ML20062B528

Control of Heavy Loads, Draft Technical Evaluation Rept

ML20062B528
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	07/07/1982
From:	Sargent I FRANKLIN INSTITUTE
To:	Clemenson F NRC
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ML20062B514	List: ML20062B528
References
TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TER-C5257-181, NUDOCS 8208040560
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TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT ,. .

CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS (c-10) .

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT NRC DOCKET NO. 50-259 FRC PROJECT CS257 NRC TAC NO. 07974 FRC ASSIGNMENT 3 l NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-79-118 FRCTASK 181

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Preparedby Author: I. sargent Franklin Research Center

. 20th and Race Street FRC Group Leader: 1. sargent Philadelphia, PA 19103

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Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Cornrnission Lead NRC Engineer: F. Clemenson

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Washington, D.C. 20555 July 7,1982-This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any. legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights. .

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$DRADOCK05000g; J _ _ Franklin Research Center A Division of The Franklin Institute The Benjam:n FranhJin Parkway. Pnita.. Pa 15~103 (215) 4481000

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TER-C5257-181 CONTENTS Section Title Page l

l 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

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1.1 Generic Issue Background. . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 ' Specific Issue Background . . . . . . . . 1 1.3 Purpose of the Review . . . . . . . . . 2 2 NRC CRITERIA . . . . . . '. . . . . . . 3 3 TECHNICAL EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 I -

5 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 9

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TER-C5257-181

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FOREWORD This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical assistance in support of NRC operating reactor licensing actions. The technical evaluation was conducted in accor, dance with criteria established by the NRC. _

Mr. I. H. Sargent contributed to the technical preparation of this report through a subcontract with WESTEC Services, Inc.

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TER-C5257-181

1. INTRODUCTION -

l.1 GENERIC ISSUE BACKGROUND In order to ensure adequate safety for fuel storage and handling systems that can cause a direct or indirect release of radioactivity, the NRC has established guidelines for design and manufacture of single-failure-proof cranes. These criteria were originally stated in Regulatory Guide 1.13,

" Spent Puel Storage Facility Design Basis" [1]. As a consequence of this regulatory guide, a series of standards were issued (including Regulatory Guide,1,104 [2] ana Branch Technical Position APCSB 9-1 [3]) which further

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i defined single-failure-proof crane criteria and identified acceptable alternatives for existing handling systems to comply with staff requirements.

NUREG-0554 [4] , " Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants,"

consolidated these various documents into one standard for evaluation of fuel

( . handling systems. The criteria of NUREG-0554 provided the basis for NUREG-061'2 [5] , " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," which in turn provided equivalent alternative designs or. interim measures for cranes .

manufacturedandinusebeforeimplementationofNUREG-}0554.

1.2 SPECIFIC ISSUE BACKGROUND ,

In the initial design of the Browns Ferry reactor building crane, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) recognized the need for material handling safety and attempted to comply with then-issued standards to provide a

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. single-failure-proof crane. Initial compliance with the staff guidelines establishec in BTP APCSB 9-1 was noted in the Licensee's June 30, 1976 letter

[6] to the NRC. On August 4, 1980 [7], the NRC requested additional information from TVA to determine the extent of compliance with NUREG-0554.

In a letter dated February 10, 1981 [8), TVA provided additional information concerning tne design of these cranes, the results of additional c,rane i analysis, and several modifications and tests proposed to meet the intent of 1

l NUREG-0554. This response was modified by subsequent transmittals dated March 11 and May 27, 1981 [9,10].

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TER-C5257-181 1.3 PURPOSE OF THE REVIEW ,

This review provides a basis for determining if the reactor building cranes at the Browns Ferry plant, upon completion of the modificatiobs and testing proposed in Reference 9, satisfy the requirements for a single .

f ailure-proof crane considering the criteria of NUREG-0554.

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TER-C5257-181

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2. NRC CRITERIA -

l Current criteria for a single-failure-proof crane are provided"in NUREG-0554. This document, supplemented by exceptions identified in NUREG-0612, Appendix C, for cranes constructed prior to the publication of j

NUREG-0554, forms the basis for this evaluation.

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TER-CS257-181

3. TECHNICAL EVALUAT. ION 3.1 SPECIFIC ISSUES , ,

Table 3.1 provides a detailed comparison of the Browns Ferry cranes, based on Licensee-provided information, with the criteria of NUREG-0554. An assessment of the extent of compliance for each specific criterion is provided supplemented by explanatory comments where appropriate.

The following notations are used to specify the extent of compliance indicating that the specific requirement of, NUREG-0554:

~[C] - has been complied with by the Licensee.

.[T] - has been complied with by actions or an adequate design which are technically equivalenti to the specified requirement.

[P] - has been partially complied with by the Licensee with the exception of those items noted.

[N] '- has not been complied with by the Licensee.

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[R] - Will be complied with upon completion of tests or modifications proposed by the Licensee.

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h/ Table 3.1 single-ratture-Proof Crane Compilance Matrie HUPF.C-0554 pe<tuirement Licensee's Reerense Evaluation / Comment

2. Specification and Evolgn Criteria 2.1 Construction and Operating Periode

1. When an overhead crane handling system will Performance specifications for construction [Cl - Separate performance specifications are not he used during the plant construction phase, and plant use were Identical. required by the Lleensee since the requiremente neparate per formance specit teatione may be for construction and plant une are identical.

needed to reflect the duty cycles and load-Ing requiremente for each service.

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2. The allowable design strese limite for the A direct comparison of the alloweble stresses [T]

crane intended for plant operation should provided in Tables 12.2-14 and 12.2-15 of the be those Indicated in Table 3.3.3.1.3-1 of Browns Ferry F8AR with those given in CMAA CMAA Frecification 970 and reflecting the 70-1975 cannot be made since they are Interre-appropriate duty cycle in OtAA Specificattw Inted through actual design factors much as the 970 the retto of the trolley weight to hook load.

[ In ord' er to assess the degree to which actual 3 design stresses comply with the ellowable ,

stresses given in CHAA 70-1975, the erane was e remnalysed using the load combination given in .

CMAA 70-1975. The results of thts analyets as shown below indicate that the CMAA 70-1975 allowable stressee',are not esceeded for the structures in question.

Mastmum Actual CMAA A110weble

, Stress (kell _ 8 trees (tell mz gire*ers *

• tenaton 12.2 17.5 comprees ton 11.5 17.5 .

ebear 2.5 13.2 *

. End truches tension 7.8 14.4 compreselon 7.0 14.4

. ahear 3.2 10.0 I -

Trolley frames O

tension compeeeeton 13.5 13.5 14.4 14.4 to ahear 1.9 10.0 y H

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h HUREG-0554 Requirement Licensee's Response Evaluation / Comment

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jy 3. The sum total of simultaneously applied lCl - Acceptable bened upon FSAR Table 12.2-14

.g loads (static and dynamic) should not result and 12.2-15.

j in strees levels causing permanent deformation jo other than locallred strain concentration.

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3 4. The effects of cyIlic loadinI; induced by The electrical features designed into the (T) - The Licensee *o drive system is a ec==pensated jogging or pluggiry an uncompensated hotet General Electric sterless DC adjundable voltage- steplese DC adjuntable voltage drive ayaten. This control system should be included in the de- drive systema for the main holst, aux!!!ary system eliminates the effects of cyc!!c loading sign specification. hotet, bridge, and trolley effectively ensure through use of acceleration control. Therefore, smooth acceleration and deceleration regardless no design specification la required and the of the operator's movement of the controls. Licensee compiles with this requirement.

The major features involved in this accelera-tion control process ares

a. Timed acceleration - The rate of change e of the speed reference voltage is limited f through a resistor-capscitor network.

Thle sof tena any abrupt control movement by the operator. *

• b. Armature voltage sensing - When a stop is made by returning the control to the "of f *

, gesition e.an armature voltage relay will prevent the brake from setting untti the motor back est and hence speed drops to a preset level. Initial slowing to provided by the much smother regenerative braking feature whereby the kinetic energy of the moving parts !s converted to electrical energy and pumped back into the electrical system. *

c. Current 11mit - The static SCR voltage reg-ulators incorporate current Ilmiting c!r-cults set at the following percentages of

, rated armature currents main and ausf1- d lary holets 200 percent, bridge and trolley '

hI 150 percent. This limits the torque avail-able for acceleration and thereby smoothe

• h speed changes.

