ND-19-1323, Unit 4 - Notice of Uncompleted ITAAC 225-days Prior to Initial Fuel Load Item 2.5.02.06a.ii (Index Number 530)

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Unit 4 - Notice of Uncompleted ITAAC 225-days Prior to Initial Fuel Load Item 2.5.02.06a.ii (Index Number 530)
ML19304B856
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 10/31/2019
From: Yox M
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ND-19-1323
Download: ML19304B856 (39)


Text

Michael J. Yox 7825 River Road

^Southern Nuclear Regulatory Affairs Director Waynesboro, GA 30830 Vogtle 3 & 4 OCT 3 1 2019 Docket Nos.: 52-025 52-026 ND-19-1323 10 CFR 52.99(c)(3)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 and Unit 4 Notice of Uncompleted ITAAC 225-davs Prior to Initial Fuel Load Item 2.5.02.06a.ii (Index Number 5301 Ladies and Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.99(c)(3), Southern Nuclear Operating Company hereby notifies the NRC that as of October 18, 2019, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant(VEGP) Unit 3 and Unit 4 Uncompleted Inspection, Test, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Item 2.5.02.06a.ii

[Index Number 530] has not been completed greater than 225-days prior to initial fuel load. The Enclosure describes the plan for completing ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii [Index Number 530]. Southern Nuclear Operating Company will at a later date provide additional notifications for ITAAC that have not been completed 225-days prior to initial fuel load.

This notification is informed by the guidance described in NEI-08-01, Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52, which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.215. In accordance with NEI 08-01, this notification includes ITAAC for which required inspections, tests, or analyses have not been performed or have been only partially completed.

All ITAAC will be fully completed and all Section 52.99(c)(1) ITAAC Closure Notifications will be submitted to NRC to support the Commission finding that all acceptance criteria are met prior to plant operation, as required by 10 CFR 52.103(g).

This letter contains no new NRC regulatory commitments.

If there are any questions, please contact Tom Petrak at 706-8530-1575.

Respectfully submitted Michael J. Yox Regulatory Affairs Director Vogtle 3&4

Enclosure:

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant(VEGP) Unit 3 and Unit 4 Completion Plan for Uncompleted ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii [Index Number 530]

MJY/JBN/sfr

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Page 2 of 3 To:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company/ Georgia Power Company Mr. Peter P. Sena III (w/o enclosures)

Mr. D. L. McKinney (w/o enclosures)

Mr. M. D. Meier (w/o enclosures)

Mr. D. H. Jones (w/o enclosures)

Mr. G. Chick Mr. M. Page Mr. M. J. Yox Mr. A. S. Parton Ms. K. A. Roberts Mr. T. G. Petrak Mr. C. T. Defnall Mr. C. E. Morrow Mr. J. L. Hughes Mr. S. C. Leighty Ms. A. C. Chamberlain Mr. J. C. Haswell Document Services RTYPE: VND.LI.L06 File AR.01.02.06 cc:

Nuclear Reoulatorv Commission Mr. W. Jones (w/o enclosures)

Mr. F. D. Brown Mr. C. P. Patel Mr. G. J. Khouri Ms. S. E. Temple Mr. N. D. Karlovich Mr. A. Lerch Mr. C. J. Even Mr. 8. J. Kemker Ms. N. C. Coovert Mr. C. Welch Mr. J. Gaslevic Mr. V. Hall Mr. G. Armstrong Ms. T. Lamb Mr. M. Webb Mr. T. Fredette Mr. C. Weber Mr. S. Smith Oalethorpe Power Corporation Mr. R. B. Brinkman Mr. E. Rasmussen Municipal Electric Authoritv of Georgia Mr. J. E. Fuller Mr. S. M. Jackson

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Page 3 of 3 Dalton Utilities Mr. T. Bundros Westinqhouse Electric Company. LLC Dr. L. Oriani (w/o enclosures)

Mr. D. C. Durham (w/o enclosures)

Mr. M. M. Corletti Ms. L. G. Iller Mr. Z. 8. Harper Mr. J. L. Coward Other Mr. J. E. Hesler, Bechtel Power Corporation Ms. L. Matis, Tetra Tech NUS, Inc.

Dr. W. R. Jacobs, Jr., Ph.D., GDS Associates, Inc.

Mr. 8. Roetger, Georgia Public Service Commission Ms. 8. W. Kernizan, Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. K. C. Greene, Troutman Sanders Mr. 8. Blanton, Balch Bingham

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 1 of 36 Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-19-1323 Enclosure Vogtle Electric Generating Plant(VEGP) Unit 3 and Unit 4 Completion Plan for Uncompleted ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii [Index Number 530]

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 2 of 36 ITAAC Statement Desion Commitment 6.a) The RMS initiates an automatic reactor trip, as identified in Table 2.5.2-2, when plant process signals reach specified limits.

6.b) The RMS initiates automatic actuation of engineered safety features, as identified in Table 2.5.2-3, when plant process signals reach specified limits.

6.c) The RMS provides manual initiation of reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4.

8.a) The RMS provides for the minimum inventory of displays, visual alerts, and fixed position controls, as identified in Table 2.5.2-5. The plant parameters listed with a "Yes" in the "Display" column and visual alerts listed with a "Yes" in the "Alert" column can be retrieved in the MGR.

The fixed position controls listed with a "Yes" in the "Control" column are provided in the MGR.

8.c) Displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers can be retrieved in the MGR.

9.a) The RMS automatically removes blocks of reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation when the plant approaches conditions for which the associated function is designed to provide protection. These blocks are identified in Table 2.5.2-6.

9.b) The RMS two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed. All bypassed channels are alarmed in the MGR.

9.c) The RMS does not allow simultaneous bypass of two redundant channels.

I nspections/Tests/Analvses An operational test of the as-built RMS will be performed using real or simulated test signals.

An operational test of the as-built RMS will be performed using real or simulated test signals.

An operational test of the as-built RMS will be performed using the RMS manual actuation controls.

i) An inspection will be performed for retrievability of plant parameters in the MGR.

iii) An operational test of the as-built system will be performed using each MGR fixed position control.

Inspection will be performed for retrievability of displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers in the MGR.

An operational test of the as-built RMS will be performed using real or simulated test signals.

An operational test of the as-built RMS will be performed.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 3 of 36 An operational test of the as-built RMS will be performed. With one channel in bypass, an attempt will be made to place a redundant channel in bypass.

Acceptance Criteria ii) RMS output signals to the reactor trip switchgear are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit. This needs to be verified for each automatic reactor trip function.

Appropriate RMS output signals are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit.

These output signals remain following removal of the test signal. Tests from the actuation signal to the actuated device(s) are performed as part of the system-related inspection, test, analysis, and acceptance criteria.

ii) RMS output signals are generated for reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4 after the manual initiation controls are actuated.

i) The plant parameters listed in Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" in the "Display" column, can be retrieved in the MCR.

iii) For each test of an as-built fixed position control listed in Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" in the "Control" column, an actuation signal is generated. Tests from the actuation signal to the actuated device(s) are performed as part of the system-related inspection, test, analysis and acceptance criteria.

Displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers can be retrieved in the MCR.

The RMS blocks are automatically removed when the test signal reaches the specified limit.

The RMS two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed. All bypassed channels are alarmed in the MCR.

The redundant channel cannot be placed in bypass.

ITAAC Completion Description Multiple ITAAC are performed to verify that:

The Rrotection and Safety Monitoring System (RMS)initiates an automatic reactor trip, as identified in Table 2.5.2-2, when plant process signals reach specified limits.

  • The RMS provides manual initiation of reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4.
  • The RMS provides for the minimum inventory of displays, visual alerts, and fixed position controls as identified in Table 2.5.2-5, with the plant parameters listed with a "Yes" in the "Display" column and visual alerts listed with a "Yes" in the "Alert" column retrievable in the MCR (Main Control Room), and the fixed position controls listed with a "Yes" in the "Control" column provided in the MCR.

The subject ITAAC requires:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 4 of 36

  • An operational test of the as-built RMS be performed using real or simulated test signals to verify RMS output signals to the reactor trip switchgear are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit for each automatic reactor trip function
  • An operational test of the as-built RMS be performed using the RMS manual actuation controls to verify RMS output signals are generated for reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4 after the manual initiation controls are actuated.
  • An inspection be performed to verify the plant parameters listed in Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" in the "Display" column, can be retrieved in the MGR
  • An operational test of the as-built system be performed using each MGR fixed position control to verify for each test of an as-built fixed position control listed in Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" in the "Control" column, an actuation signal is generated.

This ITAAG also performs:

  • An operational test of the as-built RMS using real or simulated test signals to verify appropriate RMS output signals are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit and remain following removal of the test signal to demonstrate the RMS initiates automatic actuation of engineered safety features, as identified in Table 2.5.2-3, when plant process signals reach specified limits,
  • An inspection for retrievability of displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers in the MGR to demonstrate displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers can be retrieved in the MGR
  • An operational test of the as-built RMS using real or simulated test signals to demonstrate the RMS automatically removes blocks of reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation identified in Table 2.5.2-6 when the plant approaches conditions for which the associated function is designed to provide protection
  • An operational test of the as-built RMS to demonstrate the RMS two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed and bypassed channels are alarmed in the MGR, and
  • An operational test of the as-built RMS in which with one channel in bypass, an attempt will be made to place a redundant channel in bypass to demonstrate the RMS does not allow simultaneous bypass of two redundant channels.

ii) RMS output signals to the reactor trip switchgear are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit. This needs to be verified for each automatic reactor trip function.

An operational test of the as-built RMS is performed using simulated test signals. The operational test verifies that RMS output signals to the reactor trip switchgear are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit for each automatic reactor trip function identified in GOL Appendix G Table 2.5.2-2 (Attachment A).

This ITAAG is completed as a combination of:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 5 of 36

  • Site software installation and regression test- Hardware and software integration verification and testing of post system delivery changes The Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT)follows the guidance of NEI 08-01 Section 9.4 (Reference 49)for the as-built tests to be performed at other than the final installed location.

The FAT was performed in accordance with RMS Software Program Manual WCAP-16096 (Reference 1), PMS Test Plan APP-PMS-T5-001 (Reference 2), and applicable Codes and Standards described in Vogtle 3 and 4 UFSAR Chapter 7(Reference 48).

The FAT included testing of PMS inputs and outputs, logic, and functionality. During the test, the process parameters were simulated and adjusted to create applicable reactor trip conditions.

PMS signals at reactor trip computer point PMSY-RXTR (Y = A, B, C, or D in accordance with its PMS division) were monitored and it was confirmed that each automatic reactor trip function works as designed from the simulated input to reactor trip computer point PMSY-RXTR. This testing was performed in accordance with FAT Test Procedures APP-PMS-T1P-007(Reference

3) and APP-PMS-T1P-035 (Reference 4). The results of this testing are documented in FAT test reports SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-007(References 5 through 7)and SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-035 (References 8 through 10) Test Case TPS35-01. Attachment A provides a listing of test cases used in References 5 through 7. During testing in FAT Test Procedure APP-PMS-T1P-012(Reference 11), a Steam Generator-2 Level Low-2 is initiated, signals at the computer point PMSY-RXTR are verified, the shunt trip outputs from PMS are verified to turn on, and the under voltage outputs from PMS are verified to turn off. The results of this testing are documented in the FAT test reports SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-012(References 12 through 14) Test Case B17.

