ML20042A226

Twenty-second Set of Interrogatories

ML20042A226
Person / Time
Site:	Clinch River
Issue date:	03/18/1982
From:	Finamore B, Weiss E HARMON & WEISS, National Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club
To:	NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD)
Shared Package
ML20042A222	List: ML20042A221 ML20042A226 ML20042A230 ML20042A234 ML20042A239 ML20042A245 ML20042A253
References
NUDOCS 8203230222
Download: ML20042A226 (17)

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.g7 !"713 P 3 OI UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION _

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD i Before Administrative Judges:

Marshall E. Miller, Chairman Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.

Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr.

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In the Matter of )

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} Docket No. 50-537 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY )

PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION )

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY )

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(Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant) )

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NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.

AND THE SIERRA CLUB TWENTY-SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO STAFF 1

Pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.740b, and in accordance with the 4

Board's Prehearing Conference Order of February ll, 1982, Intervenors, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and the Sierra Club, request that the attached interrogatories be answered fully, in writing and under oath, by one or more officers or employees of Staff who has personal knowledge thereof or is the closest to having personal knowledge thereof. If the interrogatories are answered by more than one 8203230222 820318 gDR ADDCK 050CO537 PDR

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2 person, whether or not he or she verified the answers, and whether or not he or she is an officer or employee of Staff, such person's name and title should be set forth together with an identification of which interrogatories he or she is responsible for.

Each answer to an interrogatory shall be preceded by a copy of the particular question to which the answer is responding.

Each question is instructed to be answered in six parts, as f ollo ws .

Answer to Question  :

(a) Provide the direct answer to the question.

(b) Identify all documents and studies, and the particular parts thereof, relied upon by Staf f, now or in the past, which serve as the basis for the answer. In lieu thereof, at Staff's option, a copy of such document and study may be attached to the answer.

(c) Identify principal documents and studies, and the particular parts thereof, specifically examined but not cited in (b). In lieu thereof, at Staff's option, a copy of each such document and study may be attached to the answer.

(d) Identify by name, title and affiliation the primary Staf f employee (s) or consultant (s) who provided the answer to the question.

3 (e) Explain whether Staff is presently engaged in or intend to engage in any further, ongoing research program which may affect Staff's answer. This answer need be provided only in cases where Staff intends to rely upon ongoing research not included in Section 1.5 of the PSAR at the LWA or construction permit hearing on the CRBR. Failure to provide such an answer means that Staff does not intend to rely upon the existence of any such research at the LWA or constructicn permit hearing on the CRBR.

(f) Identify the expert (s) if any, which Staff intends to have testify on the subject matter questioned, and state the qualifications of each such expert. This answer may be provided for each separate question or for a group of related questions. This answer need 1 not be provided until Staff has in fact identified the e xper t (s) in question or determined that no expert will testify, as long as such answer provides reasonable notice to Intervenors.

As used herein, " documents" include, but are not limited to papers, photographs, criteria, standards of review, recordings, memoranda, books, records, writings, letters, telegr ams, mailgrams, correspondence, notes and minutes of meetings or of conversations or of phone calls, interoffice, intra-agency or

4 interagency memoranda or writcen communications of any nature, recordings of conversations either in writing or upon any mechanical or electronic or electrical recording devices, notes, exhibits, appraisals, work papers, reports, studies, opinions, surveys, evaluations, projections, hypotheses, formulas, designs, drawings, manuals, notebooks, worksheets, contracts, agreements, letter agreements, diaries, desk calendars, charts, schedules, appointment books, punchcards and computer printout sheets, computer data, telecopier transmissions, directives, proposals, and all draf ts, revisions, and differing versions (whether formal or informal) of any of the foregoing, and also all copies of any of the foregoing which differ in any way (including handwritten notations or other written or printed matter of any nature) from the original.

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INTERROGATORIES I. Contention 5 Intervenors request that the interrogatories in this section be answered by the relevant official (s) or employee (s) of the NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

1. In light of the analysis in the NASAP report, for each principal chemical and physical f orm in which plutonium-containing material is found in the CRBR fuel cycle:

a. identify the chemical and physical form of such material;

b. identify where such material is found in the CRBR fuel cycle (e.g. , fuel f abrication plant, reprocessing plant) ;

c. identify whether such material is directly weapons-usable, i.e. , does not require f urther chemical processing;

d. identify what quantities of such material are considered to be of " safeguards significance,"d/ (i.e. , give the approximate 1/ Intervenors use the term " safeguards significance" to define a significant quantity of material in relation to the amount of nuclear material needed for a nuclear explosive.

(Cf. NASAP Report, DOE /NE-0001/2, pp. 3-3 8 and 4-4. ) The use ot-this definition is meant to avoid the need for Staff to release details concerning weapons design.

6 mass needed for a clandestine fission explosive (CFE));

e. Indicate Staff's estimate of the time needed to convert such material into a form suitable for a CFE;

f. define the response time Staff deems to be

adequate for detecting the diversion of an amount of such material considered to be of safeguards significance;

g. identify the degree of Staff's assurance (e.g., 99 percent confidence level) that detection will occur within the period specified in subpart (e) above..

