ML20080D540

Comments on ASLB 831024 Recommendations to Commission Re Emergency Planning,Plant Risk & Comparative Risk.Continued Operation Recommended.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20080D540
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	02/06/1984
From:	Brandenburg B, Morgan C CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. OF NEW YORK, INC., MORGAN ASSOCIATES, POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:
References
ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8402090154
Download: ML20080D540 (65)

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00CXETin;; s sgn, BRANCH UNITED STATES OF MERICA NUCIZAR REGUIKIORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSIWERS:

Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Victor Gilinsky Thcmas M. Roberts James K. Asselstino Frederick M. Bernthal

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In the Matter of )

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CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC. ) Eccket Nos.

(Indian Point, Unit No. 2) ) 50-247 SP

) 50-286 SP POWER AUIHORITY OF IHE STATE OF NEW YORK )

(Indian Point, Unit No. 3) ) February 6, 1984

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LICENSEES' OJMMENIS ON THE RECCMMENDATIONS OF THE INDIAN POINT SPECIAL PRTEEDING LICENSING BOAA9 2090154 840206 ADOCK 03000p47 G

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l TABIE OF CONTENIS Page INIR0 DUCTION........................................................ 1 I. BACKGROUND......................... .......................... 2 II. PRINCIPAL CDNCLUSIONS OF THE INDIAN POINE HEARING. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 ,

III. Cm MISSICN QUESTION ONE: PIANI RISK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 A. Agreement Between IPPSS and Staf f Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

1. Plant Analys is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

a. Containment Capability.......................... 11

b. Use of Bayes' heoren in IPPSS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 B. Consequence Analysis.................................... 17

1. Evacuation Modeling for External Events and the Inclusion of the 2-10 Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

2. Camputer Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

3. Probability Distributions.......................... 20 C. Re alistic Source Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 D. Board Estimates of Risk................................. 24

1. Expression of Risk by Site......................... 24

2. Ctmulative vs. Annual Risk. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3. Ccznbining Early and Latent Fatality Risks. . . . . . . . . . 25

4. Treatment of Uncertainty........................... 27

5. Ccmpounding of Risks............................... 28 E. Large Consequence Accidents............................. 29 IV. OCMMISSION QUESTION TWO: FURIHER SAFETY MEASURES............ 32 A. Plant Modifications..................................... 32 B. The Develgrnent and Implenentation of a Safety Assurance Progran at Indian Point Is Not Justified... ... 33 V. CCNMISSION QUESTIOti FIVE: COMPARATIVE RISKS................. 37 A. Interplant PBA Canparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 B. Special Design Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 C. Sandia Siting Study..................................... 39 D. Preliminary Safety Goals................................ 40 VI. CCMMISSION QUESTIONS THREE AND EDUR: EMERGENCY PIANNING. . . . . 42 A. The Camtission's Subsequent Emergency Plannirg Determinations.......................................... 42 B. Existing Response Capabilities.......................... 44

1. Rockland County.................................... 44

2. We stchester County. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5

a. Route Alerting and Ccmmunications Capability.... 47

b. Information for Non-English Speakirg Persons.... 48

c. Additional Measures for Mobility-Lapaired Persons......................................... 49

d. Early Dismissal of Schools...................... 49 C. Evacuation Time Es timates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 D. Behavioral Assumptions.................................. 51

O E ii VII. COMMISSION GJESTION SIX: IMPACTS OF A SHUrDOWN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 VIII. ADDITIONAL ERRORS IN THE RECORD.............................. 52 A. We Board Should Have Struck the Testimony of Intervenors' Witnesses hhich Only Addressed Consequences............................................ 52 B. W e Board Should Not Have Imposed Arbitrary and Prejudicial Limitations upon the Cross-Examination of Certain Emergency Plannirg Witnesses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 C. W e Board Should Have Struck Certain Intervenor

" Expert" Witnesses...................................... 54 D. We Board Erred in Receiving the Westchester County Testimony Prior to the Final Reformulation of Contentions Under Questions 3 and 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 E. The Board Failed to Permit Adequate Discovery of FEMA Witnesses............................................... 56 F. The Board Erred in Restrictirg the Licensees' Right to Object to Cross-Examination Questions................... 56 G. W e Board Should Have Received into Evidence the s Deposition of Donald P. McGuire, and Exhibit 2 Thereto................................................. 57 IX. CONCLUSIONS.'................................................. 58 4

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INTRODUCTION Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Con Edison) and the Power Authority of the State of New York (Power Authority), licensees of Indian Point Units 2 and 3, respectively, hereby submit their ccaments on the Reccmnendations to the Ccmuission issued on October 24, 1983, by the Atcmic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) in the Indian Point Spe-cial Proceeding.

Licensees concur in the Board's conclusion that the continued operation of the Indian Point units poses no undue risk to the public and that the early fatality and delayed cancer risks posed by Indian

, Point are a very small fraction of.the non-nuclear background risks to which the population around Indian Point is exposed. Licensees further concur with the Board's conclusion that such major modifications to the plant as filtered vented contairunents and separate containments are not warranted. The Board's Reccanendations are based upon a two-year admin-istrative proceeding, including a transcript exceedirg 15,000 pages.

Licensees believe that most of these conclusions and reccmnendations rest upon sound evidence and deserve to be accorded full weight by the Canmission. In addition, the Ccmnission's finding in October 1983, that emergency planning at Indian Point is' adequate obviates the need to evaluate a record canpiled by the Board which closed in April 1983.

Several Board conclusions and reconmendations, however, were either not supported by the record or constitute new approaches which appear for the first time in the Board's Reccmmendations. Moreover, these new approaches were not subject to examination by the parties duriry the proceeding.

I. BACKGROUND The Co mission last acted regarding the Indian Point Special Pro-ceeding on July 27, 1982, when it determined that the Board should reconsider the contentions it had admitted and refonnulate those that did not comport with the Comission's guidance. In re Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Units 2 and 3), 16 N.R.C. 27, 33-37 (1982).1 In its September 17, 1982 response to four questions certified by the Board, the Comission stated that the hearing's "real focus should be on the probabilities," comensurate with the purpose of the hearing-to conpare "the risk of the Indian Point plants . . . with that for other U.S. plants." Order at 3, 4 (Sept. 17, 1982) (emphasis in original).

Thus, each party's evidence on probabilities "should be at least as detailed as the consequences discussion." d at 4.

_I_d_.

The Board issued reformulated contentions on October 1, 1982,2 and, following a prehearing conference on November 3-4, 1982, issued its final formulation of contentions under Camission Questions One, Te, Five, and Six, and set its schedule for discovery, the filing of testi-mony, and the hearing.3 By order dated January 7, 1983, the Board reformulated contentions under Camission Questions Three and Four.

1. - The Comission also upheld the Board's grants of intervention and its denial of the licensees' notion for a stay or dismissal of the proceedirgs.

2. Memorandum and Order (Restating Contentions and Establishing Procedures Based on Comission Guidance) (Oct. 1, 1982).

3. Memorandum and Order (Formulating Final Contentions and Setting Schedule) (Nov. 15, 1982).

While the Board conducted its hearing activities, the Ccmnission continued its analysis of the develeprnent of an offsite radiological emergency plan for Indian Point. As a result of this analysis, the Ccm- ,

l mission has already reviewed all available evidence and found that the two significant deficiencies cited by the Board and the Federal Emer-gency Management Agency (FEMA) in Rockland and Westchester counties have been resolved.1 On June 10, 1983, the Ccanission acknowledged that mea-sures undertaken since the Board closed its record had dramatically improved the situation:

In the five weeks since the May 5 order, the fact-l ual situation we confront has altered dramatic-l ally. The new ccanit:nents on the part of the

[ State and the licensees give us confidence that l adequate canpensatory measures either have been, or shortly will be, taken for those areas in which shortconings still ranain in the state of ener-gency planning and preparedness. In Westchester County, for example, letters of intent have been signed that will assure the availability of buses in the event they are needed for evacuation, and programs have begun which should assure the avail-ability of trained bus drivers. The revised eter-gency response plan subnitted by the State of New York-a document which reflects substantial effort, and a demonstration of the State's ccmnit-ment to the timely resolution of renaining prob-lems-now is explicit in providing that the State, with the assistance of utility personnel, will take over Rockland County's emergency response functions in the upconirg exercise, and in the event of an actual emergency, will supplement, or if necessary take over, the county's efforts. In those areas where the Radiological Advisory Com-mittee found weaknesses in the revised State plan, moreover, the State has ccmmitted itself to

1. The two alleged significant deficiencies renainirg were the lack of assurance that buses would be available in Westchester County during an emergency, and Rockland County's limited participation in the four-county planning process.

i resolving those problems within 30 days. Lastly, FEMA's letters indicate that the level of the licensees' involvement in the correction of defi-ciencies, and in working effectively with State and county authorities, has improved significantly since FEMA last reported to us eight weeks ago.

Ccmnission Memorandun and Order at 11 (June 10,1983).

Af ter further review and an exerci.3e, the Ccmnission found that the two alleged deficiencies had been fully corrected, and accepted FENA's assurance "'that the health and safety of the residents living within a ten-mile radius of Indian Point can be protected.'" Ccmnission Notice to the Parties at 2 (Oct. 4, 1983) (citation anitted). The Ccmnission, thus, has already determined upon a record more current than that before ,

the Board that energency planning at Indian Point is adequate.

II. PRINCIPAL (DNCLUSIONS OF THE INDIAN POINT HEARING In an effort to focus upon the important issues in the lengthy rec-ord of this Special Proceeding, licensees have identified the following as the principal conclusions of the testimony presented to the Board:

1. We use of probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs), as specified in the Ccmnission's Orders establishing this proceeding, den-onstrates that the risk to the public posed by operation of the Indian Point units is extranely low and within the range of risks posed by other plants licensed to operate by the Can-mission.-

2. The risks posed by Indian Point are a very small fraction of the non-nuclear background risks to which the population around Indian Point is exposed. W e Indian Point units meet, by wide margins, the public health indices of the Ccmnission's Preliminary Safety Goals for nuclear power plants.

3. Given the extremely low risks, no major plant modifications, such as a filtered vented containnent or a separate contain-ment, are warranted.

4. 'Ihe .anount of radioactive material that might be released dur-ing an accident would be significantly below that assumed in the Reactor Safety Study (NASH-1400) (RSS) and well below that utilized in the Indian Point Probabilistic Safety Study 1

(IPPSS) and in Staff's analysis. With more realistic source terms, there would be no early fatality risk and all other public health and economic risks would be significantly reduced.

5. . 'Ihe Indian Point contairments have much greater strength than

' previously assmed. .In order to breach the containments through overpressurization, every form of containment heat removal nust fail. Operation of any one of five fan coolers or any ona of six containment spray modes would prevent con-tainnent failure. There will not be a structural failure of the containments due to any seismic event that could occur at .

the site.

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6. Core melt frequency is a poor indicator of risk because, as long as the containment is not breached or bypassed, offsite consequences fran an accident are insignificant.

7 In the extreme situation of both core melt and the complete loss of all contaiment heat removal capability, it would still likely take twenty-four or nore hours before the con-tairment becane overpressurized and radioactive material began to be released to the environment. A quickly-developing acci-dent sequence which would bypass the contaiment is far less frequent than the overpressurization sequence. These two accident scenarios are the daninant contributors to risk at Indian Point.

8 Because latent cancer fatalities are virtually unaffected by evacuation, the range of early fatality risks determines the size of the emergency planning zene (EPZ). Even using RSS-type source terms (which the Board found overstate the risk),

95%'of such risk would occur within 4 miles of the site.

Accordingly, ample technical basis exists for reducing the size of the plume exposure pathway EPZ at Indian Point.

Smaller, more realistic source terms would further reduce the

nunber of people who might need evacuation and the distances 4

they would have to travel.

9. Evacuation beginning prior to release would be the most effec-tive emergency response measure to protect the public. Icw 1 . evacuation speeds (about 3 aph) would then be sufficient to prevent early fatalities among the evacuees. Even in the case of a quickly-developing accident, she.'.tering followed by selected relocation, as an alternative to evacuation, would provide an effective method of protecting the public.

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10. The evacuation time estimates of frczn 7 to 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> for the Indian Point ten-mile emergency plannirg zone (EPZ) are rea-sonable.

