be a good cause for an extension of time to pursue such a useless endeavor. A corollary of this proposition is that the Licensing Board could condition the approval of an extension on modifications of the proposed reinspection program for which an extension is sought in order to assure that it will be useful.

Also, in ALAB-722 the Appeal Board concluded that even in the absence of a good cause finding for the applicant an extension might be approved if it is determined that continued construction should still be. allowed. 17 NRC at 553. Here again the Licensing Board would be called upon to make a judgment about the proposed work to be conducted during the extension and to consider conditions which should be imposed if that work is to be deemed sufficient to justify the extension.

l L  ;

Thus the question presented to the Licensing Board in this proceeding encompasses within the good cause determination not only the reason for the delay but whether, in light of the cause for the delay, the work proposed to be conducted during the extension should be allowed and what if any conditions should be imr osed on that work in order to make it allowable.

CONCLUSION For the reasons presented here and in the Licensing Board.

decision, the appeals of the Staff and TUEC should be denied.

t Respectfully submitted, u

THONY Z. Rp Trial Lawye fo Public Justice 2000 P Street, NW, #611 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 463-8600 t Counsel for Meddie Gregory Assisting:

Billie P. Garde Law Graduate f

^/ J ANITA ELLIS

]%

, 426 S. Polk Dallas, TX 75224 (214) 946-9446 Representative for CASE i Dated: May 27, 1986 i

l UNITED STATES

. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

)

TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY, ) Dkt. Nos. 50-445-CPA

- _al.

et )

(Comanche Peak Steam Electric )

Station, Units 1 and 2 )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that CASE AND MEDDIE GREGORY'S OPPOSITION

, TO APPEAL OF TUEC AND NRC STAFF were served today, May 27, 1986, by first class mail, or by hand where indicated by an asterisk, upon the following:

Administrative Judge Peter Bloch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Walter H. Jordan 881 West Outer Drive Oak Ridge, TN 37830 Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom 1107 West Knapp Stillwater, OK 74075 Nicholps Reynolds, Esq.

Bishop,, Liberman, Cook, Purces.1 & Reynolds 1200 6.7th Street, NW Washinhton, D.C. 20036 Docketing & Service Section

. Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission J Washington, D.C. 20555

)

E .

Stuart Treby, Esq.

Geary S. Mizuno, Esq.

Office of Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

' Washington, D.C. 20555 Thomas G . Dignan, Jr.

Ropes & Gray 225 Franklin Street Boston, MA 02110 Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. W. Reed Johnson Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Thomas S. Moore, Esq.

Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 4--

ANTHONY OI

I

- s-.

t.

/$ 3,

/-

j BEFORE THE I

. UNITED STATES , , ': .y '~0 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION {f JW , 3 '

g -/

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board j, l

I' N

./

) '.~ /

In the Matter of

)

TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY, ) Dkt. Nos. 50-445-CPA

-et_al. )

)

(Comanche Peak Steam Electric )

Station, Unit 1) )

l ,-

4 ATTACHMENT I TO CASE AND MEDDIE GREGORY'S OPPOSITION TO APPEAL OF TUEC AND NRC STAFF 4

l

T APPRNDIX B

o

SUMMARY

OF NRC INSPECTIONS AND INDEPENDENT AUDITS FROM 1976 TO JANUARY 1985 In 1976 an internal NRC trend analysis of Comanche Peak stated:

During the early part of 1976, it became apparent to the principal inspector that the effectiveness of the licensee's QA/QC Program was in a state of degradation as a result of a domineering and over-powering control by the contractor's site construction management. (NRC Trend Analysis 1976, Staf f Exhibit 184, p. 1, Hems 3, f, and g)

In 1979 the NRC found that the QA/QC program was ineffective because the Applicant has been led down a poor path by Brown and Root during past, years. It appears to [the RRI] that Brown and Root has, in many instances, provided construction procedures to fulfill Appendix B that provide a minimum amount of direction to the construction force and yet comply to the words, if not the spirit of Appendix B.

What I have begun to see, but have difficulty proving is that the Brown & Root construction philosophy is to build something anyway they want to and then put it up to the engineer to document and approve the "as built" condition.

If the engineer refuses, he is blamed for being too conservative and not responsive to the client's needs and thus the driving force behind my request for a special engineering audit of site operations.

Only recently has there been a real effort on the part of the licensee itself or on the part of Brown & Root, to write explicit instructions to the line inspectors on what they were to inspect. Previously, the procedures were frequently pretty general,-again not too bad if the inspectors were knowledgeable they are not.

in the subject being inspected but terrible if In a couple of cases I have been able to show them that their people are essentially incompetent, even though they have been th, rough the site training and certified as competent.

too often an installation clearly accomplished other '

than as originally designed and buildable has been approved the licensee's onsite engineering are as fulfilling requirements. In effect, the engineer has approved a non-conforming condition in advance of QC being called. QC has

? O.

4 been-signing.for problem the as-built condition and the underlying is not addressed. (NRC Staff Exhibit, p. 2(f))

The report continues on page 3 about trends indicative of poor performance, It seems likely to me that the licensee will use his full

• powers to be less open with us in the area of identified construction deficiencies than he has in the past. I think he will take maximum advantage of part 50.55(e) and the

[NRC] guidance to go through the necessary formalities but avoid, if at all possible, having to report to us. (supra)

In 1980, 4

the first annual Systematic Assessment of Licensing Performance report (IE Report #80-25, NRC Staff Exhibit 181), c continued to report problems with the QA/QC program, unqualified 4

personnel, and attitude toward regulations.

The r.eport concludes the following about the effectiveness t.

~

and attitudes of. licensing personnel .n u' in-complying.with NRC

~

^

requirements: ' ' ~~

y .

Licensee construction and engineering management -- the NRC personnel stated that it appears there is a continuing tendency to engineer away construction problems rather than enforce compliance to drawings and specifications.

{

Again the Applicant promised to reform and correct its programmatic and personnel weaknesses by taking unspecific

" management action with the engineering and construction

, ' personnel to alleviate this situation." (p. 5) 1 4- In 1981 Comanche Peak underwent a survey conducted by the

'American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) in connection with obtaining an extension on Brown and Root's Authorization (N-stamp).

That survey failed to provide Brown & Root the sought-after extension. Instead the survey team decided that a re-survey was required.

In a November 23, 1981 letter from ASME I

Manager of Accredidation to then QA Director R.J. Vurpillat, the i

1 3

O

% ~

following observations were noted.

(CASE Exhibit 590)

The deficiencies noted in your program include, but are not limited.to, the following items which require corrective actionso ,

I. Quality Assurance Manual (A) The manual was vague, failed to establish required controls, responsibilities, or provide for objective evidence that required activities were satisfactorily performed.

(B)

The manual established the Summer addenda 1974 for piping and Winter addenda 1974 for component supports as the Code effectivity. The manual addressed activities only permitted by later Code addenda; such; as NC-2610, NA-3867.4(f) and supply of material - NCA-3820(e), without any identification of the applicability of these provisions.

(C) The manual control system did not include the exhibits displayed in the manual or any manual approval method.

(D) The program elements of process control, nonconformity control and document control required significant changes.

(E) The design control element (control) of field change design information and feed back of construction information to the Owner) was missing from the manual.

(F) All elements required changes to provide definitive information since few auditable controls were included.

II. Implementation (A) Document Control - The manual requires that the File Custodians in each department maintain a log of design changes received from the Owner. The File Custodian is to mark the involved document to indicate that a design change had been received and then the document user checks the log to find the applicable l

l design change (s).

f e

The log being maintained by the QA Department File f Custodian information. contained numerous mistakes and was missing i by the team, Three of three design packages, checked identified in the log. design changes not properly contained (B) Instruction Procedures & Drawings - B&R Construction Procedure 6.9G, reviewed by the Site QA i

Manager, was the Code.(NA-5241)in direct conflict with the OA Manual and signhold ANI a blank points.process sheet and then B&R would add thein The AIA representatives stated that had requested the procedure to be revised.this The procedur procedure has not been revised.

The purpose of the Site OA Manager's review is to assure that the procedure complies with the Code and the OA Manual.

(C)

Control of Purchased Materials. Items and Services (1) from a vendor thatVendor Control - B&R procured plate material Material Supplier of bolting and plate materialsthey . Th'b had surveye material this vendor. had been formed into a saddle configuration by The B&R survey and qualification of this vendor did to forming and thenot address B review of any operation relative forming process or pr&R ocedure.purchase order did not define a (2)

The same material addressed in C1 was This material had not been receipt inspected in non identified as required by the B&R purchase .

B&R ordercomp had divided the identification material and transferred the material incorrectly. B&R does not verify _the transfer of material identification and during the review of the manual stated that this verification was unnecessary. (emphasis added)

(D)

Control of Construction Processes -

(1) that had not been reviewed with the ANIProcess Sheets were o Manual and NA-5241 of the Code. ment of hold points in noncom 068-002-S33R and AF-035-023-S33A are included in thisThe process finding.although production. numerous such process sheets are in (See B above)

(2)

Welding Procedure Specification 11012 for welding wih impact. test requirements did not specify the travel speed but instead controlled the heat input by Volt / amp electrode range and maximum bead width for a given diameter.

010AB127 than that allowed for this by the WPA WPS. recorded a beam width greaterThe Pro (S)

Report Nonconformity Control - Nonconformity Control been welded into the system backwards.(NCR) M-2952 reporte B&R OA

determined the disposition to be rework and not repair and reweld and therebyit the disposition to cut the spool piece out in the correct configuration was not reviewed by welding engineering, as would have been required by a repair designation. There appeared to be no consideration material, etc. of the heat input effects on the nonconformance. as would be expected with this type of (F)

Identification and Control of Material and Items -

Component Supports are procured as stamped items by the Owner.

225. The Code Data Report does not list Code Case N-The Component Support is supplied to B&R with only the Code Data Report by the Owner.

the component support, removing the welds,B&R then cuts material to fabricate other component supports.and uses the does not have the Certificate of Compliance (C ofB&R C) <

for the material.

(G)

Authorized Nuclear Inspector Involvement - The ANI hold points on process sheets have been bypassed on numerous occasions. The ANI logbook documents these conditions and the volume would indicate a significant breakdown of the program and interface between B&R and the Authorized Inspection Agency personnel (See B and D-1 above).

According to a Brown and Root interoffice about the ASME Resurvey team's exit interview held on January 20, 1982 (CASE Exhibit 604), ASME still found problems with the QA program.

That was confirmed by a letter from Hartford Steam Boiler to ASME dated February 8, 1982 (CASE Exhibit 605) which detailed three findings of the ASME Resurvey Team which required resolution.

Finding #1corrective proposed of ASME Resurvey action, and Team; consists of deficiency, summary of verification of actual corrective actions taken. [ Clearly shows B&R QA Program problems with vendor supplied items, although problem.]was supposedly taken care of after ASME identified problem (CASE Exhibit 606)

~

Finding #2corrective proposed of ASME Resurvey action, Team; consists of deficiency, actual corrective actions taken.and summary of verification

[This finding of is another indication the approvedwhereby list. B&R procured items from a supplier not on the supplier held ASME N stamp and to then add them toThe corrective ac approved suppliers list.

Again, raises questions about how many other vendor items were procured by B&R from non-approved suppliers that were not caught by either ASME or B&R OA program, and every problem.] neither of which are designed to catch each (CASE Exhibit 610)

Finding #3 of the ASME Resurvey Team; deficiency, proposed corrective action,consists of verification of actual corrective actions taken.and summary of Finding relates to welding materials received from vendor which wer receipt inspected and accepted but not identified and e documented as having had the receipt material was scrapped (see CASE Exhibitinspection. CThe 613). However, as a result of this finding, receiving inspectors in proper use of procedures.it was necessary to be somewhat late in the game Seems to to be training inspector receiving inspections (Feb. 1982).] s in (Case Exhibit 611)

The 1982 SALP reviewed the following noncompliances , during the 1981-82 review period. '

s The following deficiencies were identified by Region IV I E inspectors:

Personnel not properly trained and indoctrinated Failure to follow procedures for verification of the performance of automatic welding machines Failure to follow electrical cable nonconformance procedures for Failure to follow procedures for hoisting safety-related components Failure to update procedures Failure to provide appropriate instructions for installation of Class IE equipment Failure to follow welding procedures Failure to provide instructions and procedures appropriate chargers to installation of Class IE battery Failure to follow procedures for cable pulling of damaged electric,al cableFailure to follow procedures r for report Failure to follow welding procedures Failure to follow electrical inspection procedures '

Failure Class to establish 5 pipe support quality systemsassurance program for

Failure to stamps inspection follow inspection procedure for returning Failure to follow inspection procedure to initial and date operations traveler Failure to report a significant construction deficiency (50.55(e))

Failure to drawings follow construction procedures required by In Spring of 1982 the CPSES Quarterly Report on QA Department and QA Program Activities for the First Quarter of 1982 (CASE Exhibit 620) reported:

c (1) The constant revision of the QA procedures and instructions prevented the QA/QC program from being adequately and implemented Construction and followed personnel alike. by management, QA/QC, (2) Internal, external, and vendor audits for the 1st Quarter of 1982 reveal deficiencies which have been recurring since the inception of the QA/QC program at Comanche-Peak.