Additional hardware and software installation and associated inspections and testing are performed on-site to verify that the cabinets are intact and functional in accordance with Units 3 and 4 for applicable Field Change Notifications(FCNs) API000 Vogtle Unit 3 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1 and API000 Vogtle Unit 4 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release X.X.X.X (References 15 and 16). References 15 and 16 include steps that confirm and document successful software load and further confirm the physical properties of the as-built PMS. A regression analysis (i.e., change evaluation) is performed post-delivery and installation for hardware changes (References 17 and 18) and software changes(Reference 19) to determine if additional testing is needed for the as-built system.

The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 FAT test reports (References 5 through 10 and 12 through 14),

FCNs (References 15 and 16), and regression test results (References 17 through 19) confirm that appropriate PMS output signals are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit. These output signals remain following removal of the test signal. Tests from the actuation signal to the actuated device(s) are performed as part of the system-related inspection, test, analysis, and acceptance criteria.

References 5 through 10 and 12 through 19 are available for NRC inspection as part of the ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii Unit 3 and 4 Completion Packages(References 46 and 47).

Appropriate PMS output signals are generated after the test sional reaches the specified limit.

These output sionals remain following removal of the test signal. Tests from the actuation signal to the actuated device(s) are performed as part of the svstem-related inspection, test, analvsis.

and acceptance criteria.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 6 of 36 An operational test of the as-built RMS is performed using simulated test signals. The operational test verifies that appropriate RMS output signals are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit and that these output signals remain following removal of the test signal.

This ITAAC is completed as a combination of:

  • Factory Acceptance Test- Functional testing of RMS automatic engineered safety features from the test signal input to the actuation signal output
  • Site software installation and regression test- Hardware and software integration verification and testing of post system delivery changes.

The Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT)follows the guidance of NEI 08-01 Section 9.4 (Reference 49)for the as-built tests to be performed at other than the final installed location.

The FAT was performed in accordance with RMS Software Program Manual WCAR-16096 (Reference 1), RMS Test Plan ARR-RMS-T5-001 (Reference 2), and applicable Codes and Standards described in Vogtle 3 and 4 UFSAR Chapter 7(Reference 48).

The FAT includes testing of RMS inputs and outputs, logic, and functionality. During this test, the initial conditions for the test scenarios were established and confirmed that the setpoints and logics which generated output signals for all the engineered safety features(ESF)identified in COL Table 2.5.2-3(Attachments B and C)work as designed. Testing initially inputs a test signal that verifies the bistable and coincidence logic of the RMS, as documented in the test cases shown in Attachment B. The output from the RMS is then sent to modules that operate the devices in the field with the output signals of these modules documented in the test cases shown in Attachment C. Additionally, output signals which are designed to remain following removal of the test signal were verified in the test cases shown in Attachment C. This testing was performed in accordance with FAT Test Procedures ARR-RMS-T1R-007(Reference 3),

ARR-RMS-T1R-008(Reference 20), ARR-RMS-T1R-009(Reference 21), ARR-RMS-T1R-012 (Reference 11), and ARR-RMS-T1R-035 (Reference 4). The results of the tests are documented in FAT Test Reports SV0/SV3/SV4-RMS-T2R-007(References 5 through 7), SV0/SV3/SV4-RMS-T2R-008(References 22 through 24), ARR/SV3/SV4-RMS-T2R-009(References 25 through 27), and SV0/SV3/SV4-RMS-T2R-012(References 12 through 14), and SV0/SV3/SV4-RMS-T2R-035(References 8 through 10) Test Case TRS35-01. Attachments B and C provide a listing of test cases used in References 5 through 7, 12 through 14 and 22 through 27.

The output signals for the Turbine Trip ESF function are designed to not remain following removal of the test signal and is not included in the testing above. In the event of a Turbine Trip, manual operator action is performed to latch the Turbine.

Additional hardware and software installation and associated inspections and testing are performed on-site to verify that the cabinets are intact and functional in accordance with Units 3 and 4 for applicable Field Change Notifications(FCNs) API000 Vogtle Unit 3 RMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1 and API000 Vogtle Unit 4 RMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release X.X.X.X (References 15 and 16). References 15 and 16 include steps that confirm and document successful software load and further confirm the physical properties of the as-built RMS. A regression analysis (i.e., change evaluation) is performed post-delivery and installation for hardware changes(References 17 and 18) and software changes (Reference 19)to determine if additional testing is needed for the as-built system.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 7 of 36 The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 FAT test reports (References 5 through 10, 12 through 14, and 22 through 27), PONs (References 15 and 16), and regression test results (References 17 through 19) confirm that appropriate RMS output signals are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit. These output signals remain following removal of the test signal.

Tests from the actuation signal to the actuated device(s) are performed as part of the system-related inspection, test, analysis, and acceptance criteria.

References 5 through 10,12 through 19, and 22 through 27 are available for NRG inspection as part of the ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii Unit 3 and 4 Completion Packages(References 46 and 47).

ii) PMS output signals are generated for reactor trip and selected engineered safetv features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4 after the manual initiation controls are actuated.

An operational test of the as-built PMS is performed using PMS manual actuation controls. The operational test verifies that PMS output signals are generated for reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4 after the manual initiation controls are actuated.

This ITAAC is completed as a combination of:

  • Factory Acceptance Test- testing of PMS logic and functions using simulated manual initiation control inputs and verifying generation of the outputs for reactor trip and ESF functions
  • Site software installation and regression test- Hardware and software integration verification and testing of post system delivery changes to confirm integrity of as-built system post installation
  • Component Test- testing of the as-built manual initiation controls and verifying the inputs to PMS for ESF functions
  • Preoperational Test- testing of the as-built manual initiation controls and verifying the inputs to PMS for reactor trip functions The Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT)follows the guidance of NEI 08-01 Section 9.4 (Reference 49)for the as-built tests to be performed at other than the final installed location.

The FAT was performed in accordance with PMS Software Program Manual WCAP-16096 (Reference 1), PMS Test Plan APP-PMS-T5-001 (Reference 2), and applicable Codes and Standards described in Vogtle 3 and 4 UFSAR Chapter 7(Reference 48).

The FAT included testing of PMS inputs and outputs, logic, and functionality. During this test, the manual initiation control inputs to the PMS were simulated and it was confirmed that the output signals were actuated for reactor trip and selected engineered safety features manual actuations as identified in COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-4 (Attachment D). This testing was performed in accordance with the PMS FAT procedures APP-PMS-T1P-007(Reference 3)and APP-PMS-T1P-008(Reference 20). The results of the tests are documented in the FAT test reports SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-007(References 5 through 7) and SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-008(References 22 through 24). Attachment D provides a listing of test scenarios within each FAT procedure.

Additional hardware and software installation and associated inspections and testing are performed on-site to verify that the cabinets are intact and functional in accordance with Units 3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 8 of 36 and 4 for applicable Field Change Notifications(FCNs) AP1000 Vogtle Unit 3 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1 and API000 Vogtle Unit 4 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release X.X.X.X (References 15 and 16). References 15 and 16 include steps that confirm and document successful software load and further confirm the physical properties of the as-built PMS. A regression analysis (i.e., change evaluation) is performed post-delivery and installation for hardware changes (References 17 and 18) and software changes (Reference 19)to determine if additional testing is needed for the as-built system.

Testing of selected ESF manual initiation controls identified in Attachment D is performed in accordance with component test packages SNCXXXXXX (Unit 3)and SNCYYYYYY (Unit 4)

(References 28 and 29). These component test packages utilize B-GEN-ITPCI-006 (Reference

30) to test ESF manual initiation controls. Selected ESF manual initiation controls are actuated and confirmed at the PMS input, by visually inspecting the digital input LED. The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 component test packages confirm that select ESF manual controls actuations are received at PMS.

Testing of reactor trip manual controls is performed in accordance with pre-operational tests 3/4-PMS-ITPP-504(References 31 and 32) to test reactor trip manual initiation controls.

Reactor trip manual initiation controls PMS-HS025 and PMS-HS026 are actuated in the Main Control Room (MCR)and Manual Reactor Trip Logic Trip is verified on each divisional safety display. The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 test procedures confirm that each RTCB trip status is changed after actuation of manual controls.

The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 FAT test reports (References 5 through 7 and 22 through 24),

FCNs (References 15 and 16), regression test results (References 17 through 19), completed component test packages (References 28 and 29), and completed preoperational test results (References 31 and 32), confirm that the PMS output signals are generated for reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4 after the manual initiation controls are actuated.

References 5 through 7,15 through 19, 22 through 24, and 28 through 32 are available for NRC inspection as part of the ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii Completion Packages(References 46 and 47).

i) The plant parameters listed in Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" in the "Displav" column, can be retrieved in the MCR.

An inspection is performed to verify the retrievability of the VEGP Unit 3 and Unit 4 plant parameters in the MCR. The inspection for retrievability confirms that the plant parameters listed in Attachment E with a "Yes" in the "Display" column (Attachment E) can be retrieved in the MCR.

The inspection is performed in accordance with Work Orders SNC921600 (Unit 3) and SNCZZZZZZ (Unit 4)(References 33 and 34) and visually confirms that when each of the plant parameters identified in Attachment E with a "Yes" in the "Display" column is recalled using the MCR PMS Visual Display Units (VDUs), the expected display appears on the PMS VDU.

The inspection results are included in References 33 and 34 and confirm that the plant parameters listed in Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" in the "Display" column can be retrieved in the MCR.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 9 of 36 References 33 and 34 are available for NRG inspection as part of the Unit 3 and Unit 4 ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii Completion Packages (References 46 and 47).

iii) For each test of an as-built fixed position control listed in Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" in the "Control" column, an actuation signal is generated. Tests from the actuation sional to the actuated devicefs) are performed as part of the svstem-related inspection, test, analvsis and acceptance criteria.

An operational test of the as-built PMS is performed using each MCR fixed position control to verify that for each test of an as-built fixed position control listed in Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" in the "Control" column (Attachment E), an actuation signal is generated.

This ITAAC is completed as a combination of:

  • Factory Acceptance Test- testing of PMS logic and functions using simulated fixed position control inputs and verifying generation of the actuation signal output
  • Site software installation and regression test- Hardware and software integration verification and testing of post system delivery changes to confirm integrity of as-built system post installation
  • Component Test - testing of the as-built fixed position controls and verifying the inputs to PMS for ESP functions
  • Preoperational Test- testing of the as-built fixed position controls and verifying the inputs to PMS for reactor trip functions The Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT)follows the guidance of NEI 08-01 Section 9.4 (Reference 49)for the as-built tests to be performed at other than the final installed location.

The FAT was performed in accordance with PMS Software Program Manual WCAP-16096 (Reference 1), PMS Test Plan APP-PMS-T5-001 (Reference 2), and applicable Codes and Standards described in Vogtle 3 and 4 UFSAR Chapter 7(Reference 48).

