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LER 89-015-00:on 890918,two of Nine Remote Manually Operated Diaphragm Air Operated Containment Isolation Valves Failed Acceptance Criteria for Closing Time.Caused by Buildup & Hardening of Iron Oxide Sludge.Valves cleaned.W/891018 Ltr
	ML19327B133
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	10/18/1989
From:	Fernandez W, Fish H; POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:	; NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
	JAFP-89-0745, JAFP-89-745, LER-89-015, LER-89-15, NUDOCS 8910250269
	Download: ML19327B133 (8)
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  ; y                                                                                                                    .j I-a N                                             William Femandez ll .

Resident Manager - .' .I October- 18, 1989 JAFP-89-0745 l s . I l United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission '! Document Control Desk- i t Mail Station PI-137 > n- Washington',.D.C. 20555 -)

REFERENCE:

DOCKET NO. 50-333 ; LICENSEE EVENT REPORT: 89-015-00 1 Containment Isolation Valves. Closed Cooling ] r , Dear Sir Enclosed please' find the referenced Licensee Event Report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii). If-there are anyJguestions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Hamilton Fish at (315) 349-6013. !

                                .Very truly yours, W*

I LIAM FERNA DEZ WF:HCFlar[ Enclosure cc: USNRC, Region I (1) . m INPO Records Center, Atlanta, GA (1) b .American Nuclear Insurers (1) i L Internal Power Authority Distribution NRC Resident Inspector Document Control Center '& LER/OR File i i p2'

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Nine Air Operated Containment Isolation Valves Exhibit Operational Deficiencies Due to Packinn Problems & Iron Build-Up in Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling System eveer ante m ten enamen a moon, enge m oneen eam6 m es move 6ves e paeuvv asaases asseme tav veAA V AA 6 nuneeb % "n esosevM Day veAm Mi ceuessang oislelelel i l l 0l9 1 l8 8 9 8 l9 0l1l5 0l0 1l0 1l8 8l9 os sicio en s i l was asser e asemse euneuam to vue neewaamome e, se een si m . ., m. a j w mi sueou _ sum. mesweim ann 4 mmewum N O10no

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n E , me.mv . , ~ .._- . , , , , _ m n., 1 EIIS Codes are in [] On September 18, 1989 during a scheduled outage and performance of a j scheduled ASME, Section XI In-Service Test, two of nine remote manually 1 oaerated diaahragm air operated containment isolation valves (ISV) on l ! t:1e reactor:auilding closed loop cooling water system [CC] failed the acceptance criteria for valve closing time. One valve would not close except by manual operation. Another valve closing time exceeded the criteria by 0.4 seconds or 3.6 percent. Subsequent outage operations revealed common problems with the seven valves which initially passed the closing time test. Valves appeared to be binding due principally to the buildup and hardening of iron oxide sludge in the valve . : l operating in.ternals although there is some indication that the original l packing may have contributed to the problem. Ie l Corrective action: Disassembled and cleaned all nine valves and L changed packing from seven ring Grafoil to live loaded five ring type on five valves. Three other valves had previously been changed to this , type of packing in 1988. ! Long- term corrective action will flush system to reduce iron oxide buildup and investigate possible changes to internal valve trim which is less susceptible to corrosion product accumulation. LERr, with common elements: 88-005, 88-009, and 86-003.

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ame Peror SW U 8 NUCL A3 4 elWLt ToaV CoMM888 ton ) F ' LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION areaovio oue womio-om 2 exeias em.. l l' eneurv = m ooCai,=Ut.ia m t.v.... . . . . JAllES A. FITZPATRICK vita am;t6 07 3; , i NilCLEAR POWER PLANT wn w . .mu - nam un v uu w m, ols o o ol3 l 8l9 - 0 l1l5 - 0l0 0l2 0F 0 17 ' EIIS Codes are in [] i Description g The plant was shutdown for a planned maintenance outage. During the outage deficiencies were discovered in the operation or internal condition-of each of the nine containment isolation valves (ISV) of the Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling water system (RBCLCW) [CC). The valves are air diaphragm operated with piston in-cage valve internals. The sizes are one 1-1/2 inch, one 6-inch, and seven 4-inch valves. The stroke closing time of all nine valves was measured on

,         September 18, 1989 during the scheduled performance of In-Service Testing (IST) Surveillance Test ST-IR, " Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Containment Isolation A0V Exercise".               The closing times for seven'of the valves were within the IST limits. The stroke time for valve 15A0V-130B of 11.81 seconds exceeded the maximum permitted closing time of 11.4 seconds by 0.41 second or 3.6 percent.                            Also, observation of the valve stem showed an erratic sticking motion. The operating mechanism for valve 15A0V-131A could be closed only by manual operation of the valve handwheel. The stroke time for valve 15A0V-131B was'within the IST limits. However, visual observation of the valve stem travel revealed an erratic sticking motion. The position i          indicating limit switch for valve 15A0V-130A required adjustment.

