ML20042A234

Request for Admissions

ML20042A234
Person / Time
Site:	Clinch River
Issue date:	03/18/1982
From:	Finamore B, Weiss E HARMON & WEISS, National Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club
To:	NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD)
Shared Package
ML20042A222	List: ML20042A221 ML20042A226 ML20042A230 ML20042A234 ML20042A239 ML20042A245 ML20042A253
References
NUDOCS 8203230232
Download: ML20042A234 (14)

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o hl FETED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA O 78 P3:3; NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

't ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD J

Before Administrative Judges:

Marshall E. Miller, Chairman t

Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.

Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr.

)

In the Matter of )

)

) Docket No. 50-537 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY )

PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION )

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY )

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(Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant) )

)

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.

i AND THE SIERRA CLUB NINTH REQUEST TO STAFF FOR ADMISSIONS i

j Pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.742, and in accordance with the f Board's Prehearing Conference Order of February 11, 1982, i Intervenors, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and the Sierra Club, request admission by Staff of the' truth of the following matters of fact.

4 I. Contention 2 i'

1. The assumed frequency of anticipated transient without i

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scram (ATWS) accidents in LWRs is less than once in a thousand reactor years.

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2. The assumed frequency of anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) accidents in LWRs is on the order of once in a thousand reactor years.

3. With LWRs, there have been several observed precursor events, i.e., faults detected that could have given rise to ATWS events.

4. The fact that there have been several observed precursor events that could have given rise to ATWS events suggests that the frequency of ATWS accidents, although less than once in a thousand reactor years, may not be very much less.

5. There is insufficient actuarial experience with LMFBRs to reasonably indicate that the probability of an ATWS event in the CRBR is less than that in an LWR.

6. It would be imprudent to assume for purposes of designing the CRBR to cope with accidents that the probability of an ATWS event in the CRBR is less than the probability of an ATWS event in an LWR.

7. Most studies of the likely causes of serious accidents conclude through probabilistic risk analysis that over 50% of the risk is associated with human failure to perform as intended. This observation includes human errors in design a.nd construction, in maintenance and testing during operation, and, of course, mistakes by operators in response to unusual occurrences.

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8. The NRC has concluded that the reliability of current light water reactor protection systems has not been demonstrated to be adegitate and most likely is not adequate.

II. Contention 3

1. Reasonable assurance that a proposed site is a suitable location for a reactor of the general size and type proposed by Applicants requires a determination of an exclusion area and a low population zone as defined in 10 CFR S 100.3.

2. Determination of an exclusion area requires calculations of dosages to the whole body and selected organs from an assumed radioactive release, i.e., a source term.

3. The source term assumed in a site suitability assessment must, in terms of its potential health hazard, not be exceeded by the release from any accident considered credible.

4. For purposes of assessing the suitability of the Clinch River site with reasonable assurance, accidents involving the disruption of the reactor core caused in part by failure to scram the reactor must be considered credible.

5. For purposes of assessing the suitability of the Clinch River s'ite with reasonable assurance, it is

4 inappropriate to use the source term used for purposes of assessing the suitability of a light water reactor site.

6. For purposes of assessing the suitability of the Clinch River site with reasonable assurance, it is inappropriate to use the source term used for purposes of assessing the suitability of a light water reactor site because of significant differences in designs and potential accident scenarios.

7. For purposes of assessing the suitability of the Clinch River site with reasonable assurance, the health risks associated with absorbed dose to lung from postulated radioactive releases (i.e., the source term) exceed the health risks associated with absorbed doses to the whole body or thyroids.

8. For pitrposes of assessing the suitability of the Clinch River site with reasonable assurance, the health risks associated with absorbed dose to bone from postulated radioactive releases (i.e., the source term) exceed the health risks associated with abrorbed doses to the whole body or thyroids.

9. For purposes of assessing the suitability of the Clinch River site with reasonable assurance, the health risks associated with absorbed dose to lung from postulated radioactive releases (i.e., the source

5 term) are likely to exceed the health risks associated with absorbed doses to the whole body or thyroids.

10. For purposes of assessing the suitability of the Clinch River site with reasonable assurance, the health risks associated with absorbed dose to bone from postulated radioactive releases (i.e., the source term) are likely to exceed the health risks associated with absorbed doses to the whole body or thyroids.

