ML022380409

Final - Section C Operating

ML022380409
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	07/29/2002
From:	Pisano L Constellation Nuclear
To:	Conte R NRC/RGN-I/DRS/OSB
Conte R
References
05000410/02-301 05000410/02-301
Download: ML022380409 (43)

Text

Scenario Outline Nine Mile Point 2 Scenario No. 2 Operating Test No. 1 Examiners:

Candidates: SRO:

Upgrade 1,2,3 RO: Instant 1,2,3 BOP: RO 1, 2, Surrogate Objectives:

Evaluate candidates ability to perform routine operating tasks using normal, abnormal and emergency procedures while ensuring compliance with Technical Specifications.

The candidates will respond to the following events:

1.

CRD pump trip

2.

Recirculation FCV fail to full open position

3.

RCIC steam leak in Reactor Building with a failure to isolate

4.

Control rods fail to fully insert on a valid scram signal.

This scenario will be classified as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY (EAL 4.1.1)

Initial Conditions:

1.

Reactor Startup in progress, currently at 50% reactor power and 80-100% rod line.

2.

N2-OP-8 Section E, step 4.0 is being used to start the third 4 th Point Heater Drain pump and place it pumping forward.

Turnover:

1.

Currently the Plant is at 50% reactor power and 80-100% rod line.

2.

Continue Plant startup (N2-OP-101D, Section E, step 1.10), and place the third 4 'h Point Heater Drain pump in service and start pumping forward per N2-OP-8, Section E, step 4.0.

Event Malt.

Type Event Description No.

No.

1 N

(BOP/SRO) Start HDL Pump 3 for pumping forward per N2-OP-8.

2 RD12A C

(RO) "A" CRD pump trip - Electrical fault 3

R (RO) Raise Reactor Power to 70-75% using Reactor Recirculation FCVs.

4 RR49A C

(RO/SRO) Recirculation FCV position indication failure causes FCV to open. (T.S. 3.4.1 Loop Flow Mismatch.) DER 2-2000-3 775 5

Overrides (SRO) MCC 302 Feeder Breaker to ICS*MOV128 trips open, (T.S.

3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valve Inoperable).

6

RC12, C

(BOP/RO/SRO) RCIC Steam Leak with RCIC Failure to Isolate RC1 I requiring a manual scram. Minor Fuel Failure (3% over 2 minutes RXO 1 following scram) 7 RDI7A M

(RO/BOP/SRO) One Group of 12 Control Rods stuck at position 04 RD07 and power < 4%. Emergency Blowdown is required due to high Reactor Building temperatures.

8 AD08C C

(BOP/SRO) ADS/SRV PSV 126 fails to open during Emergency Blowdown due to Loss of N2 supply.

Appendix D Form ES-D-1

NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO SCENARIO # 2 REV. 0 No. of Pages:

23 CRD PUMP TRIP/RCS FCV FAILURE/RCIC STEAM LEAK WITH STUCK RODS PREPARER Ai ý DATE

_____t._()__

VALIDATED

_ý_tL__'__.__DATE

.;i,-

GEN SUPERVISOR

]-,

7 7

OPS TRAINING

)aX~j DATE OPERATIONS MANAGER UNIT 2 DATE CONFIGURATION CONTROL DATE SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Length:

60 minutes The scenario begins at 50% power during power ascension. The crew will continue the plant startup using normal operating procedures. Heater Drain Pumps will be lined up to pump forward prior to raising power.

The operating Control Rod Drive Pump will trip due to an electrical fault. The crew will implement the required actions of N2-SOP-30 and start the standby Control Rod Drive Pump. The crew will commence power ascension by raising Recirculation Flow System (RCS). As power is being raised, the RCS Flow Control Valve will experience a failure of the valve position components (RVDT) which results in an uncontrolled ramping open of the FCV. The operator will implement the actions of N2-SOP-08 to stop the valve motion by tripping the Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU). The power excursion results in a small amount of fuel failure, which results in elevated radiation levels later in the scenario. Tech Spec entry is required due to the RCS Loop Flow mismatch.

When conditions are stable, the circuit breaker for RCIC Steam Line Isolation valve trips open. This results in Primary Containment Isolation Valve inoperability. The crew will investigate the breaker trip. A steam leak will develop on the RCIC steam piping resulting in a rise in Reactor Building temperatures.

When the high temperature isolation setpoint is exceeded the crew will enter and execute N2-EOP-SC. A failure in the RCIC isolation circuit prevents manual and automatic isolation of the leaking steam line.

The crew will be required to manually initiate a reactor scram, based on the rising Reactor Building temperature. A group of 12 control rods will fail to fully insert. The crew will continue attempts to isolate the steam line and monitor the rising temperatures and radiation levels in the Reactor Building.

When more than one area temperature exceeds 212'F, the crew is required to perform an RPV Blowdown per N2-EOP-C2. The Blowdown is complicated by the post scram control rod positions and the inability to open all seven ADS valves.

SCENARIO # 2

-I-March, 2002

1.

SIMULATOR SET UP IC Number:

IC-15 50% reactor power and 74% rod line.

A.

Presets/Function Key Assignments

1. Malfunctions:

a. RD 12A, CRD Pump (P I A) Trip.

F3

b. RR49A, FCV "A" RVDT Coupling Failure F6

c. RC 11, RCIC Isolation Failure Queued

d. RC12, RCIC Steam Leak in RB 215' Elevation, 25% ramp 10 minutes F5

e. RD 1 7A, Partial Insertion of a Bank of Rods under Scram (L1),

triggered by the Mode Switch in the "shutdown" position.

ET04

f. RD071435, Control Rod 14-35 Stuck TD 30 sec ET04

g. RD075031, Control Rod 50-31 Stuck TD 30 sec ET04

h. RXO 1, Fuel Cladding Failure, 3% over 2 minutes, triggered by the Mode Switch in the "shutdown" position.

ET04

g. AD08C, ADS Valve N 2 Supply severed (MSS*PSV126)

Queued

2. Remotes:

a. NONE

3. Overrides:

a. MOV 121, Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) - "OPEN" Queued

b. MOV 128, Steam Supply Line Isolation (Inboard) - "OPEN" Queued

c. MOV 128, Steam Supply Inboard Isolation INOP Amber - "ON" F4

d. MOV 128, Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) Green - "OFF" F4

e. MOV 128, Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) Red - "OFF" F4

f. MOV 121, Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) Green - "ON",

triggered when alarm 601157 RB High Temperature actuates.