- 11. The present value cost to electiic consuners of replacing Indian Point Units 2 and 3 over their remaining service lives is no less than S4 to S6 billion.

III. COMMISSION CUESTICN ONE: PIRfr RISK Ccmnission Questions One, Two, ark 1 Five relate to the subject of risk at Indian Point. The Board's principal conclusions that the risk posed by Indian Point is very low and that no major plant modifications are necessary are fully supported by the Staff's risk assessment. The validity of Staff's analysis is further buttressed by licensees' IPPSS, which, although employing a scxnewhat dif'fering methcdology, reached the same basic conclusions. In this regard, the Staff analysis cperates as an independent peer review upon IPPSS, provirg the validity of the IPPSS results and thus providing the Board with a broader technical base for its reccmnendations. For these and other reasons, the Board's criti-cisms of IPPSS are not well founded and should be rejected by the Ccxn-mission.

A. ,vJreement Between IPPSS and Staff Analysis IPPSS is a state-of-the-art PRA, as the Board recognized when it called IPPSS "a watershed PRA." Reccramendations at 48. This twelve volume dccanent, with thousands of pages of text, graphs, and tables, represents the ccmbined effort of a large and diverse team of scientists and engineers. Many pioneering efforts, such as the quantification of external events, were undertaken. This massive effort has also under-gone an exceptional amount of review by the authors themselves, the utilities, an independent review group of outstanding PRA scientists,

the Advisory Ccmnittee on Reactor Safeguards, the Comtission, and by the Board and its consultant. See Power Authority's Prcposed Findings of Fact 32 (July 11, 1983); Con Edison's Proposed Findings of Fact 1.1-20 to -21 (July 11, 1983).1 In identifyirxg which factors are important to risk, both IPPSS and Staff risk assessments can be divided into two phases: the plant analy-sis, which includes identification of accident sequence 9 and various plant damage states, and the consequence analysis, which includes the assessment cf the transport of radioactive materials, the modeling of emergency responses, and the calculation of health effects.

1. Plant Analysis With regard to the plant analysis, the most important points to consider are:

1. 'Ihe frequency of those contairrnent failure sequences which daninate the risk;

2. 'Ihe time between initiation of an accident sequence and the release of radioactive material to the envirorinent; and

3. 'Ihe quantities of radioactive material released, particularly iodine, tellurium, and cesium, for each risk relevant containment failure sequence, i.e., the sequence-dependent source term.

1. Subsequent references to the Power Authority's Proposed Find-ings of Fact shall be "P.A. Finding" followtxi by the number of the find-ing referenced; subsequent references to Con Edison's Proposed Findings of Fact shall be "C.E. Finding" followed by the number of the finding referenced. For the Commission's convenience, when possible, licensees have referenced their proposed findings of fact submitted to the Board instead of the record of the hearing detailed in the findings of fact themselves because each finding may contain numerous references to the record.

s 3 These three points are the output fran the numerous- accident sequences which could result fran a number of initiatirg events, and are deter-mined by the response of the engineered safety features and the conatin-ment structure. These items form the plant-related input to the conse-quence analysis, the second phase, and are most important because they represent the beginning of an accident's potential offsite impact.

Staff and licensees agree that the two types of accidents that den-inate the risk at Indian Point are releases to the atmosphere fran the highly unlikely slow containment overpressurization accident and the even less frequent containment bypass accident, also called the inter-facing systems LOCA (loss of coolant accident). P.A. Findings 19, 20, 25; C.E. Findirgs 1.1-179 to -181. As shown in the Table on page 10, close agreement exists between IPPSS and Staff on the frequency of occurrence, and also on the period between accident initiation and a release of radioactive material to the atmosphere.

For the overpressurization accident, both IPPSS and Staff analyses demonstrated that there would be a long period (13-24 hours) before the containment failed. See P.A. Finding 136; C.E. Finding 1.1-149. The time between accident initiation and the release of radioactive material is important for several reasons. During this period, recovery actions may be accomplished by the operator that would prevent a core melt or containnent failure. This then would affect the frequency of contain-ment failure. Full credit for plant recovery actions was not taken in

IPPSS or Staff analyses.1 Further, during this period, there would be radioactive decay, particularly of the short-lived isotopes, as well as various chemical and physical processes which would reduce the amount of radioactive material available for release to the environnent, i.e., the source term. P.A. Finding 136; C.E. Finding 1.1-149. The duration of this period has a direct bearing on the efficacy of various emergency response measures.

1. Direct Testimony of Frank H. Rowsone Concerning IV.C. Accuracy of the Risk Assessments at 7 (Jan. 24,1983) (Rowsone Testimony); Licen-sees' Testimony on Caumission Questien one and Board Question 1.1 and Contention 1.1, at 73, 111 (Jan. 24, 1983) (Licensees' Question one Testimony); NUREG/CR-2934, " Review and Evaluation of the Indian Point Probabilistic Safety Study" at 2.5-13 (1982).

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1 TABLE IA'IE CONTAINMENT INTERFACING SYSTEMS OVERPRESSURIZATION IOCA RELEASES RELEASES IPPSS NPC IPPSS NRC CATEGORY CATEGORY CATEGORY CATEGORY 2RW C 2 B (best (best (mean) estimate) (mean) estimate)

1. Frequency Per Reactor Year 7 IP2 5.7 x 10-5 3.5 x 10-5 5.4 IP3 1.1 x 10-5 1.7 x 10-5 4.8 x x 10-7 10-7 4.3 4.3 xx 10 10-7

2. Time Fron Initi-ating Event To Start Of Release (Hours)

IP2 & 3 12 to 24(2] 13 2.5 1.0

-3. Pressure At Nhich Contairment Fail-ure Is Assumed To Occur (PSIA) Contairment Contairinent IP2 & 3 141 141 Bypassed Bypassed Staff's conparic.ons of IPPSS and Staff point estimate, RSS-type source tenus shw close agreement. Meyer/Pratt Testimony on Question One at III.B-60, -61. Licensees, however, applied probability distribu-

1. See Licensees' Question One Testimony at 87, 118, 119; Direct Testimony of James F. Meyer and W. Trevor Pratt Concerning Ccmmission Question One at III.B-25 to -26 (Jan. 24,1983) (Meyer/Pratt Testimony on Question Cne); P.A. Findings 125, 136; C.E. Findings 1.1-135, 1.1-182.

2. Although IPPSS used a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> time to release, subsequent analyses testified to in the hearing demonstrate that the containment would not likely f ail for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> follwing accident initia-tion. See P.A. Finding 136; C.E. Finding 1.1-149.

- tions to the source term point estimates used in IPPSS. See text, infra, at Section B(3).

Because IPPSS and the Staff analysis are similar regardirg identi-fication of important accident scenarios, the ability of the Indian Point contairments to withstand these accidents, the frequency of severe radioactive releases, and the source term estimates,1 the Board is not justified in rejecting IPPSS on the basis of these portions of the study. Rather, this close agreement, despite the differing mathematical .

approaches of equally qualified experts, lends credibility to both stud-ies,

a. Contairment Capability IPPSS and Staff analysis showed that the large volume, high failure pressure containment structure at Indian Point has greater strength and capability than had been previously assumed. See P.A. Finding 121; C.E.

f Findings 1.1-135, -142. Much of the agreement with regard to the plant analysis phase results fran the profound impact of the strength of the containment building, which was assessed in both licensees and Staff testimony. This high failure pressure containment renders a consider-able number of technical issues insignificant contributors to public health risk. Among these issues are core melt frequency, operator error, aging of equipnent, steam explosions, hydrogen detonations, and the various ways the reactor pressure vessel might fail and disperse molten fuel.

1. Licensees contend that smaller, more realistic source terms should be empicyed in the assessment of plant risk. See text, infra, at Section III(C).

IPPSS analyses presented in licensees' testimony, and confirmed by independent studies by Staff and by national laboratories, show that the contairinent can withstand at least 141 psia before onset of yield, and that the ultimate failure pressure would be still higher. See P.A.

Findings 125-27; C.E. Findings 1.1-135, -140, -154, -156. This value of 141 psia is approximately 2.3 times higher than the original licensed design basis pressure, and is due to various conservatisms in the original design. P.A. Findings 128, 134; C.E. Finding 1.1-142. 'Ihis failure pressure is an important determinant of the period between accident initiation and a release of radioactive material to the atmos-phere. See P.A. Finding 125; C.E. Finding 1.1-149.

Licensees and Staff also agree that even if the reactor core melted and the reactor pressure vessel failed, the containment structure, as a result of its large volume and high failure pressure, would withstand virtually any subsequent steam spike or hydrogen explosion. Because of the strength of the contairment, technical differences regarding such issues as the modes of vessel failure, the way in which molten fuel would disperse, and hydrogen evolution are also much less important because they will not appreciably affect the time at which the contain-ment could fail or the containment failure frequency. See P.A. Findings 155-56, 163; C.E. Findings 1.1-150, -165, -171.

Additionally, reliable, redundant, and diverse systems exist for cooling the containment. See P.A. Findings 134, 137. Operation of any one of five fan coolers or any one of six contairnent spray modes would prevent containment failure and the risk impact of core melt with an intact containment would be negligible. See P.A. Finding 137; C.E.

Findings 1.1-150, -152. Because of this, core melt frequency is a poor indicator of public risk. In the extrene situation of both core melt and the emplete loss of all containment heat removal capability, it would still likely take twenty-four or more hours before the centainment became overpressurized and radioactive material began to be released to the environnent. See P.A. Findirg 136; C.E. Finding 1.1-149.1 ne majority of the containment overpressurization scenarios result frm coumon cause events that produce a simultaneous loss of core cool-ing and containment heat renoval. bbre specifically, IPPSS found that fires, seismic events, or high winds that prevent the distribution of electric power to critical core and containment heat removal systems doninate the overpressurization scenarim, accountirg for over 90 per-cent of these scenarios. See P.A. Findings 25-26; C.E. Finding 1.1-379 to 381; Licensees' Question One Testimony at 33-34; IPPSS at 8.3-25; IPPSS Amendment 1, at 8.1-4, 8.1-5.

The need to defeat totally both core cooling and containnent cool-ing to produce a public risk bears on a number of residual Board con-cerns. For example, it is possible that a series of operator errors might cause severe core damage or even core melt and pressure vessel failure. It is extrenely unlikely, however, that the operators would, on their own initiative or through misinfonnation, turn off the contain-ment sprays and fans and keep them off throughout the long period before

1. h is delay would allCW sufficient time for evacuation to occur, if necessary. See Licensees' Ouestion one Testimony at 24; text, infra, at Section VI(C).

- the containment would becme overpressurized. Rowscrue Testimony at 10.

Operator errors, therefore, can have a large econanic impact on a nuclear power plant, but they are unlikely to cause a major public health risk when, as at Indian Point, there is a long period between accident initiation and containment failure during which recovery <

actions can take place. See _id. at 8-9.

Another insignificant contributor to risk is the potential effect of aging of equipnent. The Board stated that the failure to include equipnent aging factors was an error of cmission. This concern was based upon its belief that aging could increase the failure rate of equignent over the lifetime of the plant.1 Recmmendations at 100-01.

Over 90 percent of contalment overpressurization accidents would result fran conmon cause events such as earthquakes, fires, and winds.

See text, sudra, at 13. The loss of the use of particular canponents would be caused by the initiating event itself, and any impact of aging would be limited to sequences which could produce contairment failures similar to the remaining 10 percent of the overpressurization se-quences. Even if aging increased the frequency of these sequences

1. Moreover, the IPPSS use of constant failure rates is also justified because the industry-wide data base as well as Indian Point specific data used in IPPSS include information on equignent and can-ponents of varying ages. The Indian Point plant-specific data reflect the effects of licensees' continuirg maintenance and replacement program. See P.A. Finding 113; C.E. Findings 1.1-48 to -50. Further, there are technical specification requirements and equiptent qualifi-cation programs for safety equipnent that result in high availability rates.

tenfold, the overall change in risk would be small. Staff witness Rowsme testified that, even if an error of mission significantly changed the core melt frequency, "it would probably affect those kinds of accidents that are cmparatively well-contained. . . . [I] t would have very little effect on the projected offsite radiological losses unless it happened to involve an accident sequence in which both core melt and severe contalment failure happen together." Rowsme Testimony at 9 (emphasis added). Aging is, therefore, not an important con-tribator to risk.1 In sumary, the strength and capability of the Indian Point con-taiments make a number of technical issues insignificant contributors to public safety. Among these issues are core melt frequency, operator error, aging of equipuent, steam explosions, and hydrogen detonation.

b. Use of Bayes' Theorm in IPPSS The Board, in its criticism of IPPSS, overenphasized the differ-ences between Bayes' theoren used in IPPSS and Staff's Maximus method.

