IR 05000454/1992024

Physical Security Insp Repts 50-454/92-24 & 50-455/92-24 on 921207-11.One inspector-identified Item Noted Re Handling of Simulator Explosive Device.Major Areas Inspected:Protected & Vital Area Access Control of Personnel & Packages

ML20126E148
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	12/16/1992
From:	Creed J, Kniceley J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20126E143	List: IR 05000454/1992024 ML20126E138
References
50-454-92-24, 50-455-92-24, NUDOCS 9212290023
Download: ML20126E148 (4)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-454/92024(DRSS); 50-455/92024(DRSS)_

Docket Nos.' 50-454; 50-455 Licenses No. NPF-37;-NPF-66--

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company

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Opus West III 1400 Gpus Place Downers Grove, IL 60515 Faci'ity Name: Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2-Inspection Dates: December 7-11, 1992 Type of Inspection: Routine, Announced, Physical Security ,

Date of Previous Physical Security Inspection: August 18-September 3, 1992 Inspector: SM&

J Mes-R. Kniceley *

d'Ib Date Physical Security Inspector Approved By:

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-* [ 92-ames R. Creed, Chief Date pSafeguardsSection Inspection Summary Insoection on December 7-11. 1992 (Recorts No. 50-454/92024(DRSS):

No.-50-455/92024(ORSS)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced physical security inspection [ involving:

Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles; Training' and Qualification of Security Personnel-General Requirements; Follow-up'on Previous Inspection Findings and Review of-a Reported Fitness-For-Duty-Even Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements

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within the areas examined. 'One Inspector Identified Item (IFI) regarding tiie discovery and handling of a simulated explosive device was. reviewed and closed. A reported Fitness-For-Duty-incident was also reviewed and closed.-

- The security program was well implemented and well managed. Security-personnel observed were' knowledgeable of their assigned duties and adequately-implemented security program requirements. Staffing levels are ample and the Training 'and Qualification program is effective and meets regulatory:

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requirements. The professionalism, attitude and performance of the security

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organization continues to be good.

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I DETAllS l

- Key Persons Contacted in addition to the key members of the licensee's staff listed below, the inspector interviewed other employees, contractor personnel, and members ,

of the security organization. The asterisk (*) denotes those present at the onsite Exit Interview conducted on December 11, 199 G. Schwartz, Station Manager, Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)

• J. Kudalis, Services Director, CECO B. Saunders, Nuclear Security Administrator, Ceco F. Willaford, Nuclear Security Administrator, Ceco

• D. Goble, Station Security Administrator, CECO H. Krist, Assistant Security Administrator, Ceco

• M. Whitemore, Assistant Security Administrator, Ceco S. Nosko, Assistant Security Administrator, Ceco E. Zittle, Regulatory Assurance, CECO

• Mareth, Site Manager, Burns International Security Services, Inc.(BISSI) '

• M. Cavanaugh, Training Coordinator, BISSI

• D. Minor, Operations Coordinator, BISSI

• D. Anderson, Q.A. Manager, BISSI

• D Brindle, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor, CECO followun on Previous Inspection Findinas (IP 92701) (Closed) Inspector Identified Item (IFI) (Recorts No.50-454/9201601:50-455/92016-01: This item was discussed in section 5 of that report. This matter pertained to the discovery and subsequent management handling of simulated explosive devic Inspection results showed the-commitments identified in the licensee's response letter dated October 28,_1992, have been completed.

l_ A letter was distributed to station personnel on October 21, 1992 l addressing the need to make the appropriate notifications anytime a device is found that is believed to be an explosive =and-the need to properly communicate pertinent information. Security management personnel attended a Explosive Training Presentation given by the FBI during November, 1992. Additionally, criteria ,

for determining Suspected Explosive Devices was established and added to station procedure BXP 200-1. The inspector determined that the training and increased awareness involving explosive devices was adequate to help prevent any further mishandling of expected explosive devices. This item is considered closed.