ET02

g. MOV 121, Not Fully OPEN, Amber - "ON",

triggered when alarm 601157 RB High Temperature actuates.

ET02

4. Annunciators:

a. AN601305, RCIC System Inoperable - "ON" F4

b. AN601319, RCIC Valves Motor Overload - "ON" F4 SCENARIO # 2 July 2002

C.

Equipment Out of Service

1. NONE D.

Support Documentation

1. N2-OP-101D, Section E.l.10

2. N2-OP-08, Section E.4

3. RMR to raise power to 65% with Recirc flow E.

Miscellaneous

1. Perform N2-OP-08 Section G. 1.0 to place Heater Drain Pump "C" back on Recirc, but leave Pump "A" and "B" pumping forward.

2. Yellow Rod Line Sign posted SCENARIO # 2 July 2002

SHIFT:

- N

- D DATE:

PART I:

To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

0 Control Panel Walkdown (all panels)

(SSS, ASSS, STA, CSO, CRE)

PART 1I:

To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

"* Shift Supervisor Log (SSS, ASSS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)

"* CSO Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SSS, ASSS, STA)

"* Lit Control Room Annunciators 0

Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)

(SSS, ASSS, STA, CSO, CRE)

Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:

0 Reactor Power =

50%

Loadline =

74%

Plant start-up in progress per N2-OP-101 D A & B Heater Drain Pumps are pumping forward.

Pump C is still on Recirc.

PART III:

Remarks/Planned Evolutions:

Continue Plant startup (N2-OP-101D, Section E, step 1.10), and place the third 4th Point Heater Drain pump in service and start pumping forward per N2-OP-8, Section E.4.0.

THEN raise power to 65% with recirc flow PART IV:

To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:

"* Review new Clearances (SSS)

Test Control Annunciators (CRE)

"* Shift Crew Composition (SSS/ASSS)

TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SSS CRE ASSS E

STA E

CSO Other SCENARIO # 2 II.

SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION July 2002

III.

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A.

Critical Tasks:

CT-1.0 Given conditions requiring an RPV Blowdown and all control rods not fully inserted the crew shall terminate and prevent all RPV injection sources (except CRD, RCIC and SLS) so that none inject between SRV opening (for blowdown) and reaching the MAFP, per N2-EOP-C2.

CT-2.0 Given conditions requiring an RPV Blowdown and all control rods not fully inserted the crew shall open SRVs to reduce reactor pressure below the MAFP (153 psig for 7 SRVs) per N2-EOP-C2.

CT-3.0 Given conditions requiring an RPV Blowdown and all control rods not fully inserted the crew shall restore and maintain RPV water level between

-42 inches (Fig Z, -57" @ 153 psig) and 202 inches when RPV pressure drops between 153 psig per N2-EOP-C5.

B.

Performance Objectives:

PO-1.0 Given the plant at 50% power during power ascension the crew will lineup the 4t" Point Heater Drain Pumps to pump forward in accordance with N2 OP-8.

PO-2.0 Given an electrical fault trip of the operating Control Rod Drive Pump the crew will start the standby pump in accordance with N2-SOP-30.

PO-3.0 Given a failure (unexpected opening) of a Recirc Flow Control Valve (RCS FCV) that results in Jet Pump flow mismatch the crew will stabilize reactor power and Recirc Flow in accordance with N2-SOP-08 and comply with Technical Specifications.

PO-4.0 Given a circuit breaker trip on the RCIC Steam Line Containment Isolation Valve (ICS*MOV128), the crew will identify non compliance with Primary Containment Isolation Valve Tech Specs, investigate the cause of the breaker trip and initiate actions to restore Tech Spec compliance.

SCENARIO # 2 July 2002

PO-5.0 Given an unisolable steam leak in the Reactor Building the crew will attempt to isolate the leak and manually scram the reactor prior to any area exceeding 212TF per N2-EOP-SC.

PO-6.0 Given reactor power below 4% and a failure of one group of control rods to fully insert following a manual scram the crew will execute the actions of N2-EOP-C5 including inserting all control rods.

PO-7.0 Given an unisolable steam leak in the Reactor Building resulting in more than one area above 212TF and all rods not fully inserted, the crew will terminate and prevent RPV injection and open 7 SRVs to perform an RPV Blowdown per N2-EOP-C2.

PO-8.0 Given the plant in a condition requiring emergency classification, the SRO shall properly classify the event per EPP-EPIP-02.

PO-9.0 Given the plant with an RPV blowdown in progress and not all rods in, the crew will restore and maintain RPV level 160 to 200 inches using feedwater when RPV pressure drops below 153 psig.

SCENARIO # 2 July 2002

IV.

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTI NS Instructor - check all queued malfunctions, overrides and annunciators have remained active.

Once given shift turnover information, allow no more than five (5) minutes for the crew to perform a walk down of panels.

Begin Scenario.

Event # 1 BOP Normal Evolution Role Play: As AO acknowledge the need to establish communication with the Control Room at Panel 204. Wait about 2 minutes and report that you are stationed at Panel 204 and communications with the Control Room has been established.

CREW

• Complete panel walk down and tests annunciators.

• SRO conducts pre-shift brief.

• Crew assumes the shift.

SRO PO-1.0

"* Directs BOP to place the third 4t" Point Heater Drain Pump in service per N2 OP-08, Section E.4.0

"* Conducts pre-evolution brief.

BOP PO

• Perform N2-OP-08, Section E.4.0 Dispatches an AO to 2CES IPNL204 to monitor 4th Point Heater Level AND maintain communication with the Control Room.

Set 2HDL-LV4C auto setpoint thumbwheel to 36%

1.0 SCENARIO # 2 July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Booth Operator Instruction:

WHEN directed to raise 2HDL-LV24C setpoint to 67%, activate REMOTE:

FWI3C to 67%

Event #2 RO Component Failure Booth Operator Instruction:

When the last of the 4th Point Heater Drain Pumps is pumping forward, insert the following malfunction:

RD12A, CRD Pump Trip (P1A)

F3 CRD *P]A trips on instantaneous overcurrent.

Expected annunciators:

603308 CRD PUMP 1A/1B AUTO TRIP 603313 CRD PUMP 1A/1B MOTOR ELEC FAULT 603311 CRD CHARGING WTR PRESSURE LOW 603446 CRD PUMP DISCH HEADER PRESSURE LOW Open 2HDL-LV4C using controller in manual to match auto setpoint.

