ML20093C661

Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,South Texas Project,Units 1 & 2 (Phase II)

ML20093C661
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	05/31/1984
From:	Shaber C EG&G, INC.
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML20093C663	List: ML20093C661 ML20093C665
References
CON-FIN-A-6457, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8406150095
Download: ML20093C661 (35)

Text

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-l CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 1 AND 2 (PHASE II)

Docket No. [50/498)

[50/499]

Author C. R. Shaber

' Principal Technical Investigator T. H. Stickley Published May 1984 l

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EG&G Idaho, Inc.

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Prepared for the 70:S' Nuclear Regulatory Commission

,7 Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 f -

FIN No. A6457

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ABSTRACT The Nuclear Regulatory Commis'sion (NRC) has requested that all nuclear plants, either operating or under construction, submit a response of consistercy with NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." EG&G Idaho, Inc., has contracted with the NRC to evaluate the responses of those plants presently under construction. This report contains EG&G's evaluation and recommendations for South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 for the requirements of Sections 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.1.5, and 5.1.6 of NUREG-0612 (Phase II). Section 5.1.1 (Phase I) was covered in a separate report [1].

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 is not totally consistent with the guidelines of NUREG-0612. In general, inconsistencies exist in the following areas:

o The interface lift points for five heavy loads handled by the FHB overhead crane should be upgraded to meet NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.6.

o Information for proper evaluation of the auxiliary hook of the FHB overhead crane is needed.

o Mechanical stops or electrical interlocks are needed to supplement administrative control for heavy loads handled over the in-containment fuel holding pool when it contains fuel, o Information for proper evaluation of the Containment Building Polar Crane Auxiliary hook is needed.

o Complete tabular information on heavy loads subject to NUREG-0612 criteria is not provided. Either complete the tabular entries or justify their omission.

The main repnrt contains recommendations which will aid in making the above items consistent with the appropriate guidelines.

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CONTENTS ABSTRACT ............................................................. 11 4

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

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1. INTRODUCTION .................................................... 1 1.1 Purpose of Review ......................................... 1

, 1.2 Generic Background ........................................ 1 1.3 Pl ant-Speci fic Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4

2. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................. 4 2.1 Overview ... .............................................. 4 2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems ...................... 4 2.3 Guidelines ........................ ....................... 4

3. CONCLUDING

SUMMARY

.............................................. 30 3.1 Guideline Recommendations ................................. 30

.3.2 Additional Recommendations ................................ 31 3.3 Summary ................................................... 31

4. REFERENCES ........................................ ............. 32 TABLES 2.1 Overhead Handling Systems Subject to NUREG-0612 Criteria ........ 5

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CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCdEAR POWER PLANTS SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 1 MND 2 (PHASE II) 1

1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose of Review s

This technical evaluation report documents the EG&G Idaho, Inc.,

review of general load-handling policy and procedures at South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP). This evaluation was performed with the objective of assessing conformance to the general load-handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" [2], Sections 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.1.5, and 5.1.6. This constitutes Phase II of a two phase evaluation. Phase I assesses conformance to Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612 and was documented in a separate report [1].

1.2 Generic Background A

Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes to these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17,

• 1978 [3], to all power reactor applicants, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from j certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes i

of load-handling accidents and should be upgraded.

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In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two phase objective using an accepted a'pproach or protection philosophy. The first portion of the objective, achieved through a set cf general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load-handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated such that their probability of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Articles 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load-handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (a) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load-handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure proof crane) or (b) conservative evaluations of load-handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small. Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria as follows:

o " Releases of radioactive material that may result from damage to spent fuel based on calculations involving accidental dropping of a postulated heavy load produce doses that are well within 10 CFR Part 1001.imits of 300 rem thyroid, 25 rem whole body (analyses should show that doses are equal to or less than 1/4 of Part 100 limits);

o " Damage to fuel and fuel storage racks based on calculations involving accidental dropping of a postulated heavy load does not result in a configuration of the fuel such that k,f f is larger than 0.95; o " Damage to the reactor vessel or the spent-fuel pool based l on calculations of damage following accidental dropping of a l postulated heavy load is limited so as not to result in I i

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water leakage that could uncover the fuel, (makeup water provided to overcome leakage should be from a borated source of adequate concentration if the water being lost is borated); and f o "Dainage' to equipment in redund tnt or dual safe shutdown f

paths, based on calculations a: suming the accidental dropping of a postulated heavy load, will be limited so as not to result in loss of required safe shutdown functions."

The approach used to -develop the staff guidelines for minimizing sne potential for a load drop was based on defense in depth. This plan includes proper operator training, equipment design, and maintenance coupled with safe load paths and crane interlock devices restricting movement over ciritical areas.

Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612.

1.3 Plant-Soecific Background On December 22, 1989, the NRC issued a letter [4] to Houston Lighting and Power, the applicant for STP requesting that the applicant review provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at STP, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines. Houston Lighting and Power provided responses to this request on December 19, 1983 [5].

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2. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2.1 Overview I

The following sections summarize Houston Lighting and Power review of heavy load handling at STP accompanied by EG&G's evaluation; conclusions, and recommendations to the applicant for making the facilities more consistent with the intent of NUREG-0612.

2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems Table 2.1 presents the applicant's list of overhead handling systems which are subject to the criteria of NUREG-0612. The applicant has not indicated the weight of a heavy load for the facilities per the NUREG-0612 definition.

