3F0314-01, Response to Request for Additional Information to Exemptions on Radiological Emergency Response Plan Requirements Defined by 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E to Part 50, Revision 1

Response to Request for Additional Information to Exemptions on Radiological Emergency Response Plan Requirements Defined by 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E to Part 50, Revision 1

ML14098A072
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	03/28/2014
From:	Elnitsky J Duke Energy Florida
To:	Document Control Desk, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
References
3F0314-01, TAC MF2981, TAC MF3415
Download: ML14098A072 (73)

Text

Crystal River Nuclear Plant 15760 W. Power Line Street

@DUKE ENERGY1 Crystal River, FL 34428 Docket 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 10 CFR 50.12 March 28, 2014 3F0314-01 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Crystal River Unit 3 - Exemptions to Radiological Emergency Response Plan Requirements Defined by 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E to Part 50, Revision 1, and Response to Request for Additional Information

Reference:

CR-3 to NRC letter, "Crystal River Unit 3 - License Amendment Request #315, Revision 0, Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme, and Request for Exemption to Certain Radiological Emergency Response Plan Requirements Defined by 10 CFR 50," dated September 26, 2013. (ADAMS Accession No. ML13274A584)

Dear Sir:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, Duke Energy Florida, Inc. hereby submits the response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) request for additional information (RAI) received by email on February 20, 2014, regarding the request for exemption to certain Radiological Emergency Response Plan requirements defined by 10 CFR 50, which were contained in the September 26, 2013 submittal (Reference). Enclosure 1 to this letter provides the RAI response. Enclosure 2 to this letter provides the revised request for exemption to certain Radiological Emergency Response Plan Requirements defined by 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E to Part 50.

This correspondence contains regulatory commitments identified in Enclosure 3.

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Dan Westcott, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs, at (352) 563-4796.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on March 28, 2014.

Since Pr ect Management and Construction JE/sam

Enclosures:

1. Response to Request for Additional Information

2. Request for Exemption to Certain Radiological Emergency Response Plan Requirements Defined by 10 CFR 50, Revision 1

3. Regulatory Commitments xc: NRR Project Manager Regional Administrator, Region 1 /1(1

DUKE ENERGY FLORIDA, INC.

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50 - 302 / LICENSE NUMBER DPR - 72 EXEMPTIONS TO RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN REQUIREMENTS DEFINED BY 10 CFR 50.47 AND APPENDIX E TO PART 50, REVISION 1, AND RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ENCLOSURE 1 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 1 of 37 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION By letter dated September 26, 2013, Duke Energy Florida, Inc. (DEF) requested exemptions from portions of Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations (10 CFR 50) for the Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Plant (CR-3) Radiological Emergency Response Plan (ADAMS Accession No. ML13274A584). Specifically, DEF requested exemption from certain emergency plan requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and Section IV to Appendix E of 10 CFR 50. The requested exemptions would allow DEF to reduce emergency plan requirements and subsequently revise the CR-3 Radiological Emergency Response Plan consistent with the permanently defueled condition of the reactor.

On February 20, 2014, via an e-Mail, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) provided a request for additional information (RAI) regarding the proposed exemptions to CR-3. The RAI questions and the CR-3 responses are provided below.

In the NRC RAI questions, the specific portions of the requirement within the regulation from which the exemption is being requested is depicted in emphasized (bold/strikeout) font. In the tables below, the column titled, "Crystal River Request Wording," indicates CR-3's originally requested exemption as contained in Enclosure 2 of Reference 1. The column, titled, "Past Precedent Wording,"

indicates exemptions as previously granted by the NRC for the associated regulation.

RAI-001 10 CFR Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedent Wording 50.47(b)(1) Primary responsibilities for emergency response Primary responsibilities for emergency response by by the nuclear facility licensee and by State and the nuclear facility licensee and by State and local l.oal . -ganizationswithin the Emergency organizations within t-he- EM..geRcY Planning Planning Zonce have been assigned, the Zones have been assigned, the emergency emergency responsibilities of the various responsibilities of the various supporting supporting organizations have been specifically organizations have been specifically established, established, and each principal response and each principal response organization has staff to organization has staff to respond and to respond and to augment its initial response on a augment its initial response on a continuous continuous basis.

basis.

Although formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness (REP) plans have typically been exempted for decommissioning sites, State and local organizations continue to be relied upon for firefighting, law enforcement, ambulance and medical services in support of the licensee's (onsite) emergency plan. Please provide further justification as to why this requirement would not be applicable based on the context described above.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 2 of 37 Response to RAI-O01 The intent of the originally requested exemption was to continue to rely on State and local organizations for firefighting, law enforcement, ambulance, and medical services as needed for events at the site, but without an expected need for these organizations for offsite radiological emergency response. Details regarding assistance from offsite organizations are provided in the Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP), Revision 0 (contained in Enclosure 3 of Reference 1). However, the past precedent wording also meets this intent. Therefore, DEF is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1) in Reference 1, to read as shown in Enclosure 2 of this submittal. The revised request is consistent with the past precedent wording shown above.

RAI-002 10 CFR Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedent Wording 50.47(b)(7) Infor-mation is m'adailabe to the public Infor.mation is made available to the public en a on a periodir, hbasis on how they will be priodic* basis on how they Will be notified and notified and what thelir initial actions ghould  :-what their initial actions should be in an be in an cmcrg8AncY (e.g., listening to -alocal-2 emergency (e.g., listening to a local bronadc-ast broadcast st*atio*-n -:and-remaining indoors), stao and. remaining indoor.s), [T]he principal the principal points Of c-ontac wi90th the news points of contact with the news media for

.m.dia for dissemination of inf*rmation dissemination of information during an emergency during an emer-gency (including the physical (including the physical location or locations) are IeGat.n- e ,,,'ates, are .. established in established in advance, and procedures for advance,.and procedures for.coo*.rdinat coordinated dissemination of information to the diss..'-e-minattion- of ifo,-r.m"ation to the publi.c public are established.

are established-.II 10 CFR 72.32(a)(16) states, "Arrangements made for providing information to the public." While CR-3 does not currently have an ISFSI, the staff used the regulations and guidance for an ISFSI to inform the previous exemptions granted to decommissioning licensees to maintain consistency as the licensee transitions through the decommissioning process. Please describe how information would be disseminated to the public should an event occur at the CR-3 site.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 3 of 37 Response to RAI-002 DEF maintains a corporate communications organization, which includes a media relations group. News media contacts for CR-3 will continue to be maintained and upon an event at the CR-3 site, information will be disseminated to the public and briefings with pertinent media organizations will be conducted per corporate communication protocols.

Since there are no longer any pre-planned actions that the public needs to take as a result of an anticipated emergency at CR-3, it is no longer necessary to pre-plan dissemination of emergency information to the public. The intent of the originally requested exemption was to discontinue specific emergency response organizational requirements for major interactions with news media.

However, the past precedent wording also meets this intent. Therefore, DEF is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) in Reference 1, to read as shown in Enclosure 2 of this submittal. The revised request is consistent with the past precedent wording shown above.

RAI-003 10 CFR Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedent Wording 50.47(c)(2) Gcnerally, the plume expesurc pathway EPZ Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for for nuclear power plantS shall conSiSt of an nucicar power plants shall consist of an area arcpa about 10 miles (16 kin) inradius and the abhout- 110 Milces (16 kin) in radius and t-he ingcstion pathway EPZ s-hall so-nSist of an ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area area-. ab-out-50 miles (80 kin) in radius. The abou- --iles (80 kin) in r-adius. The exact size

--t- -50M exac~t size and configuration of the EM~ and configur-ation o-f t-he EPZs SUrrounding a surrounding a particular nuclear power particular nuclear power reactor shall be reactor shall be deteFrmined i relationto deterrmnend in relatin to local emergencGy loc~al emergency response needs and r-esponse needs and capabilities as they are c~apabilities as they are affected by rsuch affected by such conditio-ns- as de m-ography, coenditions as demography, topography, land topogr-aphy, land characteristics, access routes-,

c~haracteristics acsroutes, and and jUrisd ictio-nal boundaries. The size of the IUrisdictienal onais h ieo h EPZs alsG may be determined on a case-by-case EPZ~s also mnay be determin-edd on a-Case by basis for gas-cooled nuclear reactors and for case basis for-gas cooled nuclerr reactors reactors with an authorized power level less than and for reactors with an aulthorized power 250 MW thermal. The plans for the ingestio level less than 250 MW thermal. The plans for pathway shall focus on such actions as are the ingestion pathway sh-all focr-u-s on such appropriate to protect the foodinsto a2c-tio0ans as :are appropriate to protect the food pathway.r ingestion patha.....-_____________________

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 4 of 37 This requirement as it relates to gas-cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermal is not applicable to CR-3, and therefore, does not require exemption. Please remove as a requested exemption or provide specific justification for exemption.

Response to RAI-003 DEF agrees that the portion of 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that identifies the requirement for determination of the size of the Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) for gas-cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermal is not applicable to CR-3 and is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) in Reference 1, to read as shown in Enclosure 2 of this submittal. The revised request is consistent with the past precedent wording shown above.

RAI-004 10 CFR 50 Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedent Wording Appendix The final safety analysis report or the site safety E, III analysis report for an early site permit that includes complete and integrated emergency plans under § 52.17(b)(2)(ii) of this chapter shall contain the plans for coping with emergencies.

The plans shall be an expression of the overall concept of operation; they shall describe the essential elements of advance planning that have been considered and the provisions that have been made to cope with emergency situations.

The plans shall incorporate information about the emergency response roles of supporting organizations and offsite ago*ncei. That information shall be sufficient to provide assurance of coordination among the supporting groups and with the licensee. The site safety analysis report for an early site permit which proposes major features must address the relevant provisions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, within the scope of emergency preparedness matters addressed in the major features. The plansp submitt..ed.a FAU,. .e :R 1-u.jde a Annn..;n!:an

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 5 of 37 the elements set out in Section IIl for the emnergencY planning ZOneS (EPZs) to an cxtcnt suffmcicnt to demRonStrate that the plans provide Feasonable assurancc that adequate protec-tive measure* *an S and InAlfill be taken in the event of an emergency._'.

This section of the regulations is not applicable to CR-3, as it applies to only license applicants and therefore does not require exemption. Please remove as a requested exemption or provide specific justification for exemption.

Response to RAI-004 DEF agrees that this requirement is not applicable to CR-3 and is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, III in Reference 1, to identify that no exemption is requested.

RAI-005 10 CFR 50 Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedent Wording Appendix The applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but The applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but E.IV.1 not be limited to, information needed to not be limited to, information needed to demonstrate compliance with the elements set demonstrate compliance with the elements set forth below, i.e., organization for coping with forth below, i.e., organization for coping with radiological emergencies, assessment actions, radiological emergencies, assessment actions, activation of emergency facilities and equipment, activation of emergency facilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency preparedness and training, maintaining emergency preparedness and recovery, and onsite protective actions during recovery, and "nsitc protective artion. during hostie anctio.. In addition, the emergency hostil. actio. In addition, the emergency response plans submitted by an applicant for a response plans submitted by an applicant for a reactor power reactor operating license under this reactor power reactor operating license under this Part, or for an early site permit (as applicable) or Part, or for an early site permit (as applicable) or combined license under 10 CFR Part 52, shall combined license under 10 CFR Part 52, shall co.ntain information needed to dc.mOntrate contain information needed to demonstrate

.ompliance with the standa,.s described in compliance with the standards described in

§6047(b)1 and they will be evaluated against §50.47(b), and they will be evaluated against those standards. those standards.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 6 of 37 The standards in §50.47(b) that have not been exempted remain applicable to CR-3. Therefore, the emergency plans still "shall contain information needed to demonstrate compliance with the standards described in §50.47(b)." Please provide specific justification for exempting this requirement or delete these words from the exemption request.

Response to RAI-005 DEF agrees that the PDEP still "shall contain information needed to demonstrate compliance with the standards described in

§50.47(b)," and is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.1 in Reference 1, to read as shown in Enclosure 2 of this submittal. The revised request is consistent with the past precedence wording shown above.

RAI-006 10 CFR 50 Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedent Wording Appendix Identification, by position and function to be Identification, by position and function to be E.IV.A.4 performed, of persons within the licensee performed, of persons within the licensee organization who will be responsible for making organization who will be responsible for making offeite dosc projcctiens and a de.r.iptiOR o offsie-dose projections and a description of how how these p.. jcctio, S will be made and, the these projections will be made and the results r'eulte t;an.mi.ttd to State and Iocal transmitted to State and local authorities, NRC, authoritie.NRC, and other appropriate and other appropriate governmental entities.

governmental entities.

10 CFR 72.32(a)(9) states: "Information to be communicated. A brief description of the types of information on facility status; radioactive releases; and recommended protective actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite response organizations and to the NRC."

While unlikely or not projected to exceed EPA protective action guidelines, a radiological release reaching beyond the site boundary is still possible (based on elapsed time since cessation of power operations). Please provide specific justification for exempting this requirement.

Response to RAI-006 The intent of the originally requested exemption was to discontinue offsite dose assessment and the transmittal of offsite dose projection results to offsite agencies, but to maintain the responsibility and process for communicating information on facility status and onsite radioactive releases (from onsite dose projection results) to offsite response organizations and to the NRC if necessary,

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 7 of 37 as defined in the PDEP, Revision 0. Therefore, DEF is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.A.4 in Reference 1, to read as shown in Enclosure 2 of this submittal. The revised request is consistent with the past precedence wording shown above.

RAI-007 10 CFR 50 Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedent Wording Appendix The means to be used for determining the The means to be used for determining the E.IM.B.1 magnitude of, and for continually assessing the magnitude of, and for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive materials impact of, the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies, the participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and other Federal agencies, and the Commission, and other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to be used for emergency action levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of protective determining when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and measures should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect health and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety. The emergency action levels shall be safety. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-plant conditions and instrumentation based on in-plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite-monitoring. By in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor June 20, 2012, Wor nu.lear powcr reaGcOt licensees, these action levels must include hostile Iiccnsees, t.hese atolevels mustinlwud-action that may adversely affect the nuclear power hostile action that may adversely affect the plant. The initial emergency action levels shall be nu.,.a. power plant. The initial emergency discussed and agreed on by the applicant or action levels shall be discussed and agreed on by licensee and State and local governmental the applicant or licensee and State and local authorities, and approved by the NRC. Thereafter, governmental authorities, and approved by the ee.rgency ac-tio-n levels shall be reviewed with NRC. Thereafter, emergency action levels shall the State and local governme.nt*,,l ahorities on be reviewed with the State and local annu-a-l ba-*-.

._an governmental authorities on an annual basis.

In the EP Final Rule, the Commission defined "hostile action" as, in part, an act directed toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel. The staff determined that a decommissioning reactor site would not be characterized as a nuclear power plant in view of

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 8 of 37 the risk for offsite radiological consequences. Therefore, CR-3 would not be required to include hostile action in the EALs. Please provide specific justification for maintaining this requirement.

Maintaining the requirement for the offsite response organizations (OROs) to review the EALs on an annual basis will ensure the proper awareness by OROs of applicable emergency classifications and will also ensure that communications with the proper authorities are maintained based on continued requirement for prompt notification of State and local response organizations in the event of a classified emergency under §50.47(b)(5). As such, the basis for this requirement remains applicable. Please provide specific justification for exempting this requirement.

Response to RAI-O07 After further consideration of the intent of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.B.1, DEF agrees that the requirement to include hostile actions in the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) should be included in the exemption in view of the current risk for offsite radiological consequences. Therefore, DEF is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.B.1 in Reference 1, to read as shown in Enclosure 2 of this submittal. This change will require an update to the Permanently Defueled (PD)

EAL Bases Manual, Revision 0 (contained in Enclosure 5 of Reference 1), and an update to the PDEP that will be completed with the PDEP RAI response (regulatory commitment).

The intent of the originally requested exemption was to discontinue the review of the EALs with local governmental authorities on an annual basis as a result of the reduced extent of involvement of local county officials in the CR-3 PDEP. However, based upon this question, DEF understands that this annual review supports proper ORO awareness of applicable classifications and ensures communications with proper authorities are maintained based upon the State and local response organization notification requirements upheld by CR-3. CR-3 proposes to continue to review EALs with the State of Florida and local governmental authorities on an annual basis.

The CR-3 Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) currently defines local government to include Citrus County and Levy County, as a result of the need for the public to take protective actions and offsite emergency planning by State and local organizations. Because it is no longer possible for the radiological consequences of a design basis accident or a credible beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA Protective Action Guides at the site boundary, DEF will only include Citrus County government authorities in the review of EALs, since local support organizations may coordinate with the Citrus County Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

Based upon the reduced scope of EALs for the permanently defueled facility, the scope of the annual review of EALs is expected to be reduced (informal mailings, etc.), however this will ensure the proper awareness of the applicable emergency classifications.

Therefore, DEF is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.B.1 in Reference 1, to read

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 9 of 37 as shown in Enclosure 2 of this submittal. This change will require an update to the PDEP and will be completed with the PDEP RAI response (regulatory commitment).

In addition to the past precedent wording included in RAI-007, "and offsite" is struck through the requested exemption to 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.B.1 in Enclosure 2 of this submittal, since offsite monitoring is no longer applicable. This strikethrough was included in the Table 1, "EXEMPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION," contained in the NRC draft Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) document NSIR/DPR-ISG-02, "Emergency Planning Exemption Requests for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants," for 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.B.1.

