ML022380409
| ML022380409 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 07/29/2002 |
| From: | Pisano L Constellation Nuclear |
| To: | Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB |
| Conte R | |
| References | |
| 05000410/02-301 05000410/02-301 | |
| Download: ML022380409 (43) | |
Text
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Nine Mile Point 2 Scenario No. 2 Operating Test No. 1 Examiners: Candidates: SRO: Upgrade 1,2,3 RO: Instant 1,2,3 BOP: RO 1, 2, Surrogate Objectives: Evaluate candidates ability to perform routine operating tasks using normal, abnormal and emergency procedures while ensuring compliance with Technical Specifications.
The candidates will respond to the following events:
- 1. CRD pump trip
- 2. Recirculation FCV fail to full open position
- 3. RCIC steam leak in Reactor Building with a failure to isolate
- 4. Control rods fail to fully insert on a valid scram signal.
This scenario will be classified as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY (EAL 4.1.1)
Initial Conditions:
- 1. Reactor Startup in progress, currently at 50% reactor power and 80-100% rod line.
- 2. N2-OP-8 Section E, step 4.0 is being used to start the third 4 th Point Heater Drain pump and place it pumping forward.
Turnover:
- 1. Currently the Plant is at 50% reactor power and 80-100% rod line.
- 2. Continue Plant startup (N2-OP-101D, Section E, step 1.10), and place the third 4 'h Point Heater Drain pump in service and start pumping forward per N2-OP-8, Section E, step 4.0.
Event Malt. Type Event Description No. No.
1 N (BOP/SRO) Start HDL Pump 3 for pumping forward per N2-OP-8.
2 RD12A C (RO) "A" CRD pump trip - Electrical fault 3 R (RO) Raise Reactor Power to 70-75% using Reactor Recirculation FCVs.
4 RR49A C (RO/SRO) Recirculation FCV position indication failure causes FCV to open. (T.S. 3.4.1 Loop Flow Mismatch.) DER 2-2000-3 775 5 Overrides (SRO) MCC 302 Feeder Breaker to ICS*MOV128 trips open, (T.S.
3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valve Inoperable).
6 RC12, C (BOP/RO/SRO) RCIC Steam Leak with RCIC Failure to Isolate RC1 I requiring a manual scram. Minor Fuel Failure (3% over 2 minutes RXO 1 following scram) 7 RDI7A M (RO/BOP/SRO) One Group of 12 Control Rods stuck at position 04 RD07 and power < 4%. Emergency Blowdown is required due to high Reactor Building temperatures.
8 AD08C C (BOP/SRO) ADS/SRV PSV 126 fails to open during Emergency Blowdown due to Loss of N2 supply.
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO SCENARIO # 2 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 23 CRD PUMP TRIP/RCS FCV FAILURE/RCIC STEAM LEAK WITH STUCK RODS PREPARER Ai ý DATE _____t._()__
VALIDATED ____, _ý_tL__'__.__DATE .;i,- ::-
GEN SUPERVISOR ]-, . 7 7 OPS TRAINING )aX~j DATE OPERATIONS MANAGER UNIT 2 DATE CONFIGURATION CONTROL DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 60 minutes The scenario begins at 50% power during power ascension. The crew will continue the plant startup using normal operating procedures. Heater Drain Pumps will be lined up to pump forward prior to raising power.
The operating Control Rod Drive Pump will trip due to an electrical fault. The crew will implement the required actions of N2-SOP-30 and start the standby Control Rod Drive Pump. The crew will commence power ascension by raising Recirculation Flow System (RCS). As power is being raised, the RCS Flow Control Valve will experience a failure of the valve position components (RVDT) which results in an uncontrolled ramping open of the FCV. The operator will implement the actions of N2-SOP-08 to stop the valve motion by tripping the Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU). The power excursion results in a small amount of fuel failure, which results in elevated radiation levels later in the scenario. Tech Spec entry is required due to the RCS Loop Flow mismatch.
When conditions are stable, the circuit breaker for RCIC Steam Line Isolation valve trips open. This results in Primary Containment Isolation Valve inoperability. The crew will investigate the breaker trip. A steam leak will develop on the RCIC steam piping resulting in a rise in Reactor Building temperatures.
When the high temperature isolation setpoint is exceeded the crew will enter and execute N2-EOP-SC. A failure in the RCIC isolation circuit prevents manual and automatic isolation of the leaking steam line.
The crew will be required to manually initiate a reactor scram, based on the rising Reactor Building temperature. A group of 12 control rods will fail to fully insert. The crew will continue attempts to isolate the steam line and monitor the rising temperatures and radiation levels in the Reactor Building.
When more than one area temperature exceeds 212'F, the crew is required to perform an RPV Blowdown per N2-EOP-C2. The Blowdown is complicated by the post scram control rod positions and the inability to open all seven ADS valves.
SCENARIO # 2 -I- March, 2002
- 1. SIMULATOR SET UP IC Number: IC-15 50% reactor power and 74% rod line.
A. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. RD 12A, CRD Pump (P I A) Trip. F3
- c. RC 11, RCIC Isolation Failure Queued
- e. RD 17A, Partial Insertion of a Bank of Rods under Scram (L1),
triggered by the Mode Switch in the "shutdown" position. ET04
- f. RD071435, Control Rod 14-35 Stuck TD 30 sec ET04
- g. RD075031, Control Rod 50-31 Stuck TD 30 sec ET04
- h. RXO 1, Fuel Cladding Failure, 3% over 2 minutes, triggered by the Mode Switch in the "shutdown" position. ET04
- g. AD08C, ADS Valve N 2 Supply severed (MSS*PSV126) Queued
- 2. Remotes:
- a. NONE
- 3. Overrides:
- a. MOV 121, Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) - "OPEN" Queued
- b. MOV 128, Steam Supply Line Isolation (Inboard) - "OPEN" Queued
- c. MOV 128, Steam Supply Inboard Isolation INOP Amber - "ON" F4
- d. MOV 128, Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) Green - "OFF" F4
- e. MOV 128, Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) Red - "OFF" F4
- f. MOV 121, Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) Green - "ON",
triggered when alarm 601157 RB High Temperature actuates. ET02
- g. MOV 121, Not Fully OPEN, Amber - "ON",
triggered when alarm 601157 RB High Temperature actuates. ET02
- 4. Annunciators:
- a. AN601305, RCIC System Inoperable - "ON" F4
- b. AN601319, RCIC Valves Motor Overload - "ON" F4 SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
C. Equipment Out of Service
- 1. NONE D. Support Documentation
- 1. N2-OP-101D, Section E.l.10
- 2. N2-OP-08, Section E.4
- 3. RMR to raise power to 65% with Recirc flow E. Miscellaneous
- 1. Perform N2-OP-08 Section G. 1.0 to place Heater Drain Pump "C" back on Recirc, but leave Pump "A" and "B" pumping forward.