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NUPIG-0554 p+quirement Licensee's Response Evaluation /Cc w ent 1

d. static reversing - povereing of all drives le accomplished through static SCR voltage regulatore which effect a emm th voltage reversal Instead of the abrupt reversal found in magnetic contactor controle. This eliminates the posetbility of plugging and i jogging in the usual eense of arPI F i ng full power (torward or reverse) to promote t Ilmited movement.

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e. toad float - Rach hotet is provided with a load float feature actuated from a thumb I evitch on the master switch control. I Operation of thle evitch holds the brake off independent of the hotet or lower evitch and limits the speed reference voltage to e 25 percent of its full value. This allows a load to be accurately positioned lup and/

3 or down) without the shock producing effect ,

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• of the brate. seitin, .nd reies.in. .e the .

i load to maneuvered. '

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f. Delft 5cin,t - The bridge and trolley drives are provideel with a delf t point feature

which operates essentially the some ao de- i

, ecribed under 2(e) above for "tead float." I i

g. Slow-down !! alt switches - The bridge and trolley are provided with a set of limit evitches which are actuated N fore reach- {

Ing the maelmum travel Ilmit evitches.

Actuation of these evitches automatically limits the speed reference voltage to 25 percent of its full value. This provides *

• an automatic slowdown feature which limite deceleration produced by actuation of mast-mun travet 11stt switches or contact of {

bumpers with thwir stops.

. , *-1 The holot brakes are electrically connected so

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$3 as to release only when the motor la energized.

• From a stopped condition, the holet brates are .

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? i actually prevented from releasing until the motor *

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is producing torque. This le accomplished through a .

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• q I i torque proving relay which eenees armature loop current 4

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and delays rolesse of the brakes untti a preset y 'I level of current le reached. This prevente shock p producing load nog ea initiation of the hotating g motion.

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'E I" 5 NUREG-0554 Requirement Licensee's Response Evaluation / Comment

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,yg The bridge and trolley brakes are electrically

" ce connected so as to release only when the motor fi 8r to energized for normal operation. It le poe-1 alble to release these brakes by actuating the

'k) " drift point

• sultch with the motor deenergired.

)3 4 This la not regarded es a nefety hasard since no movement of the Ined le involved in the brake O!

release.

e 2.2 Manimum Critical Load

1. The crane should be designed to handle the The maalmum critical load (MCL) which will be (C]

manimum critical load (MCL) that w!11 be Imposed on the crane le the' reacto'r vessel head imposed. which with ite !!f ting device will weigh 105 tone.

I CD 2. A slightly higher design load should be The design rated load (DRL) to which the crane (C]

I selected for component parte that, are subject will be maintained and tested to 125 tone. The to degradation due to wear and esposure. MCL, which le actuelty the maximum working lood

• An increase of approximately 15% of the (MwL) , is 84 percent of the DRL. This margin design load for these component parts would of capacity prpeides for any degradation of com-be a reasonable margin. ponents which hight not be detected through our preventive malrltenance program, e

Devices which limit the holet motor torque out-put and thus the load on mechanical componente ere

'a . Inverse time delay overload relay on MG set AC motor - Thle relay le set at 150 percent of full load current and limite sustained .

Overloads. *

b. Rolet motor current Ilmit circuit - This electronic torque limit le set at 200 percent of full toed current and reprenente the upper pg limit of torque production of the motor. ,

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c. Instantaneous overeurrent relay - This relay , [3 is set to trip at 250 percent of full load on current for the holot motoe and serves as a ($

back up to the current 11mit c!reult ,

-J described in (b). I H

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snCIC-0554 Pequirement Lleenece's Responee Evaluation / Comment A more direct and flexible system for limiting the load on the crane le in the procese of design at thle time. Dio conalate of a load cell load detector with digital readoute and verlable tely paints. With this system a trip point mar be selected slightly above the load to be lifted '

which if exceeded would stop the motor and set the brakes. This system will effectively limit the stremo empettenced by the holettag erstem componente and protect the load from load hang-

• up conditions.

3. The MCL rating should be clearly marked on Only one contractor name plate was provided, les! - MCL rating should be clearly marked on the crane. which states only the design rated load for. the crane.

the main and aus11ery holet'. D ie is's 12-inch by 13-inch sign located near the center of the bridge.

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W 4. The PitL rating should be marked on the crane (C]

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• separately from the MCL marking. ,

2.3 (Terattnq Environment ,

1. D e ot* rating environment, including mastmum D e possibility,of entenelve surface condense- (T) and minimum pressure, maximum rate of pres- 'tlon was provided for by cleaning, priming, sure increase, temperature, humidity, and - and painting all structural Insulation outf aces emergency corrosive or hatardous conditions, in an approved manner, using non-hygroecopic

• ehould be speelfled for the crane erut electrical insulation, plating critical mechen-Alfting fluturen. Icel parte and terminale of electrical devices, )

and installing motor space heaters.

s for cranea inalde the containment structure, The crane is located in a nonpressure confining IT) - Since the crane le limited to use outelde of

• the closed tes sections of the crane struc= part of the reactor bu11 ding. The girders were pressure bounderles, the Licensee technically

, tute should be vented to avoid co11spee dur- of 4 sealed design with no need for venting or compiles with this requirement.

Ing containment pressurlastion. Drainage deelnage prowlsione 19WR).

ahould be provided.

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2.4 Material Properties O

1. De crane and lifting flatures for crane already fabricated or operating may be sub-ne cold-proof test of'the crane and nondestruc- IRI - The Licensee has Indleated that a cold-tive enemination of critical welds will be per- proof test of the crane will ba performed.

y gfi jected to a cold-proof test coneleting of a formed by NUC PR under the direction of EN DES. Verification that all requlrements of thl's item M single dummy load test se followes Mowever, these actielties must be scheduled at the convenience of other critical refuel floor will be included as part of thle test should be provided.

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,e jh NUREG-0554 Requirement Licensee's hosponse Evaluation / Comment

?(5 :r a. Me*at temperature of the structural mem-h(} t>ere ensential to the structural integrity a ha of the crane handling system should be at g below the minimum operating temperature.

b. The corresponding dummy load should be equal

, to 1.25 times the McL.

c. We cold-proof test should be followed by a nondestructive examination of welde whose f atture could result in the drop of a critical load.

I d. The nondestructive enestantion of critical gj areas should be repeated at 4-yr Intervals e or less. ,

2. Crance and lif ting flatures made of low-allor Cold-proof test of the crane and MDS l9l

• The Licenmee has agreed to cold. proof

• steel such as ASTM A514 should be cold-proof of critica1*welde ,w!!! be performed. test the crane.

tested in any ceae. . ,

3. Cast iron should not be used for load-bearing Cast iron was not used for lood-bearing [Cl componente. componente as required by NUREG-0554.

• 2.5 Setemic Design

1. The crane should be designed and constructed The selenic analyste of the reactor butiding lCl In accordance with regulatory poeltlon 2 of '

crane was performed by idealising the crene as .

Regulatory Calde 1.29. a lumped-mass mathematical model. The stiff-

• nees of the model to the stif fness of the crane girders. The trolley was asegmed to be rigid and was idealised in the mathematical model as algid links connecting the crane girders. The pg trolley was assumed to be pinned to the crane ,

I girdere in order to maximise the inertial ef fects of the trolley. The nazimum load on the crane during a setemic event was amoumed to be 150

. r)m

• kipe, which is 60 percent of the design rated gn loed. '

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o NUPF.G-05$4 pequirement Licensee's Reeronse Evaluation / Comment A model analysis was performed for motion trane-verse to the crane girders. The analyets con-oldered two cases of trolley positions one case for the trolley at the centerlane of the girdere and one for the trolley at the end. Selenic re-sponses were cateulated for each case by use of the reagense spectrum method of analyste. Accelera-tion response spectra at the elevation of the runway were taken from the selsele analyste of the reactor butiding and used as input to the mathe-matleal model. A damping value of one percent of critical damping was used in the response analyste for both the operating base earthquake and design base earthquake evento.

In the both the longitudinal and vertical diree-g tions, the crane was deetgned for pseudostatte H setente loads caused by the seco period accelera-Y tion (IPA) of the acceleration response spectrum .

at the evaluation of the crane runway.

The seismic loads were combined on an absolute beste with other loads in the appropriate loading combinations. Selenio 1 bade from only one hor t- .

egntal direction at a time were considered to occur almultaneously with the vertical direction.