III. Contentions 8A and 22

1. The admonition that exposures to ionizing radiation should be maintained as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) is a long-standing tenet of the health physics community and organizations and agencies responsible for recommending and establishing radiation protection criteria.

2. The ALARA principle was previously referred to as the ALAP principle, where ALAP stands for "as low as pr ac ticab le . "

3. "As low as reasonably achievable," and "as low as practicable" are two of several variations in statements of the same principle.

4. There is no philosophical difference in terms of the intent of the admonition between "as low as reasonably achievable," and "as low as practicable."

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5. The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), formerly the National Committee on Radiation Protection, has had a long-standing philosophy that radiation exposures from whatever source should be as low as practicable. (See Handbook 59, " Permissible Dose from External Sources of Ionizing Radiation," U.S. Department of Commerce, September 24, 1954, p. 2.)

6. The radiation protection principle that radiation exposures from whatever source should be maintained as low as reasonably achievable or, formerly, as low as practicable, has been a basic tenet of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), formerly the National Committee on Radiation Protection, since the late 1940s.3!

7. The ALAP philosophy was first published by the ICRP circa 1953.

8. The name of the principle was changed from ALAP to ALARA in ICRP publication 22 (circa 1973).

9. The ALARA (or ALAP) principle was and is based on the theory that any dose of ionizing radiation, no matter how small, may produce some genetic or somatic damage, 1/ This admission is based on a private communication between Lauriston S. Taylor and Thomas B. Cochran.

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and thus it is considered wise to avoid all unnecessary exposure to radionuclides. (See Handbook 69, " Maximum Permissible Body Burdens and Maximum Permissible Concentrations of Radionuclides in Air and in Water for Occupational Exposure," U.S.

Department of Commerce, June 5, 1959, p. 4.)

10. The ALARA (or ALAP) concept is a concise summary of the intention to encourage protection practices that are better than any prescribed minimal level, which is the basic criterion for all cases in which a non-threshold dose-effect relationship either exists or has been assumed. (See NCRP Report No. 39, " Basic Radiation Protection Criteria," January 15, 1981.)

11. The ALARA (or ALAP) principle is an admonition to avoid all unnecessary radiation exposure to ionizing i radiation, not simply unnecessary routine radiation exposures to ionizing radiation. (See Handbook 59,

" Permissible Dose from External Sources of Ionizing Radiation," U.S. Department of Commerce, September 24, i

19 54, p . 20.)

12. The original concept of ALARA (or ALAP) was based on the view that, when maximum permissible exposure limits were established by government agencies, the industry should not be encouraged to push exposures up to these levels, but should instead be encouraged to

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keep well below them.

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1.3 . There was no intent in the development of the ALARA (or ALAP) principle to limit the principle to routine exposure limits, but instead to apply this philosophy to all activities th'at could lead to humar. exposures to radiation.

14. No publication of the ICRP, NCRP, or the Federal Radiation Council makes any explicit reference to the ALARA (or ALAP) principle a'a being applied only to routine exposures and not- to potential accidental exposures.

15. The 10 CFR S 20. l(c) ALARA requirement derives directly from the guidance of the Federal Radiation Council (FDC) as published in its Report No. 1,

" Background Material for the Development Radiation Protection Standards," May 13, 1960, at 1 5.3, p. 26 and 1 5.8, p. 28.

16. The Federal Radiation Council (FRC) recognized that there was a possibility of biological damage to the individual or his progeny from the Radiation Protection Guide values of 0.5 rem per year for an individual in the general population and 5 rem per year for occupational exposure.

17. The FRP recommended that radiation exposures should always be maintained at the minimum practicable level.

18. In adopting the ALAP principle, the Federal Radiation Council was en'dorsing the recommendations of the NCRP,

9 which had previously established ALAP as a basic tenet of radiation protection.

19. The recommendations of the NCRP with regard to maximum permissible radiation exposure to persons outside of controlled areas and attributable to the operation 4

within the controlled areas were derived primarily for the purpose of keeping the average doses to the whole population as low as reasonably possible. (See Handbook 59, supra, p. 5.)

20. Given that the ALARA (or ALAP) principle applies to all radiation exposures, the fact that the ALARA requirement is stated explicitly under 10 CFR Part 20 requirements and not explicitly in Parts 50 and 100 does not imply that the ALARA principle does not apply to potential accidental exposures as well.