2. In determining what constitutes an adequate safeguards system, does Staf f conservatively or otherwise assume that a crude CFE could be designed and constructed by a small group of people (perhaps one) , none of whom has ever had access to the classi51ed literature, without necessarily using a great deal of technological equipment or conducting any experiments? (See OTA Report, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, pp. 140-141.)

3. In light of recent analyses and recommendations by the General Accounting Office, see GAO, Assessment of Various Aspects of this Nation's Nuclear Safeguards

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7 Program (EMD-80-4 8) (1980) , describe what steps have been taken to coordinate nuclear threat definition policy and levels of protection provided to similar nuclear materials by DOD, DOE, and NRC. To the extent differences among the three agencies still exist with respect to the application of physical security and material control and accounting at facilities that possess or handle strategic quantities of special nucles material, specify what such differences are, with specific reference to:

a. the internal threat to such facilities assumed by each agency, including assumptions regarding:

1. the number of people;

11. the degree of collusion; iii. the degree of armament; iv. the degree of training;

v. the degree of planning; and

b. the external threat to sucn facilities assumed by each agency, including assumptions regarding the factors listed in subpart (a) (i) through (a) (v) above.

4. For each facility that is of a type lixely to be utilized in the CRBR fuel cycle, identify fully each safeguards inspection of such facility conducted from April 23, 1977, to date by NRC and the General

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8 Accounting Office which has identified f ailure(s) to meet the requirements of:

a. federal law (s) ;

b. agency regulations;

c. license conditions;

d. other agency guidance; or

e. prudent safety practice.

5. Identify all reports in possession of Staff or know to Staff, issued since April 23, 1977, that assess the adequacy of safeguards at:

a. NRC-licensed f acilities;

b. DOD facilities.

6. Does Staff believe that having reasonable assurance that Applicants will comply with NRC safeguards requirements at the CRBR site and related NRC-licensed activities (e.g. transportation) is sufficient to enable Staff to determine that CRBR safeguards are adequat,e?

7. With respect to unlicensed DOE f acilities at which CRBR fuel cycle activities will or are likely to be conducted:

a. does Staff believe that such f acilities are operated in a manner that would be in compliance with the Commission's present regulations on safeguards?

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b. Has Staff ever assessed the adequacy of safeguards at such facilities? If the answer is yes, identify the assessment and provide a summary of the analysis and conclusions.

c. Does Staf f believe that mere compliance with existing DOE safeguards requirements at such facilities is sufficient to enable Staff to determine that CRBR safeguards are adequate?

d. Does Staff believe that current safeguards are adequate at:

1. the Savannah River Plant;

11. the Hanford reservation; iii. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.

III. Contention 8

1. John W. Gofman argues, in Radiation and Human Health, Sierra Club Books 1981, pp. 760-853 that the BEIR I, III and UNSCEAR (1977) estimates of genetic risk from radiation exposure do not adequately account for many irregularly inherited diseases and consequently they underestimate the genetic effect of radiation exposure with respect to irregularly inherited diseases by a factor between 6 and 100. (See Gofman, supra, page 791. ) If Staff disagrees with Gofman's analysis in this regard or if Staff disagrees with Gofman's 4 1

10 estimate of the total of all genetic and chromosomal diseases or defects (at page 849) please explain precisely the nature of your disagreement.

2. Does Staff believe tha'; dose limitations under 10 CFR Part 100 should be based on the principle that risk should be equal whether the whole body is irradiated uniformly or whether there is non-uniform irradiation (see ICRP 26 at 1104) ?

3. Were the limits on whole body and thyroid exposure under 10 CFR Part 100 based on limiting the occurrence of stochastic effects to an acceptable level, or were they also intended to prevent non-stochastic effects?

4. Provide the supporting basis for Staff's answer to question 3 above.

5. If the current dose limits in 10 CFR Part 100 were intended to prevent non-stochastic effects, explain how a limitation of 300 rems to the thyroid is intended to prevent non-stochastic effects.

6. When internal and external exposures to radiation are received together, does Staff believe that a dose limitation approach for stochastic effects, as taken in 1110 of ICRP 26, is more appropriate than the approach taken in ICRP 2, namely the concept of establishing separate annual dose equivalent limits for individual tissue and organs? (This question is v

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11 ' 'M directed at the methodology and not at the choices'of the weighting f actors or individuals organs or ' the ,

annual dose equivalent limit for whole body exposure.)

7. Identify the latest EPA position with respect to ,

proposed occupational exposure limits. -

8. Identify the latest Staff position with regard to proposed occupational exposure Ilmits.

9. If the approach taken in ICRP 26 at 1104 and 1110 for limiting stochastic effects were adopted, what is r .

Staff's position with regard to the most appropriate -

values for the tissue weighting functions? For example, does Staff f avor the recommendations of 1105 of ICRP 26, or does it favor the weighting factors currently being proposed by EPA, or does Staff -

recommend some other weighting factors? ..