2.3 Guidelines The basic guidelines of NUREG-0612 for Phase II evaluations are quoted and followed with: (a) a summary of the applicant's statements, (b) EG&G's evaluation, and (c) recommendations. The criteria include guideline 5.1. for Boiling Water Reactors only. STP are pressurized water reactors and need to show consistency with guidelines 5.1.2, 5.1.3, and 5.1.5. The alternative Guideline 5.1.6 may be used for upgrading to meet the required guidelines.

2.3.1 Spent-Fuel pool Area [NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.2]

(1) "The overhead crane and associated lifting devices used for  ;

handling heavy loads in the spent-fuel pool area should satisfy the single-failure proof guidelines of Section 5.1.6 of this report.

OR-(2) "Each of the following is provided:

(a) Mechanical stops or electrical interlocks should be  !

provided that prevent movement of the overhead crane I lead block over or within 15 feet horizontal (4.5 meters) of the spent-fuel pool. These mechanical 4

TABLE 2.1. OVERIEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS SUBJECT 10 N'JREG-0612 CRii[RIA -

Targets Elimination Crane / Tag Number Weight Special (Capacity in Tons) (for all loads farget Category Load (s) (Ibs) Lif ting Device associated with crane) E levation/L oc at inn (Note 1)

Reactor Containment Building Reactor Vessel Internals 21,000 Load Cell Linkage Mainsteam Piping 68 ft/Figuies 16, NA (RCB) Polar Crane Unit I Lif t Rig 18, 19 1C10lNCP101A (417/15)

Lower internals !31,000 Internals Lift Rig RC Pump 52 ft/ Figure 16 55, NA RCB Polar Crane Unit 2 Load Cell Linkage 3,000 None Yessel 68 ft/ Figures 16, 7C102NCP20lA (500/15)

55. IL la Containment Fuel Pool 8,520 None Steam Generators 102 ft/ Figures I6, NA Gate 18, 19 Reactor Coolant Pump 16,500 RCP Lift Device HVAC ducting 120 ft/ Figures 16, NA Flywheel 18, 19 Reactor Coolant Pump 97,600 RCP Lif t Device Cable Trays 68 ft/ Figure 16 NA Motor Reactor Coolant Pump 36,800 RCP Lift Device Pressurizer 101 f t/ Figures 16 NA Rotor lg Inservice Inspection Rig 3,600 None Hydrogen Recombiner 68 ft/ Figure 16 NA RIR Pump 6,900 None RHR Piping Conduit -2 f t SR RHR Pump Motor 5,700 None RilR lleat Exchanger 29,000 None RIR ileat Exchanger 14,000 None Tube Bundle Integrated lead Package 612,000 Head Lif t Rig (includes the following to be lifted together during rapid refueling) 5 mm m =====

TABLE 2.1. (continued) larg2ts E liminat ion Crane / Tag Nuiaber Weight Special (for all loads Target Category (Capacity in Tons) Load (s) (Ibs) Lifting Device associated with crene) E levat ion /Locat ion (Note 1)

PCB Polar Cranes a. Imad Lif t Rig 8,800 (continued)

b. Misslie Shield 30,000

c. Cooling Shroud 30,000

d. Cables on Shroud 5,000

e. Cooling Fans and 2,400 Duc t s

f. Vessel Head Plus 230,000 Water 9 Cable Tray 7,500

h. Cables on Tray 15,000

1. Stud Tensioners 6,000 J. Upper internals 137,400 Internals Lift Rig (Non-rapid refueling)

Studs, Nuts, Washers 30,000 None (12 in carrier)

Hatches (HE) (3) 21,700 None liatch (Pump motors) 15,850 None lutch 13,400 None RCB Monorail RCfC Fan 4,414 None Safety injection -2 ft/ Figure 17 SR 9Cl0lNCM102A Piping 9C102NCH202A (3) 6 mel m

TABLE 2.1. (continued)

Targets Elimination Crane / Tag Number Weight Special (for all loads Target Cateqory (Capacity in ions) toad (s) (Ibs) Lif ting Device associatea with crane) E levat ion / Loc at ion (Note 1)

RC8 Monorail RHR Pump 6,500 None RHR Piping -2 ft/ Figure 17 SR 9Cl0lNCM104A 9C102NCH204A (4) RHR Pump Motor 5,700 None RHR Pump -2 ft/ figure 17 SR RCB Monorail RHR Pump 6,500 Mine RHR Piping -2 ft/ figures 17, SR 9P10lN M107A 19 90302NCH207A (4)

RHR Pump Motor 5,700 None RHR Pump -2 ft/ Figures 17, SR 19 RCB Monorail RHR Pump 6,500 None RHR Piping -2 ft/ Figures 17, SR 9C10lNCM1070 19 9C102NCH2010 (4)

RHR Pump Motor 5,700 None RHR Pump -2 ft/ Figures 17, SR 19 Mechanical Electrical Auxiliary CCW Pump 10.200 None CCW Piping 10 ft/ Figures 20, SR Building (MEAB) Monorail 24, 26 9M10lNCM103A 9M102NCH203A CCW Pump Motor 2,500 None CCW Pump 10 ft/ Figures 20, SR (7.5) 24, 26 Supplementary Cooler 5,502 None MEAS Monorail CCW Pump 10,200 None CCW Piping 10 ft/ Figures 20, SR 9M10lNCM104A 24, 26 9M102NCH204A (1.5) CCW Pump Motor 2,500 None CCW Pump 10 ft/ Figures 20, SR 24, 26 Supplementary Cooler 5,502 None MEAB Mnnorail CCW Pump 10,200 None CCW Piping 10 ft/ Figures 20, SR 9M10lNCM105A 24, 26 9Ml02NCH205A (7.5) CCW Pump Motor 2,500 None CCW Pump 10 ft/ Figures 20, SR 24, 26 1

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TABLE 2.1. (continued) .