Verify 2HDL-FV35C recirc valve closes as pump flow rises.

Places 2HDL-LV4C controller in auto.

Directs AO at IPNL204 to raise setpoint for 2HDL-LV24C to 67%.

Report all 4 th Point Heater Drain Pumps are pumping forward.

RO Identifies and reports the loss of RDS-P1A.

SRO PO-2.0

• Direct entry into N2-SOP-30, Section 4.2.

SCENARIO # 2 July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE: Depending on the amount of time that no CRD pump is operating, Annunciator 603316, "Control Rod High Temperature" may be received at this time.

Role Play: As AO wait about three minutes and report;"RDS-P 1 A breaker is tripped with an overcurrent flag." and/or"RDS-PlA motor is very hot to the touch."

Role Play: IF Annunciator 603316, "Control Rod High Temperature" has actuated, as dispatched AO, wait about three minutes report that the highest temperature is on rod 18-43 and ask the RO if the alarm is clear.

If it is NOT, report the temperature at 265°F.

If it IS, report the temperature at 239°F.

RO PO-2.0

• Takes the actions of N2-SOP-30 to start the standby CRD Pump.

Determines that NO accumulators are inoperable.

Shift RDS-FC107 Flow Controller to MAN Close FCV to 0%

Determines pump trip was NOT caused by low suction pressure by observing Electric Fault trip annunciator Starts RDS -P1B Opens FCV to establish 63 gpm Shift RDS-FC107 to AUTO.

• Dispatches AO to RDS-P lA and/or the supply breaker.

RO

"* Recognizes and reports the Control Rod high temperature alarm.

"* Dispatched an AO to monitor CRD temperatures.

SRO

• Notifies Operations management of current conditions.

SCENARIO # 2 OPERATOR ACTIONS July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event #3 RO Reactivity Manipulation After RDS-P lB is running and the Control Rod high temperature alarm is investigated and cleared the CREW will continue the power ascension.

Event #4 RO/SRO Component Failure Booth Operator Instruction:

AFTER RO Evaluator has determined power change was significant enough for evaluation AND the power ascension will continue, activate malfunction for the "A" Recirculation FCV by depressing F6 key:

RR49A, FCV "A" RVDT coupling failure F6 After malfunction is entered, the next FCV demand signal will cause the FCV to open fully regardless of the demands that may be inserted by the RO.

Recirc Loop "A "flow and reactor power will rise.

When the FCV hydraulics are isolated ajet pump loop flow mismatch is likely to be occurring.

If a "close" signal is inputted, the FCV will close to minimum position and a power reduction SRO

"* Obtains RMR for power change.

"* Performs reactivity brief.

"* Directs power ascension to continue by raising power to 65% with recirc flow.

RO

• Raises Recirc Flow using Loop Flow Controllers in Manual.

RO PO-3.0 Recognize and respond to the "A" FCV failure, using N2-SOP-08, Section 3.3 and 4.4.

May attempt to stabilize flow by inputting a close signal to FCV "A".

Shutdown the HPU using P602 pushbutton Close outboard valves to isolate hydraulic lines to the FCV.

"* Report the "A" FCV failure to the SRO.

SR0 PO-3.0 Acknowledges RO report.

If flow is lowered due to the FCV failure, enters N2-SOP-29.

SCENARIO # 2 July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR A CTTONS Role Play:

As I&C, wait about five minutes and report that the failure of the "A" FCV was due to an RVDT failure.

It is NOT intended for the crew to place the alternate position indication system in service for this scenario.

Event #5 SRO Component Failure/Tech Spec Booth Operator Instruction:

When directed by the Lead Evaluator, insert the following overrides for ICS*MOV128 breaker trip, by depressing F4 key:

MOV*128, Steam Supply Line Isolation (Inboard) - Green - "OFF" MOV*128, Steam Supply Line Isolation (Inboard) - Red - "OFF" MOV*128, Steam Supply Inboard Isolation INOP Amber - "ON" AN601305, RCIC System Inoperable - "ON" AN601319, RCIC Valve Motor Overload - "ON" All on "F4" MOV*128 Steam Supply Line Isolation

"* Enters T.S. 3.4.1 for Loop Flow Mismatch

"* Determines loop flow mismatch is not within limits and declare loop not in operation.

Notifies I&C to investigate the cause of the "A" FCV failure.

BOP

"* Recognizes and reports RCIC Inboard Isolation Valve failure.

"* Dispatches AO to investigate breaker trip for MOV* 128.

SRO PO-4.0 Acknowledges BOP report.

"* Refers to T.S. 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation failure.

Determines penetration must be isolated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

SCENARIO # 2 PERAT R ACTI NS July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE

()PEP1A Tfl A CTJC'hJZ (Inboard) - "OPEN" Queued Role Play: When dispatched by the BOP, ask for panel and breaker numbers.

Wait two (2) minutes and report breaker in the tripped condition. "No cause is apparent."

Event #6 Major Transient Booth Operator Instruction:

After Tech Specs are reviewed by the SRO for MOV* 128 failure, insert the following malfunction:

RC12, RCIC Steam Leak in Reactor Building, 25% over 10 minute ramp F5 Expected Annunciators:

852254 Process Airborne Rad Monitor Activated 60115 7-Reactor Building General Areas Temperature High is received and RCIC Steam Line should isolate as temperature rises above 135 0F. WCS system isolates.

"* May enter Tech. Spec. 3.5.3 for RCIC inoperable.

"* Requests I&C assistance.

BOP

"* Check DRMS to determine RB HVR*RE32A/B alarming.

"* Verify RB Ventilation System isolates and GTS starts.

"* When directed, evacuates the reactor Building.

SRO

"* Enters EOP-SC when HVR*RE32A/B exceed DRMS Red setpoint.

"* Directs RB evacuated.

SCENARIO # 2 July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE CPFRATO1 A CTT NMQ WHEN 601157, Reactor Building General Areas Temperature High is received, Event Trigger ET02 activates:

MOV*121, Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) - Green - "ON" MOV*121, Not Fully Open - Amber - "ON" ET02 MOV*121 Steam Supply Line Isolation (Outboard) - "OPEN" Queued (Prevents valve from closing)

MOV*128 has no power and MOV*121 appears to be closing.

However, RCIC steam line pressure stay up and temperatures in the area are still rising.

Thus, no isolation of the RCIC Steam Line has occurred BOP

"* Recognize and reports increasing area temperatures and high airborne radiation levels in the Reactor Building.