The FAT included testing of PMS inputs and outputs, logic, and functionality. During this test, the fixed position control inputs to the PMS were simulated and it was confirmed that the actuation signals were generated for reactor trip and selected engineered safety features manual actuations as identified in Attachment E. This testing was performed in accordance with the PMS FAT procedures APP-PMS-T1P-007(Reference 3) and APP-PMS-T1P-008 (Reference 20). The results of the tests are documented in the FAT test reports SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-007(References 5 through 7)and SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-008 (References 22 through 24). Attachment F provides a listing of test scenarios within each FAT procedure.

Additional hardware and software installation and associated inspections and testing are performed on-site to verify that the cabinets are intact and functional in accordance with Units 3 and 4 for applicable Field Change Notifications(FCNs) API000 Vogtle Unit 3 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1 and API000 Vogtle Unit 4 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release X.X.X.X (References 15 and 16). References 15 and 16 include steps that confirm and document successful software load and further confirm the physical properties of the as-built PMS. A regression analysis (i.e., change evaluation) is performed post-delivery and installation for hardware changes (References 17 and 18) and software changes(Reference 19) to determine if additional testing is needed for the as-built system.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 10 of 36 Testing of selected ESF fixed position controls identified in Attachment E is performed in accordance with component test packages SNCAAAAAA (Unit 3) and SNOBBBBBB (Unit 4)

(References 35 and 36). These component test packages utilize B-GEN-ITPCI-006 (Reference

30) to test ESF fixed position controls. Selected ESF fixed position controls identified in Attachment E are actuated and confirmed at the PMS input, by visually inspecting the digital input LED.

Testing of the Manual ADS and IRWST Injection Unblock is performed in accordance with Unit 3 and Unit 4 component test packages SNCAAAAAA and SNOBBBBBB (References 35 and 36). These component test packages utilize B-GEN-ITPCI-039(Reference 43)to direct the performance of test procedures 3/4-PMS-OTS-17-012(References 44 and 45). The Manual ADS and IRWST Injection Unblock fixed position control switch is taken to unblock in the MGR and the block is verified to be removed at the Component Interface Modules (CIM).

Testing of reactor trip fixed position controls is performed in accordance with pre-operational tests 3/4-PMS-ITPP-504(References 31 and 32)to test reactor trip fixed position controls.

Reactor trip fixed position controls are actuated in the Main Control Room (MCR)and Manual Reactor Trip Logic Trip is verified on each divisional safety display. The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 test procedures confirm that each RTCB trip status is changed after actuation of the manual reactor trip fixed position controls.

The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 FAT test reports (References 5 through 7 and 22 through 24),

FCNs (References 15 and 16), regression test results (References 17 through 19), completed component test packages (References 35 and 36), and completed preoperational test results (References 31 and 32) confirm that for each test of an as-built fixed position control listed in Attachment E with a "Yes" in the "Control" column, an actuation signal is generated. Tests from the actuation signal to the actuated device(s) are performed as part of the system-related inspection, test, analysis and acceptance criteria.

References 5 through 7, 15 through 19, 22 through 24, 31, 32, 35, and 36 are available for NRC inspection as part of the Unit 3 and Unit 4 ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii Completion Packages (References 46 and 47).

Displavs of the open/closed status of the reactor trio breakers can be retrieved in the MCR.

An inspection Is performed to verify the displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers can be retrieved in the MCR.

The inspection is performed in accordance with 3/4-PMS-ITPP-504(References 31 and 32)and visually confirms that when each of the displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers are summoned using the MCR PMS Visual Display Units (VDUs), the expected display appears on the PMS VDU.

The inspection results are included in References 31 and 32 and confirm that displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers can be retrieved in the MCR.

References 31 and 32 are available for NRC Inspection as part of the Unit 3 and Unit 4 ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii Completion Packages (References 46 and 47).

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 11 of 36 The RMS blocks are automatically removed when the test sianal reaches the soecified limit.

An operational test of the as-built RMS is performed using simulated test signals to verify that RMS blocks are automatically removed when the test signal reaches the specified limit.

This ITAAC is completed as a combination of:

  • Factory Acceptance Test-functional testing of RMS ability to automatically remove blocks
  • Site software installation and regression test- Hardware and software integration verification and testing of post system delivery changes The Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT)follows the guidance of NEI 08-01 Section 9.4 (Reference 49)for the as-built tests to be performed at other than the final installed location.

The FAT was performed in accordance with RMS Software Program Manual WCAR-16096 (Reference 1), RMS Test Plan ARR-RMS-T5-001 (Reference 2), and applicable Codes and Standards described in Vogtle 3 and 4 UFSAR Chapter 7(Reference 48).

The FAT included testing of RMS inputs and outputs, logic, and functionality. During this test, the initial condition for the test scenarios was established and confirmed that RMS blocks are automatically removed as appropriate for the reactor trip and engineered safety feature actuation blocks identified in COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-6. During the test, the process parameters were simulated and adjusted to create applicable unblock conditions, RMS unblock signals were monitored, and it was confirmed that the automatic unblock functions work as designed. This testing was performed in accordance with FAT Test Procedures ARR-RMS-T1R-008 and ARR-RMS-T1R-035(Reference 20 and 4). The results of the testing are documented in the FAT test reports SV0/SV3/SV4-RMS-T2R-008 (References 22 through 24) and SV0/SV3/SV4-RMS-T2R-035 (References 8 through 10) Test Case TRS35-01. Attachment G provides a listing of test cases used in References 22 through 24. Attachment H provides a matrix which correlates the ESF RMS blocks to the ESF functions identified in COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-6.

Additional hardware and software installation and associated inspections and testing are performed on-site to verify that the cabinets are intact and functional in accordance with Units 3 and 4 for applicable Field Change Notifications(FCNs) API000 Vogtle Unit 3 RMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1 and API000 Vogtle Unit 4 RMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release X.X.X.X (References 15 and 16). References 15 and 16 include steps that confirm and document successful software load and further confirm the physical properties of the as-built RMS. A regression analysis (i.e., change evaluation) is performed post-delivery and installation for hardware changes (References 17 and 18) and software changes (Reference 19)to determine if additional testing is needed for the as-built system.

The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 FAT test reports (References 8 through 10 and 22 through 24),

FCNs (References 15 and 16), and regression test results (References 17 through 19) confirm that the RMS blocks are automatically removed when the test signal reaches the specified limit.

References 8 through 10, 15 through 19, and 22 through 24 are available for NRC inspection as part of the Unit 3 and 4 ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii Completion Packages(References 46 and 47).

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 12 of 36 The PMS two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed. All bypassed channels are alarmed in the MGR.

An operational test of the as-built PMS is performed to verify that PMS two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed and that all bypassed channels are alarmed in the MGR.

This ITAAG is completed as a combination of:

  • Factory Acceptance Test-functional testing of PMS to ensure two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed and that all bypassed channels are alarmed in the MGR.
  • Site software installation and regression test- Hardware and software integration verification and testing of post system delivery changes
  • Pre-operational Test-functional testing of PMS to ensure that an alarm is received in the MGR when a channel is bypassed.

The Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT)follows the guidance of NEI 08-01 Section 9.4 (Reference 49)for the as-built tests to be performed at other than the final installed location.

The FAT was performed in accordance with PMS Software Program Manual WGAP-16096 (Reference 1), PMS Test Plan APP-PMS-T5-001 (Reference 2), and applicable Godes and Standards described in Vogtle 3 and 4 UFSAR Ghapter 7(Reference 48).

The FAT included testing of PMS inputs and outputs, logic, and functionality. During this test, the initial condition for the test scenarios was established and confirmed that PMS two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed. During the test, one of the four PMS channels was taken to bypass, PMS logic was monitored, and it was confirmed that the change in logic works as designed. This testing was performed in accordance with FAT Test Procedures APP-PMS-T1P-026 (Reference 37). The results of the testing are documented in the FAT test reports SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-026 (References 38 through 40). Attachment I provides a listing of test cases used to test the PMS initiation logic and channel bypass logic.

Additional hardware and software installation and associated inspections and testing are performed on-site to verify that the cabinets are intact and functional in accordance with Units 3 and 4 for applicable Field Ghange Notifications(FGNs) API000 Vogtle Unit 3 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1 and API000 Vogtle Unit 4 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release X.X.X.X (References 15 and 16). References 15 and 16 include steps that confirm and document successful software load and further confirm the physical properties of the as-built PMS. A regression analysis (i.e., change evaluation) is performed post-delivery and installation for hardware changes (References 17 and 18) and software changes (Reference 19)to determine if additional testing is needed for the as-built system.

Testing of bypass alarms in the MGR is performed in accordance with pre-operational tests 3/4-PMS-ITPP-521 (References 41 and 42). Each PMS division is individually placed in partial bypass at the Maintenance and Test Panel(MTP)and the bypassed channel alarms are verified in the MGR. The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 test procedures confirm that each RTGB trip status is changed after actuation of the manual reactor trip fixed position controls.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 13 of 36 The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 FAT test reports (References 38 through 40), FGNs (References 15 and 16), regression test results (References 17 through 19), and completed preoperational test results (References 41 and 42), confirm that the RMS two-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed and that all bypassed channels are alarmed in the MGR.

References 38 through 40, 15 through 19, 41, and 42 are available for NRG inspection as part of the ITAAG 2.5.02.06a.ii Unit 3 and 4 Completion Packages (References 46 and 47).

The redundant channel cannot be oiaced in bvoass.

An operational test of the as-built PMS is performed by attempting to place a redundant channel in bypass with one channel in bypass to verify the redundant channel cannot be placed in bypass.

This ITAAG is completed as a combination of:

  • Factory Acceptance Test-functional testing of PMS to ensure redundant channels cannot be placed in bypass with one channel in bypass
  • Site software installation and regression test- Hardware and software integration verification and testing of post system delivery changes The Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT)follows the guidance of NEI 08-01 Section 9.4 (Reference 49)for the as-built tests to be performed at other than the final installed location.

The FAT was performed in accordance with PMS Software Program Manual WGAP-16096 (Reference 1), PMS Test Plan APP-PMS-T5-001 (Reference 2), and applicable Godes and Standards described in Vogtle 3 and 4 UFSAR Ghapter 7(Reference 48).

The FAT included testing of PMS inputs and outputs, logic, and functionality. During this test, the initial condition for the test scenarios was established and confirmed that with one channel of PMS in bypass, the redundant channel cannot be placed in bypass. During the test, one of the four PMS channels was taken to bypass, an attempt to place a redundant channel in bypass was made, and it was confirmed that the redundant channel cannot be placed in bypass. This testing was performed in accordance with FAT Test Procedure APP-PMS-T1P-026 (Reference 37). The results of the testing are documented in the FAT test reports SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-026(References 38 through 40). Attachment I provides a listing of test cases used to test that a redundant PMS channel cannot be placed in bypass.