Targets E liminat ion Crane /T g Number Weight Special (for all loads Target Category (Capacity in Tons) Load (s) (Ibs) Lif ting Device associated with crane) E levat ion /Locat ion (Note 1)

Supplementary Cooler 5,502 None MEA 8 Monorail Charging Pump 2,400 None Charging Pump Piping 10 ft/ Figures 20, SR 9M10lNCM106A 27 9M102NCM206A (3) Charging Pump Motor 4,400 None Charging Pump 10 ft/ Figures 20, SP 27 Charging Pump Gear 2,700 None Charging Pump Base 5,100 None

, . Supplementary Cooler 2,938 None MEAS Monorail Charging Pump 2.400 None Charging Pump Piping 10 f t/ Figures 20, SR 9M10lNCM101A 21 9M102NCH297A (3) Charging Pump Muwr 4,400 Ncne Charging Pump 10 ft/ Figures 20, SR 27 Charging Pump Gear 2,700 None Charging Pump Base 5,100 None Supplementary Cooler 2,938 None MEAB Monorail itatch 3,000 None Boric Acid Tank 9M10lMCMl41A 10 f t/ Figures 20, SR 24, 27 9M102NCM24IA (2)

MEA 8 Monorail lla tch 3,000 None Boric Acid Tank 9M10lNCM142A 10 ft/ Figures 20, SR 24, 27 9M102NCM242A (3)

MEA 8 Monorail llatches(9)lleaviest 5,500 None CVC Callon Bed 9M10lNCM156A ' 41 ft/ Figures 21, NA Demineralizers 25, 28 9M102NCM256A (3) CVC Mixed Bed 41 ft/ Figures 21, NA Demineralizers 25, 28

TABLE 2.1. (continued) -

Taigets E liminat ion trene/ Tag Number Weight Special (Capacity in Tons) (for all loads Target category Load (s) (Ibs) Lif ting Device associated with crane) E levat ion /L oc at ion (Note 1)

MEA 8 Monorail Hatches (22) 5,280 9M10lNCM160A None Letdown Preheat filter 41 ft/ Figures 21 NA 9M102NCM260A 28 (5) Seal Water injection 41 ftifigures 21 N4 Filter 28 Seal Water Return 41 ft/ Figures 21 NA Filters 28 Reactor Coolant 41 ft/ Figures 21 NA Filters 28 MEA 8 Monorail Hatches (22) 5,280 Nor,e 9M10lNCMI608 Letdown Preheat filter 41 ft/ Figures 21, NA 9M102NCM2608 28 (5) ,

Fuel Handling Building (FHB) Containment Spray Pumps 7.155 None Spent Fuel Pool Overhead Crane 68 ft/ Figures 30, SF 31, 33, 34 7F10lNC8103A 7F102NC8203A Containment Spray Pump 5,820 None (15/2) Motors Containment Spray Pump 3,924 None SFP Ikat E xchangers Figure 34 SF, SR Outer Barrel L.H. Safety injection 7.155 None Pump L.ll. Safety injection 3,400 None Pump Motors L.fl. Safety injection 3,924 None Pump Outer Barrel 11.11. Safety injection 7.155 None Pump t

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TA8LE 2.1. (continued) ,

i Targets E limination -

Crane / Tag Number Weight Special (for all loads Target Category (Capacity in Tons) Load (s) (lbs) Lif ting Device associated with crane) F levat ion /Locat ion (Note 1)

FH8 Overhead Crane (continued) H.H. Safety injection 3,400 None 7F10lNC8103A Pump Motor 7F102NC8203A (15/2) H.H. Safety injection 3,924 None Pump Outer Barrel Inner Gate (FTC to SFP) 8,400 None Outer Gate (FTC to SFP) 5,950 None inner Gate (SFP to CLP) 8,400 Mone Outer Gate (SFP to CLP) 5,950 rane Spent Fuel Pool Heat 10,200 None Exchanger Hatch Spent Fuel Pool Heat 14,320 None Exchangers Spent Fuel Shipping Not None Cask Head Available New Fuel Shipping 5,000 None Containers FH8 Monorail L.H. Safety injection 7.155 None LH Safety injection -19 ft/ Figures 29, SR 9F10lNCM104A Pump Pug 33, 34

-9F102NCN204A (5) L.H. Safety injection 5,820 None Pump Motor L.H. Safety injection 3,924 None Pump Outer Barrel FNB Monorail H.H. Safety injection 7,155 None list safety injection -19 f t/ Figures 29, SR 9F10lNCM1048 Pump Pamp 33, 34 9F102NCH2048 (5) H.H. Safety injection 5,820 None Pump Motor

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IABLE 2.1. (continued)