- 2. Yellow Rod Line Sign posted SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION SHIFT: -N -D DATE:
PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
0 Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SSS, ASSS, STA, CSO, CRE)
PART 1I: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
"* Shift Supervisor Log (SSS, ASSS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
"* CSO Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SSS, ASSS, STA)
"* Lit Control Room Annunciators 0 Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
0 Reactor Power = 50%
- Loadline = 74%
Plant start-up in progress per N2-OP- 101 D A & B Heater Drain Pumps are pumping forward.
Pump C is still on Recirc.
PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
Continue Plant startup (N2-OP-101D, Section E, step 1.10), and place the third 4th Point Heater Drain pump in service and start pumping forward per N2-OP-8, Section E.4.0.
THEN raise power to 65% with recirc flow PART IV: To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
"* Review new Clearances (SSS)
- Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
"* Shift Crew Composition (SSS/ASSS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SSS CRE ASSS E STA E CSO Other SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
III. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.0 Given conditions requiring an RPV Blowdown and all control rods not fully inserted the crew shall terminate and prevent all RPV injection sources (except CRD, RCIC and SLS) so that none inject between SRV opening (for blowdown) and reaching the MAFP, per N2-EOP-C2.
CT-2.0 Given conditions requiring an RPV Blowdown and all control rods not fully inserted the crew shall open SRVs to reduce reactor pressure below the MAFP (153 psig for 7 SRVs) per N2-EOP-C2.
CT-3.0 Given conditions requiring an RPV Blowdown and all control rods not fully inserted the crew shall restore and maintain RPV water level between
-42 inches (Fig Z, -57" @ 153 psig) and 202 inches when RPV pressure drops between 153 psig per N2-EOP-C5.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.0 Given the plant at 50% power during power ascension the crew will lineup the 4 t"Point Heater Drain Pumps to pump forward in accordance with N2 OP-8.
PO-2.0 Given an electrical fault trip of the operating Control Rod Drive Pump the crew will start the standby pump in accordance with N2-SOP-30.
PO-3.0 Given a failure (unexpected opening) of a Recirc Flow Control Valve (RCS FCV) that results in Jet Pump flow mismatch the crew will stabilize reactor power and Recirc Flow in accordance with N2-SOP-08 and comply with Technical Specifications.
PO-4.0 Given a circuit breaker trip on the RCIC Steam Line Containment Isolation Valve (ICS*MOV128), the crew will identify non compliance with Primary Containment Isolation Valve Tech Specs, investigate the cause of the breaker trip and initiate actions to restore Tech Spec compliance.
SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
PO-5.0 Given an unisolable steam leak in the Reactor Building the crew will attempt to isolate the leak and manually scram the reactor prior to any area exceeding 212TF per N2-EOP-SC.
PO-6.0 Given reactor power below 4% and a failure of one group of control rods to fully insert following a manual scram the crew will execute the actions of N2-EOP-C5 including inserting all control rods.
PO-7.0 Given an unisolable steam leak in the Reactor Building resulting in more than one area above 212TF and all rods not fully inserted, the crew will terminate and prevent RPV injection and open 7 SRVs to perform an RPV Blowdown per N2-EOP-C2.
PO-8.0 Given the plant in a condition requiring emergency classification, the SRO shall properly classify the event per EPP-EPIP-02.
PO-9.0 Given the plant with an RPV blowdown in progress and not all rods in, the crew will restore and maintain RPV level 160 to 200 inches using feedwater when RPV pressure drops below 153 psig.
SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
IV. INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTI NS Instructor - check all queued malfunctions, overrides and annunciators have remained active.
Once given shift turnover information, allow no more than five (5) minutes for the crew to perform a walk down of panels.
CREW
- Complete panel walk down and tests annunciators.
- SRO conducts pre-shift brief.
- Crew assumes the shift.
Begin Scenario. SRO PO-1.0 Event # 1 BOP Normal Evolution "* Directs BOP to place the third 4t" Point Heater Drain Pump in service per N2 OP-08, Section E.4.0
"* Conducts pre-evolution brief.
Role Play: As AO acknowledge the need to BOP PO 1.0 establish communication with the Control Room at
- Perform N2-OP-08, Section E.4.0 Panel 204. Wait about 2 minutes and report that - Dispatches an AO to 2CES you are stationed at Panel 204 and communications IPNL204 to monitor 4 th Point with the Control Room has been established. Heater Level AND maintain communication with the Control Room.
- Set 2HDL-LV4C auto setpoint thumbwheel to 36%
SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Open 2HDL-LV4C using controller in manual to match auto setpoint.
- Verify 2HDL-FV35C recirc valve closes as pump flow rises.
- Places 2HDL-LV4C controller in auto.
- Directs AO at IPNL204 to raise setpoint for 2HDL-LV24C to 67%.
- Report all 4 th Point Heater Drain Booth Operator Instruction: Pumps are pumping forward.
WHEN directed to raise 2HDL-LV24C setpoint to 67%, activate REMOTE:
FWI3C to 67%
Event #2 RO Component Failure RO Booth Operator Instruction:
- Identifies and reports the loss of When the last of the 4th Point Heater Drain Pumps is RDS-P1A.
pumping forward, insert the following malfunction:
RD12A, CRD Pump Trip (P1A) F3 CRD *P]A trips on instantaneousovercurrent.
Expected annunciators:
603308 CRD PUMP 1A/1B AUTO TRIP 603313 CRD PUMP 1A/1B MOTOR ELEC FAULT SRO PO-2.0 603311 CRD CHARGING WTR PRESSURE
- Direct entry into N2-SOP-30, LOW Section 4.2.