RAI-008 10 CFR 50 Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedent Wording Appendix The entire spectrum of emergency conditions that The entire spectrum of emergency conditions that E.IV.C.1 involve the alerting or activating of progressively involve the alerting or activating of progressively larger segments of the total emergency larger segments of the total emergency organization shall be described. The organization shall be described. The communication steps to be taken to alert or communication steps to be taken to alert or activate emergency personnel under each class of activate emergency personnel under each class of emergency shall be described. Emergency action emergency shall be described. Emergency action levels (based not only on onsite and offsite levels (based not only on onsite and effe.ite radiation monitoring information but also on radiation monitoring information but also on readings from a number of sensors that indicate a readings from a number of sensors that indicate a potential emergency, such as the pr...u.. in potential emergency, such as the pressure in containment and the r o.nt.ainment

.espon. and the Fe. po o.... 4

-m..geR.. orcGCooling System) for ,-c........Ce Cooling System) for notification of offsite agencies shall be described, notification of offsite agencies shall be described.

The existence, but not the details, of a message The existence, but not the details, of a message authentication scheme shall be noted for such authentication scheme shall be noted for such agencies. The emergency classes defined shall agencies. The emergency classes defined shall include: (1) notification of unusual events, (2) alert, include: (1) notification of unusual events, (2) alert, (3)site area emergcncry, and (4)genel (3)site arca emergency, and (4) general emer-geny of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, emeigency of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.C. 1. These classes are further discussed in IV.C. 1. These classes are further discussed in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 10 of 37 CR-3 requested exemption 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), "Adequate methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use". Typical EAL schemes for decommissioning sites do not include use of offsite radiation monitoring information as part of EAL scheme. Please provide justification for maintaining the requirement for use of radiation monitoring information.

Response to RAI-008 The intent of the originally requested exemption was to eliminate the requirement to maintain methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition, as described in the PDEP, Revision 0.

Therefore, DEF is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.C.1 in Reference 1, to read as shown in Enclosure 2 of this submittal. The revised request is consistent with the past precedent wording shown above.

RAI-009 10 CFR 50 Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedence Wording Appendix A licensee shall have the capability to notify A licensee shall have the capability to notify E.IV.D.3 responsible State and local governmental responsible State and local governmental agencies within 4-minutes after declaring an agencies within 4.5-minutes after declaring an emergency. Thc liccnse shall demonstrate emergency. The Iccnsec shall demo-n-strate that the appropriate govcrnmental auithorities that the aprpiate governmental authorities have the caabliyt makc a public. alerting have the capability to make a public alerting and naotfiation decison promptly on beiing and- no-tific~ation decision promptly on being informed by the licensee of an emnergency inMformed- by the licensee -ofan e-mergency co.ndtieon. Prior to initial oper-ation greater rol;nddition. Prior toe initial operation greater 5%o ~ ae hral than _- pwrothe frt than 5%of rated thermal power-of the first reactor at a steach nuclear power reactor reactor at a site, each nuclear power reactore lic-ensee shall1 d-emonst-r-ate that administrative icepnseep shall demonstrate that administrative and physical1 memans- have bee-pn e-st-ablis-hed- for and physical means have been established forF alerting and providing prompt inRstrucItions to alerting and proeviding prompt instruc-tions to the public within the plume exposure pathway the public. within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The design objective of the prompt EPZ. The design objective of the prompt public alert a2nd- notific.ation system shall be to public alert and no-tific-ation system shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the have;P the capability to essentially complete the.

initial alerting and initiate notification of the initfial alerting and initiate notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ public. within the plume exposure pathway EPZ

_______within about 15 minutes. The use of this wit-hin ab-out 15 minutes. The use of this

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 11 of 37 alerting and no-tific-a-tion capability Will range allerting and mnotifica2tion capabilityw ill range

.romll imnmme iatc * *in* pie ing an a fOI4lC~tli fnl T fro~m immed-iate allerting and notification ofth public (within 1 -5Minutes of thc timc that State public. (within 15 minutes of the time that State and local officials arc notified that a situation and local2. o-fficials16 are notified that a situationt n xI nin r n n u ulr in u Ilr a nn i

• Pi m n ni i n i n ng m orn exists requiring urgent action) to the m*r.e likely events Where there is substantial time likely events w~hereP thereP issbstantial time avaelab or he app op iate gove rnm en t available Ifo the appropriate government autoriiesto make a judgment whether or not authorities to make a judgment whether Or not to activate the pub~lic aller-t and notification to activate the public alert and- no-tification system. The allerting and noetific-atione system. The alerting and_ notificatio capability shall additionally include capability shall ad"ditio1nally include administrative and physicsal mneansfoa admian*i0strMative and physicalmeans foDr a backup method of public. aller-ting and backup method of public almerting an notification capable of being used in the event no-tific.-ation capable of being used in the event the primar-y mnethod of allerting and notification the primary method of alerting and notification isn unavail bl d r n an e rg cy to ale rt or is unavaial during an emergency to alert Or notify all Or por-tions of the plume exposure notify all Or portions of the plume exposure E=PZ population. The bac2kup mnethod shall EPZ population. The backup method shall have the csapability to allert and notify th h-ave the c-apability to alert and notify the public within the plume exposure pathway public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, but doe s non-t ne ed to M eet the 15 m inu- te EPZ, but does not need to Meet the 15minute design objec-tive for the primary prompt public design objective for the prmr 3rmpt public, alert and notification system. WAhen there Is a alet nd notfi atonsystem . W hen there i d-ecisi-on to ac-tivate the allert and no-tification decision to activate the ealert and notification system, the appropriate governmnental system, the appropriate governmental authorities wIll deter-mine wvhether to activate authon~riti esa will.. dePter-Fmine.P wMh.etherf to activate the entire alert and notification syste the entire alert and notification system s1imult2aneGously Or in a graduated Or staged sFimulta2neoGusly orn a graduated Or staged manner. The responsibility for activating such m-anner. The responsibility for activating such

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1. ', ek '~I-reai with the appr-opr-iate governmentall remain %rith the appFOPFiate gGveFnMPnt;ll a u, .t h.*em. e; autheffties-. authefftws-.

10 CFR 72.32(a)(8) states: "Notification and coordination. A commitment to and a brief description of the means to promptly notify offsite response organizations and request offsite assistance, including medical assistance for the treatment of contaminated injured onsite workers when appropriate. A control point must be established. The notification and coordination must be planned so that

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 12 of 37 unavailability of some personnel, parts of the facility, and some equipment will not prevent the notification and coordination. The licensee shall also commit to notify the NRC operations center immediately after notifications of the appropriate offsite response organizations and not later than one hour after the licensee declares an emergency."

The requirement to maintain the capability to notify the local government agencies (response organizations) is still required under

§50.47(b)(5) and has been retained for previous exemption requests. Please provide specific justification for exempting requirement to notify local government agencies.

Response to RAI-009 The intent of the originally requested exemption was to maintain the capability to notify offsite response organizations and request offsite assistance, including medical assistance for the treatment of contaminated injured onsite workers when appropriate, as described in the PDEP, Revision 0. A control point is established and the responsibilities for notification and coordination are planned, as described by the PDEP.

In 1999, the NRC exempted Zion Units 1 and 2 from notifying responsible State and local government agencies within 15 minutes of an emergency with the commitment to maintain notification of the State of Illinois and Wisconsin within 30 minutes (Reference 3). In 1998, the NRC exempted Maine Yankee from notifying responsible State and local government agencies within 15 minutes of an emergency and currently Maine Yankee notifies the Maine State Police within one hour of the declaration of an emergency (Reference 4). Both the Zion and Maine Yankee Emergency Plans notify the NRC operations center immediately after notifications of the appropriate offsite response organizations and not later than one hour after the licensee declares an emergency. The past precedent wording of the exemption to Appendix E, IV.D.3 for Zion and Maine Yankee is the same as the past precedent wording referenced in RAI 9.

CR-3 will maintain the capability to communicate with the State Watch Office Tallahassee (SWOT) within 60 minutes after an emergency declaration or a change in classification. The SWOT will assume the responsibility to provide notification to Citrus County (acknowledged by agreements between DEF and Citrus County and also the State of Florida). CR-3 will notify the NRC operations center immediately after notifications of the appropriate offsite response organizations and not later than one hour after the licensee declares an emergency, as described in the PDEP, Revision 0. This notification and coordination practice is consistent with practices maintained by Zion and Maine Yankee, which were approved by the NRC. This was the intent of the originally requested exemption, however based upon this RAI, the text strikeout was incorrect. Therefore, DEF is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.D.3 in Reference 1, to read as shown in Enclosure 2 of this submittal. The revised request is consistent with the past precedent wording shown above.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 13 of 37 RAI-01 0 10 CFR 50 Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedent Wording Appendix A licensee ,n.ite technical support center and A licensee onsite technical suppot center and E.IV.E.8.a(1) an eFme.rgncy operations facility from which an emer;gency operations facility from which effective direction can be given and effective effective direction can be given and effective control can be exercised during an emergency control can be exercised during an emergency A designated "facility" needs to be maintained to provide a point for command and control. Please provide specific justification for elimination of term "facility" or provide substitute terminology as part of exemption request.

Response to RAI-010 The intent of the originally requested exemption was to eliminate the requirement to maintain an onsite technical support center and an emergency operations facility, and maintain a designated onsite facility to provide a point for command and control, as described in the PDEP, Revision 0. Therefore, DEF is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.E.8.a(i) in Reference 1, to read as shown in Enclosure 2 of this submittal. The revised request is consistent with the past precedent wording shown above.

RAI-011 10 CFR 50 Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedent Wording Appendix Vlr a nuclear power reactGo llcensee*s E.IV.E.8.b. emergency operations facility r-equired by paragraph I a of this. section, either a facility located betweean 10 miles and 25 males of the nuclear poer vreacntr site(s), Or a prmaa,'

fcili, locted- less than 10 Miles.f*rm the nuclear-power reactor site(s) and a backup fac-ility located be*,-ee*,,,,n 10 miles and 25 mn*iles of the nuclVV*Iear poWer reacto* site(s). An emergency operations fa,.clity may s.,,, more than one nuclear power rceactOr site. A licensee desiring to locate an emergency operatiIons nura facility PGIVIIV l -alllMore than r amI~ l sha ll25 r-qV~

miles IIPI frnm I a F GF,

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 14 of 37 Co-mmissio-n approval by submitting an app~lication for an amendment to- its liccense.

For an cmF-gency opeFations facility located More than 25 miles from a nuclear poweV roaG*tr site,.r viio-n munnst h made for locating NRC and oeffiite responders closer to t-he nuclear. power reactor site so that NRC and offsitc responderS can interact face to face with emergency response perSonnel entering and leaving the nuclear power reactor- site.

ProVisionAs for locating NRC and offsitp responders cloAser to -anuclear power reactor sit that is mor than 25 miles fromR the emnergency operations facility must include the following "A licensee desiring to locate an emergency operations facility more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site shall request prior Commission approval by submitting an application for an amendment to its license. For an emergency operations facility located more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site, provisions must be made for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to the nuclear power reactor site so that NRC and offsite responders can interact face-to-face with emergency response personnel entering and leaving the nuclear power reactor site. Provisions for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to a nuclear power reactor site that is more than 25 miles from the emergency operations facility must include the following:" is not applicable to CR-3 because the EOF is closer than 25 miles from the site. Please remove this wording from the exemption request or justify why the exemption is needed.

Response to RAI-01I DEF agrees that this requirement is not applicable to CR-3 and is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.E.8.b in Reference 1, to identify that no exemption is requested.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 15 of 37 RAI-012 10 CFR 50 Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedent Wording Appendix Provisions for communications with Gent 'u"us Provisions for communications with contiguous E.IV.E.9.a Stateic!cal govcrn.m.nts within the plume State/local governments within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Such communication exposure pathway EPZ. Such communication shall be tested monthly shall be tested monthly Notification of State and the local governments (response organizations) was retained in previous exemptions under §50.47(b)(5) and as discussed in RAI-010 above. Requirement in Appendix E IV.IV.E.9.a continues to be applicable to ensure that adequate lines of communication are maintained in support of these notifications. Please provide specific justification for exempting this requirement as requested.

Response to RAI-012 The intent of the originally requested exemption was to maintain the capability to notify State and local response organizations with adequate lines of communication to coordinate assistance onsite if required, as described in the PDEP, Revision 0. CR-3 will maintain the capability to communicate with the State Watch Office Tallahassee (SWOT) within 60 minutes after an emergency declaration or a change in classification. The SWOT will assume the responsibility to provide notification to the Citrus County EOC (acknowledged by agreements between DEF and Citrus County and also the State of Florida). Additionally, CR-3 will notify resources for firefighting, law enforcement, ambulance, and medical services through the established lines of communication. This was the intent of the originally requested exemption, however based upon this RAI, the text strikeout was incorrect. Therefore, DEF is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.E.9.a in Reference 1, to read as shown in of this submittal. The revised request is consistent with the past precedent wording shown above.

RAI-013 10 CFR 50 Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedent Wording Appendix Provision for communications among the nuclear Provision for communications among the nuelea E.IV.E.9.c power reactor control room, the onsite e-hni-a' power reactor.control room, the on..e suppo~t center, and the emer-gency operations technical r.,ppeot center, and the eMeFgcncy facility; and among the nuclear facility, the operations facility; and among the nuclear principal State and leaal emergency operations facility, the principal State and local emergency centers, and the field assessment teams. Such operations centers, and the field Assessment communications systems shall be tested annually. teams. Such communications systems shall be tested annually.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 16 of 37 DEK's Basis for Requested Exemption states in part, "an onsite facility (whether the control room or a facility similar to the technical support center) would continue to be maintained, from which effective control can be exercised during an emergency." While the basis for requested exemption indicates that one onsite facility will be maintained, the requested exemption wording infers that two separate locations: the nuclear power control room AND an onsite nuclear facility will be maintained to support communications to principle offsite emergency operations centers. Please clarify or provide further justification for exemption.

Additionally, please provide specific justification for exempting provisions for communications with "local" emergency operations centers, as required in §50.47(b)(5).

Response to RAI-013 CR-3 will maintain the capability to communicate with the SWOT from the Control Room. The SWOT will assume the responsibility to provide notification to Citrus County. The communication with State and Citrus County EOCs will ensure the coordination of assistance onsite if required. Additional offsite organization contact information will be maintained in the Control Room. The onsite facility located in the Control Complex (adjacent to the Control Room) will be used as a point of assembly for necessary technical expertise to assist the Emergency Coordinator in the assessment, mitigation and response to an emergency, as described in the PDEP, Revision 0. The Control Complex contains commercial telephone lines and intra-plant phones (PAX) and augmented staff responders will bring radios for onsite communication. Augmented staff responding to the Control Complex will have access to up-to-date technical documentation, including drawings, system information and procedures to enable mitigation planning and support of the Control Room staff.

DEF is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.E.9.c in Reference 1, to read as shown in Enclosure 2 of this submittal. The revised request is consistent with the past precedent wording shown above.

RAI-014 10 CFR 50 Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedent Wording Appendix Provisions for communications by the licensee Provisions for communications by the licensee E.IV.E.9.d with NRC Headquarters and the appropriate NRC with NRC Headquarters and the appropriate NRC Regional Office Operations Center from the Regional Office Operations Center from the nuclear power reactor control room, the onsite nucl.a. pow..

.. a.to. control Froo., the.. n.,e tachnical support center, and the.e...gen.- technical

' upport center, and the cme.genc.

.per-ati"ne facility. Such communications shall opeoatione-facility. Such communications shall be tested monthly be tested monthly

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 17 of 37 DEK's Basis for Requested Exemption states in part, "an onsite facility (whether the control room or a facility similar to the technical support center) would continue to be maintained, from which effective control can be exercised during an emergency". While the basis for requested exemption indicates that one onsite facility will be maintained. The requested exemption wording infers that two separate locations: the nuclear power control room AND an onsite nuclear facility will be maintained to support communications to principle offsite emergency operations centers. Please clarify or provide further justification for exemption.

Response to RAI-014 CR-3 will maintain the capability to communicate with the NRC, via the Emergency Notification System (ENS), from the Control Room. DEF is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.E.9.d in Reference 1, to read as shown in Enclosure 2 of this submittal. The revised request is consistent with the past precedent wording shown above.

RAI-01 5 10 CFR 50 Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedent Wording Appendix In addition, a radiologigc *al rOrPinta-ton training In addition, a radiological orientation training E.IV.F.1 program shall be made available to local program shall be made available to local services services personnel; e.g., local emergency personnel; e.g., local emergency serviceslGivil services/Civil Defense, local law enforcement Defense, local law enforcement personnel,-leral personnel, loc.al news media

. peS..S. ne....s media peron. .

10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) states: "Radiological emergency response training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency."

10 CFR 72.32(a)(10) states: "Training. A brief description of the training the licensee will provide workers on how to respond to an emergency and any special instructions and orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire, police, medical and other emergency personnel."