Indaed, this was a major reason for the Board's preference for Staff's risk estimates.

1. Sabotage is another issue with reduced importance. The Commis-sion did not intend the inclusion of sabotage in its Safety Goals.

48 Fed. Reg.10,773 ("The possible effects of sabotage or diversion of nuclear material are also not presently included in the safety goal . ") . Additionally, the issue is not included in the FRA procedures guide as within the scope of risk assessments.

While it would be inappropriate to present an analysis of sabotage in a publicly disseminated document, see P.A. Finding 62; C.E. Findings 1.1-70, -71, it is clear that a potential saboteur would not only have to devise a means of initiating a core melt and carrying it through to cmpletion but would also have to render and keep all contaiment safeguard features inoperable for a long period of time. Catmen sense dictates that such a scenario is extrenely unlikely.

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Although the Board often relied upon the testimony of Staff witness Frank Rowsme, it chose to ignore Mr. Rowsme's statement that both Bayes' theorem and the Maximus method used by Staff's analysts produced consistent results. Tr. 8797-98. In fact, as the Board itself noted, despite the use of different mathematical approaches, the IPPSS results and these of Staff "did not differ markedly." Recmmendations at 44.

The Board mistakenly stated that licensees "made no attempt to defend their use of Bayes' Theorem on statistical grounds." Recomenda-tions at 43. To the contrary, licensees' witnesses testified that the Bayesian method is appropriate because it is the mathmatical formula which provides a method for c mbining generic industry data, plant specific data, and judgments based on expert opinion in a mathmatically rigorous way. See P.A. Finding 39; C.E. Finding 1.1-31 Staff methodology is incapable of incorporating this more extensive infor-mation. See P.A. Finding 44; C.E. Finding 1.1-32.1 Therefore, important data and expert judgment are ignored.

The Board was, thus, unjustified in its exaggeration of the signif-icance of the use of Bayes' theorm as contrasted to the Maximus method used by Staff.

1. In rejecting the Bayesian methodology, the Board stated that

"[i}n making a judgment with respect to statistical procedures, we believe that preponderant weight should be given to the testimony of statisticians." Recmmendations at 44. Yet the Board then rejected the testimony of licensees' witness Stanley Kaplan. Id_. Dr. Kaplan, a recognized expert in the mathematics of risk assessment, holds a doctor-ate in Applied Mathematics frm the University of Pittsburgh and was a participant in the formulation of the methcxiology section of the PBA Procedures Guide, NUREG/CR-2200 (1983), as well as the author of over forty articles on risk assessment and related areas. Resume of Stanley Kaplan (attachment to Licensees' Question One Testinony) .

i B. Consequence Analysis The major point of significant disagreenent between IPPSS and Staff is in the early fatality estimates, with the largest differences appear-ing at the extrenely low probebility/high consequence portion of the risk curves. See P.A. Finding 200; C.E. Findinge 1.1-349 to -355.

There is relatively close agreement between the latent fatality calcula-tions. P.A. Finding 200; C.E. Finding 1.1-371; III.C.A Testinony of Dr.

Sarbeswar Acharya Regarding NRC Staff Assessment of Accident Conse-quences and Risks at III.C.A-41 (Archarya Testimony).

The IPPSS/ Staff consequence conparison presented here deliberately canpares the calculated maximan consequences for low probability acci-dents. This severe conparinen prcduces the largest numerical difference between Staff and licensee calculations. Most of the difference between licensees and Staff early fatality analyses can be attributed to four factors: Staff's use of the unrealistic " late reloc" evacuation model, Staff's inclusion of the Z-10 scenario (structural containment failure due to a seismic event), differing canputer codes, and the use of prob-ability distributions instead of point estimates.

1. Evacuation Modelina for External Events and the Inclusion of the Z-10 sequence The crucial difference between IPPSS and Staff emergency response assumptions is the manner in which severe external events such as earth-quakes were modeled. Staff used a " late reloc" energency response model for severe external events in which individuals were assumed to remain in the plume exposure pathway for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after plume passage and

18 -

people were assmed to have no shielding whatsoever, i.e., they stcod outdoors until evacuated. Recm mendations at 59-60 n.29; Archarya Testimony at III.C.A-9 to -10. Because a radioactive release would not occur until 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> after an accident and subsequent exposure of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is assumed, this Staff model is clearly unrealistic in its assump-tion that people would not evacuate for 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.1 Although Staff itself described its " late reloc" model as "very conservative" and "very pessimistic," the Board employed this analysis. Recommendations at 98; Acharya Testimony at III.C.A-33.

The " late reloc" evacuation model is not simply " pessimistic,"

which the Board recognized, Reccmnendat' ions at 95, but is also unrealis-tic in its ir. % tion of the early fatality risk. The " late reloc" nodel

- does not provide for any protective actions whatsoever, despite the fact that severe externally initiated events lead to sequences that would not likely release radioactivity for at least frca 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> (Staff ana. lysis) to over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (licensees' analysis) . See text, supra, at 10 (Table);

P.A. Finding 136; C.E. Finding 1.1-149.2

1. Both the licensees and Staff models do not account for the deaths and injuries that would result frcm the natural disaster itself, Licensees' Ouestion one Testimony at 47, thus ignoring the fact that, under such conditions, any incremental early fatality risk due to an event at Indian Point would be smdl ermpared to the direct results of the natural disaster itself. See P.A. Finding 84; C.E. Finding 1.1-246.

2. 'Ihis model.also does not account for any plant recovery actions that would be taken to avoid containment failure. NUREG/CR-2934, "Re-view and Evaluation of the Indian Point Probabilistic Safety Study" at 2.5-13 (1982).

Staff utilized two other emergency response models, the " evac relec" and the "early reloc." The " evac reloc" model is appropriate for situations, such as internally initiated accidents, where no unusual impediments to evacuation are anticipated. The "early reloc" model is the more realistic choice for accidents initiated by external events that could delay evacuation. This model assumes a delay of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> prior to an evacuation proceeding at 1.5 miles /hcur. Acharya Testimony at III.C.A-9 n.*; see text, infra, at 50-51.

Based upon information generated by Staff, if the " late reloc" model were replaced by the "early-raloc" model, Staff's maximum early fatality consequences would be reduced by 75 percent for Indian Point Unit 3 and by 66 percent for Indian Point Unit 2. See Acharya Testimony at Figures III.C.12 and 39, and III.C.1 and 28, respectively. Use of the "early reloc" model also eliminates the early fatality risk contri-bution fran the 2-10 scenario (seismic failure of the containment),

which licensees' analysis demonstrated was physically impossible. See P.A. Finding 21; C.E. Finding 1.1-63.1 Staff stated that the reanalysis

1. Further licensee analysis of this scenario, coupleted and sub-mitted to all parties during the course of the hearing, identified pre-vicusly uncredited steel rebars in the containnent. See P.A. Finding 81; C.E. Finding 1.1-83; Letter fran D. Wesley to H. Perla and Attachments (Dec. 30, 1982) (exhibit to Licensees' Question One Testi-nony admitted Apr. 7,1983, Tr.12,989) . This analysis concluded that the structural integrity of the contairrnent was so high that it could withstand any earthquake which could be experienced at the Indian Point site. _I_dd . Simply stated, the 2-10 sequence was eliminated.

It should be noted that the Board erroneously referred to witness "Daum,' Wesley." Reccmmendations at 47. As was noted in licensees' transcript corrections, the court reporter mistakenly labeled licensees' witness Donald Wesley, "Daum." Latter fran Paul F. Colarulli and Brent L. Brandenburg to Administrative Judges (June 15, 1983) (enclosure at 33-35).

.. _____--___--___--_-J

confirmed its judgment that the original IPPSS analysis understated the strength of the contaiment and was perfouned by empetent analysts.

Tr. 7528-30 (Budnitz). The Board declined to accept the reanalysis because Staff had not empleted its review. Recm mendations at 47 n.23.

2 Conouter Codes Staff and licensees agreed that the consequence cmputer code used

. in IPP33 was, in general, more " realistic" than that used by Staff. See P.A. Findirg 173; C.E. Finding 1.1-198. Had Staff additionally used the IPPSS CPACIT consequence code instead of its CR4C code, there would be no differences between the point estimates of Staff and those of

. IPPSS. See Acharya Testimony, Fig. III.C.55.

3. Probability Distributions The previous cmparisons are based upon point estimates. Licen-sees, however, contend that it is more appropriate to express risk esti-mates in a manner which accounts for the probability distributions for many key parameters. When the early fatality risk is presented in this way, the maximum number of early fatalities is approximately 1,000 at the 50 percent confidence level. See Licensees' Testimony on Question One at 26a (Fig. III-2a) . This lower number is principally due to the l

probability distribution used for the RSS-type source tems in IPPSS.

See IPPSS at 5.6-1, -2, -5 (Fig. 5.6-1) .

In sm, with the existing close IPPSS/ Staff agreement in the plant

analysis area and the close agrement that is obtained in the conse-quence analysis ccmparison after making reasonable modifications, over-all agreement would exist between IPPSS ard Staff risk evaluations.

Therefore, IPPSS serves as an additional technical basis in support of

the Board's major conclusions. Full weight should be accorded IPPSS by the Canmission because peer review has supported its processes and con-clusions.

C. Realistic Source Terms Expert testimony at the hearings established that the amount of radioactive material which would be released in the event of a severe release would be significantly less than had been supposeo in earlier risk estimates such as the RSS, IPPSS,.and Staff's assessment.

Licensees' witnesses Dr. Walton A. Rodger and Dr. William R. Stratton testified that overly conservative source terms "can lead to inaccurate arx! misleading overestimates of the consequences of various accident sequences and to inappropriate responws to these hypothetical accidents." Licensees' Testimony of William R. Stratton, Walton A.

Rodger, and Thanas E. Potter on Question One at 5 (Jan. 24,1983)

(Stratton Testimony).

These witnesses offered testimony regarding data fran Three Mile Island (TMI) and a nunber of other actual accidents as well as prior research and experimental data which confinned that physical and chemi-cal processes would reduce the anount of radionuclides that could be released. These prccesses do not depend upon operator action or equip-ment functioning. The witnesses presented their own estimates of real-istic source tenns for the doninant accident sequences at Indian Point. P.A. Findings 241-78; C.E. Findings 1.1-276 to 312. Specifi-cally, licensees' experts concluded that:

o There would be no early fatalities fran any accident scenarios that might occur at Indian Point;

o The risk of latent fatalities is extremely small, ard the con-sequences of even a " worst case" accident would be similar to other, large-scale industrial accidents; o There would be a reduction in prcperty damage estimates by an order of magnitude; o The benefit of additional mitigating devices would be reduced by a factor of 10; and o A smaller Emergency Planning Zone may be justified, ang the selection of protective measures would warrant review.

Stratton Testimony at 6.

Staff witness Robert Bernero testified that Staff had no data or information which were inconsistent with the more realistic source terms set forth in the Stratton Testimony. C.E. Finding 1.1-308. He also agreed that the RSS methodology for source term calculation used in _

IPPSS and by Staff leads to overestimates of risk. See Testimony of Robert M. Bernero on Severe Accident Source Terms at 3 (Mar. 22, 1983)

(Bernero Testimony) . He also stated that while he believed that orgoing research would lead to reductions in the source term, it was still too early to quantify the exact magnitude of this reduction and that the reduction would be sequence-dependent. Id. at 2; see P.A. Finding 269; C.E. Finding 1.1-312. Thus, although parties disagreed on the degree to which reductions in source terms could be quantified, they agreed that ongoing research would support raductions in source terms.

1. Because the early fatality consequences are very sensitive to the source term, modest reductions in the source term would move the point at which 95 percent of the early fatality risk is obtained closer to the plants. Licensees' Ouestion One Testimony at 127. Therefore,

- the nu.cer of people requiring evacuaticn and the distance they would have to travel decreases with smaller source terms. See Stratton Testi-Inony at 6.