Subsequent to the IST, a modification was in progress to replace the L existing air supply to the valve operators with a nitrogen supply.

         .This modification required closing the valves as a part of the protective tagging procedure. On September 29th and 30th, two valves, 15A0V-132B and 15A0V-133B, would not close for tag-out although they had previously passed the stroke time test ten days before.

On October 4th, as part of the system valve line-up, in preaaration for plant start-up, additional sticking problems were found with several of the valves. Plant management directed that the remaining four valves in the system be disassembled, examined, and retested. At this time the pistons for the four remaining valves, 15A0V-130A, 15A0V-132A, 15A0V-133A, and 15A0V-134A, while previously demonstrated to be operable under air pressure, were found to be sufficientl corrosion products that mechanics considered them to be "y fouledand frozen" by immovable with use of normal amounts of force. 33,oeM ou, c

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                                .There'are four contributing conditions which, because they existed                                                          l

y. ;;u . concurrently, jointly may have contributed to excessive resistance to omotion of the valve stem or the piston inside of the cage assembly:

2 H o Valve. stem packing .

      ;#                                      o Corrosion product (iron oxide) build-up h                                           o Inappropriate selection iof valve trim for valve application                                               ,

b 7 o Infrequent (outage only) cycling of valves closed and open '

11. . Packing !

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The valves were originally supplied with seven rings of Grafoil

          -0 packing. Inspection of the valve stems found a film of Grafoil packing material adhering to the exposed surface. . Based on this e-                                          description, the valve vendor (by telephone) suggested that the                                              ,
                                             . rings:may be shearing on the surface in contact with the valve                                             -
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stem. These observations indicate that packing problems-may be

                                             'one. contributor to the observed slow, erratic, or sticking motion (or lack of motion) of the valve stems.                                                                    ,

2.. Corrosion Products All 6f the valves were disassembled for inspection. All exhibited an excessive accumulation of a black corrosion product sludge (magnetite iron oxide Fe-3 0-4) on internal surfaces and in critical crevices of the operating parts such as the close

lr clearance space between the piston and cage, c Rm The corrosion product build-up was sufficiently extensive that the ,, pistons on four of the valves were characterized by the mechanics E :. as-frozen or seized. Although the three valves which had J pr.eviously (1988) had live load packing installed all passed the P-

                                  ,           initial 11ST, two of them subsequently stuck during valve line-up.                                         '

Upon disassembly all three were found to have pistons frozen in alace. Because of this, corrosion product build-up is believed to se the principal contributor to the problem. w . "v The. water in the RBCLCW system is demineralized. No chemical

   ~.t'                                       treatment is a'dded. Given the quantity of carbon steel pipe and                                           .

fittings in the system, the generation of iron oxide is expected. It is not known at this time whether the quantity of iron oxide is

     ,-                                       excessive. A corrosion evaluation of the plant closed loop l

cooling system is in progress. This is expected to provide, i additional information on this subject. 1 1

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3. Valve Type and Trim Remote operated containment isolation valves for the RBCLCW system were not part of the original design configuration of the plant.

                     - The valves were installed as an upgrade modification in 1983 to provide' remote containment isolation operation capability.                                             To meet a commitment installation deadline, the selection of valves was necessarily limited to those available on a short lead time.

It appears that'the internal trim option in these valves was not optimal for this application and may be.more appropriate to a flow control application than to a full open to full closed isolation application. This particular trim option cppears to be inherently more susceptible to accumulation of corrosion products and to fouling than a full flow isolation valve would be.

4. Cycling These valves are cycled only'during plant shutdown because there is an inherent risk of recirculation pump trip, containment temperature and pressure transients, and a scram resulting from failure of the valves in a closed position. This infrequent cycling, together with the original packing system and valve trim, permits build-up of corrosion products and contributes to possible .

sticking in the packing gland. Analysis These nine valves were not installed as part of the original plant design in 1975. In response to the NRC, they were installed as a . modification in 1983 to meet 10 CFR 50 Appendix A General Design Criteria 54 and 57. The valves are not included in the current plant

         . Technical Specifications.                             They are included in a proposed amendment to                                    i the specifications which was submitted to the NRC on May 31, 1989 as JPTS-84-005.                        They are listed in Table 7.3-1 of the updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). As such, they are part of the revised
         -design basis of the plant.

