ML20090H628
| ML20090H628 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 03/14/1984 |
| From: | Bomberger C FRANKLIN INSTITUTE |
| To: | Singh A NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18026B065 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TAC-07974, TAC-7974, TER-C5506-337-3, TER-C5506-337-338-33, NUDOCS 8403160371 | |
| Download: ML20090H628 (25) | |
Text
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- l TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS (c-10)
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 NRC DOCKET NO. 50-259. 50-260, 50-296 FRC PROJECT C5506 NRC TAC NO. 07974, 07975, 08438 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13 NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-81 130 FRC TASKS 337/338/339 Prepared by Franklin Research Center Author: C. Bomberger 20th and Race Streets Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group leader: I. H. Sargent Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer: A. Singh March 14, 1984 This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use or the results of such use, of any information, appa-ratus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights. Prepared by: Reviewed by: Approved by:
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1 TER-C5506-337/338/339 coNTzurs Section Title Page 1 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Purpose of Review . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Generic Background . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.3 Plant-Specific Background . . . . . . . . . 2 t 2 EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1 General Guidelines . . . . . . . . . .. . 4 2.2 Interim Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . 17 3 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.1 General Provisions for Ioad Handling . . . . . '. 20 3.2 Interim Action . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4 ' REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 gA 111 hhj Franklin
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l 4 TER-C5506-337/338/339 roasuono This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center und:r a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical as0ictance in suppoct of NBC operating reactor licensing actions. The technical evaluation was conducted in accordance with criteria established by ! th3 NRC. Mr. C. R. Bomberger and Mr. I. H. Sargent contributed to the technical pesperation of this report through a subcontract with WESTEC Services, Inc. J i l ( N / v d Franklin Research Center -'
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TER-C5506-337/338/339
- 1. IwrmococTIOu l.1 PURPOSE OF REVIEW This technical evaluation report h=sts an independent review of j general load-handling policy and procedures at Tennessee valley Authority's Browns Ferry Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3. This evaluation was performed with the following objectives:
o to assess conformance to the general load handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Inada at Nuclear Power Plants" [1] , i Section 5.1.1 . o to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of j NUREG-0612, Section 5.3. l 1.2 GENP.RIC na N annUND i , Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the Nuclear Regulatory Comunission (NRC) staff to systematically esamine staff licensing
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i criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power. plants to ensure the safe handling of heavy loads, and to recommend necessary changes in these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 [2] to all power reactor licensees, requesting information rencerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel. i l The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy l Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation l tras that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating j plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not cdequately cover the major causes of. load handling accidents and should be - upgraded. In order to upgrade measures provided to control the handling of heavy loads, the staff developed a' series _of guidelines designed to achieve a two-part objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The first part of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines - identified'in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handling
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TER-C5506-337/338/339 systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated so that their probability of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The second part of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Sections 5.1.2 through
! 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load-handling systems in areas where their l failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are i provided, in addition to those required for all load handling systems, to 1
ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-i failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably J small. Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria. A defense-in-depth approach was used to develop the staff guidelines to ensure that all load handling systems are designed and operated so that their pec,bability of failure is appropriately small. The intent of the guidelines
- 18 to ensure that licensees of all operating nuclear power plants perform the
} followings o define safe load travel pa"b, through procedures and operator training, so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not
- carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment o provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system.
Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612. Section 6 of NUREG-0612 recommended that a program be initiatt.d to ensure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants. l l 1.3 PIANF-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND On December 22, 1980, the NBC issued a letter (3] to Tennessee valley ( Authority (TVA), the Licensee for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3, requesting that the Licensee review provisions for handling and control of h avy loads at Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3, evaluate these provisions with ecspect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional
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TER-C5506-337/338/339 information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines. On June 3, 1982, TVA provided a response [4] to this request. Based upon this informatien, a draft Technical Evaluation Report (MR) was prepared and informally transmitted to the Licensee for review and comt. On October 28, 1982, a telephone conference call was held between the NBC and TVA to discuss the draft TER. In response to this telephone call, TVA provided additional information on January 25, 1983 [5], which has been incorporated into this final TER. 1 i 4-MW Franidin Research Center 4 o, # n r .n m .