Target 5 Elimination Crane / Tag Number Weight Special (Capacity in Tons) (for all loads Target Category Load (s) (Ibs) Lif ting Device associated with crane) Elevation / Location (Note I)

H.H. Safety injectton 3,924 None Pump outer Barrel Fl4 Monorail Containment Spray Pump 7.155 None containment Spray Pump 9F10lNCM104C 19 ft/ Figure 29, SR 9F102NCM204C 33, 34 (5) Containment spray Pump 5,820 None Motor Containment Spray Pump 3,924 None Outer Barrel FHB Monorail L.H. Safety Injection 7,155 None 9F10lNCMIO4D Pump LH S1 Pump -19 ft/ Figures 29, SR 9F102NCM204D 33, 34 (5) L.H. Safety injection 5,820 None Pump Motor L.H. Safety injection 3,924 None Pump Outer Barrel Fla Monorail H.H. Safety injection 7,155 None HH SI Pump -19 ft/ Figures 29 SR 9F10lNCM104E Pump 33, 34 9F102NCM204E (5) H.H. Safety injection 5,820 None Pump Motor H.lf. Safety injection 3,924 None Pump Outer Barrel FHB Monorail Containment Spray Pump 1,155 None Containment Spray Pump -19 ft/ Figure 29 SR 9F10lNCM104F 9F102NCM204F 33, 34 (5) Containment Spray Pump 5,820 None Motor containment spray Pump 3,924 None Outer Barrel e

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Targets Clininatton Crane / Tag Number Weight Special (for all loads Target Category (Capatity in Tons) Load (s) (Ibs) Lif ting Device associated with crane) E levat ion /Locat ion (Note I)

FH8 Monorail L.H. Safety injection 7.155 None LH Safety injection -19 ft/ Figures 29, SR 9F10lNCM104G Pump Pump 33, 34 9F102NCM204G (5) L.H. Safety injection 5,820 None Pug Motor L.H. Safety injection 3,924 None Pump Outer Barrel

, FHB Monorail H.H. Safety injection 7,15) None HH St Pump -19 ft/ Figures 29, 1 SR 9F10lNCM104H Pump 33, 34 9F102NCM204H (5) H.H. Safety injection 5,820 None Pump Motor H.ll. Safety injection 3,924 None

. Pump Outer Barrel FH8 Monorail Containment Spray Pug 7,155 None Containment Spray Pump -19 f t/ Figure 29, SR 9F10lNCM1041 33, 34 9F102NCM204I (5) Containment Spray Pump 5,820 None Motor Containment Spray Pump 3,924 None Outer Barrel Essential Cooling Water (ECW) ECW Pump and Motor 26,300 None ECW Piping 34 ft/ Figure 36 SR Intake Gantry 1P200NCG001C Traveling Screen 19,700 None ECW Pumps 34 ft/ Figure 36 SR (20)

. Strainers (Wet) 19,467 None ECW Screens 34 ft/ Figure 36 SR Stop Log 5,300 None Strainers 31.5 ft/ Figure 36 SR Hatch to screens 38,250 None 12 3 m

TA8tf 2.I. (coe.:inued)

Targets E liminat ion Crane / Tag Number Weight Special (Capacity in Tons) (for all loads Target Category Load (s) (Ibs) Lif ting Device associated with crane) E levat ion /l ocation _jNoteI)

Hatch to Pumps 24,500 None Hatch to Strainers 25,500 None Olesel Generator' Building (DG8) Starting Air Tank 2,110 None Olesel Generators 29 ft/ Figure 37 SR Overhead Crano 8010lNCB101A Flywheel 4,450 None 801024C8201A (3) 8 earing & Stand 2,300 None Air Filter 5,400 None DG8 Overhead Crane Starting Air Tank 2,710 None Diesel Generators 29 ft/ Figure 37 SR .

8010lNC81018 80102NC82018 Flywheel 4,540 Naae (3)

Bearing & Stand 2,300 hone Air Filter 5,400 None DG8 Overhead Crane Starting Air Tank 2,110 None Olesel Generators 29 ft/ Figure 37 SR 8010lNC810lc 80102NC82CIC Flywheel 4,540 None (3)

Bearing & Stand 2,300 None Air Filter 5,400 None Notes:

1. In the elimin'ation category column the following abbreviations are used to indicate the method of elimination.

SR = separation and redundancy IL = interlocks SS = site specific AN = analysis SF = single-f ailure-proof crane NA = not required for safe shutdown, decay heat removal or spent fuel cooling.

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steps or electrical intarlocks should not be bypassed when the pool contains " hot" spent fuel, and should not be bypassed without approval from the shift supervisor (or other designated plant management personnel). The mechanical stops and electrical interlocks should be verified to be in place and operational prior to placing

" hot" spent fuel in the pool.

(b) The mechanical stops or electrical interlocks of 5.1.2(2)(a) above should 'also not be bypassed unless an analysis has demonstrated that damage due to postulated load drops would not result in criticality or cause leakage that could uncover the fuel.

(c) To preclude rolling if dropped, the cask should not be carried at a height higher than necessary and in no case more than six (6) inches (15 cm) above the operating floor level of the refueling building or other components and structures along the path of travel.

(d) Mechanical stops or electrical interlocks should be provided to preclude crane travel from areas where a postulated load drop could damage equipment from redundant or alternate safe shutdown paths.

(e) Analyses should conform to the guidelines of Appendix A.