603446 CRD PUMPDISCH HEADER PRESSURE LOW SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE: Depending on the amount of time that no RO PO-2.0 CRD pump is operating, Annunciator
- Takes the actions of N2-SOP-30 to 603316, "Control Rod High Temperature" start the standby CRD Pump.
may be received at this time. - Determines that NO accumulators are inoperable.
- Shift RDS-FC107 Flow Controller to MAN
- Close FCV to 0%
- Determines pump trip was NOT caused by low suction pressure by observing Electric Fault trip annunciator
- Starts RDS -P1B
- Opens FCV to establish 63 gpm
- Shift RDS-FC107 to AUTO.
- Dispatches AO to RDS-P lA and/or the supply breaker.
Role Play: As AO wait about three minutes and RO report;"RDS-P 1A breaker is tripped with an "* Recognizes and reports the Control overcurrent flag." and/or"RDS-PlA motor is very Rod high temperature alarm.
hot to the touch." "* Dispatched an AO to monitor CRD temperatures.
Role Play: IF Annunciator 603316, "Control Rod SRO High Temperature" has actuated, as dispatched AO,
- Notifies Operations management of wait about three minutes report that the highest current conditions.
temperature is on rod 18-43 and ask the RO if the alarm is clear.
If it is NOT, report the temperature at 265°F.
If it IS, report the temperature at 239°F.
SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event #3 RO Reactivity Manipulation SRO After RDS-P lB is running and the Control Rod "* Obtains RMR for power change.
high temperature alarm is investigated and cleared "* Performs reactivity brief.
the CREW will continue the power ascension. "* Directs power ascension to continue by raising power to 65% with recirc flow.
Event #4 RO/SRO Component Failure RO Booth Operator Instruction:
- Raises Recirc Flow using Loop Flow AFTER RO Evaluator has determined power Controllers in Manual.
change was significant enough for evaluation AND the power ascension will continue, activate malfunction for the "A" Recirculation FCV by RO PO-3.0 depressing F6 key: " Recognize and respond to the "A" RR49A, FCV "A" RVDT coupling failure F6 FCV failure, using N2-SOP-08, Section 3.3 and 4.4.
After malfunction is entered, the next FCV demand - May attempt to stabilize flow by signal will cause the FCV to open fully regardless inputting a close signal to FCV of the demands that may be insertedby the RO. "A".
- Shutdown the HPU using P602 Recirc Loop "A "flow and reactorpower will rise. pushbutton When the FCV hydraulics are isolated ajetpump - Close outboard valves to isolate loop flow mismatch is likely to be occurring. hydraulic lines to the FCV.
If a "close" signal is inputted, the FCV will close to "* Report the "A" FCV failure to the minimum position and a power reduction SRO.
SR0 PO-3.0 Acknowledges RO report.
If flow is lowered due to the FCV failure, enters N2-SOP-29.
SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR A CTTONS PERAT R ACTI NS
"* Enters T.S. 3.4.1 for Loop Flow Mismatch
"* Determines loop flow mismatch is not within limits and declare loop not in operation.
Notifies I&C to investigate the cause of the "A" FCV failure.
Role Play:
As I&C, wait about five minutes and report that the failure of the "A" FCV was due to an RVDT failure.
It is NOT intended for the crew to place the alternate position indication system in service for this scenario.
Event #5 SRO Component Failure/Tech Spec Booth Operator Instruction:
When directed by the Lead Evaluator, insert the following overrides for ICS*MOV128 breaker trip, BOP by depressing F4 key: "* Recognizes and reports RCIC Inboard MOV*128, Steam Supply Line Isolation Isolation Valve failure.
(Inboard) - Green - "OFF" "* Dispatches AO to investigate breaker MOV*128, Steam Supply Line Isolation trip for MOV* 128.
(Inboard) - Red - "OFF" MOV*128, Steam Supply Inboard Isolation SRO PO-4.0 INOP Amber - "ON"
- Acknowledges BOP report.
AN601305, RCIC System Inoperable - "ON"
"* Refers to T.S. 3.6.1.3, Primary AN601319, RCIC Valve Motor Overload - "ON" Containment Isolation failure.
All on "F4"
" Determines penetration must be MOV*128 Steam Supply Line Isolation isolated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE
()PEP1A Tfl ACTJC'hJZ (Inboard) - "OPEN" Queued "* May enter Tech. Spec. 3.5.3 for RCIC inoperable.
"* Requests I&C assistance.
Role Play: When dispatched by the BOP, ask for panel and breaker numbers.
Wait two (2) minutes and report breaker in the tripped condition. "No cause is apparent."
Event #6 Major Transient Booth Operator Instruction:
After Tech Specs are reviewed by the SRO for BOP MOV* 128 failure, insert the following malfunction: "* Check DRMS to determine RB RC12, RCIC Steam Leak in Reactor Building, HVR*RE32A/B alarming.
25% over 10 minute ramp F5 "* Verify RB Ventilation System isolates and GTS starts.
Expected Annunciators:
"* When directed, evacuates the reactor 852254 ProcessAirborne Rad Monitor Activated Building.
"* Enters EOP-SC when HVR*RE32A/B exceed DRMS Red setpoint.
"* Directs RB evacuated.
60115 7- Reactor Building GeneralAreas Temperature High is received andRCIC Steam Line should isolate as temperature rises above 135 0F. WCS system isolates.
SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE CPFRATO1 A CTT NMQ WHEN 601157, Reactor Building General Areas Temperature High is received, Event Trigger ET02 activates: BOP MOV*121, Steam Supply Line Isolation "* Recognize and reports increasing area (Outboard) - Green - "ON" temperatures and high airborne MOV*121, Not Fully Open - Amber - "ON" radiation levels in the Reactor ET02 Building.
MOV*121 Steam Supply Line Isolation "* Confirms WCS and RHR isolation.
(Outboard) - "OPEN" Queued "* Reports failure of RCIC to (Prevents valve from closing) automatically isolate.
MOV*128 has no power and MOV*121 appears to
"* Monitors back panels for trending area be closing.
temperatures and radiation levels.