Additional hardware and software installation and associated inspections and testing are performed on-site to verify that the cabinets are intact and functional in accordance with Units 3 and 4 for applicable Field Ghange Notifications(FGNs) API000 Vogtle Unit 3 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1 and API000 Vogtle Unit 4 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release X.X.X.X (References 15 and 16). References 15 and 16 include steps that confirm and document successful software load and further confirm the physical properties of the as-built PMS. A regression analysis (i.e., change evaluation) is performed post-delivery and installation for hardware changes (References 17 and 18) and software changes(Reference 19) to determine if additional testing is needed for the as-built system.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 14 of 36 The completed Unit 3 and Unit 4 FAT test reports (References 38 through 40), PONs (References 15 and 16), and regression test results (References 17 through 19) confirm that with one RMS channel in bypass, the redundant channel cannot be placed in bypass.

References 38 through 40 and 15 through 19 are available for NRG inspection as part of the ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii Unit 3 and 4 Completion Packages (References 46 and 47).

List of ITAAC Findings In accordance with plant procedures for ITAAC completion. Southern Nuclear Operating Company(SNC) performed a review of all findings pertaining to the subject ITAAC and associated corrective actions. This review found there are no relevant ITAAC findings associated with this ITAAC.

References(available for NRC inspection)

1. WCAP-16096 "Software Program Manual for Common Q Systems" Revision 4A
2. APP-PMS-T5-001, Rev. 5,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Test Plan"
3. APP-PMS-T1P-007,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System - Reactor Trip Channel Integration Test Procedure"
4. APP-PMS-T1P-035,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Display Calibration Data Test Procedure"
5. SV3-PMS-T2R-007,"Vogtle Unit 3 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Display Calibration Data Test Report"
6. SV4-PMS-T2R-007,"Vogtle Unit 4 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Display Calibration Data Test Report"
7. SV0-PMS-T2R-007,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Display Calibration Data Test Report"
8. SV3-PMS-T2R-035,"Vogtle Unit 3 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System -

Reactor Trip Channel Integration Test Report"

9. SV4-PMS-T2R-035,"Vogtle Unit 4 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System -

Reactor Trip Channel Integration Test Report"

10. SV0-PMS-T2R-035,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System - Reactor Trip Channel Integration Test Report"
11. APP-PMS-T1P-012,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System - System Integration Test for Time Response Test Procedure"
12. SV3-PMS-T2R-012,"Vogtle Unit 3 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System -

System Integration Test for Time Response Test Report"

13. SV4-PMS-T2R-012,"Vogtle Unit 4 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System -

System Integration Test for Time Response Test Report"

14. SV0-PMS-T2R-012,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System - System Integration Test for Time Response Test Report"
15. SV3-GW-GCW-300, Field Change Notice "API000 Vogtle Unit 3 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1"(WO SCNXXXXXX)
16. SV4-GW-GCW-XXX, Field Change Notice "API000 Vogtle Unit 4 PMS Initial Software Installation - Software Release 8.7.0.1"(WO SCNYYYYYY)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 15 of 36

17. GIC-AP1000-HEDS-19-001, Rev. 0"Regression Testing Analysis for Vogtle Unit 3 Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) Baseline 8.2 to 8.4 Hardware Modifications Performed at Site"
18. GIC-AP1000-HEDS-YY-XXX, Rev. X "Regression Testing Analysis for Vogtle Unit 4 Protection and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) Baseline X.X to X.X Hardware Modifications Performed at Site"(YY-XXX is the Year-Letter #)
19. SV0-PMS-T2R-050,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Channel Integration Test Integrated System Validation Test Report"
20. APP-PMS-T1P-008,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System - System-Level Engineered Safety Features Channel Integration Test Procedure"
21. APP-PMS-T1P-009,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System - Integrated Logic Processor Component Logic Channel Integration Test Procedure"
22. SV3-PMS-T2R-008,"Vogtle Unit 3 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System -

System-Level Engineered Safety Features Channel Integration Test Report"

23. SV4-PMS-T2R-008,"Vogtle Unit 4 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System -

System-Level Engineered Safety Features Channel Integration Test Report"

24. SVO- PMS-T2R-008,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System - System-Level Engineered Safety Features Channel Integration Test Report"
25. SV3-PMS-T2R-009,"Vogtle Unit 3 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System -

Integrated Logic Processor Component Logic Channel Integration Test Report"

26. SV4-PMS-T2R-009,"Vogtle Unit 4 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System -

Integrated Logic Processor Component Logic Channel Integration Test Report"

27. APP-PMS-T2R-009,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System - Integrated Logic Processor Component Logic Channel Integration Test Report"
28. SNCXXXXXX
29. SNCYYYYYY
30. B-GEN-ITPCI-006,"Main Control Room & Remote Shutdown Room"
31. 3-PMS-ITPP-504,"PMS REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS"
32. 4-PMS-ITPP-504,"PMS REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS"
33. SNC921600,"Perform ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii, Item 8.a.i"
35. SNCAAAAAA
36. SNCBBBBBB
37. APP-PMS-T1P-026,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Display Partial Actuate / Partial Bypass Test Procedure"
38. SV0-PMS-T2R-026,"API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Display Partial Actuate / Partial Bypass Test Report"
39. SV3-PMS-T2R-026,"Vogtle Unit 3AP1000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Display Partial Actuate / Partial Bypass Test Report"
40. SV4-PMS-T2R-026,"Vogtle Unit 4 API000 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Display Partial Actuate / Partial Bypass Test Report" 41.3-PMS-ITPP-521,"Protection and Safety Monitoring System Logic Test Preoperational Test Procedure"

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 16 of 36 42.4-PMS-ITPP-521,"Protection and Safety Monitoring System Logic Test Preoperational Test Procedure"

43. B-GEN-ITPCI-039,"PMS CIM Component Test Procedure" 44.3-PMS-OTS-17-012,"ADS & IRWST Injection Block and Squib Valve Testing" 45.4-PMS-OTS-17-012,"ADS & IRWST Injection Block and Squib Valve Testing""

46.2.5.02.06a.ii -U3-CP-Rev 0"U3 ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii Completion Package" 47.2.5.02.06a.ii -U4-CP-Rev 0"U4 ITAAC 2.5.02.06a.ii Completion Package"

48. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant(VEGP) Units 3 and 4 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report(UFSAR)
49. NEI 08-01,"Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52"

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 17 of 36 Attachment A Excerpt from COL Appendix 0 Table 2.5.2-2 Automatic Reactor Trip Testing (SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-007)

Reactor Trip Div A Test Div B Test Div C Test Div D Test Case Case Case Case Source Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Trip TPS01A-01.1 TPS01B-01.1 TPS01C-01.1 TPS01D-01.1 Intermediate Range High Neutron Flux Reactor TPS01A-02.1 TPS01B-02.1 TPS01C-02.1 TPS01D-02.1 Trip Power Range High Neutron Flux (Low Setpoint) TPS01A-03.1 TPS01B-03.1 TPS01C-03.1 TPS01D-03.1 Trip Power Range High Neutron Flux (High Setpoint) TPS01A-04.1 TPS01B-04.1 TPS01C-04.1 TPS01D-04.1 Trip Power Range High Positive Flux Rate Trip TPS01A-05.1 TPS01B-05.1 TPS01C-05.1 TPS01D-05.1 Reactor Coolant Pump High-2 Bearing Water TPS01A-12.1 TPS01B-12.1 TPS01C-12.1 TPS01D-12.1 Temperature Trip RCP1A Reactor Coolant Pump High-2 Bearing Water TPS01A-12.2 TPS01B-12.2 TPS01C-12.2 TPS01D-12.2 Temperature Trip RCP1B Reactor Coolant Pump Hlgh-2 Bearing Water TPS01A-12.3 TPS01B-12.3 TPS01C-12.3 TPS01D-12.3 Temperature Trip RCP2A Reactor Coolant Pump Hlgh-2 Bearing Water TPS01A-12.4 TPS01B-12.4 TPS01C-12.4 TPS01D-12.4 Temperature Trip RCP2B Overtemperature Deita-T Trip TPS01A-07.1 TPS01B-07.1 TPS01C-07.1 TPS01D-07.1 Overtemperature Deita-T Trip TPS01A-07.2 TPS01 B-07.2 TPS01C-07.2 TPS01D-07.2 Overpower Deita-T Trip TPS01A-08.1 TPS01B-08.1 TPS01C-08.1 TPS01D-08.1 Pressurlzer Low-2 Pressure Trip TPS01A-09.1 TPS01B-09.1 TPS01C-09.1 TPS01D-09.1 Pressurlzer Hlgh-2 Pressure Trip TPS01A-13.1 TPS01B-13.1 TPS01C-13.1 TPS01D-13.1 Pressurlzer Hlgh-3 Water Level Trip TPS01A-14.1 TPS01B-14.1 TPS01C-14.1 TPS01D-14.1 Low-2 Reactor Coolant Flow Trip HL 1 TPS01A-10.1 TPS01B-10.1 TPS01C-10.1 TPS01D-10.1 Low-2 Reactor Coolant Flow Trip HL 2 TPS01A-10.2 TPS01B-10.2 TPS01C-10.2 TPS01D-10.2 Low-2 Reactor Coolant Pump Speed Trip TPS01A-11.1 TPS01B-11.1 TPS01C-11.1 TPS01D-11.1 Low-2 Steam Generator Narrow Range Water TPS01A-15.1 TPS01B-15.1 TPS01C-15.1 TPS01D-15.1 Level Trip SGI Low-2 Steam Generator Narrow Range Water TPS01A-16.1 TPS01B-16.1 TPS01C-16.1 TPS01D-16.1 Level Trip SG2 Hlgh-3 Steam Generator Water Level Trip SGI TPS01A-17.1 TPS01B-17.1 TPS01C-17.1 TPS01D-17.1 Hlgh-3 Steam Generator Water Level Trip SG2 TPS01A-18.1 TPS01B-18.1 TPS01C-18.1 TPS01D-18.1 Automatic or Manual Safeguards Actuation Trip TPS01A-19.1 TPS01B-19.1 TPS01C-19.1 TPS01D-19.1 Automatic or Manual Depressurlzatlon System TPS01A-20.1 TPS01B-20.1 TPS01C-20.1 TPS01D-20.1 Actuation Trip Automatic or Manual Core Makeup Tank(CMT) TPS01A-21.1 TPS01B-21.1 TPS01C-21.1 TPS01D-21.1 Injection Trip Passive Residual Heat Removal(PRHR) TPS01A-06.1 TPS01B-06.1 TPS01C-06.1 TPS01D-06.1 Actuation Reactor Trip

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 18 of 36 Attachment B Excerpt from COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-3*