98 (3) "Each of the following are provided (Note: This alternative is similar to (1) above, except it allows movement of a heavy load, such as a cask, into the pool while it contains

" hot" spent fuel if the pool is large enough to maintain wide separation between the load and the " hot" spent fuel.):

(a) " Hot" spent fuel should be concentrated in one location in the spent-fuel pool that is separated as much as possible from load paths.

(b) Mechanical stops or electrical interlocks should be provided to prevent movement of the overhead crane load block over or within 25 feet (7.5 m) horizontal of the

" hot" spent fuel. To the extent practical, loads should be moved over load paths that avoid the spent-fuel pool and kept at least 25' feet (7.5 m) from the !' hot" spent fuel unless necessary.. When it is necessary to bring loads within 25 feet of the restricted region, these mechanical stops or electrical interlocks should not be bypassed unless the spent fuel has decayed sufficiently as shown in Table 2.1-1 14

and 2.1-2, or unless the total inventory of gap activity for fuel within the protected area would result in off-site doses less than 1/4 of 10 CFR Part 100 if released, and such bypassing should require the approval from the shift supervisor (or other  !'

designated plant management individual). The mechanical stops or electrical interlocks should be verified to be in place and operational prior to placing " hot" spent fuel in the pool.

(c) Mechanical stops or electrical interlocks should be provided to restrict crane travel from areas where a postulated load drop could damage equipment from

, redundant or alternate safe shutdown paths. Analyses have demonstrated that a postulated load drop in any location not restricted by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops would not cause damage that could result in criticality, cause leakage that could uncover the fuel, or cause loss of safe shutdown equipment.

(d) To preclude rolling, if dropped, the cask should not be carried at a height higher than necessary and in no case more than six (6) inches (15 cm) above the 4

operating floor level of the refueling building or other components and structures along the path of travel.

(e) Analyses-shoul'd conform to the guidelines of Appendix A.

OR (4) "The effects of drops of heavy loads should be analyzed and shown to satisfy the evaluation criteria of Section 5.1 of this report. These analyses should confcrm to the guidelines of Appendix A."

A. Summary of Applicant's Statements ~

The response information is presented in the specific sequence of the statements used in the NRC 81-07 Generic Letter, Section 2.2 subparagraphs 1 through 4.

The cranes physically capable of carrying loads which could, if dropped, land or fall into the spent fuel pool are the FHB Overhead Crane and Containment Polar Crane. The latter crane is considered because the STP includes an in-containment fuel pool for temporary fuel holding 15

capability during refueling. Administrative procedure will state that no heavy loads will be moved while spent fuel is being held in this pool. One exception, at inservice inspection requiring removal of the lower internals from the vessel (10 year interval), the internals are moved to the adjacent lower internal storage stand. It is not reasonable to postulate the movement of this load over the Fuel Pool.

The FHB Overhead Crane design makes the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads based on the fact that it is designed to meet the intent of RG 1.104. The information requested in Attachment 1 of the Generic letter is provided in Attachment 0 of this submittal.

The Polar Crane is the only crane identified in the response to the request for crane identification (r.ot excluded below) which is evaluated as not having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a drop extremely small. Since no spent fuel will be in the in-containment fuel pool during load movement, the Criteria of NUREG-0612 Article 5,1 are not addressed.

The Cranes excluded are:

Cask Handling Crane Incapable of carrying heavy New Fuel Area Bridge Crane loads within 15 ft of the FHB pool boundary Fuel Handling Machine Do not carry " heavy loads" Refueling Machine Monorails in FHB Lo'cated at levels below the -

and Containment spent fuel pools.

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B. EG&G Evaluation The Generic Letter 81-07 Section 2.2 guides and NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.2 guideline are sufficiently different to cause some confusion in matching responses for one to the other.

The basis for EG&G review is the NUREG-0612 guideline.

Matching the applicant statements and references prompts the following evaluation.

o The two cranes, FHB Overhead Crane and Containment Building Overhead Crane, are justified as the only ones of concern with this guideline.

o The FHB Overhead Crane information through the statement given in A above and details given in the Attachment 0 and references is shown to meet the single failure p, roof guide. lines, NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.2 Option (1). The RG 1.104 design used has subsequently been replaced by NUREG 0554. The crane is rated for 15 tons, but the maximum critical load handled weighs 6.16 tons. The auxiliary 2-ton hook on this crane is not of single failure proof design and its use has not been addressed. The main hook single failure proof status must be extended to include the " associated lifing devices" which it handles. The submittal in its Appendix D indicates that no special lifting devices will be used, and that slings will be procured and used in accordance with ANSI 830.9-1971 as modified by NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.1.(5) and 5.1.6. The Appendix also identifies five loads for this crane hook, whose interface lift point design does not meet'NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.6 requirements. STP indicates that safe

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load paths, procedures and the single failure proof crane are considered adequate to show consistency with requirements. Since the Article 5.1.6 reqr.irements are specified to supplement Article 5.1.1, the consideration is not valid. The " system" for these 17

five loads is not single failure proof and requires upgrade of the interface lift points.

o The exclusion of the Containment Building Overhead Crane from NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.2 on the basis of Administrative procedure is less than the " defense in depth" requirement of NUREG-0612, for cranes that can operate over a spent fuel pool. The premise of Article 5.1.2 specifies that its requirements are in addition to satisfying the requirements of Article 5.1.1 which requires procedures, safe load paths, etc. Specific attention should be given to Article 5.1.2 (a) and (b). The Administrative procedures, safe load paths plus controls of mechanical stops or electrical interlocks would show consistency with the guideline.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations The information provided for the FHB Overhead Crane, main hook, i.dicates it is consistent with NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.2. However, the method of upgrading the interface lift points on five loads it handles should be provided to show that the crane and its associa d lifting

, devices are consistent with the guideline.