2. The Mct. plus operational and setemically INI - The seloste analyste amoumed only an induced gendulum and evinging load ef fects on underhook load of apreestaately fit of McL.

the crane should be considered in the deetgn of the trolley, and they should be added to

• the troller weight for the design of'the bridge.

• a 2.6 Lame 11ar Teartnq

1. All weld jointo whose fatture could result leo nondestructive esamination (NDE) cf welde was [F) - The Licensee has suggested that the 125% N in the drop of a critical load should be made at the time of fabrication. Subsequent load test be substituted for ' nondestructive nondestructively esamined. load testing at 125% of rated capacity has esamination of load-twaring welds. Typically the proved their soundness. , soundness of critical welde la estabitehed on*the , #,

beats of either a volumetrie esamination on a

• eo proof-test followed by a surface esamination.

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.o NUsEG-0554 Requirement Licensee's Response Evaluation / Comment ogg 13 4 2. If any of these weld joint geometries would At the time of design and f abrication of the [Tl - The Licensee review of structural'detalte

) be oueceptible to lameller tearing, the base reactor building crane, lameller tearing was not provides an adequate basta for eliminating (l30 metal at the jointa should be nondestruc . considered. lameller tearing as a significant potentist 3@ contributor to structural failure.

d3 tively enemined.

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A review of actual fabrication drawinge indicatee

[$5 that structural and welding details were used which

• would neither be expected to cause not be vulner-able to lameller tearing. The deelga le such that tee and corner welded connectione in the matn structural members are loaded primertir in sheer or compreeston and are made with f!11et velde of 5/16-inch or smaller.

There le no evidence or suggestion in available technical literature to indicate that welds of thle else would induce sufficient shrinkage strees I to create lameller tearing.

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2.7 Structural Fatique

1. A fatigue analyste should be conaldered for The critical load bearing rotating parte listed IC) - The Licensee also states in the FSAR the critical load-bearing structures and com- below were analyzed for cumulative damage from that *stremes in a!! etructural and mechanical ponente of the crane handling system. The fatigue. The endurance limit was taken as a parts will be f ar below the endurance Ilmite for cumulative fatigue seage factore should re- conservative 40 percent of tenette etsength, infinite life of the various materials'for both flect ef fects of the cycile loading from *both Since the maulmum stress for each part le lose l the rated crane capacity and the test load of 1254 .

the construction and operating periode. than one-half the endurance limit, no f atigue capacity. All loads to be handled are below rotei .

damage le Indicated. capab!!ity. Therefore, stremece should never reach allowable working stresses. Imade on the Maelmum Endurance structural parts will very but will not reverse.

Part Material Streme (kel) Limit (kal) The only critical parte with stress reverente w!!!

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be the rotating parte, and these are provided with Drum A36 10.g 23.2 single failure protection. Since the crane le to

• operate under normal temperature conditlene and Drum Bhaft 4140 22.0 44.0 eince the streme levels are below the endutance l limit for infinite life, testing of the crane Ring Gear 4140 20.0 44.0 to 125% of rated capacity provideo reasonable e as assurance that the crane will not fall while F3 Pinion 4340 29.5 72.0 handling a apent f uel cask.* .

D1 A

I Pinton Gear The Licensee has ateo demonstrated that the Il Shaft C1140 21.0 44.0 mantmum strese emperienced by critical perte in h" ,.

less than 1/2 the endurance Almit.

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$ 2.0 Melding I'r ocedu r e s

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3 1. Preheat temg'eratures and postweld heat-treat- All welding was done in accordance with the lC)

N ment intress relief) temperatures for all AW9 Dt.1 8tandard Code for welding in matiding O weldmente should be specified in the weld Construction. All welde requiring preheat

'$ procedure. and post-heat were done by procedures which opeelfled the required temperature.

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2. welde described in the reccoumandations of The welda whose failure could result in the drop lTI - Although the 125 percent overload test did

, Section 2.6 nhould h p4Jtweld heat treated of a critical load were not postweld heat not provide the streme relief inherent in poetwald in accordance with Subarticle 3.9 of ANS D1,1, treated. The only eEemInstion made for these heat treatmente, the fact that the crane le made

" Structural welding Code.* welds was visual. The 125 percent overload test of carbon eteel, has been Anatalled in a moderate and conservative strese levels were used to environment, and has been operated for about 10 ensure adequate design. years supports the concluelon that little can be gained in the way of further reeldual strees rollet.

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u g 3. Safety Features .

3.1 Ceneral 3.2 Auxiliary Systeme

1. All aualliary hotating systems of the main , n e aust11ery hoist is used in handling some [Tl - The Licensee has Indicated that sever'al crane handling system that are employed to crltiest loads. The maalmum criteria load (MCL) additional features contributing to preventing Ilft or mantet in handitng critical loads handled by the'auntilary holet le limited by the load drop following a single failure have been should be single failure proof. Browns terry Technical Specification to 1,000 applied to the auntilary hotata. In addition,

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poundo over opent fuel assemblies in the opent the Licenace has committed to limiting loade

. . fuel storage pool. 'ne design rated load IDal.) carried over the opent fuel pool on thle holet and maximum working load (MWL) le 5 tone. to less than 1,000 lb.

D e aust11ery hoist to designed as a ningle- . .

f atture-proof Ilf ting system encept for attachment points. The following features are includede

a. There are two independent hotating ropeo each terminating at a crosehead at the hook (one- d part double reeving). '

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b. The drum to provided with structural devices to limit the drop and prevent disengagement h

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from braking system should the drum, shaft, or ,

bearings fall. g H

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.m Le j$ c. The holet la equipped with two spring met f8 electrically released brakes connected to the j :r drum through mechanically separate gear E (? tralne. Each brake le elsed for 125 percent h3 of the full Inad motor torque at the point of

{ appilcation.

d. Two independent overhotet Ilm!t evitches of dif ferent design are provided to prevent "two blocking.*

2. Aunillary systeen or dual componente should See FSAR paragraph 12.2.2.5.2 for detalle of IC) - Licenece responnes contained in FSAR he provided for the main holating mechanism comp!!ance, paragraph 12.2.2.5.2 and responses to iteng so that, in came of subsystem or component 3.3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.5 and 4.7 demonstrate failure, the load will be retained and held compilance for the musillary systeme and dual I in a stable or immobile safe position. componente.

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3.3 Electric Control Systeme .

1. The automatic controle and limiting devices See FSAR pare (laph 12. 2.2.5.2 for detalle of IT) - Although the Licensee has not espiteltty should be designed so that, when disordere compliance. '.* stated compilance with thle requirement, it due to inadvertent operator action, compo- le implicit in the response to APCSR g-1 and in nont malf unction, or disar rangement of sub-a system control functions occur eingly or in the FSAR that the automatic controle and limiting devices are properly designed.

combination during the load handi tng, and as-euming no components have failed in any sub-synteng, these disorders will not prevent the handling system from stopping and holding the load. *

2. An emergency stop button should be added at All limit switches, overspeed evitches, over- (T) - FSAR Sectione 12.2.2.5.2.j 5 k state that .

the enntrol station to stop all motion. eurtent relays, etc., are provided as safety the cratee is provided with a manual (-magnetic) backup devlees and are not intended for normal main power supply contactor that can be ofwrated operating use.

manually from the cah, by a pushbutton in the cab, *

• and by pushbutton on the pendant control. This q contactor controle the power supply motions. N3 for all motione. Asecondandseparatecontactor,f or circuit breaker, la provided in the power (3 supply to the main crane feed ralle, which.can be [" r*

operated by three emergency etcP pushbuttone on, gpi the operating floor (elev. 664' 0*). - -J .

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A Table 3.1 (Cont.l e

NURre-0554 Requirement 1,1censee's peeponse avsluntion/_ Comment 3.4 rmergency Repaire

1. Means should be provided for using the, An extenelve inventory of spare parts and stan- lP) - The Intent of the NUREG to to g*rovide devices required in repairing, adjusting, or dard plant maintenance equipment will allow in- a means for emergency repair, not just to have an seplacing the f ailed component (s) or ' place repalte to be made of any credible com- *entensive space parte inventory." As an alter- i

'nuhsystem(s) when failure at an active ponent fa!!ure. native to repairing in place, means may be component or subsyster A's o ;urred and the provided for safely moving the Immobilized hand-load is sopported and te **.4 in the safe Separate Licensee responses (see 4.9-4 and 5.1-5 11ng system with load to a safe laydown area that

,' " pre ttacqwith the hand 11rt ed!*n !sseobile. following) Indicate that esaual operation of has been designed to accept the load while brakes Is ave 11able. repairs are being made.