Local services personnel (i.e., firefighting, local law enforcement and ambulance) expected to respond onsite under the licensee's emergency plan will continue to require some basic knowledge about radiation and the facility to facilitate their timely response consistent with §50.47(b)(15), which DEF did not request an exemption from. Please provide justification for exempting this requirement, specifically how training to prepare these local services personnel to respond to an event at the CR-3 site will be provided or why training is no longer deemed necessary.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 18 of 37 Response to RAI-015 The intent of the originally requested exemption was to ensure radiological emergency response training is provided to local services personnel (firefighting, local law enforcement, and ambulance) to prepare these local services personnel to respond to an event at the CR-3 site, as described in the PDEP, Revision 0. This intent is reflected in the PDEP, Revision 0. Therefore, DEF is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.F.1 in Reference 1, to read as shown in Enclosure 2 of this submittal. The revised request is consistent with the past precedent wording shown above.

RAI-016 10 CFR 50 Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedent Wording Appendix Each licensee at each site shall conduct a Each licensee at each site shall conduct a E.IV.F.2.b subsequent exercise of its onsite emergency plan subsequent exercise of its onsite emergency plan every 2 years. Nuclear pwc-r ;cactor licensees every 2 years. Nu-cear powe-r reactor licen*sees shall submit exerci.. cnrios.under § 50.4 hall1 submit ex.rcise sc.naros. un.. er. 50.4 a2t least-60 days before usMna xrise at leas~t 60 days before use inan exercse required by this paragraph 2.b. The exercise required by this paragraph 2.b. The exercise mFay be inlud-cdl in t.he full par"tipation may be included in the full pa.ticipation biennial exe~rcise required by paragraph 2.G. of bienniall execs reuied by paragraph 2.G. of thissertion. In addition, the licensee shall take thaq Aootin In addition, the licensee shall take actions necessary to ensure that adequate actions necessary to ensure that adequate emergency response capabilities are maintained emergency response capabilities are maintained during the interval between biennial exercises by during the interval between biennial exercises by conducting drills, including at least one drill conducting drills, including at least one drill involving a combination of some of the principal involving a combination of some of the principal functional areas of the licensee's onsite functional areas of the licensee's onsite emergency response capabilities. The principal emergency response capabilities. The principal functional areas of emergency response include functional areas of emergency response include activities such as management and coordination activities such as management and coordination of emergency response, accident assessment, of emergency response, accident assessment, event classification, notification of offsite event classification, notification of offsite authorities, assessment of the onsite an.d-fftite authorities, assessment of the onsite-and-effsite impact of radiological releases, protective action impact of radiological releases, protective action recommendation development, protective action rcoammendation development, protectiFe decision making, plant system repair and action decision making, plant system repair and mitigative action implementation. During these mitigative action implementation. During these

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 19 of 37 drills, activation of all of the licensee's emergency drills, activation of all of the licensee's emergency response facilities (T-echn.cal Support Cente response facilities (Technical Support Center (TSC), Ope.ation, Support Center (OSC), and (TSC), Op-rations Suppo.t Crntcr (OSC), and the Emcr~gcncy Operations Facility (EOF)) the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF))

would not be necessary, licensees would have the would not be necessary, licensees would have the opportunity to consider accident management opportunity to consider accident management strategies, supervised instruction would be strategies, supervised instruction would be permitted, operating staff in all participating permitted, operating staff in all participating facilities would have the opportunity to resolve facilities would have the opportunity to resolve problems (success paths) rather than have problems (success paths) rather than have controllers intervene, and the drills may focus on controllers intervene, and the drills may focus on the onsite exercise training objectives, the onsite exercise training objectives.

While previous exemptions granted by the NRC recognized the need to retain the ability to assess the impact of a radiological release and promptly communicate with offsite government authorities, the technical basis for evaluating exemption requests to remove formal offsite REP plan requirement assumes that release would not exceed EPA protective action guidelines at the site boundary or that sufficient time would be available for offsite response organizations to implement offsite protective measures on an ad hoc basis. As such, please provide specific justification for DEF's retaining ability for "protective action recommendation development and protective action decision making," including any agreements with State or local government authorities to retain these capabilities.

Response to RAI-016 CR-3 recognizes that it is no longer possible for a radiological release from a credible accident to exceed Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) protective action guidelines at the site boundary and that sufficient time would be available for offsite response organizations to implement offsite protective measures on an ad hoc basis. DEF will not plan to retain the ability for "protective action recommendation development and protective action decision making" and this intent is reflected in the PDEP, Revision 0.

Therefore, DEF is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.F.2.b in Reference 1, to read as shown in Enclosure 2 of this submittal. The revised request is consistent with the past precedent wording shown above.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 20 of 37 RAI-017 10 CFR 50 Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedent Wording Appendix Licensees shall enable any State OF -I-.al Licensees shall enable any State or local E.IV.F.2.e gove..mcnt loWtd .ithin the plume . xp.e..e government catcd wiAthi the plume expoure pathway-EPZ to participate in the licensee's drills pathway-EPZ- to participate in the licensee's drills when requested by such State er-loeal when requested by such State or local government, government.

10 CFR 72.32(a)(12) states: "Exercises. (i) Provisions for conducting semiannual communications checks with offsite response organizations and biennial onsite exercises to test response to simulated emergencies. Radiological/Health Physics, Medical, and Fire drills shall be conducted annually. Semiannual communications checks with offsite response organizations must include the check and update of all necessary telephone numbers. The licensee shall invite offsite response organizations to participate in the biennial exercise.

ii) Participation of offsite response organizations in biennial exercises, although recommended, is not required. Exercises must use scenarios not known to most exercise participants. The licensee shall critique each exercise using individuals not having direct implementation responsibility for conducting the exercise. Critiques of exercises must evaluate the appropriateness of the plan, emergency procedures, facilities, equipment, training of personnel, and overall effectiveness of the response. Deficiencies found by the critiques must be corrected."

While formal REP plans may no longer be required pending granting of exemption request, the licensee's emergency plan will still retain the requirement to promptly notify State and local government authorities and to identify, and provide orientation training to, local service personnel who may be expected to respond to the CR-3 site in the event of an emergency. Please provide additional justification for exempting this requirement, specifically addressing how these elements of the licensee's emergency plan would be periodically tested.

Response to RAI-017 CR-3 will enable the State of Florida or local government to participate in drills when requested by such State or local government.

DEF is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.F.2.e in Reference 1, to read as shown in Enclosure 2 of this submittal. The revised request is consistent with the past precedent wording shown above.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 21 of 37 RAI-01 8 10 CFR 50 I Crystal River Reauest Wordinc I Past Precedent Wordina Appendix Remed, ia.,,*l e..erises will be required if the Remedial exercises will be required if the E.IV.F.2.f emergency plan is not satisfactorl*.Y t,,t.d emergency plan is not satisfactorily tested during durng the biennial exercise, such that NRC, in the biennial exercise, such that NRC, in consultation with FEMA, cannot (1) find con.ultatn.i..th PUMA, cannot (1) find rc...ag.ohn.ablc -as...ur.anc.ethat adequate

. protective reasonable assurance that adequate protective moasr*-c cran .2ndw"il be taken in the event oe measures can and will be taken in the event of a a radiological, emcr.gcncY Or (2) deter.mine that radiological emergency or (2) determine that the the Emergency Response Organization (ER*) Emergency Response Organization (ERO) has has maintained key skills specific.to maintained key skills specific to emergency emerg...y response. The extent of State and response.

"xte-nt The orf Stame and, lc I

locMal particgipatin inR remedial evercises must participation in remedialerceI must be be sufficient to s~howA tha aprpiaesfficient to show that aporaecretv corrective measures,~ hvav been takn measu-res haire been taken regarding the regarding the elements of the plan not properly elements of the plan not properlY tMeste in the tested in the prvo exerises. previous exercises.

10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) states: "Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic drills are (will be) conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or drills are (will be) corrected."

Biennial exercises of the licensee's emergency plan continue to be required and are subject to NRC inspection under §50.47(14). A remedial exercise, if required, ensures that, an exercise does provide reasonable assurance to the NRC that the license can and will take adequate protective measures in the event of a radiological emergency. Please provide justification for exempting this requirement.

Response to RAI-018 CR-3 recognizes the role that a remedial exercise has, if required, is to provide reasonable assurance to the NRC that the license can and will take adequate protective measures in the event of a radiological emergency. This was not the intent of the original exemption, however remedial exercises will be conducted commensurate with the reduced exercise scenario scope when necessary.

Therefore, DEF is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.F.2.f in Reference 1, to read as shown in Enclosure 2 of this submittal. The revised request is consistent with the past precedence wording shown above.

This change will require an update to the PDEP and will be completed with the PDEP RAI response (regulatory commitment).

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 22 of 37 RAI-019 10 CFR 50 Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedence Wording Appendix The participation of State and local None.

E.IV.F.2.h governments. in 2n m.....ergncy ex.... i- not required to the extent that the applicant has idetifcdthese goveFrnAment a2g refausing to partiailpatc furthcr in mcrgcncy plannn actiVities, pur-sunt to § 50.47(r)(1). In such c~ases, an exerciste shall be hold Ait the applic~ant or licrensee and such governmental entitiOes as elect to par-ticipate in the cmergency

_________planning prOccss._____________________

This section of the regulations applies to an "applicant," and therefore, is not applicable to CR-3, and does not require exemption.

Please provide justification for further staff consideration as an exemption.

Response to RAI-019 DEF agrees that this requirement is not applicable to CR-3 and is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.E.F.2.h in Reference 1, to identify that no exemption is requested.

RAI-020 10 CFR 50 Crystal River Request Wording Past Precedence Wording Appendix By June 20, 2012, for nucl~ear power reactor By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor E.IV.x licensees, a range of potec..tive

, actions to licensees, a range of pro.tec.ive ac.tions to protect onsite personnel during hostille action protect onsite personnel during hostile action must be developed to ensu-re the continued must be developed to ensure the continue ability of the li-enseep to safely shut-do-IwFn- the ability of the iene to safely shu-t dowAn the,

.e..tF-and perform the functions of the licensee's re.ac.*tor and- perfo-rm the functions Of the emergency plan. I en.see's emergency plan.

Appendix E.IV.l is applicable only to onsite protective actions during hostile actions, which DEF is requesting to be exempted.

However, exemption request retains the statement "and perform the functions of the licensee's emergency plan." Please provide rational for retaining this statement and provide context for its applicability.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 23 of 37 Response to RAI-020 DEF agrees that the statement "and perform the functions of the licensee's emergency plan" should be included in the exemption.

Therefore, DEF is revising the originally requested exemption from portions of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.1 in Reference 1, to read as shown in Enclosure 2 of this submittal. This change will require an update to the PDEP and will be completed with the PDEP RAI response (regulatory commitment).

RAI-021 The Executive Summary in NUREG-1738 states (in part), "the staffs analyses and conclusions apply to decommissioning facilities with SFPs [spent fuel pools] that meet the design and operational characteristics assumed in the risk analysis. These characteristics are identified in the study as industry decommissioning commitments (IDCs) and staff decommissioning assumptions (SDAs).

Provisions for confirmation of these characteristics would need to be an integral part of rulemaking." The IDCs and SDAs are listed in tables 4.1-1 and 4.1-2, respectively, of NUREG-1738. Please explain if/how CR-3 meets each of these IDCs and SDAs, or why they are not considered applicable.

Response to RAI-021 Results of a comparison of the CR-3 spent fuel pool against the IDCs and SDAs listed in tables 4.1-1 and 4.1-2, respectively, of NUREG-1738, are shown below.

Table 1: Industry Decommissioning Commitments (IDCs) Comparison IDC IDC Description CR-3 Alignment with IDC No.

1. Cask drop analyses will be performed or CR-3 practices align with this commitment.

single failure-proof cranes will be in use for handling of heavy loads (i.e., phase II CR-3 has developed procedures for handling heavy loads that comply with of NUREG-0612 will be implemented). NUREG-0612 guidelines. Heavy load drops (other than spent fuel casks) have been evaluated and safe load paths developed. These safe load paths are administratively controlled by operations procedures. These controls are in accordance with CR-3 Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.6.4, "Control of Heavy Loads Program Description." Currently, the CR-3 Auxiliary Building Overhead Crane (FHCR-5), which will be used for lifting spent fuel casks, is not a single failure proof crane. This crane is administratively controlled so that it will not be used for cask lifts until required upgrades are completed. These upgrades

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 24 of 37 IDC IDC Description CR-3 Alignment with IDC No.

will be completed before the CR-3 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) project is complete. In accordance with License Amendments #239 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11321A165) and #241 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12136A392), CR-3 will complete replacement of FHCR-5 with a single failure proof crane prior to moving a spent fuel shipping cask.

2. Procedures and training of personnel will CR-3 practices align with this commitment.

be in place to ensure that onsite and offsite resources can be brought to bear Consistent with CR-3 Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) during an event, requirements, CR-3 has procedures in place to ensure that onsite and offsite resources are available and appropriate personnel are trained on the access and use thereof during an event. The Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP), Revision 0 (contained in Enclosure 3 of Reference 1), maintains these requirements with EM-202, "Duties of the Emergency Coordinator." EM-202 is an implementing procedure identified in Appendix A of the RERP. CR-3 also maintains agreements with offsite agencies to ensure additional resources are available if needed.

3. Procedures will be in place to establish CR-3 practices align with this commitment.

communication between onsite and offsite organizations during severe PDEP implementing procedure, EM-202, will maintain the requirements that weather and seismic events, establish the appropriate communication between onsite and offsite organizations during severe weather and following seismic events. CR-3 maintains separate procedures to provide information to assist in a site response to violent weather.

Should severe weather or a seismic event occur that results in a RERP/PDEP entry, EM-202 directs personnel to establish the necessary communications and make the appropriate notifications. For example, the Emergency Coordinator (Shift Supervisor) would direct notification of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO), the State of Florida who will notify Citrus County, local response organizations if necessary, and the NRC.

4. An offsite resource plan will be developed CR-3 practices align with this commitment.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 25 of 37 IDC IDC Description CR-3 Alignment with IDC No.

which will include access to portable CR-3 maintains an Off-site Support Directory (OSD). The OSD provides the pumps and emergency power to information necessary to access the necessary offsite resources in a timely supplement onsite resources. The plan manner. Appropriate station personnel are trained to use the OSD to obtain would principally identify organizations or offsite resources, when needed, to support onsite activities. The OSD lists suppliers where offsite resources could contacts for government agencies, emergency equipment contacts (e.g., for fuel, be obtained in a timely manner. electrical power, makeup water, firefighting equipment, etc.). It also identifies private agencies that would be capable of transporting resources when needed.

EM-503, "Conduct of the Emergency Mitigation Coordinator." EM-503 requires that the Emergency Mitigation Coordinator make the determination on the need for off-site resources. Once received on-site, the accident assessment procedure addressing Contingencies for a Loss of SFP Level will be used for installation and operation of the off-site equipment.

EM-503 is not listed in the current implementing procedure list contained in Appendix A of the PDEP, however will be added to align with this IDC. This change will require an update to the PDEP and will be completed with the PDEP RAI response (regulatory commitment).

5. SFP instrumentation will include readouts The CR-3 design aligns with this commitment.

and alarms in the Control Room (or where personnel are stationed) for SFP SFP temperature: Independent temperature elements monitor SFPs "A" and "B" temperature, water level, and area that provide inputs to the plant computer. Computer points provide high radiation levels, temperature alarms when the monitored pool reaches 140 0 F.

SFP level: Independent level transmitters monitor SFP "A" and "B" that provide inputs to level indicators on the Main Control Board (MCB) for continuous level indication. A high level alarm is received when the monitored pool level reaches elevation 159' and a low level alarm is received when pool level reaches elevation 1566". Both alarms annunciate in the Main Control Room for the monitored pool.

The lowest Control Room level indication is at elevation 154'.

The Cask Loading Area is monitored by a level switch which provides a high level

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 26 of 37 No_ IDC Description CR-3 Alignment with IDC No.

alarm at elevation 159' and a low level alarm at elevation 157'6". Both alarms annunciate in the Main Control Room.

There are 2 gates located in the SFP which are normally not installed. One gate isolates the "A"SFP from the "B" SFP and one gate isolates the "B" SFP from the Cask Area. If the gates are not installed, any one of the three level instruments will provide level monitoring for the entire SFP.

Area radiation levels: Two general area radiation monitors are installed to measure radiations levels in the fuel storage area. One is located adjacent to the pools at elevation 149' and the second is located on the SF Handling Bridge directly above the SFPs. Both monitors provide local indication and alarms in addition to indication and alarms in the Main Control Room.

6. SFP seals that could cause leakage The CR-3 design aligns with this commitment.

leading to fuel uncovery in the event of seal failure shall be self limiting to The CR-3 SFPs have no gates with seals that could lead to fuel uncovery. There leakage or otherwise engineered so that are 2 gates located in the SFP which are normally not installed. One gate drainage cannot occur. isolates the "A"SFP from the "B" SFP and one gate isolates the "B" SFP from the Cask Area. The two gates are identical in construction. The gates are 28'3-3/8" tall and 39" wide. The bottom of the gate is located at elevation 134', when installed, which is approximately 1' above the top of the spent fuel racks.

Therefore, failure or leakage of a SFP gate seal would not allow fuel uncovery.

If failure of a seal were assumed, the design of the gates would significantly limit the amount of leakage allowed. During installation, the gates are lowered down into a vertical slot which captures the gate horizontally. A W"gap exists on each side of the gate to allow for installation. In the event of a seal failure, leakage would be limited to the amount that could flow though the W"gaps. If a differential water level existed across a gate, it is likely that the gate would shift horizontally to one side of the slot due to the differential pressure across the gate and the W" gap would be eliminated. Therefore, it is concluded that the SFP gate design is also leak limiting.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 27 of 37 No. IDC Description CR-3 Alignment with IDC No.