The use of and control of the 2-ton auxiliary hook of the FHB Overhead Crane should be provided, and show that it is consistent with one NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.2 option.

The Containment Building Polar Crane dependence on an Administrative procedure only to prevent heavy load handling over the in-containment fuel holding pool, when it contains ,

fuel, is not consistent with the guideline. Mechanical or electrical stops should be installed and arranged to provide positive controls. The Administrative procedure should be 18

used to show consistency with the other parts of NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.2(2). Since both the main hook and auxiliary hook could handle heavy loads, the controls should apply to both of the crane hooks.

2.3.2 Reactor Building [NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.31 (1) "The crane and associated lifting devices used for handling heavy loads in the containment building should satisfy the single-failure proof guidelines of Section 5.1.6 of this report.

f 93 (2) " Rapid containment isolation is provided with prompt

' automatic actuation on high radiation so that postulated releases are within limits of evaluation Criterion I of Section 5.1 taking into account delay times in detection and actuation; and analyses have been performed to show that evaluation criteria II, III, and IV of Section 5.1 are satisfied for postulated load drops in this area. These analyses should conform to the guidelines of Appendix A.

Og (3) "The effects of drops of heavy loads should be analyzed and shown to satisfy the evaluation criteria of Section 5.1.

Loads analyzed should include the following: reactor vessel head; upper vessel internals; vessel inspection platform; cask for damaged fuel; irradiated sample cask; reactor coolant pump; crane load block; and any other heavy loads trought over or nea* the reactor vessel or other equipment required for continued decsy heat removal and maintaining shutdown. In this analysis, credit may be taken for containment isolation if such is provided; however, analyses -

should establish adequate detection and isolation time.

Additionally, the analysis should conform to the guidelines of Appendix A."

A. Summary of Applicant's Statements i

The polar crane is the only crane physically capable of carrying heavy loads over the reactor vessel. This crane is l

not of single failure proof design. I l

To prevent loads from being carried over the reactor vessel, the polar crane will be equipped with an interlock to 1

19 l l

p , .

w

prevent the trolley from moving within a given radius of the reactor vessel (the zone of the interlock is shown in Figure 38). Heavy loads that are required to pass within the interlock zone (with or without the head in place on the vessel) are the upper and lower internals, the in-service inspection rig, the integrated head package, the stud carrier rack containing twelve studs, nuts, and washers, the stud tensioners, and the Internals Lift Rig.

The polar crane is used only during shutdown and refueling.

Once the integrated head package is removed, the only loads required to be carried through the interlock while fuel is in the vessel are the internals lift rig which is required

, to change the 0-rings and the upper internals if they are removed separately from the IHP.

The interlocks are active at all times unlers bypasser. by key. The bypass will be in effect as long as the key is inserted. The key cannot be removed without reactisc.ing the interlock.

4 1

An integrated head package (IHP) drop analysis which is l

applicable to STP was performed by Westinghouse and submitted to the NRC by Westinghouse letter NS-CE-1101 dated June 11, 1976, on the RESSAR-41 docket. This analysis determined that dropping the head would not result in an unacceptable degree of core damage. It received NRC approval on November 30, 1976.

The Polar Crane meets Criteria I to III. The Westinghou:e head drop analysis covers compliance for all large loads less than 636,000'1bs.

The internals lift rig is shown on submittal Figure B-3. It 3 is 14 ft in diameter and 30 ft high. Because of its size and shape, it is impossible for it to hit the fuel. The effects of a drop of this rig onto the vessel are enveloped 20

s 1

by the Westinghouse Head Drop Analysis since the rig is much lighter than the IHP. The effects of a drop of the upper internals are also enveloped by the Westinghouse Head Drop Analysis.

The lower internals and inservice inspection rig are moved only when all the fuel has been removed from the vessel.

The key to the vessel interlock will be under the control of the refueling director. The interlock will be bypassed to remove the IHP. Once the IHP is removed from the vessel and cicars the area above the vessel, the interlock will be restored. During rapid refueling, bypass will only be permitted for replacement of the 0-rings. During nonrapid refueling bypass will be permitted to remove the internals as well. The interlock will be bypassed to replace the IHP.

The key for bypassing the vessel interlock of the polar crane will be controlled by the refueling director and released only upon proper authorization. Procedures will also control the use and bypass of the interlock; additional

! technical specifications are not warranted.

The interlock boundaries will be tested before *.he interlocks are bypassed and following replacement of the IHP. The tests will be run without load on the crane hook.

For the Polar Crane, reliance is placed on other site specific considerations only for the movement of the lower internals and the inservice inspection rig. Movement of these loads is performed once every 10 years and will only occur after all the fuel has been removed from the vessel.

Consequently bypassing the interlock at this time poses no hazard to the fuel.

Since the lower internals are never removed and the inservice inspection rig is never used while fuel is in the l 21

vessels no additional administrative, physical controls, or technical specifications over those described above are required for these items.