Even small reductions in source terms would have significant impacts on consequences:

o Modest source term reduction would coupletely eliminate the early fatality risk because of the threshold nature of early fatalities, o A source term reduction of a factor of 10 would reduce the maximtm nunber of early fatalities to 20 (a 400-fold decrease) people at a frequoney of once in 100,000,000 years, assuming evacuation as modeled in IPPSS; o A reduction factor of about 15, with evacuation as modeled in the IPPSS, would eliminate the early fatality risk at Indian Point; and ,

o A factor of 20 reduction in the source term would reduce the risk of latent fatalities by about an order of magnitude.

See P.A. Findings 273, 275; C.E. Findirg 1.1-302, -304 to -306; Lican-sees' Question One Testimony at 126.

The Board ignored the fact that Staff and licensees' witnesses agreed that current analyses using RSS-type source terms lead to an overestimation of risk, and took the position that reduction in source terms was premature. The Board thus did not account for such reductions in derivirg their own risk estimates. Reconmendations at 102 n.44. The Board "may not act arbitrarily in disregardirg uncontradicted and entirely probable testimony of witnesses whose qualifications and judg-ment have not been discredited." Security-First National Bank v. Lutz, 322 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1963); see Alvary v. United States, 302 F.2d 790, 794 (2d Cir. 1962).

More realistic source terms not only reduce the absolute value of offsite risks, but reduce the uncertainty in these risks. In its Recom-mendations, the Board should have accorded greater importance to the impacts of using rmre realistic source terms. 'Ihis is particularly true

because the Board took a special interest in extremely low probability, high consequence accidents upon which more realistic source terms have the greatest impact.

D. Board Estimates of Risk The Board improperly introduced into its Reconmendations three novel approaches to the estimation of risks: cmbining the risk of each plant at the Indian Point site; conparing cumulative risk to annual risk; and conbining early and latent-fatality risks. The Board also presented separate risk estimates, based upon its views on uncertainty, that were even more " pessimistic" than those that Staff endorsed.

Reccamendations at 95. Moreover, these new approaches were not subject to examination by the parties during the hearings.

1. Expression of Risk By Site The Board conbined the -risk fran each plant at the Indian Point site, thus expressing the risk figures as one nunber. See Recanmenda-tions at 56-57, 72, 72 n.34.

The Indian Point units were licensed individually, by plant, not by site. All amendments to those licenses occur on a plant-specific basis, not on a site-specific basis. Moreover, as the Board noted, such a con-bined expression of risk is inconsistent with the Canmission's Prelimi-nary Safety Goals, and with NURm-0880 Revision 1 for Conment (May 1983), in which the Canmission " changed the quantitative design objec-tives fran risks per site to risks per plant, to avoid imposing a regu-latory bias against multi-unit sites." Recomiendations at 56 n.29.

2. Cumulative vs. Annual Risk The Board expressed risk in tems of cumulative risk over the life of.the plant. Although the Board recognized that risks are nomally expressed as annual rates, it argued that, because the Indian Point risks continue for each year of cperation, they should be cumulated to express the total risk to the people near the site. See Recmmendations at 91-95. ,

The primary purpose of calculating risks is to permit decisions on whether particular risks are acceptable. In the Comtission's Prelimi-nary Safety Goals, acceptability is determined by couparing nuclear to non-nuclear risks. 48 Fed. Reg. 10,773, 10,774. To achieve an equitable cmparison using the Board's method, non-nuclear risks would also have to be accumulated. The Board, however, inappropriately contrasted the cumulative risk of Indian Point with the annual non-nuclear risk.

3. Cmbining Early and Latent Fatality Risks The Board also inapprcpriately c m bined the early and latent fatal-ity risks. Recmmendations at 93. The early fatality risk is geograph-ically short ranged, is manifested soon after the accident, is extremely sensitive to source term reduction, and is subject to reduction by evac-uation and sheltering. See P.A. Findings 13, 14, 199, 239; C.E.

Findings 1.1-302, -359, -367, -370. The latent fatality risk is geo-graphically widely distributed, is very long term, is less sensitive to I

source tenn reduction, and is unrelated to evacuation within the EP2.1 IPPSS results demonstrated that almost all of the Indian Point early fatality risk results fran the interfacing systems ILCA, while alrcst all of the latent fatality risk results fran the contalment overpres-surization scenarios. See P.A. Findings 19, 25; C.E. Findings 1.1-369, 379.

Canbining the early and latent fatality risks, therefore, confuses the causes of these risks, the time during which they occur, the differ-ent populations that could be affected, their likelihood of being elimi-nated through source term reduction, and the different plant design fea-tures and operating procedures that affect them.2 For these reasons the Preliminary Safety Goals recomend separate conparisons of nuclear to non-nuclear risks for both early and latent fatality risks. 48 Fed. Reg. 10,774. The Board's unique treatment of risk and consequence estimates rejects established Comission indices for evaluating risk as set forth in the Preliminary Safety Goals and NUREG-0880, and distorts the characteristics of early and latent fatal-ity risks. The Board's cumulation of estimates results in gross exaggerations of the risk. They should not, therefore, be given any waight by the Comission.

1. See Acharya Testimony at Fig. III.C.53; III.C.B. Joint Testi-mony of Sarbeswar Acharya and Roger M. Blond Regarding Calculational Methodolcgy of the CFAC Code at III.C.B-9; cf,. f P. A. Findings 199, 234, 272, 274; C.E. Findings 1.1-304, -370, -372.

2. If added together, the early fatali*.y portion is so mall that it loses its relevance.

, l

[

4. Treatment of Uncertainty

-Both the IPPSS and Staff analysis dealt with the issue of uncer-tainty in the risk assessments. One of the important advances in IPPSS over earlier PRAs was the canbining of various uncertainties and their s

propagation through the analysis. The IPPSS process of retaining uncer-tainties throughout the calculation allows construction of a final family of risk curves which not only display the occurrence frequency of each level of consequence, but also the uncertainty or confidence band associated with that frequency. See P.A. Finding 42; C.E. Finding 1.1-

29. Risk curves which displayed consequences at different frequency of exceedance values were presented at the 10, 50, and 90 percent confi-dence levels. See P.A. Findings at p. 9; C.E. Findings at p. 1-246.

This pioneering effort was praised during the hearing by Staff witness Rowsone, who testified that "the treatment of uncertainty in the IPPSS is the most comprehensive quantitative assessment of uncertainties that has been given in a PRA to date." P.A. Finding 51; C.E. Finding 1.1-42; Rowsone Testimony at 4. Even intervenor witness Robert Weatherwax

" believes that . . . IPPSS makes substantial methodological progress in

. . . acccmnodating uncertainty." Reccmnendations at 39.

Staff witness Rowsane stated that he "would be mildly surprised, bat not very surprised if (Staff's] estimates of offsite radiological risks were too lcw by a factor of 40." Rowsane Testimony at 19. Based upon this testimony, the Board presented additional, higher offsite risk figures. Recanmendations at 86, 95, 101-02. Rcrasane, however, also stated that the Staff's estimate was as likely to have been "too high by a factor of 400." Rowsone Testimony at 19. Although the Board accepted

)

a b

s 28 -

n.

4 N s Rowscme'sfopinionthattheestimatescouldbe; low,andwentontodoits

own calculations accordingly, it icnored Pusane's estimate that Staff's

, s .

estimates could be high by a factor of 40,0. Bus, the recalculated risk

~

values presented by the Board are nct,only overstated to the licensees' prejudice, but.do not accurately reflect the testimony of the witness t

upon whose opinion the Board relies.

• 5. Congxxmding of Risks _

1. The various approaches used by the Board, conbining risks fran both

, plants, accumulating risks over the plants' projected lifetimes, conbin-

,n -

~

• ing early and latedt fatality risks, and utilizing the largest uncer-

.f , tainty factor that would' increase r'isks all go in the same direction:

they serve to increase the calculated risk, o(a te Board then campounded this situtation by multiplying these s - . .

W *- individual approaches together, Reconmendations at 93-95. We Board's perceived risk was increased by'a factor of over 1,000 by this coupcund-N ' ing.1 ,

c- Thrcughout its assessnent of risk at Indian Point, the Board has consistently adopted conservative or pessimistic assumptions and analy-

.ses. 21s accretion of conservatisms, many of them highly unrealistic, not only causes the Board's risk values to be higher than licensees' and Staff estimates, but causes the Board's " pessimistic" estimates to be greatly exaggerated. Moreover, none of these new approaches was subject to examination by any of the parties during the proceeding.

l. Using a factor of 40 for uncertainty multiplied by a factor of about 25 for cumulative risks results in a thousandfold increase. See Reconmendations at 101, 106.

. g, .

O

29 -

E. Large Consecuence Accidents With Chairman Gleason dissentirn, the Board recomended that the Comtission accord special consideration to large consequence accidents at several selected sites. Recomendations at 103-05, 107.1 Yet, the Board did not recomend any limiting value for such consequences nor did it attenpt to relate such consequences to a particular probability.

Any hypothetical accident could be made worse by assuming addi-tional improbable circumstances. There is no such thing as a " worst" accident unless there is a limit established by som probability level, below which more renote, but more serious, accidents are not con-sidered. The Board's recomendation is unbounded because the Board offered no corresponding probability limit. If there is no requirement that consequences of a radioactive release be linked to the probabili-ties of that release (which is contrary to the Carmission's repeated directives) then any nuclear power plant, even those at remote sites, could be challerged. See text, infra, at Section VIII(A) .

1. The Board stated that the Comtission should consider the potential consequences of low prob-ability accidents at sites such as Indian Point, Zion, Limerick, and Salen, where the consequences of a severe accident would be greater than at most other sites, and . . . require that the risk decrease as potential consequences increase.

Therefore, we recomend that the Carmission factor into its deliberations the potential consecuences of a low crobability accident at Indian Point.

Recomendations at 105 (emphasis added); see M. at 107

. . ~

'Ihe reconmendation by the Board's majority proposes a new, unde-fined safety standard for five sites which would unlawfully and uncon-stitutionally single out Indian Point and a limited number of other plants. Cf.

f Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645, 652-53 (1954) (footnote anitted) ("while the Caumission has adumbrated the reascns that conmended these charges to its approval, the Canmission has not adequately explained its departure fran prior norms and has not sufficiently ~ spelled out the legal basis of its decision") . Moreover, a serious deficiency in using an extremely low probability, high conse-quence standard is that it does not permit meaningful choices between carpeting alternatives, which may result in an increasd in overall risk.

Chairman Gleason prcperly objected to the majority's recanmendation that low probabilities be " ignored" because the " net effect" of such action "seens to suggest an absolute and not the adequate protection called for by the Atanic Energy Act." Recanzmndations at 433 (Cissent-ing Views cf Chainnan Gleason).1 The Atanic Energy Act authorized the Ccmmission to license a nuc-lear power plant upon a finding that the facility "will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public." 42 U.S.C.

S 2232(a). As the Canmission has stated concerning this standard, Congress did not elaborate further en the meaning of " adequate protection," but it is reasonable to conclude that such a standard, as distinguished for example fran " absolute" protection, left roan for sane degree of health impact on the public

1. Concare Reconmendations at 37 n.18 (mimimax theory assumes that

" decisions are taken subject to the condition that the maximu:n risk in taking a wrong decision is minimized") .

31 -

ccmnensurate with the benefits of having a nuclear power prcgran. " Adequate" protection implies a realistic judgment.

While tfie Ccmnission brings its best judgment to the task of applying the phrases " adequate protec-

- tior.' or "no undue risk" to individual cases, we do not do so in vacuum. A country that builds highways, that licenses airplanes, that regulates coal mines, has clearly not established "zero risk" or "zero deaths" as a legal or moral abso-lute.