It is likely that the gate between SFP "B" and the cask loading area will be used to load spent fuel into casks to support dry fuel storage. The lowest the cask area water level can be lowered with the permanently installed equipment is elevation 138'4". If the SFPs are at the low level alarm set point of 156'6" and the cask area gate seals fail, approximately 13,500 gallons of water would drain from the from the SFPs to the cask area. This would drop the level in the SFPs approximately 1'3". Since there is approximately 11,100 gallons per foot in the SFPs, it is concluded that the most credible failure scenario involving a SFP gate would result in a relatively small change in SFP level.

4 I.

7. Procedures or administrative controls to Both design features and administrative controls are provided which reduce the reduce the likelihood of rapid draindown likelihood of rapid draindown events. Normal SFP level is at 158'6", and the low events will include (1) prohibitions on the level alarm is at 156'6". The top of the taller fuel storage rack is at 132'11". The use of pumps that lack adequate siphon bottom of the SF pump suction connections to the pools are at 154'2". The lowest protection or (2) controls for pump drain point with available alignment to installed pumps is at 138'4" in the SF cask suction and discharge points. The loading area connected to the pools via a gate which is normally open. This drain functionality of anti-siphon devices will be line is equipped with an anti-siphon vent, but is not functionally tested; the only periodically verified. valve in the anti-siphon line is locked open by procedure. The drain is a 3" pipe which would limit the rate of SFP draindown. If unmitigated draining were to occur thru this line, the lowest pool level that could be reached would leave approximately 5' of pool level over the fuel storage racks. If draining were to occur, it would be signaled by three level alarms, two area radiation alarms, and likely an Auxiliary Building sump alarm that all annunciate in the Control Room.

The cask loading area drain, which is normally isolated by a procedurally controlled closed valve, can be connected to a pump in the Demineralized Water system for water addition. If this drain is used to draw down the cask loading area to load in a cask, the water is transferred by SFP-2 to the SFPs. The Spent Fuel Cooling system operating procedure contains a limit and precaution instructing operators to monitor pool levels and affected tank or system levels, when cross connecting to another system, to prevent inadvertent water transfer out of the SFPs.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 28 of 37 IDC IDC Description CR-3 Alignment with IDC No.

8. An onsite restoration plan will be in place CR-3 practices and design align with this commitment.

to provide repair of the SFP cooling systems or to provide access for makeup The Demineralized Water system provides normal makeup to the SFPs. The water to the SFP. The plan will provide system can be used to add inventory without accessing the fuel pool floor.

for remote alignment of the makeup source to the SFP without requiring entry An assessment will be performed to determine the feasibility of repairing any to the refuel floor, emergent SFP cooling system issues. However if repair is not feasible, CR-3 has two permanent connection points diverse from the SFP deck for makeup capabilities to the pool. They are located at valves SFV-122 and SFV-129.

These valves are physically located on the 143' and 119' elevation of the Auxiliary Building, respectively, and are diverse/separated from the SFP deck (162' elevation plant datum). Each connection (only one is required to achieve the required flow) requires the removal of a threaded pipe cap and the installation of an adapter for hook up to a portable independently powered pump. Either valve is approximately 1000 feet from the expected location of the pump used to mitigate this event; hoses are used to connect the pump to the SF valves. The adapters are stored within an Emergency Operations Box (EOB) which will keep them protected and readily accessible during the event. The contents of this storage box are periodically inventoried by a CR-3 surveillance procedure to ensure the availability of the equipment. The installation of the adapter will be governed by an Accident Assessment procedure addressing Contingencies for Loss of SFP Level, along with the installation of the hose and operation of the pump.

9. Procedures will be in place to control CR-3 practices align with this commitment.

SFP operations that have the potential to rapidly decrease SFP inventory. These CR-3 has procedures that stipulate fuel handling activities shall not occur without administrative controls may require a licensed Senior Reactor Operator or Certified Fuel Handler providing oversight additional operations or management of the activities. Procedures further require that heavy loads (> 2750 pounds) that review, management physical presence travel over fuel assemblies in the SFP shall not occur without a Shift for designated operations or Supervisor/Certified Fuel Handler providing oversight of the activity and an administrative limitations such as individual qualified in Radiation Protection on site.

restrictions on heavy load movements.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 29 of 37 IDC IDC Description CR-3 Alignment with IDC No.

See IDC 1 for a description of control of heavy loads and the CR-3 requirement for a single failure proof crane for fuel cask handling operations.

10. Routine testing of the alternative fuel pool CR-3 practices align with this commitment.

makeup system components will be performed and administrative controls for The CR-3 Fire Protection Program establishes the administrative controls over equipment out of service will be the operability of the fire service pumps similar to the controls established in the implemented to provide added assurance CR-3 Technical Specifications for accident mitigation systems. Surveillance that the components would be available, Procedures periodically test pump starting and running, output, fuel supply, and if needed. battery condition. Fire hoses for adding water to the pools are also periodically checked for integrity.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 30 of 37 Table 2: Staff Decommissioning Assumptions (SDAs) Comparison SDAI No. SDA Description CR-3 Alignment with SDA No.

1. Licensee's SFP cooling design will be at The CR-3 design aligns with this assumption.

least as capable as that assumed in the risk assessment, including The SFP is a safety related, Seismic Class 1 structure that is sufficiently robust to instrumentation. Licensees will have at be protected from severe environmental challenges. It is located within the least one motor-driven and one diesel- Auxiliary Building which is a Class I structure (excluding the steel roof support driven fire pump capable of delivering structure) protected from external hazards such as missiles and flooding. The inventory to the SFP. CR-3 engineering procedure for the condition monitoring of structures provides the inspection and acceptance criteria to assure design function capability is monitored under the Maintenance Rule.

The SFP cooling system at CR-3 includes all the basic equipment described in Figure 3.1 of NUREG-1738. There are 2 redundant motor driven pumps, 2 redundant heat exchangers, an ultimate heat sink, a demineralized water system tank for makeup water, a filtration system, and isolation valves. The installed SF pumps are powered from Engineering Safeguards (ES) buses and can be supplied power from an onsite diesel generator upon a loss of offsite power.

Motor and diesel driven fire pumps are also available to provide makeup water to the SFPs.

Spent fuel decay heat is transferred to the original systems used to provide SF cooling. These systems include the Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water system (SW) and the Nuclear Services and Decay Heat Seawater system (RW). These systems reject heat to the Gulf of Mexico. These systems include a normal duty pump powered from the plant unit buses and safety related emergency duty pumps which are powered from ES buses and can also be powered from the onsite emergency diesel generator.

Any future changes to the SFP cooling configuration will maintain conformance with the capabilities assumed in the risk assessment.

The response to IDC 5 describes the SFP temperature and level instrumentation and the associated alarms.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 31 of 37 SDA SDA Description CR-3 Alignment with SDA No.

CR-3 has the fire pump configuration described in this SDA, each rated for 2000 gpm at 125 psi, capable of delivering inventory to the SFPs.

2. Walk-downs of SFP systems will be The CR-3 operating procedures and processes align with the intent of this performed at least once per shift by the assumption.

operators.

CR-3 procedures require Operations personnel to record SFP level and Procedures will be developed for and temperature in the Control Room and visually observe the pools at least once per employed by the operators to provide shift. Other SF system operating parameters are recorded once per day during guidance on the capability and availability operator rounds in the Auxiliary Building where the equipment is located.

of onsite and offsite inventory makeup sources and time available to initiate CR-3 response procedures do not explicitly identify the time available to initiate these sources for various loss of cooling actions for loss of cooling or loss of inventory events. Operations personnel are or inventory events. aware of SFP conditions based on the daily plant data report that is part of the shift briefing for each on-coming crew. This data continually informs Operations personnel of the relative time to respond to SFP events addressed in Abnormal Procedures (AP) for Loss of SFP Cooling or Refueling Canal/SFP Level Lowering. APs are procedures which once entered are executed expeditiously until the entry condition is resolved using installed systems, or the conditions escalate to a severity where additional onsite or offsite resources must be employed. The calculations described in Enclosure 6 of LAR #315 (Reference 1) demonstrate time available to respond to the full spectrum of possible SFP conditions. Due to the 4.5 years since CR-3 last operated, the remaining low decay heat of the fuel provides an abundance of time to respond to anticipated events addressed in the response procedures.

In the event of a significant loss of inventory that causes SFP area radiation monitors to alarm, CR-3 would enter one of two Emergency Action Level (EAL) conditions prompting entry in the PDEP. This requires the Emergency Coordinator (Operations Shift Supervisor) to assess the situation and provide notification to the State of Florida (who will notify Citrus County), local response organizations if necessary, and the NRC within one hour, and the ability to augment the ERO within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 32 of 37 SDA SDA Description CR-3 Alignment with SDA No.

3. Control Room instrumentation that The CR-3 design aligns with this assumption.

monitors SFP temperature and water level will directly measure the parameters The response to IDC 5 describes the SFP temperature and level instrumentation involved, and the associated alarms.

Level instrumentation will provide alarms CR-3 will adopt the Permanently Defueled (PD) EALs detailed in Nuclear Energy at levels associated with calling in offsite Institute (NEI) 99-01, "Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive resources and with declaring a general Reactors," Revision 6. The EAL entry conditions include detection of a SFP low emergency. level by a high radiation alarm or an elevated temperature condition that may warrant declaration of an emergency event (Unusual Event).

Regarding the declaration of a general emergency, it should be understood that consistent with the PD EAL scheme, station conditions will not have the capacity to reach any threshold requiring the declaration of a General Emergency.

4. Licensee determines that there are no As described in IDC 7, the lowest drain point with available alignment to installed drain paths in the SFP that could lower pumps could reduce the SFP levels to 20 feet below the normal pool operating the pool level (by draining, suction, or level, which is 5 feet above the top of the fuel storage racks.

pumping) more than 15 feet below the normal pool operating level and that Recovery from draining can be accomplished by either onsite or offsite resources.

licensee must initiate recovery using offsite sources.

5. Load Drop consequence analyses will be The CR-3 design aligns with this assumption.

performed for facilities with non single failure-proof systems. The analyses and CR-3 has developed procedures for handling heavy loads that comply with any mitigative actions necessary to NUREG-0612 guidelines. Heavy load drops (other than spent fuel casks) have preclude catastrophic damage to the SFP been evaluated and safe load paths developed. These postulated load drops do that would lead to a rapid pool draining not result in catastrophic damage to the SFP. All heavy load lifts (other than would be sufficient to demonstrate that casks) and safe load paths are administratively controlled by maintenance and there is high confidence in the facilities operations procedures.

ability to withstand a heavy load drop.

See IDC 1 for a description of control of heavy loads and the CR-3 requirement

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 33 of 37 SDA SDA Description CR-3 Alignment with SDA No.

for a single failure proof crane for fuel cask handling operations.

6. Each decommissioning plant will CR-3 has determined that completion of the seismic checklist contained in successfully complete the seismic Appendix 2B of NUREG-1738 is not required. Checklist Item 10 contains the checklist provided in Appendix 2B to this following potential mitigation measures that may be considered in the event that study. If the checklist cannot be the requirements of the seismic screening checklist are not met at a particular successfully completed, the plant.

decommissioning plant will perform a plant specific seismic risk assessment of " Delay requesting the licensing waivers (E-Plan, insurance, etc.) until the plant the SFP and demonstrate that SFP specific danger of a zirconium fire is no longer a credible concern.

seismically induced structural failure and rapid loss of inventory is less than the " Design and install structural plant modifications to correct/address the generic bounding estimates provided in identified areas of non-compliance with the checklist. (It must be 5

this study (<1 x10 per year including acknowledged that this option may not be practical for significant seismic non-seismic events). failure concerns.)

• Perform plant-specific seismic hazard analyses to demonstrate that the seismic risk associated with a catastrophic failure of the pool is at an acceptable level. (The exact "acceptable" risk level has not been precisely quantified but is believed to be in the range of 1x10 5 per year.)

To satisfy the first mitigative measure, CR-3 has completed an analysis that shows that the surface temperature of the cladding in the SFPs will not exceed the failure temperature for zirconium following a total loss of water from the pools.

This is based on spent fuel conditions on or after September 26, 2013. As discussed below for seismic risk, dropped objects, and other IDC/SDAs discussed in this submittal, the probability of a rapid drain down event is very unlikely.

Therefore, CR-3 concludes that a zirconium fire is no longer a credible concern.

The second mitigative measure is not being considered by CR-3.

The third mitigative measure is addressed by existing license and design basis features of the SFP. Currently, CR-3 has no plans to complete a plant specific

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 34 of 37 SDAI No_ SDA Description CR-3 Alignment with SDA No.

seismic risk assessment to show compliance with the seismic checklist. CR-3 is located in a seismically inactive zone and considers the catastrophic failure of the SFP due to seismic activity to be very low risk.

The SFP is designed as a Safety Related, Seismic Class I structure using a conservative ground response (0.05g for an Operating Basis Earthquake and 0.1g for a Safe Shutdown Earthquake). The conservative nature of the CR-3 design basis seismic loads was recently confirmed when CR-3 received the EPRI sponsored ground motion study completed by Lettis Consultants International, Inc. The "Central and Eastern United States Seismic Source Characterization" document shows a ground motion response spectra (GMRS) that is less than the licensing basis of the CR-3 Safe Shutdown Earthquake ground response.

With no credible zirconium fire and no credible seismic damage to the SFP, CR-3 concludes completion of the seismic checklist is not required. In addition, CR-3 has procedures in place to ensure successful implementation of mitigation measures to supply alternate cooling water using portable equipment. As a result, no radiological releases with offsite consequence are expected following a severe earthquake.

7. Licensees will maintain a program to CR-3 does not have Boraflex in the spent fuel racks. CR-3 proactively replaced provide surveillance and monitoring of the "B" Spent Fuel Racks that contained Boraflex in 2000 with racks containing Boraflex in high-density spent fuel racks Boral.

until such time as spent fuel is no longer stored in these high-density racks.

RAI-022 The first page of Enclosure 2 includes the statement, "shaded text identifies the extent of the proposed exemption with respect to the regulation." However, no shaded text appears in the table, while it appears that strikeouts are actually used to identify proposed exemption text. Please clarify the use of shaded areas or strikeouts.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 35 of 37 Response to RAI-022 The statement on the first page of Enclosure 2 should have specified "strikeout text identifies the extent of the proposed exemption with respect to the regulation." DEF has revised this statement to identify "bold strike out text identifies the extent of the proposed exemption with respect to the regulation" and updated the text for the proposed exemptions to bold strike out text, as shown in of this submittal. The bold strikeout text is consistent with the format of the past precedence exemptions provided in the RAI (Reference 2) previously granted by the NRC for the associated regulations. The Enclosure 2 also includes revision bars to identify the sections of regulation wording with strikeout changes and to identify where the basis for exemption text was modified from the previous Enclosure 2 included in Reference 1.

RAI-023 Part of the justification for relaxing formal offsite REP plan requirements is based on the ability to perform actions to prevent or mitigate the effects of a zirconium fire at CR-3. Section 3.1.5 of Enclosure 1 to DEK's license amendment request #315, states "This analysis determined the time to heat up adiabatically to 900 degrees Celsius to be 19.7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />. This result meets the acceptance criteria. Further, because of the length of time it would take for the adiabatic heatup to occur, there is ample time to respond to any partial drain down event that might cause such an occurrence by restoring cooling or makeup, or providing spray. As a result, the likelihood that such a scenario would progress to a zirconium fire is not deemed credible.

Please provide additional information related to:

a. What is the availability of trained personnel to perform the required actions?

b. How is the referenced equipment maintained and tested?

c. Are there procedures developed to perform this task and how are they controlled?

d. Will these procedures and equipment be referenced in the emergency plan since the basis for this exemption, in part, is the existence of these mitigative strategies?

Response to RAI-023

a. Availability of trained personnel to perform the required actions The on-shift Plant Operators and other plant personnel are appropriately trained on the various actions to provide makeup to the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) using procedures that have been in place since August 2005 to respond to the spectrum of conditions that could result from a large area fire. A minimum of two trained on-shift individuals will be maintained to perform the required actions until all fuel is removed from the pools to storage in an ISFSI. This number of trained personnel are sufficient to perform the required actions necessary to mitigate the conditions.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 36 of 37

b. Referenced equipment maintained and tested Existing plant systems used for SFP makeup are maintained and tested/surveilled during operation using existing plant procedures. Governance for SFP abnormal inventory events is provided within CR-3's abnormal procedure for Refueling Canal/SFP Level Lowering. This procedure provides guidance for inventory make-up to the SFPs using permanent plant systems. An accident assessment guidance procedure contains instructions for multiple methods to provide inventory control using normal make-up through the demineralized water (DW) pumps (required flows < 100 gpm) to significantly larger flow volume pumps, such as the fire service pumps or the portable independently powered pump. During operator rounds, the performance of the normal duty DW pumps is routinely monitored. With respect to the fire service and portable independently powered pump, performance testing by surveillance procedures is performed to validate their functionality on a regular basis.

c. Procedures developed to perform this task and how they are controlled The CR-3 procedures that govern the operation of the pool are an operating procedure for the spent fuel cooling system, abnormal procedures for Loss of SFP Cooling and Refueling Canal/SFP Level Lowering and an accident assessment procedure addressing Contingencies for Loss of SFP Level. These procedures are maintained in accordance with the CR-3 10 CFR 50 Appendix B document control process.

d. Referencing these procedures and equipment in the emergency plan These procedures and equipment are not specifically referenced in the PDEP, but are contained in the PDEP implementing procedure, EM-503, "Conduct of the Emergency Mitigation Coordinator." For the scenario described, EM-503 would instruct the Emergency Mitigation Coordinator to direct implementation of the accident assessment procedure addressing Contingencies for a Loss of SFP Level. As identified in IDC No. 4, EM-503 is not listed in the current implementing procedure list contained in Appendix A of the PDEP, however will be added to align with this IDC.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-01 Page 37 of 37

References:

1. CR-3 to NRC letter, "Crystal River Unit 3 - License Amendment Request #315, Revision 0, Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme, and Request for Exemption to Certain Radiological Emergency Response Plan Requirements Defined by 10 CFR 50," dated September 26, 2013. (ADAMS Accession No. ML13274A584)

2. NRC to CR-3, e-Mail from C. Gratton (NRC) to D. Westcott (CR-3), "Request for Additional Information: Exemptions to the Radiological Emergency Plan Requirements," dated February 20, 2014.