However, RCIC steam line pressurestay up and
"* Reports levels and trends to the SRO.
temperatures in the area are still rising.
Thus, no isolation of the RCIC Steam Line has occurred SRO
- Attempts to manually isolate the RCIC Steam Line by closing MOV* 121.
- Verifies Reactor Building Ventilation isolated, GTS, HVR*UC413B and all RB area unit coolers are running.
SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS First area temperature approaches212 'F. BOP Recognizes and reports the failure of the manual isolation of the RCIC Steam Line.
Event #7 Crew Component Failure SRO PO-5.0 Placing the Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN position "* Recognizes that a "primary system" is will trigger the following malfunctions: discharging into the Reactor Building.
RD17A, Partial Insertion of a Bank of Rods "* Direct a manual scram and entry into under Scram (Li), final value of "04" N2-SOP- 101 C, before any area RD071435, Control Rod 14-35 Stuck exceeds 212'F.
RD075031, Control Rod 50-31 Stuck
"* Enters N2-EOP-RPV.
RX01, Fuel Cladding failure, 3% over 2 minutes.
ET04 RO PO-5.0
"* Places the Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN.
"* Recognizes and reports that NOT all control fully inserted
- Reports reactor power, pressure and water level.
SRO PO-6.0 6 Enters N2-EOP-C5
- Directs BOP to inhibit ADS and place HPCS in PTL
- Directs RO to initiate RRCS per N2-EOP-6, Attachment 13
- May direct MSIV Low Level SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Booth Operator Instruction: isolations bypassed per N2-EOP-6, IF MSIV Low Level isolations are directed to be Attachment 10.
bypassed MANUALLY enter the following - Assigns RPV water level and REMOTE functions: pressure bands.
MS06A, Defeat Level 1 Isolation, Defeated MS06B, Defeat Level 1 Isolation, Defeated BOP MS06C, Defeat Level 1 Isolation, Defeated "* Inhibits ADS using keylock switches.
MS06D, Defeat Level 1 Isolation, Defeated "* Places HPCS Pump switch in PTL.
"* Manually initiates RRCS by arming and depressing RRCS pushbuttons.
"* Reports control rods are still NOT fully inserted, but Reactor power is less than 4% and lowering.
IF RO drives control rods per N2-EOP-6 4, rods 14-35 and 50-31 are stuck at position 04. This ensures RPV Blowdown is performed in the all rods not full in leg of EOP-C2.
IF rods are not driven until after the blowdown, delete RD07 14-35 and RD07 50-3 1, to allow all rods to be fully inserted.
SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATO ACTIONS Booth Operator Instruction:
WHEN directed by the Lead Evaluator to ensure 2"' BOP area temperature reaches 212'F, activate
- Reports second area temperature above malfunction by depressing F7 key: 212'F to the SRO.
RC12, RCIC Steam Leak in Reactor Building 30% F7 The second area temperature exceeds 212 'F.
SRO PO-7.0
"* Acknowledges BOP report of second area temperature above 212 0 F.
"* Enters and executes N2-EOP-C2.
- Directs RO and BOP to terminate and prevent all injection to the RPV, except CRD, RCIC and SLS.
- After RPV injection is terminated and prevented, directs BOP to open seven (7) ADS/SRVs.
RO CT-1.0
- Terminates and prevents injection from ECCS systems as follows:
- Manually initiates Div 1 and 2 RHR logic
- Overrides closed CSL and 3 RHR SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS system Injection Valves
- Places CSL and RHR "C" pumps in PTL.
Event #8 BOP/SRO Component Failure BOP CT-2.0 The queued malfunction: "* Attempts to open seven (7) ADS /
AD08C, ADS Valve N2 supply severed. Queued SRVs by arming and depressing will prevent one of the ADS / SRV's from opening. both divisions of ADS logic.
"* Recognizes and reports failed ADS /
"* Acknowledges the failed ADS / SRV.
"* Directs BOP to open a non-ADS /
SRV so that the total open relief valves is seven (7).
BOP CT-2.0 0 Opens a non-ADS / SRV using keylock switch.
0 Reports seven (7) SRVs are open.
SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS RO CT-3.0 Reactor Pressureis lowering. "* Reports when RPV pressure drops Reactor BuildingArea Temperature level out and below 153 psig.
start to lower "* When directed, commences injection Suppression Pool temperature is risingbut by opening FWS- LV10s to restore controlled and maintain level above -42 inches.
SRO CT-3.0, PO-9.0
- When RPV pressure drops below 153 psig directs injection to restore and maintain level between -42 inches and 202 inches (CT-3.0) with a target of 160 - 200 inches (PO-9.0).
NOTE: If control rods are not yet being driven in, ensure EOP-6 Attachment 14 is continuing at this point in the scenario.
"* Performs N2-EOP-6, Attachment 14, Alternate Control Rods Insertion, Sections 3.3 Additional Manual Scrams AND/OR 3.5 Manual Control Rod Insertion (by driving rods) concurrently:
"* Additional Manual Scrams
- Directs ARI interlocks defeated by pulling ARI fuses.
- Directs RPS defeated by installing RPS jumpers.
- After ARI fuses are pulled and SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPER ATR ACTI IJq RPS jumpers are installed resets RPS logic and verifies eight white RPS solenoid lights are lit Booth Operator Instruction: - Verify SDV Vent and Drain valves After RPS is reset, delete malfunction RD17A to are open.
allow control rods to fully insert when a manual - Waits until SDV is drained before scram signal is inserted. Also verify stuck rod inserting a manual scram using malfunctions RD071435 and RD075031, Control pushbuttons.
Rod Stuck are removed RO Manual Control Rod Insertion:
- Starts 2 nd CRD Pump
- Places CRD FCV in MAN and fully opens valve.
- Fully closes Drive Pressure Control Valve to raise drive pressure.
- Bypasses RWM using key.
- Begins driving control rods.
Termination Cue:
"* RPV Blowdown is completed. SRO PO-8.0
"* Reactor Building temperatures are lowering.
- Classify this event as a SITE AREA
"* RPV water level is restored and maintained EMERGENCY (EAL 4.1.1) above -42 inches
"* All rods are fully inserted SRO Candidate Evaluator:
After simulator is placed in FREEZE, ask the SRO Candidate to classify the event.
SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE (Not required for Annual and Initial Operating Exams.)
VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events
- 1. None B. Commitments
- 1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED SCENARIO # 2 July 2002
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Nine Mile Point 2 Scenario No. 3 Operating Test No. 1 Examiners: Candidates: SRO: Instant 1,2,3 RO: ROI,2, Surrogate BOP: Upgrade 1,2,3 Objectives: Evaluate candidates ability to perform routine operating tasks using normal, abnormal and emergency procedures while ensuring compliance with Technical Specifications. The candidates will respond to the following events:
- 1. APRM #2 fails upscale
- 2. Standby Gas Train "B" Fan trip during testing.
- 3. Emergency Shutdown of Reactor Feedwater Pump "B".
- 4. Inadvertent RCIC Initiation.
- 5. Loss of Offsite Power Line 5 with Diesel Generator failure.
This scenario will be classified as an ALERT (EAL 3.1.1)
Initial Conditions:
- 1. 100% Power Above 100% Rod Line (IC-20)
Turnover:
- 1. 100% Power Above 100% Rod Line
- 2. MFLCPR is 0.95
- 3. Unidentified Drywell leakage has risen from 0.1 gpm to higher value in the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- 4. Perform Monthly 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> run surveillance for Standby Gas Train "B".
Event Malf. Type Event Description No. No.
1 N (BOP/SRO) Standby Gas Train "B" 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> run surveillance 2 NMIl B I (RO) APRM # 2 fails high requiring manual bypass 3 PC04B C (BOP/SRO) Standby Gas Train "B" Fan trip during surveillance.
T.S. 3.6.4.3, Seven day Required Action A. 1 4 Field C (BOP) Feedwater Pump "B" Emergency Shutdown due to Report excessive seal leakage.
5 R (RO) Emergency Power Reduction using Cram Rods and Recirc Flow for Feedwater Pump Shutdown 6 RC10 C (BOP) Inadvertent RCIC Injection to the Reactor.
7 ED02A C (BOP/RO/SRO) Loss of Line 5, EDG-1 fails to auto start DG02A requiring a manual scram with concurrent small break LOCA.
8 FW01B M (RO/SRO) Loss of Feedwater due to degraded power. NPS Overrides SWG-001 fails to transfer to Line 6 following Generator trip.
RR20 Small LOCA occurs during scram.
9 CS02 C (BOP/SRO) HPCS fails to automatically start.
10 CS05 C (BOP) HPCS Pump trip after manually starting and injecting.
I NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO SCENARIO # 3 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 28 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP SHUTDOWN/RCIC SPURIOUS INITIATION/LOSS OF HIGH PRESSURE FEED/SMALL LOCA PREPARER X 4LDATE k l VALIDATED DATE GEN SUPERVISOR
/Iv) ~I OPS TRAINING & Z1 ios g0( ' DATE *A /s OPERATIONS MANAGER UNIT 2 DATE 1/36Z CONFIGURATION CONTROL DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 75 minutes The crew will perform a scheduled surveillance on Standby Gas Train "B". APRM #2 will fail upscale, requiring bypassing of the failed instrument. After APRM#2 is bypassed, the Standby Gas Fan lB will trip. The SRO will enter Tech Specs for the inoperable GTS Train.
A report from the Turbine Building that Feedwater Pump "B" seal leak is worsening will prompt the crew to perform a Rapid Power Reduction by inserting Cram Rods and reducing Recirc Flow. Cram rod insertion is required because MFLCPR is above 0.93. Following the power reduction, the crew will perform an Emergency Shutdown of Feedwater Pump "B".
When conditions are stable, RCIC spuriously initiates. The crew will be required to stop RCIC injection within 4 minutes to prevent an automatic trip of the Main Turbine. For this scenario, if the crew does not stop RCIC injection in time, the RCIC turbine will automatically trip. This will ensure the remainder of the scenario runs as intended for candidate evaluations. When RCIC injection is stopped, a Loss of Offsite Line 5 occurs and the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator fails to start. This results in a required manual scram.
Following the manual scram, NPS-SWGOOI fails to transfer to Line 6. A loss of all Feedwater pumps results due to the degraded electrical sources. The crew will be required to control reactor water level with the High Pressure Core Spray (CSH) Pump. The CSH Pump will require a manual start to maintain level above TAF, due to a failure of the pump to automatically start. A small LOCA occurs resulting in a loss of inventory and the need for Drywell Spray.
After High Pressure Core Spray (CSH) injection is initiated, the High Pressure Core Spray (CSH) Pump will trip on an electrical fault. This results in a loss of all High Pressure Injection. The Crew will determine that RPV level cannot be maintained above TAF and execute the Alternate Level Control steps of N2-EOP-RPV. The Crew will then restore and maintain level above TAF by performing an RPV Blowdown and injecting with a Low Pressure Injection source.
- C
-7 SCENARIO # 3 -I- March, 2002
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. NMI 1B, APRM "B" Channel Failure Upscale F3
- b. RC10, RCIC Spurious Initiation TRA :30 F4
- c. RC06, RCIC turbine trip TUA 3:50 F4
- d. PC04B, Standby Gas Treatment Train lB Fan Trip F6
- e. DG02A, Diesel Generator #1 Trip F7
- f. ED02A, Loss of offsite Line #5 F7
- g. RR20, DBA LOCA, 8% over 7 minute ramp Triggered when the Mode Switch is placed in "SHUTDOWN" ET01
- h. FW0 1B, "B" Condensate Pump Trip Triggered when the Mode Switch is placed in "SHUTDOWN" ET01
- i. CS02, High Pressure Core Spray Auto Start Failure Queued
- j. CS05, High Pressure Core Spray Pump Trip TD 30 seconds ET03 Triggered when CSH*P1 Pump red light is ON, after control switch is placed in START
- k. EG15A, No Transfer To Reserve Power SWG001 Queued
- 2. Remotes:
None
- 3. Overrides:
None
- 4. Annunciators:
None C. Equipment Out of Service None D. Support Documentation N2-OSP-GTS-MOO1, Attachment 3, completed to step 7.3.1 E. Miscellaneous Post White "MFLCPR > 0.93" sign at P603 SCENARIO # 3 July 2002
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION SHIFT: -N -D DATE:
PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
PART Ih: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
"* Shift Supervisor Log (SSS, ASSS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
"* CSO Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SSS, ASSS, STA)
"* Lit Control Room Annunciators 0 Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
- Reactor Power 100%
- Loadline = >100%
MFLCPR is 0.95 Unidentified Drywell leakage has risen from 0.1 gpm to current reading in the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
Continue N2-OSP-GTS-MOO 1, Attachment 3, GTS Filter Train lB Functional Test (10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> Run)
PART IV: To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
"* Review new Clearances (SSS)
- Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
"* Shift Crew Composition (SSS/ASSS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SSS CRE ASSS E STA E CSO Other SCENARIO # 3 July 2002
III. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.0 Given a loss of all Feedwater Pumps following a reactor scram and a failure of High Pressure Core Spray (CSH) to automatically start the crew will manually start CSH and establish RPV injection.