46 Fed. Reg. 39,573, 39,580 (1981); accord Citizens for Safe Power, Inc.

v.-NRC, 524 F.2d 1291, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("(albsolute or perfect assurances are not required (by the Atonic Energy Act), and neither present technology nor public policy admit of such a standard").1 By intentionally singling out Indian Point, and a limited number of other sites, for the proposed new and higher standard, the Board's reconmended new standard denies the licensees their rights to the equal protection of the laws. " Equal protection demands at a minimum that [an agency of the federal goverrment] must apply its laws in a rational and

1. In enacting the Atonic Energy Act, Congress found that regulation of nuclear energy was necessary "to protect the health and safety of the public," 42 U.S.C. S 2012(e), and authorized the Ccmnission to establish standards "to protect health or to minimize danger to life or prcperty." Id. S 2201(b). In implementirg these standards, the Ccmmission must abide by the principle that "[t]he pronise of equal protection of the laws (contained in the fourteenth amendment and applicable to the federal government through the fifth amendnent] is not limited to the enactment of fair and impartial legislation, but necessarily extends to the application of these laws." United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1973); United

- States v. Christcpher, 700 F.2d 1253,1258 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,103 S.Ct. 2436 (1983). "Any law which is nondiscriminatory on its face may be applied in such a way as to violate the Eqeal Protection Clause . . . ." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 233, 257 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).

---__a __

~

nonarbitrary way." Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 522 (7tn Cir. 1982); see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).1 IV. COMMISSION CUESTION TWO: FUR 1EER SAFETY LEASURES A. Plant Modifications Licensees agree with the Board and with Staff that major plant mod-ifications, such as filtered vented contalments and separate contain-ment systens, are not warranted for the Indian Point units. Further, licensees also concur that retrofitting a closed cycle service water cooling systen is not required. Licensees are prepared to voluntarily implement the Board's recoumendations regarding the loose parts monitoring systen and the radiciodine Technical Specification.

Reconmendations at v, 168-69.

At the outset of this proceeding, . the Director of the Division of Nuclear Reactor. Regulation issued an Order dated February 11, 1980, which imposed certain requirements on the Indian Point licensees not otherwise required by the Ccmnission's rules and regulations. The Director's Confinnatory Order expressly contemplated that it would be for_ an " interim" duration, pending review of other possible safety nea-sures. Order at 2 (Feb.11,1980) . Because the risk posed by Indian Point has already been reduced by voluntary licensee actions since the

1. Although "the conscious exercise of some celectivity in the enforcement of laws dces not violate the Constitution (, t] hat correct principle does not in many cases answer the question whether selective enforcement in a given case is invidious discrimination which cannot be reconciled with the principles of equal protection." United States v.

Falk, 479 F.2d at 624, citing Ovler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).

. . o 33 -

time of the Director's Order,1 the intended interim purpose of that order in reducirg risk has been achieved by other means, and the Direc-tor's Order, to the extent it has not been made generic, should be rescinded by the Canmission.

B. Se Develcpnent and Implenentation of a Safety Assurance Program At Indian Point Is Not Justifled he Board in its Reconmendations adopted a Staff proposal that would require the Indian Point licensees to implenent a safety Assurance Program (SAP), which the Staff envisioned as integrating probabilistic risk assessment techniques and insights into the day-to-day operations of the Indian Point units. Reconmendations at 141. The Staff's reccm-mended progran would include the continued use of PRAs as an evaluation and management tool. Reconmendations at 139-40. Staff stated that

"[t]he IPPSS models should be employed as a test bed to assesa the importance to risk of events at other plants," and suggested that IPPSS be maintained as a " current, up-to-date evaluation tool." Reconnenda-tions at 140. Staff arbitrarily estimated that start-up costs alone for SAP would run as high as S3,000,000 Recormendations at 140-41. Licen-sees believe that the cost could be significantly higher.

SAP is objectionable for several reasons. D e record provides no basis for requiring the implementation of a major new program at the

1. Af ter ccmpletion of the IPPSS analysis in 1982, licensees informed the Commission that on their own initiative they were making certain plant roodifications at both units to take advantage of risk reduction measures identified in the course of the study. See Reconnen-dations at 40 n.19, 46-47; Iatter fran John D. O'Toole and J. Phillip Bayne to Harold R. Denton (Mar. 5,1982) (letter transmitting IPPSS to the Canmission).

Indian Point units. The Board found that the contribution of Indian Point to the overall accidental death and cancer risk is very small.1 Recamendations at 108. The expected source term reductions will reduce the already Icw calculated radiological health risks and narrow the uncertainty. See text, supra at 20-23.

SAP is unnecessary to achieve cmpliance with either the Ccemis-sion's rules and regulations or its Preliminary Safety Goals. Current Ccmmission regulations do not require such a progran for any operating plant and neither the Board nor Staff advanced any appropriate basis for singling out Indian Point for such a program. In fact, the Board's conclusion that risk at the site is already very lcw precludes such a justification. Implementation of SAP would run afoul of the Ccmmission's statutory mandate and would be constitutionally imper-missible. See text, _s_uora, at Section I(E) .

SAP also should not be imposed upon the Indian Point licensees because, as the_ Board reccgnized, "[iln fact, at Indian Point signifi-cant safety improve:.ents have been made" on a voluntary basis as a result of IPPSS. Reccmmendations at 40 n.19. These modifications, which reduce overall risk, include plant changes to reduce seismic,

1. Indeed, Staff testified that a rigorous examination of safety levels denonstrated that the contributior to risk of early accidental death posed by serious reactor accidents at Indian Point is roughly 2.5 parts per million of the background risk averaged over a 50-mile radius of the plant, or 0.0000025 percent of the overall risk of accidental death in the vicinity of the site. Reccrmendations at 64. Staff also determined that the contribution of severe accidents at Indian Point to the incidence of delayed cancer fatalities within 50 miles of the units was roughly 11 parts per million, or 0.00001 percent of the overall background cancer fatality risk. Reccmmendations at 66.

35 -

fire, and hurricane risk. P.A. Finding 376; C.E. Findings 2.0-5, -15 to

-16, 5.0-48; Recmmendations at 46-48; Direct Testimony of Frank Rowsone and Roger Blond Concerning Ccrxaission Question 5, at 3, 4 (Mar. 22, 1983). One amendrent to IPPSS has already been published, see P.A.

Finding 29; C.E. Finding 1.1-17, and a second amendment is imninent.

Further, the single site implementation of a major progran such as SAP at this time would offend both the Ccmnission's current backfitting regulation, 10 C.F.R. S 50.109 (1983), and the interim measures con-tained in the Conmission's Policy Statement on backfitting at operating reactors. 48 Fed. Reg. 44,173 (1983).

The Ccrnmission's current backfitting regulation requires a showing of " substantial, additional protection which is required for the public health and safety" before the additicn of any new " system" may be ordered at an operatirg plant. 10 C.F.R. S 50.109 (1983). Staff's acknowledgement that it has not perfonned an intensive evaluation of the effectiveness of a SAP progran precludes the shcwirg necessary under the current regulation.

Additionally, by its recent backfitting policy statenent, the Ccin-mission signaled an intention to move away frczn the present backfitting regulation and to implement interim rules. The interim measures relat-ing to new plant-specific requirements clearly encompass SAP because they cover "each staff proposed requirement that involves a new staff position or charge in an existing position" with respect to the licensee. 48 Fed. Reg. at 44,174. The Policy Statement requires Staff to prepare, on a plant-specific basis, a description of each proposed new requirenent, and continues that:

ne description must include a brief statement of how the preposed requirement would improve safety We Cmmission has directed the staff to provide an informal appeal process . . . . If, after use of the appeal process, the licensee objects to the proposed requirement, the staff must prepare an assessment of the costs and benefits of the pro-posed requirement that considers, to the extent practical and applicable, the information required for review of generic requirements by the CRGR.

Unless the appropriate Office Director determines that the prompt imposition of a requirement is needed to protect the public health and safety or the camon defense and security, a staf f-proposed requirement may not be imposed durirg the appeal process and, if the licensee objects, until after the cost-benefit assessment is empleted and a final determination has been made that the requironent should be imposed. .

_I.d.-

These steps have barely begun in connection with a proposal for a SAP at Indian Point. For example, Staff expressly advised the Board that no nonetization benefit calculation was prepared for the SAP simi-lar to that performd by Staff for other additional safety masures evaluated in the hearirgs. Tr.12,929 (Rowsane) . Accordingly, there is no basis in the record to sustain a license requirement for implemen-tation of a SAP program at Indian Point.

Regarding systems interaction, which is item 10 of SAP, the Power Authority has an ongoing program in this area and recently subnitted an extensive report on it to the Canmission. Istter fran J. P. Bayne to Steven A. Varga (Nov. 30, 1983) (attachment: " Systems Interaction Study"). De purpose of this program is to determine if there are pre-viously undetected mechanisms by which safety systems might fail through impacts fran failed non-safety systems. The secpe of the systems inter-

.

• O action study includes all credible interactions within the design enve-lope used in licensing Indian Point Unit 3. The Power Authority is con-mitted to resolving all safety-related systems interactions within the design envelcpe.

With more realistic source terms, as currently expected, the already 1cw radiological health risks will be even lower. Thus, the focus of the future use of IPPSS will shift fran the very low radiologi-cal risks to econcaic risks to the owners. The structure and implemen-tation of future turk with IPPSS, therefore, rests more with licensees than with the Ccmmission. Moreover, an assessment of the safety bene-fits associated with the Safety Assurance Progran cannot even be made j until the Ccanission's source term work is ccuplete.

V. COMMISSION OUESTION FIVE: COMPARATIVE RISKS Under Question Five, the Carmission directed the Board to consider whether the risks posed by-Indian Point fall within the range of risks posed by other licensed nuclear plants. To assess this question, the Board was presented with four approaches: (1) interplant comparisons based upon existing PRAs; (2) the impact on risk of special design fea-tures of Indian Point; (3) use of the Sandia Siting Study; and (4) use of the Carmission's Preluninary Safety Goals as a standard.

A. Interplant PRA Comoarisons There is general agreement that conparing PRAs of different nuclear power plants is an imperfect art because there is no standard PRA meth-odology and the secpes of the different studies vary. See P.A. Finding 958; C.E. Finding 5.0-15 to 17. For example, because IPPSS included the

e . .

38 -

effects of external events to a greater degree than other PRAs, canpar-ing the Indian Point PRA to other PRAs which do not fully account for external events results in a distortion of risk comparisons. As the Board recognized, "in a sense, the IPPSS appears to offer a pessimistic appraisal of Indian Point's risks when compared to the other PRAs which have been produced." Recoramndations at xi. Licensees presented data frcn a Staff menorandtn based upon a number of plant-specific PRAs.

This canparison demonstrated that the risk to an individual living within one mile of Indian Ibint is within the range of estimated risks for individuals living the same distance fran other nuclear powr plants. Moreover, this comparison is true even when comparing the internal plus external risk fran Indian Point with the internal risk only fran other plants. See P.A. Findings 959-60; C.E. Findings 5.0-50 to 51. Licensees also demonstrated that the latent fatality risk at Indian Point is well within the range of risks posed by other nuclear pow r plants. See P.A. Finding 963; C.E. Finding 5.0-63.

B. Soecial Design Fatures It is also possible to identify those special design features at Indian Point which would lower the frequency of major releases carpared with other nuclear plants lacking such special features. Licensees identified the interfacing systems IirA as virtually the only accident that can cause early fatalities. Staff stated that, because Indian Point does not have as many large pipes leading fran the reactor to low pressure systans outside contairment as do most pressurized water reac-tors, it is safer than average regarding this accident. See P.A. Find-ing 970; C.E. Finding 5.0-30. The configurations of the Indian Point

c containments are particularly effective for containment heat removal.

See P.A. Finding 973; C.E. Finding 5.0-27 Furthennore, the fan coolers are less likely to fail due to core melt debris than at other plants, and Indian Point is unique in having two of its recirculation pumps inside containmnt and in having two sunps. See P.A. Findings 972-74; C.E. Finding 5.0-27. These features contribute to the low risk demonstrated for Indian Point. P.A. Findings 969-83; C.E. Finding 5.0-27 to -37.

. C. Sandia Siting Stirly Attenpts were made by the intervenors to use the Sandia siting study, NUREG/CR-2239, " Technical Guidance for Siting Criteria Develop-ment" (Nov.1982), to achieve relative risk rankings. See UCS/NYPIRG Testimony of Steven C. Sholly on Ccmmission Cuestion Five. However, these attempts failed because, as acknowledged by the report's authors, the study does not present risk values: "[tlo accurately portray the risk, very specific accident sequence probabilities and source tenns are needed . . . the results presented in this report [thus] do not repre-sent nuclear power risk." NUREG/CR-2239 at Foreword.

ne intent of the siting study was to present relative conse-quences, independent of any plant features, and it made no attempt to present relative risks. n e strength of the Indian Point containment structure, howaver, affects not just risks, but also early fatality con-sequences because it affects the time between accident initiation and the time at which radioactive material ent.ers the environment and, therefore, the efficacy of evacuation. Because ';he number of early fatalities is sensitive to evacuation, see text, suora, at Section III

(B)(1), consideration of this health index must include consideration of plant features, particularly the containment, to be meaningful.I This is especially important in the case of Indian Point, where, according to the testimony of Staff witnesses Passme and Blond, the contaiment is thought to be among the best at mitigating the effects of core melt accidents. Direct Testimony of Frank Bassme and Roger Blond Concerning Cmmission Question Five at 27 (Mar. 22,1983).