3. NRC to Zion Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, "Request For Approval of Defueled Station Emergency Plan and Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, "Emergency Plans"- Zion Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (TAC NOS MA5253 and MA5254)," dated August 31, 1999. (ADAMS Accession No. 9909070079)

4. NRC to Maine Yankee Atomic Electric Company, "Response to Exemption Request For Portions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix E, and Section 50.47 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations for the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station (TAC NO. L24661)," dated May 2, 2013. (ADAMS Accession No. ML13112A842

DUKE ENERGY FLORIDA, INC.

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50 - 302 / LICENSE NUMBER DPR - 72 EXEMPTIONS TO RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN REQUIREMENTS DEFINED BY 10 CFR 50.47 AND APPENDIX E TO PART 50, REVISION 1, AND RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ENCLOSURE 2 REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION TO CERTAIN RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN REQUIREMENTS DEFINED BY 10 CFR 50, REVISION 1

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 1 of 31 REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION TO CERTAIN RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN REQUIREMENTS DEFINED BY 10 CFR 50.

REVISION 1 Bold strike out text identifies the extent of the proposed exemption with respect to the regulation. The basis for the exemption explains the scope of the exception. The 10 CFR 50.12, "Specific exemptions," provisions with respect to the proposed exemptions are discussed in Section 4.2 of .

Reference # Regulation in 10 CFR 50.47 Basis for Exemption 1 10 CFR 50.47(b): The onsite and, exc*pt as provi*dd in Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) requests an exemption to the requirements paragraph (d) of this s. tO.., off.it_ emergency for offsite emergency response plans. Offsite response plans are not response plans for nuclear power reactors must meet the necessary because it is no longer possible for the radiological following standards: consequences of a design basis accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident to result in radioactive releases which exceed the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs) at the site boundary.

CR-3 requests exemptions from the regulations to the extent that these regulations apply to specific provisions of onsite and offsite emergency planning that are not applicable to CR-3. Details related to specific exemption requests are provided below.

2 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1): Primary responsibilities for CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation requiring the emergency response by the nuclear facility licensee and by assignment of primary responsibilities for emergency response to State and local organizations within the Em.**g.cy State and local organizations within the existing Plume Exposure Plaing Zes have been assigned, the emergency Pathway and Ingestion Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zones responsibilities of the various supporting organizations (EPZs). Because it is no longer possible for EPA PAGs to be have been specifically established, and each principal exceeded at the site boundary, defined Plume Exposure Pathway and response organization has staff to respond and to augment Ingestion Exposure Pathway EPZs are no longer necessary. Letters its initial response on a continuous basis. of Agreement and conduct of operations with various offsite support organizations (hospitals, ambulance, fire-fighting and law enforcement) will be maintained to the extent necessary to support defueled conditions. Response may be to the plant or in support of transport or treatment of contaminated and/or injured individuals. The normal station operating staff and Emergency Organization will be replaced by a Defueled On-Shift Staff and Emergency Organization with the capability to respond to declared emergencies on a 24-hour basis. Minimum on-shift positions will be governed by the CR-3 Technical Specifications. Augmented staff will be available to respond

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 2 of 31 Reference # Regulation in 10 CFR 50.47 Basis for Exemption to an emergency.

3 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2): On-shift facility licensee No exemption is requested.

responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of response capabilities is available and the interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.

4 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3): Arrangements for requesting and CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation to maintain effectively using assistance resources have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local emergency response arrangement.s to at Stiat and-lol

, , staff staff at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Because it is no the liccnsee's Emerg-..ny Operations Facility have longer possible for EPA PAGs to be exceeded at the site boundary, been-made, and other organizations capable of elimination of the EOF is requested since there will be no need for a augmenting the planned response have been identified. response by offsite agencies to this facility. The CR-3 emergency plan will continue to maintain arrangements for requesting and using assistance resources from offsite support organizations.

5 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4): A standard emergency classification CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation requiring the onsite and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility emergency classification and action level scheme information to be system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear provided in support of initial offsite response measures. CR-3 will facility licensee, and. Sate-and local response plans cal adopt the Permanently Defueled Emergency Action Levels (EALs) for replancn informin provided by fac.ility detailed in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, "Development of licen-*see..for detcMination'

- of minimu.m. initi"al

.ff-site Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors," Revision 6.

rFe.pG.sc mcaurcU . Because it is no longer possible for the radiological consequences of a design basis accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the need to provide information to State and local response organizations for the development of Protective Action Decisions and offsite emergency planning by State and local organizations, with currently defined emergency response roles, is no longer necessary.

6 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5): Procedures have been established for CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation requiring onsite and notification, by the licensee, of State and local response State and local offsite emergency plans contain the means to provide organizations and for notification of emergency personnel early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the Plume by all organizations; the content of initial and followup Exposure Pathway EPZ. Because it is no longer possible for the

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 3 of 31 Reference # Regulation in 10 CFR 50.47 Basis for Exemption messages to response organizations and-the-publiG has radiological consequences of a design basis accident or a postulated been established; -andm..o.-ans to provide carly beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in radioactive releases n-otific*tion ad c-la-W nat.rUction to the popul.ace within which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the need to provide the plume exposurc. pathway Emergency Planning these messages to the public, the need to maintain the Alert and Zone have- been establi--h-d. Notification System, the need for the public to take protective actions and offsite emergency planning by State and local organizations, with currently defined emergency response roles, is no longer necessary.

7 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6): Provisions exist for prompt CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation requiring communications among principal response organizations to maintenance of provisions for prompt notification to the public.

emergency personnel and tG the public. Because it is no longer possible for the radiological consequences of a design basis accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the need for prompt notification and supporting systems, the need for the public to take protective actions and offsite emergency planning by State and local organizations, with currently defined emergency response roles, is no longer necessary.

8 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7): Information is made ava-ilable to CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation requiring information the public On a poridic basis on how they will be be made available to the public on a periodic basis on how they will be not..ificd and what their initial acto.ns sh'uld be in an notified and what their initial actions should be during an emergency.

emergecyG *(e.g., li.tenin to a local broadcast station News media contacts for CR-3 will be maintained and upon an event and r.maini"n indeors), the principal points of contact at the CR-3 site, information would be disseminated to the public and with the news media for dissemination of information during briefings with pertinent media organizations would be conducted per an emergency (inl*uding the physical" location o corporate communication protocols. Because it is no longer possible

-- *ati"ne4-are established in advance, and procedures for for the radiological consequences of a design basis accident or a coordinated dissemination of information to the public are postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in established, radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the need to educate the public on what their prompt actions would be in the event of a radiological emergency is not necessary because the need for the public to take protective actions does not exist.

9 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8): Adequate emergency facilities and No exemption is requested.

equipment to support the emergency response are provided and maintained.

10 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9); Adequate methods, systems, and CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation requiring offsite

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 4 of 31 Reference # Regulation in 10 CFR 50.47 Basis for Exemption equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential accident assessment capabilities during an emergency and for the effsite consequences of a radiological emergency onsite emergency plan to contain established procedures for condition are in use. coordinating accident assessment capabilities with offsite organizations. Because it is no longer possible for the radiological consequences of a design basis accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, there is no need for CR-3 to maintain offsite accident assessment capabilities. Since a need for monitoring and assessing no longer exists, CR-3 no longer intends to maintain the capability to deploy field teams for assessing and monitoring offsite radiological conditions. The CR-3 Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP) will continue to maintain onsite assessment capabilities.

11 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1 0): A raRge of prot-ecttive actions has CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation requiring beon devevlpcd for the plume expoeure pathway,. -PZ- development of protective actions for the Plume Exposure Pathway for em.gen.y Workers and the public. in d,*vloping and Ingestion Exposure Pathway EPZs. Because it is no longer this range of actions, consideration has been given to possible for EPA PAGs to be exceeded at the site boundary, the need evac.uation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, to provide Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) to State and the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), as local response organizations for the development of Protective Action appropriate. E tim.-e e.tim.ates have be,

.acuation Decisions, including consideration to evacuation, sheltering, and, as a delopedby applicants and licensees. License" s supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI) is shall update the evacuation time estimates on a no longer necessary. Evacuation of the public and the need to periodic basis. Guidelines- for the choeie Of protecti;e develop Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) is no longer necessary.

acton duin an emergeny cositnt With Federal guidne, arc developed and inplace, and proetective ac~tions for the ingestion exposre pathway EP-Z appropriate to-t-he loc--ale have been developed.

12 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11): Means for controlling radiological No exemption is requested.

exposures, in an emergency, are established for emergency workers. The means for controlling radiological exposures shall include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action Guides.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 5 of 31 Reference # Regulation in 10 CFR 50.47 Basis for Exemption 13 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12): Arrangements are made for medical No exemption is requested.

services for contaminated injured individuals.

14 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13): General plans for recovery and No exemption is requested.

reentry are developed.

15 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14): Periodic exercises are (will be) No exemption is requested.

conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic drills are (will be) conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or drills are (will be) corrected.

16 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15): Radiological emergency response No exemption is requested.

training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency.

17 10 CFR 50.47(b)(16): Responsibilities for plan No exemption is requested.

development and review and for distribution of emergency plans are established, and planners are properly trained.

18 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2): Generally, the plume exposure CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation requiring defined pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants shall consist of Plume Exposure Pathway and Ingestion Exposure Pathway EPZs.

an ar.c..a abo4ut 10 milS (16 kinm) n -adius and the The analysis of the potential radiological impact of an accident for CR-Sngc.StI.. pathway EPZ 'hall c-GonI.sist of an

..... a bout 3 in a permanently defueled condition indicates that any releases 50 miles (80 ki) in radiu., Th- exact size and beyond the site boundary are limited to small fractions of the EPA c.onfiguratio.n o^f the EPZs surrounding a particula PAG exposure levels, as detailed in the EPA's "Protective Action nu..,lear po...er. re^actor shall be dterni,.d in r-.tian Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents, Draft for to local

, m.rg*nc r. .pons .

needs Rnd capabilitics as Interim Use and Public Comment," dated March 2013 (PAG Manual).

they are affected by such conditions-as demor*aphy, According to the PAG Manual, "EPZs are not necessary at those topography, land chaarateristics, accessn rouites, and facilities where it is not possible for PAGs to be exceeded off-site."

jur.isdic.tional b.und.ari* The size of the EPZs also may be determined on a case-by-case basis for gas cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors with an authorized power level less than 250 MW thermal. The plans fCr the ingestion pathway shall focus on such actions as are appropriate to protect the food ingestion pathway-.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 6 of 31 Reference # Regulation in Appendix E to Part 50 Basis for Exemption 19 10 CFR 50 App E: Ill. The Final Safety Analysis Report; No exemption is requested.

Site Safety Analysis Report The final safety analysis report or the site safety analysis report for an early site permit that includes complete and integrated emergency plans under § 52.17(b)(2)(ii) of this chapter shall contain the plans for coping with emergencies. The plans shall be an expression of the overall concept of operation; they shall describe the essential elements of advance planning that have been considered and the provisions that have been made to cope with emergency situations. The plans shall incorporate information about the emergency response roles of supporting organizations and offsite agencies. That information shall be sufficient to provide assurance of coordination among the supporting groups and with the licensee. The site safety analysis report for an early site permit which proposes major features must address the relevant provisions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, within the scope of emergency preparedness matters addressed in the major features. The plans submitted must include a description of the elements set out in Section IV for the emergency planning zones (EPZs) to an extent sufficient to demonstrate that the plans provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency.

20 10 CFR 50 App E The scope of the PDEP will not include onsite protective actions during IV Content of Emergency Plans hostile action. In the Emergency Preparedness (EP) Final Rule I

1. The applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but (December 2011), the NRC defined "hostile action" as, in part, an act not necessarily be limited to, information needed to directed toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel. The NRC demonstrate compliance with the elements set forth excluded non-power reactors (NPRs) from the definition of "hostile below, i.e., organization for coping with radiological action." CR-3 should not be required to plan for an offsite impact emergencies, assessment actions, activation of resulting from "hostile action" because: (1) the facility poses a lower emergency organization, notification procedures, radiological risk to the public than does a power reactor, and (2) the emergency facilities and equipment, training, facility has a low likelihood of a credible accident resulting in

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 7 of 31 maintaining emergency preparedness, recovery, an4 radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures.

onsite protective actions during hostile actionI.In addition, the emergency response plans submitted by an applicant for a nuclear power reactor operating license under this part, or for an early site permit (as applicable) or combined license under 10 CFR part 52, shall contain information needed to demonstrate compliance with the standards described in § 50.47(b),

and they will be evaluated against those standards.

21 IV. 2 This nuclear power reactor license applicant shall also No exemption is requested. This regulation does not apply to CR-3 provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate (intended for nuclear power reactor license applicants).

various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau data as of the date the applicant submits its application to the NRC.

22 IV. 3 Nuclear power reactOr licn-se_.es shall u-e NRC CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation requiring the use of approved evacuation time estimates (ETE, ) and NRC-approved ETEs and updates to the ETEs in the formulation of updates to the ETE6 in the formulation Of ptc*e' tiv' PARs and the requirement to provide ETE updates to State and local action and shall provide the E..*.- government authorities for use in developing offsite protective action and ETE updates. to-State and local gove,.menta, strategies. Because it is no longer possible for EPA PAGs to be authoritie- forF use in developing off.ite PrFotecti, exceeded at the site boundary, EPZs and the associated protective co,-,n sr,,atege,. actions developed with consideration to ETEs are no longer required.

23 IV. 4 Within 365 days of the later of the date of the CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation requiring the use of availability of th mos*t FRO eet decGnnial cen.us. da:t' NRC-approved ETEs and updates to the ETEs in the formulation of fom the- U.S.. Cnsus Bureau Or December 23, 204-1, PARs and the requirement to provide ETE updates to State and local nuclear power reactor ,liensees shall develop an ETE government authorities for use in developing offsite protective action analYsi6s usi. thi' deceAnmal d.at.a and wb*m*t"t unde strategies. Because it is no longer possible for EPA PAGs to be

§ 60.4 to the NRC. These l-.icensees shall submit th exceeded at the site boundary, EPZs and the associated protective ETE= analysis to the NRC at least 180 days befor.e using actions developed with consideration to ETEs are no longer required.

itGtforFm protective actio ec mmedationst and providing it to State and lclgvrmental aulthoritics

• t*v v.., ie . v v w v v v == v . .u .

• v . ..

for usea in developing offesite protective action

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 8 of 31 24 IV 5 Du-rig tho years bet-w;e de.enniall ccnsuscs, CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation requiring the i In nuI a power reacto -il lienee frjesimt tilt-M;!T estimation of EPZ permanent resident population changes once per pcrmancntresidcnt population changes once a ycar, year using recent U.S. Census Bureau annual resident population b-ut no later-than 366 days from the datc of thc estimate and State/local government population data. CR-3 also pr~evious cstimatc, using the mRost Frecent U.S. Ccnsus requests an exemption to the requirement to maintain estimates for Bu-reau annu al resident population estimate and NRC inspection and the requirement to submit estimates and updated State/local government population data, if available ETE analysis. ETEs will no longer be used in the formulation of PARs These licensecs shall maintain thcsc cstimatcs so that or to provide ETE updates to State and local government authorities thcy arc avail-able for-NRC inspection during thc period for use in developing offsite protective action strategies. Because it is bctwecn deccnnial censuscs and shall submit thcsc no longer possible for EPA PAGs to be exceeded at the site boundary, estimates to the NRC with any updated ETE analysis. EPZs and the associated protective actions developed with consideration to ETEs are no longer required.