TER-C5506-337/338/339
- 2. EVALUATION This section presents a point-by-point evaluation of load handling provisions at Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3 with respect to NRC staff guide-lines provided in NUREG-0612. Separate subsections are provided for both the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 and the interim measures of N 612, Section 5.3. In each case, the guideline or interim measare is presented, Licensee-provided information is summarized and evaluated, and a conclusion as to the extent of compliance, including recommended additional e
action where appropriate, is presented. These conclusions are summarized in Table 2.1. 2.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES The NRC has established seven general guidelines which must be met in order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the. handling of heavy loads. These guidelines consist of the following criteria from Section 5.1.1 ' of NOREG-0612: Guideline 1 - Safe Ioad Paths Guideline 2 - Load Handling Procedures ' Guideline 3 - Crane operator Training Guideline 4 - Special Lifting Devices 3 Guideline 5 - Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed) Guideline 6 - Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) Guideline 7 - Crane Design. These seven guidelines should be satisfied by all overhead load handling systems 'and programs used to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems. The Licensee's verification of the catent to which these guidelines have been satisfied and the evaluation of this verification are contained in the succeeding paragraphs. i l i l A Nd Frenidin Research Center 4cm .#n.r, n m e
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TER-C5506-337/338/339 2.1.1, Overhead Heavy Inad Handling Systems b o. Suasary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions he r.i====e's review of overhead load handling systems identified the following headling systems to be subject to the criteria of NUREG-0612:
- , o reactor building crane (Units 1, 2, and 3) -
o two-operator, self-propelled, full-revolving, truck-type, rubber-tired, diesel-powered truck crane (yard) o 4-ton, hook-type, manual chain hoist (Units 1, 2, and 3). j The Licensee also provided an extensive list of more than 100 overhead j load handling systems which have been excluded on the basis that a load drop , would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay f heat removal for one of the following reasons: , 1. More is sufficient physical separation of the overhead handling system from any system or component required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. I 2. The system or component over which the load is carried is out of service while the load handling system is used.
- 3. The load weighs less than 1000 lb and is not considered to be a heavy load. This weight is a conservative estimate of a fuel assembly and
, its handling device. In a subsequent submittal [5], the Licensee provided additicnal informa-tion to substantiate exclusion of the followings o 3-ton iib crane The Licensee made a commitment to initiate a design change report by June 1,1983 requiring a stop to be installed to 5 prevent the 3-ton jib crane from swinging into the criticial electrical
- panels within its area of coverage.
i o 7.5-ton electric wire rope hoist: The Licensee confirmed that sufficient physical separation exists to preclude any safety impact on an 18-inch EECH header shown within the hoist area of coverage on j drawings.47W200-6 and 47W200-13. 4 i l
- b. Evaluation and Conclusion l The Licensee's exclusion of above-mentioned systems and numerous others i from compliance with NUREG-0612 is acceptable on the basis of TVA's justifica-l f'k .*du4mFranhan Research Center
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l l I- '- TBB-C5506-337/33V339 tions and additional commitment to incorporate a stop on the 3-ton jib crane to prevent its swing into the critical electrical panels within its arwa of ; coverage. i 2.1.2 Safe IAad Paths (Guideline 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(111 i
" Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to i minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. These load paths
- should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and
!. clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be hwidled. Deviations from defined load paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee." l
- c. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusion
- , The Licensee stated that loads, safe load paths, and handling procedures for the reactor building crane are contained in Browns Ferry Mechanical a
Maintenance Instruction (MI) 119. Safe load paths for the truck crane are shown in Browns Ferry drawings 37W300-1, 47W220-1, and 47W220-2. l The 4-ton manual chain hoist (47B/C) is used over hatches to remove various equipment from lower floors to the elevation-565 floor as shown on 1 Browns Ferry drawing 44N330. When operating over the hatches shown on Browns Ferry drawings 47W220-6, ~7, -13, and -14 during unit operation, the hoist must not lift heavy loads over the core spray pumps and piping. l In a subsequent submittal (5), the Licensee made a commitment to complete the following actions:
- 1. MKI-119 will be revised by June 1, 1983 to require the person in j charge of each heavy load lif t to walk the predetermined load path for l the benefit of the crane operator and the flagman.
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- 2. MMI-119 will be revised by June 1,1983 to require plant operational j' . review committee (PORC) approval for any deviation from a safe load path which will require a heavy load to be lifted over spent fuel or functional safe shutdown equipment.