Thus, because neither the frequency of the release scenarios nor the sequence dependent source terms used in the siting study are relevant to Indian Point, the study cannot be used for risk cmpari-sons. See P.A. Finding 995; C.E. Findings 5.0-72 to -73.

The Cmmission directed the Board in Question Five to consider the range of risks, not the range of consequences. 'Ihe Board did not con-clude that Indian Point was a significant " outlier" in risk, and closer examination of the role of the containment would shcw that Indian Point is not a significant " outlier" in consequences, even accconting for its high population site.

D. Preliminary Safety Goals Because of the difficulties in car.parirg various PRN precisely and because a standardless relative ranking of plants does not suffice to establish acceptability, the licensees used the Cm mission's Preliminary Safety Coals in respondiry to Cmmission Question Five. This " reference

1. Many nuclear plants are in the same range of latent fatality risks because the latent fatality risk is widely dispersed geograph-ically and because population dif ferences anong plants are not great when 50 mile radii are used, particularly in the midwestern and eastern United States. See P.A. Finding 1006; C.E. Findings 5.0-62 to -63.

point" avoids difficult interplant comparisons and meaningless relative rankin;;s. Licensees do not agree with the Board that it is an "inappro-priate rubric" to include cmparison to the Preliminary Safety Goals under Cmmission Question Five. Recmmendations at 339. On the con-trary, a comparison of Indian Point's risks relative to these Prelimi-p nary Safety Goals is the most meaningful reply to Cmmission Question Five. t3ecause these goals reflect the full spectrum of accidents, tak-ing into account both consequences and probability, this emparison avoids the inevitable pitfalls of the large consequence, los frequency accident acceptance criterion. The goals permit practical cmparisons to be made, and, because they are expressed as a fraction of background risk, they establish that nuclear power is only a small contributor to societal risk.

Even using RSS-type source tems, which overstate the risk, Indian Point Unit 3 is a factor of 75, and Indian Point Unit 2 is a factor of 70, below the early fatality goal. Thus, Unit 3 is 1 part in 75,000, and Unit 2 is 1 part in 70,000, of the non-nuclear early fatality risk. See P.A. Finding 946; C.E. Finding 5.0-6. Indian Point Unit 3 is also a factor of 710, and Unit 2 is a factor of 165, below the latent fatality goal. See P.A. Finding 349; C.E. Finding 5.0-7. Stated otherwise, the median frequency of having a one percent increase above the background cancer fatality rate is once in approximately 100,000,000 years for Unit 3 and once in approximately 10,000,000 years for Unit

2. Licensees' Question one Testimony at 23. Use of more realistic source terms would reduce these risks still further, particularly the early fatality risk.

To provide sam perspective on the level of riak at Indian Point, the licensees presented the testimony of Bernard L. Cohen. Licensees' Testimony of Bernard L. Cchen on Cannission Question Five (Jan. 24, 1983). Dr Cohen demonstrated that the risks posed by Indian Point are very small compared to various non-nuclear risks. See P.A. Findings 985-86, 988-90; C.E. Findings 1.1-394 to -401. Staff also concluded that risks at Indian Point are much less than ccrapeting risks. See P.A.

Finding 987; C.E. Findings 1.1-402 to -405.

A criterion based on large consequences alone does not serve the public well. The Ccmaission's Preliminary Safety Goals for early and latent fatality risks establish a meaningful framework with which spe-cific plants can be conpared and the entire nuclear power industry can be kept to a small fraction of the non-nuclear risks. Appreciation of the large reargins between the absolute risks fran nuclear power plants and these strict goals should serve to accelerate the implenuntation of these goals.

VI. COU1ISSION OUESTIONS THREE AND FOUR: E24ERGENCY PLANNING A. 'Ihe Connission's Subsecuent Emergencv Plannirr1 Determinations The Board accepted FEMA's conclusion that two significant of fsite emergency planning deficiencies existed at the close of the record, although it noted that efforts were underway to correct both.1 i 1. First, the Board cited offsite emergency planning as " generally deficient" in Rockland County, by reason of the County's formal with-drawal fran the four-county planning process and the Board's evn unwill-ingness to examine the actual state of planning in Rockland Cour.ty, not-withstandirg the fonnal withdrawal. Second, the Board found that the

. . . As noted above, the Caumission has already reviewed a much nore current record, including significant recent develcpments, and found emergency planning to be adequate. See text, supra, at Section I. In accordance with the well-established doctrine of law of the case, the previous finding of adequacy by the Commission as a reviewing body con-trols the instant review. As the reviewing court held in White v.

Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1967) (footnotes cmitted):

The " law of the case" rule is based on the salu-tary and sound public policy that litigation should cane to an end. ,It is predicated on the pranise that "there would be no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court to listen to criticisms en their opinions or speculate of chances fran changes in its members," and that it would be impossible for an appellate court "to perfonn its duties satisfactorily and efficiently" and expe-ditiously "if a question, once considered and decided by it were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal" thereof.

In the instant matter, it would serve no useful purpose and waste the Canmission's resources to step backward in time and re-examine a less canplete record. Given the extensive emergency planning effort and lack of written agreenents with bus operators in Westchester County constituted a significant deficiency. The Board acknowledged that fairness and praticality required the closing of the record, notwith-standing its recognition of ongoing progress:

The Board reaches no conclusion as to the adequacy of the new State Compensatory Plan, the provisions of which are unknown to it; nor is it aware of the progress with respect to planning in Rockland in the five and one-half months since the record was closed (though it is aware that FE4A no longer believes that significant deficien-cies exist -- see Notice to the Parties (Oct. 4,1983)) .

Recaumendations at 173 n.55.

exhaustive subsequent reviews by FDIA and the Canmission, there can be no dcubt about the adequacy of emergency planning.

B. Existing Response Cacabilities A review by the Board of the overall status of emergency planning in Rockland County, as well as existing provisions for transit-dependent persons in Westchester County, would have undoubtedly led to a different conclusion. Unfortunately, the Board chose to review neither.

1. Rockland County The Board determined that because Rockland County's emergency plans were only in draft form (and had not received a formal FDIA analysis) as of the close of the record, it wouM not be " productive . . . to perform (sua soonte) a further evaluation of the inccmplete Rockland plan against the planning standards of 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b) and the evalua-tion criteria of NUREG-0654 (Rev. 1)." Recaumendations at 172-73. Wis decision not to evaluate a considerable amount of evidence regarding Rockland County's capabilities, in itself, deprived the Canmission of valuable information. But more importantly, the Board utilized its own decision'not to consider that evidence as the basis for its finding that emergency planning in Rockland County was " generally c'eficient." Id. at 172-73, 213.

The evidence concerning the actual state of emergency planning in Rockland County would have led to a much different conclusion. De rec-ord demonstrated that (1) the State of New York had adopted a ccmpensat-ing plan for Rockland County; and (2) over one thousand Rockland County response personnel had already had training and experience for both

. -

• radiological and non-radiological emergencies that would enable then to mcunt an effective response to a radiological energency.1

2. Westchester County The Board found that the lack of written agreements with bus opera-tors constituted a significant deficiency in Westchester County. Here, too, the Board's failure to consider the actual bus transport needs and capabilities in Wastchester County lef t the Recmraendations incomplete and misleading. 'Ihe record showed that there were, in fact, adequate provisions for the transit-dependent public.

FF14A, upon whose evidence the Board relied almost exclusively in this area, did not examine the actual need for buses. Tr. 14,804-08.

FD!A assu:wd, without analysis, that car pooling, ride-sharing, and ad

1. New York State Exhibit 9; Reccmmendations at 172; P.A. Finding 688; C.E. Finding 3.1-18. FDtA ccramended New York State's compensatory denonstration at the March 9,1983 excrcise. Subsequent to the close of the record, an exercise was conducted of the state compensating plan.

Several key local agencies in Rockland County actively participated.

FDiA and the Ccmnission tenned the exercise a success.

County personnel participated effectively in the 1982 four-ccunty exercise and in a " table top exercise" of the new draft plan just prior to the March 9, 1983 exercise. Soon thereaf ter, Pockland County accan-plished an effective evacuation of a large number of residents during a chenical fire, demonstratirg the notification, coordination, and deci-sion-making which FD1A considers the " heart and soul" of effective emer-gency response. P.A. Finding 687.

Additional evidence demonstrating Rockland County's actual emer-gency response capability was contained in the deposition of Donald P.

McGuire, the County's chief emergency planner. Specifically, Mr.

McGuire would have testified to: (1) Rockland County's actual ability to respond in an emergency, (2) shortconings in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FDIA's) assessment of Rockland County's response capabilities, ard (3) FD1A's underrating of the effectiveness of New York State's compensating plan as demonstrated during the March 9, 1983 exercise. See Licensees' Motion for Reconsideration of Ruling en Admis-sibility of Deposition at 3, 6-9 (May 9, 1983); text, infra, at section VIII(G).

j

e > .

hoc transportation measures would be inadequate. But the evidence--

including that proferred by the intervanors-shewed that the actual need <

for buses in an emergency would be far less than originally assumed.1 P.A. Finding 677; C.E. Finding 3.3-20.

The Recanmendations overestimte bus demands and underestimate actual capabilities. Although written agreenents with bus operators were not finalized until after the close of the record, the evidence overwhelmingly supported the State's and licensees' position that ade-quate bus transportation would be available in the event of a radiologi-cal emergency. Virtually all the testimony--including that of a bus driver, a bus company owner, a county civil defense director, and Dr.

Russell Dynes, the leading sociological expert on disaster response--

suggested that bus owners and drivers would, in fact, cooperate during a radiological emergency. P.A. Finding 681; C.E. Finding 3.2-12.

Finally, written conmitments for buses are not required by Canmission regulations, nor are they set forth in hus3-0654 or uniformly required by FD1A policy. FDIA has approved plans at other sites without such written agreenents.2 P.A. Finding 683. Had the Board given further consideration to thase factors, there would have been no basis for a deficiency Einding in Westchester County.

1. A survey intrcduced by the intervencrs demonstrated that only 3 *

. percent of the EP2 population would require bus transportation, not the 11 percent originally contemplated. P.A. Findings 677-78; C.E. Finding 3.3-20. The Board did not include this factor in its Recar nendations, nor did it include the further reduction in demand occasioned by the early dismissal plan for school children.

2. The Board erred in denying the licensees adequate discovery of FEMA on this critical issue. See text, infra, at Section VIII(E).

l

In addition to the two significant deficiencies cited by FEMA, the Board raised questions about several other areas of offsite emergency planning.1 In most of those other offsite cases, the Board did not find flaws in planning, but simply suggested a need for further infornution or analysis.2

a. Route Alertirn and Cormunications Carabilig The Board's recorrendations to study extraordinary route alerting procedures are unnecessary. First, the Board erred in suggesting that route alerting procedures are necessary to satisfy Carmission regula-tiens set forth in 10 C.F.R. Part 50. Second, nothiry in the record supports the notion that ad hoc alerting procedures used during more carmon, non-radiological emergencies would not suffice in the event of

1. It is noteworthy that the Board found licensees' onsite energency planning fully acceptable.

2. 'Ihe Board correctly refused to admit into evidence a verifica-tion analysis of material contained in the offsite emergency plans prepared by the Argonne National Iaboratory. Tr. 15,052. The Carmis-sion should be aware, however, that the Argonne analysis has little, if any, probative value, because it was based on a lon;; outdated earlier version of the offsite plans. State officials acted to rectify any dis-crepancies. Tr. 14,684-86 (Glass). In any event, the verification analysis is not in the record and is, therefore, beyond the scope of the Canmission's review.