CT-2.0 Given a loss of all high pressure injection and RPV level at TAF, the crew will initiate RPV Blowdown (enter EOP-C2) BEFORE level reaches MSCWL, -42 inches (Fig Z, -55" @ 800 psig) and opens seven SRVs.
CT-3.0 Given a loss of all high pressure injection and the RPV depressurizing, the crew will restore and maintain RPV water level between 159.3 and 202.3 while preventing RPV level from exceeding 255 inches, with at least one Low Pressure Injection system per the Alternate Level Control steps of N2-EOP-RPV.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.0 Given N2-OSP-GTS-M001 for routine performance, the crew will continue the surveillance test on Standby Gas Train "B" in accordance with applicable sections of N2-OSP-GTS-M001.
PO-2.0 Given APRM #2 failing upscale during power operation the crew will identify the failed instrument, bypass APRM #2 per N2-OP-92 and ensure compliance with Technical Specifications.
PO-3.0 Given a report from the Turbine Building that Feedwater Pump "B" seal is degrading, the crew will perform a Rapid Power Reduction by inserting cram rods and reducing Recirc Flow per N2-SOP-101 D, prior to performing an Emergency Shutdown of Feedwater Pump "B", per N2 SOP-06.
PO-4.0 Given a RCIC system spurious initiation, the crew will take actions to terminate RCIC injection into the reactor vessel in accordance with 601347 annunciator response.
SCENARIO #3 July 2002
PO-5.0 Given a Loss of Line #5 and failure of Division I Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to start resulting in a loss of Service Water, the crew will implement the actions of N2-SOP-03, N2-SOP- 11 and perform a manual reactor scram.
PO-6.0 Given a reactor coolant leak into the Drywell the crew will control Primary Containment parameters by entering and executing N2-EOP-PC.
PO-7.0 Given the plant in a condition requiring emergency classification, the SRO shall properly classify the event per EPP-EPIP-02.
SCENARIO # 3 July 2002
IV. INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Instructor - check all queued malfunctions, overrides and annunciators have remained active.
Once given shift turnover information, allow no more than five (5) minutes for the crew to perform a walk down of panels.
CREW
"* Complete panel walk down and tests annunciators.
"* SRO conducts pre-shift brief.
"* Crew assumes the shift.
Begin Scenario. SRO PO-1.0 Event #1 BOP Normal Evolution "* Directs BOP to perform the Standby Gas Treatment "B" System Functional Role Play: As Turbine Building AO on Rounds, Test, "B" Train, N2-OSP-GTS-M001, report that a small seal leak has developed on Attachment 3.
Feedwater Pump "B". The water stream leaking "* Conducts pre-evolution brief.
from the seal is about the diameter of a pencil.
BOP PO-1.0
"* Reviews N2-OSP-GTS-MOO1, Standby Gas Treatment System Functional Test, Attachment 3.
"* Obtain SRO permission to perform the test.
" Establish communication between the Control Room and the GTS Filter Train lB.
SCENARIO # 3 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS OPERATO ACTI NS Request AO check:
- 2GTS*CH1B heater "LOW AIR FLOW" green light energized at Panel 30B.
- Timed reading at Panel 102 in the south Auxiliary Bay.
Role Play: As AO, report the following conditions exist locally; 2GTS*CH1B heater "LOW AIR FLOW" green light is energized at Panel 30B. BOP PO-1.0 Timer reading at Panel 102 - 3430 hrs. "* Start 2GTS*FLT1B
"* Observe the following at P871:
Queue: NO additional sampling is required - SBGTS TRAIN B INITIATION at this time. red indicating light energized.
- SBGTS FAN 2GTS*FN1B red indicating light energized.
- GTS*MOV1B, INLET FROM RX BLDG VENTILATION, open.
- GTS*AOV2B, TRAIN B INLET VLV, open.
- GTS*AOV3B, FAN 1B DISCH ISOL LV, open.
Role Play: As AO, report the following " Request AO at Panel 30B check:
conditions exist locally at Panel 30B: - 2GTS*CH1B Heater "ON" red 2GTS* CH 1B Heater "ON" red indicating light indicating light energized.
is energized. - 2GTS*CH1B Heater "LOW 2GTS*CH 1B Heater "LOW AIRFLOW" green AIRFLOW" green indicating light indicating light is de-energized. de-energized.
SCENARIO # 3 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS OPERAT ACTI NS 2GTS
- CHI 1B Heater "OVERTEMPERATURE" - 2GTS*CHlB Heater green indicating light is de-energized. "OVERTEMPERATURE" green indicating light de-energized.
BOP Notify SRO GTS Train 1B has been started per N2-OSP-GTS-MOO1.
Event #2 RO Instrument Failure RO PO-2.0 Booth Operator Instruction: "* Reports and responds to alarms.
When SRO acknowledges GTS Train 1B is - Determine APRM #2 has alarmed running, insert malfunction - Check other APRM Channels to NM11B, APRM B Channel Failure upscale verify no scram should have F3 occurred.
"* Check back panels for additional Expected Annunciators: indications/information.
603202 - APRM Trip System UPSCALE/INOP "* Enter N2-OP-92, Neutron Monitoring, 603208 - APRM Trip System UPSCALE and bypass the affected APRM using 603442 - Control Rod OUT BLOCK Section H.2.0.