Engineered Safety Function* DIv A Test DIv B Test DIv C Test DIv D Test Case Case Case Case Safeguards Actuation TPS02A-01.1 TPS02B-01.1 TPS02C-01.1 TPS02D-01.1 TPS02A-01.3 TPS02B-01.3 TPS02C-01.3 TPS02D-01.3 TPS02A-01.4 TPS02B-01.4 TPS02C-01.4 TPS02D-01.4 TPS02A-01.5 TPS02B-01.5 TPS02C-01.5 TPS02D-01.5 TPS02A-01.6 TPS02B-01.6 TPS02C-01.6 TPS02D-01.6 TPS02A-01.7 TPS02B-01.7 TPS02C-01.7 TPS02D-01.7 Containment Isolation TPS02A-02 TPS02B-02 TPS02C-02 TPS02D-02 Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) TPS02A-05.2 TPS02B-05.2 TPS02C-05.2 TPS02D-05.2 Actuation TPS02A-05.3 TPS02B-05.3 TPS02C-05.3 TPS02D-05.3 TPS02A-05.4 TPS02B-05.4 TPS02C-05.4 TPS02D-05.4 TPS02A-05.5 TPS02B-05.5 TPS02C-05.5 TPS02D-05.5 TPS02A-05.6 TPS02B-05.6 TPS02C-05.6 TPS02D-05.6 Main Feedwater Isolation N/A TPS02B-07.1 N/A TPS02D-07.1 TPS02A-07.2 TPS02B-07.2 TPS02C-07.2 TPS02D-07.2 N/A N/A N/A TPS02D-07.3 Reactor Coolant Pump Trip TPS02A-06 TPS02B-06 TPS02C-06 TPS02D-06

- See FAT SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-007 for additional RCP Trip Test Cases CMT Injection TPS02A-04.1 TPS02B-04.1 TPS02C-04.1 TPS02D-04.1

- See FAT SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-012 for TPS02A-04.2 TPS02B-04.2 TPS02C-04.2 TPS02D-04.2 additional CMT Injection Test Cases TPS02A-04.3 TPS02B-04.3 TPS02C-04.3 TPS02D-04.3 Turbine Trip (Isolated signal to non-safety TPS02A-09.1 TPS02B-09.1 TPS02C-09.1 TPS02D-09.1 equipment) TPS02A-09.2 TPS02B-09.2 TPS02C-09.2 TPS02D-09.2 TPS02A-28 TPS02B-28 TPS02C-28 TPS02D-28 Steam Line Isolation N/A TPS02B-11.1 N/A TPS02D-11.1 TPS02A-11 TPS02B-11.2 TPS02C-11 TPS02D-11.2 N/A TPS02B-11.3 N/A TPS02D-11.3 N/A TPS02B-11.4 N/A TPS02D-11.4 TPS02A-01.4 TPS02B-01.4 TPS02C-01.4 TPS02D-01.4 TPS02A-01.5 TPS02B-01.5 TPS02C-01.5 TPS02D-01.5 Steam Generator Relief Isolation N/A TPS02B-25.1 N/A TPS02D-25.1 N/A TPS02B-25.2 N/A TPS02D-25.2 Steam Generator Slowdown Isolation N/A TPS02B-12.1 N/A TPS02D-12.1 N/A TPS02B-12.2 N/A TPS02D-12.2 Passive Containment Cooling Actuation TPS02A-13 TPS02B-13 TPS02C-13 N/A Startup Feedwater Isolation N/A TPS02B-14.1 N/A TPS02D-14.1 N/A TPS02B-14.2 N/A TPS02D-14.2 N/A TPS02B-14.3 N/A TPS02D-14.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 19 of 36 Attachment B (cent.)

Excerpt from COL Appendix 0 Table 2.5.2-3*

Engineered Safety Function* Div A Test Div B Test Div C Test Div D Test Case Case Case Case Passive Residual Heat Removal(PRHR) TPS02A-04.1 TPS02B-04.1 TPS02C-04.1 TPS02D-04.1 Heat Exchanger Alignment TPS02A-08.1 TPS02B-08.1 N/A TPS02D-08.1 TPS02A-08.2 TPS02B-08.2 TPS02C-08.2 TPS02D-08.2 TPS02A-08.3 TPS02B-08.3 N/A TPS02D-08.3 TPS02A-08.4 TPS02B-08.4 TPS02C-08.4 TPS02D-08.4 Block of Boron Dilution TPS02A-15.1 TPS02B-15 TPS02C-15.1 TPS02D-15.1 TPS02A-15.2 N/A TPS02C-15.2 TPS02D-15.2 Chemical and Volume Control System TPS02A-16.1 TPS02B-16 TPS02C-16.1 TPS02D-16.1 (CVS) Makeup Line Isolation TPS02A-16.2 N/A TPS02C-16.2 TPS02D-16.2 TPS02A-16.3 N/A N/A N/A Steam Dump Block (Isolated signal to non- N/A TPS02B-11.1 N/A TPS02D-11.1 safety equipment) N/A TPS02B-17.1 N/A TPS02D-17.1 N/A TPS02B-17.2 N/A TPS02D-17.2 N/A TPS02B-17.3 N/A TPS02D-17.3 Main Control Room Isolation, Air Supply TPS02A-18.1 TPS02B-18.1 TPS02C-18.1 N/A Initiation, and Electrical Load De- TPS02A-18.2 TPS02B-18.2 TPS02C-18.2 N/A energization TPS02A-18.3 TPS02B-18.3 TPS02C-18.3 N/A

- See FAT SV0-PMS-T2R-008 for additional MCR Isolation, Air Supply Initiation, and Electrical Load De-energization for test cases Auxiliary Spray and Purification Line and TPS02A-19 TPS02B-19 TPS02C-19 TPS02D-19 Zinc/Hydrogen Addition Isolation Containment Air Filtration System Isolation TPS02A-20 TPS02B-20 TPS02C-20 TPS02D-20 Normal Residual Heat Removal Isolation TPS02A-21.1 TPS02B-21.1 N/A TPS02D-21.1 TPS02A-21.2 TPS02B-21.2 N/A N/A Refueling Cavity and Spent Fuel Pool TPS02A-22 TPS02B-22 TPS02C-22 N/A Cooling System (SFS) Isolation

- See FAT SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-008 for additional Refueling Cavity and Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFS) Isolation test cases In-Containment Refueling Water Storage TPS02A-03 TPS02B-03 TPS02C-03 TPS02D-03 Tank (IRWST) Injection IRWST Containment Recirculation TPS02A-10.1 TPS02B-10.1 TPS02C-10.1 TPS02D-10.1 TPS02A-10.2 TPS02B-10.2 TPS02C-10.2 TPS02D-10.2

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 20 of 36 Attachment B (cont.)

Excerpt from COL Appendix 0 Table 2.5.2-3*

Bistable & Coincident Logic Testing [ i SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-008)(cont.)

Engineered Safety Function* Div A Test Div B Test Div C Test Div D Test Case Case Case Case CVS Letdown Isolation TPS02A-23 TPS02B-23 TPS02C-23 TPS02D-23 Pressurizer Heater Block (Isolated TPS02A-04.1 N/A N/A N/A signal to non-safety equipment) TPS02A-08.2 N/A N/A N/A Containment Vacuum Relief TPS02A-27 N/A TPS02C-27 N/A Component Cooling System TPS02A-01.1 TPS02B-01.1 TPS02C-01.1 TPS02D-01.1 Containment Isolation Valve TPS02A-01.3 TPS02B-01.3 TPS02C-01.3 TPS02D-01.3 Closure TPS02A-01.4 TPS02B-01.4 TPS02C-01.4 TPS02D-01.4 TPS02A-01.5 TPSG2B-01.5 TPS02C-01.5 TPS02D-01.5 TPS02A-01.6 TPS02B-01.6 TPS02C-01.6 TPS02D-01.6 TPS02A-01.7 TPS02B-01.7 TPS02C-01.7 TPS02D-01.7 TPS02A-06 TPS02B-06 TPS02C-06 TPS02D-06 Excerpt from COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-3*

Bistable & Coincident Logic Testing (SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-0()7)

Engineered Safety Div A Test Div B Test Div C Test Div D Test Function* Case Case Case Case Reactor Coolant Pump Trip TPS01A-12.1 TPS01B-12.1 TPS01C-12.1 TPS01D-12.1

- Additional RCP Trip Test TPS01A-12.2 TPS01B-12.2 TPS01C-12.2 TPS01D-12.2 Cases TPS01A-12.3 TPS01B-12.3 TPS01C-12.3 TPS01D-12.3 TPS01A-12.4 TPS01B-12.4 TPS01C-12.4 TPS01D-12.4 Excerpt from COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-3*

Bistable & Coincident Logic Testing (SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-01 2)

Engineered Safety Div A Test Div B Test Div C Test Div D Test Function* Case Case Case Case CMT Injection TPS12-ESF TPS12-ESF TPS12-ESF TPS12-ESF AUT0-A1 AUT0-B1 AUTO-C1 AUT0-D1 Excerpt from COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-3*

Bistable & Coincident Logic Testing (SV0-PMS-T2R-008)

Engineered Safety Div A Test Div B Test Div C Test Div D Test Function* Case Case Case Case Main Control Room TPS02A-18.4 TPS02B-18.4 TPS02C-18.4 N/A Isolation, Air Supply Initiation, and Electrical Load De-energization Refueling Cavity and Spent TPS02A-22.2 TPS02B-22.2 TPS02C-22.2 TPS02D-22.2 Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFS) Isolation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 21 of 36 Attachment 0 Excerpt from COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-3*

Component Interface Module(CIM) Output Testing (APP/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-009)

Engineered Safety Function* Test Cases Safeguards Actuation Test cases

- Actuates the following Engineered Safety Functions sections: associated with o Containment Isolation Safeguards o Main Feedwater Isolation Actuation o Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS) Makeup Line Isolation included in the o Normal Residual Heat Removal Isolation sections noted.

o CMT Injection o Component Cooling System Containment Isolation Valve Closure Containment Isolation TPS03A-01.8 TPS03A-01.9 TPS03A-01.10 TPS03A-01.il TPS03A-01.12 TPS03A-01.14 TPS03A-01.15 TPS03A-01.16 TPS03A-01.17 TPS03A-01.26 TPS03A-01.27 TPS03A-01.33 TPS03B-01.5 TPS03B-01.8 TPS03B-01.9 TPS03B-01.17 TPS03B-01.25 TPS03B-01.26 TPS03B-01.27 TPS03C-01.3 TPS03C-01.22 TPS03D-01.2 TPS03D-01.6 TPS03D-01.7 TPS03D-01.8 TPS03D-01.9 TPS03D-01.10 TPS03D-01.il TPS03D-01.12 TPS03D-01.14 TPS03D-01.15 TPS03D-01.16 TPS03D-01.17 TPS03D-01.19

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 22 of 36 Attachment C(cont.)

Excerpt from COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-3*

Component Interface Module(CIM)Output Testing (APP/SV3/SV4-PMS-1r2R-009)(cont.)

Engineered Safety Function* Test Cases Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Actuation TPS03A-01.28

- In addition, actuates GMT Injection, Passive Residual Heat Removal(PRHR) TPS03A-01.29 Heat Exchanger Alignment, and In-Containment Refueling Water Storage TPS03A-01.31 Tank (IRWST) Injection. Test cases associated with GMT Injection, Passive TPS03A-01.32 Residual Heat Removal(PRHR) Heat Exchanger Alignment, and In- TPS03A-01.34 Gontainment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) Injection included in TPS03A-01.39 those sections. TPS03A-01.40 TPS03A-01.41 TPS03A-01.42 TPS03B-01.11 TPS03B-01.18 TPS03B-01.19 TPS03B-01.44 TPS03B-01.45 TPS03B-01.46 TPS03B-01.47 TPS03B-01.48 TPS03B-01.49 TPS03B-01.50 TPS03G-01.12 TPS03G-01.20 TPS03G-01.25 TPS03G-01.26 TPS03G-01.27 TPS03D-01.32 TPS03D-01.39 TPS03D-01.42 TPS03D-01.43 TPS03D-01.48 Main Feedwater Isolation TPS03B-01.40 TPS03B-01.41 TPS03B-01.42 TPS03B-01.43 TPS03D-01.21 TPS03D-01.22 TPS03D-01.28 TPS03D-01.29 TPS03D-01.30 TPS03D-01-31 TPS03D-01.58 TPS03D-01.59 TPS03D-01.60

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 23 of 36 Attachment 0(cont.)