(3) Trend evaluations performed on deficiency control documents reveal that recent trende in both construction and engineeringtrends, deficiency type problems are mere extrapolations of past indicating that corrective actions taken on previous deficiencies did not prevent recurrence.

On December 3, 1982, the second SALP report was issued which again noted deficiencies or violations in:

plant operations and preoperational testing, noting that tests were scheduled "out of sequence with con struction status, coupled with the lack of timely test procedure generation, are examples of lack of experience" (p. 4) failure to follow Quality Assurance Procedures for inspection of coatings (81-15) failure to perform inspections of installation acti-vities

11) related to Unit 1 Containment Polar Crane (82-failure to properly indoctrinate and train personnel performing activities affecting quality (82-11) inadequate control of procurement document and

purchased materials (82-03)

In October 1982 the Comanche Peak station received a Design and Construction Self-Initiated Evaluation, using methodology prepared by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO).

That evaluation, transmitted to the Board on March 8, 1983, also contained numerous warnings about the failure of the OA/OC program.

Construction procedures were observed as not being followed.

Construction procedures. personnel were observed bypassing steps of weld This observation was performed on balance of.

plant work activities and not safety-related items. (p. 123)

Procedures do not appear sufficient activities. to control construction It was noted that welding had been initiated on large bore piping attachments with water _ flowing through the pipe, contrary to welding procedures. No construction procedure 127) was found which would preclude this situation. (p.

Uncontrolled drawings were observed being used. Sketches had beenitems.

supplied made(p. to 129) assist in the modifications of vendor The Startup Support Group checks their records to determine the status released. of systems for Hangers, however, which work packages are being and are being issued directly to the field without thisare being treated differently review.

They are only aware of attachments when they noticed work being performed or a question arose. Another instance was of welding brought being performed on a turned over system to my attention. (p. 133)

Several sketches had been made using the details in CP-CPM 9.13.

These uncontrolled sketches are used to provide the physical information required to correctly modify the transition kits. Using uncontrolled sketches does not assure control,of the processes used to fabricate these snubber assemblies. (p. 133)

Paper tags with no protective covering on them are used for calibration may stickers allow for and the the dates on duration between the calibration calibrations stickers to become unreadable calibration. (p. 148)and cause a tool to be used out of The majority of activities evaluated under the performance objective was generally satisfactory. However, the procedure for indoctrination and training of CPP engineers

L

. b.

is inadequate as it does not require or document formalized training in site procedures. (p. 198)

Comanche Peak Project engineers are indoctrinated by required reading of listed documents. Any additional i training is the responsibility of the CPP discipline engineers and is not documented. The adequacy of the

]-

training of the engineers in the application of site procedures is questionable. (p. 199)

Current TUGCO-TUSI policy documents and procedures pertaining to training were reviewed. There were no of CPP engineers in site engineering procedures other thanpro CP-EP-2.0. (p. 200)

Discussed Pipe Hanger Design with TSG supervisor. There is no formal training to procedures / instructions / guidelines.

f Supervisors require personnel to read documents. (p. 200)

Sampling of _ DCA's/ CMC's indicate that " engineering / design

. error" documents.is the reason for processing of the design change Such an approrach, of using general terms in i

.of identifying the error, the root cause of the prevents errors. identification (p. 226) and trending

,! Three findings, included below, contain explanations by TUEC management which are illustrative of its dangerous management j attitude.

Finding:

The TUSI engineering procedures / instructions define safety-related activities to be performed. However, Quality Assurance review and concurrence with these procedures / instructions is not required by the Comanche Peak Quality Assurance Plan.

-Response: We agree with the finding. Our experience leads us to 4 believe that this is the best approach for the following reason: Quality is designed and built into a plant - not "QA-d" into it. In our system, each functional group is responsible for developing a working knowledge of the requirements and commitments that apply to their activity. Each group is responsible for developing and establishing procedures

~

that not only ' address requirements and commit-ments, but also serve as management tool to accomplish activities uniformly.

TUGCO OA verifies through timely audits that the above described system results in a quality awareness and places work. responsibility on the people who are doing the This verification by TUGCO OA is accomplished by assuring that procedures / instructions are adequate and i

3 4

O effective. TUGCO OA also assures that they contain

' proper controls and that they are consistently implemented.

Finding:

DOuen reviewing CP-EP-6.0, Preparation of Engineering  ;

Procedures and Instructions, it appeared that TUCGO OA does not review site engineering procedures / instructions.

Response: In various discussions with the Site OA Manager and the

'OA/OC Supervisor, the following was noted:

TUGCO audits include review of engineering procedures, as well as technical audits. However, in accordance with TUGCO corporate policy, OA review of site engineering procedures / instructions is,not required. (emphasis added) c Finding:

The procedure for DCA/ CMC's does not require formal inter-disciplinary review at the site. There is the possibility that two or more disciplines could issue i.e., design change requests for the same problem area; the procedure does not require interdiscipline review of DCA's/ CMC's.

Response We agree with the finding. However, our experience has indicated that the after-the-fact. design review performed at New York provides adequate assurance that no problem of safety significance will remain unresolved.

(pp. 220-222)

In late 1982 a special NRC Construction Appraisal Team (CAT) also identified significant-deficiencies in the OA/QC program.

In its report, released April 11, 1983 (Staff Exhibit 206), the team identified the following construction program weaknesses:

1.

Results of the inspection indicated a breakdown in fabrication, installation, and inspection in the heating, systems. ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) 2.

A number of examples were identified of failure to meet  !

criteria for separation of safety-related cables from mechanical structures and piping, and separation of redundant trains of safety systems....

3.

The licensee's quality assurance program did not ensure that certain hanger, support, electrical and mechanical equipment was installed to the latest design documents, and commensurately that an appropriate inspection was 1

- _ _ _ - , . _ _ _ - _ , - - . - _ - _ - , - - _ _ _ . . ._.- - - ~

conducted to the latest design documents.

4.

Findings also indicate a number of instances where nonconforming conditions were identified; however, var 4Ious methods (e.g., punchlists, inspection reports, ver$hl, and other informal methods) were used to address and resolve these nonconformances. These methods do not comply with requirements to identify nonconforming conditions and provide corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

5.

The licensee's Quality Assurance audit program should have been more effective in detecting and obtaining correction as of deficiencies those in the HVAC system, in safety-related work; such electrical components. mechanical equipment, and In summary, the identified weaknesses require increased n dedication by management at all levels to assure completed installations meet design requirements and that inspection documentation reflects that the completed installations have been adequately inspected to the latest design document.

On September 13, 1984 the Technical Review Team issued its first of three reports into the " allegations of improper construction practices at the facility." (p. 1) This report covered the areas of electrical / instrumentation, civil / structural and test programs.

This report provided the utility with a confirmation of allegations that:

1) electrical quality control inspectors were not aware of certain inspection attributes for witnessing the installation of " nuclear heat shrinkable cable insulation sleeves t

2) inspection reports didn't contain the " witnessing" attribute'for splice installation

3) lack of cable splice, qualification requirements and circuit operability i 4) drawings and "as-built" cable terminations are in disagreement

5) improperly closed NCRs on vendor-installed GE motor control centers

6) violations of minimum separation requirements for

j safety-relate'd cable within flexible conduits 7) violation of minimum separation requirements between safety and non-safety cables 8) beenno requirement performed NRC review of separation criteria has

' 9) violation of separation criteria inside control panels 10) inconsistent support installation for non-safety related conduits with seismic requirements 11) lack of inspections verification documentation for electrical OC 12) for OCtotally compromised testing and certification programs inspectors ,

13) cavity omission and unauthorized cutting of rebar from reactor 14) buildingunauthorized cutting of rebar from the fuel handling

15) . questionable concrete strength tests 16) questionable " air-gaps" between concrete structures

17) inadequate control room design (seismic)

18) . inadequate, incomplete, test procedures and unreliable heat functional

19) unreliable CILRT resulta 20) tests.use of unqualified craft personnel to perform start-up On November 29, 1984 the TRT issued its second of three reports into their investigation of allegations in the mechanical and miscellaneous areas. They found that:

1) No fillet weld inspection criteria existed for certain types of skewed welds. *

"... although the the small sample of welds inspected by TRT are acceptable, due to deficiencies in inspection criteria, records and the apparent lack of inspection the TRT is not certain whether other type skewed welds were inspected properly. This is a generic issue involving many NF supports in various safety-related systems." (p. 2) 2)

R No evidence installed, and notexisted cut. that anchor bolts were properly "The TRT concludes that such unauthorized bolt-cutting and lack of installation inspection records is a violation of Criticism XVII in Appendix B of 10 C.F.R. 50 and ... General Design Criterion 1 of 10 C.F.R." (p. 2)

3) ' Piping systems (Main Steam, Aux.

are routed from the Electrical ControlSteam I) and Feedwater)

Building (seismic Cat to the Turbine Building (non-seismic Cat I) without any isolation.

} 4) Uncontrolled repairs supports, cable tray cable tray supports and base plates (plug welds) of holes in pipe L

supports, Unit 2). (confirmed in

"Although the effects of unauthorized,

uninspected plug welds in some locations ... will beundocumented and inconsequential, critically located their effect in critical locations in supports or base plates could affect their structural integrity and intended function." (p . 4)

5) "...

inadequate requirements and construction practices and general.for temporary supports for piping and equipment info i In particular, evaluations to assure the adequacy of temporary supports during flushing and installation were not required.

the analyses, The deficiencies in specifications and construction practice identified of Appendixabove B to 10constitute C.F.R. 50."a violation (p. 5) of Criterion V

6) "...

a design change in the RPVRI support ring (i.e.

insulation) locating the ring outside rather than inside the RPVRI and the shield wall.resultedThe TRT in a limited review of theclearance between the

! 50.55(e) report revealed that TUEC failed to (1)

] address the fundamental issue of design change impact on 2 wasannulus cooling similarly flow, and(p.

affected." (2)6)determine whether Unit 7) design Polar Crane bracket and seismic connections exceeded requirements.

Finally, several weeks ago the Technical Review Team released a 25 page summary of its findings which, according to the January 8 report, indicates:

A.

TUEC failed to periodically assess the overall been no regular reviews of program adequacy by senioreff management.

Further, TUEC did not assess t effectiveness of its QC inspection program.he B.

During the peak site construction period of 1981-2

.TUEC employed only four auditors, ,

all of whom had questionable qualifications in technical disciplines.

Although charged with overview of all site construction and associated vendors, these Dallas based auditors provided activities. only limited QA surveillance of construction C. Repetitive NCRs were retrain construction issued that identified the need to personnel in the requirements and contents of QA procedures.

request One corrective (CAR) dealing with inadequate action constructi training and records remained open for one year.on The identical problem was identified in a subsequent CAR r; which onsite TRT's still had not been closed at the time of the review.

D.

The TRT found many examples of incomplete and inadequate workmanship and ineffective QC inspection i n Section 4evaluation of the as-built program. (See TUEC's for a detailed discussion.)

E.

Some craft workers newly assigned as QC inspectors were in a position to inspect their own work and records Site management did not view this lack of separation .

between production and inspection roles as a potential conflict-of-interest.

F.

There were potential weaknesses in the TUEC 10 CFR 50.55(e) deficiency-reporting system.

procedures did not identify what types Applicableof deficiencies constituted significant breakdowns in the QA program, nor how they should be evaluated for reportability to the NRC.

Evaluation guidelines for reporting hardware deficiencies lacked clarity and definitive instructions and the threshold for reporting deficiencies was too high.

G.

The TUEC exit interview system for departing employees as evidenced by the lack of employee confidence, appear limited implementation, explanations and ra failure to document corrective actions tionale, and failure to complete and to determine root causes.

H.

The B&R corrective action system was generally ineffective and was bypassed by the B&R QA Manager.

I.

The and TUEC corrective action system was poorly structured ineffective.

Additionally, in 1978 the Management Analysis Corporation (MAC) conducted an audit of the Quality Assurance program of Texas Utilities Generating Company to determine the adequacy of the program as related to the NRC's requirements and the effectiveness of implementation to meet program requirements.

The scope of the audit included commitments made in the PSAR, the corporate OA manual, the project procedures manual, and the Brown & Root OA manual and procedures related to the Comanche Peak site.

Their findings, including a finding that as late adC 1978 the OA program did not conform to Appendix B requirements, are included in their entirety as further evidence that the terms of the construction permit were not complied with.