B. - EG&G Evaluation The information presented provides specific answers to the guide of the Generic letter 81-07. Section 2.3 sub items 1, 2, 3, 4a, 4b, and 4c. Collectively these show consistency with NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.3 Option (3). However, it is not stated that the information applies to both the main and auxiliary hooks of the crane.

The EG&G evaluation concerning the use of this crane when the in-containment fuel pool is holding fuel, was discussed in 2.3.lc abote. It is not intended that the discussions here for NUREG-0612 Article 51.3 change the recommendation concerning Article 5.1.4.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations Verify the status of the Auxiliary hook to confirm consistency. For the other Reactor Building hoists STP

shows there is consistency with guidelines of NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.3.

2.3.3 Other Areas [NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.5]

(1) "If safe shutdown equipment are beneath or directly adjacent to a potential travel load path of overhead handling systems, (i.e., a path not restricted by limits of crane travel or by mechanical stops or electrical interlocks) one of the following should be satisfied in addition to satisfying the general suidelines of Section 5.1.1:

l 1

l 22 1

(a) The crane and associated lifting devices should conform to the single-failure proof guidelines of Section 5.1.6 of this report; (b) If the load drop could impair the operation of equipment or cabling associated with redundant o. dual safe shutdown paths, mechanical stops or electrical interlocks should be provided to prevent movement of loads in proximity to these redundant or dual safe shutdown equipment. (In this case, credit should not be taken for intervening floors unless justified by analysis.)

(c) The effects of load drops have been analyzed and the results indicate that damage to safe shutdown equipment would not preclude operation of sufficient equipment to achieve safe shutdown. Analyses should conform to the guidelines of Appendix A, as applicable.

(2) "Where the safe shutdown equipment has a ceiling separating it from an overhead handling system, an alternative to Section 5.1.5(1) above would be to show by analysis that the largest postulated load-handled by the handling system would not penetrate the ceiling or cause spalling that could cause failure of the safe shutdown equipment."

A. Summary of Applicant's Statements The original tabulation of STP overhead handling systems indentified those from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay ,

heat removal. Targets which were at risk from a load drop were identified and a code system was used to identify elimination categories, e.g.

Separation and redundancy Interlocks ,.

Site specific

• Analysis Single failure proof crane Not reuuired for safety shutdown or decay heat removal.

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STP has been designed to ensure that redundant safety-related trains are provided with adequate separation and protection to ensure their continued function following a wide variety of events and conditions. Also considered are the consequences of floor failures where there is an intervening floor (s) between the load and the target.

Bases for determination of hazard elimination categories are justified for loads handled in each of five buildings.

These include the Fuel Handling Building and Containment Building which have been discussed specifically for NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 above. Hazard elimination categories, where applicable, for these have been given here also. The other loads are those in the Mechanical Electrical Auxiliary, Essential Cooling Water Intake, and Diesel Generator Buildings.

The FH8 overhead crane is single failure proof and its loads meet NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.5(1)(a) except the problem concerning interface lifting points previously discussed.

The Containment Building system of crane mechanical stops and electrical interlocks with Administrative controls used

, to supplement them are presented. Special discussion is given to the RHR system and RCFC fan /SI piping heavy loads which indicate that NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.5(1)(b) or (1)(c) as appropriate has been met.

Five load groupings handled by the Mechanical Electrical Auxiliary Building monorails are discussed and appropriate i

justifications established. Administrative procedures as appropriate will address operational restrictions. -

For both the Diesel Generator Building and Essential Cooling Water Intake Building, elimination is based on separation and redundancy. Where appropriate fo" the ECWI loads, Administrative procedures provide operational restrictions.

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B. EG&G Evaluation The response in the submittal. is very specific to the Generic letter guides and in the above summary of the applicant statements the comments rela ive to application of NUREG-0612 Articles was added by EG&G.

Evaluation indicates the aplicant has shown consistency with the requirements of NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.5 for those loads

.where an elimination category has been specified (see Table 2.1). For loads handled by monorails it is not clear from the tabular information if a hazard elimination category used for one load is valid for all loads handled by that monorail. It seems logical to assume that one target

, below a monorail would be a target for any load it handles.

However, equal logic cannot b: applied for unspecified hazard elimination categories because the size, shape, and weights of the loads vary. The information on the charts, if the blank areas were completed, would improve the presentation and prevent misunderstanding. Similarly the lack of information in the table for loads of the ECW Intake Gantry and OG Building Overhead Crane prevents making valid evaluation for all loads they handle.

i C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations General, but not total, consistency with this guideline, NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.5 for other areas has been shown. To show total consistency, all loads not covered by 2.3.1 or 2.3.2 above, of Table 2.1 (Submittal Table 1) should be addressed in the last three columns of the table to confirm their status. This will permit an accurate complete evaluation. .

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2.3.4 Single-Failure-Proof Handling Systems [NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.6]

(1) " Lifting Devices:

(a) Special lifting devices that are used for heavy loads in the area where the crane is to be upgraded should meet ANSI N14.61978, " Standard For Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More For Nuclear Materials," as specified in Section 5.1.1(4) of this report except that the handling device should also comply with Section 6 of ANSI N14.5-1978. If only a single lifting device is provided instead of dual devices, the special lifting device should have twice the design safety factor as a required to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1.1(4). However, Icads that have been evaluated and shown to satisfy the evaluation criteria of Section 5.1 need not have lifting devices that also comply with Section 6 of ANSI N14.6.