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- b. Evaluation Drawings indicate that the Licensee identified safe load paths for the reactor building crane and safe load areas for the 24-ton truck crane and the various hoists. In addition, these load paths and area.J sre defined in plant procedures contained in W8I-119.
Although the Licensee has not indicated that load paths will be marked, this objective of providing visual aid for the operator and flagman is accomplished by having the person in charge of the lift walk the predetermined load path to ensure that the path is clear prior to the start of the lift. However, the Licensee should ensure that the duties of the path walker and the flagman are clearly defined in appropriate procedures. Further, the method proposed to implement the review and approval of safe load path deviations is consistent with the intent of NUREG-0612. I
- c. Conclusion and Recommendations Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3 comply with Guideline 1 of NUREG-0612 contingent upon Licensee verification that proposed changes in MMI-119 have .
j been acceptably implemented and that the duties of the flagman with regard to safe load handling are defined in appropriate procedures. 2.1.3 Inad Handling Procedures (Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Sectic,n 5.1.l(2)] ! " Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for heavy loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel er safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612. These procedures should includes identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the j steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the loads defining the safe load paths and other special precautions." i a.- Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions i l The Licensee stated that h'andling procedures for the reactor building ' crane are contained in MMI-119. Handling procedures for the - truck crane will l
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TER-C5506-337/338/339 1 be developed and implemented to meet the requirements of the interim guidelines delineated in NUREG-0612. Administrative controls for the 4-ton manual chain hoist will be invoked to ensure that safe handling operations are maintained over these hatches during unit operation. In a subsequent submittal, the Licensee made a commitment to incorporate administrative controls for the truck crane and the 4-ton manual chain hoist into MMI-119 by June 1,1983 and
-to provide the information on this change by June 30, 1983.
- b. Evaluation M1-119 provides procedural controls consistant with NUREG-0612 for the movement of heavy loads on the refueling floor by the reactor building crane.
Further, the Licensee's commitment to implement administrative controls for the loads handled by the truck crane and the 4-ton manual hoist meets the intent of Section 5.1.l(2) of NUREG-0612.
- c. Conclusion and Recommendation Development of safe load paths at Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3 is consistent with Guideline 2 of NUREG-0612 contingent upon implementation of acceptable administrative controls for the truck crane and the 4-ton manual chain hoist.
2.1.4 Crane operator Training [ Guideline 3, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(3)1
" Crane operators should be trained, qualified, and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' [6]."
- 4. Suimmary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licenses stated that qualification requirements for reactor building crane operators are in Browns Ferry Standard Practice BF 4.3, " Crane Operator-Qualification and Authorization," which implements the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976.
Operators for the truck crane are journeyman operators from the Inter-national Unit of Operating Engineers, Tocal 320. The Licensee stated in a 4% d!j Franidin Research Center A Dramen of the hennhn inesswee
TER-C5506-337/338/339 subsequent submittal that, by June 1, 1983, a review will be performed to determine compliance with ANSI B30.5 with regard to truck crane operator training and qualification. Qualification of operators of hand-powered chain hoists is not required. j b. Evaluation j Crane operator training, qualification, and conduct described in BF 4.3 4 is consistent with the intent of Section 5.1.l(3) of NUREG-0612. Further,
- although operator training outlined in ANSI B30.2-1976 is not required for j, such handling systems as the truck crane and the 4-ton manual chain hoist, the Licensee should ensure that indoctrination and training covering Browns Ferry I administrative controls for these load handling systems are in effect and that this program complies with applicable requirements of ANSI B30.5, " Crawler, i Inconotive, and fruck Cranes"; and ANSI B30.16, " Overhead Boists (Underhung) ."
- c. Conclusfon i Training and qualification of crane operators at Browns Ferry Units 1, 2,
- and 3 is performed in a manner consistent'with Guideline 3 of NUREG-0612.
1 2.1.5 Special Lifting Devices [ Guideline 4, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 (41) i "Special lif ting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978 , (7], ' Standard for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Neighing 10,000 pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials. ' This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy . loads in areas as defined above. For operating plants certain i inspections and load testa may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard. In addition, the stress design factor i stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined , maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imperted on the handling , ' device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only the weight (stactic load) of the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device." A, s JM aon Franklin Research C. enter ae m mensa
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- a. Summary of Licensee statements and conclusions
. The following special lifting devices have been identified by the
' Licensee to be subject to compliance with the criteria of this guideline: '
- o spent fuel cask rotator f o spent fuel cask redundant link assembly o reactor pressure vessel (RFv) head strongback o steam dryer / moisture separator sling.