(Exhibit B-1) h ADMISSIONS BY SPOKESPERSONS FOR TUEC (OR AS CONTAINED IN DEFICIENCY REPORTS, NCRs, OR OTHER TUEC-GENERATED DOCUMENTS)

December 18-19, 1985, Meeting between NRC and TUGCO regardi ng

, breakdown in the Unit 1 cable tray as-built program anQ status of CPRT program plan activities:

The NRC inspection of the Comanche Peak Unit 1 cable first. tray as-built program was discussed The purpose of this inspection was verify the accuracy of the as-built data to developed by EBASCO which would be used in

.their reanalysis of the cable tray supports.

T. Westerman (NRC) presented a summary of the -

findings 1985 identified in the November 18-23, inspection. Out of 32 cable tray supports inspected, the independent NRC inspection team found 19 supports which had discrepancies.

W. Counsil (TUGCO) then presented a summary of the actions, and the consequential findings, taken by by V. Noonan Texas Utilities after being informed (NRC) on December 3, 1985 of the NRC inspection results.

The first action was a stop-work sampling order; the second was to develop a program. This sampling program was to confirm the NRC findings and to insure that this problem was confined to Unit 1. TUGCO's preliminary findings identified that there are deviations from the as-built program on Unit 1 and that the problem is confined to Unit 1.

W. Counsil said investigation he that the results ordered from indicated ana that supervisor had reinterpreted work procedures to eliminate double-checking of inspection results and that the supervisor had placed production quotas on inspection teams.

January 13, 1985, Summary of Meeting Held on December 18-19, 1985 re Discussion of Comanche Peak Unit 1 cable tray as-built program anu status of CPRT program plan activities.

Similar problems have been discovered by the staff in other areas of the plant.

Additionally, the record produced through

. -. _ = - .

discovery and investigation confirms that a major breakdown in compliance with federal and/or corporate procedures occurred during the life of construction.

See, generally, record of recent 50.55(e) reports, significant design adequacy review reports, nonconformance reports, deficiencies. and all other identifications of 4

4 i.

j e

1 e

i s

f f

I s

e

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF STAFF INVESTIGATIONS OF ALLEGATIONS BY FORMER WORKERS AT UNIT 1 AS DETAILED IN THE SSERS; AND THE EG&G FINDINGS Five Supplemental Safety Evaluation Reports have been issued since January 1985 which detail the findings and conclusions of the NRC's Technical Review Team into allegations provided to the TRT by allegers.

SSER #7, which deals with electrical and instrumentation issues, SSER #8, which addresses miscellaneous quality and hardware issues, SSER #9, which deals with protective s

coatings allegations, SSER #10, which addresses mechanical and piping concerns, and SSER #11 on OA/QC allegations.

The significance of the TRT's findings is demonstrated by the conclusions of the QA/QC Group regarding the implementation of the QA/QC program approved-by the original FSAR. The summary, pages P-27 to P-35 of SSER #11, are attached in their entirety.

The undeniable conclusion of the TRT's findings is that the QA/QC program at Comanche Peak failed over the life of construction. (Exhibit B-2)

In September 1985 the EG&G issued its supplementary report into the alleged climate of intimidation. The supplement, while only reviewing a selection of the harassment and intmidation

. incidents pursued during the licensing case and none of the incidents of harassment of cr. aft personnel, engineering personnel, or auditors, still reached the conclusion that some incidents of harassment had occurred. The report concluded:

In summary, a number of managerial practices exist which, while not intimidating, may not have been conducive to good job performance.

The job skills of inspectors may la

have been> negatively impacted by poor communication with their supervisors, inadequacy incineir job training, infrequent feedback on performance.andSome evidence exists that inspectors were asked to perform taska without adequately unde'rstanding what Was expected or why the work was perforiced.

Difficulties in dealing with crafts-were apparently accepted rather than managed, fostering with more little attention cooperative devoted to working relat'ionships. A lack of clarity prevailed regarding the NRC. appropriate employee interfaces with The general lack of supervisory.

attention to the human dimension may have go'nerated mistrust, suspiclon, of credibility with employees. and some lack <

I r

a

• m-w k

w ,

4' t

S s

4 S

f

' lo

SUMMARY

OF PRELIMINARY DECISIONS OF THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD On December 28, 1983, the ASLB issued a Memorandum and Order (Quality Assurance for Design) which contained the Board' s initial conclusions on the question of the design adequacy of Comanche Peak. The Board stated:

Thequality design recordofbefore us casts Peak the Comanche doubtSteam on the Electric Station (Comanche Peak), both because the Texas Utilities Generating Company, etc al(applica of a system that promptly corrects design deficiencies of andexplanation a satisfactory because our forrecord is devoid several design questions raised by the Citizens Association for Sound Energy (CASE) . We suggest that there is a need for an independent design review and we require applicant resolve ourtodoubts.

file a plan that may help to On October 2, 1985, the Board stated in a Memorandum and Order (Applicants' Motion for Modification) that nothing subsequently presented to them in the record since December 1983 has detracted from the conclusion-reached above.

20 L-

/

!O APPENDIX B TEXA5 UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS c

• h

/'

l t -

TUGC0 AUDIT -

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

.O t. OaGAu m TIOu

~

A. General ~

TUGC0 Quality Assurance has undergone considerable reorganization in the past year. The general thrust of this effort has been the assumption of greater direct involvement in the management and supervision of the Comanche Peak Quality Assurance program. It is to be noted that important shifts in responsibility were being made at the time of MAC's review.

As e part of this assessment , MAC evaluated the reactions of key managers, -

supervisors and inspectors to the overaII changes that have taken piace to date. -

V It was. generally observed that those interviewed. thought that with few exceptions the changes were for the better. There appeared tn be a team effort ort the part of QA and Construction with excellent TUSI executive management and project management support of the QA program. There was ner noticeable problem.wittr organizationai prejudice brought about by the organizational intermixing of TUSI,. Browrr & Root or Gibbs. & Hill work forces and supervision.

B. Organization '

During the course of the audit MAC discussed the value of a revised organizational structure with the TUGC0 Quality Assurance Manager and the Manager, Site Surveillance.

4 It is reconnended that TUGC0 adopt art organizational realignment of

, activities as set forttr irr Exhibit I, whereby Qualf ty Engineering and Inspection report to tne Site QA Supervisor as two separate sub-organizational entities with responsibilitier as defined in Exhibit 1.

Such an organization will better supolement th' e existing Construction organization and will per nit better organization for handling day-to-day site problems as well as implementing recomendations of this report.

This is particularly so in the area of inspection planning.

b

TUGC0 OBSERVATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS C. Quality Surveillance Comittee AIT minutes of meetings of the 05C since its inception were reviewed.

[- It is noted that the QSC was established as a mechanism for providing r -

to;r TUGC0 management with a periodic update on such matters as " schedules

, and miTestones" or " audits and corrective actions".

It was noted that recent meetings dealt with tracking on the status of i action ttems as set forth in the Outstanding Surevillance Report Etems or the QuaTity Assurance items of Concern Report.

3 In such instances it appeared the Quality Surveillance Comittee was. taking on the refe of a task force or problem solving group. The problem that exists if tne QS assumes. sucir a role is that problems would tend to await the three month meeting cycle before the necessary management attention is effected.

It is reconnended that TUGCQ re-evaluate the charter of the consideration given as. to its value tot the project recognizing that:

T.

AT.T action to resolve problems should be handled on a day-to-day b through the functioning organization, and Z.

The primary objective of maintaining management awareness of Qua Assurance status might be accomplished more efficiently, effectively and on a more timely basis through a monthly Quality Assurance progress report distributed to the TUGCO/TUSI executives.

U.

Qualificatiert of Personnel MAC reviewed the qualifications of all TUGC0/TUSI and Gibbs & Hill Quality Assurance personnel and many of the Brown & Root personnel. It was observed that most of the TUGC0/TUSE Quality Assurance personnel have gained their Quality Assurance experience through Comanche Peak activities only.

Although the project has provided valuable experience, it is rec-amended that any future assignments in Quality Assurance be filled witn Q quality engineers hired from outside the company with broad nuclear ex-perience,. preferably in construction. Such experience added to the existing staff will serve TUGCO/TUSI well in accomplishing the important

- ^ v

~~D

. TUGC0 085ERVATICNS & RECCffENDATIONS 3 piping, electrical and startup activities ahead.

g MAC had occasion throughout the audit to assess the quaiffications and a experience of 20-30 inspectors throughout the construction site. These observations are worth mentioning:

1. The inspectors are generally young and inexperienced with many having l as little as six months experience in inspection.

2' There was air obvious need for more seasoned inspectors to work with the novice inspectors ort a day-to-day basis.

3. Too much responsibiTfty is placed on the inspectors with respect to preparatforr of inspectiori planning, resolutfort of site problems and

, determinatfort of the design configuratfort base for performance of inspections.

E

• II QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAY The Quality Assurance Program is defined in three basic documents:

The Corporate Quality Assurance Manual Chapter 17 of the PSAR

The Comanche Peak QuaTity Assurance Plan These documents are not irt total agreement with one another. Since enere is no other nuclear plant currently planned and since the authority cele-gations identified irt the Corporate Manual are not irt consonance with practices ort Comanche Peak,. TUGCQ should consider discontinuance of the l Corporate Manual unless. there are other projects to which it is to be applied. If a. Corporata Manual is required at a later date, a new one jg could be prepared based ort Comanche Peak experience and the requirements of any new projects to which it would be applied.

The Comanche Peak Quality Assurance Plan addresses only the following criteria of the eignteen identified in 10CFR50 Appendix B.

a m

U TUGCO-CBSERVATIONS i RECOMMENDATICNS l .:._

i O Organization  !

Desigrr Control Procurement Administration Inspectiorf l Nonconformance Control Document Control Records ,

Audits With the- expanded responsibilities of the TUGC0 Quality Assurance Depart-

' ment, the plan needs to be expanded to address aTI eighteen criteria to reflect the creation and functions of the procurement Department and to

!I be consistent with: the authority deTegations and functions stfli resting with Gibbs & Hili and with Brow & Root.

There needs to be a plan for procedural identiffcation and development and a schedule and assigned responsibilities for their completion, incTuding

. a complete architecture of QuaTity Assurance procedures project procedures and interfacing procedures of the Architect / Engineer and Constructor. The effort shouTd be te minimize the nunter of procedures required and to eliminate dupitcating or overlapping procedures through consolidation of detafT and joint approvais of the organizations involved. It is recermnended that the Quaitty Assurance Manager use his organization as. the driving force to achieve required procedural coverage on schedule.

It was. noted that idGCG is planning on obtaining its own Code manual.

The stated reasort for this was the fear thac Browrr & Root would n Code acceptance. The auditors feel that the Browrr i Root manual would be acceptable to, the code Survey Teant and that its weid practices ar exemp1 f-find in, the Weld Shop are very acceptable. The auditors are of the opinion that obtaining a Code Stamp wili be difficult where all the work of implementing the progrant is perfor,ned by others.

III. DESIGN CONTROL The present system of expedicing field changes by referring design changes te the original design organization for approval after the fact does not

TUG C0 CBSERVATICNS & RECCMMENDATIONS 7 -i-O et th fat at or iocraso ^aaeadix a aor or anst "45 2 11. which re9uire /

that field changes be subject to design controls comensurate with those 0 exercised on the original design. TUGC0 audits have already disclosed that the Architect / Engineer has not been reviewing field originated changes .'

on a concurrent basis, thus the design engineer's cements may be received

• after the specific construction work is complete resulting in possible loss of design integrity, undue pressure on the designer to justify wnat has been done, loss of designer responsibility or possible extensfve repairs.

It is reccmended that a system for expediting review and approval by the originaT designer be established on all safety related changes using teTephone,. telecopier or teiex as necessary to coordinate and document change approvais.

IV. PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT CONTROL Except for site procurements, the Comanche Peak Quality Assurance pian

, does not provide for a review of procurement documents and their changes prior tar placing. a purchase order. This is. contrary to requirements of 10CFR5G Appendix S,. Criterion I'T and ANSE N45.2.T3,. " Quality Assurance Requirements for Control of Procurement.....*. There is a review of pro-curement documents by Quality Assurance during Design Review, but is was ascertained that this was a review of the drawings and specifications and not the purchase order or contract.

procurement document review by Quality Assurance should assure that ali necessary requirements for access. to the supplier's facilities are provided and that r.ecessary controis and documentacion have been specified and

that the appropriate ccnfiguration has. been defined.

j The review should also assure that requirements imposed are appropriate to the procurement and that there are no excessive requirements for quality program develop-ment or for the delivery of unnecessary documentation. Scme of the. pro-curement packages reviewed apoeared to have both blanket requirements for Quality Assurance programs and excessive requirements for documentation.

f55E l

TUGC0 GBSERVATIONS & RECOMMENCATICNS t

V. INSTRUCTIONS A. Insoection Planning The current system of providing inspection instructions or checklists to the inspectors is too generic in nature. In the case of concrete inspection planning the inspector fills out a simple pour card with an attached Concrete Placement Checklist, a Reinforcing Steel, Electrical, Mechanical and Embedded Item Placement Checklist and a Stainless Steel Liner Checklist, k the combination of wnich:

1.