Excerpt from COL Appendix 0 Table 2.5.2-3*

Engineered Safety Function* Test Cases Reactor Coolant Pump Trip TPS03A-07.3 TPS03B-01.20 TPS03B-01.21 TPS03B-01.22 TPS03B-01.23 TPS03C-01.8 TPS03C-01.9 TPS03C-01.10 TPS03C-01.11 TPS03D-07.6 TPS03D-07.7 CMT Injection TPS03A-01.6

- In addition, actuates Passive Residual Heat Removal(PRHR) Heat Exchanger TPS03B-01.2 Alignment, CVS Letdown Isolation, and Pressurizer Heater Block (Isolated signal to TPS03C-01.2 nonsafety equipment). Test cases associated with Passive Residual Heat Removal TPS03C-07.3 (PRHR) Heat Exchanger Alignment, CVS Letdown Isolation, and Pressurizer Heater TPS03D-01.1 Block (Isolated signal to nonsafety equipment) included in those sections. TPS03D-07.2 Steam Line Isolation TPS03B-01.33

- In addition, actuates Steam Dump Block (Isolated signal to non-safety equipment). TPS03B-01.34 Test cases associated with Steam Dump Block (Isolated signal to non-safety TPS03B-01.36 equipment) included in that section. TPS03B-01.37 TPS03B-01.38 TPS03B-01.39 TPS03B-01.6 TPS03B-01.7 TPS03D-01.24 TPS03D-01.25 TPS03D-01.26 TPS03D-01.27 TPS03D-01.4 TPS03D-01.5 TPS03D-01.44 TPS03D-01.45 TPS03D-01.55 TPS03D-01.56 Steam Generator Relief Isolation TPS03B-01.14 TPS03B-01.31 TPS03D-01.20 TPS03D-01.35 Steam Generator Slowdown Isolation TPS03B-01.4 TPS03B-01.5 TPS03D-01.2 TPS03D-01.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 24 of 36 Attachment 0(cent.)

Excerpt from COL Appendix 0 Table 2.5.2-3*

Engineered Safety Function* Test Cases Passive Containment Cooling Actuation TPS03A-01.7 TPS03A-07.16 TPS03S-01.3 TPS03S-07.2 TPS03C-07.10 TPS03C-07.2 Startup Feedwater Isolation TPS03S-01.15 TPS03S-01.32 TPS03D-01.23 TPS03D-01.36 TPS03D-01.61 TPS03D-01.62 Passive Residual Heat Removal(PRHR) Heat Exchanger Alignment TPS03A-01.19

- In addition, actuates Steam Generator Slowdown Isolation. Test cases TPS03A-07.17 associated with Steam Generator Slowdown Isolation included in that section. TPS03S-01.4 TPS03S-01.5 TPS03S-01.10 TPS03S-01.35 TPS03D-01.2 TPS03D-01.3 TPS03D-01.13 Slock of Soron Dilution TPS03A-01.13 TPS03C-01.5 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS) Makeup Line Isolation TPS03A-01.21 TPS03D-07.3 Steam Dump Slock (Isolated signal to non-safety equipment) TPS03S-01.51 TPS03S-01.52 TPS03S-01.53 TPS03S-01.54 TPS03S-01.55 TPS03S-01.56 TPS03D-01.49 TPS03D-01.50 TPS03D-01.51 TPS03D-01.52 TPS03D-01.53 TPS03D-01.54 Main Control Room Isolation, Air Supply Initiation, and Electrical Load De- TPS03A-01.23 energization TPS03A-01.24 TPS03A-01.25 TPS03S-01.1 TPS03S-01.16 TPS03C-01.1 TPS03C-01.15 TPS03C-01.16

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 25 of 36 Attachment 0(cont.)

Excerpt from COL Appendix 0 Table 2.5.2-3*

Engineered Safety Function* Test Cases Main Control Room Isolation, Air Supply Initiation, and Electrical Load De- TPS03C-01.17 energization (cont.) TPS03C-01.18 TPS03C-01.6 Auxiliary Spray and Purification Line and Zinc/Hydrogen Addition Isolation TPS03A-01.12 TPS03A-07.11 TPS03A-07.20 TPS03C-01.4 TPS03C-07.8 TPS03D-01.7 TPS03D-01.12 Containment Air Filtration System Isolation TPS03A-01.14 TPS03A-01.15 TPS03A-01.33 TPS03C-01.22 TPS03D-01.14 TPS03D-01.16 Normal Residual Heat Removal Isolation TPS03A-01.28 TPS03A-01.29 TPS03B-01.46 TPS03B-01.47 TPS03B-01.50 TPS03B-01.9 TPS03D-01.46 TPS03D-01.47 Refueling Cavity and Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFS) Isolation TPS03A-01.26 TPS03A-01.27 TPS03B-07.7 In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) Injection TPS03A-01.38 TPS03B-01.30 TPS03C-01.24 TPS03D-01.41 IRWST Containment Recirculation TPS03A-01.20 TPS03A-01.37 TPS03B-01.29 TPS03B-07.3 TPS03C-01.23 TPS03D-01.40 CVS Letdown Isolation TPS03A-01.17 TPS03D-01.19 Pressurizer Heater Block (Isolated signal to non-safety equipment) TPS03A-01.1 TPS03A-01.2 TPS03A-01.3 TPS03A-01.4 TPS03A-01.5

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 26 of 36 Attachment 0(cont.)

Excerpt from COL Appendix 0 Table 2.5.2-3*

Engineered Safety Function* Test Cases Containment Vacuum Reiief TPS03A-01.33 TPS03C-01.22 Component Cooiing System Containment Isolation Vaive Closure TPS03B-01.8 TPS03D-01.10 TPS03D-01.9

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 27 of 36 Attachment D Excerpt from COL Appendix 0 Table 2.5.2-4*

Switch Description* Tag Div A Test Div B Test Div C Test Div D Test Cases Cases Cases Cases Manual Safeguards Actuation PMS-HS033 TPS01A-19.1 TPS01B-19.1 TPS01C-19.1 TPS01D-19.1 Manual Safeguards Actuation PMS-HS034 TPS01A-19.1 TPS01B-19.1 TPS01C-19.1 TPS01D-19.1 Excerpt from COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-4*

RMS Manually Actuated Function Testing (SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-008)

Switch Description* Tag Div A Test Div B Test Div C Test Div D Test Cases Cases Cases Cases Containment Isolation PMS-HS027 TPS02A-02 TPS02B-02 TPS02C-02 TPS02D-02 Containment Isolation PMS-HS028 TPS02A-02 TPS02B-02 TPS02C-02 TPS02D-02 Depressurization System Stages PMS-HS001 TPS02A-05.1 TPS02B-05.1 TPS02C-05.1 TPS02D-05.1 1, 2, and 3 Actuation Depressurization System Stages PMS-HS002 TPS02A-05.1 TPS02B-05.1 TPS02C-05.1 TPS02D-05.1 1, 2, and 3 Actuation Depressurization System Stages PMS-HS101 TPS02A-05.1 TPS02B-05.1 TPS02C-05.1 TPS02D-05.1 1, 2, and 3 Actuation Depressurization System Stages PMS-HS102 TPS02A-05.1 TPS02B-05.1 TPS02C-05.1 TPS02D-05.1 1, 2, and 3 Actuation Depressurization System Stage 4 PMS-HS003 TPS02A-05.4 TPS02B-05.4 TPS02C-05.4 TPS02D-05.4 Actuation Depressurization System Stage 4 PMS-HS004 TPS02A-05.4 TPS02B-05.4 TPS02C-05.4 TPS02D-05.4 Actuation Depressurization System Stage 4 PMS-HS103 TPS02A-05.4 TPS02B-05.4 TPS02C-05.4 TPS02D-05.4 Actuation Depressurization System Stage 4 PMS-HS104 TPS02A-05.4 TPS02B-05.4 TPS02C-05.4 TPS02D-05.4 Actuation Feedwater Isolation PMS-HS031 N/A TPS02B-07.1 N/A TPS02D-07.1 Feedwater Isolation PMS-HS032 N/A TPS02B-07.1 N/A TPS02D-07.1 Core Makeup Tank Injection PMS-HS015 TPS02A-04.1 TPS02B-04.1 TPS02C-04.1 TPS02D-04.1 Actuation Core Makeup Tank Injection PMS-HS016 TPS02A-04.1 TPS02B-04.1 TPS02C-04.1 TPS02D-04.1 Actuation Steam Line Isolation PMS-HS021 N/A TPS02B-11.1 N/A TPS02D-11.1 Steam Line Isolation PMS-HS022 N/A TPS02B-11.1 N/A TPS02D-11.1

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 28 of 36 Attachment D (cont.)

Excerpt from COL Appendix 0 Table 2.5.2-4*

RMS Manually Actuated Function Testing (SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-008)(cont.)

Switch Description* Tag Div A Test Div B Test Div C Test Div D Test Cases Cases Cases Cases Passive Containment Cooling PMS-HS017 TPS02A-13 TPS02B-13 TPS02C-13 N/A Actuation Passive Containment Cooling PMS-HS018 TPS02A-13 TPS02B-13 TPS02C-13 N/A Actuation Passive Residual Heat Removal PMS-HS023 TPS02A-08.1 TPS02B-08.1 N/A TPS02D-08.1 Heat Exchanger Alignment Passive Residual Heat Removal PMS-HS024 TPS02A-08.1 TPS02B-08.1 N/A TPS02D-08.1 Heat Exchanger Alignment IRWST Injection PMS-HS007 TPS02A-03 TPS02B-03 TPS02C-03 TPS02D-03 IRWST Injection PMS-HS008 TPS02A-03 TPS02B-03 TPS02C-03 TPS02D-03 IRWST Injection PMS-HS107 TPS02A-03 TPS02B-03 TPS02C-03 TPS02D-03 IRWST Injection PMS-HS108 TPS02A-03 TPS02B-03 TPS02C-03 TPS02D-03 Containment Recirculation PMS-HS005 TPS02A-10.1 TPS02B-10.1 TPS02C-10.1 TPS02D-10.1 Actuation Containment Recirculation PMS-HS006 TPS02A-10.1 TPS02B-10.1 TPS02C-10.1 TPS02D-10.1 Actuation Containment Recirculation PMS-HS105 TPS02A-10.1 TPS02B-10.1 TPS02C-10.1 TPS02D-10.1 Actuation Containment Recirculation PMS-HS106 TPS02A-10.1 TPS02B-10.1 TPS02C-10.1 TPS02D-10.1 Actuation Main Control Room Isolation, Air PMS-HS019 TPS02A-18.3 TPS02B-18.3 TPS02C-18.3 N/A Supply Initiation, and Electrical Load De-energization Main Control Room Isolation, Air PMS-HS020 TPS02A-18.3 TPS02B-18.3 TPS02C-18.3 N/A Supply Initiation, and Electrical Load De-energization Steam Generator Relief Isolation PMS-HS041 N/A TPS02B-25.1 N/A TPS02D-25.1 Steam Generator Relief Isolation PMS-HS042 N/A TPS02B-25.1 N/A TPS02D-25.1 Chemical and Volume Control PMS-HS029 TPS02A-16.2 N/A N/A TPS02D-16.2 System Isolation Chemical and Volume Control PMS-HS030 TPS02A-16.2 N/A N/A TPS02D-16.2 System Isolation Normal Residual Heat Removal PMS-HS013 TPS02A-21.1 TPS02B-21.1 N/A TPS02D-21.1 System Isolation Normal Residual Heat Removal PMS-HS014 TPS02A-21.1 TPS02B-21.1 N/A TPS02D-21.1 System Isolation Normal Residual Heat Removal PMS-HS113 TPS02A-21.1 TPS02B-21.1 N/A TPS02D-21.1 System Isolation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 29 of 36 Attachment D (cont.)