For each of these devices, a detailed comparison was made between the j design, fabrication, and acceptance testing of each , device and the applicable criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978. Design margins for the cask rotator, cask redun-
- dant link assembly, and the dryer / separator sling are in compliance with ANSI criteria of 3 on yield strength and 5 on ultimate strength. Design margins
- for the RPR head strongback are in compliance with one exception, the cruci-i form structure, which has a design m' a rgin of 4.8 on ultimate. The Licensee stated that this is adeqdately compensated for by a requirement that the device have a design margin of 4 for all components on yield strength.
The Licensee stated that initial load tests were performed for the cask rotator and the dryer / separator sling which satisfy the ANSI criteria for 150% i load tests. In addition, the cask redundant link assembly will be load tested , to 150%. For the head strongback, however, a cated load test was performed to 130% only, followed by nondestructive examination (NDE) of all load bearing welds. Further testing to 150% is not considered to be necessary by the } l Licensee due to infrequent and specified uses of this device. l . Regarding programs to ensure continuing compliance of these devices, the Licensee stated that annual load tests of these devices are impractical. Therefore, periodic visual and NDE inspections will be performed as allowed by l ANSI N14.6-1978, Section 5.3.l(2) . Visual inspections will be performed prior to each use, whereas NDE will be performed at longer intervals (5 or 10 years, to be selected); longer inspection intervals are believed warranted by the Licensee due to the limited . frequency of use of these devices. l l l
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- b. Evaluation ,
Although not in strict compliance with the criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978, the detailed comparison which has been performed by the Licensee clearly
- demonstrates that design and fabrication of these devices was performed in a t
manner consistent with the standard, design margins adequately satisfy the standard, and it is evident that these devices will provide a high degree of r l load handling reliability. Further, pe,rformance of (or commitment to perform) substantial overload tests adequately provides proof of workmanship during fabrication of these devices. Programs that will be implemented to ensure l continuing compliance also appear to be satisfactory based upon the Licensee's
- commitment to comply with Section 5.3.l(2) of ANSI N14.6-1978. It is also agreed that relaxation of the periodicity of NDE beyond one year is reasonable based on the reduced service of these devices.
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- c. Conclusion and Recommendation
.! Design, fabrication, and programs for continuing compliance of special lifting devices at Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3 are consistent with the criteria of Guideline 4. i l 2.1.6 Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed) (Guideline 5,'NUREG-0612, j Section 5.1.l(511 1 ' "Lif ting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guideline of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings' [8). However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be-the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the ! sling should be in terms of the ' static load' which produces the taaximum static and dynamic load. Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with I which they may be used." l l c. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that all slings used with load handling systems cubject to NUREG-0612 criteria are inspected and tested in accordance with Browns Ferry MMI-102 (Rigging Equipment Program) which implements the requirements of ANSI B30.9-1971. Dynamic _ loads are not considered to be' a l (
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TER-C5506-337/338/339 problem for loads handled by the reactor building crane. Maximum fuel load hoisting speeds are 5.33 fps (main hoist) and 22.6 fpm (auxiliary hoist) . In addition, the crane control system is a GE stepless, DC adjustable, cottage drive system which assures smooth acceleration and deceleration and further reduces dynamic loading of the slings.
- b. Evaluation Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3 satisfy the requirements of this guideline to a large degree on the basis that current nocedures for the selection and
^ use of slings are in accordance with ANSI B30.9-1971. Further, it is agreed that dynamic sling loading considerations may be disregarded for this crane due to the relatively slow hoisting speeds and the smooth operating charac-teristics of the crane' control system. i
- c. Conclusion Selection and use of slings at Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3 is performed in a manner consistent with Guideline 5.
2.1.7 Cranes (Inspection, Testing and Maintenance) (Guideline 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1. (6) 1 "The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes, ' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power operation. ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be perfc.cmed daily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, tests, and maintenance should performed prior to their use.)"