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10. Does Staff believe that the risks associated with si - .

whole body exposure of 25 rems is equivalent to the . -

risk of irradiating the thyroid only to 300 rems? -

11. If the answer to Question 10 is yes, please provide .

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the source of data which Staff believes best ' '

represents mortality or morbidity risk data for, whole ,

body and thyroid exposures. s

12. If Staff believes that the risks associated with 25 s rems to the whole body are not equivalent to the risks S.

associated with irradiating the thyroid to 300 rems, ,

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12 for purposes of establishing organ doses other than thyroid, does Staff believe that the thyroid (300 rem) or the whole body (25 rem) dose limit is the more

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tihE: an'swer to this question.

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III. Contention 23

1. Fully describe the extent to which Staff has modified, or intends to modify, the CRBRP General Design

- Criteria (as set forth in Appendix A to the 1977 Site

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accident and lessons learned from that accident,

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including..but not-limited to, changes in criterion 49,

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Containmeiit Atmosphere: Cleanup.

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' Fully describe the e5 tent to which Staff has modified, f

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or intends to modif','its y interpretation of the CRBRP Design Criterin (as set forth in Appendix A to the

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e. 1977 SiEe Suitability Report) in light of the Three

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' Mile Island acciident and lessons learned from that

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3. F6'c.-purposes of assessing the capability of the CRBR

_ contfinment to'sithstan'd'an accident with a co6 comitant release of large amounts of sodium:

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a. What quantities of sodium does Staff currently assume will be released?

b. What does Staff currently assume will be the physical nature of such sodium release (e.g.,

aerosol or liquid) ?

c. Fully describe the extent to which Staff assumptions referred to in subparts (a) and (b) above have changed from previously held assumptions in light of changing Commission requirements f or LWR hydrogen control following the accident at Three Mile Island.

d. Fully explain the reason (s) for the change (s) , if any, described in response to subpart. (c) .

e. Does the Staff believe it appropriate to require the CRBR to accomodate a larger sodium release than previously thought necessary, in light of changing Commission requirements for LWR hydrogen control following the accident at Three Mile Island?

f. If answer to subpart (e) is no, explain the basis for such answer.

g. In light of changing Commission regirements regarding LWR hydrogen control, does Staf f now believe CRBR requirements regarding hydrogen control and sodium control should also be made d

14 more stringent to meet Staff's goal of ensuring "that the consequences of [CRBR] accidents will not be significantly different from those already assessed for LWRs?" [FES at 7-11] .

4. Identify the CRBR " essential equipment" which Staf f believes should be able to " survive" a sodium fire or hydrogen burn following an accident with a concomitant release of large amounts of sodium, and continue to be able to perform its safety function.

5. Provide the " survivability criteria" which Staff believes should be applied to ensure the quality of such CRBR essential equipment.

IV. Contention 24

1. Ansker the questions below with respect to th7 following conclusion reached by NRC Staf f in its 1977 Final Environmental Statement on the CRBR (p. 7-11) :

The design information and evaluations available at this time have been revie wed . Based on this review, our conclusion is that the accident risks can be made acceptably low with the incorporation of the features and requirements in the design as discussed above. The Staff's safety evaluation will provide the basis for determining what plant features and R&D programs are acceptable in this regard. The Staff believes it is within the state-of-the-art to design, construct and operate the CRBRP in such a manner that the consequences of accidents will not be significa,ntly different from those

, already assessed for LWRs.

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a. Identify and describe the precise nature of each of the design features and requirements to which Staff was referring in the second sentence of this statement.

b. Provide the exact page references in the FES and other relevant documents where such design features and requirements are discussed,

c. What was Staff 's basis for believing, at the time the FES was issued, that Applicants' then-current design features would not serve to make CRBR accident risks and consequences acceptably low?

d. What was Staff's basis for believing, at the time the FES was issued, that incorporation of the design features and requirements discussed by Staff would serve to make CRDR accident risks acceptably low?

e. Does Staff still agree with this conclusion?

f. If Staf f no longer agrees with this conclusion, indicate the precise manner in which Staff's current position differs from such conclusion.

g. Fully describe the extent to which the accident at Three Mile Island has caused Staff to change it position from that described in the above statement.

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h. Fully describe the extent to which Applicants have, in Staff's judgement, incorporated the design features and requirements referred to by Staff in the years since the FES was issued.

i. Fully describe the extent to which the incorporation of such design features and requirements by Applicants comply with the changes proposed by Staff in the above statement.

j. Fully identify all CRBR design changes or modifications, beyond those referred to in the above statement, which Staf f believes would further reduce the risks and consequences of CRBR accidents.

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17 Respectfully submitted,

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EllYn R. Weiss /

HARMON & WEISS 1725 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 833-9070

$kWM Ilarbara A. Finarfore S. Jacob Scherr Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

1725 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C 20006 (202) 223-8210 ,

Attorneys for Intervenors Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

and the Sierra Club Dated: March 18, 1982 Washington, D.C.

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