The safety function of the valves is to provide a remote manual method i to selectively close and isolate individual sections of the RBCLCW system to isolate identified contamination pathways from primary containment to the environment if they occur during postulated design basis accidents. These valves fail open. By procedure, these valves ' will be closed only if there is an indication of radioactivity leakage in the RBCLCW system. These valves do not receive isolation signals for automatic closure. Remote manual operation of the valves requires a licensed operator to obtain a key and rotate manual keylock switches on a back panel. Further, these valves are accessible in the reactor building and may be closed manually by use of a handwheel. Therefore, neither the FSAR nor the proposed Technical Specifications specify a maximum closing time for these valves, i.A"""

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$ 'HCLEAR POWER PLANT o 1s l0 lo l0 l3 l3 l3 8l9 -- 0l115 -- 0l0 015 0F O 17 mic 4 me, 4wnn While the valves.may have been inoperable by remote control, the valves were never inoperable by local manual handwheel. They could have always performed their safety function to be selectively closed. Nevertheless, because of the number of valves of a common type in one system which exhibited common problems indicative of a potential to fail, this event is reported as a " condition that was outside the design basis of the plant" in accordance with 10 CFR.50.73(a)(2)(ii). The potential for the loss of ability to close these valves does not by itself have any safety consequence. To assess the safety consequence it is first necessary to postulate a' scenario in which simultaneously: ; o a loss of coolant accident occurs o RBCLCW piping integrity in the drywell fails o RBCLCW piping integrity outside the primary containment [NH] or heat exchanger to service water barrier fails or Emergency Service Water (ESW) system cross-tie to the containment is.in < service o the failures are of such a magnitude that both the RBCLCW pumps and (ESW) pumps cannot maintain system pressure above primary containment pressure o service water system pumps cannot maintain system pressure above RBCLCW pressure o the system pressure drops below the maximum primary containment pressure o service water system on RBCLCW heat exchange components cannot be isolated Then, if all of these events were to occur simultaneously, the possibility exists for radioactive contamination to reach secondary containment [NG) or the lake through the service water system. Corrective Action Immediater All nine valves were disassembled. The pistons and cage trim were cleaned and polished. The accumulated black iron oxide sludge, magnetite, was removed from the internal valve body. The existing seven ring Grafoil packing was replaced with five ring live loaded packing on five valves. The packing had previously been replaced in 1988 on three other valves. The valves were tested for satisfactory performance pricr to returning the system to service, c c O.. . .

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                                                                              .                                                          EXP6AIS: 8/3148 q           PASILITY MAME 14                                   Decat? NUMBER tal                        L4R NUMeta (Si                          PAtttal d                ?JAllEl A. FlTIPATRICK                                                             "aa W2!f.h" *WJ.R                                             i
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            ?                    Long-term                                                                                                                                     >
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                                ;1.         Two valves will be disassembled'and insaected during the next scheduled outage approximately six montis from now (March 1990).

2.: The. remaining. valve will be replaced during the next scheduled outage to ensure consistency between the valves. ,

3. The-RBCLCW system will be flushed during the next outage to ,

attempt to remove some of the accumulated iron oxide. l

                                '4.- lThe, plant engineering group will investigate the suitability-of alternate styles'of internal trim designed for the application assigned.to these valves.                                                                                                           ,
                                 ~5.        Periodic cycling of the valves during operations was considered-and rejected due to operational restraints.                                                                                       3 The other corrective actions, in conjunction with required cycling-
     ",                                     duritig shutdown conditions, should ensure continued operability.                                                                  !

Additional Information Failed Component Identification: Valve Manufacturur ITT Grinnell Valve-Hammel Dahl Model Number: V500 Size: . 1-1/2", 4", 6" l Pressure Rating: 1-1/2" - 600 psig

                .                                              4" and 6" - 150 psig Stroke:                      6" 1/4"
          ,                                                    4" 1/2" 1-1/2" 1/8"
                                ' Number of Valves:            1 - 6" 1 1/2"                                                                                                      '

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                            , LERs with common elements:

L ,Nv . . 88-005 05/25/89 Emergency Service Water. Check Valves Blocked by Sludge Accumulation

                                      '88-009                      10/21/89'          Unit Coolers and Check Valves for ECCS-Equipment Fouled by Mud ~and Silt ~
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                               "86-003                             03/12/86           Containment Isolation Valve Inoperable Due'to
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ML19327B133

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