- a. . S_ummary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions l
The Licensee stated that inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements for the reactor building crane are contained in Browns Ferry MMI-ll7, which l implements the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976. anidin
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1 TER-C5506-337/338/339 ANSI B30.2-1976 is not applicable for inspection, testing, and maintenance of the truck crane. - These requirements are imposed by ANSI B30.5-1968 (Crawler, Iccomotive, and Truck Cranes), and implemented in Browns Ferry leEI-130. Periodic inspections are performed by the TVA Power Services shop crane inspection team in accordance with the requirements of MMI-130. Inspection and test requirements for the 4-ton manual chain hoist are contained in Browns Ferry MMI-102 which complies with ANSI B30.16-1973,
" Overhead Bolsts (Underhung) ."
In a subsequent submittal, the Licensee stated thats o Browns Ferry electrical maintenance instruction EMI-2 currently provides an adequate electrical checkout of the reactor building crane o Ibye reeving checks are currently required in frequent inspections by Division Procedure Manual DPM N74M15. Browns Ferry MMI-ll7 will be revised to reflect this requirement by June 1,1983.
- b. Evaluation Crane inspection, testing, and maintenance at Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3 are consistent with the guidance in NUREG-0612 in that MMI-il7 is based on ANSI B30.2-1976. The Licensee indicated that MMI-il7 is being revised to incorporate frequent inspection requirements for rope reeving and that elec-trical checkout of the reactor building crane is adequately covered by EMI-2.
In addition, the use of ANSI B30.$ and ANSI B30.16 inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements for the yard crane and the 4-ton manual chain l l hoist meets the intent of NUREG-0612. 4
- c. Conclusion Inspection, testing, and maintenance of cranes at Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3 is consistent with Guideline 6 of NUREG-0612 based on the Licensee's verification of compliance with ANSI B30.2, ANSI B30.5, and ANSI B30.16, 2.1.8 Crane Design (Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(7)]
"The crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and
- guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry branklin Research Center a on w N re m u. ,
1 TER-C5506-337/338/339 T l Cranes' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric overhead Traveling Cranes' (9]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI B3C.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in . lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the i specification is satisfied."
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- a. Summary of Licansee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee stated that a review of the reactor building crane design indicates that the crane meets the requirements of CMAA (1975) and ANSI B30.2.
The truck crane was not analyzed in accordance with CMAA-70 and ANSI R30.2 because these standards address the design of multiple girder, overhead, and gantry cranes. Purchase specifications of this crane required that all applicable parts of ANSI B30.5-1976 be met.
- b. Evaluation .
Crane design for the Browns Ferry reactor building crane and the yard truck crane meets the intent of NUREG-0612 based on compliance t.o CMAA-70/ ANSI B30.2 and ANSI B30.5, respectively.
- c. Conclusion Design of cranes at Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3 is consistent with Guideline 7 of NUREG-0612.
1 2.2 INTERIM PROFECTION MEASURES The NRC has established six interim protection measures to be implemented at operating nuclear power plants to provide reasonable assurance that no heavy loads will be handled over the spent fuel pool and that measures exist to reduce the potential for accidental load drops to impact on fuel in the core or spent fuel pool. Fcur of the six interim measures of the report are Guide-l line 1, Safe Ioad Paths; Guideline 2, Icad Handling Procedures; Guideline 3, Crane operator Training; and Guidaline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance). The two remaining interim measures cover the following criteria: De
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- l. Beavy load technical specifications
- 2. Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.
The status of _ the Licensee's implementation and the evaluation of these , 4 interim protection measures are summarized in the succeeding paragraphs of ' this section. , 2.2.1 Technical Specifications (Interim Protection Measure 1, NUREG-0612, l Section 5.3 (1)1
" Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7,
' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building,' for PWR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' Crane Travel,.' for BWR's, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementa-tion of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1."
- a. Evaluation Review indicates that Browns Ferry Technical Specifications Section 5.5.C prohibits loads in excess of 1000 lb from being carried over spent fuel in the spent fuel pool.
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- b. Conclusion Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3 comply with this interim protection measure.
I 2.2.2 Administrative Controls (Interim Protection Measures 2, 3, 4, and 5, NUREG-0612, Sections 5.3. (2)-5.3 (5) 1
- ' Procedural or administrative measures [ including safe load paths, load handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection] ...
can be accomplished in a short time period and need not be delayed for
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- a. Summery of Licensee Statements and Conclusions '
an=== ries of Licensee statements and conclusions are contained in discussions of the respective general guidelines in Section 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7. b.- Evaluations, Conclusions, and Recommendations Evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations are contained in
- discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, I 2.1.4, and 2.1.7.