25 IV A If mt an" time dmirinn the derennhl nerind the FPZ

~---- CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation requiring the permanent resident populattion incr-reases such that i continuous monitoring of EPZ permanent resident population changes cýauises- the longest ETE value for the 2 mnile zone OrF using recent U.S. Census Bureau annual resident population estimate mnile zone, including all affected E~mergency Response and State/local government population data and the requirement to Planniinn Areast or for the entire 10-miel F=PZ to submit estimates and updated ETE analysis. ETEs will no longer be increase by 25 percent Or 30 minues, whic.heve used in the formulation of PARs or to provide ETE updates to State less, from the nulear poweFF eacGto licensee's and local government authorities for use in developing offsite currnFtly NRC approved Or updated ETE, the "iensee protective action strategies. Because it is no longer possible for EPA shall update the ETE anallysis to reflect the impacto PAGs to be exceeded at the site boundary, EPZs and the associated that population ices.The licensee shall submit the protective actions developed with consideration to ETEs are no longer updated ETE analysis to the NR *under § 50.4 no later required.

than 365 days after the licnsee's deteormination that the criFteriia for updating the ETE have been met and at least 180 days before using it to form protective ac-t-ion recommendations and providing itto State and loc-al governmenltall authorfities f-or use indevelloping offsite nnprotectve action sf-trategies 26 IV 7 After an applicant for a combined license under part 52 No exemption is requested. CR-3 is not an applicant for a combined of this chapter receives its license, the licensee shall license, and therefore, this regulation is not applicable to CR-3.

conduct at least one review of any changes in the population of its EPZ at least 365 days prior to its scheduled fuel load. The licensee shall estimate EPZ permanent resident population changes using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau annual resident population

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 9 of 31 estimate and State/local government population data, if available. If the EPZ permanent resident population increases such that it causes the longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all affected Emergency Response Planning Areas, or for the entire 10-mile EPZ, to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less, from the licensee's currently approved ETE, the licensee shall update the ETE analysis to reflect the impact of that population increase. The licensee shall submit the updated ETE analysis to the NRC for review under § 50.4 of this chapter no later than 365 days before the licensee's scheduled fuel load.

27 A Organization The organization for coping with radiological emergencies shall be described, including definition of authorities, responsibilities, and duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's emergency organization and the means for notification of such individuals in the event of an emergency. Specifically, the following shall be included:

i 28 A. 1. A description of the normal plant epe~ating CR-3 requests an exemption to the term "operating" as it no longer organization. applies to CR-3. The station will be maintained by a defueled on-shift staff.

29 A 2. A description of the onsite emergency response No exemption is requested.

organization (ERO) with a detailed discussion of:

a. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of the individual(s) who will take charge during an emergency;

b. Plant staff emergency assignments;

c. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of an onsite emergency coordinator who shall be in charge of the exchange of information with offsite authorities responsible for coordinating and implementing offsite emergency measures.

30 A 3. A de,.ript.o., by;position and- f'u'n.ction to hbe CR-3 requests an exemption to the requirement to describe peFf.med, no the li,.en.ee's headquarter.s peronnel headquarters personnel who will be sent to the plant to augment the h wil .be se.nt to the plant site to a,-*..-e..t the ,te onsite emergency organization. The level of emergency response

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 10 of 31

.m..gen.y organization, required by the CR-3 PDEP does not require response by headquarters personnel. Because it is no longer possible for the radiological consequences of a design basis accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the need for headquarters response is no longer necessary.

31 A 4. Identification, by position and function to be performed, CR-3 requests an exemption to the requirement to make offsite dose of persons within the licensee organization who will be projections. The responsibility and process for completing onsite dose responsible for making-effite dose projections and a projections and the communication of results to State and local description of how these projections will be made and the authorities, NRC, and appropriate governmental entities will be results transmitted to State and local authorities, NRC, and maintained by the PDEP. Offsite emergency response capability is no other appropriate governmental entities. longer appropriate as no design basis accident or postulated beyond design basis accident can result in radioactive releases which exceed EPA PAGs at the site boundary. The postulated dose to the general public from any credible event would not exceed EPA PAGs.

32 A 5. Id*ntification, by position and function to be CR-3 requests an exemption to the requirement to identify employees, pc."f"med, of other cmployecs of the c.".nscc with other persons or consultants with special qualifications who may be spc.cial, qual.ific.ations for coping with em.ergenc. called upon for assistance. Individuals with special qualifications are conditions that may arise. Other persons with special no longer needed to assist emergency response personnel because qual-ifications, such as consultants, who are not. no design basis accident or postulated beyond design basis accident employees of the ,icc.se and . who m.ay be called upon can result in radioactive releases which exceed EPA PAGs at the site for asi . tanc. for .. em;rgences61

. shal a2lo be 5dPntifid, boundary.

The speci.alI qualifications of these peFsens shall be 33 A 6. A description of the local offsite services to be No exemption is requested.

provided in support of the licensee's emergency organization.

34 A 7. By June 23, 2044-, identification of, and a d... iiptiGo CR-3 requests an exemption to the requirement for describing of-the assistance expected from, appropriate State, local, assistance expected from State, local, and Federal agencies with and Federal agencies with responsibilities for coping with responsibilities for coping with emergencies, including hostile action.

emergencies, including hostile action at the site. For Since protective actions are no longer needed for the public, the pur-pses of thi. appendix, "hostile action" asdefined responding agencies would not have conflicting duties that may as.. an act dihraected towa.rd. a nu.clea.r power

. plant or prevent offsite resources from responding to the site during a hostile personnel that icludes the ue of eilent frc;e to action. Offsite emergency response capability is no longer appropriate det*roy equipment, take hostages, ando. d'ifa.ntimdat as no design basis accident or postulated beyond design basis the"I...... 6,... . p -..... TWA i-- eatta-by '-, accident can result in radioactive releases which exceed EPA PAGs at

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 11 of 31 air, land, OF water using guns, expl...i... projctiles, the site boundary. In the EP Final Rule (December 2011), the NRC vehi.k,. , o. other devi.es used to deliverstruc* as. defined "hostile action" as, in part, an act directed toward a nuclear forna power plant or its personnel. The NRC excluded NPRs from the definition of "hostile action." CR-3 should not be required to plan for an offsite impact resulting from hostile action because: (1) the facility poses a lower radiological risk to the public than does a power reactor, and (2) the facility has a low likelihood of a credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures.

35 A 8. Id-entificration of the State and!or local offic"ias CR-3 requests an exemption to the requirement to identify State or

.. sp.nsiblc for planning for, ordering, and controlling local officials responsible for protective actions. Offsite protective appropriate protective actions, including evacuations actions are no longer appropriate as no design basis accident or when ne...essar.. postulated beyond design basis accident can result in radioactive releases which exceed EPA PAGs at the site boundary. The need to provide PARs to State and local response organizations for the development of Protective Action Decisions and the need to plan for, order and control protective actions, including evacuations, is no longer necessary.

36 A 9. By De.em.ber 24, 2012, for nuclear powe-r reactr CR-3 requests an exemption to the requirement to complete a detailed lic.ensees, a d.etailedn aanalysi.s demonstrating that on analysis demonstrating that on shift personnel assigned emergency shift per.sonnel assigned emergency plan plan implementation functions are not assigned responsibilities that implementation functions are not assigned would prevent the timely performance of their assigned functions as

.responsibiliti that would prevent the timely specified in the emergency plan. In the EP Final Rule (December prfo.rmance of their assigned functions as specified in 2011), the NRC acknowledged that the staffing analysis requirement the emergency plan. was not necessary for non-power reactor licensees because staffing at non-power reactors is generally small which is commensurate with operating the facility in a manner that is protective of the public health and safety. Because of the slow rate of the event scenarios postulated in the design basis accident and postulated beyond design basis accident analyses, significant time is available to complete actions necessary to mitigate an emergency without impeding timely performance of emergency plan functions.

37 B. Assessment Actions CR-3 requests an exemption to the requirement to use EALs for B. 1. The means to be used for determining the magnitude consideration of protective measures outside the site boundary of, and for continually assessing the impact of, the release because it is no longer possible for the radiological consequences of a of radioactive materials shall be described, including design basis accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident at emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for CR-3 to result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at determining the need for notification and participation of the site boundary. CR-3 will adopt the Permanently Defueled EALs

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 12 of 31 local and State agencies, the Commission, and other detailed in NEI 99-01, Revision 6. CR-3 also requests an exemption Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are from the requirement to include "hostile action". In the EP Final Rule to be used for determining when and what type of (December 2011), the NRC defined "hostile action" as, in part, an act protective measures should be considered within and directed toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel. The NRC outside the site boundary to protect health and safety. The excluded NPRs from the definition of "hostile action." CR-3 should not emergency action levels shall be based on in-plant be required to plan for an offsite impact resulting from hostile action conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and because: (1) the facility poses a lower radiological risk to the public offaite-monitoring..By jun 20, 2012, fo. nuclear po.. than does a power reactor, and (2) the facility has a low likelihood of a reactor licensees, these a*ctio Ivioov. muvt iudv credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite hostile ac*tin that nay adversely affect the nucl*Ma protective measures.

pewe.

. pant.-The initial emergency action levels shall be discussed and agreed on by the applicant or licensee and CR-3 proposes to continue to review EALs with the State of Florida state and local governmental authorities, and approved by and local governmental authorities on an annual basis. However, the NRC. Thereafter, emergency action levels shall be based upon the reduced scope of EALs for the permanently defueled reviewed with the State and local governmental authorities facility, the scope of the annual review of EALs is expected to be on an annual basis. reduced (informal mailings, etc.).

38 B.2. A licensee desiring to change its entire emergency No exemption is requested.

action level scheme shall submit an application for an amendment to its license and receive NRC approval before implementing the change. Licensees shall follow the change process in § 50.54(q) for all other emergency action level changes.

39 C. Activation of Emergency Organization CR-3 requests an exemption from the requirement to describe C.1. The entire spectrum of emergency conditions that information from containment pressure sensors and the Emergency involve the alerting or activating of progressively larger Core Cooling System (ECCS) System for notification of offsite segments of the total emergency organization shall be agencies. Because it is no longer possible for the radiological described. The communication steps to be taken to alert or consequences of a design basis accident or a postulated beyond activate emergency personnel under each class of design basis accident to result in radioactive releases which exceed emergency shall be described. Emergency action levels the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the Permanently Defueled EALs, (based not only on onsite an.d,*ffaite-radiation monitoring detailed in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, will be adopted. This scheme information but also on readings from a number of sensors eliminates the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency event that indicate a potential emergency, such as the pressUre classifications. Additionally, the need to base EALs on containment In c..nt.-ainment and the r.epons. of the Em..genc. pressure and the response of the ECCS is no longer appropriate for CMre Cooling System) for notification of offsite agencies notification of offsite agencies.

shall be described. The existence, but not the details, of a message authentication scheme shall be noted for such

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 13 of 31 agencies. The emergency classes defined shall include: (1)

Notification of unusual events, (2) alert, (f3)site*a*ea e..er.ency, and (4) general emergency. These classes are further discussed in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1.

40 C.2. By June 20, 2012, nuclear power reactor licensees CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation requiring it maintain shall establish and maintain the capability to assess, the capability to assess, classify and declare an emergency condition classify, and declare an emergency condition within. 16 within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to plant operators m.nu.e^ after the availability of indications to plant that an EAL has been exceeded and promptly declare the emergency.

operators that an emergency action level has been CR-3 will maintain the capability to assess, classify, and declare an exceeded and shall promptly declare the emergency emergency condition. In the permanently defueled condition, the condition as soon as possible following identification of the rapidly developing scenarios associated with events initiated during appropriate emergency classification level. Licensees shall reactor power operations are no longer credible. The consequences not construe these criteria as a grace period to attempt to resulting from the only remaining events (e.g., fuel handling accident) restore plant conditions to avoid declaring an emergency develop over a significantly longer period. As such, the 15 minute action due to an emergency action level that has been requirement to classify and declare an emergency is unnecessarily exceeded. Licensees shall not construe these criteria as restrictive. The elimination of the time permitted to identify an event is preventing implementation of response actions deemed by acceptable since there is no need for State or local response the licensee to be necessary to P.rtect pub*ic h'alth .nd organizations to implement any protective actions. The 10 CFR safety provided that any delay in d..l.a'atio"n doe not 50.72(a)(3) requirement to complete an Emergency Notification deny the Stat-e and- l-c-al a'- thoities the opper-"unity to System notification of the declaration of an Emergency Class within iamplement.. ea.e.e nece.sa.y to p.otect the public one hour after the time the licensee declares one of the Emergency health and safety. Classes is not impacted by this exemption. Because it is no longer possible for the radiological consequences of a design basis accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, and public protective actions are no longer necessary, the need to identify an emergency within 15 minutes and to promptly provide information to the State and local response organizations for the protection of the public health and safety is no longer necessary.

41 D. Notification Procedures CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation requiring emergency D.1. Administrative and physical means for notifying local, plans contain the means to provide early notification to local, State and State, and Federal officials and agencies and agreements Federal officials and agencies for the prompt notification of the public reached with these officials and agencies fet-he prompt and for public evacuation or other protective measures. Because it is lef.e-.Ifon of the public and for Puli,'cA e.ac..Uati or. no longer possible for the radiological consequences of a design basis other protective.- mea...,ures, should they become accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to

.eesary, shall be described. This description shall result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 14 of 31 include identification of the appropriate officials, by title boundary, the need to provide these messages to the public, the need and-agenry, of the State and local government agencies to maintain the Alert and Notification System, and the need to withn the r0PZs. implement protective action strategies are no longer necessary. CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation requiring the description of State and local government officials within the EPZs. Because it is no longer possible for EPA PAGs to be exceeded at the site boundary, the description of EPZs is no longer necessary.

42 D.2. Pro.visions shall, bhc. de.Scr.,ibed for yea.rly CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation to provide information dis.se*,*inati-on to the publics wit-hin the plume. xpOSU. e to the public on a periodic basis for how they will be notified, what their pathway EPZ of basic em.er.gency planning i"nformation, initial actions should be during an emergency, and for the onsite r.uch ag tho methods and times required for publ*ic emergency plan to contain established procedures for the coordinated no^.tifi-atti.n and the pr.otec.tive act.ions planned ifdissemination of information to the public. Because it is no longer ac.c.adent occurs, g io

-nF.al ationast the nature possible for the radiological consequences of a design basis accident and-effectsb of radiation, and a listing

, of local, broadca-t or a postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in stati-o-ns that-will -b used for dissemination of radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site information duing an emergen*y. Sign; Or other boundary, the need for the public to take protective actions and the meas.ur. shall also be used-to dissemnatin t any need to educate the public on what their prompt actions would be in tran.ient population within the plume exposure the event of a radiological emergency is no longer necessary.

pathway EPZ appropriate inform atin that would be helpful if an ac.cident occur-s.

43 D.3. A licensee shall have the capability to notify CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation requiring the responsible State and local governmental agencies within capability to notify responsible State and local governmental agencies 46 minutes after declaring an emergency. The ficensee within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency. Because it is no s.hall demonstrate that the appro.pri-'ate govermental' longer possible for the radiological consequences of a design basis aut-ho-r-iies-^ have the capability to make a publi... al.erting accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to and notification decirsin promptly on being informed result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site by the li.ensee of an emergency cO.d.iti. A. Prir t boundary, the need for the public to take protective actions in the initial. operation greater than 5 percent Of rated thermal event of a radiological emergency is not necessary. CR-3 proposes to poweroF. vh_ thMe firs at a site, eac.h n.clear powe

.t-reato complete emergency notification through the State Watch Office reactGo licensee shall demonstrate that adm-inir.st;rtative Tallahassee (SWOT) within 60 minutes after an emergency and physi*cal, means have been establis.hed for^alle-ting declaration or a change in classification. This timeframe is consistent and providing prompt ito the public withi with the 10 CFR 50.72 notification to the NRC and is appropriate the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The design because there is no need for State or local response organizations to objective of the p.. mpt publich al.e- t and- no-t-ific*a-tion,., implement any protective actions. The SWOT will assume the sste. 6h-ll be Wehaee the cap-bI t', to e st responsibility to provide notification to Citrus County. An exemption to

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 15 of 31 complete thc initial allerting and initiate notification of maintain a backup alerting and notification capability is being taken thc public within the plume exposure pathway E-PZ because this is an offsite emergency planning requirement. Offsite wiA4thin about 15 minutes. Thc usc of this alerting and emergency response capability is no longer appropriate as no design basis accident or postulated beyond design basis accident can result

. 4; nA ... n 4h..

.. .... M...r .. .. . . 4. . in radioactive releases which exceed EPA's protective action guides at minutes of thc time that State and local officialls are the site boundary.

no-tifficd that a smiatuatin eists rcquir~ing urgent acton to thc*more likely events where tlhere is substantl" timne -avail-ablle for the appropriate governmentall auithorities to make a judgment whether or not to ac~tivate the public allert and- noiiaion system. The aler-ting and notification capability shall additionally include admininstrative and physicall means fora backup methed of pub!i alerting and notificatiGn c~apable of being used inthe event the primairy method of al.e.ting and- notific.ation is u ailable during an emergencly to aleIrt Or notify all Or Po.rIo of the plume exposure pathway EPZ popullation. The backup method shall have the capability to alert and notify the public within the plume exposur-e pathway EPZ, but does not need to- Meet the 15 mninute design objective for the primay propt public. alert and notification system.

WA.hen thee-i a d-eciAsioen to ac-tivatte the alert and-no-tific-ation system, the appropriate governmental authorities will determi. e*whpether to activate the entie*

alert and notification system simultaneously OrFn graduated Or staged manner. T~he responsiibiliity for ac~tivating such a public ale1rt and iinotification system s-hall remain with the appr-opriate governmental allthOmoes.