"* Confirms WCS and RHR isolation.

"* Reports failure of RCIC to automatically isolate.

"* Monitors back panels for trending area temperatures and radiation levels.

"* Reports levels and trends to the SRO.

SRO

• Directs BOP to manually isolate RCIC Steam Line.

BOP

• Attempts to manually isolate the RCIC Steam Line by closing MOV* 121.

RO

• Verifies Reactor Building Ventilation isolated, GTS, HVR*UC413B and all RB area unit coolers are running.

SCENARIO # 2 July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS First area temperature approaches 212 'F.

Event #7 Crew Component Failure Placing the Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN position will trigger the following malfunctions:

RD17A, Partial Insertion of a Bank of Rods under Scram (Li), final value of "04" RD071435, Control Rod 14-35 Stuck RD075031, Control Rod 50-31 Stuck RX01, Fuel Cladding failure, 3% over 2 minutes.

ET04 BOP Recognizes and reports the failure of the manual isolation of the RCIC Steam Line.

SRO PO-5.0

"* Recognizes that a "primary system" is discharging into the Reactor Building.

"* Direct a manual scram and entry into N2-SOP-101 C, before any area exceeds 212'F.

"* Enters N2-EOP-RPV.

RO PO-5.0

"* Places the Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN.

"* Recognizes and reports that NOT all control fully inserted

• Reports reactor power, pressure and water level.

SRO 6

PO-6.0 Enters N2-EOP-C5 Directs BOP to inhibit ADS and place HPCS in PTL Directs RO to initiate RRCS per N2-EOP-6, Attachment 13 May direct MSIV Low Level SCENARIO # 2 July 2002 INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Booth Operator Instruction:

IF MSIV Low Level isolations are directed to be bypassed MANUALLY enter the following REMOTE functions:

MS06A, Defeat Level 1 Isolation, Defeated MS06B, Defeat Level 1 Isolation, Defeated MS06C, Defeat Level 1 Isolation, Defeated MS06D, Defeat Level 1 Isolation, Defeated IF RO drives control rods per N2-EOP-6 4, rods 14-35 and 50-31 are stuck at position 04. This ensures RPV Blowdown is performed in the all rods not full in leg of EOP-C2.

IF rods are not driven until after the blowdown, delete RD07 14-35 and RD07 50-3 1, to allow all rods to be fully inserted.

isolations bypassed per N2-EOP-6, 0.

Assigns RPV water level and pressure bands.

BOP

"* Inhibits ADS using keylock switches.

"* Places HPCS Pump switch in PTL.

RO

"* Manually initiates RRCS by arming and depressing RRCS pushbuttons.

"* Reports control rods are still NOT fully inserted, but Reactor power is less than 4% and lowering.

SRO

• Directs RO to enter and perform N2 EOP-6, Attachment 14.

SCENARIO # 2 July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATO ACTIONS Booth Operator Instruction:

WHEN directed by the Lead Evaluator to ensure 2"'

area temperature reaches 212'F, activate malfunction by depressing F7 key:

RC12, RCIC Steam Leak in Reactor Building 30%

F7 The second area temperature exceeds 212 'F.

BOP

• Reports second area temperature above 212'F to the SRO.

SRO PO-7.0

"* Acknowledges BOP report of second area temperature above 212 0F.

"* Enters and executes N2-EOP-C2.

Directs RO and BOP to terminate and prevent all injection to the RPV, except CRD, RCIC and SLS.

After RPV injection is terminated and prevented, directs BOP to open seven (7) ADS/SRVs.

RO CT-1.0

• Terminates and prevents injection to the RPV by closing Feedwater LVIOs.

BOP

• Terminates and prevents injection from ECCS systems as follows:

Manually initiates Div 1 and 2 RHR logic Overrides closed CSL and 3 RHR SCENARIO # 2 July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event #8 BOP/SRO Component Failure The queued malfunction:

AD08C, ADS Valve N2 supply severed.

Queued will prevent one of the ADS / SRV's from opening.

system Injection Valves Places CSL and RHR "C" pumps in PTL.

BOP CT-2.0

"* Attempts to open seven (7) ADS /

SRVs by arming and depressing both divisions of ADS logic.

"* Recognizes and reports failed ADS /

SRV to the SRO.

SRO

"* Acknowledges the failed ADS / SRV.

"* Directs BOP to open a non-ADS /

SRV so that the total open relief valves is seven (7).

BOP CT-2.0 Opens a non-ADS / SRV using keylock switch.

Reports seven (7) SRVs are open.

SRO

• Continues on EOP-C2 and re-enters EOP-C5 at 10.

SCENARIO # 2 0

0 July 2002 INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Reactor Pressure is lowering.

Reactor Building Area Temperature level out and start to lower Suppression Pool temperature is rising but controlled NOTE:

If control rods are not yet being driven in, ensure EOP-6 Attachment 14 is continuing at this point in the scenario.

RO CT-3.0

"* Reports when RPV pressure drops below 153 psig.

"* When directed, commences injection by opening FWS-LV10s to restore and maintain level above -42 inches.

SRO CT-3.0, PO-9.0 When RPV pressure drops below 153 psig directs injection to restore and maintain level between -42 inches and 202 inches (CT-3.0) with a target of 160 - 200 inches (PO-9.0).

RO

"* Performs N2-EOP-6, Attachment 14, Alternate Control Rods Insertion, Sections 3.3 Additional Manual Scrams AND/OR 3.5 Manual Control Rod Insertion (by driving rods) concurrently:

"* Additional Manual Scrams Directs ARI interlocks defeated by pulling ARI fuses.

Directs RPS defeated by installing RPS jumpers.

After ARI fuses are pulled and SCENARIO # 2 July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPER ATR ACTI IJq Booth Operator Instruction:

After RPS is reset, delete malfunction RD17A to allow control rods to fully insert when a manual scram signal is inserted. Also verify stuck rod malfunctions RD071435 and RD075031, Control Rod Stuck are removed Termination Cue:

"* RPV Blowdown is completed.

"* Reactor Building temperatures are lowering.

"* RPV water level is restored and maintained above -42 inches

"* All rods are fully inserted SRO Candidate Evaluator:

After simulator is placed in FREEZE, ask the SRO Candidate to classify the event.

RPS jumpers are installed resets RPS logic and verifies eight white RPS solenoid lights are lit Verify SDV Vent and Drain valves are open.

Waits until SDV is drained before inserting a manual scram using pushbuttons.

