ML20129J535

Discusses Status of IE post-Rogovin Investigation Prompted by Congressman Udall 800121,0204 & 0325 Ltrs.Evidence of Willful Withholding of Info Cited.Oeld Should Plan Enforcement Strategy to Deal W/Withholding

ML20129J535
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	04/17/1980
From:	Bachmann R NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD)
To:	Jenny Murray NRC
Shared Package
ML20127A105	List: IA-84-311, Recommends That V Stello Be Requested to Give Yes or No Answer to Listed Question Re Util Playing Down Seriousness of Facility Incident in Initial Dealings W/Commonwealth of PA ML20127A102 ML20129J493 ML20129J501 ML20129J517 ML20129J526 ML20129J535 ML20129J621 ML20129J632 ML20129J644 ML20129J659 ML20129J669 ML20129J681
References
FOIA-84-311 NUDOCS 8507230116
Download: ML20129J535 (3)

Text

I A

s April 17,1980 s

. flote to James p. Murray TMI IflVESTIGATION You have inquired about the status of the IE post-Rogovin TMI investigation, and particularly about the questions posed by llenry Meyers of Congressman Udall's staff. As I indicated to you in our discussion on April 15, 1980, the main thrust of the investigation is aimed at the apparent failure of TMI ,

,7 personnel to report: [

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1. the calculated exposure rate of 40 rem /hr at Goldsboro. b',

2. the high incore/ exit temperatures, and [Se ,;

3. the containment pressure spike. i-(Memo: StollotoMoseley, April 1,1980)

The investigation was prompted by letters from Congressman Udall dated January 21, February 4, and March 25, 1980, to Chainnan Ahearne. The 34 questions sub-mitted by Meyers in his April 3,1980, draft are in addition to, and duplicates of, some of the questions presented in the Udall letters. On April 7,1980, I met with John Craig of IE, who is florm Moseley's task force coordinator. I was informed that IE did not intend to answer the various questions one by one, but would prepare a comprehensive report covering all of the points raised.

This approach is being used because of a certain amount of confusion :urrounding this investigation, created primarily by Meyers' draft questions. The Udall letters themselves pose factual cuestions aimed at discovering (1) whether the instrument indications at TMI did or should have alerted the operators to the seriousness of the accident and (2) if the actual situation was known, whether they withheld'this information from the NRC. The legal points raised concern only the obligation to make reports. This is consistent with Udall's statements made in the letters and to the press, e.g., as reported in the Baltimore Sun _

article of April 3,1980.

Mayors, on the other hand, has made a number of factual / legal inquiries, r.ost of which pertain to in-plant monitoring and procedural requirements, rather than re-

. porting obligations. These questions cannot be answered by a reading of flRC regulations alone. 10 CFR 50.36 requires incorporation of technical specifica-tions in the license. Tech spec. 6.8 requires that procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering identified activities. Thorofore, with the exception of reports to flRC, a detailed reading of the TMI procedures will be necessary to answer the bulk of Meyers' questions. A meeting has boon scheduled with IE for April 21,1980 to discuss inter alia, athese matters.

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4 Ilowever, insofar as potential violations of flRC reporting requirements are con-cerned, some initial observations from a legal viewpoint are in order. The bottom line is, of course, whether the failure of 1MI personnel to inform the flRC of various conditions at the plant constituted actions for which sanctions may be imposed.

The apparent initiating factor in this investigation was the proposed civil penalties for failure to report. These were dropped after consultation with the Conmission last October, but the intention at the time was to consider their reinstatement after publication and study of the Kemeny and Rogovin reports.

As proposed the deleted items of noncompliance read:

12. 10 CFR 20.403(a) requires intacdiate notification of any incident involving by product, source, or special nuclear material possessed by llRC licensees which may have caused or threatens to cause:

- The release of radioactivo material in concentrations which, if averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, would exceed 5,000 times the limits in Appendix B. Table II; or

- Damage to property in excess of $200,000.

Contrary to the above:

A. On liarch 28, 1979, the required notification was not made following calculations of projected dose rates in Goldsboro at 7:10 a.m.,

estimated to be in the 10 - 40 R/hr range, indicative of a threat to cause a release of radioactive materials in concentrations which, if averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, would exceed 5,000 times the limits in Appendix B, Table II.

B. On March 28, 1979, the required notification was not made follow-ing a pressure spike of 28 psig which occurred in the reactor containment building at 1:50 p.m. on March 28, 1979, which threatened to cause property damage involving radioactive ma-terials in excess of $200,000, and flRC was not inmediately noti-fled. (Although this pressure spike was reported to f1RC in the morning of March 30, 1979, immediato notification to flRC was essential for assessment of the potential for failure of the reactor containment building with concomitant gross fission pro-duct release by this event or subsequent similar energy releases.)

C. On March 28, 1979, the required notification was not made follow-ing knowledge of fuel effluent temperatures in excess of 700 F in conjunction with the release of significant quantities of fission products from the damaged core with the threat to cause

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a release of radioactive materials in concentrations which, if averaged over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, would exceed 5,000 times the limits in Appendix B, Table II, were not im.nediately reported to ilRC.

(This information was not available to ilRC until the evening of ttarch 28, 1979, and was obtained at that time by an onsite llRC inspector.)

This is an infraction. (Civil Penalty $4,000)

Discussions with Jim Lieberman and an independent verification of flRC re and regulatory guides indicate the rationale for using section 20.403(a)gulation

. It was the only requirement imposing a duty of "immediate notification". Within the con-text of Part 20 however, this section appears not to have been intended to cover radiological releases subsequent to a core melt. Also, the concept of an "inci-dent" would seem not to include conditions from which an incident might be inferred.

Pending further discussions with the IE task force, which is now engaged in a careful review of the events of Itarch 28, 1979, I view the immediate mission of' .

• OELD to develop a legal enforcement structure based on a knowing and willful ,

withholding of infonnation.

f C 2 Richard G. Bachmann Attorney Rulemaking and Enforcement Division

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