Provides no. information with respect to unique, encedments,or penetrations to be incorporated. in the pour.

2'.

PTaces an undue burden art the inspector in attempting. to deterTnine applicable drawings, specifications, applicable revisions and k applicable DC 00A's.

Muctr of this input should be prbvided by clerical support under the direction and subsequent approvat of

(, a. quality engineer.

Inspectors estimated that 45-70% of their time is spent on docu-mentatiert rather than physical inspection activity. WelI thought out planning could do much to alleviate this situation.

Traceability It was observed that Comanche Peak has established a program of unnecessary material traceability which, based en one estimate, consumes

!h at least a three-mart levei of effort and pernaps as high as a six man leveT of effort if one considers all the suprart functions required to

{ implement the program. ATT anchor bolts ud S series cadwelds are fully traceable ter neat numbers such that through an elaborate and extensive system of mapping all installations, the capability exists of identifyina each encedded anchor bolt,. B series cadwelds and other i

standard embeds to its heat number. There exists no such NRC or industry requirement ir this degree of traceability. It is inter-esting to note that recar does not require traceability on Cemanche Peak (and shouldn't), MAC< ' nows of no other project that imposes this require-I E

TOGC0 OBSERVATIONS & REC 0ffEN0ATIONS_ _ _ . _ - . - - - - - - - - - - - - -

l

-7 ment andit.could not identify a Comanche Peak specification or procedure requiring Accordingly, it is recorrrnended that this practice be g dropped inmediately.

E Such a move wuid enhance inspector morale as those involved are aware that the practice serves no useful purpose .

k C.

Procedure Simotification Newly established procedural systems are such that Construction and

. Quality Assurance issue procedures on s.imilar subject matter jointly, f for example,. the recently issued procedure on shop travelers was.

jointiy prepared by Construction and Quality Assurance .

It is recom-  !

mended that important procedures such as those related ta concrete be

{ revised and fssued as a single procedure approved by Construction and Quality Assurance.

Similarly,. those procedures related to piping and electrical should be revtsed and fointTy issued as a single Comanche Peak procedure.

D.

_ Procedures Independent of' Houston-The present syster:r of obtaining Browrt & Root. Houston office approval on construction procedures should be modified.

, Guidelines should be worked out witti the Houston office whereby they approve only top levei procedures, permitting the site full flexibility in revising detailed site procedures.

Perhaps the Brown & Root, Houston office could retain approval authority on those top level documents that establish Brown &

Root policy, controi the necessary type of forms, etc. However, detailed operating procedures should be changed with site approval onT .

Perhaps the Houston office would agree ta a retroactive review procedure .

E .. Conffquration controT A review of records for completed concrete pours indicates that the

}, configuration reflecting the as-poured condition is not property defined.

I It was noted that the inspectors record the particular drawing

{, number and revision letter, however, all applicable DC 00As are not noted anywhere in tae- inspection sup' porting documentation.

TUGC0 CBSERVATTCNS & RECOMMENCATIONS

-a_

r Q F. Preolanning of Construction Work

' In discussions withr construction management personnel it was indicated

' that a new scheme of construction planning is being developed. This new scheme provides for a d'etailed material takeoff on ali Gibbs & Hill drawings which provides detailed instructions to the crafts as to the civil, mechanical and electrical items to be included in each segment

, of work. This fannalized approach of taking material takeoffs in the

( office and providing this information to the field forces on an approved material takeoff Tist will da much to. improve the quaTity of the work.

Since the materf at takeoff is a formai process accomplished by constructiarr

' engineers we1T in advance of the work, it provides a significant measure

' of preplanning,. including the processing of necessary- design changes ts accomplish the work.

• Such an effort will da much to minimize field errors 1

with respect to. Teft out embedments or inability to complete work as a result of design errors.

It is recommended, however that this effort be.

• formatized inta a Comanche Peaje site procedure. As such, it wili be recognized as part of the systent and will da much tar assure that Gibbs 5 Hil.1 drawings. are forwarded ta the site art a timeTy basis to accomoif sn this preplanning effort.

VI. DOCUMENT CONTROL While thent appeared to be some problems with bringing the Automatic Records Management System on line, the manual system backing it up appeared to be functioning satisfactority. The auditors found no deficiencies in document control.

i VII.

CONTR0t. OF PURCHASED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES i

The QuaTity Assurance Pian is not up to date in regard to TUGCO's responsibf Tities for procurement, source evaluation and source sur-veillance. TUGCG has developed a program for rating supplier perform-

! ance and shows evidence of actions when reatings are unsatisfactory.

\ -

lIg The list of suppliers requiring evaluation and source surveillance is i

not kept up to date by the Architect / Engineer. The Ifst in use is over

TUGC0 OBSERVATIONS & RECOMP.ENCATIONS E~ -

.g.

four months old, but is maintained manually by the TUGC0 Supervisor of Supplier Comp 1 f ance.

There does not appear to b'e any method. of assuring that the latest con-figuration is supplied to the personneT performing source inspection prior to shipment of procured items.

The source inspector appears to

,be at the mercy of the supplier in determining what changes have been identified and incorporated.

Thus,. it is conceivable that items will be shipped ta the site that de not meet the desired configuration even though requirements of the purchasing document have been met.Such receipts can cause delays. and unwarranted costs, in meeting the prope configuration.

I It is reconinended that a practice be estabTished of identifying and confirming required configuratiert prior to procurement and prior to shipment of purchased materials and components.

VIII.

IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF MATERIALS. PARTS A No deficiency noted.

Materiar reviewed in the warehouse, in open storage and in the weid shop appeared to be adequately identified.

l IX.

.i SPECIAL PROCESSES i

l A. _Radiograohy

,l Iridium 192 is being used as the radiatiert source for all radiography at the site.

This isotope has its optimunt capability at about 1.5 inch thickness of steeT and is not recorrunended by the Code below .75 inches.

'l It is pennitted for lesser thicknesses when the use of other radiation sources is not practical and whert resolution of the outline and 4T hoTe size of the penetrameter can be demonstrated. The energy levels of iridium isotopes are higher tharr optimum for materials .375 inches or i _

thinner, resulting in a flat image and Tack of contrast. Because exposure time relates to distance, the isotope is noma 11y placed against the pipe opposite the film.

g of the image.

Witn a .100 inctr source size, this causes blurring Lack of contrast and, a blurred image makes it uniikely o

L

N N E W ^W R % M E M CATIONS _

that hairline cracks will be seert and difficult to accurately define larga indications.

The use of iridiunr 192 meets the mirtimunt requirements of theCbde, but by not providing optimune identification of observed anomo11serit does three undesirable things. First it causes unnecessary

(

removal and repair of indications that can be seen but not properly identiffed; secondly, it masks narrow cracks, tight lack of weld pene-tration and non-fusion Wich can be detrimental to service life; thirdly,

{ it does not provide art adequate base 11ne for in-service inspections performed. after the plant has gone inte operatfort. FaiTure to have cTear identification of the originai indications at that point cart cause deTays ,

the cost of which greatly exceeds the cost of p'roviding better identiff-cation and necessary repair of defects found in the constructfort phase.

Recommendation - It is recommended that TUGC0 require x-ray for shop welds, and consider its use where practical for construction weYds. X-ray

' machines irt the range of thirty pounds of weight are availabTe and are nearly as. portable as the isotope. Because of its smelier- focaI spot size and variable voltage,. x-ray can give superior radiography. The feedback of informatforr to. welders can improve the quaTity of welds and minimize the potential for defects. The abiTity to discriminate betweert indications having roundness or sharpness at the ends can eliminate repair.

The ability to positively identify in the constructiert phase those indf-cations which have a potential for growth and faiTure can pennit economical repair without radiation hazards that are inherent if found later irt the i

operating phase.

B. Weiding '

Ho causes for concern and no procedural noncompf f ances were found. frr review of the weld. shop. There seemed to be a generaT opiniorr that after radiography repairs. are being required that are acceptable within the Code.

A review of a smell quantity of rejected film indicates this generalization may be valid. It was disclosed during the audit that f- radiographs may be reviewed by as many as five individuals. Such ex-V cessive review leads to supercritical evaluacion of filnr and ta excessive repair. As. previously stated, better radiography permits. better g ere~ eme M '* __ -. . -

a o TUGC0 CBSERVAT8CNS & RECCMENDATIONS E -11

• identification of conditions. acceptable withine.the Cod Unnecessary repairs. increase cost and reduce pipe reliability.

Reconinendations - Have radiographs which ce have been reje

( reviewed by TUGC0 Level III radiographer.

sample shows that excessive repair of welds for defects has bee e , establish g the policy that Code acceptable indications shall remai shall be recorded en the reports. n untouched, but As an economy, consider reducing the numcer of persons sequential review of radiographs. . performing C.

_NDE Qualifications.

The site NDE Level III situatiert is. unclear.

by Brown.& Root was available for the NDE .

Cupervisor; hoO wever, it is understood that TUGC0 has. tssued. a Tetter identifying hin evet III.

f Recommendation - Clarify the authority andy msponsibilit of the NCE supervisor sonnel. in administering tests and evaluating per- and certi This is very important as related to Code work

{

Level stamp. III will be working under the authority of the hold, since t, er of the Code

's X. J_N5pECTION There were no deficiencies. noted relative to inspectio n; nowever, it was noted that a large numeer of inspection personnel a their first nuclear construction experience onrethe receiving C

omanche Peak site.

, As a. consequence, it is necessary to improve the qualit y of inspection planning and to increase the Tevei of supervision and q support.

including applicable J'C OCAs,. the features on to h method and error. and acceptance crt eria in order to minimize possibl:e v e confusion 155E

45 TUGC0 CBSERVATIONS & REC 0ffiENDATIONS 12-XI. TEST CONTROL l A review was made of the TUGCQ startup administrative the following observation:. r s, with proc 1.

f The procedures appear to be written around the old  ; organi that is, in several instances they refer to the Brown C

& Ro I input required in the preparation of "startup work requests" .

Z.

It was noted that an unique system is being established to h I~ nonconformances during the startup phase. e It is. recommended that wherever possible existing schemes utilized in construction b during the startup process. used This is important since most personnel involved in dispositioning such items as nonconformance gn changes wiTT be the same persons involved in construction.

XII.

CONTROL OF MEASURING & TEST EQUIPMENT It was observed that out of 2k instruments sampled e n which civil, structurai, mechanical and electrical work, approximat percent had not been withdrawrr from the calibration elaboratory s Tast caTibration date. its This is particularly significant when it is recognized that the present system is such that if a calibration e da becomes due, the instrument is recalibrated whether issued for use.

or not it ha s been It is recomended that consideration be given to simply changing the esifbration date rather than going through a calibra cycle if the toof has not been used.

i It was noted that many construction tools are calibrated . It is important to note that calibration of construction toots is not necessary wittr respect to 10CFR50 Appendix B.

Although calibration and maintenance is extremely important on construction too be, that frequencies may be relaxed.

XIII.

INSPECTION, TES 4 0 OPERATING STATUS No deficiencies wre noted in this area. Material and equipment observed in receiving inspection, in the warehouse and outs

~, TUGC0 OBSERVATIONS & RECCMMEN0ATIONS

g. .

_13 area appeared to be adequately identified.

No tests were observed.

XIV. HANDLING, STORAGE AND SHIPPING I

Exterior storage practices ~should be reviewed. The protective coverings of many items are damaged; some reported on monthly surveillance reports have not been corrected. Large temporary structures, such as those over the emergency diesel engines, require wind bracing to prevent further damage. Because of soil chemistry, rain and humidity, the current prac- '

tice of allowing large stainless s: eel piping to remain uncovered should be reviewed.

Sensitized stainless. is extremely sensitive to chloride,. '

fluoride and sulphide contamination witch with water as a couplant can cause intergranular corrosion and primature faiTure.

. XV. CONTROL OF NONCONFORMANCES There appears to be an effort to reduce the number of documented non-conformances.

It was noted that DC 00As were being utilized for nonconfonnance reports.

Although this was observed ort a small percentage of DC 00As issued during the monttr of April, it is recommended that this practice be stopped insnediately. The TUGC0 system is correctly established whereby non-conformances are written after the fact and DC ODAs are reserved for design changes before the fact. It is important that this practice :se enforced since DC 00As prepared after the fact necessitate that workers be directed verbally to .vioTate the drawing since the deviation will me handled after the fact with DC 00As. This is a poor Quality Assurance practice.

Procedure CPQ1-AB., Rev. O, dated 5-5-78 was issued for the purpose of providing expedient disposition of concrete discrepancies. The procedure infers that discrepancies of 72'F versus 70*F or 6.25 air content versus 6.0% maximum is perfectly acceptable when it is signed off by the field engineer.