RO Manual Control Rod Insertion:

Starts 2 nd CRD Pump Places CRD FCV in MAN and fully opens valve.

Fully closes Drive Pressure Control Valve to raise drive pressure.

Bypasses RWM using key.

Begins driving control rods.

SRO PO-8.0 Classify this event as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY (EAL 4.1.1)

SCENARIO # 2 July 2002

V.

POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE (Not required for Annual and Initial Operating Exams.)

VI.

REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events

1. None B. Commitments

1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED SCENARIO # 2 July 2002

Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Nine Mile Point 2 Scenario No. 3 Operating Test No. 1 Examiners:

Candidates:

SRO:

Instant 1,2,3 RO:

ROI,2, Surrogate BOP:

Upgrade 1,2,3 Objectives:

Evaluate candidates ability to perform routine operating tasks using normal, abnormal and emergency procedures while ensuring compliance with Technical Specifications. The candidates will respond to the following events:

1.

APRM #2 fails upscale

2.

Standby Gas Train "B" Fan trip during testing.

3.

Emergency Shutdown of Reactor Feedwater Pump "B".

4.

Inadvertent RCIC Initiation.

5.

Loss of Offsite Power Line 5 with Diesel Generator failure.

6.

Small LOCA with concurrent Loss of Feedwater.

This scenario will be classified as an ALERT (EAL 3.1.1)

Initial Conditions:

1.

100% Power Above 100% Rod Line (IC-20)

Turnover:

1.

100% Power Above 100% Rod Line

2.

MFLCPR is 0.95

3.

Unidentified Drywell leakage has risen from 0.1 gpm to higher value in the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

4.

Perform Monthly 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> run surveillance for Standby Gas Train "B".

Event Malf.

Type Event Description No.

No.

1 N

(BOP/SRO) Standby Gas Train "B" 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> run surveillance 2

NMIl B I

(RO) APRM # 2 fails high requiring manual bypass 3

PC04B C

(BOP/SRO) Standby Gas Train "B" Fan trip during surveillance.

T.S. 3.6.4.3, Seven day Required Action A. 1 4

Field C

(BOP) Feedwater Pump "B" Emergency Shutdown due to Report excessive seal leakage.

5 R

(RO) Emergency Power Reduction using Cram Rods and Recirc Flow for Feedwater Pump Shutdown 6

RC10 C

(BOP) Inadvertent RCIC Injection to the Reactor.

7 ED02A C

(BOP/RO/SRO) Loss of Line 5, EDG-1 fails to auto start DG02A requiring a manual scram with concurrent small break LOCA.

8 FW01B M

(RO/SRO) Loss of Feedwater due to degraded power. NPS Overrides SWG-001 fails to transfer to Line 6 following Generator trip.

RR20 Small LOCA occurs during scram.

9 CS02 C

(BOP/SRO) HPCS fails to automatically start.

10 CS05 C

(BOP) HPCS Pump trip after manually starting and injecting.

Appendix D

I NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO SCENARIO # 3 REV. 0 No. of Pages:

28 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER PUMP SHUTDOWN/RCIC SPURIOUS INITIATION/LOSS OF HIGH PRESSURE FEED/SMALL LOCA PREPARER X

4LDATE k

l VALIDATED GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING OPERATIONS MANAGER UNIT 2 CONFIGURATION CONTROL

/Iv) ~I

& Z1 ios g0( '

DATE DATE

• A

/s DATE 1/36Z DATE SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Length:

75 minutes The crew will perform a scheduled surveillance on Standby Gas Train "B". APRM #2 will fail upscale, requiring bypassing of the failed instrument. After APRM#2 is bypassed, the Standby Gas Fan lB will trip. The SRO will enter Tech Specs for the inoperable GTS Train.

A report from the Turbine Building that Feedwater Pump "B" seal leak is worsening will prompt the crew to perform a Rapid Power Reduction by inserting Cram Rods and reducing Recirc Flow. Cram rod insertion is required because MFLCPR is above 0.93. Following the power reduction, the crew will perform an Emergency Shutdown of Feedwater Pump "B".

When conditions are stable, RCIC spuriously initiates. The crew will be required to stop RCIC injection within 4 minutes to prevent an automatic trip of the Main Turbine. For this scenario, if the crew does not stop RCIC injection in time, the RCIC turbine will automatically trip. This will ensure the remainder of the scenario runs as intended for candidate evaluations. When RCIC injection is stopped, a Loss of Offsite Line 5 occurs and the Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator fails to start. This results in a required manual scram.

Following the manual scram, NPS-SWGOOI fails to transfer to Line 6. A loss of all Feedwater pumps results due to the degraded electrical sources. The crew will be required to control reactor water level with the High Pressure Core Spray (CSH) Pump. The CSH Pump will require a manual start to maintain level above TAF, due to a failure of the pump to automatically start. A small LOCA occurs resulting in a loss of inventory and the need for Drywell Spray.

After High Pressure Core Spray (CSH) injection is initiated, the High Pressure Core Spray (CSH) Pump will trip on an electrical fault. This results in a loss of all High Pressure Injection. The Crew will determine that RPV level cannot be maintained above TAF and execute the Alternate Level Control steps of N2-EOP-RPV. The Crew will then restore and maintain level above TAF by performing an RPV Blowdown and injecting with a Low Pressure Injection source.

C

-7 SCENARIO # 3

-I-March, 2002

1.

SIMULATOR SET UP A.

IC Number:

IC 20, 100% Reactor Power B.

Presets/Function Key Assignments

1. Malfunctions:

a. NMI 1B, APRM "B" Channel Failure Upscale F3

b. RC10, RCIC Spurious Initiation TRA :30 F4

c.

RC06, RCIC turbine trip TUA 3:50 F4

d. PC04B, Standby Gas Treatment Train lB Fan Trip F6

e. DG02A, Diesel Generator #1 Trip F7

f. ED02A, Loss of offsite Line #5 F7

g. RR20, DBA LOCA, 8% over 7 minute ramp Triggered when the Mode Switch is placed in "SHUTDOWN" ET01

h. FW0 1 B, "B" Condensate Pump Trip Triggered when the Mode Switch is placed in "SHUTDOWN" ET01

i. CS02, High Pressure Core Spray Auto Start Failure Queued

j.

CS05, High Pressure Core Spray Pump Trip TD 30 seconds ET03 Triggered when CSH*P1 Pump red light is ON, after control switch is placed in START

k. EG15A, No Transfer To Reserve Power SWG001 Queued

2. Remotes:

None

3. Overrides:

None

4. Annunciators:

None C.