4. elotating Machinery ,

i 4.1 Peeving System j 8 1. Design of the rope reeving system (s) should Both the h nd and load block have phyelcelly (Tl - The rope teeving system to redundant and

[ be dual with each system providing separately separate sheave systems for the two ropeo. A meets the intent of NUREG-0554. Refer to rsAR _f I I the load balonce on the head and load load balance le thus established on that portion rigure 12.2-2 12.2-224 . j blocks through the configuration of ropes and of the block associated with the unfalled rope j rope equaliser (s) . system. j l

2. W e marinum load (including static and inertle For a MCL of 105 ton & for the main hoist the maa- lNl - The maximum dynamic rope stress identifled forcesi cm each individual wire rope in the imum dyramic rope str'eso is 15.14 percent of the by the 1.!censee exceeds the maximum allowed by d sal 'eeving system with the MCL attached a break tg strength. This le ulth 15 percent NUREG-0554.

shou;J not-exceed 104 of the manufacturer's impact. he 15.5 percent given in response to published breaking ettength, to APCSS 9-1 did not include impact. l

' ' i For a MCL of 1,000 pounds for the auxillary ( ,

hoist the maalmum dynamic tope strees le 2.06 percent of the breaking strength. ,

3. D e maximum fleet angle from drum to lead The naminum fleet angle from drum to lead sheave lT) - The Licensee's resp ~is,e le atceptable. The .

eheave in tha load block or between Ind!- le 2.96*. In the high hook pooltlen the Licensee han Indicated that the maximum fleet  ;

vidual sheaves should not exceed 0.061 rad maximum fleet angle between aheavec le 4.15 de- angle between oheaves le 4.15* and decreases to (3 1/2*) at any point during holating except grees. This angle decreases to the suggested 1.5* within 8 feet 3 inches. The NUREG limit is that for the last 1 meter of maximum lif t 1.5 degrees within 8 feet 3 Inches of hook 3.5* (3 f t) . The distance associated with 3.5*

elevation the fleet angle may increase travel. A minlesse amount of handling le done equale 3.5' or 1.06 maters. Therefore, the N '

alightly. The use of reverse bende for run-ning wire ropes should be limited.

near the high hook poeltlon. Intent of NUREG-0554 in satisfied.' h

• i No reverse bonde are used la this reeving ,

f gn system. M .

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'h I{/ Table 3.1 (Cont.)

b a

71

$ NUREG-0554 pequirement Licensee's Response S Breluation/ Comment

.g 4. The equaliser for stretch and load on the The eque11 ing device le a double-ended

r rope reeving system may be of either beam er hydraulio cylinder se shown in Figure 12.2-22d ICI - The equalizing device shown in FSAR Figure

() sheave type or combinations thereof. A 12.2-22d satleflee the NUREG requirement.

of the FSAR. This is a modified beam type with ,

@ dual cope reeving system w!Lh individual internal damping. The equalitation rate is gi attaching pointe and means for balancing or

' limited to 6 inches per minute by a velocity fuse distributing the load between the two oper- arrangement in the case of a rope break.

ating rope reeving systems will permit

, either rope system to hold the critical load and transf er the critical load without excessive shock in the case of f ailure of the other rope system.

5. The pitch diameter of running sheaves and The running aheaves are 27.3 and 24.1 times the drums should be selected in accordance with (Cl rope diameter and the equalising aheaves are g

the recoaseendations of CMAA specification 20.1 times the rope diameter. This le in

>d 170.

jf accordance with CHAA Spec 970 which allows ration of 24 to 1 and 12 to 1, respectively.

a The ratio of the main holot drum diameter to the rope diameter le (9.6s1.

The ratto of the muzillary hoist drum diameter i to the rope diameter le 38.4:1.

These exceed the requiremente of the OtAA 70.

6. The dual reeving system may be a single rope The, redundant reeving system te f rom each end of a drum terminating at one of shown in Figure 12.2-22d of the IC]

the blocks or equaliser with provietone for FSAR.

equa11 ing bess-type load and rope stretch, ,

with each rope designed for the total load.

• Alternately, a 2-rope system may be used from each drum or separate drums using a sheave equaliser or beam equaliser or any other com-bination that provides two separate and com-plete reeving systems.

• (pa

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Table 3.1 (Cont.)

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HUREG-0554 Re<}utrement Licensee's Response Evaluation / Comment 1 4.2 Drum Support *

1. The load holeting drum on the trolley should See paragraph 12.2.2.5.2.c and (T) - Paragraph 12.2.2.5.2.c of the FSAR states be provided with structural and mechanical 12.2.2.5.2.d of the r8AR for statement that safety plates are provided at each end and I

estety devices to limit the drop of the drum of compliance. at the center of the drum. The Lleenece claims '

and thereby prevent it from disengaging from that these plates will limit the drum move-its holding brake system !! the drum shaft or bearings were to fall or fracture. ment in the hortrontal or vertical directions to 1/4-inch. Although no positive statement has been made that these plates prevent the n

drum from disengaging from its holding brake system, it le judged that a 1/4-inch limit le acceptable and entleflee the intent of the NUREG.

4.3 Head and inad Blocks

1. The head and load blocks should be designed The reeving system for the main holet shown In (C)

'I to maintain a vertical load balance about Figure 12.2-22d of the FSAR is dual and maintains l

[ the center of Ilft from load block.through vertient balance and allgnment with both ropeo '

I head block and have a reeving system of dual intact.

deelgn. *

2. The load-block assembly should be provided The opent fuel cask le the only load for which (M] - The Licensee does not comply with thle re-with two load-attaching points (hooks or other dual attaching polnte from the lower block are quirement in that the load block assembly has only means) so deelgued that each attaching point provided. %e load-block assembly illustrated ' ,one attachment point (i.e., lower block hook).

will be able to support a load of three t!'mee in Figure 12.2-22d le schematic to the ex**nt y Only one load lopent fuel caski has been provided the load letette and dynamic) being handled that the safety cables are actually safety links with dual attachment points. In lieu of without permanent deformation of any part of that were made from alloy steel bare (ASTM A322). redundant attachment pointe, the staff has

• the load-block assembly other than loca11:ed These links can support three times the weight attain concentration in areas for which addt- of the critical-load they handle. These links accepted (MUREG-0612, Appendle C) a single tional materlat has been provided for wear. attachment point If the safety factor le were designed with a safety factor of 5.1 based increased to lost to compensate for loss of on the critical load they handle, h e links are the olngle-f allute-proof feature. '

not loaded during normal caek handling but are ,

pinned to the redundant lif ting beam. With the

• pin connection the Impact would be negilgible in came of a hook failure. The redundant links were tested to 127 percent of their design rated load. g a >

Dual attaching pointe from the lower block are e hg .,

not provided for any other critical loads and the . O safety factor for the attaching ellnge varies from 4.06 to 7.13. D ere are critical loads that are . . .

[

tp handled that are above 10 percent of the load-carrying capability of the hook.

y p

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i Table 3.1 gCont.)

NUREC-0554 Requirement Licensee's Response Evaluation / Comment

3. The individual com pnente of the vertical As shown in Table 12.2-15 of the FBAR, all IC] - The Licensee's response le accepteble holsting system componente, which include the mechanical parte are designed with a safety because the vertical hotating nynten is designed head block, rope reeving system, load blocke factor of 5 under normal condltions. to handle greater than 5 times the MCL.

and dual load-attaching device, should each be designed to support a static load of 2004 of the MCL.

4. A 2004 static-type load test should be per- The hooks were proof tested to 2004 rated cepec- (Pl - The Licenace has indicated that the formed for each load-attaching hook. Heasure- ity with subsequent magnetic particle examina- hook has been static load tested to 2001 and ments of the geometric configuration of the tion prior to installation. After Installation, then magnetic particle tested. The Licenace han hooks should be made before and after the a complete 1:56 load test was performed on the not stated that the safety llnen (used in liens test and should be followed by a nondestrue- crane. of redundant hook) have been static load tested tive examination that should conelet of volu- to 2004. Surface and volumetric NDE of the load metric and surface esaminations to verify the Ho static load tests were performed on the blocks have not been performed.

soundnenn of fabrication and ensure the integ- reeving erstem at the manufacturer's plant.

h co rity of the hooks. The load blocke should be 3

nondestructively enemined by surface and The loei blocks were not nondestructively exam- a volumetric techniques. ined by surface and volumetric techniques.