Such a system shortcuts the established nonconforming material control system as defined in Brown & Root and TUGC0 procedures and snculd

TUGC0 OBSERVATIONS & RECCMMEN0ATIONS 14_

v Q be discontinued. If tolerances are unrealistic such that the 72*F is acceptable, then the design specification should be changed to se indicate.

It is reconenended that good inspection planning be provided inspectors, identifying the characteristics ta be inspected, the method of inspection and acceptance criteria and that inspectors identify nonconformances to such criteria. Th,is will maintain the integrity of inspectors and provides identification of problern areas and provides a means for their correction.

It fs reasonable to assume that orr a project as Targe as Comanche Peak.

there will be several thousand nonconfonnance reports. The number does not reflect adversely arr the quaTity of construction, but the failure ta identify nonconfonnances does refTect adverseTy orr the integrity of ..

inspectors and leaves unknown the quaTity of the plant.

XVI. CORRECTIVE ACTION There were ne deficiencies noted. reTative to corrective action on hard-ware. The Suppifer Compf fance Supervisor has established a method of tracking vendor perfonnance and shows positive results fronr actions taken to correct supplier quality probTems. A review of reports of site sur-veillance conducted by T1JGC0 showed corrective actiert responses. were being promptly received. A review of r' eports of surve11Tance actions by Brown & Root showed generally adequate response and resolution of corrective action except for a period of four months whert surveillance personnel were assigned to other tasks.

l Irr general,. corrective action appears tct be adequate and timely on vendor-and site related problems, but sone deffeiencies identified irr audits of major contractors still persist. Some of the changes in authority dele-gation to major contractors appears to be action takert to correct inadequate or untimely response by those organizations;. however, other actions. taken, sucir as handling of f'eid enanges and nonconfonnances, appear to be those of circumventing the preelem rather chart correcting it.

Y

' TUGC0 GBSERVATICNS & RECCMMENDATICNS 13

.c 4

XVII. RECORDS-Except for lack of internal fire protection, the quality records area is considered to be satisfactory. Some Quality Assurance records, such as personnei qualtfications, are not stored in the records center but '

are maintained separately by the Brown & Root training coordinator.

There is not currently a catalog or Tisting of required records although it is being prepared. A review of a selection of Quality Assurance records showed the documents in them to have been properly completed and irt the correct order.

n Reconinendation - The instaTiatforr of an inert gas fire extinguishing systeer or the identtficatio:t of geographicaTTy separate duplicate records '

should be expedited. TUGC0 shouTd review the fire protectiert capabilities =

of storage facfTities irr the training supervisor's trailer and consider a duplicate set of such records ta be maintained frr the records center. ,,

XVIII. AUDITS ~

There are several audit and surveiTTance programs in effect. Audits by the Quality Assurance Department Central Staff are performed on site activities., major contractors. and. suppTiers. Site surveillance actions are performed under the direction of the TUGC0 QA Site Supervisor. Similar  !

surveillance activities are carried out under the direction of the Brown &

Root Site Quality Assurance Manager. While called surveilTance actions, the surveillance programs are forma 1Ty planned and scheduled, utilize checklists to guide the activity and record resuits,. and issue reports of deficiencies and require correctiert. Except for formal and documented pre-audit and post-audit meetings,. ali the elements of an audit program are irt place.

It was reported that the reason for calling the activity "surveiliance" was to avoid outside auditors finding the program deficient because it did not include the documented pre- and post-audit meetings, yet the auditors found that such meetings were conducted, but on an informal basis.

Recommendation - The auditors consider the present program to be an effective tool whicn could be further improved. TUGC0 should consider

.. TUGC3 CBSER'/ATICNS i RECCMMENDATICNS -i d-

\

combining the audit and surveillance activities into a single, cohesive Q effort. Such art integrated effort could cover required areas more efficiently, without duplication and at a frequency that can be main-tained. Such an audit program should be described in written procedures.

and include a description of both the fonnai audit and the continuous audit plan (survei1Tance) and the method of conducting pre- and post-audit meetings should be described to preclude later criticisms by outside organizations. The resulting audit program should be a superior tool for management assessment of program implementation and effectiveness.

. c

. D e

t

m m aus uppe pues , ,

"g~ ""* ,

~ " N. esse ,,,, ,,,,

SITE

~ SUPsayIs0g . _ .

i i

1 pro f INSPECT 10tf u EN N 1 NG T8AINING VERIFl?ATION SITE PROCEDURES PR REY, HON F0 N CE SURVEILLANCE /

INSPECTION PLAN's* g . CONT't. AUDITS

INSP. HElll00S INDOCTRINATION QUALITY STUS. TRAINING NONCONf0R$NCE QUALITY RECORDS '

DISPOSIIION CORRECTlyE ACTION E XillB I T 1

. ~ ~

l

~

l l

c APPENDIX A TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY

l AUDIT REPORT I .

I I

I I

I I

I MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS COMPANY

a .u-,a. .- a .m -ma.- 4-am ,m., , .

a

=

h 5

N 4

1 S

APPENDIX A E '

TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY AUDIT REPORT l

l I ,

I f

I l l

i I

L) 10 1 -

t i APPENDIX A LETTES GENERATING COMPANY AUDir gEPORT I (

l .

1 i

1 .; .

]

I '

\

i C 1 f

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ . . _ _ . _ . . _ _ . _C

I j

n AUDIT REPORT sudaect:

10 Audie of Texas ut4ii 4es. cenerating Company, oaties Office ,

and Comanche Peak Steam ETectric Station Construction Date of Audit: May 1-12,197E -

Audit Scope:

A management audit was conducted of the Quality Assurance Program of Texas Utilities Generating Company during the weeks of May I and May 8,.1978. The purpose of the audit

• was to detennine the adequacy of the Quality Assurance Progran as related to Nuclear Regulatory Commissfoit require-ments and the effectfveness of implementation ta Tneet program requirements and authorf ty delegations. Activities were audited at bottr the TUGCC offices in Dailas and at the Comanche Peak construction site. Activities of the Archi Engineer and Constructor were audited only at the construction site. The scope of the audtt included comitments made in the PSAR,. the Corporate QuaTity Assurance Manuai, the Comanche Peak Quality Assurance PTan,. the Pmfect Procedures Manual and the Brown & Root QuaTity Assurance Manuais and Procedures related to the Conunche Peak site.

Auditors: Dallas office, May T-3,1978 J. P. Jackson,. PAC Audit Team Leader J. ft. Norris, MAC Auditor Comanche Peak Construction Site, May 4 & F, May 8-12,1978 J. P. Jackson,. MA' C Audit Team Leader J. M. Norris, MAC Auditor J. A. Hendron, MAC Auditor (May 8-T2 only)

Personnel NAME COMPANY TIT 1.E i fn"trv D. N. Cha: man TUGC0 QA Manager, '-1-2 R. G. Tolson C R. V. Fleck.

TUGC0 Mgr, Site Surveillance, '-1-2 l

TUGCO/ GAR Civ. Inspec. Supv. *-1 '

J. V. Hawnins TUGCO/G&H Prod. Assurance (QA), *-1

v m

. TUGC0 AUDIT REPORT

. . Personnel NAME CCMPANY TI'LE fn"tery J. B. George TUSI Prof. General Mgr. , *-i-2 J. T. Merrit TUSI Resident Manager, *-1 E. G. Gibson - TUSI Project Engineer. *-1-2 E J. Murray TUSI Engineering Supv. , *-1 J. J. Moorhead G&H Resident Engineer, *-1-2 B. C. Scott B&R Site QA Manager, *-1 I J. P. Clarke

• B&R Site QC Manager, *-1

, R. Mann B&R' QA Records Coordinator,

• 1 if. O'. K.f rkiand

' B&R Prof. Generai Mgr, *-i

~

lf. 2. Dougias B&R Project Manager. *-1 E C. Frankunt BAR Asst. Project Mgr. , *-1 h

P. Foscolo B&R Prof. Chief Engineer. *-T L. Hancock B&R Mat'l Procurement. Con-struction Branch, *-i A. Baren TUGC0 Vendor Compliance.,

• A Vega TUGCG QA Central Staff Function, '-i-

, C Beggs TUGCQ Systems Compf f ance, *.T-2 R". Gary TUGCG V.P., Operations, *-1 L. Fiker TUSI V.P'., Design & Procurement. *-:

P. Brittain TUGCD/TUSI President,1 Interview 1 Pre-audit meeting Z Post audit meeting Audit Method: The audit was conducted through a series of interviews *itn responsible management and supervision and examination of Quality Assurance manuals, procedures, records and work operations bcth at the Dallas headquarters of Texas utilittes Generating Company and Texas Utilities Services, Incorporated and at the ' omanche Peak construction site.

h Suninary:

The aucit disclosed that recent changes in authority dele-gations nat been generally weli accepted and that morale

U TilGC0 AUDIT REPORT gQ Summary (Cont'd): and team spirit were good. However, the changes had n 1

yet been fonnalized in revisions to the PSAR and the Comanche Peak Quality Assurance Plan.

The audit also disclosed that present practices in the control of design

[ changes and of certain nonconformances do not provide the requisite level of review by the original designer. In other instances it was evident that design changes were being used in lieu. of nonconformance reports. Except for the areas, noted. herein and below, there was generally good adherence to existing procedures. , c Findings: T.

The current activities of 711GC0 Quality Assurance per-sonnel are not consistent with the authority delegations tot Brown & Root and to Gibbs & Hill as defined in the PSAR and Comanche Peak Quality Assurance Plan.

- SimilarTy the- Qualf ty Assurance Plan and Procedures are not consistent with current and pianned revisions in authority delegations to tne Architect / Engineer and the ,

Constructor, and is not comolete in addressing all 3 eighteen criterf a of 10CFR50 Appendix 8.

The lack of a well identified plan of reorganization and responsibility causes uncertainty in carrying out some activities.

There needs to be a plan for revising the Quality Assur-ance Programt such a plan should include the estabilshment of an architecture of procedures to show how other TUSI/

i T1)GC0 and contractor manuals inter-relate with the Qualf ty Assurance Manuar. The TUGC0 QA Manager should establistr a schedule and assign responsibilities for completion of the necessary procedures.

The schedule should be supple-mented wittr a management effort to monitor adherence to the olan and achievement of the schedule, h 2.

The currunt site DC 00A system of after the fact coordi.

nation of design changes with the original designer

a TUGC0 AUDIT REPORT

. -a-1

'n

,U Findings:

(Cont'd) provides a significant risk of design error and does not meet the requirements of TOCFR50 Appendix B, nor of ANSI N45.2.IT, " Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants".

A systent for expediting and documenting Gibbs & Hill

' home office approvals should be established using telephone, telecopier or telex as 4 means of speeding

, corrmunicatf ort.

b 3.

, Tne Comanche Peak Quality Assurance Plan does ilot provide

- for a Quality Assurance review of procurement documents and changes thereto prior to purchase order placemept.,

except for site orfginated procurements. Such a review is identified in 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterfon IV and is a requirement of ANSI N45.2.13. It should be required on ali safety related procurements.

t 4

The current combinatiorr of Chapter 17 of the PSAR, the

• TUGC0 Corporate Quality Assurance Manual, the Comanene

' Peak Quality Assurance Pian, Project Procedures and Brown & Root Manuals and Procedures provides a com::!ex array of procedures which is difficult to maintain current and consistent.

f S.

The current systerit of providing inspection instructions or checkTists to: inspectors is too generic, placinq an undue burderr on the inspector in attemDting to deter tine applicable drawings and. specification > and applicable revisions thereto. A review of records of concrete pours incidates that configuration reflecting the as-coured condition is not clearly defined. Applicaole OC 00As are not noted in inspection documentation.

Configuration needs to be clearly identified to inspectors on a current basis, including all applicaole

m o TUGC0 AUDIT PIFORT I' Findings: DC 00As and completed documentation must reflect the

( ont'd) statu's of the applicable changes.

6. Special, processing markings for later in-service inspections. are careTessly applied. The circle and f arrow used for such maricing is sometimes incomplete and not recognizable for its intended purpose. In one instance only a. portion of the circle resembling the letter "C" was. discernible. FaiTure to properly mark these Tocators now wiii cause delay and possitrie I error wnen in-service inspections are made in highly frradfated areas.

7. Dispositiert of nonconfonning items does not always achieve the requisite review by appropriately qualified design personnel. A procedure,. Timited to. defects in concrete,. was recentTy issued.whictr bypasses the estac-Tfshed: nonconformance contrat systen and,. thus, violates reguTatory requirements in this regard. In other instances,. the DC 00A, progrant has been used to- bypass g the nonconformance reporting system. The nonconfonnance-I control system should be the means for maintaining in-spector integrity, identifying problem areas and provite f a driving force for their correction.

f 8". The records storage factif ty does not currentiy have any means of internaT fire protection during hours it is unmanned, although it is understood some method is planned. Quality Assurance records, such as personnel quaif fications,. are not maintained in the Records Center, but are maintained in fireproof file cabinets in a trafier under the cognizance of Browrr & Root training coordinator.