Excerpt from COL Appendix 0 Table 2.5.2-4 RMS Manually Actuated Function Testing (SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-008)(cont.)

Switch Description* Tag DIv A Test DIv B Test DIv C Test DIv D Test Cases Cases Cases Cases Normal Residual Heat Removal PMS-HS114 TPS02A-21.1 TPS02B-21.1 N/A TPS02D-21.1 System Isolation Containment Vacuum Relief PMS-HS044 TPS02A-27 N/A TPS02C-27 N/A Containment Vacuum Relief PMS-HS045 TPS02A-27 N/A TPS02C-27 N/A

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 30 of 36 Attachment E Description* Control* Displav*

Neutron Flux .

Yes Neutron Flux Doublina -

No Startup Rate .

Yes Reactor Coolant Svstem (RCS) Pressure _

Yes Wide-range Hot Leg Temperature -

Yes Wide-range Cold Leg Temperature -

Yes RCS Cooldown Rate Compared to the Limit Based on RCS Pressure -

Yes Wide-range Cold Leg Temperature Compared to the Limit Based on RCS Pressure -

Yes Change of RCS Temperature bv more than 5°F in the last 10 minutes -

No Containment Water Level -

Yes Containment Pressure -

Yes Pressurizer Water Level -

Yes Pressurizer Water Level Trend -

Yes Pressurizer Reference Leg Temperature -

Yes Reactor Vessel-Hot Leg Water Level -

Yes Pressurizer Pressure -

Yes Core Exit Temperature -

Yes RCS Subcooling -

Yes RCS Cold Overpressure Limit -

Yes IRWST Water Level -

Yes PRHR Flow -

Yes PRHR HX Outlet Temperature -

Yes PRHR HX Inlet Isolation and Control Valve Status Yes Passive Containment Cooling Svstem (PCS)Storage Tank Water Level -

Yes PCS Cooling Flow -

Yes IRWST to Normal Residual Heat Removal Svstem (RNS)Suction Valve Status -

Yes Remotelv Operated Containment Isolation Valve Status (2) -

Yes Containment Area High-range Radiation Level -

Yes Containment Pressure (Extended Range) -

Yes CMT Level -

Yes Manual Reactor Trip (also initiates turbine trip) Yes -

Manual Safeguards Actuation Yes -

Manual CMT Actuation Yes -

Manual MCR Emergencv Habitabilitv Svstem Actuation Yes -

Manual ADS Stages 1. 2, and 3 Actuation Yes -

Manual ADS Stage 4 Actuation Yes -

Manual PRHR Actuation Yes -

Manual Containment Cooling Actuation Yes -

Manual IRWST Iniection Actuation Yes -

Manual Containment Recirculation Actuation Yes -

Manual Containment Isolation Yes -

Manual Main Steam Line Isolation Yes -

Manual Feedwater Isolation Yes -

Manual Containment Vacuum Relief Yes Manual ADS and IRWST Iniection Unblock Yes -

Note; Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 31 of 36 Attachment F Excerpt from COL Appendix 0 Table 2.5.2-5*

Fixed Position Controls in MCR Testing (SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-007)

Control* Tag Div A Test Div B Test Div C Test Div D Test Cases Cases Cases Cases Manual Safeguards PMS-HS033 TPS01A-19.1 TPS01B-19.1 TPS01C-19.1 TPS01D-19.1 Actuation Manual Safeguards PMS-HS034 TPS01A-19.1 TPS01B-19.1 TPS01C-19.1 TPS01D-19.1 Actuation Excerpt from COL Appendix 0 Table 2.5.2-5*

Fixed Position Controls in MCR Testing (SV0/SV3/SV4-PI\/IS-T2R-008)

Control* Tag Div A Test Div 8 Test Div C Test Div D Test Cases Cases Cases Cases Manual GMT Actuation PMS-HS015 TPS02A-04.1 TPS02B-04.1 TPS02G-04.1 TPS02D-04.1 Manual GMT Actuation PMS-HS016 TPS02A-04.1 TPS02B-04.1 TPS02G-04.1 TPS02D-04.1 Manual MGR Emergency PMS-HS019 TPS02A-18.3 TPS02B-18.3 TPS02G-18.3 N/A Habltablllty System Actuation Manual MGR Emergency PMS-HS020 TPS02A-18.3 TPS02B-18.3 TPS02G-18.3 N/A Habltablllty System Actuation Manual ADS Stages 1, 2, and 3 PMS-HS001 TPS02A-05.1 TPS02B-05.1 TPS02G-05.1 TPS02D-05.1 Actuation Manual ADS Stages 1, 2, and 3 PMS-HS002 TPS02A-05.1 TPS02B-05.1 TPS02G-05.1 TPS02D-05.1 Actuation Manual ADS Stages 1, 2, and 3 PMS-HS101 TPS02A-05.1 TPS02B-05.1 TPS02G-05.1 TPS02D-05.1 Actuation Manual ADS Stages 1, 2, and 3 PMS-HS102 TPS02A-05.1 TPS02B-05.1 TPS02G-05.1 TPS02D-05.1 Actuation Manual ADS Stage 4 Actuation PMS-HS003 TPS02A-05.4 TPS02B-05.4 TPS02G-05.4 TPS02D-05.4 Manual ADS Stage 4 Actuation PMS-HS004 TPS02A-05.4 TPS02B-05.4 TPS02G-05.4 TPS02D-05.4 Manual ADS Stage 4 Actuation PMS-HS103 TPS02A-05.4 TPS02B-05.4 TPS02G-05.4 TPS02D-05.4 Manual ADS Stage 4 Actuation PMS-HS104 TPS02A-05.4 TPS02B-05.4 TPS02G-05.4 TPS02D-05.4 Manual PRHR Actuation PMS-HS023 TPS02A-08.1 TPS02B-08.1 N/A TPS02D-08.1 Manual PRHR Actuation PMS-HS024 TPS02A-08.1 TPS02B-08.1 N/A TPS02D-08.1 Manual Gontalnment Gooling PMS-HS017 TPS02A-13 TPS02B-13 TPS02G-13 N/A Actuation Manual Gontalnment Gooling PMS-HS018 TPS02A-13 TPS02B-13 TPS02G-13 N/A Actuation Manual IRWST Injection PMS-HS007 TPS02A-03 TPS02B-03 TPS02G-03 TPS02D-03 Actuation Manual IRWST Injection PMS-HS008 TPS02A-03 TPS02B-03 TPS02G-03 TPS02D-03 Actuation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 32 of 36 Attachment F (cent.)

Excerpt from COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-5*

Control* Tag DIv A Test DIv B Test DIv C Test DIv D Test Cases Cases Cases Cases Manual IRWST Injection PMS-HS107 TPS02A-03 TPS02B-03 TPS02C-03 TPS02D-03 Actuation Manual IRWST Injection PMS-HS108 TPS02A-03 TPS02B-03 TPS02C-03 TPS02D-03 Actuation Manual Containment PMS-HS005 TPS02A-10.1 TPS02B-10.1 TPS02C-10.1 TPS02D-10.1 Recirculation Actuation Manual Containment PMS-HS006 TPS02A-10.1 TPS02B-10.1 TPS02C-10.1 TPS02D-10.1 Recirculation Actuation Manual Containment PMS-HS105 TPS02A-10.1 TPS02B-10.1 TPS02C-10.1 TPS02D-10.1 Recirculation Actuation Manual Containment PMS-HS106 TPS02A-10.1 TPS02B-10.1 TPS02C-10.1 TPS02D-10.1 Recirculation Actuation Manual Containment PMS-HS027 TPS02A-02 TPS02B-02 TPS02C-02 TPS02D-02 Isolation Manual Containment PMS-HS028 TPS02A-02 TPS02B-02 TPS02C-02 TPS02D-02 Isolation Manual Main Steam PMS-HS021 N/A TPS02B-11.1 N/A TPS02D-11.1 Line Isolation Manual Main Steam PMS-HS022 N/A TPS02B-11.1 N/A TPS02D-11.1 Line Isolation Manual Feedwater PMS-HS031 N/A TPS02B-07.1 N/A TPS02D-07.1 Isolation Manual Feedwater PMS-HS032 N/A TPS02B-07.1 N/A TPS02D-07.1 Isolation Manual Containment PMS-HS044 TPS02A-27 N/A TPS02C-27 N/A Vacuum Relief Manual Containment PMS-HS045 TPS02A-27 N/A TPS02C-27 N/A Vacuum Relief

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 33 of 36 Attachment G Excerpt from COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-6*

RMS Block Testing (SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-008)

RMS Block Div A Test Div B Test Div C Test Div D Test Cases Cases Cases Cases Source Range High Neutron Flux Reactor TPS01A-1.1 TPS01B-1.1 TPS01C-1.1 TPS01D-1.1 Trip* TPS01A-01.1 TPS01B-01.1 TPS01C-01.1 TPS01D-01.1 Intermediate Range High Neutron Flux TPS01A-2.1 TPS01B-2.1 TPS01C-2.1 TPS01D-2.1 Reactor Trip*

Power Range High Neutron Flux (Low TPS01A-03.1 TPS01B-03.1 TPS01C-03.1 TPS01D-03.1 Setpoint) Trip*

Pressurizer Low-2 Pressure Trip* TPS01A-09.1 TPS01B-09.1 TPS01C-09.1 TPS01D-09.1 Pressurizer High-3 Water Level Trip* TPS01A-14.1 TPS01B-14.1 TPS01C-14.1 TPS01D-14.1 Low-2 Reactor Coolant Flow Trip* TPS01A-10.1 TPS01B-10.1 TPS01C-10.1 TPS01D-10.1 TPS01A-10.2 TPS01B-10.2 TPS01C-10.2 TPS01D-10.2 Low-2 Reactor Coolant Pump Speed Trip* TPS01A-11.1 TPS01B-11.1 TPS01C-11.1 TPS01D-11.1 High-3 Steam Generator Water Level Trip* TPS02A-01.3 TPS02B-01.3 TPS02C-01.3 TPS02D-01.3 Low-2 Steam Generator Narrow Range TPS02A-08.4 TPS02B-08.4 TPS02C-08.4 TPS02D-08.4 Water Level Trip*