2.2.3 Special Reviews for Heavy Icads Over the Core [ Interim Protection Measure 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3 (6)] 4 i
"Special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel internals or vessel inspection tools. This special review should include the following for these loads: (1) review of procedures for installation of rigging or lifting devices and movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and *
- conciser (2) visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes, i
slings, and special liftinrJ devices to identify flaws or deficiencies that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (4) verify that the crane l operatoes have been properly trained and are familiar with specific L procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of operations, and content of procedures."
- a. Summary of Licensee Statements and conclusions The Licensee stated that a special review for this interim measure was
- performed during the implementation of -interim guidelines for the reactor building crane and is currently in stI-119.
- b. Evaluation and Conclusion Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3 comply with the criteria of Interim l
Protection Measure 6 on the basis of the Licensee's verification that specific requirements are completed. l
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- 3. coNCLuszoM l
1 This summary is provided to consolidate the results of the evaluation .. 4 contained in Section 2 concerning individual NIC staff guidelines into an o overall evaluation of heavy load handling at Browns Ferry Units 1, 2, and 3. i'. , o overall conclusions and recommended Licensee actions, where appropriate, are J' provided with respect to both general provisions for load handling (NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1) and completion of the staff recommendations for 4 interim protection (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) . 2
- - 3.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR LOlW BANDLING The NRC staff has established seven guidelines concerning provisions for l handling heavy loads in the area of the reactor vessel, near stored spent j fuel, or in other areas where an accidental load drop could damage equipme_nt ,
required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. The intent of these ' guidelines is twofold. A plant conforming to these guidelines will have , developed and implemented, through procedures and operator training, safe load travel paths such that, to the maximum extent practical, heavy -loads are not 5 , carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. A plant ' conforming to these guidelines will also have provided sufficient operator g. , , t' w training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment; ,, sq l inspection 'to ensure reliable operation of the handling system. As detailed / [ , in Section 2, it has been found that load handling operations at Browns Fert/ k k t l - Units 1, 2, and 3 can be expected to be conducted in a highly reliable manner consistent with the staff's objectives as expressed in these guidelines. (( ' [%
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9, 3.2 INTERIM ACTIONS The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) certain measures
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that should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance .that handling of \ t , heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner 'until final implementation of /4 \ l the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1 is complete. .Specified - o measures include the implementation of a technical specification to prohibit }{l i /- the handling of heavy loads over fuel in the ' storage pools compliance with 4 A/m y x x .Q
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s .. TER-C5506-337/338/339 1 l Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of load s handling procedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program, (< including component repair or replacement, as necesssry, of cranes, slings, "i t and special lif ting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to i I s j .i v component failure. rialuation of information provided by the Licensee j, i indicates;that these actions either have been satisfactorily implemented or i will be implemented in a timely manner at the Browns Ferry plant. {' ' s _N' (s t , p s, > I t 4a /,
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- 4. REFERENCES
- 1. " Control of Heavy I4 ads at Nuclear Power Plants" NRC, July 1980 NUREG-0612
- 2. V. Stello, Jr. (NRC)
- Letter to all Licensees
Subject:
Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel May 17, 1979
- 3. NRC Letter to Tennessee Valley Authority
Subject:
Request for Review of Heavy Load Handling at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Units 1, 2, and 3 ,' Decen:bar 22, 1980
- 4. D. S. Kam!ner (TVA)
Letter to D. B. Vassallo (NRC)
Subject:
Control of Heavy Loads June 3, 1982
- 5. D. S. Kansner (TVA)
Letter to D. B. Vassallo (NRC)
Subject:
Control of Heavy Ioads January 25, 1983
- 6. American National Standards Institute
" Overhead and Gantry Cranes" ANSI B30.2-1976
- 7. American National Standards Institute
" Standard for Special Lif ting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials" ANSI N14.6-1978
- 8. American National Standards. Institute
" Slings" .
ANSI B30.9-1971 l
- 9. Crane Manufacturers Association of America,1975
" Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" .
CMAA-70 y j}}