21. If unnecessary exposure of the general population to ionizing radiation is not avoided when it is practicable to do so, the general population is being su'sjected to an undue risk to its health and safety.

22. The Clinch River Breeder Reactor containment building is designed for the purpose of meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 100 without the incorporation of the ALARA concept.

23. The Clinch River Breeder Reactor containment is not designed to limit radiation exposures from accidents to levels as low as can be reasonably achieved.

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24. There are alternative practicable designs of the CRBR containment that will result in lower radiation exposures to the public from potential accidents than those that would be received with the current design.

25. Applicants have not demonstrated that the Clinch River Breeder Reactor containment is designed to limit exposures to the general population due to accidental releases of radioactivity to levels that are (or will be) as low as reasonably achievable.

IV. Contention 8b

1. Almost without exception, detectable mutations have been found to be mildly or strongly deleterious in their effects. (See The Ef fects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation (National Academy Press, 1980) (BEIR III) , p. 79.)

2. In every species studied by geneticists, the overwhelming majority of mutations that have effects large enough to be readily observed are deleterious.

(See The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation (National Academy Press, Nov. 1972) (BEIR I) , p. 4 9. )

3. Because radiation-induced transmitted genetic effects have not been unequivocably demonstrated in man, and because of the likelihood that ?.dequate information

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will not soon be forthcoming, estimation of genetic J

j risk must be based on laboratory animal data. (See i

i BEIR III, supra, pp. 4-5; 73.)

l l 4. Any increase in the mutation rate is likely to be 1

harmful to future generations. (See BEIR III, supra, i

p. 80.)

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5. While genetic risk to humans is based largely on animal studies, for purposes of licensing the Clinch I River Reactor, one should assume that any increase in the human mutation rate will be harmful to future generations.

6. For purposes of licensing the Clinch River Reactor, at low levels of exposure one should assume that the effect of radiation in producing either (1) those genetic disorders which depend on changes in individual genes (gene mutations or small deletions) ,

or (2) those which depend on changes in chromosomes, either in the total number or in the genes' i

arrangement (chromosomal aberrations) will be proportional to dose.

7. It is reasonable to assume that the estimated relative mutation risk for humans exposed to continuous exposure over a large number of generations is 0.02-0.004 per rem (or a doubling dose of 50-250 rems). (See BEIR III, supra, pp. 96.)

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8. An exposure of one rem received in each generation is estimated to result at genetic equilibrium in an increase of 60-1100 serious genetic disorders per million live-born offspring. (See BEIR III, supra, pp. 5, 96.)

9. It is reasonable to assume that the BEIR III estimate of 60-1100 cases per million live births for 1 rem per person per generation underestimates the total of all genetic and chromosomal diseases or defects and that the number of cases may be in the range of 191 to more than 20,000. (See John W. Gofman, Radiation and Human Health, Sierra Club Books, 1981, p. 849.)

10 . It is reasonable to assume that in the first generation one rem of parental exposure before conception throughout the general population will result in an increase of 5-65 additional serious genetic disorders per million live-born offspring.

(See BEIR III, supra, page 97.)

11. It is reasonable to assume that the BEIR III estimate of 5-65 additional cases of serious genetic disorders underestimates the total of all genetic and chromosomal diseases or defects and that the number of cases may be as much as 20 times higher. (See Gofman, supra, p. 849.)

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12. Some experts in radiation health effects research believe that BEIR III underestimates the genetic risks associated with radiation exposure. (See Gofman, supra, p. 849.)

V. Contention 23

1. Combustible gases such as hydrogen may accumulate following a CRBR core disruptive accident.

2. As a consequence of the accident at Three Mile Island, it has become clear that additional protection greater than that previously required is necessary to provide assurance that large amounts of hydrogen can be safely accomodated by BWRs and PWRs.

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14 Respectfully submitted, C  % khe rr E119n R. Weiss '

m h &de HARMON & WEISS 1725 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 833-9070 r &Y &

Barbara A. Finamore S. Jacob Scherr Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

1725 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C 20006 (202) 223-6210 Attorneys for Intervenors Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

and the Sierra Club Dated: March 18, 1982 Washington, D.C.

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