ML20134B629

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Event Tracking & Assignment Sheets of 950818 Event Re Spray Down of Containment
ML20134B629
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/06/1995
From: John Tappert
NRC
To:
Shared Package
ML20134B255 List:
References
FOIA-96-485 NUDOCS 9509140063
Download: ML20134B629 (4)
v • d • e


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OEAB EVENT TRACKING SEEET SORT > Assignment Date QUERY > "TAPPERT" $ Assigned To & Assigned Date >- 08/01/95 & Assigned Date <- 09/01/95 Plent: SAINT LUCIE Unit: 2 Engineer: TAPPERT J.

Evcat: 08/18/95 Norning Report: Briefing:

l 50.72#: O LER#: 050000009500000 PN#:

1 Oth r Notification: REGION II CALL OF 8/18/95 System: Component:

l OPERATING NO_DE SIGNIFICANCE 1 - Operation A - Reactor Protection System

- Startup B - Safety-Related Cooling System 3 - Hot Standby C - Fuel Cladding

- Hot Shutdown - Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 5 - Cold Shutdown E - Containment 6 - Refueling - Plant Power 7 - Other G - Unexpected Plant Performance H - Other:

CAUSE EVENT TYPE 1 - Equipment Failure SIG - Significant Event

- Design or Installation Error X E0I - Event of Interest 3 Operating Error k TBD - To Be Determined

- Maintenance Error OTH - Other 5 - External 6 - Other POTENTIAL AO: Criterion:

Pr: posed By: TAPPERT J. N Engineer Approved: D i OINh Section Leader A. Chaffee Branch Chief EVENTS ASSESSMENT PANEL First Screening: sur :

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l significance

Description:

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l SPRAY DOWN-Or CONTAINMENT '

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AsstGweENT SHEET l PANEL -- Y YES _ NO
ASSIGNMENT DATE: Auaust 21. 1995 l

, ASSIGNED T0: TAPPERT I PLANT & UNIT: ST LUCIE 2

., EVENT DATE: Auaust 18. 1995

, 50.72 REPORT N0: .

i MR N0: REGION 2 CALL OF Auaust 18. 1995 OTHER SOURCE REPORT: .

l RELATED REPORTS: LER 95-07 SPECIALTY CODE: .

EVENT / CONDITION

SUMMARY

SPRAY DOWN OF CONTAINMENT a

i SPECIFIC FOLLOW-UP ASSIGNMENT DETERMINE DETAILS, EVALUATE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE AND GENERIC IMPLICATIONS. IN 4 ADDITION, ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC CONCERNS:

l P0TENTIAL MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS INDICATED BY MULTIPLE EVENTS 9

PREPARE TO BRIEF: X YES 1 N0

TARGET CLOSE0VT SCHEDULE
FAST i

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INITIAL SCREENING BY PANEL REGULATORY ASSESSMENT:

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EVENT / CONDITION SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
_ OTH _ E01 _ SIG _ A0 i i REMAINING OR ADDITIONAL FOLLOW-UP ITEMS:

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1 CLOSE00T TEXT REGULATORY ASSESSMENT: (Abstract of Closeout / Findings)

A procedural deficiency led to an inadvertent 10,000 gallon spray down of the St Lucie Unit I containment while in hot shutdown. Equipment important to safety installed in containment is designed to withstand the effects of a spray down event and therefore the safety significance of the event was minimal. Damage was limited to several smoke detectors, a ground on a Safety Injection Tank sample valve, and contamination. The licensee held a work stand down and has carefully planned their recovery actions. These actions appear adequate to address all immediate safety concerns. The specific procedural deficiency that led to the event is not a generic issue, however, inadvertent containment spray is generic and has been a recurring industry problem. The frequency and consequences of inadvertent containment spray events are not sufficent to justify additional generic regulatory action.

CLOSE00T/ FINDINGS:

On August 17, 1995, St Lucie Unit I was in Mode 3 at 532*F and 1550 psia making preparations to start up. The containment spray system had been aligned for automatic actuation as part of the startup procedure. The A containment spray header flow control valve was not in its normal position because it had failed its stroke test the previous week. The licensee opted to feil the valve in its safety position (open) and repair it during the next refueling outage. In the standby lineup, the spray header flow control valve is the only shut valve between the SDC HX and the containment spray header.

The licensee did perform a 50.59 evaluation for this temporary modification.

As a corrective action for a previous LPSI problem, the licensu had written an ECCS fill and vent procedure to be implemented following the cont.lusion of shutdown cooling operations. This procedure vented the LPSI system than ran the LPSI pumps and vented the system again. When this procedure was performed with the abnormal containment spray configuration, a direct flow path was created from the RWT to the containment spray header. Three minutes after establishing the flow path, the control room received high reactor cavity leakage annunciators and multiple containment fire alarms. Operators entered the off-normal procedure for excessive RCS leakage and verified normal RCS parameters. Operators then identified the flow path from LPSI to the containment spray header and secured the LPSI pump and isolated the SDC HX.

Post event analysis determined approximately 10,000 gallons were sprayed in containment.

In response to this event, the licensee stopped all nonessential work on site.

The plant was cooled down and a thorough containment inspection and cleanup was undertaken. Damage was limited to several failed smoke detectors and a ground on a SIT sample valve. St Lucie has had a number of recent performance problems including procedural noncompliances which led to the failure of an RCP seal and an inadvertent MSIV isolation during a shutdown. Other errors led to inoperable PORVs for several months. A management meeting between the Region and licensee management has been scheduled to discuss recent performance trends. Additionally, an enforcement conference on the PORV l inoperability issue has been scheduled. Further regulatory action will await l

the result of these meetings.

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3 In light of recent performance problems, and despite the limited safety significance of the actual event, this event is classifed as an Event of Interest.

Information Notices have been written for more significant containment spray I r

events including 81-10, 87-25, and 94-52. Additionally, NRR has transmitted a '

1991 safety evaluation regarding inadvertent containment spray events to all

, the regions to assist them in spray event followup. No additional generic ,

communciation is warranted at this time. >

] FINAL PANEL ASSESSMENT:

1 The panel considered the significance of this to be moderate. The specific causes of the event were judged to not be generic. Factors impacting priority determination were effect of spraydown on containment and recent performance

problems at the facility.  ;

l EVENT / CONDITION SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: OTH X E01 _ SIG _ A0 BASIS: _ RISK _ PROGRAMMATIC _ MARGIN _ N/A

', GENERIC FOLLOW-UP ACTION RECOMMENDED: _ YES _ NO _ PRIORITY (1,2,3,4)'

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BRIEF #

1. Priority endnote:

PRIORITY 1: Immediate assignment of resources (e.g., for highly risk-significant safety concerns) '

J PRIORITY 2: Near -term action (e.g., significant safety issues not warranting immediate action)

PRIORITY 3: Long-term action (e.g., issues of moderate to low safety significance)

PRIORITY 4: Resource dependent action (e.g., items that can he deferred)

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