44 D.4. If FE.MA *as. apprved a nuclear power reactor CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation requiring onsite and site-'s, --art and notification design report, including the State and local offsite emergency plans contain the means to provide backup aler*t and notification capability, as of early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the Plume December 23, 2011, then the backup alert and Exposure Pathway EPZ. Because it is no longer possible for the ne-tific-,-atio.n capability requirements in Sect-io.'n .D3 n radiological consequences of a design basis accident or a postulated must be implemented by De*emhber 24, 2012. if the alert beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in radioactive releases and notification design repor.t does not include a

._,,,_ which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the need for the

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 16 of 31 backup alelt and notification capability OF needs public to take protective actions in the event of a radiological rcis..n.in-, ensure adequate backup aler,t and emergency is not necessary. Therefore, the need to provide these notification capability, then a r.vision of the alcrt and messages to the public, the need to maintain the Alert and Notification notification design report must he submitted to FEMA System and backup capability is no longer necessary.

for reMviw by -no2-013, and the FEMAapproGvd 24, backup allert and notification meanst must hc i mplemented Waithin 3-6 days after FEMA approlval.

Howevcr, the total time period to implement a FEM A approved backup allert and no-tific-at-ion Means must not exceed Juno 22, 2015.

45 E. Emergency Facilities and Equipment No exemption is requested.

Adequate provisions shall be made and described for emergency facilities and equipment, including:

E. 1. Equipment at the site for personnel monitoring; 46 E.2. Equipment for determining the magnitude of and for No exemption is requested.

continuously assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials to the environment; 47 E.3. Facilities and supplies at the site for decontamination No exemption is requested.

of onsite individuals; 48 E.4. Facilities and medical supplies at the site for No exemption is requested.

appropriate emergency first aid treatment; 49 E.5. Arrangements for medical service providers qualified No exemption is requested.

to handle radiological emergencies onsite; 50 E.6. Arrangements for transportation of contaminated No exemption is requested.

injured individuals from the site to specifically identified treatment facilities outside the site boundary; 51 E.7. Arrangements for treatment of individuals injured in No exemption is requested.

support of licensed activities on the site at treatment facilities outside the site boundary; 52 E.8.a. (i) A licensee -nsite technicaln suppr't center and CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation that requires an em.ergency operation facility from which effective direction can be given and effective control can be arrangements are maintained to accommodate State and local emergency response staff at the EOF. Because it is no longer I

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 17 of 31 exercised during an emergency possible for EPA PAGs to be exceeded at the site boundary, the EOF will no longer exist and there will be no need for a response by offsite agencies or company employees to the EOF. CR-3 also requests an exemption from the requirement to maintain a Technical Support Center (TSC). An onsite facility will continue to be maintained, from which effective direction can be given and effective control may be exercised during an emergency. The CR-3 PDEP will continue to maintain arrangements for requesting assistance and using resources from appropriate offsite support organizations.

53 E.8.a (ii) For nu.lea. power r... tor li-.*

"a"n", a CR-3 requests an exemption from the requirements for the onsite li,.ns.. .n-ite

.p..ational

, . uppo.t

. ntr;,, Operational Support Center (OSC). In the permanently defueled condition, the rapidly developing scenarios associated with events initiated during reactor power operation are no longer credible. As such, an onsite OSC is no longer needed.

An onsite facility will continue to be maintained, from which control room support, emergency mitigation, radiation monitoring, and effective control may be exercised during an emergency.

54 E.8.b. For a nuclear power reactor licensee's emergency No exemption is requested.

operations facility required by paragraph 8.a of this section, either a facility located between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor site(s), or a primary facility located less than 10 miles from the nuclear power reactor site(s) and a backup facility located between 10 miles and 25 miles of the nuclear power reactor site(s). An emergency operations facility may serve more than one nuclear power reactor site. A licensee desiring to locate an emergency operations facility more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site shall request prior Commission approval by submitting an application for an amendment to its license. For an emergency operations facility located more than 25 miles from a nuclear power reactor site, provisions must be made for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to the nuclear power reactor site so that NRC and offsite responders can interact face-to-face with emergency response personnel entering and leaving the

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 18 of 31 nuclear power reactor site. Provisions for locating NRC and offsite responders closer to a nuclear power reactor site that is more than 25 miles from the emergency operations facility must include the following:

55 E.8.b. (1) Space for members of an NRC site team and No exemption is requested. Refer to the 10 CFR Appendix E, IV.

Federal, State, and local responders E.8.b., basis for exemption description, which identifies the elimination of the EOF.

56 E.8.b. (2) Additional space for conducting briefings with No exemption is requested. Refer to the 10 CFR Appendix E, IV.

emergency response personnel; E.8.b., basis for exemption description, which identifies the elimination of the EOF.

57 E.8.b.(3) Communication with other licensee and offsite No exemption is requested. Refer to the 10 CFR Appendix E, IV.

emergency response facilities; E.8.b., basis for exemption description, which identifies the elimination of the EOF.

58 E.8.b.(4) Access to plant data and radiological information; No exemption is requested. Refer to the 10 CFR Appendix E, IV.

and E.8.b., basis for exemption description, which identifies the elimination of the EOF.

59 E.8.b.(5) Access to copying equipment and office supplies; No exemption is requested. Refer to the 10 CFR Appendix E, IV.

E.8.b., basis for exemption description, which identifies the elimination of the EOF.

60 E.8.c. By jU.n 20, 2012, f-*.- nu*.l. a powc.

. .. ctO. CR-3 requests an exemption from the requirements for the EOF.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 19 of 31 licensec's cmc.g.n.y operations facility required by Because it is no longer possible for EPA PAGs to be exceeded at the paragraph 8.a of thi section, - a facility having the site boundary, offsite emergency response plans are no longer following capabilities, necessary and there will be no response by offsite agencies to an EOF (1) The capability fo obtaining - and displaying plant and JIC. An EOF and JIC will no longer be maintained. The CR-3 data- and radiological information for each reacor at a PDEP will continue to maintain arrangements for requesting nuc.lear power rcactOr s-ite and for .ac.h nucIla. power assistance and using resources from offsite support organizations.

reactor site that the fcacliaty serves; 61 E.8.c (2) The capability to analyze plant technical CR-3 requests an exemption from the requirement to brief offsite info,,a-rmation,. and provide techni-cal briefings on e.. nt response organizations on event conditions at CR-3. Because it is no

.onditions and prognosis tic.n-see W andl o.ffmit longer possible for EPA PAGs to be exceeded at the site boundary, response organizations for .ac.h ractor at a wncl.ar offsite emergency response plans are no longer necessary and there power reactor soit and f .eac.h nucle,..ar power reactor , will be no response by offsite agencies to an EOF and JIC. An EOF site that the facility s. ..es; and and JIC will no longer be maintained. The CR-3 PDEP will continue to maintain arrangements for requesting assistance and using resources from offsite support organizations.

62 E.8.c (3) The capability to support response to events This requirement does not apply to the CR-3 EOF.

occurring simultaneously at more than one nuclear power reactor site if the emergency operations facility serves more than one site; and 63 E.8.d. For nuclear power reactor li.ensees, an CR-3 will maintain an alternative facility for augmentation of the ERO alternative facility (Or facilities) that would hb capable of: communicating with the control room and plant Security, acceaAssihbi en if the site fis under threat Of Or performing notifications to the SWOT, enabling emergency repair and exper*icing hostile action, to function as a staging damage control teams to begin planning actions to mitigate the area for augmentation of emergency response staf consequences of an event, and supporting a rapid response as soon and- .ollec-,tively having the folowing charc*ter6iti-*'s as the site is deemed accessible, in the event that the site is not the capability forGcoMm*un... ican with the emergency accessible. CR-3 requests an exemption from the requirement to operations facility, control room., and plant secury,; maintain communications with the EOF. The scope of an emergency the capability to pefoFrm offsitc notifications; and the response will be appropriate for the defueled plant status (not be the capability f:..r e r..ig assessment activities, same as actions necessary for "hostile actions" at operating power including damage control. team planning and plants). In the EP Final Rule (December 2011), the NRC defined preparation, for use when onsite emergency facilities "hostile action" as, in part, an act directed toward a nuclear power c.annot be safely access d dur.iRn hostile actio. The plant or its personnel. The NRC excluded NPRs from the definition of r.equirements in this paragraph 8.d must be "hostile action." CR-3 should not be required to plan for an offsite implemented. no later. than _Decembern^.F 23, 2014, with the impact resulting from hostile action because: (1) the facility poses a exception of the capability f.r staging emergency lower radiological risk to the public than does a power reactor, and (2) response

...... organization personnel at the alternativ"e the facility has a low likelihood of a credible accident resulting in

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 20 of 31 fa.ility (OF facilities) and the capability for radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures.

communiM-AMcation Wit-h the cmcrgency opcrations faGility, contro*lrom, and plant security, whih must be implemented no l2atr.than Juno 20, 2012.

64 E.8.e. A lic-ensee shall not be subject to th* CR-3 requests an exemption from the requirements established for an requirements Of pr*agraph 8.1 Of thi. seGtion for an EOF. Because it is no longer possible for EPA PAGs to be exceeded existing emergency operations facility appro.ved as, of at the site boundary, the EOF will no longer exist and there will be no rDece..mbher 23, 2011; need for a response by offsite agencies to the EOF. The CR-3 PDEP will continue to maintain arrangements for requesting assistance and using resources from offsite support organizations.

65 E.9. At least one onsite and one offsite communications CR-3 requests an exemption from the regulation requiring system; each system shall have a backup power source. communications with contiguous State and local governments within All communication plans shall have arrangements for the Plume Exposure Pathway EPZ. Because it is no longer possible emergencies, including titles and alternates for those in for the radiological consequences of a design basis accident or a charge at both ends of the communication links and the postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in primary and backup means of communication. Where radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site consistent with the function of the governmental agency, boundary, the need to provide prompt notification to the local these arrangements will include: governments to implement protective actions is no longer necessary.

CR-3 will maintain the capability to communicate with the SWOT.

E.9.a. Provision for communications with contiguous SWOT will assume the responsibility to provide notification to Citrus State/local governments within the plume . xp..ur.e County. CR-3 will maintain communications with the SWOT and the pathway-EPZ-, Such communications shall be tested NRC. The onsite response facilities will be combined into a single monthly. facility.

66 E.9.b. Provision for communications with Federal No exemption is requested.

emergency response organizations. Such communications systems shall be tested annually.

67 E.9.c. Provision for communications among the maGIoa CR-3 requests an exemption from the requirement for communications power reactor contrl room, the onsitoe t.ec;.hnical* among the control room, the TSC, and the EOF; and communication support center, and the emergency . pe.ations fac-ility;" with field assessment teams for assessing and monitoring offsite and.*among-.h, nuclear facility, the principal State and radiological conditions. Because it is no longer possible for the local emergency operations centers, ad-the-field radiological consequences of a design basis accident or a postulated assessment teams. Such communications systems shall beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in radioactive releases be tested annually. which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the need to provide prompt notification to the local governments to implement protective actions is no longer necessary. CR-3 will maintain the capability to

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 21 of 31 communicate with the SWOT from the control room. The SWOT will assume the responsibility to provide notification to Citrus County.

Since a need for monitoring and assessing no longer exists, CR-3 no longer intends to maintain the capability to deploy field teams for assessing and monitoring offsite radiological conditions. The CR-3 PDEP will continue to maintain communication between onsite assessment teams and the onsite response facility.

68 E.9.d. Provisions for communications by the licensee with CR-3 requests an exemption from the requirement for communications NRC Headquarters and the appropriate NRC Regional between the NRC and the TSC and EOF. CR-3 will maintain Office Operations Center from the nu.G*a; pew-; ;cactor communications with the NRC from the Control Room.

.o..ro. room, th. on.ite technical center, and

-upport the.m..genc op.r.atione facility. Such communications shall be tested monthly.

69 F. Training No exemption is requested.

F. 1. The program to provide for: (a) The training of employees and exercising, by periodic drills, of emergency plans to ensure that employees of the licensee are familiar with their specific emergency response duties, and (b) The participation in the training and drills by other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiological emergency shall be described. This shall include a description of specialized initial training and periodic retraining programs to be provided to each of the following categories of emergency personnel 70 F.1. i. Directors and/or coordinators of the plant emergency No exemption is requested.

organization; 71 F.1. ii. Personnel responsible for accident assessment, No exemption is requested.

including control room shift personnel; 72 F.1. iii Radiological monitoring teams; No exemption is requested.

73 F.1. iv. Fire control teams (fire brigades); No exemption is requested.

74 F. 1. v. Repair and damage control teams; No exemption is requested.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 22 of 31 75 F.1. vi. First aid and rescue teams; No exemption is requested.

76 F.1. vii. Medical support personnel; No exemption is requested.

77 F.1. viii. Lic~ensee's headqua"t.es support personnel; CR-3 requests an exemption from the requirement to provide training to headquarters personnel because the level of emergency response required by the CR-3 PDEP does not require response by headquarters personnel. Because it is no longer possible for the radiological consequences of a design basis accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the need for headquarters response is no longer necessary.

78 F.1. ix. Security personnel. No exemption is requested.

79 F.1 In addition, a radiological orientation training program CR-3 requests an exemption from the requirement to maintain a shall be made available to local services personnel; e.g., radiological orientation training program for Civil Defense and local local emergency services/CivWl-* Den-e, local law news media persons. Training will be provided to prepare local enforcement personnel, local, ne.s media per-sons. services (firefighting, local law enforcement, and ambulance) personnel for their response to an event at the CR-3 site. Because it is no longer possible for the radiological consequences of a design basis accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the need to educate the public on what their prompt actions would be in the event of a radiological emergency is no longer necessary.

80 F.2. The plan shall describe provisions for the conduct of CR-3 requests an exemption from the requirement to conduct full emergency preparedness exercises as follows: participation biennial exercises. CR-3 will continue to test the Exercises shall test the adequacy of timing and content of adequacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and implementing procedures and methods, test emergency methods, test emergency equipment and communications networks, equipment and communications networks, test the puns and ensure that ERO personnel are familiar with their duties, through alert and notificatiin* *ystem, and ensure that emergency periodic exercise, drill and training activities. CR-3 also requests an organization personnel are familiar with their duties. exemption from the requirement to test the public notification network as part of emergency preparedness exercises. Because it is no longer possible for the radiological consequences of a design basis accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the need to provide emergency messages to the public and

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 23 of 31 the need to maintain the Alert and Notification System are no longer necessary.

81 F.2.a. A full paticipation .. e... .. . ... is as mucn CR-3 requests an exemption from the requirement to conduct full plans asiV isHll participation biennial exercises. CR-3 will continue to include the of theIImenlee State, andl

! Iotl IV n~gni roSonably achievable wit-hout Amandator; public State of Florida, the Citrus County Sheriffs Office, and local support partici6pation shall be conducted for Pach aitc at which organizations in the periodic drills and exercises to assess its ability to a powor reacatoar is locr-ated. N uclear power reactor perform responsibilities related to an emergency at CR-3 to the extent Micnsccs shall submit cxercise sccnarios undcr § 50.4 defined by the CR-3 PDEP and State emergency plans. Because it is att Waist 6 daysc bofore use on a full par-ticiipation no longer possible for the radiological consequences of a design basis exercise rcguired by this paragraph 2a accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the need for State and local response organizations to participate in drills and exercises is no longer necessary. CR-3 also requests an exemption from the requirement to submit the exercise scenario at least 60 days in advance since relief is being requested from the requirement to perform a full participation exercise.

82 F.2.a(i) For an operating license issued under this part, this No exemption is requested.

exercise must be conducted within two years before the issuance of the first operating license for full power (one authorizing operation above 5 percent of rated power) of the first reactor and shall include participation by each State and local government within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and each state within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ. If the full participation exercise is conducted more than 1 year prior to issuance of an operating licensee for full power, an exercise which tests the licensee's onsite emergency plans must be conducted within one year before issuance of an operating license for full power. This exercise need not have State or local government participation.

83 F 2.a.(ii) For a combined license issued under part 52 of No exemption is requested.

this chapter, this exercise must be conducted within two years of the scheduled date for initial loading of fuel. If the first full participation exercise is conducted more than one year before the scheduled date for initial loading of fuel, an exercise which tests the licensee's onsite emergency plans

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 24 of 31 must be conducted within one year before the scheduled date for initial loading of fuel. This exercise need not have State or local government participation. If FEMA identifies one or more deficiencies in the state of offsite emergency preparedness as the result of the first full participation exercise, or if the Commission finds that the state of emergency preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, the provisions of § 50.54(gg) apply.

84 F 2.a (iii) For a combined license issued under part 52 of No exemption is requested.

this chapter, if the applicant currently has an operating reactor at the site, an exercise, either full or partial participation, shall be conducted for each subsequent reactor constructed on the site. This exercise may be incorporated in the exercise requirements of Sections IV.F.2.b. and c. in this appendix. If FEMA identifies one or more deficiencies in the state of offsite emergency preparedness as the result of this exercise for the new reactor, or ifthe Commission finds that the state of emergency preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, the provisions of § 50.54(gg) apply.