Equipment Out of Service None D.

Support Documentation N2-OSP-GTS-MOO1, Attachment 3, completed to step 7.3.1 E.

Miscellaneous Post White "MFLCPR > 0.93" sign at P603 SCENARIO # 3

- July 2002

II.

SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION SHIFT:

- N

- D DATE:

PART I:

To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

• Control Panel Walkdown (all panels)

(SSS, ASSS, STA, CSO, CRE)

PART Ih:

To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.

"* Shift Supervisor Log (SSS, ASSS, STA) 0 Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)

"* CSO Log (CSO) 0 LCO Status (SSS, ASSS, STA)

"* Lit Control Room Annunciators 0 Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)

(SSS, ASSS, STA, CSO, CRE)

Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:

Reactor Power 100%

Loadline =

>100%

MFLCPR is 0.95 Unidentified Drywell leakage has risen from 0.1 gpm to current reading in the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

PART III:

Remarks/Planned Evolutions:

Continue N2-OSP-GTS-MOO 1, Attachment 3, GTS Filter Train lB Functional Test (10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> Run)

PART IV:

To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:

"* Review new Clearances (SSS)

Test Control Annunciators (CRE)

"* Shift Crew Composition (SSS/ASSS)

TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SSS CRE ASSS E

STA E

CSO Other SCENARIO # 3 July 2002

III.

PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A.

Critical Tasks:

CT-1.0 Given a loss of all Feedwater Pumps following a reactor scram and a failure of High Pressure Core Spray (CSH) to automatically start the crew will manually start CSH and establish RPV injection.

CT-2.0 Given a loss of all high pressure injection and RPV level at TAF, the crew will initiate RPV Blowdown (enter EOP-C2) BEFORE level reaches MSCWL, -42 inches (Fig Z, -55" @ 800 psig) and opens seven SRVs.

CT-3.0 Given a loss of all high pressure injection and the RPV depressurizing, the crew will restore and maintain RPV water level between 159.3 and 202.3 while preventing RPV level from exceeding 255 inches, with at least one Low Pressure Injection system per the Alternate Level Control steps of N2-EOP-RPV.

B.

Performance Objectives:

PO-1.0 Given N2-OSP-GTS-M001 for routine performance, the crew will continue the surveillance test on Standby Gas Train "B" in accordance with applicable sections of N2-OSP-GTS-M001.

PO-2.0 Given APRM #2 failing upscale during power operation the crew will identify the failed instrument, bypass APRM #2 per N2-OP-92 and ensure compliance with Technical Specifications.

PO-3.0 Given a report from the Turbine Building that Feedwater Pump "B" seal is degrading, the crew will perform a Rapid Power Reduction by inserting cram rods and reducing Recirc Flow per N2-SOP-101 D, prior to performing an Emergency Shutdown of Feedwater Pump "B", per N2 SOP-06.

PO-4.0 Given a RCIC system spurious initiation, the crew will take actions to terminate RCIC injection into the reactor vessel in accordance with 601347 annunciator response.

SCENARIO #3 July 2002

PO-5.0 Given a Loss of Line #5 and failure of Division I Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) to start resulting in a loss of Service Water, the crew will implement the actions of N2-SOP-03, N2-SOP-11 and perform a manual reactor scram.

PO-6.0 Given a reactor coolant leak into the Drywell the crew will control Primary Containment parameters by entering and executing N2-EOP-PC.

PO-7.0 Given the plant in a condition requiring emergency classification, the SRO shall properly classify the event per EPP-EPIP-02.

SCENARIO # 3 July 2002

IV.

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Instructor - check all queued malfunctions, overrides and annunciators have remained active.

Once given shift turnover information, allow no more than five (5) minutes for the crew to perform a walk down of panels.

Begin Scenario.

Event #1 BOP Normal Evolution Role Play: As Turbine Building AO on Rounds, report that a small seal leak has developed on Feedwater Pump "B". The water stream leaking from the seal is about the diameter of a pencil.

CREW

"* Complete panel walk down and tests annunciators.

"* SRO conducts pre-shift brief.

"* Crew assumes the shift.

SRO PO-1.0

"* Directs BOP to perform the Standby Gas Treatment "B" System Functional Test, "B" Train, N2-OSP-GTS-M001,.

"* Conducts pre-evolution brief.

BOP PO-1.0

"* Reviews N2-OSP-GTS-MOO1, Standby Gas Treatment System Functional Test, Attachment 3.

"* Obtain SRO permission to perform the test.

" Establish communication between the Control Room and the GTS Filter Train lB.

SCENARIO # 3 July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Role Play:

As AO, report the following conditions exist locally; 2GTS*CH1B heater "LOW AIR FLOW" green light is energized at Panel 30B.

Timer reading at Panel 102 - 3430 hrs.

Queue:

NO additional sampling is required at this time.

Role Play:

As AO, report the following conditions exist locally at Panel 30B:

2GTS* CH 1B Heater "ON" red indicating light is energized.

2GTS*CH 1B Heater "LOW AIRFLOW" green indicating light is de-energized.

Request AO check:

2GTS*CH1B heater "LOW AIR FLOW" green light energized at Panel 30B.

Timed reading at Panel 102 in the south Auxiliary Bay.

BOP PO-1.0

"* Start 2GTS*FLT1B

"* Observe the following at P871:

SBGTS TRAIN B INITIATION red indicating light energized.

SBGTS FAN 2GTS*FN1B red indicating light energized.

GTS*MOV1B, INLET FROM RX BLDG VENTILATION, open.

GTS*AOV2B, TRAIN B INLET VLV, open.

GTS*AOV3B, FAN 1B DISCH ISOL LV, open.

Request AO at Panel 30B check:

2GTS*CH1B Heater "ON" red indicating light energized.

2GTS*CH1B Heater "LOW AIRFLOW" green indicating light de-energized.

SCENARIO # 3 OPERATO ACTI NS July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 2GTS

• CHI 1B Heater "OVERTEMPERATURE" green indicating light is de-energized.

Event #2 RO Instrument Failure Booth Operator Instruction:

When SRO acknowledges GTS Train 1 B is running, insert malfunction NM11B, APRM B Channel Failure upscale F3 Expected Annunciators:

603202 - APRM Trip System UPSCALE/INOP 603208 - APRM Trip System UPSCALE 603442 - Control Rod OUT BLOCK 2GTS*CHlB Heater "OVERTEMPERATURE" green indicating light de-energized.