- Verify no other APRM in bypass
- Place APRM bypass joystick to APRM # 2 position.
- Verify APRM # 2 bypass light on P603 is "lit"
- Verify "BYP" is displayed in inverse video on APRM # 2 Chassis (P608)
- Verify "blue" BYPASSED LED on 2/4 Module is lit (P608)
SCENARIO # 3 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 0 Reset the 2/4 Module per N2-OP-92, Section F.8.0
- Depress "TRIP MEMORY RESET" pushbutton (P608)
- Verify all red and yellow LED's are extinguished.
SRO PO-2.0
"* Acknowledges RO report of "APRM and Rod Block" annunciators.
"* Directs I&C be contacted to investigate and troubleshoot APRM #2
"* Consults Technical Specifications to determine minimum required channels.
- T.S. 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1
- NO action required at this time Event #3 BOP/SRO Component Failure/Tech Spec BOP PO-3.0 Booth Operator Instruction:
- Reports and responds to alarms.
When the SRO completes the crew update, activate - Verify Fan 1B tripped malfunction, by depressing F6 key: - Verify GTS*AOV2B and 3B are PC04B, Standby Gas Train Fan 1B Trip F6 closed.
Annunciator 871125, SBGTS Fan 1B Auto Trip/Fail To Start SRO Refers to Tech Spec 3.6.4.3, Restore in Seven day Required Action A. 1 SCENARIO # 3 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATC)R ACTIflNo, Event #4 BOP Component Failure RO After GTS Tech Spec is reviewed: "* Acknowledge the AO's report.
Role Play: As an AO call the Control Room and "* Relay status of "B" Feedwater Pump report that the "B" Feedwater Pump seal leak has seal to the SRO.
gotten worse. Steam is starting to blow out from the seal. Report that you are leaving the area because it looks like the seal will start blowing more steam at any minute.
"* Acknowledges RO report.
"* Directs RO to perform Rapid Power Reduction per N2-SOP- 101 D
"* Directs BOP to perform an Emergency Shutdown of Feedwater Pump "B" per N2-SOP-06.
"* Requests assistance from Maintenance.
Event #5 RO Reactivity Manipulation RO
"* Enters N2-SOP-101D
- Begins reduction in Reactor Power using Recirculation Flow Controls Role Play: As the AO acknowledge that you are - Inserts 1st four Cram Rods before standing by in a safe location and that you will reducing power below 75%
check out the "B" Feedwater pump once it is "* Lowers power to about 60% to 65%.
secured and the seal quits blowing steam.
SCENARIO # 3 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS OPER-AT R ACTIONS BOP
- Performs Emergency Feedwater Pump Shutdown per N2-SOP-06, Step 4.5 after power is reduced.
- Places FWS-P IB control switch to STOP
- Verify Aux LO Pump started.
- Confirm RPV level is controlled between 178 inches and 187 inches.
- Places LV OB controller to Manual and closes LV lOB Role Play: As AO report Feedwater Pump "B" Aux - Closes FWS-MOV47B Disch Lube Oil pump control switch is in START and the Valve.
pump is running. - Dispatches AO to place Aux Lube Oil Pump control switch to start.
Booth Operator Instruction: - Dispatches AO to remove When directed to remove Cond Demins from Condensate Demineralizers from service, MANUALLY activate REMOTE service, as required for the reduced FW01A, Cond Demineralizer A, OFF power level.
FW01B, Cond Demineralizer B, OFF FW01C, Cond Demineralizer C, OFF Role Play: As AO report three Cond Demins were CREW removed from service. Five Demins are in service
- Notifies Fire Dept and RP of steam and conditions are satisfactory. leak from feed pump.
Event #6 BOP Component Failure Booth Operator Instruction:
When conditions are stable and all notifications and SCENARIO # 3 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS crew updates are complete, activate the following malfunctions, using F4 key:
RC10, RCIC Spurious Initiation (TRA 30 sec)
RC06, RCIC turbine trip (TUA 3:50) F4 Plant response.
RCIC initiates and injects.
CREW PO-4.0
- Identifies and reports RCIC is injecting
- Identifies that reactor vessel level is in normal band.
Booth Operator: BOP IF contacted, trip unit E5 1-N656E, high exhaust
- Refers to 2CEC*PNL601 for pressure is only unit in tripped condition. annunciator 601347.
SRO Directs reset of RCIC logic or shutting of 21CS*MOV126 to stop injection.
BOP Four minutes after RCIC initiates,the turbine will "* Secures RCIC injection as directed by trip to maintain the scenarioon the plannedpath. the SRO and the annunciator response.
"* Identifies and reports RCIC trip (if not manually tripped).
- Refers to Tech Spec 3.5.3, Verifies HPCS is Operable - Action Al SCENARIO # 3 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Restore in 14 days - Action A2 Event #7 Major Transient Booth Operator Instruction:
When RCIC injection has been terminated, insert the following remote/malfunctions using F7 key:
ED02A, Loss of Offsite Line 5, True F7 DG02A, Diesel Generator #1 Trip BOP PO-5.0 Plant Response: "* Determine 2ENS*SWG1O1 has lost Emergency Bus 101 trips and remains de power, and Division I Diesel energized. Generator has failed to start.
Division J Service Water Pumps trip. " Dispatches an AO to Division I Diesel Division II Service Water Non Essential MOVs Generator to investigate.
close, resulting in loss of Service Water. " Verify Service Water flow to RHR Division I RHR and LPCS systems are lost. heat exchanger "B" by;
- Verifying open 2SWP*MOV90B, and
- Throttle open 2SWP*MOV33B until flow through the heat exchanger is > 3,000 gpm.
Role Play: As AO acknowledge that you are on BOP your way to Division I Diesel Generator.
- Verifying SWP Division II non essentials are isolating by verifying the following valves are closing;
- 2SWP*MOV19B
- 2SWP*MOV93B
- 2SWP*MOV3B SCENARIO # 3 - July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Throttle running Service Water Pump discharge valves to maintain pump flows < 10,000 gpm as required.
CREW PO-5.0
"* Enter N2-SOP-03, Loss of AC Power, Section D. 1.7.