85 F 2.b. Each licensee at each site shall conduct a CR-3 requests an exemption from the requirement to conduct full subsequent exercise of its onsite emergency plan every 2 participation biennial exercises. Because it is no longer possible for years. Nu--cae; pow'cr ;cact; Ic.ns.ccs shall submit the radiological consequences of a design basis accident or a uxurc.~ii ~n~rin~ unnnr o nu.~ ~IT iuii~i nu n~:~ n~ToruA postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in iier-in ean na i~a - uvr

- niitrtF

- - - MIA ati least GO r days n

• .. v radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site q " ..an ..

oo.' oxor c-'- mn

-b.-y.... Fedin, th t.h

'vb oinc-isfull e nt.

n'"'.....,.

p, .b. The""'-"o

,a ticip boundary, the need for State and local response organizations to tionk~a. , I p r ~e .. n IA k n m ft~r .'.r f I k Ir~

. ^ ^ f 2 a*

i . . . .

participate in drills and exercises is no longer necessary. CR-3 will ser.toon. In addition, the licensee shall take actions continue to include the State of Florida, the Citrus County Sheriffs necessary to ensure that adequate emergency response Office, and local support organizations for firefighting, ambulance and capabilities are maintained during the interval between medical services for events at the CR-3 site in the periodic drills and biennial exercises by conducting drills, including-at least exercises to assess its ability to perform responsibilities related to an one drill involving a combination of some of the principal emergency at CR-3 to the extent defined by the CR-3 PIDEP and State functional areas of the licensee's onsite emergency

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 25 of 31 response capabilities. The principal functional areas of emergency plans.

emergency response include activities such as management and coordination of emergency response, CR-3 also requests an exemption from the requirement to submit the accident assessment, event classification, notification of exercise scenario at least 60 days in advance since relief is being offsite authorities, assessment of the onsite and-effsite requested from the requirement to perform a full participation exercise.

impact of radiological releases, pr.ot"tive actin---. The public will no longer have any response actions in the event of an Frccmmcnlnedation development, pFettmtive action emergency at CR-3. The need to coordinate with State and local deci.-ion

.. a.n, ,plantsystem repair and mitigative response organizations for the development of Protective Action action implementation. During these drills, activation of all Decisions is no longer necessary. Activation of the EOF, TSC, and of the licensee's emergency response facilities (Terhn.Gal OSC is no longer necessary. The onsite response facilities will be

....... t C.nti. . ITSC.. I v*von . .tinn5S *.. .. r.t Cren... combined into a single facility.

JVbj, ana Mec L-mergencY 0peraIIons 1-aGNITi tLJIJ))

would not be necessary, licensees would have the opportunity to consider accident management strategies, supervised instruction would be permitted, operating staff in all participating facilities would have the opportunity to resolve problems (success paths) rather than have controllers intervene, and the drills may focus on the onsite exercise training objectives.

86 F 2.c. Offsito plane for each 6ite shall be exercisod CR-3 requests an exemption from the requirement to conduct full biennially with full par-ticipation by each offeito participation biennial exercises. Periodic exercises and drills will be aulthority having a role u-nd-er the rmadiiologic~al rcSpOnsc completed to demonstrate ERO proficiency and evaluate performance.

plan. Where the offtitc aulthority has a rolc undcr a Training will be provided to ERO personnel. CR-3 will continue to radiologic~all rc~ponse plan for more than one 6itc-,it include the State of Florida, the Citrus County Sheriffs Office, and shall fully particiipate in one exorcise every F.wo years local support organizations in the periodic drills and exercises to and shall, at least, partially par-ticipate inother offIteU assess its ability to perform responsibilities related to an emergency at planl Cexe~ILU inl tisI periuu. 11 two UIIIurWIL licensees CR-3 to the extent defined by the CR-3 PDEP and State emergency each have licensed facilities located either on the same site plans.

or on adjacent, contiguous sites, and share most of the elements defining co-located licensees, then each licensee Because it is no longer possible for the radiological consequences of a shall: design basis accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the need for State and local response organizations to fully participate in drills and exercises is no longer necessary.

87 F 2.c.(1) Conduct an exercise biennially of its onsite No exemption is requested. This regulation does not apply to CR-3.

emergency plan;

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 26 of 31 88 F 2.c.(2) Participate quadrennially in an offsite biennial full No exemption is requested. This regulation does not apply to CR-3.

or partial participation exercise; 89 F 2.c.(3) Conduct emergency preparedness activities and No exemption is requested. This regulation does not apply to CR-3.

interactions in the years between its participation in the offsite full or partial participation exercise with offsite authorities, to test and maintain interface among the affected State and local authorities and the licensee. Co-located licensees shall also participate in emergency preparedness activities and interaction with offsite authorities for the period between exercises; 90 F 2.c.(4) Conduct a hostile action exercise of its onsite No exemption is requested. This regulation does not apply to CR-3.

emergency plan in each exercise cycle; and 91 F 2.c.(5) Participate in an offsite biennial full or partial No exemption is requested. This regulation does not apply to CR-3.

participation hostile action exercise in alternating exercise cycles.

92 F 2.d. Each State With responsibili;. fo. nuclear power CR-3 requests an exemption to conduct the ingestion pathway r.a Po .r. megency preparedns .. should

, fully exercise and the State participation in this exercise. Because it is no partic..ipate in the ingestion pathway por.tion o longer possible for the radiological consequences of a design basis exercises at least once every exerci. e cycle. in States accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to With m... than one nuclear power reactor plum. result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site exp..uro pathway EPZ, Mho State sho.uld, roato thi' boundary, the need to conduct an ingestion pathway exercise is no parti.ipation from siteetWite. Each State with longer necessary. CR-3 also requests an exemption from the

... p.nsibility fr nuc'lear powe*r.actO. emer.gency requirement to require "hostile action" drills and exercises. In the EP preparednes hould fully participate in a ho..t.ile Final Rule (December 2011), the NRC defined "hostile action" as, in action ex...i.e at least once every cycle and should part, an act directed toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel.

fully participate on one hostile action exerci. e by The NRC excluded NPRs from the definition of "hostile action." CR-3 December 31, 201 5. Stat.s IN with more than one nuc.lear should not be required to plan for an offsite impact resulting from power reactor plume expo.ure pathway EPZ 6hould hostile action because: (1) the facility poses a lower radiological risk to rotate this participation from siwte to s.e. the public than does a power reactor, and (2) the facility has a low likelihood of a credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures.

93 F 2.e. Licensees shall enable any State or local CR-3 requests an exemption from this regulation that requires government located within the plume expsur.e pathway participation of offsite response organizations within the plume E-P-Z- to participate in the licensee's drills when requested by exposure pathway EPZ in drills. CR-3 will enable any State or local

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 27 of 31 such State or local government. government to participate in drills when requested by State of Florida or local government. Because it is no longer possible for the radiological consequences of a design basis accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the need to provide information to State and local response organizations for the development of Protective Action Decisions and offsite emergency planning by State and local organizations is no longer necessary.

94 F 2.f. Remedial exercises will be required if the emergency CR-3 requests an exemption from the requirement for the NRC to plan is not satisfactorily tested during the biennial exercise, consult FEMA if the emergency plan is not satisfactorily tested during such that NRC, in cc.'tat.-n .ith FEMA, cannot the biennial exercise. Remedial exercises will be conducted (1) find reasonable assurance that adequate protective commensurate with the reduced exercise scenario scope when measures can and will be taken in the event of a necessary. Because it is no longer possible for the radiological radiological emergency or consequences of a design basis accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the need for State and (2) determine that the Emergency Response Organization local response organizations to participate in drills and exercises in the (ERO) has maintained key skills specific to emergency resnonse. The evxtent of S÷-,^ -,nd loca.l n-art-ic--'-tion, in same manner as full participation exercise is no longer necessary.

remedial exercises must be sufficient to show that approprioate crrec~etiive meacuree have been takent

• A.*I U---------------------------

Fnte u e- erien orein Me ftepae.IP~e1 05-95 F 2.g. All exercises, drills, and training that provide No exemption is requested.

performance opportunities to develop, maintain, or demonstrate key skills must provide for formal critiques in order to identify weak or deficient areas that need correction. Any weaknesses or deficiencies that are identified in a critique of exercises, drills, or training must be corrected.

96 F 2.h. The participation of State and local governments in No exemption is requested.

an emergency exercise is not required to the extent that the applicant has identified those governments as refusing to participate further in emergency planning activities, pursuant to § 50.47(c)(1). In such cases, an exercise shall be held with the applicant or licensee and such governmental entities as elect to participate in the

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 28 of 31 emergency planning process.

4-97 F 2"i. Licensees shall use drill and exercise scenarios that CR-3 requests an exemption from the requirement to conduct full provide reasonable assurance that anticipatory responses participation biennial exercises. Periodic drills and exercises will be will not result from preconditioning of participants. Such completed to demonstrate ERO proficiency and evaluate performance.

wecnariGo fGo nuI.,car pGo.er rc-pactolicenscee mt n Because it is no longer possible for the radiological consequences of a MInlude -a%Wide peptrUM Of radioloegicall rcllases d design basis accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident at events, including hostile action. CR-3 to result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the need for State and local response organizations Exercise and drill scenarios as appropriate must to participate in drills and exercises is no longer necessary. CR-3 will emphasize coordination among onsite and offsite response continue to include the State of Florida, the Citrus County Sheriffs organizations. Office, and local support organizations in the periodic drills and exercises to assess its ability to perform responsibilities related to an emergency at CR-3 to the extent defined by the CR-3 PDEP and State emergency plans. CR-3 also requests an exemption from the requirement to include "hostile action" drills and exercises.

In the EP Final Rule (December 2011), the NRC defined "hostile action" as, in part, an act directed toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel. The NRC excluded NPRs from the definition of "hostile action." CR-3 should not be required to plan for an offsite impact resulting from hostile action because: (1) the facility poses a lower radiological risk to the public than does a power reactor, and (2) the facility has a low likelihood of a credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures.

i i A D 98 F 2.i. Th-e exer.cisee ea. Iducted under naraaranfl ~ at CR-3 requests an exemption from the requirement to conduct full this s-.ti.n by nuclear po.r. cac.to. riGen-ece mu. t participation biennial exercises. Periodic drills and exercises will be proVide the oppo~tunity for.the FRO to dimoinftrate completed to demonstrate ERO proficiency in key skills necessary to profic.icncy in the key ekile cceeR to mlmn implement the principal functional areas of emergency response as the prwincipall functionall are-av o-f emerigency responie applicable for the permanently defueled plant status. Critiques will identified i-n paragraph 2.b of thie ecotion. Each follow each drill or exercise activity. The CR-3 PDEP discusses cxcrcie ,uSt provide the yPPoUwitY for the ERO to exercise and drill types and frequencies of occurrence. Scenarios will demr-onatirate key skills c pecific to emnergency resepnse be developed to test all major elements of the PDEP within an eight duties in the control room, TSC, OSC, EOF, and joint (8) year period. These elements include management and infomaton enter. Additionally, in each eight calendar coordination of emergency response, accident assessment, and yearoxecia cycle, nuclear poWer reactor. l6aicnceec system repair and corrective action. CR-3 will continue to include the eh~~IIta GGnttent a! sre~narin durn xrin State of Florida, the Citrus County Sheriffs Office, and local support I_______ ----..-- Paa-P 2o hs eU RE FV0 organizations in the periodic drills and exercises to assess its ability to

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 29 of 31 the opportunitY for the ERG to dcmon~tratc proficiencY perform responsibilities related to an emergency at CR-3 to the extent inR the key skill: neec:ary to rcspond to the folloWing defined by the CR-3 PDEP and State emergency plans. Because it is Scenario lelmente:! no longer possible for the radiological consequences of a design basis accident or a postulated beyond design basis accident at CR-3 to hostilc :iction dierccted at the plant site, no radiologca result in radioactive releases which exceed the EPA PAGs at the site rolease Or an unplanned mini-mal r-adOiGologcal Felease boundary, the need for State and local response organizations to th2t-doec-6 not require public protcctivc actione,-an participate in drills and exercises is no longer necessary. CR-3 also caceiicatOnf or rapid escalation to a Site Area inital requests an exemption to require "hostile action" drills and exercises.

Em~ergcncY o-r GePne-ral Emergency, implementation o etrategies, procedures, and guidance developed under In the EP Final Rule (December 2011), the NRC defined "hostile 60.54(hh)(2), and integrat-ion of offeite recouree% Vith action" as, in part, an act directed toward a nuclear power plant or its onito reponsec. The licencee shall maintain a recor~d personnel. The NRC excluded NPRs from the definition of "hostile of exercices rcondhuc-ted- duFrig each eight year exercricte action." CR-3 should not be required to plan for an offsite impact c~ycle that document: the con~tent Of ecnro ~dto resulting from hostile action because: (1) the facility poses a lower eomFply with the requirement: of thi: paragraph. Each radiological risk to the public than does a power reactor, and (2) the licencee shall coend-ucnt a host-ile act-io 4xricfor facility has a low likelihood of a credible accident resulting in ofite ci8te no later than D~ecember 31, 2015. The nea radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures.

firest eight yea ex rccycle forF a site vAIl begin in the calendar year in which the firet hostile action exeFcise a: con.ducated. Foar- a sit-e licensed under Part 562, the first eight year exercise cycle begine in the c-alendar. year ot the inta exrie eurd by Section 'If F 2.

99 G. Maintaining Emergency Preparedness No exemption is requested.

Provisions to be employed to ensure that the emergency plan, its implementing procedures, and emergency equipment and supplies are maintained up to date shall be described.

100 H. Recovery No exemption is requested.

Criteria to be used to determine when, following an accident, reentry of the facility would be appropriate or when operation could be resumed shall be described.

101 I. Onsite Protective Actions During Hostile Action CR-3 requests an exemption from the requirement to establish By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power Feactor li.en.-"e.. protective actions to protect onsite personnel during hostile action to a range of protective action:, to protect onit- ensure reactor shut down. In the EP Final Rule (December 2011), the I I......e,,i-'.. hosi-*-' .---" mu.s b--e ..- '-.-- .-- NRC defined "hostile action" as, in part, an act directed toward a

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 30 of 31 e..U.. the... tnu.. ab-;lity of the lir" n... to saf""" nuclear power plant or its personnel. The NRC excluded NPRs for an shut down the F...t. and pe.f.. m the +, fctions of the offsite impact resulting from hostile action because: (1) the facility

!i.en...'. em'.genc'. pla,. poses a lower radiological risk to the public than does a power reactor, and (2) the facility has a low likelihood of a credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures.

102 10CFR 50 App E No exemption is requested.

V. Implementing Procedures No less than 180 days before the scheduled issuance of an operating license for a nuclear power reactor or a license to possess nuclear material, or the scheduled date for initial loading of fuel for a combined license under part 52 of this chapter, the applicant's or licensee's detailed implementing procedures for its emergency plan shall be submitted to the Commission as specified in § 50.4.

Licensees who are authorized to operate a nuclear power facility shall submit any changes to the emergency plan or procedures to the Commission, as specified in § 50.4, within 30 days of such changes.

103 10CFR 50 App E The regulation that identifies the requirement to maintain the VI. Emergency Response Data System Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) is not applicable to

1. The Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) is a nuclear power facilities that are permanently shutdown.

direct near real-time electronic data link between the licensee's onsite computer system and the NRC Based upon the permanently defueled status of CR-3, this system is Operations Center that provides for the automated no longer necessary to transmit safety system parameter data. No transmission of a limited data set of selected parameters. exemption is requested since this change in ERDS data requirement is The ERDS supplements the existing voice transmission identified in 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, VI. 2.

over the Emergency Notification System (ENS) by providing the NRC Operations Center with timely and accurate updates of a limited set of parameters from the licensee's installed onsite computer system in the event of an emergency. When selected plant data are not available on the licensee's onsite computer system, retrofitting of data points is not required. The licensee shall test the ERDS periodically to verify system availability and operability. The frequency of ERDS testing will be quarterly unless otherwise set by NRC based on demonstrated

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-01 Page 31 of 31 system performance.

2. Except for Big Rock Point and all nuclear power facilities that are shut down permanently or indefinitely, onsite hardware shall be provided at each unit by the licensee to interface with the NRC receiving system. Software, which will be made available by the NRC, will assemble the data to be transmitted and transmit data from each unit via an output port on the appropriate data system.

DUKE ENERGY FLORIDA, INC.

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 DOCKET NUMBER 50-302 / LICENSE NUMBER DPR-72 EXEMPTIONS TO RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN REQUIREMENTS DEFINED BY 10 CFR 50.47 AND APPENDIX E TO PART 50, REVISION 1, AND RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ENCLOSURE 3 REGULATORY COMMITMENTS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 3 3F0314-01 Page 1 of 1 REGULATORY COMMITMENTS The following table identifies the actions committed to by Duke Energy Florida, Inc. in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be regulatory commitments. Please notify the Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3)

Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs of any questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments.

Regulatory Commitments Due Date/Event CR-3 will incorporate the requirement to complete the review of Emergency Action Levels (EALs) with the State of Florida and local governmental authorities on an annual basis in a revision to the Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP) in the response to the PDEP RAI.

CR-3 will incorporate the requirement to conduct remedial exercises commensurate with the reduced exercise scenario scope, when necessary, in a revision to the PDEP in the September 25, 2014 response to the PDEP RAI.

CR-3 will remove "hostile action" from the PDEP and the September 25, 2014 Permanently Defueled (PD) (EAL) Bases Manual in a revision to the PDEP in the response to the PDEP RAI.

CR-3 will add EM-503, "Conduct of the Mitigation September 25, 2014 Coordinator," to the PDEP implementing procedure list in the response to the PDEP RAI.