4.4 stolating speed i

1. Mastmum hotating speed for the critical load The masimum full load cleting speeds ares main [C] - The Licensee's anulmum full load hotat'ing should be Ilmited to that given in the " slow"' book 5.33 fra and auxiliary hook 22.6 fra. speed of 5.33 fra meets the intent of the column of rigure 70-6 of CMAA Spec f 70. F>pty hook speede of 275% of these values are MUREC and only represente a 7% decrease in Conservative industry practice limits the provided by the tapered speed load characterts- reaction time itime for corrective action for tice of the CE menspeed drives. The line speeds holeting seovement and the potential behavior of rope line speed to 1/4 m/s (50 fpm) at the for full load holating ares main holet 32 fpm failed rope). The line speed la below that drum. and avulltery hoist 22.6 fpm. Each of these recosamended during handling of MCL (i.e., 32 fpm speeda.can increase by a factor of 2.75 wit 3e versus 50 fpm recomm nded). Therefore, th'e empty hook conditions. Licensee's response to conaldered *dequate a to a settsfy the MUREC-0554 requirement.

4.5 Destqn Against Two-Blocking

1. 3

1. The mechanical and structural com p nenta of The Licennee has opted for' the altbtnatives pro-the complete hotating system should have the req stred strength to restet f ailure if the vided in NUREC-0554 (see 4.5-2 below). , [ .

hot ting system should 'two-block

• or if " load t.n ',

• M hangu," should occur during holeting.

e s

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Table 3.1 (Cont.)

NUQEG-0554 pequirement Licensee's Response Evaluation / Comment i

2. As an alternative, the protective control pedundant limit switches of dif ferent designo Irl - The Licennee has Indicated that redundant

' erstem to prevent the hotating system from are provided to stop the upward motion of the limit switches of dif ferent denign are provided two blocking should include se a alnimums- book in the event of operator negligence. to stop the upward motion of the book to prevent t "two blocking.* No verification has been made ,

o Two Independent travel-11mit devices of The travel limit switches are inspected and test- that the limit switches are activated by separate  ;

dif ferent designs and activated by sepe- ed in accordance with ANSI 830.2.0-1976. Fre- mechanical means or that they operate to rate mechanical means. quent and periodic inspection requirements have deenergire the holet drive motor and main power been imposed through NUC PR Divleton Procedures supply.

O These devices should de-energine the holet Manual N74M15.

drive motor and main power supply.

3. The protective control system for load hang- toad hangup le connervatively provided for by [7] - With renpect to load hangup, the Licensee up, a part of the overload protection system, designing for 275% full load motor torque at in FSAR Paragraph 12.2.2.5.2 han indicated that '

should connlet of load cell systeme in the stall while the actual value le 200 percent. the torque of all motors in Ilmited by the j

, delve train or motor-current-sensing devices Concerning the tenting of the current-timiting corrent-timiting device to 2006 rated for the i g or mechanical load-limiting devices. device on the hoist motor, the current Ilmit should be set at 200 percent current ratings holotn. In addition, overload protection le by Instantaneous overcurrent releyn on the j

, l thle value should be vertfled on the hoint do motora set at about 250% rated current and by regulator. Ths instantaneous overcurrent inredse time delay overload devices on the oc [

. relays and the overload relays should also motore of the n-g set to trlp at 150% full be tested. NUC FR 4111 revlee the associated load current. Taking into conalderation that electrical maintenarice instructions to include the mechanical and structural parts were l sthese teste. ' designed to 2754 full load motor torque l under stall conditions, the NUSEG-0554 j rwquirement le setlefied. e

4. The mechanical holding brakes and their con- [C]

trole should include the capability to with-

• ntand the maximum torque of the driving motor if a malfunction occure and power to the ,

f

, , {

driving motor cannot be shut off. *

. 5. The auxillary holet should be equipped with The aux 111ary handling system has part direct lT]

[ two independent travel-11mit switches to lif t or whip style reeving that requires no l l prevent two-blocking. 1ower or upper block. This system in provided

' , g e

wlth two up-travel limit switches to stop the 19 l<

holet, set the brakes, and prevent hook over travel.

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Table 3.1 (Cont.)

I Licensee's Response Evaluation / comment

$ NUPEG-0554 Itaquir ement b

3 4.6' Lifting Devices .

3)  :

$ 1. Lifting devices should be connervatively Several slings are provided for handling various Information provided by the Licennee le insuff t-

$ designed with a dual or auxiliary device or covers and shleid pluge. The minimum safety cient for en evaluation in thle area. No in-A combination thereof. Each device should be factor for these ellnge le 4.06 bened on the formation has been provided concerning spacint 3' designed or selected to support a load of actual load to be !!fted. Redundant design wne lifting devices other than the reactor preneure not used since none of the loads using e11nga vessel head strongback. In the Intter came the

() three times the load (static and dynamic) g being handled without permanent deformation. are handled over the open reactor veneet. fact that this device has e " factor of safety of 4 bened on rated capacity" doce not address the Q

leaue of design with respect to meterial yletd stress or permanent deformation.

There are two lifting devices that may be used Information provided concerning olings to also with the reactor building crane over an open inadequate. The fact that ellnga are not used reactor pressure vessel. These devices are the over the open reactor vennel to not suf ficient ,

justification for a Inck of a " dual or '

dryer-separator oling and the reactor pressure veneet head strongback. The dryer-separator auxiliary device

• since the requireme'nte of NUREG-I sting has a safety factor of 5.55 based on rated 0554 are based on inade lif ted over objects other hj ca paci ty. The reactor preneure vessel head than the reactor veneet le.g., opent fuel in the s strong-back has a safety f actor of 4 based on fuel pool). Pront testing of elinge in accordance .

rated capacity. Both devices have been tested with ANSI B30.9 (phyolcal testing of a eling to 125% of their rated capsetty. ht twice rated carnetty) does not addrese ,

the question of design.

All eggetal !!! ting devices used with this crane The leeue of design requiremente for elings and

, were purchased on the MSSS contracts therefore, special lif ting devices le addressed In'more they will have to be analysed by the General detall in the guidelines of NUREG-0612. This Electric Company to determine conformance leeue should be separated from the basic question with ANSI N14.5-1970. of single-f allure-proof crane deelgn.

Al'1 olinge'us'ed on the refuel floor have been proof-load tested as speelfled in ANSI B30.9-1971. Some slings used on the refuel floor ,

are not tagged for Intended use. .

I 4.7 Nire Rope Protection

(

"I '

1. If sideldade cannot be avoided, the reeving both main and auxillary holet drums are provided [C]

i '

nyntem should be equipped with a guard that with guards to prevent the holeting ropes from would keep the wire rope properly located in leaving the grooves on the drum.

l the grooves on the drum. -

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Table 3.1 (Cont.)

NUREG-0554 pequirement Licensee's mesponse '

/ Evaluation / Comment f 4.8 Machinery Allqnment

1. Where gear trains are interposed between the holding brakes and the holating drum, these IC) - Review of Figure 12.2-224 of the FSAR shows gear trains should be alngle f ailure proof that the gear trains are interposed between and should be of dual design. the holding brakes and the holating drums.

FSAR paragraph 12.2.2.5.2d describes these gears as two apparate gearing systems, each with its own spring-act electrically releaned brake.

Each gearing system constate of a ring gear and '

pinion mounted at one end of the drum and a gear reducer. Therefore, the design is single failure proof and matteiles the NUREC requirement.

• 4.9 Iloist Breking System

1. The minimum holeting braking system should All aspects of these criterla are complied with.

include one power control braking system (not *

• ICI - The Licensee has indicated that all aspects mechanical or drag brake type) and two hold- of the criteria are compiled with. Documentation ing brakes. The holding brakes should be of the holsting braking gynten in the FSAR indt-etplied when power in off and should be auto- cates the following.

[ matically applied on overspeed to the full yo holding position !! a malfunction occura. 1. From paragraph 12.2.2.5.2.d of FSAR - The ,

I tholet holding) brake has sufficient torque Each holding brake should have a torque rating not less than 125% of the full-load holet- capac)ty to stop and hold a rated crane capac-Ing torque at point of application. " .ity load lowering at 125% of rated top speed.

', 2. From paragraph 12.2.2.5.2.1 of FSAR - All

• motione are provided by de motore driven from

• ' m-9 sets with regenerative braking under normal

, operation. Emergency automatic dynamic braking provides controlled lowering of the inad upon loss of electrical power together with f ailure of both brakes to set.