9. Aporoximately twenty-four percent of Central Staff auct:s nave not been conducted as scheduled. Combining Central Staf" audits,. site audits and site surveillance activities

I. .

TUGCf1 AUDIT REPORT

{ , -

/

{O Findings:

(Cont'd)

^

by TUGC0 and by Brown & Root into a single, cohesive

~

program would provide f.oproved visibility to the overall audit and surve11Tance effort and permit evaluation and ajustment to the audit schedule to attainable and yet effeetiye frequenc'ier ID e

b l

i p '

e 6

4 4

, T

. e t

b I

r \

e t

9 1

n i

W , .

Y~^ .

W . .

ewe - ,., ~

~

apg-

.c:.,,.%

NEIREG-0797+- Q u

m; &.g..

~~

. - Supplement No.11 t4 4e4

+y; y* . . - . . ~;

f <t '2 - . .

..W.

~rt .' < ' . jp . .

< ~..

a " ..+; ,; .P

. a4 - ' - ' - _i' '

~i , ,ee g '

9 G .

- M. +. - ..'= , g.w .,n . ,. ?m7 , 't I

u -

'l,s, .'i.>-M[-Jdkg M., ,

','g#[r i

• t '

t'. f;' 5

,...a z.$y.a , , . .

.n n g~g .9.. g ~,...s ~.

I the operatid@o ~

~

h[s Peak Steam E(le 3 .

• $ .D.

.a .'..a. nd 2

r. and 50-44&c ,.

wl

?.. . -

. .. ..q: .~ rag : -

.+

p. , I. C

~"

y reigenerating 9_

+ c.m Company, . . . -

.;@.' et ak".[%g

% 7..:sq T-

. . , u.. -a. ,

~

~

, , . - n_. ,

,\ -

~?' ,: '}.n.4

. .. l'.

.J v.:.,w . ,, , p I

l . U S. Nuclear Regulatory p'; Co. . .mmission . . .

y. '4.g., .- -

Officaof Nuclear Reactor Regulation May 1985 4sn MQq .

h o f

. . , I.

e. a ..

%, . ' 'r. . .. . / r ., -

[.'

ft S

_ __ f

w 4 QA/QC CONCLUSIONS This specificsection summa,izes areas in.Section 2 and in and concludes the tables the issues in Attachment 1. presented in ea reflect the findings of Appendices 0 and P. The conclusions Section 4.9 presents the QA/QC Group's Peak. conclusion regarding the QA/QC issues reviewed by cethe TRT at C 4.1 Design Process The assessment of design process generally focused on a review of cont t changes to design documents, principally vendor designs, incorporation o changes in the design, and design interaction with plant organizations From the QA/QC point of view, the TRT finds that the design process .

omanche for C Peak is based on procedures procedures were i.nplemented. consistent with HRC requirementsese and that th played some deficiencies. Actual design process performance, however, dis-Design changes (OCAs and CMCs

accumulate against basic design documents with no program) were permitted requirement for their to timely inco porat.fon into the drawings.

delays previously experienced. quicken the incorporation of changes andi I l

The IRT found examples of ineffective interaction among, the con- engineering struction, inadequate workand instructions quality control for thegroups that was evident because of incomplete craft personnel and incomplete seismic analyses.tionable construction practices, nges, inadeq poor in judgment, lacking in analysis and in technical depth.NCR dispositions Because a basic premise in designing a piping system includes the fact that support designs will reflect the assumptions made in the analysis of that pip-ing, the failure of the design process to require Gibbs & Hill to wrevie de-signs and modifications of pipe supports prior to fabrication and is of concern. installation documentation (see SSERs 8 and 10).There were instances of failure to of changes to the FSAR (see SSER 10). There was also failure to notify the NRC i Within the scope of TRT QA/QC Group's assessment of the design , the process interactions among the engineering, construction and QC, and groups program d2ficiencies presented, appear to be the only deficient areas addressed by TUEC.

in future SER supplements dealing with the NRC's review o CYGHA Independent Assessment Program. e 4.2 Document Control The TRT assessment of the document control function for the period following July 1984 indicates that the preparation, issuance and changes to documents that specify ad:quately quality requirements or prescribe activities affecting quality are controlled.

and in the field to be complete where prescribed activities were being performed, we and current.

Further, a sample of safety-related quality Comanche Peak SSER 11 P-27

y The records stored in the permanent plant records vault (PPRV) was reviewed and not found to be acceptable. Included in the documentation packages were completed t e'.

records for piping, piping supports (hangers), assembled and/or installed com- ret ponents, fabrication and inspection / testing data, including walkdown inspection anc check lists and the applicable N-5 data reports. In process and final ir. spec- mor tion and acceptances for completed record packages appeared to have been per-

' formed to the latest revision of drawings and specifications. The no However, the history of recurring document control deficiencies prior to the July 1984 raises concerns about certain aspects of the quality of construction.

For example, the TRT observed deficiencies in coating inspection reports which B&R met included: inadequate description or location of areas or items coated; improp-er changes and corrections; lack of signatures or acceptance for inprocess and the l

, final inspections; and missing dates and times. These deficiencies were sig- to nificant enough to render the inspection reports unacceptable as quality boti records and inadequate to provide documentation of material traceability. One the per!

specific traceability and records problem w:.5 that paint mixing slips were not retained as permanent records, but were discarded after the inspector in the rule j coating applications area transcribed the informatian onto his own report.

Thus, the original record of the mixing inspection, including inspection accep- The tance, was lost. In procedural control, the TRT mechanical and piping group inac observed that uncontrolled and unauthorized procedures were used to perform cold-springing (realign piping) during its installation. The pote

1. tth respect to drawing control prior to 1984, the TRT found deficiencies that orde

,# included: distribution of incomplete or obsolete drawing packages to the craf t h

y and QC personnel; inadequate drawi,ng control; high DCC satellite error rates; and procedural non-compliance. The TRT QA/QC Group concludes that although 4.4 many of the document control inadequacies have been corrected, the implications The N of past inadequacies on construction and inspection have potential generic sig-pract

.pificance which has not yet been fully analyzed by TUEC. ,.

recur C M _m - -_ --

or cc 4.3 Training and Qualifications The TRT QA/QC Group found a pattern of inadequacies with the training, certifi- (1) cation and qualification program at CPSES, because of the many deficiencies identified. These problems can be directly traceable to TUEC's and 8&R's " min- (2) imal requirement" training, certification, and qualification program; the lack of or failure to follow procedures and guidelines; and a lack of programmatic controls to assure that the program achieved and maintained requirements as set (3) forth by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.

The TRT Electrical and Instrumentation, Protective Coatings, and Civil and Structural Groups also assessed allegations and concerns about electrical in- (5) l spectors, coatings inspectors, and concrete inspectors. These inspectors were

{ all trained, certified, and qualified under the same program (non-ASME) as t5e (6) inspection personnel reviewed by the QA/QC Group. Each TRT group found exam- ,

ples of the same kinds of deficiencies: no verification of education or work experience; an identical certification test taken af ter the examinee f ailed the (7) E first one; no guidelines provided for the use of waiver for OJT; no time limit on how many times an examination could be retaken; and inspectors with ques- The fa tionable qualifications. proper Comanc Comanche Peak SSER 11 P-28

4 There were non-ASME also inspectors. many problems with the certification testing or the program f test, there were different scoring methods to grade the original tThere n retest, there were no guidelines on how a test question should est and bethe dis qualified, and there were no details on how the administration of tests shoul monitored.

no prior background or experience in inspection.The nspection had TRT also fou 1

' the coatings area when painters were made " instant"nspectors. QC paint iThis was especially tr met the requirements of ANSI N45.2.6 aand Regulatory Gu minimally these guidelines were not always followed. .

, but in practice l

to follow the requirements set forth in ANSI N45 2 6 and RAlthough TUEC and B&R had i com both chose the normal to follow method the " exception to the rule" and used " thegulatory Guide 1.58, of qualification. o er factors" as personnel rule" factor. (both ASME and non-ASME) were qualified under the "exceptiMo on to the i.

The TRT QA/QC Group also found that some QA auditors ence, were lacked experi inadequately trained, or had questionable qualifications .

The TRT QA/QC Group concludes that deficienciesu rements in procedural req i and programs ha guidelines in TUEC's potential quality significance. training, certification, and qualification ve

't Further evaluation by TUEC is required in order to determine the impact of the deficiencies on theect.

4.4 safety of the proj is Corstruction and Testing g-practice which were considered to be deficient.The ructiontable, in Attachme l

or contributing factor and had a plant wide impact. recurring practices r a primary i-(1)

Craf t personnel procedures. failed to follow design documents or installation is-(2) i l

Unauthorized work was performed in absence of procedures.

t (3) Housekeeping procedures were not followed.

(4)

Use and return of equipment, tools, and materials were not per require ments.

(5) e There was loss, damage, and interchange of valve parts.

e (6) used in a pipe support.There was improper transfer of heat numbers onto scrap h2 t

(7)

Equipment repairs and rework were performed without proper documentation.

I Tha fact proper that thesupervision.

first-level TRT found these recurring practices indicates ]

a lack of t Coranche Peak SSER 11 P-29 .

A In conclusion, these types of improper workmanship by craf t personnel, coupled with lack of proper supervision of craft personnel during construction, have i potential for significant quality and safety impact on critical plant systems  !

and structures.

For several entries on the tables in Attachment 1 to Appendix P, there were ,

allegations or concerns involving construction practice that were neither sub- l stantiated nor refuted. These were not included in the above conclusion, but are unresolved QA/QC issues.

The i There were only two entries on the tables in Attachment 1 which involved the ports area of testing. Both of these entries indicated that the deficient practice forms was not frequent enough as to imply a generic problem. One concern involved tive several hot functional test objectives that were not met. The other deficient practice was that TUEC's method for calculating leak rate was not consistent In Co-with TUEC's FSAR commitment. some and T 4.5 Nonconformances and Corrective Actions appli:

The TRT QA/QC Group identified deficiencies during its overall review of the 4.6 nonconformance system. Most of the deficiencies related to implementation of the NCR system in specific areas; for example, coatings NCRs that were dispo- The t sitioned "use-as-is" lacked suf ficient engineering justification (Protective sider-Coatings Category SA), and some instances were noted in the Mechanical and inspei Piping area in which NCR corrective action was not considered to be satisfacto- impac-ry. There was also an instance of the use of pieces of nonconforming pipe while are e-on NCR hold. Improper disposition of the NCR allowed the installation of the entrie pipe (Mechanical and Piping Categories 13 and 20). items, quent The TRT also noted a generic deficiency in the corrective action system. Some above of the specific deficiencies noted are: cient made s

a. The B&R corrective action system was generally bypassed, as shown in the inspec following examples: tion /t (1) There were no definitive instructions to describe the types of prob- As des, lems that required corrective action. Minimal procedural instruc- the tal

! tions resulted in corrective action decisions frequently being left design to the judgment of the QA Manager. potent-erly re (2) Since June 1983, B&R had issued no corrective action requests (CARS), inaccu.

and was substituting memos and letters of concern for this function. in the This shortcut had become a regular method of operation and appeared Group i to bypass the CAR system. in mon-signif-

b. The TUEC corrective action system was poorly structured and ineffective in that: 4.7 .A t.

(1) Controlling procedures were brief and general. In the evaluat (2) There was no translation of FSAR requirements on trending and no de- view th tails on how trend analyses were to be accomplished. tified (3) Quarterly reports were not issued in a timely manner.

Comanche Peak SSER 11 P-30 Comanch l

f 6 (4) The method of categorizing irs and NCRs by building did not assure meaningful trend analysis.

(5) A 1984 CAR report identified three items that appeared to require action; however, none had been taken.

(6) CAR 029 was used as a vehicle for a specific disposition rather than for generic action, as intended by the CAR system.

I The TRT QA/QC Group also noted that approximately 40 different forms and re-ports (other than NCRs) were used for recording deficiencies. Many of these j forms and reports did not appear to provide information entry into the Correc- h tive Action System to prevent problem recurrence. t In conclusion, the QA/QC Group found deficiencies in NCR implementation; and.in some cases NCR corrective action was unsatisfactory. The QA/QC Group found B&R and TUGCO's corrective action systems poorly structured, ineffective, and poorly applied.

4.6 QC Inspection The tables in Attachment 1 indicate those items of QC inspection that were con-sidered to be deficient. Of particular concern were those items for which QC

- Inspection was indicated as being primarily responsible and having a generic lo impact level of 4 (frequent occurrences that have plant-wide impact). There are eight such items in the tables.