(b) Lifting devices that are not specially designed and that are used for handling heavy loads in the area where the crane is to be upgraded should meet ANSI B30.9-1971, " Slings" as specified in Section 5.1.1(5.) of this report, except that one of the followir.g should also be satisfied unless the effects of a drop of the particular load have been analyzed and i

shown to satisfy the evaluation criteria of Section 5.1:

(i) Provide dual or redundant slings or lifting devices such that a single component failure or malfunction in the sling will not result in uncontrolled lowering of the load; 03 (ii) In selecting the proper sling, the load used should be twice what is called for in meeting Section 5.1.1(5) of this report.

(2) "New cranes should be designed to meet NUREG-0554, '

" Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants." For operating plants or plants under construction, the crane should be upgraded in accordance with the implementation

. guidelines of Appendix C of this report.

(3) " Interfacing lift points such as lifting lugs or cask trunions should also meet one of the following for heavy loads handled in the area where the crane is to be upgraded I

unless the effects of a drop of the particular load have been evaluated and shown to satisfy the evaluation criteria of Section 5.1:

26

i (a) Provide redundancy or duality such that a single lift point failure will not result in uncontrolled lowering of the load; 1.ift points should have a design safety factor with respect to ultimate strength _of five (5) times the maximum combined concurrent static and dynamic load after taking the single lift point failure.

O_@

(b) A non-redundant or non-dual lift point system should have a design u fety tactor of ten (10) times the maximum combined concurrent static and dynamic lead."

A. Summary of Applicant's Statements Specific coverage information concerning the alternative of equipment upgrade for NUREG-0612 Articles 5.1.2, 5.1.3 and 5.1.5 by use of Article 5.1.6 specifications is not chosen and is not addressed. Specific information on the interface lift points of five loads handled by the single failure proof FHB Overhead Crane has been discussed previously (2.3.1 above).

B. EG&G Evaluation In the Spent Fuel Area discussions, above, on the interface lift points of five loads handled by the FHB overhead crane there is a need to meet the Article 5.1.6 upgrade option.

The unresolved issue concerning the loads handled over the in-containment fuel pool by the Containment Building Polar Crane might also be resolved by use by the Article 5.1.6 alternative.

Except for the above two comments, A'ticle 5.1.6 remains as an option for upgrading that has not been chosen for STP.

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C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations l

i The recommendations relative to the two items commented on  !

in the above evaluation have been given previously and are i not repeated. The viable option of upgrading other overhead handling systems by use of Article 5.1.6 guides remains as a I choice that may be used.

j

• 1 1

i a

e i

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. .__. . . , - . _-. _ . . , . . ~ . .

v=

v "

3.

CONCLUDING

SUMMARY

3.1 Guideline Recommendations 3.1.1 Spent Fuel pool Areas o The FHB Overhead Crane main hook and associated lifting devices, except for five loads, meet single failure proof requirements. The interface lift points on the five loads should be upgraded to meet one of the options of NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.6 o The details concerning use and loads handled by the 2-ton auxiliary hook should be given to show how it is consistent with NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.2 o The physical (mechanical ~ stops and/or electrical interlocks) controls to st'pplement administrative procedure should be established for heavy load handling control when fuel is in storage in the in-containment fuel holding pool, Containment Building.

1.1.2 Reactor (Containment) Building Information submitted indicates that the Containment Building Polar Crane main hook heavy load handling is consistent with the guideline of NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.3. However the auxiliary hook of this crane was not discussed. Information should be given to indicate if the information provided applies equally to the auxiliary hook. If it does not, provide suitable information on the auxiliary hook for evaluation.

r.

3.1.3 Other Areas Most other area hoists entered in the tables for Phase II evaluation have one or more loads that are shown to be consistent with the guideline requirements. However a number of heavy loads 29

nandled by these other area cranes involve potential risk but have no elimination categories in the submittal information table. Information on these loads should be provided. ,

3.2- Additional Recommendations Information specifying the weight of a heavy load in accord with the NUREG-0612-definition should be provided, e.g., more than the combined weight of a single spent fuel assembly and its associated handling

-tool.

- 3.3 Summary The Phase II evaluation based on NUREG-0612 Articles 5.1.2, 5.1.3, 5.1.5 and as appropriate 5.1.6 has reported some areas where mora information or action is recommended. These are identified and discussed in this report.

30 L._

m 7

w  : -

4. REFERENCES t

1. Control of Heavy LoadsLat Nuclear Power Plants, South Texas Projects Unit 1 and 2 C. R. Shaber, Author, T. H. Stickley, Principal Investigator; Oraft Report May 1984.

2. .NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, NRC.

3. V. Stello, Jr. (NRC), Letter to all applicants.

Subject:

Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel, NRC, 17 May 1978.

4. USNRC, Letter to Houston Lighting and Power Co.

Subject:

NRC Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel, NRC, 22 December 1980.

5. J. H. Goldberg, Houston Lighting and Power Co. Letter to D.'G. Eisenhut, NRC, Wahington, D.C.

Subject:

South Texas Project

~

Units 1 and 2, Schedule for Submittal of Response to Generic Letter 81-07, Control of Heavy Loads, 19 December 1983.

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