3. From paragraph 12.2.2.5.2.r of FSAR - A mechan-leal overspeed switch in provided on the main .

and austilary hotet drive motorn to trip at

, 1250 of top rated speed in either direction to j stop the hoist motor and set the holding brakee '

on the drum.

e f e M p

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- - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----~ --

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. . n {l Table 3.1 (Cont.)

ys a

..' g-c HUREG-0554 Requirement Licensee's Response Evaluation / Comment

- :0

')O

• 2. The minimum number of brak!ng systems that See 4.9-1 above.

? should be operable for emergency lowering [C) - Single failure of the regenerative braking

)$ E! after a ningle brake fa!!ure should be two system will result in two holding brakes for stopping and control!!ng the load.

1 Sr holding brakes for stopping and controlling jr) drum rotation, go

-3

?g 3. The holding brake system should be almgle failure proof 1.e. any component or gear (Cl - See 4.0-1 above.

train should be dual !! interposed between *

, the holding brakes and the holeting drums.

4. Provision for manual operation of the holet- See 4.9-1 above.

ing brakee should be included in the design (Cl - The Licensee has Indicated that this NUREG conditions. reg'Jlrement in satistled but no detalle are pro-vided.

I 5. Bridge and Trolley N

3 5.1 Braking Capacity . * *

1. The maximum torque capability of the delving The next larger standard else motor above that (Rl *- Present crane design does not comply with motor and bridge gear motion of reducer the overhead for trolley bridgemotion crane and basedcateulated wat selec,ted. Travel drive sites are this requirement. The Licennee has agreed to a on acceleration time as well as running braking system mod 1F! cation which will result should not exceed the capability of gear train torque. '

in compliance with the requirement.

and brakes to stop the trolley or bridge from .

the maximum speed with the DRL attached. As stated in our response to APCSS 9-1, the bridge and trolley brakes are not rated for man-Control and holding brakes shseld each be imum motor torque and the bridge han only one rated at 1008 of masamum drive torque that brake for each driving motor.

can be developed at the point of application.

Presently the bridge is provided with one 50 percent brake for normal stopping and a 100 ,

percent torque brake for holding. Both trolley l

brakes are 75% torque brakes. These brakes' torque

' ratings are gynerally in accordance with CMAA specification 870 when it la conaldered thle crane e

le both a floor and cab controlled machine. q

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Table 3.1 (Cont.) ,

'l #

f NUREG-0554 Requirement Licensee's Response Evaluation / Comment However to eatisfy the requirement the trolley braking system will be upgraded by increasing the torque rating of each brake to the maximum torque rating of the motor, and the bridge brak-ing system w!!1 be upgraded by relocating each bridge drive motor and adding an additional brake 8

between the drive motor and its reducer. Each of two delve brakes for each drive motor on the bridge or trolley should be rated for 100% of .

naminum driving torque of its respective motor.

• 2. 11 two mechanical brakes one for control and An adjustable time delay le provided for each (C) one for holding, adjusted with oneare provided, brake in each they should system lead-be backup brake. All brakes are actuated on inter-ruption of power for any reason.

ing the other and should be activated by release or shutof f of power. This applies to both trolley and bridge.

g

3. The brakes should also be mechanically

>J tripped to the *on* or " holding" poeltton All brakes are actuated on interuptitn of power IP) - The Licensee has not verifled that the f in the event of a malfunction in the for any reason.

brakes are mechanically tripped to preclude move-

• power supply or en overspeed condition. ment by the trolley or bridge if power le restored.

4. Proviolone should be made for manuel All brakes hav$ provisions for manual operation emergency operation of the brakes. (C) and none are foot oper,ated.

5. The holding brake should be designed so that

• See 5.1-4 above. ~

It cannot be used as a foot-operated slow- ICI down brake.

6. Drag brakes should not be used. No drag brakes are used.

(C)

7. Opposite-driven wheels on bridge o_r trolley All bridge wheels and all trolley wheels are that support bridge or trolley on their run- lC) '

ways should be mateb*d and should have iden- within a machine tolerance of 40.010 inch of the ,

Lical diameters. same diametet.

O

8. Trolley and bridge speed should be limited.

The speed !! mite indicated for slow operating The manimum trolley speed to 30.35 fpm, and the maximum bridge speed .le 54.1 fra. [Tl - CMAA spec. 970 for 125 ton MCb Ilmits the epeeds for trolley and bridge in Spec. CMAA og trolley speed to 30 to 50 fpm while the bridge DG 310 are recommended for handling MCLo. speed la limited to 50 f pm. The sam *1 mum bridge EU opeed of 54.1 fpm is judged satinfectory. . ) *

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Table 3.1 (Cont.) 5, 2W I NURLG-0554 Reta l t e nen t Licensee's Response

$ Evaluation / Comment (E

3 5.2 Safety stops XI O 1. Limiting devices, mechanclat and/or electrl- The bridge and trolley are provided with two lC)

$ cat, should he provided to control or prevent limit switches wired in series which decelerate R over travel mod overspeed of the trolley and the drives to dieep speed between the limit

r bridge. Buf f ers for bridge and troller switch actuatore and the maximum travet.

() travet should be included at the end of the  :

3 ralle. Four bridge bumpers and two trolley bumpers of g the spring type are provided.

2. Safety devices such as !! alt-type switches All limit switches, overspeed switches, over- lCl

, provided for malfunction, inadvertent opera- current relays, etc., are provided as safety tion action or failure should be in addition backup devices and are not intended for normal to and separate from the limiting means or operating use.

control devices provided for operation.

6. Drivers and controle I

$[ 6.1 Driver Selection I f

1. The maximum torque capability of the electric The calculated power requirement and the autor (Cl ,The Licensee's response complies with the motor delve for hotating should not exceed rating for the main holet,are identical at $3 NUREG requirement for the moln holat. For tSe rating or capability of the individual horsepower. , the auxillary holet the intent was entlefled by component of the holeting system required to . providing an overe f re of 1.14.

holet the McL at the moulmum design hoist The auxillery ho,let not'or is rated at 7.5 n.P.

speed. e while the esteulated requirement la 145, an overstre of 1.14.

2. A maulmum holeting movement of $ cm (3 in) The Dieleton of Nuclear Power (NUC PR) will per- (P) - The Licensee has agreed to perform would be en acceptable stopping distance. form a f_leid tes,t of the overspeed control de- a field test. It la not clear that thle vice as delineated in item 6.2 of the scoping test w!!! demonstrate comptionee with document for Freoperational Teat No. TVA-2 as thle suggestion.

recommended by EN DES. .

3. For elaborate control systems radio control, 17) - The Licensee states in pSAR paragraph or ultimate control under unforeseen cond!- 12.2.2.5.2k that a circuit breaker can be tions of distrees, an " emergency stop button

• operated to interrupt the power supply to the should be placed at ground level to remove main crane feed ralle. Three emergency stop F3 power from the ' crane independently of the pushbuttone are located on the operating floor.

crane controle. hj g

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Table 3.1 (Cont.)

,\

s g

1 Ntf_pFG-0 55 4 Re.luirement Lleenmee's Response '

/ Evaluation / comment 6.2 Driver Control Systems t

1. h control system (s) provided should include The control system complies fully with Item 6.2 (C]

conaldaration of the holsting (raising and of MUREC-0554.

Irwer ing) of all loads, including the rated load, and the ef fec*e of the Inertia of the rotating hoisting machinery much as motor armature, shafting and coupling, gear reducer, and drum.

2. If the crane le to be used for lifting spent fuel elemente, the control system should be ne reactor butiding crane is not used to handle lC) - The crane le not intended for use to lift adaptable to include Interlocks that will Individual opent fuel elements, therefore, inter- opent fuel elements (Ref. FSAR paragregh

, locks as recommended in Regulatory Culde 1.13 12.2.2.5.1).

prevent trolley and bridge movements while are not includ=J in the design.

the load is being hoisted free of a reactor vessel or a ntorage rack, as may be recom-mended in Reg. Culde 1.13.

N l 6.3 Malfunction Protection (Drivers)

[ 1. Means should be provided in the motor control The intent of these criteria le met by the lC) circulta to sonne and respond to such items safety features !!sted in paragraph 12.2.2.5.2 ,

an excessive electric current, excessive of FSAA. "

motor temperature, overspeed, overload, and ,

overtravel. .