' o an accident at Indian Point.1 Similarly, the Board's conclusion that the record is " inconclusive" because it did not know the capability for communication with " support personnel and facilities" is not supported by the record. No reliable evidence suggested that the telephone systen and its supplements would not be adequate in the event of an actual erargency, P.A. Findings 594-95; C.E. Findings 3.1-196, -197, and FEMA did not find this area deficient.

b. Information for Non-English Sceaking Persons The Board's recarcandation "that FEMA undertake an additional review of the problan involving the non-English speaking population" is surprising. State and county officials have already conducted a thor-ough review, in response to Contention 4.7, and concluded that there are fea unsupported non-English speakers in the EPZ, and no single predoni-nant foreign language among those identified. Reccmnendations at 320; P.A. Finding 932. Based upon this review, FEMA agreed that it would ba impractical to develop plans or brochures in other languages. Reconnen-dations at 320-21; P.A. Finding 934. Moreover, public information pro-grams are alraady underway to reach non-English speakers thrcugh social and religious leaders and other means.

1. 'Ihe Board's particular concern appeared to center upon the possible failure of the siren systen during a power failure. Eajically, however, an enhanced route alerting system would not materially improve the response to a radiclogical emergency. The sole purpose of the siren systen is to alert the public to turn on their radios or televisions.

If there were a blackout, those residents with battery powered radios and televisions in their hones and/or cars undcubtedly would already be tuned in for blackout news.

_ 49 -

o

c. Additional Measures for Mobility-Irroaired Persons The Board erred in concluding that plans for non-institutionalized, -

mobility-impaired persons in Westchester and Rockland Counties were deficient.

The State, ccunties, and licenscos have made a panopoly of measures available for mobility-impaired persons to ident-ify themselves, includ-ing brochures with return postcards for special needs; toll-free numbers l for assistance; canmunity outreach programs; advertising; and buses, ambulances, and other vehicles that would be available for transporta-tion in the event of an emergency. Reconmendations at 279-82; P. A.

Findings 851-52.1

d. Early Dismissal of Schools The Board's unwillingness to evaluate the adequacy of the early dismissal plan for school children is not justified. See Reconmenda-tions at 266 The early dismissal plan has always existed as an option in the County RERPs; the revised procedures make it the preferred response. P. A. Findings 826-28; C.E. Findinjs at 3.7-6 to -9.2 '

l. Indeed, t.he Board's cri.ticism appeared to b3 based largely upon problems alleged early in the record with collecting, organizing, and responding to the special needs postcards. The Board overlocked the evidence that any earlier problems were later addressed, prior to the close cf the record. Responsible officials in Westchester and Rockland Counties, as well as State personnel, testified that they new have col-lected and catalogued the cards and that the governr. ental agencies are coordinating a response. Reconmendations at 278-79; P. A. Finding 851. -

2. One county official testified that early dismissal has baen used successfully scrne 20 times in the past five years. P.A. Finding 828. The testimony also indicated that the early dismissal plan for Indian Point had received extensive publicity in the EP2 and that resi-dents wre generally aware of it. P.A. Finding 831; C.E. Findings at '

3.7-5, 3.7-9; see, e.g. , Tr. 9706 (Courtney), 9903-04 (Doughty).

50 -

C. Evacuation Time Estimates The Car:aission's emerr;ency planning regulations currently require that the emergent.y plan for each site contain an estimate of the amount of time which would be required to evacuate the 10-mile EPZ. The Indian Point estimates indicated that the entire 10-mile EP2 could be evacuated in fran 7 to 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br />, depending upon time of day and weather condi-tions. Recommendations at 228-31.

The Board concluded that these estimates "are based on acceptable, verified m3thodology, and on reasonable assumptions with respect to nonnal weather conditions and moderately adverse weather conditions."

Reconmendations at 244,1

' Perhaps more important to an assessment of the suf ficiency of uver-gency planning, hcwever, was evidence that evacuation out to the edge of the 10-mile EPZ would not have a significant safety impact in the event of a core melt accident follcwed by a release. Even using RSS-type source teras (which the Board found overstate risk), the plant- and site-specific assessments presented in the testimony established that 95 percent of the early fatality risk would occur within 4 miles. P.A.

Finding 239; C.E. Finding 1.1-370; Licensees' Cuestion one Testincny at 113 (Fig . VIII-1) . If one assumes t' It evacuation begins eight hours af ter accident initiation and prcceeds radially outward at abcut 1-1/2 miles per hour (a sicw walk), the individuals located four miles fran

1. 'Ihe Board did find that the estimates were inadequate in severe winter weather and suggested that a note be added to the evacuation time tables advising decisionnakers that the time necessa:y to clear sncw of f impassable roads should be taken into consideration. Recoumendations at 244.

l

, , , the plant would cceplete evacuation less than twelve hours after the initiation of the accident, before the containnent would fail, thus greatly di:ninishing the calculated early f atality risk. See P.A.

Finding 213; C.E. Findings 3.3-35, 4.1-9. The reccrd also established that latent cancer fatalities would not be significantly affected by evacuation. Tr. 7643.

D. Behavioral Asst nntions In its July 27, 1982 Order of fering guidance to the Board in the Special Proceeding, the Ccmnission reiterated the applicability of 10 CFR S 2.758, which generally precludes challerr;es to Cannission regula-tions. Nonetheless, a great deal of the testimony offered before the Board consisted of challenges to the basic behavicral assumptions under-lying the Conmission's emergency planning regulations. Although inter-venor grcups' witnesses suggested that emergency workers may not res;rnd and that monbers of the public may not comply with instructions during a radiological emergency, licensees' and FDIA's experts testified other-wise. Reconnendations at 218. The Board properly found that:

the human response assur:ptions made by the Indian Point planners are reasonable. . . . [T]he theory

. . . advocate [d] (by intervenor witnesses) is unorthodox, lacks empirical support, aui is contradicted by the equally credible opinion cf Licensees' witnesses. We believe it reasonable to adcpt the conventional wisdon; to do othersise would be to abandon, on the basis of conjecture, the only available data base for emergency planning assu~ptions.

M . at 220-21. The Board also concluded that testimony regarding the response to the TMI and Ginna accidents supported the behavioral assump-

tions in the Indian Point emergency plans, particularly with respect to the responsiveness of professional energency workers. H. at 221.

VII. QUESTION SIX: IMPACTS OF A SHUIDChN The present value cost over their renaining service lives of shut-ting down the Indian Point units was estimted by licensees to be approximately S9 billion. Id.. at 361, 387, other parties, using differing assumptions as to the Indian Point capacity f.ctor, oil prices, load grcwth, and the discount rate selected for reduction of future costs to present value, and proposing certain alternative energy schanes, estimated that the cost would be less. Id. at 366-73, 387.

Using assumptions more favorable to alternative energy sources than licensees consider prudent, the Board concluded that the additional costs to ratepayers during the remaining service lives of the Indian Point units were they to shut down would be $4 to S6 billion in present day cost. d

_I_d_. at 395.

The Board also found "little merit in the evidence advocating cogeneration and conservation as viable alternatives to the Indian Point facilities." Id. at 429.

1 VIII. ADDITIONAL ERRORS IN THE RECORD A. The Board Should Have Struck the Testimony of Intervenors' Witnesses hhich Only Addressed Consecuences In its order renanding for reconsideration the contentions as they i

were originally formulated by the Board, the Cannission directed that

1. hhile several specific issues are addressed here, it should be noted that all issues raised during the hearing are thereafter pre-served. See, e.g., In re Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2) 3 N.R.C. 830, 842 n.26 (1976).

o .. o testhnony on consequences of accidents at Indian Point "must include a discussion of the probability of the accidents leading to the proposed consequences," and must address sufficiently the " accidents that sub-stantially contribute to overall risk." In re Consolidated Edison Co.

(Indian Point, Units 2 and 3), 16 N.R.C. 27, 36-37 (1982) (emphasis added). 'Ihe Canaission stated further that each party (or each grouo of parties con-sidered by the Board) be required to include in any direct testimony and related contentions (and underlying bases) that it may choose to file on accident consequences a discussion of the prob-ability of the accidents leading to the alleged consequences. It is clearly not sufficient for a party offering testimony and contentions on conse-quences to rely on other parties to develoo the issue of probability. Each party of fering testi-rrony on consecuences must of fer at least a discus-sien of probability for the Indian Point olants.

Order at 2 (Sept. 7, 1982) (footnote cmitted) (emphasis in original and added).

The licensees' trotion to strike the testimony of Pisello/Piccioni, Geiger /Sidel, and Palenik/Beyea was denied by the Board cn the basis of the testimony of Dr. Isaac Invi and Dr. Charles Perrcw, Tr. 8083-85 (Chairman Gleason),1 although neither of them offered any original testimony on the probabilities of the consequences described by the six others.2 The intervenors' testimony on consequences should have been

1. Licensees' Motion to Strike Pre-filed Testimony Under Ccmais-sion Cuestion 1 of Daniel N. Pisello, Richard G. Piccioni, H. Jack Geiger, and Victor W. Sidel, and Renewed Motion to Strike Testimony of Brian Palenik and Jan Beyea Under Canaission Questions 3 and 4 (Feb. 9, 1983). 'Ihe Board denied the nution orally. See Tr. 8083-85.

2. Dr. Levi's only reference to probabi) hies in terms of conse-quences was his denial that the probabilities set forth in the Indian

struck because they failed to address the probabilities of the accident consequences they presented, and they, therefore, lacked the site-specific, consequence-specific quantificaticn of probabilitles required by the Carmission, fee Memorandum and Crder at 16 (July 27,1982);

Septanber 17 Order at 2, 3, 4.

B. 'Ihe Board Should Not Have Impoced Arbitrary and Prejudicial Limitations upon the Cross-Examination of Certain Emergency Planning Witnesses ,

By limiting the time of cross-examination1 in response to the intervenors' attempt to deluge the hearing with 171 witnesses,2 an unmanageable number, the Board infringed upon licensees' due process rights and was inconsistent with the Carmission's regulations limitirrj unreasonable creas-examination. See 10 C.F.R. S 2.757 ,

C. The Board Should Have Struck Certain Intervenor "Excert" Witnesses Intervenor witness Steven C. Sholly testified on several cccasions on such subjects as the modeling of consequences of hypothetical reactor Point Probabilistic Safety Study (IPPSS) were reliable. See Direct Testinuny of Isaac I.evi, Ph.D. at 43, Tr. 7716; accord Tr. 7720-21. Dr.

Perrow's' testir.cny was silent on this point. Direct Testimony of Charles Perro4, Ph.D. , at 7 (Jan. 31, 1983 ) .

1. Unwarranted restrictions and a denial of a fair cpportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses resulted fran (1) limiting crcss-examination time to une-half hour per witness, regardless of the importance of the testimony, and refusing to allow accumulatien of unused time to more than two hours; and (2) establishing pseudo panels of witnesses who had prefiled testimony individually, see Tr.1198; Memorandum and Order (Schedule on Carmission Questions 3 and 4 and Notice of Hearing) (by telegraphic message) (Mar. 7, 1983); Order (Re Motions to Moc.fy the Hearing Schedule) (by Mailgram) (Mar. 10, 1983),

and applying the individual witness limits thereto. Licensees also submit that the Board erred in failing to strike the testimony of certain emergency planning intervenor witnesses.

s 2. "Although the intervenors presented a plethora of witnesses, s ly a few had any expertise to offer." Recormendations at 173.

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accidents and the desirability of further safety features at Indian Point. The opinions of this witness were apparently relied upon by the Board in formulating certain of its recourendations. See Reconmenda-tions at 325-43.

Licensees, joined by Staff, objected to the qualifications of Mr.

Sholly as an expert in the subject matter areas in which he testified, asserting that the sponsoring party, UCS/NYPIRG, had not demonstrated the witness to be an expert under the standards of Rule 702 of the Fed-eral Rules of Evidence as regularly applied in Licensirg Board hear-ing. Tr. 6158-60. The Board's denial of the motion was in error.

Examination of the witness revealed that he had had no training in engi-neering, and that his training on the environmental impacts of radiation was confined to a two or three wek portion of an undergraduate course entitled " Principles of Ecology." Tr. 6149, 6156. Several other wit-nesses who did not prcperly qualify as experts were similarly permitted to testify. See Tr. 2997-3000, 3057-58 (Jan Beyea/ Brian Palenik); 7846, 7852 (Charles Perrow); 19,167-69 (Daniel Gutman); 8069-95 (Daniel (

Pisello/ Richard G. Piccioni).