ESF - Safeguards Actuation Block TPS02A-01.2 TPS02B-01.2 TPS02C-01.2 TPS02D-01.2 ESF - Steamline/Feedwater Isolation and TPS02A-01.2 TPS02B-01.2 TPS02C-01.2 TPS02D-01.2 Safeguards Block ESF - Pressurizer Pressure Low Safeguards TPS26-1.014 TPS26-1.072 TPS26-1.135 TPS26-1.196 Block ESF - FWS/CVS Makeup Isolation & Turbine TPS26-1.015 TPS26-1.073 TPS26-1.136 TPS26-1.197 Trip Block ESF - Pressurizer Level Low CMT Block TPS26-1.016 TPS26-1.074 TPS26-1.137 TPS26-1.198 ESF - Low SG Water Level PRHR Actuation TPS02A-04.2 TPS02B-04.2 TPS02C-04.2 TPS02D-04.2 Block ESF - Low RCS WR Pressure CVS/PRHR TPS02A-01.3 TPS02B-01.3 TPS02C-01.3 TPS02D-01.3 Block ESF - Flux Doubling Block TPS02A-01.3 TPS02B-01.3 TPS02C-01.3 TPS02D-01.3 ESF - CVS Letdown Isolation Block N/A TPS26-1.078 TPS26-1.141 N/A ESF - RNS Safeguards Block N/A TPS26-1.079 TPS26-1.142 N/A ESF - Low-2 Tavg Steam Dump Block TPS26-1.020 TPS26-1.080 TPS26-1.143 TPS26-1.201

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 34 of 36 Attachment H Excerpt from COL Appendix C Table 2.5.2-6*

ESF Block to ESF Function Matri X BSAaclfteuogirkdns /SFdItesaofnlmwguir LPSBkraefocslgwuizd &IFMBTksWaoSrcl/beCitVunp iLBCPkrezoMcvslwTu PSkLWBAceaotRvGulwHrin Bkcol Automatic Safeguards*

Containment Isolation*

Main Feedwater Isolation*

Reactor Coolant Pump Trip*

Core Makeup Tank Injection*

Steam Line Isolation*

Startup Feedwater Isolation*

Block of Boron Dilution*

Chemical and Volume Control System Isolation*

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X X LRPBkreoHCcslwWSu/V FBkDoucbxling CIBLkseotVlcdaiSwn SBkafeNcgulRrods DSTLBktoaucewlv-m2gp X

Chemical and Volume Control X X X X System Letdown Isolation*

Steam Dump Block* X Auxiliary Spray and Letdown X X X X X Purification Line Isolation*

Passive Residual Heat Removal X X X X X X Heat Exchanger Alignment*

Normal Residual Heat Removal X X X X System Isolation*

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 35 of 36 Attachment I RMS Bypass Testing (SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-I026)

Bypass Description Div A Test Div B Test Div C Test Div D Test Cases Cases Cases Cases High Source Range Flux TPS26-1.001 TPS26-1.059 TPS26-1.122 TPS26-1.183 Flux Doubling TPS26-1.002 TPS26-1.060 TPS26-1.123 TPS26-1.184 High Intermediate Range Flux TPS26-1.003 TPS26-1.061 TPS26-1.124 TPS26-1.185 High Power Range Flux Low Setpoint TPS26-1.004 TPS26-1.062 TPS26-1.125 TPS26-1.186 High Power Range Flux Low Setpoint TPS26-1.005 TPS26-1.063 TPS26-1.126 TPS26-1.187 High Power Range Flux Rate TPS26-1.006 TPS26-1.064 TPS26-1.127 TPS26-1.188 Over Power Delta T TPS26-1.007 TPS26-1.065 TPS26-1.128 TPS26-1.189 Overtemperature Delta T TPS26-1.008 TPS26-1.066 TPS26-1.129 TPS26-1.190 High-1 Pressurizer Level TPS26-1.009 TPS26-1.067 TPS26-1.130 TPS26-1.191 High-2 Pressurizer Level TPS26-1.010 TPS26-1.068 TPS26-1.131 TPS26-1.192 High-3 Pressurizer Level TPS26-1.011 TPS26-1.069 TPS26-1.132 TPS26-1.193 Low-1 Pressurizer Level TPS26-1.012 TPS26-1.070 TPS26-1.133 TPS26-1.194 Low-2 Pressurizer Level TPS26-1.013 TPS26-1.071 TPS26-1.134 TPS26-1.195 Low-2 Pressurizer Pressure TPS26-1.014 TPS26-1.072 TPS26-1.135 TPS26-1.196 High-2 Pressurizer Pressure TPS26-1.015 TPS26-1.073 TPS26-1.136 TPS26-1.197 Low-3 Pressurizer Pressure TPS26-1.016 TPS26-1.074 TPS26-1.137 TPS26-1.198 Low-2 Hot Leg 1 RCS Flow TPS26-1.017 TPS26-1.075 TPS26-1.138 TPS26-1.199 Low-2 Hot Leg 2 RCS Flow TPS26-1.018 TPS26-1.076 TPS26-1.139 TPS26-1.200 Low-2 Soent Fuel Pool Level TPS26-1.019 TPS26-1.077 TPS26-1.140 N/A Low-2 RCS Hot Leg Level N/A TPS26-1.078 TPS26-1.141 N/A Low-4 RCS Hot Leg Level N/A TPS26-1.079 TPS26-1.142 N/A Low RCS Wide Range Press TPS26-1.020 TPS26-1.080 TPS26-1.143 TPS26-1.201 High-3 Pressurizer Level TPS26-1.021 TPS26-1.081 TPS26-1.144 TPS26-1.202 Low-2 Tcold Leg 2 TPS26-1.022 TPS26-1.082 TPS26-1.145 TPS26-1.203 Low-1 Tavg TPS26-1.023 TPS26-1.083 TPS26-1.146 TPS26-1.204 Low-2 Tavg TPS26-1.024 TPS26-1.084 TPS26-1.147 TPS26-1.205 Low-2 Tavg TPS26-1.025 TPS26-1.085 TPS26-1.148 TPS26-1.206 Low-2 Tcold Leg 1 TPS26-1.026 TPS26-1.086 TPS26-1.149 TPS26-1.207 RCP Underspeed TPS26-1.027 TPS26-1.087 TPS26-1.150 TPS26-1.208 High-2 RCP 1A Bearing Temperature TPS26-1.028 TPS26-1.088 TPS26-1.151 TPS26-1.209 High-2 RCP IB Bearing Temperature TPS26-1.029 TPS26-1.089 TPS26-1.152 TPS26-1.210 High-2 RCP 2A Bearing Temperature TPS26-1.030 TPS26-1.090 TPS26-1.153 TPS26-1.211 High-2 RCP 2B Bearing Temperature TPS26-1.031 TPS26-1.091 TPS26-1.154 TPS26-1.212 Low-2 SGI Startup Feed Water Flow N/A TPS26-1.092 N/A TPS26-1.213 Low-2 SG2 Startup Feed Water Flow N/A TPS26-1.093 N/A TPS26-1.214 Low-2 SGI Narrow Range Level TPS26-1.032 TPS26-1.094 TPS26-1.155 TPS26-1.215 Low-2 SG2 Narrow Range Level TPS26-1.033 TPS26-1.095 TPS26-1.156 TPS26-1.216 High-3 SGI Narrow Range Level TPS26-1.034 TPS26-1.096 TPS26-1.157 TPS26-1.217 High-3 SG2 Narrow Range Level TPS26-1.035 TPS26-1.097 TPS26-1.158 TPS26-1.218 High-1 SGI Narrow Range Level TPS26-1.036 TPS26-1.098 TPS26-1.159 TPS26-1.219

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-19-1323 Enclosure Page 36 of 36 Attachment I (cent.)

RMS Bypass Testing (SV0/SV3/SV4-PMS-T2R-026)(cent.)

Bypass Description Div A Div B DivC DivD High-1 SG2 Narrow Range Level TPS26-1.037 TPS26-1.099 TPS26-1.160 TPS26-1.220 Low-2 SG1 Wide Range Level TPS26-1.038 TPS26-1.100 TPS26-1.161 TPS26-1.221 Low-2 SG2 Wide Range Level TPS26-1.039 TPS26-1.101 TPS26-1.162 TPS26-1.222 Low-2 SG1 Pressure TPS26-1.040 TPS26-1.102 TPS26-1.163 TPS26-1.223 Low-2 SG2 Pressure TPS26-1.041 TPS26-1.103 TPS26-1.164 TPS26-1.224 Negative SG1 Pressure Rate High TPS26-1.042 TPS26-1.104 TPS26-1.165 TPS26-1.225 Negative SG2 Pressure Rate High TPS26-1.043 TPS26-1.105 TPS26-1.166 TPS26-1.226 High-3 SG1 Narrow Range Level TPS26-1.044 TPS26-1.106 TPS26-1.167 TPS26-1.227 High-3 SG2 Narrow Range Level TPS26-1.045 TPS26-1.107 TPS26-1.168 TPS26-1.228 High Thot TPS26-1.046 TPS26-1.108 TPS26-1.169 TPS26-1.229 PRHR Actuation TPS26-1.047 TPS26-1.109 TPS26-1.170 TPS26-1.230 High-2 Containment Pressure TPS26-1.048 TPS26-1.110 TPS26-1.171 TPS26-1.231 Low-2 Containment Pressure TPS26-1.049 TPS26-1.111 TPS26-1.172 TPS26-1.232 High-1 Containment Radiation TPS26-1.050 TPS26-1.112 TPS26-1.173 TPS26-1.233 High-2 Containment Radiation TPS26-1.051 TPS26-1.113 TPS26-1.174 TPS26-1.234 Battery Charger UV TPS26-1.052 TPS26-1.114 TPS26-1.175 TPS26-1.235 Battery Charger UV TPS26-1.053 TPS26-1.115 TPS26-1.176 TPS26-1.236 Low-3 CMT A Narrow Range Upper TPS26-1.054 TPS26-1.116 TPS26-1.177 TPS26-1.237 Low-3 CMT B Narrow Range Upper TPS26-1.055 TPS26-1.117 TPS26-1.178 TPS26-1.238 Low-6 CMT A Narrow Range Lower TPS26-1.056 TPS26-1.118 TPS26-1.179 TPS26-1.239 Low-6 CMT B Narrow Range Lower TPS26-1.057 TPS26-1.119 TPS26-1.180 TPS26-1.240 Low-3 IRWST Narrow Range Level TPS26-1.058 TPS26-1.120 TPS26-1.181 TPS26-1.241 High MCR Supply Radiation N/A TPS26-1.121 TPS26-1.182 N/A Low Containment Pressure TPS26-1.258 TPS26-1.259 TPS26-1.260 TPS26-1.261 Low IRWST Wide Range Level N/A N/A TPS26-1.262 TPS26-1.263