2. Controle should be provided to absorb the e See 6.3-1 above. '[C]

kinetic energy of the rotating machinery and stop the holeting movement rettably and safely through a combinatim of electrical power con-trole and mechanical braking systems and , ,, ,

torque controle if one rope or one of the dual reeving systems should fall or if, overloading ,

or an overspeed condition should occur.

6.4 Slow Speed Drives

1. If jogging or plugging is to be used, the control circult*should include features to n ese features are inherent in the General Elec- [C] See Assessment 2.1-4. 63 tric Company's mazepeed DC adjustable voltage ,

prevent, abrupt change in motion. systeme used on both holdt and travel drives. Qg

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[p NUMEG-0554 pequ ir ement Licensee's Response Evaluation / Comment a

3 2E 2. Drif t point in the electric power system Same as 6.4-1 above. lCl See Asseenment 2.1-4.

5 when provided for bridge or trolley movement

,rj nhoule. De provided only for the lowest

[ oper sting speeds.

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$ 1. safety devices such as limit-type switchen See $.2 above. [Cl

'T provided for malfunction, inadvertent opera-tor action, or fatture should be in addition to and neparate from the limiting means or

, control devices provided for operation.

6.6 Control Statione

1. The complete operating control system and The bridge mounted cab has complete operating [Cl provisions for emergency controla for the and emergency controle.

I overhead crane handling system should prefer-ably be located in a cab on the bridge.

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2. Additional operator stations should have A duplicate set of controls for all functione [C]

control systems sim!!ar to the main station. except the main hotet in provided on a bridge .

mounted retractable pendant, e

3. Manual controls for holating and trolley '. Not addressed by the Licensees however, t ile le movement may be provided on the trolley, whl1e '

not a requirement.

manunt controle for the bridge may be located nn the bridge.

4. Cranes that use more than one control station Interlocks were provided that permit only one [C]

nhould be provided with electrical interlocks control station to be operable at any one time.

that permit only one control station to be operable at any one time. ,

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a 7. Installation Instructions 7.1 C*neral

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1. Installation instructions provided by the An operating and maintenance manual satisfying (Cl

• hh i manuf acturer should include a f ull explana- the Intent of thle paragraph was supplied by 1 .

tion of the crane handling nystem, Lto con- the crane manufacturer. -

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train, and the limitations for the system and . . bJ t should cover the requirements for installa-tion, tenting, and preparations for operation. '

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NUREG-0554 pelutrement Licensee's Peoponne Evaluation / Comment 7.2 Construction and Operating Feriode

1. Alter construction une, the crane should be De construction and permanent plant regulgements (Pl - The Licennee indicatell that visual ingpec-thoroughly inspected by nondestructive exam- were the same. A thorough performance test and tion was the only NDR process uned. Article 2.6 Ination and load tested for the operating 1254 capacity load test were made prior to une staten that all weld joints whose f ailure could phane. The extent of nondestructive emanina- as permanent plant equipment. Vinual inspection result in the drop of a critical load should be Lion, the procedures used, and the acceptance was the only NDE process used on the crane after nondestructively cammined.

criteria should be defined in the design it was erected.

apecification.

2. If allowable design stress limits for the [Cl - The Licensee's response that the allow-plant operating service are to be exceeded during the construction phase, added innpec-able deelgn stress !!alte for plant operating service were not exceeded.

tion supplementing that described in Section 2.6 should be specified and developed.

[ 8. Testing and Preventive Maintenance I 8.1 Generat

1. Information concerning proof testing on com- Records of proof test on.hookh are maintained in IT) tenents and subsystems that was required and ' the permanent recordst f!!e at the plant.

per formed at the manuf acturer's plant to

• verify the ability of components or subsysteep .

to perform should be avellable for the check-Ing and testing performed at the place of in-sta!!ation of the crane system.

e.2 Static and Dynamic load Tests

1. ne crane system should be static load tested The acceptance tasts included complete perfor- (C) at 125% of the MCL. The tents should include mance tests at no load, 504, 1000, and 1250 rated all positions generating maulmum strain in capacity.

the bridge and trolley structures and other lesitionn as recomunende4 by the designer and manufacturer. * -. N

2. The crane handling system should be given See 8.2-1 above. Q lC) full per formance teste with 100% of the MCL ,

for all speede'and motions for which the sys- , tn e M

tem is destyned.

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? NUREG-0554 Re au ir emant Licensee'e Desponse E- Evsluatlon/ Comment

.3 y  % The features provided for manual lowering of a the load and manual movement of the bridge [N] - No Information has been provided by the E and troller during an emergency should be Licensee to verify that these features were tested N during acceptance testing.

O tested with the HCL attached to demonstrate T the ability to function me Intended.

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", 0.3 Two-nlock Test

1. When equipped with an energy-controlling Two-blocking le protected agelnet by redundant '(PI - The Licenece in ces device between the load and head blocks, the se to 4.5-2 han

' overholet Ilmit owltches and is not conaldered furninhed the crane with two independent travel complete hotating machinery should be allowed a credible occurrence, limit awltches which is an acceptable alternative to two-hlock during the hoisting test (load bloca limit and safety devices are bypassed). in accordance with NUREG-0612 Appendia C. The Licennee, however, should commit to verification of proper functioning of these switches to comply with the requirements of Appendia C.

g 2. The complete holating machinery should be No load hangup test was performed. Thle poest- lF] - The Licennee has indicated interlock w tested for ability to susteln a load hangup bility was provided for by designing the struc- circuitry rp condition by a test in which the load-block- will prevent this. The Licensee ,

I attaching points are secured to a fined tural and mechanical parts of the crane for 2754 has agreed to perform testing (Licenmee'n of motorfull load torque at stall. The allow-anchor or an excessive load. response, Section 4.5-3) of interlock circuitry able stress for thle condition was 0.9 yield which will result in compilance with the which gives a edfety fact 6r of more than 2 based acceptable alternative of Appendia C, NUREG-0612.

on ultimate.

(SeeSeck. ton 4.5-3.)

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3.4 Operational Teste

1. Operational teste of crane systems should be performad to verify the proper functioning of (C) - The Licensee states in FSAR Section Ilmit switches and other safety devices and 12.2.2.5.3 that " operational tests and visual the ability to perform as designed. inspections are to be made at periodic intervals

• during the life of the crane to demonstrate ite ability to mately perform its inten'ded functions." .

l l 8.5 Maintenance

1. The MCL rating of the crane should be estab- The MCL capacity wili be maintained at 100% of linhed as the eated load capacity, and the DRL capacity, ICI - This response in inconstatent with that H des *pn rating for the degradable portion of provided concerning Item 22-2 and ,must be th' handling mynten should be ident!! led to clarified. hg oinain the margin available for the mainte- . O nance program. .

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NUREG-0554 paquirement Licensee's Respog Evaluation / Comment

2. The MCL nhould be plainly marked on each side Only one contractor nameplate was provided. [N) of the crane for each holating unit. This stated the design eated load for the main i and aualliary holet. This le a 12-inch by 18-inch sign located near the center of the bridge.

• 9. Operatin<j Manual

1. The cr ane d= signer and manuf acturer should Ederer Incorporated provided TVA with eelectricat lNI compliance with thle item could be provide a manuel of information and proce- equipment and mechanical maintenance reanuele demonstrated.

dures for use in checking, testing, and oper- specifying lubrication, inspection, and pre-ating the crane. ventive maintenance regelrementop however, an operating manual as deserthed in ite's 9.0 of g NUREG-0554 was not supplied.

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2. The operating requiremente for all travel movements (ver tical and horizontal movements ,

or rotation singly or in combination) incor- ,,

porated in the design for permanent plant ,

cranes should be clearly defined in the oper- =

ating mannat for holsting and for trolley and ,

bridge travel. *

10. Quality Assurance

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1. A quality aneurance program should be estab- The reactor building crane le listed as a CSSC (Tl - The Licennee cannot provide full compilence tiehed to the entent necessary to include the item in Appendia A of the Browns Ferry Nuclear with this item since the crane was designed, recommendations of thle report for the design, Plant Operational Quality Assurance Manual. fabricated, installed, and tested' prior to the fabrication, installation, testing, and opera- Therefore, all inspection, testim , and opera- leeuence of MUREG-0554.

tion of crane handling systems for safe hand- tional requiremente, as listed in the Divleton 11ng of critical loados Procedures Manuale N7852 and NT45M15, are audit- l able by NUC FR Quality Assurance Staff.