BOP Notify SRO GTS Train 1 B has been started per N2-OSP-GTS-MOO1.

RO PO-2.0

"* Reports and responds to alarms.

Determine APRM #2 has alarmed Check other APRM Channels to verify no scram should have occurred.

"* Check back panels for additional indications/information.

"* Enter N2-OP-92, Neutron Monitoring, and bypass the affected APRM using Section H.2.0.

Verify no other APRM in bypass Place APRM bypass joystick to APRM # 2 position.

Verify APRM # 2 bypass light on P603 is "lit" Verify "BYP" is displayed in inverse video on APRM # 2 Chassis (P608)

Verify "blue" BYPASSED LED on 2/4 Module is lit (P608)

SCENARIO # 3 OPERAT ACTI NS July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event #3 BOP/SRO Component Failure/Tech Spec Booth Operator Instruction:

When the SRO completes the crew update, activate malfunction, by depressing F6 key:

PC04B, Standby Gas Train Fan 1B Trip F6 Annunciator 871125, SBGTS Fan 1B Auto Trip/Fail To Start 0

Reset the 2/4 Module per N2-OP-92, Section F.8.0 Depress "TRIP MEMORY RESET" pushbutton (P608)

Verify all red and yellow LED's are extinguished.

SRO PO-2.0

"* Acknowledges RO report of "APRM and Rod Block" annunciators.

"* Directs I&C be contacted to investigate and troubleshoot APRM #2

"* Consults Technical Specifications to determine minimum required channels.

T.S. 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1 NO action required at this time BOP PO-3.0

• Reports and responds to alarms.

Verify Fan 1 B tripped Verify GTS*AOV2B and 3B are closed.

SRO Refers to Tech Spec 3.6.4.3, Restore in Seven day Required Action A. 1 SCENARIO # 3 July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATC)R ACTIflNo, Event #4 BOP Component Failure After GTS Tech Spec is reviewed:

Role Play:

As an AO call the Control Room and report that the "B" Feedwater Pump seal leak has gotten worse. Steam is starting to blow out from the seal. Report that you are leaving the area because it looks like the seal will start blowing more steam at any minute.

Event #5 RO Reactivity Manipulation Role Play: As the AO acknowledge that you are standing by in a safe location and that you will check out the "B" Feedwater pump once it is secured and the seal quits blowing steam.

RO

"* Acknowledge the AO's report.

"* Relay status of "B" Feedwater Pump seal to the SRO.

SRO

"* Acknowledges RO report.

"* Directs RO to perform Rapid Power Reduction per N2-SOP-101 D

"* Directs BOP to perform an Emergency Shutdown of Feedwater Pump "B" per N2-SOP-06.

"* Requests assistance from Maintenance.

RO

"* Enters N2-SOP-101D Begins reduction in Reactor Power using Recirculation Flow Controls Inserts 1 st four Cram Rods before reducing power below 75%

"* Lowers power to about 60% to 65%.

SCENARIO # 3 July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Role Play: As AO report Feedwater Pump "B" Aux Lube Oil pump control switch is in START and the pump is running.

Booth Operator Instruction:

When directed to remove Cond Demins from service, MANUALLY activate REMOTE FW01A, Cond Demineralizer A, OFF FW01B, Cond Demineralizer B, OFF FW01C, Cond Demineralizer C, OFF Role Play: As AO report three Cond Demins were removed from service. Five Demins are in service and conditions are satisfactory.

Event #6 BOP Component Failure Booth Operator Instruction:

When conditions are stable and all notifications and BOP Performs Emergency Feedwater Pump Shutdown per N2-SOP-06, Step 4.5 after power is reduced.

Places FWS-P IB control switch to STOP Verify Aux LO Pump started.

Confirm RPV level is controlled between 178 inches and 187 inches.

Places LV OB controller to Manual and closes LV lOB Closes FWS-MOV47B Disch Valve.

Dispatches AO to place Aux Lube Oil Pump control switch to start.

Dispatches AO to remove Condensate Demineralizers from service, as required for the reduced power level.

CREW Notifies Fire Dept and RP of steam leak from feed pump.

SCENARIO # 3 OPER-AT R ACTIONS July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS crew updates are complete, activate the following malfunctions, using F4 key:

RC10, RCIC Spurious Initiation (TRA 30 sec)

RC06, RCIC turbine trip (TUA 3:50)

F4 Plant response.

RCIC initiates and injects.

Booth Operator:

IF contacted, trip unit E5 1 -N656E, high exhaust pressure is only unit in tripped condition.

Four minutes after RCIC initiates, the turbine will trip to maintain the scenario on the planned path.

CREW PO-4.0

• Identifies and reports RCIC is injecting

• Identifies that reactor vessel level is in normal band.

BOP

• Refers to 2CEC*PNL601 for annunciator 601347.

SRO Directs reset of RCIC logic or shutting of 21CS*MOV126 to stop injection.

BOP

"* Secures RCIC injection as directed by the SRO and the annunciator response.

"* Identifies and reports RCIC trip (if not manually tripped).

SRO

• Refers to Tech Spec 3.5.3, Verifies HPCS is Operable - Action Al SCENARIO # 3 July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event #7 Major Transient Booth Operator Instruction:

When RCIC injection has been terminated, insert the following remote/malfunctions using F7 key:

ED02A, Loss of Offsite Line 5, True F7 DG02A, Diesel Generator #1 Trip Plant Response:

Emergency Bus 101 trips and remains de energized.

Division J Service Water Pumps trip.

Division II Service Water Non Essential MOVs close, resulting in loss of Service Water.

Division I RHR and LPCS systems are lost.

Role Play: As AO acknowledge that you are on your way to Division I Diesel Generator.

Restore in 14 days - Action A2 BOP PO-5.0

"* Determine 2ENS*SWG1O1 has lost power, and Division I Diesel Generator has failed to start.

" Dispatches an AO to Division I Diesel Generator to investigate.

" Verify Service Water flow to RHR heat exchanger "B" by; Verifying open 2SWP*MOV90B, and Throttle open 2SWP*MOV33B until flow through the heat exchanger is > 3,000 gpm.

BOP

• Verifying SWP Division II non essentials are isolating by verifying the following valves are closing; 2SWP*MOV19B 2SWP*MOV93B 2SWP*MOV3B SCENARIO # 3

- July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event #8 Component Failure Booth Operator Instruction:

When Mode Switch is in SHUTDOWN, verify both malfunctions active from ET01:

RR20, RR Loop Rupture - DBA LOCA at 8%

ramped in over seven (7) minutes, and FW01B, Condensate Pump Trip P1B.