D. The Board Erred in Receiving the Westchester County Testimony Prior to the Final Refonnulation of Contentions under Questions 3 and 4 During the week of January 10, 1983, prior to the Board's issuance ,

of its final reformulation of contentions under Carmission Questions 3 and 4,1 W3stchester County officials testified before the Board. The licensees have been prejudiced because contentions " frame the issues"

1. Memorandtn and Order (Fornulating Final Contentions on Canmission Questions 3 and 4) (Feb. 7, 1983).

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and put parties on notice as to what they will have to defend against or j.

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oppose,1 and therefore, must be issued before testimony is heard, t 'l J. E. The Board Failed to Permit Adecuate Discovery of FDtA Witnesses _

.ss i /' s,

• i Because the Board decided that the licensees' interrogatories r,

related to the same subject to which Richard Kri:mt, Assistant Associate

. .s Director <bf FEMNs Office of Natural and Technological Hazards, would

^' '

+' testify, the Board denied the Power Authority's request to subpoena Vr.

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'l Kt'imm to establish the generic nature of the deficiencies cited by FDIA s ? , .~

/ . / for the Indian Point units, p.d FD'Ns sudden change in its evaluation s,

- - ~ briteria. See Pcwor Authority's Motion for Subpoena of Richard W. Krim

,;r I Jg t' - ( Apr. 26,1983); Tr.14,457-83. The answers to the interrogatories inherent 1'y far1~,to address suf ficiently these issues, however, and, in addition, deny an opportunity for cross-examination. Moreover, the answers to the in,terrogatories were submitted after the record closed

< and, thereforc, lide sees had no remedy for F.9f s inadequate responses.

F. 'Ihe BorM'Erhed in Restrictin;; the Licensees' Right to Object to Cross-W amination Ouestions

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The Board initially ruled that the licensees could not object to

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,A v questions asked of vitnesws f.rcm FDIA by intervenors' counsel and their b y representatires, Tr. 1525-28,2 thus preventing counsel frcm protecting

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the interests of licensees and forcing counsel to allcw potentially

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- 1. E.g. , In re Cour.orwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), 12 N.R.C. 683, 686 (1980).

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2. If the Board had not subsequently reversed itself and removed

,~ the prchibition, Tr.1597, the ruling would have applied to all parties r

ay and all witnesses.

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• objectionable questions to be answered on the record. See, e.g., Tr.

1566 (Morgan).

G. The Board Shculd Have Received into Evidence the Deposition of Ibnald P. McGuire, and Exhibit 2 "Ihereto The deposition of Donald P. McGuire, if admitted, would have pro-vided highly probative evidence concerning disputed iesues in this pro-l ceeding. See text, suora, at 45 n.1. In decidirg that Mr. McGuire, an official of Rockland County, was not an " officer" of the County,1 the Board ignored the categories of deponents subject to the provisions of Rule 32(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, " director [s] and managing agent {s}" of the government entity, categories that clearly enconpass Mr. McGuire.

Mr. McGuire was unquestionably a managing agent for purposes of cmergency planning in Rockland County.2 His original responsibility was "to redevelcp or revise" the Rockland County radiological emergency response plans.3 Mr. McGuire was the principal draf tsman and director and ccordinator of the day-to-day activities in the develognent of

1. Memorandum and Order (Denying Licensees' Motion for Recon-sideration of Ruling on Admissibility of Deposition) at 3 (June 8, 1983). Licensees dispute the Board's holding that Mr. McGuire, County Deputy Director of Emergency Services, was not an " officer."

2. The detennination of whether a deponent is a managing agent "should depend largely en whether the interests of the individual in-volved are Jr;ntified with those of his principal and on the nature of his ' functions, responsibilities and authority . . . respectirc the subject matter of the litigat. ion. '" Toningas v. Douglas Aircraf t Co. , _

45 F.P..D. 94, 96 (S.D.N.Y.1968), cuoting Kolb v. A.H. Bull Steamshq Co., 31 F.R.D. 252, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 1962) (emphasis in original) .

3. Testimony of Ibnald P. McGuire at second unnumber<id page, Tr. 3929; see also Tr. 4058. j l

1

Rockland County's cwn plan.1 Therefore, as the Board itself cecognized, Mr. McGuire was "in a very key position,"2 and his deposition should have been admitted into evidence.

LX . CONCLUSIONS For the foregoing reasons, licensees reccanend that the Cornission find that:

1. Indian Point Units 2 and 3 should continue to cperate because they pose an extremely los risk to the public.

No safety- or risk-related basis exists for requiring the 2.

retrofitting of additional equignant or the imposition of a Safety Assurance Progran.

3. As the Ccrrmission held in its Orders of June 10 and October 4, 1983, offsite emergency planning is adequate to protect the health and safety of the residents within a ten-mile radius of Indian Point, and no further action is warranted.

4. No further need exists for continuing the 1980 Director's .

Order in force because measures taken by licensees on their cwn initiative have reduced risk belcw levels existing at the time of the Order.

l. See Supplmentary Testimony of Donald Hastings at 1 (Feb. 22, 1983) (emphasis added); Tr. 11,022 (Hastings Statement); see, e.g.,

Tr. 11,171-72, 11,180-81, 11,183, 11,193-94, 11,218, 11,229-32, 11,248, 11,251,

2. Tr.11,015 (ranarks of Chairnan Gleason); see also Tr.10,958

("I don't knoa of anybody who would know more than I do about the stav of emergency planning in the ccenty.") (McGuire).

< i. 6 Respectfully sutxnitted, y

Brent L. Ecaddenburg C/ #

a'rles Morgan, Jr.

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! Assistant General Counsel Paul F. Colarulli Joseph J. Levin, Jr.

CONSOLImTED EDISON COMPANY MORGAN ASSOCIATES, CHARTERED OF NEN YORK, INC. 1899 L Street, N.W.

Licensee of Indian Point Washington, D.C. 20036 Unit 2 (202) 466-7000 4 Irving Place New York, New York 10003 Stephen L. Baum (212) 460-4600 General Counsel Charles M. Pratt Assistant General Counsel POWER AU1HORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Licensee of Indian Point Unit 3 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 '

(212) 397-6200 Bernard D. Fischman Michael Curley Richard F. Czaja David H. Pikus SHEA & GOULD 330 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10017 (212) 370-8000 Dated: February 6, 1984

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CERTIFICATE CF SERVICE I hereby certify that on the 6th day of February,1984, I ca,b' sed a 4 FEB -a ;:o .53 ' ' '

ccpy of Licensees' Cannents On The Recarmendations of The Indian Point

.J Special Proceeding Licensing Board to be served by first class maik,[g,.,, ER,U; d', , ,

postage prepaid, on:

Nunzio J. Palladino, Chainnan Docketirq and Service Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cannission Office of the Secretary Washirgton, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Carmission Washington, D.C. 20555 Victor Gilinsky, Cca:nissione'.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccanission Joan Holt, Project Director Washington, D.C. 20555 Indian Poit Project New York Public Interest Research Thanas M. Roberts, Camnissioner Grcup U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission 9 Murray Street Washington, D.C. 20555 New York, New York 10007 James K. Asselstine, Con:nissioner Jeffrey M. Blum, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Carmission New York University Law School Washington, D.C. 20555 423 Vanderbilt Hall 40 Washington Square South Frederick M. Bernthal, Cannissioner New York, New York 10012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission Washirgton, D.C. 20555 Charles J. Maikish, Esq.

Litigation Division Janns P. Gleason, Chair: nan The Port Authority of New York Administrative Judge and New Jersey Atanic Safety and Licensing Board One World Trade Center 513 Gilmoure Drive New York, New York 10048 Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 Charles M. Pratt, Esq.

Mr. Frederick J. Shen Stephen L. Baum, Esq.

Ad:ninistrative Judge Power Authcrity of the Atonic Safety and Licensing Board State of New York U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 10 Colu:nbus Circle Carmission New York, New York 10019 Washington, D.C. 20555 Janice Moore, Esq.

Dr. Oscar H. Paris Coursel for NRC Staff Administrative Judge Office of the L'xecutive Atonic Safety and Licensing Board Ingal Directcr U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclea; Regulatory Ccmnission Co nission Washington, D.C. 20555 washingten, D.C. 20555 l

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Brent L. Brandenburg, Esq. Renee Schwartz, Esq.

Assistant General Counsel Paul Chessin, Esq.

Consolidated Edison Company Laurens R. Schwartz, Esq.

' of New York, Inc. Margaret Oppel, Esq.

4 Irving Place Botein, Hays, Sklar and Hertzberg Nea York, New York 10003 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq.

William S. Jordan, III, Esq. Honorable Ruth W. Messinger Harinon and Weiss Member of the Council of the 1725 I Street, N.W., Suite 506 City of New York Washington, D.C. 20006 District #4 City Hall Charles A. Scheiner, Co-Chairperson New York, New York 10007 Westchester People's Action Coalition, Inc. Greater New York Council P.O. Box 488 on Energy hhite Plains, New York 10602 c/o Dean R. Corren, Director New York University Alan Latman, Esq. 26 Stuyvesant Street 44 Sunset Drive New York, New York 10003 Croton-On-Hudson, New York 10520 Joan Miles Ezra I. Bialik, Esq. Indian Point Coordinator Steve Leipzig, Esq. New York City Audubon Society Environmental Prote^ tion Bureau 71 West 23rd Street, Suite 1828 New York State Attorney New York, New York 10010 General's Office Two World Trade Center Richard M. Hartzman, Esq.

New York, New York 10047 torna Salzman Mid-Atlantic Representative Andrew P. O'Rourke Frtends of the Earth, Inc.

Westchester County Executive 208 West 13th Street 148 Martirie Avenue New York, New York 10011 hhite Plains, New York 10601 Stanley B. Klimberg, Esq.

Andrew S. Roffe, Esq. General Counsel New York State Assembly New York State Energy Office Albany, New York 12248 2 Rockefeller State Plaza Albany, New York 12223 Marc L. Parris, Esq.

Eric Thorsen, Esq. Atcmic Safety and Licensing County Attorney Board Panel County of Rockland U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11 New Hempstead Road Washington, D.C. 20555 New City, New York 10956 Atonic Safety and Licensin;;

Phyllis Rodriguez, Spokesperson Appeal Foard Panel Parents Concerned About Indian U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ca"raission Point Washington, D.C. 20555 P.O. Box 125 Croton-on-Hudson, New York 10520

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Honorable Richard L. Brodsky David R. Lewis, Esq.

Member of the Ccunty Legislature Atcmic Safety and Licensing Board Wstchester County Panel County Of fice Buildirg U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comtission hhite Plains, New York 10601 Washington, D.C. 20555 Zipporah S. Fleisher Michael D. Diederich, Jr. , Esq.

mst Branch Conservation Attorney-At-Law Association 11 South Highland Avenue (Route 9W) 443 Buena Vista Road Nyack, New York 10960 New City, New York 10956 Steven C. Sholly Mayor George V. Begany Union of Concerned Scientists Village of Buchanan 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

236 Tate Avenue Suite 1101 Buchanan, New York 10511 Washirgten, D.C. 20036 Judith Kessler, Coordinator Spence W. Perry Rockland Citizens for Safe Energy Office of General Counsel 300 Ncw He:~3tead Road Federal E:rergency Management igency New City, New York 10956 500 C Street, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20472 David H. Pikus, Esq.

Richard F. Czaja, Esq. Stewart M. Glass Shea & Gould Regional Counsel 330 Madison Avenue Roca 1349 New York, New York 10017 Federal Err.ergency Management Agency 26 Federal Plaza Arnanda Potterfield, Esq. New York, New York 10278 New York Public Interest Research Group Melvin Goldbarg 9 Murray Street, 3rd Floor Staf f Attorney New York, New York 10007 New York Public Interest Research Group Mr. Donald Davidoff 9 Murray Street Director, Radiolcgical Emergency New York, New York 10007 Preparedness Grcup Empire State Plaza Jonathan L. Levine, Esq.

Tower Building, am. 1750 P. O. Box 280 Albany, New York 12237 New City, New York 10958 Craig Kaplan, Esq.

Levinson, Mogulescu & Kaplan 9 East 40th Street New York, New York 10016

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