Of lesser concern were the 27 additional entries that indicated QC inspection as a contributing factor for level 4 items, or as either a primary or contributing factor for level 3 items (fre-quent occurrences, but apparently confined to a particular area or item). The above 35 items indicated to the TRT that QC inspection was particularly defi-cient in the areas of coatings and mechanical hardware, and that QC inspectors made significant errors in a number of additional specific items. Further, QC inspection problems are generally accompanied by and associated with construc-tion / testing problems (see Section 4.4).

As described in more detail in the individual assessments listed for entries on the tables in Attachment 1, QC inspectors in many instances failed to follow design documents and the quality procedures for inspection. Of concern is the potential for critical installations to be inadequately constructed and improp-i, erly represented on documents in the plant permanent records vault as well as inaccurate accounting of safety-related systems and structures for input used in the stress analyses by the engineering group. In conclusion, the QA/QC Group considers the site QC inspection program to be less than fully effective in monitoring, detecting, and reporting deficiencies that have or could have a significant safety impact on the plant.

In

4. 7 Audits and Reporting In the TRT's overall assessment of TUEC's audit program, emphasis was placed on

- evaluating the administration of the audit program, management's action to re-view the status and adequacy of the QA program, and followup on findings iden-tified by internal (TUEC) and external audit teams (NRC and consultants).

Comanche Peak SSER 11 P-31 I

l l

o l i

TUEC's audit program consisted of internal and external audits of design, con-struction, engineering, and procurement activities.

w bility for external audits of vendors. TUEC assumed the responsi- a I

Region IV found that TUEC's audit procedures did not comply with NRC require- @

4 ments, and that the program was not implemented in accordance with procedures. s The lack of an established audit program was also substantiated by Region IV. 1 1 For example, Region IV Report No. 50-445/84-32 cited TUEC for failure to estab- t lish and implement compliances a comprehensive identified were: system of planned and periodic audits.Non- as annual audits were not adequately addressed by audit implementation procedures; planning and staf fing to perform 1983 audits D were inadequate; the Westinghouse site organization performing Nuclear Steam ax Supply System (NSSS) engineering services was not audited by TUEC from 1977 84 through 1981; and audits of vendors that manufacture or fabricate parts, compo- me l

ance with annual or other applicable requirements dating ba as FSo Assessments by the Miscellaneous and Mechanical and Piping Groups concurred

(

ANSI N45.2.12 requirements.with the QA/QC Group that the audit frequency of N v

. ths

foy Review of the past administration of the audit program disclosed that during lob 1981 and 1982, the height of construction, the audit staff consisted of four auditors. fin From 1982 to 1984, the audit staff has increased from 4 to 12.

Also, on occasions, individuals participating on the audit teams were not QA !e l auditors. '"9 As such, a potential existed to compromise their independence. The scoq TRTas well reviewed the technical the quality background, experience, and training of auditors, as II*D of audit reports.

sum

. through qualifications to be questionable, which rendered the audit results for 1981 1983 potentially ineffective. pres 4"dt The TRT and Region IV reviewed the scope of the QA program audited during 1983. Folic Of approximately 650 safety related procedures, 165 (25% overall) were audited. 446/8 In looking at quality procedures, TUEC audited 24% of TUGCO's implementing pro. gram cedures and 39% of B&R procedures for a composite 32% audit rate. (cong audits on a sampling basis are acceptable, there was no evidence that allAlthough and g safety-related areas were audited.

the QA program in order to determine effectiveness.The audits did not encompass all The asp r progr effec With respect to audit corrective action followup, it was learned that TUEC QA resole had not been verifying that corrective action on previous audit findings was accomplished. QA pre For example, audit TCP-111, initiated to verify corrective ac-tions on previous audit findings, was started prior to the TRT's review. TUEC Ouring emphasized that TCP-111 be considered a " Punch list of Completion Tasks" to the as verify that corrective action had been implemented and not an attempt to re- effect write or change previous audit findings. Another specific example of inef fec. exampl-tive followup action was found that pertained to a deficiency identified in for 10 audit TCP-23, performed in September 1981. Audit TCP-68, conducted in March 306 wh-1983, attempted to verify corrective action of TCP-23's audit finding, but logs and acs that would document the corrective action had been destroyed.

was written at that time and the response was accepted, but the corrective ac.A new deficiency Based g tion implementation is still unverified, reporti ficant In correlating nonconformance reporting to the audit finding / corrective action during reporting tracking system, the TRT noted that during 1983, 18 NCRs identified tivenes Comanche Peak SSER 11 P-32 Comanche a

_ . 1 e

theprocedures.

QA need to retrain construction personnel in the content and requirements of The TRT found that TUEC corrective action request CAR-024,

. which dealt witti inadequate construction training and records, was open for 12 months.

training of construction personnel.After. CAR-024 was closed, five other CARS ide The TUEC construction, startup/ turnover 1984, which had not been closed at the time of the TRT inspe This fur-audit findings.ther supports the TRT finding of inadequate followup and corrective actio and adequacy of their QA program.The TRT found that TUEC manageme 84-32).

TUEC representatives stated that there have been no regular as ments or reviews of the adequacy of the total QA program by upper management as required FSAR. in Criterion II of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and as committed in the ,

With respect to follow-up corrective action for previous findings cited against the audit program by NRC and TUEC consultant audit / inspection teams , the TRT found TUEC's corrective action followup to be not fully effective. The Fred Lobbin findings: Report (a TUEC consultant), dated February 1982, identified four major

1) level of experience within the TUGC0 QA organization is low; i.e. , commer(cial nuclear plant design and construction QA ing for the audit and surveillance functions is inadequate; (3) the number and scope of design and construction audits conducted by TUGC0 QA to date has been limited; and (4) QA management has not defined clearly the objectives for the surveillance program resulting in a program which, in the author's opinion "is presently ineffective."

quately addressed by TUEC.To date, findings (2), (3) and (4) have not been ade-(Region IV Report No. 50-445/84-32.)

Following the' 446/83-12, datedLobbin Report, April 11, 1983)the NRC performed a CAT inspection (IR 445/83-18; gram at the corporate offices. and included a review of the TUGC0 audit pro-The inspection included a review of 18 audits and scheduling, audit reporting and followup, and audit pro The report concluded that weakresses existed in the established QA audit program which included the scheduling and frequenc effective monitoring of the construction program, y of audits, the lack of resolution of certain audit findings. and the lack of effective QA program should have been more ef fectivh.The inspection also indicated that the l

During the TRT's evaluation of allegations and concerns, it was observed that effective corrective action was not instituted to prevent examples were: Typical recurren for 10 CFR 50.55(e) items, (2) QA breakdown in document contro i

s and accepting documentation for work they previously perfo

[ Based on its findings and observations, the TRT concludes that the QA audit and reporting program has had and continues to exhibit deficiencies. Over a signi-ficant period of time, recurring deficiencies include: inadequate staffing during peak periods; failure by management to review the QA program for effec-tiveness; procedural and implementation inadequacies; questionable qualifica-Comanche Peak SSER 11 P-33

O tions and capabilities; incomplete assessment of the QA program on an annual basis; inadequate corrective action to prevent recurrence of identified defi-ciencies and insufficient management direction and understanding. In summa-tion, the QA/QC Group finds the past audit and reporting system less than ade-quate, and the" audit and reporting program at the time of the TRT review was questionable.

4.8 Inadequate Procedures Criterion V to 10 CFR 50, Appendix 8 requires that QA/QC procedures be written to prescribe activities affecting quality. The TRT found that procedures in some areas did not comply with this guideline. For example, material control i procedures did not adequately address requirements for physical inventory control

• material traceability, material handling, and segregation of paints. TUEC re-quirements for authorized nuclear inspector involvement in the TUEC inspection process were unclear. Quality control personnel inspected without writtsn procedures or formal accept / reject criteria. Some inspection procedures lacked comprehensive inspection and reinspection criteria for inspectors. Require-ments for reinspection of repair work were not clear.

M The TRT found that construction procedures provided inadequate instructions to craf t and QC personnel for installation of temporary supports, steam generator h

CD

(

bolting, jam nuts, thread engagement, Richmond anchor bolt inserts, repair of tg misdrilled holes / plug welding, mixing of paints, and protection of unpainted ct g threads and surfaces. Procedures do not specify design standards for fabricat- as

, ed threads, interchangeability of valve parts, and reactor vessel cleanliness CO requirements. There were inadequate welding procedures for welding of thin- a wall stainless steel pipe for preventing hoop shrinkage. Procedures did not 9 provide clear precautionary directions regarding prohibited construction meth- SYE ods, such as unauthorized welding to rebar, and restricted use of various tools.

Requirements to paint the threads of component support bolting contradict Coj i

requirements of another procedure to maintain threads free of extraneous age p terials. C03

, _ . - WM -- -- - .-

In summary, the TRT QA/QC Group concludes that construction and inspection pro-

,,[ cedures in some areas were inadequate, contradictory, uncontrolled, or nonexis-s-

tent' fm

_ T.3 Overall Assessment and Conclusions y Appendix P consolidates all quality issues identified by all TRT Groups in re-lation to eight quality attributes. As noted in the introduction, the scope of j the TRT review and inspection was limited to the QA/QC concerns raised by the allegations. Appendix P focuses on problem areas that need further identifica-tion. This identification of problem areas will facilitate the preparation of a corrective action plan, which should provide reasonable assurance that the facility has been properly constructed.

Based on its assessment of the total TRT ef fort, the QA/QC Group finds that d

QA/QC problems at Comanche Peak appear to be the result of the following condi-tions that existed prior to 1984:

ii

a. TUEC senior management was not actively involved in site QA/QC activities.

Comanche Peak SSER 11 P-34 Coma

s b

b.

The training and qualification of QA/QC, craft, and other personnel were not administered and monitored effectively.

c.

Desigo engineering activities were not effective in providing craft and QC personnel with adequate procedures, instructions, and other

, design documents.

d.

The control of documents, and subsequently of records, was replete with recurrent deficiencies.

e.

Some craft personnel appeared to be insensitive to QA/QC concerns at times, possibly because of lack of training, tight schedules, and excessive schedule emphasis by construction management.

i

f. Quality management was lax in its responsibilities to direct and oversee an ef fective site Quality Program.

id g.

Some QC personnel exhibited repeated lapses in effectively executing

, their responsibilities for inspection activities.

o The pattern of failures by QA and QC personnel to detect and document deficien-

[

' .cies suggests an ineffective 8&R and TUGC0 inspection system. This pat-tern, coupled with (a) the past problems in the document control system, (b) deft-ciencies in the QC qualification program, (c) ineffectiveness of the quality '

t- audit and surveillance systems, (d) a rudimentary and ineffective trending and corrective action system, (e) QC problems as shown in QA/QC Category 8, AQ-50; -

and (f) instances of improper workmanship of hardware as found by all of the TRT groups, system widechallenges basis. the adequacy of the QC inspection program at CPSES on a IS' Corrective action will require high-level management attention and a new man-agement emphasis construction program.on the importance of quality as a vital element of an adequate o-s-

f

/ h

, \

d ,

cf-

c-if 11 -

t Comanche Peak SSER 11 P-35 j

m o

7 E

e 5 TUEC ACTIONS l As the TRT QA/QC Group has noted previously, its results are based on a biased i sample in the sense that the sample was initially developed from allegations, additional items brought to the TRT's attention, and items found by the TRT.

Nevertheless the TRT believes the results are meaningful. TUEC shall evaluate the TRT 0A/0C findings and consider the implications of these findings on tne-quality of construction at Comanche Peak.

IULC shall then submit to the NRC^a program plan and schedule f or completing a detailed and thorough assessment of the QA issues presented in the enclosure to this supplement. The programmatic plan and the plans for its implementation will be reviewed and evaluated by the NRC staff.

The TRT considers the findings to be generic to both Units 1 and 2, and the program plan and schedule should address both units. This program plan sh,ould:

(1) address the root cause of each finding and its generic implications on safety-related systems, programs, or areas, (2) address the collective signifi-cance of these deficiencies, (3) address the total impact of one discipline-related finding in other disciplines, and (4) propose an action plan that will correct all problems identified and ensure such problems do not occur in the future.

The plan should also assure that the foregoing matters are addressed so as to provide reasonable assurance that no safety-significant deficiencies remain undetected and unresolved. TUEC's examination of the potential quality impli-cations of the TRT findings shall include, but not be limited to the areas or activities selected by the TRT. The program plan must describe the depth and breadth of TUEC's approach in sufficient detail to permit an independent evalu-ation of the plant. 'This evaluation must conclude that the plan is comprehen-sive and self-sufficient and will provide reasonable assurance that the quality of the construction can be demonstrated.

The actions shall also consider the use of management personnel with a fresh perspective to evaluate the TRT's findings and implement corrective actions.