• Throttle running Service Water Pump discharge valves to maintain pump flows < 10,000 gpm as required.

CREW PO-5.0

"* Enter N2-SOP-03, Loss of AC Power, Section D. 1.7.

"* Enter N2-SOP-i 1, Loss of Service Water.

SRO PO-5.0

"* Direct a manual scram be inserted per N2-SOP-03, Loss of AC Power, Section D. 1.7, and

"* Enter N2-SOP-1 1, Section 3.2.

BOP PO-5.0 Enters N2-SOP-03, Section D. 1.7 Trips Main Turbine Trips Reactor Recirculation Pumps Trips WCS Pumps PO-5.0

• Manually SCRAM the Reactor by placing the mode switch in "SHUTDOWN".

• Enters N2-SOP-101C Reports RPV level, pressure, APRMs downscale and "all rods in".

SCENARIO # 3 0

RC July 2002 INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Feedwater Pump "A " trips when NPS-SWGO01

./ails to transfer to offsite power.

Drywell pressure begins to rise and is trending up toward 1.68 psig.

Drywell pressure exceeds 1.68 psig. Division II Low Pressure ECCS start. High Pressure Core Spray initiation signal is received, but CSH Pump Jails to automatically start.

Containment pressure and temperature are still rising. Reactor Vessel water level is lowering faster.

Reports loss of the Condensate Pump and the imminent loss of Feedwater.

SRO 0

PO-5.0 Enters N2-EOP-RPV when level is below 159 inches.

RO

• Reports loss of Feedwater.

• Monitors Reactor power, water level and pressure and takes action as directed.

Reports Drywell pressure above 1.68 psig SRO PO-6.0 Enters N2-EOP-PC when Drywell Pressure exceeds 1.68 psig Directs Suppression Chamber Spray

• Directs Drywell Coolers restored.

Directs RPV Water level restored above 159 inches with CSH Pump.

July 2002 SCENARIO # 3 INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Event #9 BOP Component Failure Event #10 BOP Component Failure Thirty seconds after the CSH Pump has been manually started malfunction will activate:

CS05, High Pressure Core Spray Pump Trip ET03 CSH trips on an electrical fault and cannot be restarted. RPV level is lowering.

SCENARIO # 3 BOP CT-1.0

"* Verifies Division II RHR initiation signal is received.

RHR Pump "B" and RHR Pump "C" sequence on.

"* Verifies and reports CSH failure to start.

When directed, manually starts CSH Pump and confirms injection.

Coordinates RPV level control with the RO, by manually starting and stopping CSH Pump.

SRO

"* Acknowledges failure of CSH to automatically start.

"* Directs manual start of CSH as required to maintain RPV level above 159 inches.

BOP

"* Reports CSH trip on electrical fault and will not restart.

"* Dispatched AO to investigate CSH.

SRO

"* Acknowledges CSH failure.

"* Determines RPV water level cannot be July 2002 INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS When water level drops below 17.8 inches (Level 1), ADS Timers will initiate, MSIVs close.

RPV water level drops to -18 inches (TAF)

Suppression Chamber Pressure exceeds 10 psig.

Booth Operator Instruction:

When directed to defeat Group 5 Isolation per EOP 6 Attachment 30, MANUALLY INSERT MALFUNCTION RH08, Group 5 Isolation Failure a

maintained above -18 inches.

Directs:

ADS to be inhibited Maximizing injection using all preferred injection systems. (CRD is the only one still available for high pressure injection.)

Use of "Alternate Injection Systems" as needed.

)-

SLS Boron Injection from Boron Tank or Test Tank Directs either RHR Loop "B" lined up for injection per EOP-6, 0. OR RHR "B" in the LPCI mode.

SRO CT-2.0

"* Directs:

At least two (2) low pressure subsystem are aligned for injection.

)-

RHR "C" RHR "B" Prior to RPV level lowering to -42 inches, enter N2-EOP-C2, RPV Blowdown and perform concurrently.

Specify new RPV level bands as necessary.

SCENARIO # 3 July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE:

Crew may chose to line up RHR "B" for injection per N2-EOP-6 Att. 30. OR RHR "B" in the LPCI mode Suppression Chamber Pressure approaches PSP EOP-PC Fig L (about 17psig at 200foot Pool water level).

BOP

"* Inhibits ADS using keylock switches.

"* If directed, initiates SLS injection BOP If directed Performs EOP-6 0 Closes SC Spray Valve RHS*MOV33B, if open.

Defeats Group 5 Isolation Waits for RPV Pressure to drop below 350 psig If directed, initiates SLS injection either from Boron Tank or Test Tank BOP CT-2.0

"* Open seven (7) ADS/SRV's by arming and depressing both division ADS Manual Initiation pushbuttons at P601.

"* When RPV pressure drops below 350 psig, verifies injection (if using EOP-6 0).

CT-3.0

"* Restore and maintain RPV level in specified band (159.3 to 202.3, not to exceed 255 inches) using RHR "B" and/or RHR "C".

SCENARIO # 3 July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO Direct Drywell sprays WHEN Suppression Chamber Pressure exceeds 10 psig using RHR Loop "B" only after adequate core cooling assured by maintaining water level above TAF.

Directs Drywell coolers tripped Directs RCS Pumps tripped Verifies Drywell pressure and temperature are within Fig K of EOP-PC.

SRO IF Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP) is exceeded, recognize RPV Blowdown per EOP-C2 is required.

RO When directed, verifies RCS Pumps have tripped and Drywell Unit Coolers are tripped prior to initiating DW Sprays BOP PO-6.0 Initiates Suppression Chamber and Drywell Sprays as required.

SCENARIO # 3I July 2002

INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/

PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Termination Cue:

• RPV level restored and controlled above 159.3 inches.

• Drywell Sprays are in progress (or were previously in service and secured to establish injection).

SRO Candidate Evaluator:

After simulator is placed in FREEZE, ask the SRO Candidate to classify the event.

SRO Classify this event as an "Alert",

EAL 3.1.1.

SCENARIO # 3 PO-7.0 July 2002

V.

POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE (Not required for Annual and Initial Operating Exams.)

VI.

REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events

1. None B. Commitments

1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED SCENARIO # 3 July 2002