I L (Closed) Fitness-For-Duty Event Follow-up: On September 12, 1992, L the licensee reported a violation of their Fitness-For-Duty

! program which involved a reactor operator. During this inspection l a review of the licensee's immediate and follow-up actions was l

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conducted. The inspector determined that the sanctions identified in 10 CFR 26.27 were adequately implemented. The individuals access was reinstated on September 23, 1992, and unannounced follow-up testing is being don . Entrance and Exit Interviews At the beginning of the inspection, Mr.G. K. Schwartz, Station Manager, and other members of your staff were informed of the purpose of this inspection, it's scope and the topical areas to be examined, The inspector met with the licensee representatives, denoted in Section 1, at the conclusion of onsite inspection activities. A general description of the scope and conduct of the inspection was provided. Briefly listed below are the findings discussed during the exit interview. The licensee representatives were invited to provide comments on each item discussed. Those comments are included. The details of each finding listed below are referenced, as noted, in the repor (1) The inspector stated tnat their were no violations, inspector identified items TI) or program weaknesses identified within the areas examined during this inspectio (2) The inspector stated that the security program is well implemented and well manage (3) The inspector stated that the security personnel observed were knowledgeable and proficient in their assigned duties and responsibilities and that security equipment observed performed as require . Procram Areas Inspected:

Listed below are the areas examined by the inspector in which no findings (strengths, violatioiis, deviations, unresolved items or inspection followup items) were identified. Only findings are described in subsequent Report Details section The below listed clear areas were reviewed and evaluated as d6fnied necessary by the inspector to meet the specified " Inspection Requirements" (Section 02) of the applicable NRC Inspection Procedure (IP). Sampling reviews included interviews, observations, and document reviews that provided independent verification of compliance with requirements. Gathered data was also used to evaluate the -iequacy of the reviewed pregram and practices to adequately protect the facility and the health and safety of the public. The depth and scope of inspection activities were conducted as deemed appropriate and necessary for the program area and operational status of the security syste Additional testing of security systems was not requested by the inspecto I

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JP 81700-Physical Security inspection Proaram for Power Reactors-

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0 Protected and Vital Area Physical ~ Barriers. Detection and Assessment Aids: (a) PA and VA Barrier Resistance; (b) Isolation Zones Maintained; (c) PA and VA Detection Functional- and Effective; (d)' Assessment Aids Functional and Effectiv . Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel. Packaaes and Vehicles:(a) Personnel Access: (1) Identification and Authorization Checked Before Access; (5) Personnel Are Searched; (6) Badges Are Displayed; (7) Visitors Are Escorted; (8) Rapid Ingress and Egress in Emergencies; (b) Packaae Control:- (1)

Packages Authorization Checked- (2) Handcarried Packages Searched at PA; (c) ylhicle Control: (1) Vehicles Are Searched; (2)

Authorization Verified Prior to Entry; (3) Two Officers at Open Gates; (4) All Self-Propelled and Towed Vehicles Are Controlle . Alarm Stations and Communication: (a) CAS and SAS Are Manned, Equipped, Independent and Diverse and Can Call For Assistance; (b)

No Interference of CAS activities; (c) CAS and SAS Have Continuous-Communications With Each Onsite and Can Call Offsit . Testina and Maintenance: (a) Licensee Implements Programs To Verify Installation, Testing, Maintenance and Correction; (b)

Compensatory Measures Implemented That Do Not Decrease Effectivenes . Security Trainina and Oualification: (a) Each Individual Is r Trained, Qualified and Equipped For Each Task Prior To Assignment;

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(b) Security Personnel Have Knowledge and Ability To Perform Duties; (c) Response Capabilities Are Adequate and Effective To

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Meet Plans and Protect _Against Design Basis Threat; (d) Size and leadership of Response Adequate; (e) Non-Security Personnel Are Trained.

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