TUEC shall consider the use of an independent consultant to provide oversight to the program. TUEC shall also investigate the role of the principal contrac-tor personnel (Brown & Root and Ebasco) in regard to Quality Assurance / Quality Control concerns. Although the TRT QA/QC Group realizes that TUEC is ultimately responsible for the plant, the contractor (constructor) was directly respon-sible for construction and quality control. TUEC shall also consider the prudence of continuing to rely on contractor management personnel involved in ongoing work and recovery efforts when they are the same people directly responsible for the problems identified herein.

Comanche Peak SSER 11 P-36

g $L{l%

BEFORE THE S 1 UNITED STATES ..' I NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g 28133b#

BeforetheAtomicSafetyandLicensingAppealBoarh1 , ]7'liG6,pt _ (,

.= ~

e ,

Q In the Matter of

)

)

NTY TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY, et al. ) Dkt. Nos. 50-445-CPA

)

)

(Comanche Peak Steam Electric )

Station, Unit 1)

)

ATTACHMENT II TO CASE AND MEDDIE GREGORY'S OPPOSITION TO APPEAL OF TUEC AND NRC STAFF I

RESTATEMENT OF CASE'S BASES FOR CONTEKfION #1.b.2.

In addition to the bases which have already been set forth, the following are also part of CASE's bases for Contention #1.b.2:

Part of CASE's bases, the ASLB's 12/28/83 Memorandum and Order y (Qual Assurance for Design) has already been mentioned briefly (Appendix , page B

20, to CASE's 1/31/86 Request for Imposition of Fine, for Suspension of Construction Activities, and for a Hearing on Application to Renew Construction Permit, filed before the Commission), and its overall conclusions were quoted; in addition, the 10/2/85 Board Order has also already been referenced.

In the 84 page 12/28/83 Order, the Board discussed in some detall several (but not all) of the specific issues raised by CASE Witnesses Mark Walsh and Jack Doyle (known as the Walsh/Doyle a ons). alleg ti The 12/28/83 Board Order, almost in its entirety, is part of CASE's bases.

Part of CASE's more specific bases, regarding weld designsrson suppo t at Comanche Peak that did not meet minimum ASME Code requirements e for f welds,

, is discussed at pages 29-30 of the Board's 12/28/83 Order:

In our review of other engineering problems raised by CASE , we have become convinced that there are other problems, some of which are discussed later in this memorandum, that would have been addressed in a more timely fashion and might have been resolved more appropriately if applicant had a formal, prompt system for quality assurance of design. An extreme example is that in 1981 ultimately led to the discovery of 382 supports that did a minimum ASME Code requirements for fillet welds /79/. These changes, CMC's which required structural alterations, were documented on and not NCR's /80/, with the consequence that there apparently to prevent was no attempt to identify the cause of this error or its repetition.

- 1

/79/ SIT Report at 51, citing Inspection No. 99900531/81-01 (November 17-20, 1981); see CASE Findings at V-7.

/80/ Id.

Another part of CASE's more specific bases, regarding instability of supports, is discussed at page 23 (and elsewhere) of the Board's 12/28/03 Order:

Instabillcy problems were known to applicant by April 1981. . .

there was no prompt effort made to identify analogous problems elsewhere in the plant, there was no trending of siellar deficiencies, and there was a breach of applicant's obligation to determine the cause of the condition of instability and to take steps to "precluae paragraph XVI. repetition," as required by 10 CFR Appendix B ,

[ Footnotes omitted.]

(This design issue was also addressed in the context of Applicants' Motions for Summary Disposition and CASE's responses thereto, which are discussed later herein.) In addition, in a February 19, 1985, letter

~

(attached to CASE's 2/25/85 Notification of New and Significant Informati on and CASE's Supplement to CASE's 10/15/84 Motions and Answer to Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition Regarding Stability of Pipe Supports) , Cygna Energy Services. In a reversal of its previous position, stated:

If not is Individual support stability is not assured, system stability guaranteed.

The instability of one support can trigger the

> progressive instability of adjacent supports by causing the limits of the forces and displacements to which the adjacent supports were originally designed to be exceeded. This may result in the formation of plastic hinges in the pipe (due to overload) which in turn may develop into a collapse mechanism.

Cygna's letter and all related documents also are part of CASE's bases .

In addition, the Board's 12/28/83 Order relled, in part, on CASE's 8/22/83 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Walsh/Doyle Allegations), which also is an integral part of CASE's bases on design

. 2

Issues. CASE's Proposed Findings is a 447 page document which provides very specific and indexed detailed bases for the Walsh/Doyle Allegations. The Licensing Board stated regarding CASE's Proposed Findings (page 31 of its 12/26/83 Order):

In addition to questions about the quality assurance program for design, CASE has raised many specific design problems, presented to the Board in detail. CASE's Findings, which contain the discussion of these problems, is a document that is two inches thick and that la filled with technical arguments and citations to codes, regulations and testimony (and to some extra-record material).

There were also several pleadings and other documents regarding various specific points which were filed between the time of hearings on the Walsh/Doyle allegations in May 1983 and the Licensing Board's Order of December 28, 1983 (some of which were also specifically referenced in the Board's 12/28/83 Order) which also form part of CASE's bases (for example:

CASE's 11/4/83 Response "to NRC Staff's Af fidavits on Open Items Relating to Walsh/Doyle Allegations; Board Notification 82-105A, Interaction Between Piping and Pipe Clamps, August 1983, sent to the Commission under cover letter dated September 29, 1983; CASE's 11/4/83 Assessment of Applicability of Board Notification 82-105A to Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station; Affidavit of Dr. Rai Raj N. Rajan, attached to 12/13/83 NRC Staff Motion to Reopen s

Record to Admit the Af fidavit of Dr. Jai Raj N. Raj an; et c . ) .

Another part of CASE's bases concerns the design of the control room ceiling. In a 3/11/83 letter from CASE President Juanita Ellis to Mr.

Richard C. DeYoung, Director of the NRC Office of Inpsection and Enforcement, CASE reported concerns about the design of the control room ceiling. The Applicants maintained that the design was acceptable. (The NRC Region IV Senior Resident Inspector - Construction, Mr. Robert Taylor,

, 3

concurred that the design was acceptable, in NRC Region IV Inspection Report 50-445/83-24, 50-446/83-15.) However, the NRC's Technical Review Team (TRT) found that the ceiling was not properly designed for seismic and Applicants are now redesigning (or already have redesigned) the control room ceiling; this was discussed in the NRC Staf f's NUREG-0797, Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) No. 8 dated February 1985 (pages K-83 through K-85), and discussed at pages 7 and 8 of Affidavit of CASE Witness Mark Walsh, attached to CASE's 5/6/86 Additional Response to Licensing Boards' 11/11/85 Hemorandum (Statistical Inferences from CPRT Sampling). All of these documents form part of CASE's bases for this particular design issue.

On October 6,1983, the Licensing Board issued its Partial Initial Decision (Change in Material Properties for A500 Steel) (LBP-83-63, 18 NRC

), in which the Board "found that applicant had complied with the ASME Code in its analysis of supports manufactured from A-500 Steel but that it had not demonstrated that its pipe supports have adequate safety margins, considering that there was a 15 percent error in the code allowable for that grade of Steel" (quoted from Licensing Board's 12/28/83 Memorandum and Order (Quality Assurance for Design), page 32).

In May 1984, hearings were held on that portion of Cygna Energy Service's Draft Phases 1 and 2 Report which had to do with cable tray supports (and other matters). In his cross-examination of Cygna's witnesses and his own testimony, CASE Witness Mark Walsh pointed out problems with design of the cable tray supports (which no one else had identified as a problem at that time).

4

On January 25, 1985, Cygna advised the NRC Staff that it was

" withdrawing all Phase 2 conclusions for both technical adequacy and design

' quality assurance of cable tray support design" (a reversal of its previous position).

On March 28, 1986, NRC Region IV issue,d Inspection Report 50-445/85-19 (which covered inspections which they made at Comanche Peak during the period of November 18 thr' o ugh December 18, 1985); the report stated, in part (page 1 of cover letter, detailed in the report itself):

The purpose . . . was to evaluate the . . . Unit I as-built cable tray inspection program. The inspection identified multiple instances involving the failure to properly inspect and document as-built cable tray attributes. In addition, violations were identified relative to both the failure of the QA programs to establish QA overview and audits of the Unit 1 as-built cable tray 4 inspection program and the use of incorrect weld bevel angles.

The transcripts of those May 1984 hearings, Cygna's letter and other related documents, the inspection report and other related documents are all part of CASE's bases.

Beginning in late spring and continuing during the summer of 1984, Applicants filed 17 Motions for Summary Disposition on the following design i

issues: A500 Steel; AWS/ASME (Design); Axial Restraints; Cinched Down U-Bolts; Damping Factors; Design / Design QA; Differential Displacement; Friction; Caps; Generic Stiffnesses; Local Displacements; Richmond Inserts; Safety Factors; Section Property Values; Stability; U-bolts Acting as 2-Way Restraints; and Upper Lateral Restraint. During the summer and early fall of 1984, CASE responded to all 17 of Applicants' Motions for Summary Disposition. Applicants' Motions and their attached affidavits, the few 4

responses made by the NRC Staff, CASE's responses and their attached 5

~

i

l affidavits, and other additional- responses by the parties all are part of CASE's bases. I Beginning October 6, 1984, CASE filed its own Motions for Summary l

DLoposition, four of which have never been answered by Applicants or NRC Staff (but which CASE has not withdrawn). These four Motions for Summary Disposition are also part of CASE's bases.

On December, 18, 1984, the Licensing Board issued its Memorandum (Reopening Discovery; Misleading Statement) in which it found that Applicants had made a false statement in the licensing proceeding and that a

-proper remedy was to reopen discovery. The Board stated, in part (pages 1 and 2):

. . . we find Applicants' testimony to be misleading, to reflect adversely on the credibility of Applicants' expert witnesses and to be cause for reopening discovery.

The Board also set forth additional specific concerns about the reliability of Applicants' testimony. In its 11/25/85 Memorandum and Order (Reconsideration of Misrepresentation Memorandum), the Board left its initial order in ef fect but clarified it. Both of these Board Memoranda and Orderaband related documents are part of CASE's bases.

On January 30, 1985, Applicants, in a letter to the Licensing Board, attached a copy of their 8-K filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission in which they reviewed recent events in the case and advised that Applicants at that time estimated that Unit 1 of Comanche Peak would probably not be placed in commercial operation before early 1986; they also 6

asked that the Licensing Board defer further hearings until March 1985 and take no immediate action on Applicants' pending application for authority to load fuel. That letter, the 8-K SEC filing, and related documents are part of CASE's bases.

And on April 18, 1986, the Applicants filed an 8-K report with the Securities and Exchange Commission in which they stated, in part:

As a result of preliminary findings from the ongoing reinspection and corrective action programs at the Comanche Peak [ plant] . . .

, the (Applicants . . . have] concluded that [their] present schedule for commercial operation of Unit 1 by mid-1987 is no longer achievable. [The Applicants] . . . [have] Initiated further expansion of its reinspection and corrective action effort to address and resolve the additional deficiencies which have recently been discovered.

[ Applicants] . . . now expect (s] .that modifications (most of which are minor) will be required on approximately thirty percent of the pipe supports in Unit I and has also directed the replacement of containment electrical penetrations in such Unit . . .

(Applicants are]_. . . unable at this time to predict how much additional time will be required to obtain license approval to permit the operation of Unit 1 or the extent to which presently estimated construction costs will be exceeded . . .

, Applicants 8-K SEC report and related documents are part of CASE's bases.

L In addition to the preceding specific documents, there are other documents (and their underlying related documents) which are also part of .

CASE's bases; for example: 9/17/85 Board Memorandum (Cygna Review of Revised Designs); 10/29/85 Boards' Memorandum and Order (Status of Pending Motions); 11/8/85 Board Memorandum (Withdrawal of Written Filings Motion);

Applicants' 11/12/85 letter to the Licensing Board with affidavits attached,

- correcting and modifying some of the affidavits attached to their withdrawn Motions for Summary Disposition (as requested by the Board); CASE's 12/19/85 t

7 t

y _._. _ . _ . . _ . . . - w n . . ,,. 4 , . . , , _ - . , , , - - . . _ . - . - - .--. _ _ . - . . _ -

i Response to Applicants' 11/12/85 Changes to Affidavits in Support of Applicants' Motions for Summary Disposition; etc.

The preceding are-only some of the bases for CASE's contention, all of which (with the exception perhaps of one inspection report) CASE believes the Licensing Board in the Comanche Peak proceedings (which is composed of the same individuals who sit on the Construction Permit Board) is well aware (and many of which. were in fact authored by that same Board).

In addition, CASE's bases include FSAR commitments by Applicants, all applicable industry codes and standards (such as the ASME, AWS, ASTM, ANSI, etc.), and all applicable NRC regulations. (Although this may appear to be obvious, we restate it here because of the peculiar circumstances at Comanche Peak, including the fact that Applicants' current reinspection program is admittedly being conducted outside the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.)

8

~~