"* Enter N2-SOP-i 1, Loss of Service Water.
SRO PO-5.0
"* Direct a manual scram be inserted per N2-SOP-03, Loss of AC Power, Section D. 1.7, and
"* Enter N2-SOP-1 1, Section 3.2.
Event #8 Component Failure BOP PO-5.0 Booth Operator Instruction: 0 Enters N2-SOP-03, Section D. 1.7 When Mode Switch is in SHUTDOWN, verify both - Trips Main Turbine malfunctions active from ET01: - Trips Reactor Recirculation Pumps RR20, RR Loop Rupture - DBA LOCA at 8% - Trips WCS Pumps ramped in over seven (7) minutes, and FW01B, Condensate Pump Trip P1B. RC PO-5.0
- Manually SCRAM the Reactor by placing the mode switch in "SHUTDOWN".
- Enters N2-SOP-101C
- Reports RPV level, pressure, APRMs downscale and "all rods in".
SCENARIO # 3 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Feedwater Pump "A " trips when NPS-SWGO01
- Reports loss of the Condensate Pump
./ails to transfer to offsite power.
and the imminent loss of Feedwater.
SRO PO-5.0 0 Enters N2-EOP-RPV when level is below 159 inches.
RO Drywell pressure begins to rise and is trending up
- Reports loss of Feedwater.
toward 1.68 psig.
- Monitors Reactor power, water level and pressure and takes action as directed.
Reports Drywell pressure above 1.68 psig Drywell pressure exceeds 1.68 psig. Division II Low PressureECCS start.High Pressure Core Spray initiationsignal is received, but CSH Pump Jails to automaticallystart.
SRO PO-6.0
- Enters N2-EOP-PC when Drywell Pressure exceeds 1.68 psig Containmentpressure and temperature are still
- Directs Suppression Chamber Spray rising.Reactor Vessel water level is lowering
- Directs Drywell Coolers restored.
faster.
- Directs RPV Water level restored above 159 inches with CSH Pump.
July 2002 SCENARIO # 3
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS BOP CT-1.0
"* Verifies Division II RHR initiation signal is received.
- RHR Pump "B" and RHR Pump "C" sequence on.
"* Verifies and reports CSH failure to start.
- When directed, manually starts CSH Pump and confirms injection.
Event #9 BOP Component Failure - Coordinates RPV level control with the RO, by manually starting and stopping CSH Pump.
"* Acknowledges failure of CSH to automatically start.
"* Directs manual start of CSH as required to maintain RPV level above 159 inches.
Event #10 BOP Component Failure Thirty seconds after the CSH Pump has been BOP manually started malfunction will activate: "* Reports CSH trip on electrical fault CS05, High Pressure Core Spray Pump Trip and will not restart.
ET03 "* Dispatched AO to investigate CSH.
SRO CSH trips on an electricalfault and cannot be "* Acknowledges CSH failure.
restarted.RPV level is lowering. "* Determines RPV water level cannot be SCENARIO # 3 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS maintained above -18 inches.
When water level drops below 17.8 inches (Level a Directs:
1), ADS Timers will initiate, MSIVs close. - ADS to be inhibited
- Maximizing injection using all preferred injection systems. (CRD is the only one still available for high pressure injection.)
- Use of "Alternate Injection Systems" as needed.
)- SLS Boron Injection from Boron Tank or Test Tank
- Directs either RHR Loop "B" lined up for injection per EOP-6, Attachment 30. OR RHR "B" in the LPCI mode.
RPV water level drops to -18 inches (TAF)
SRO CT-2.0
"* Directs:
Suppression Chamber Pressure exceeds 10 psig. - At least two (2) low pressure subsystem are aligned for injection.
)- RHR "C"
- RHR "B" Booth Operator Instruction: " Prior to RPV level lowering to -42 When directed to defeat Group 5 Isolation per EOP inches, enter N2-EOP-C2, RPV 6 Attachment 30, MANUALLY INSERT Blowdown and perform MALFUNCTION RH08, Group 5 Isolation concurrently.
Failure " Specify new RPV level bands as necessary.
SCENARIO # 3 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS BOP
"* Inhibits ADS using keylock switches.
"* If directed, initiates SLS injection BOP
- If directed Performs EOP-6 NOTE: Crew may chose to line up RHR "B" for Attachment 30 injection per N2-EOP-6 Att. 30. OR - Closes SC Spray Valve RHR "B" in the LPCI mode RHS*MOV33B, if open.
- Defeats Group 5 Isolation
- Waits for RPV Pressure to drop below 350 psig If directed, initiates SLS injection either from Boron Tank or Test Tank BOP CT-2.0
"* Open seven (7) ADS/SRV's by arming and depressing both division ADS Manual Initiation pushbuttons at P601.
"* When RPV pressure drops below 350 psig, verifies injection (if using EOP-6 Suppression Chamber PressureapproachesPSP Attachment 30). CT-3.0 EOP-PCFig L (about 17psig at 200foot Pool "* Restore and maintain RPV level in water level).
specified band (159.3 to 202.3, not to exceed 255 inches) using RHR "B" and/or RHR "C".
SCENARIO # 3 July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO
- Direct Drywell sprays WHEN Suppression Chamber Pressure exceeds 10 psig using RHR Loop "B" only after adequate core cooling assured by maintaining water level above TAF.
- Directs Drywell coolers tripped
- Directs RCS Pumps tripped
- Verifies Drywell pressure and temperature are within Fig K of EOP-PC.
- When directed, verifies RCS Pumps have tripped and Drywell Unit Coolers are tripped prior to initiating DW Sprays BOP PO-6.0 Initiates Suppression Chamber and Drywell Sprays as required.
SCENARIO # 3I July 2002
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Termination Cue:
- RPV level restored and controlled above 159.3 inches.
- Drywell Sprays are in progress (or were previously in service and secured to establish injection).
SRO Candidate Evaluator:
After simulator is placed in FREEZE, ask the SRO SRO PO-7.0 Candidate to classify the event. Classify this event as an "Alert",
EAL 3.1.1.
SCENARIO # 3 July 2002
V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE (Not required for Annual and Initial Operating Exams.)
VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events
- 1. None B. Commitments
- 1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED SCENARIO # 3 July 2002