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TER-C5257-181

4. CONCLUSIONS This summary is provided to consolidate the evaluation,of Section 3 to identify additional Licensee actions necessary to achieve verbatim compliance with the provisions of NUREG-0554 [1], and to provide an overall evaluation and recommendation concerning the load-handling reliability of the Browns Ferry reactor building crane.

4.1 PARTIAL COMPLIANCE ITEMS The Browns Ferry reactor building crane partially satisfies the following specific guidelines of NUREG-0554. Actions necessary to achieve verbatim t

compliahce with these criteria are noted.

NUREG-0554 Item , verbatim Compliance Actions l 2.4-1 (cold-proof testing) Perform cold-proof test of the crane, including verification l

that all items listed in Section 2.4-1 of NUREG-0554 are complied with.

2,4-2 (cold-proof test, Perform cold-proof test of crane low-alloy steels) ' appropriate lifting devices.

• 2.6-1 (weld joint examination) Perform surface examination of weld joints where failure could result in the drop of a critical 3 cad.

3.4-1 (emergency repairs) Demonstrate that the crane will hold critical loads while repairs are effected or that alternative means of transferring the load to a safe laydown area are available.

4.3-4 -(static test of load Perform surface and volumetric attaching hooks) nondestructive examination of load blocks.

4.5-2 (two blocking-protective Provide verification that limit -

control systems) switches are activated,by separate mechanical means and function to deenergize the hoist drive motor and main power supply.

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TER-C5257-181 NUREG-0554 Item verbatim Compliance Actions-5.1-3 (braking system, loss Demonstrate that braking systems of power are mechanically tripped-to preclude movement of the trolley or bridge when power is restored.

6.1-2 (hoist stopping distance) Perform a field test of the crane to establish if the hoisting system achieves an acceptable stopping distance.

7.2-1 (post-construction period Perform nondestructive examination inspection) of all accessible weld joints l whose failure could result in a

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drop of a critical load.

- 8.3-1 (two blocking test) Perform testing of over hoist limit switches to verify operability to prevent a two blocking event.

8.3-2 (load hangup test) Perform testing of instantaneous overcurrent relays and the overload relays of the hoisting machinery to demonstrate the ability to sustain a load hangup condition.

4.2 NON-COMPLIANCE ITD4S The Browns Ferry reactor building crane does not comply with the following specific guidelines of NUREG-0554. Actions necessary to achieve verbatim compliance with the guidelines are noted".

NUREG-0554 Item Verbatim Compliance Actions 2.2-3 (MCL identification) Mark the crane' MCL clearly on the crane.

2.5-2 (design load effects) Provide seismic and operational analyses to demonstrate that use of 100% MCL will not exceed the design cri- teria of the trolley and bridge (original an~alysis assumed an under-hook load of approximately 71% of MCL) .

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TER-C5257-181 NUREG-0554 Item Verbatim Compliance Actions

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4.1-2 (maximum wire rope load) Replace the wire rope with one that has suitable breaking t

strength such that the maximum load (static and inertia force) '

with MCL attached will not exceed 10% of the manufacturer's i published breaking strength.

4.3-2 (load block attaching Provide dual attachment points points) for all loads, or if single attachment is used, increase the

, safety factor to 10:1 to equal the safety factor required for

. the wire rope.

8.2-3 (hoist-manual lowering Demonstrate, by actual operational

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test) test with MCL attached, manual lowering of the load and movement of the bridge and trolley.

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4.3 OVERALL EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS The reactor building crane at the Browns Ferry Unit 1 does not fully comply with the requirements of NUREG-0554 [1] for a " single-failure-proof" crane. It is, however, designed with substantial consideration for the prevention of a load-handling accident and could be found by the staff to satisfy the intent of the general requirement for the provision of a specially designed, highly reliable handling system for loads less than 75 tons upon implementation of the following: I Brake modifications. Bridge and trolley braking systems should be modified, as proposed by the Licensee, to provide control and holding brakes rated at 100% of maximum motor torque.

Test program. The Licensee has agreed to perform a cold-proof test of the crane to satisfy NUREG-0554 requirements pertaining to brittle fracture.

An expanded test program should be conducted which includes the verifi-cation of other aspects of crane design. Such a test should address:

1. Acceptable protection against brittle fracture by complyin.g with the provisions of NUREG-0612, Article 2.4.1.

2. Verification that, following the failure of an active component of the drive system (bridge, trolley, or hoist drive motor or brake), either l

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TER-C5257-181 i

suitable procedures and physical features are available to' repair or '

l replace the f ailed component while the MCL is maintained in a stable

' condition or that, without repair, the MCL can be moved and placed in a -

( safe laydown area. (Articles 3.4-1 and 8.2-3) ~

3. Verification of redundancy of electrical components (limit switches, relays) provided to prevent two-blocking and overload in the event of a load hangup. (Article 4.5-2) l

4. Verificacion that maximum hoist stopping distance is acceptable j

(approximately 3 in) . (Article 6.1-2)

5. Verification that braking system design precludes inadvertent bridge, i

trolley, or hoist motions upon' restoration of electrical power l .

following an electrical power f ailure. (Article 5.1-3)

Post-test examination. Following the operational / cold-proof test, a one time examination should be conducted to increase the assurance of future integrity of critical structural elements including the following:

1. A surface examination of accessible weldments in load-bearing joints.

2. A surface examination of the hook assembly to detect flaws affecting' structural integrity.

Routine inspection. The Licensee should-ihstitute an inspection program complying with the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2, enhanced to compensate for variations from NUREG;-0554er' q0irements in certain areas.

1. Rope replacement criteria of ANSI B30.2-19,76, Atticle 2-2.4.2, should be made more stringent to accommodate the differet,tial between the NUREG-0554 requirement concerning the ratio of maximum load to breaking strength and that provided in the Browns Fe,rry crane.

2. The periodic inspection requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976, Article 2-2.1.3, should be enhanced to include a visual inspection of I

accessible welded joints associated with load-bearing members to detect cracking in areas subject to potentially high residual stresses.

Lifting devices. The acceptability of lif ting devices, both .those specially designed and general purpose devices (e.g. , slings) should be established on tne basis of conformance with ANSI N14.6-1978 or ANSI B30 . 9-19 71, as appropriate, in accordance with the requirement of NUREG-0612. Dual attachment points should be provided for loads which, if

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dropped, could result in effects in excess of the criteria provided in NUREG-0612.

,43_ _

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TER-C5257-181 Miscellaneous *

1. A label plate should be provided on the crane to clearly identify the MCL. . .

The Browns Ferry Unit 1 crane cannot be found to satisfy single-failure-proof criteria for loads in excess of approximately 75 tons due to the lack of seismic analysis for such loads. The acceptability of this situation should be evaluated on the basis of additional information which should be required of the Licensee to identify:

o The weights of each load in excess.of 75 tons expected to be carried.

o The duty cycle, or hours per year, each load in excess of 75 tons is expected to be carried.

I The estimated total duty cycle of the crane (i.e. , hours / year the crane is expected to be under load).

o Tne accleration forces or recurrence interval associated with the seismic event during which the crane has been evaluated to be capable of carrying the MCL.

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TER-C5257-181

5. ' REFERENCES

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l. " Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis" USNRC, December 1975 ,

Regulatory Guide 1.13 l 2. " Overhead Crane Handling Systems for Nuclear Power Plants" l

USNRC, February 1976 Regulatory Guide 1.104 .

3. Standard Review Plan 9.1.4, " Fuel Handling System" Branch Technical Position APCSB 9-1, " Overhead Handling Systems for

~

Nuclear Power Plants"

.USNRC, NUREG 75/087,. November 1975

4. " Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants"

-USNRC, May 1979 NUREG-0554

5. " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" USNRC, July 1980 NUREG-0612

6. TVA ' '

Letter to NRC l 30 June 1976

7. T. M. Novak (NRC)

Letter to H. G. Parris (TZA) .

Subject:

Request for information i regarding Browns Ferry reactor building crane l 4 August 1980

8. L. M. Mills (TVA)

Letter to T. A. Ippolito (NRC) . Sdbject: Response to request for l'

information regarding Browns Ferry reactor . building crane

. 10 February 1981

9. L. M. Mills (TVA)

Letter to T. A. Ippolito (NRC).

Subject:

Revision to letter of Feb. 10, 1981 ,

11 March 1981

10. L. M. Mills (TVA) .

Letter to T. A. Ippolito (NRC) .

Subject:

Revised response to several questions addressed in letter of Feb. 10, 1991 27 bby 1981

- -edSid-

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