ML17118A076
| ML17118A076 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 04/20/2017 |
| From: | Susquehanna |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 2017-0195 | |
| Download: ML17118A076 (67) | |
Text
Page 1 of 2 MANUAL HARD COPY DISTRIBUTION DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL 2017-6195 USER INFORMATION:
GERLACH*ROSEY M EMPL#:028401 CA#: 0363 Address: NUCSA2 Phone#: 542-3194 TRANSMITTAL INFORMATION:
TO: GERLACH*ROSEY M 04/20/2017 LOCATION: USNRC FROM: NUCLEAR RECORDS DOCUMENT CONTROL CENTER (NUCSA-2)
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SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSB2 lanual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL Table Of Contents Issue Date: 04/19/2017 Procedure Name Rev Issue Date Change ID Change Nwnber TEXT LOES 129 04/19/2017
Title:
LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS 23 03/01/2017 ,,,,.---.,_
TEXT TOC
Title:
TABLE OF CONTENTS ((\;)
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SAFETY LIMITS (SLS) REACTOR CORE SLS 5 01/22/2015
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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERAT~?~r)LCJO~,~P,LICABILITY I' ., ' ~
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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS'SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) 1 '*, '\. >
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REACTIVITY CONTROL,S:YS'I'EMS REACTIVITY ANOMALIES
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Title:
REACTIVITY\CON~R0L SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY
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Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD SCRAM TIMES TEXT 3 .1. 5 2 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD SCRAM ACCUMULATORS TEXT 3 .1. 6 4 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ROD PATTERN CONTROL Page_! of 8 Report Date: 04/19/17
SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSB2 Manual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL TEXT 3.1.7 4 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL (SLC) SYSTEM TEXT 3 .1. 8 4 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME (SDV) VENT AND DRAIN VALVES TEXT 3.2.1 5 11/16/2016
Title:
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)
TEXT 3.2.2 4 11/16/2016
Title:
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)
TEXT 3.2.3 3 11/16/2016
Title:
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE LHGR
- ~EXT 3 .3 .1.1 6 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3 . 3 . 1. 2 3 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.2.1 4 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.2.2 3 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION FEEDWATER - MAIN TURBINE HIGH WATER LEVEL TRIP INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.3.1 9 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION POST ACCIDENT MONITORING (PAM) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.3.2 2 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM TEXT 3.3.4.l 2 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION END OF CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (EOC-RPT) INSTRUMENTATION Page~ of 8 Report Date: 04/19/17
SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSB2 anual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL TEXT 3.3.4.2 1 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (ATWS-RPT) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.1 6 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.2 1 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.6.1 8 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.6.2 5 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION E:XT 3.3.7.1 3 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS) SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.8.1 4 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION LOSS OF POWER (LOP) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.8.2 1 11/16/2016
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) ELECTRIC POWER MONITORING TEXT 3.4.1 5 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RECIRCULATION LOOPS OPERATING TEXT 3.4.2 4 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) JET PUMPS TEXT 3.4.3 3 01/13/2012
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES (S/RVS)
TEXT 3.4.4 1 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE
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Page~ of 8 Report Date: 04/19/17
SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSB2
-Manual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL TEXT 3.4.5 3 03/10/2010
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE (PIV) LEAKAGE TEXT 3.4.6 5 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS LEAKAGE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.4.7 3 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY TEXT 3.4.8 3 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM
- HOT SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.4.9 2 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM
- COLD SHUTDOWN
'l'EXT 3.4.10 5 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE (P/T) LIMITS TEXT 3.4.11 1 11/16/2016
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) REACTOR STEAM DOME PRESSURE TEXT 3.5.1 5 11/16/2016
Title:
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)
SYSTEM ECCS - OPERATING TEXT 3.5.2 3 11/16/2016
Title:
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)
SYSTEM ECCS - SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.5.3 4 11/16/2016
Title:
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)
SYSTEM RCIC SYSTEM LDCN 5308 TEXT 3.6.1.1 6 11/16/2016
Title:
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT TEXT 3.6.1.2 2 11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCK Page! of 8 Report Date: 04/19/17
SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSB2 '
[anual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL TEXT 3.6.1.3 16 04/19/2017
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (PCIVS)
LDCN 5243
- TEXT 3 . 6 . 1 . 4 2 11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT PRESSURE TEXT 3.6.1.5 2 11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AIR TEMPERATURE TEXT 3.6.1.6 1 11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION CHAMBER-TO-DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKERS TEXT 3.6.2.1 3 11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION POOL AVERAGE TEMPERATURE
'EXT 3.6.2.2 1 11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.6.2.3 2 11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT'REMOVAL (RHR) SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING TEXT 3.6.2.4 1 11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SUPPRESSION POOL SPRAY TEXT 3.6.3.1 2 06/13/2006
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS TEXT 3.6.3.2 2 11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AIR FLOW SYSTEM TEXT 3.6.3.3 2 11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT OXYGEN CONCENTRATION TEXT 3.6.4.1 14 04/19/2017
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Page l?_ of B Report Date: 04/19/17
SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSB2
.. Manual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL TEXT 3.6.4.2 12 04/19/2017
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (SCIVS)
LDCN 5232 TEXT 3.6.4.3 5 11/16/2016
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS STANDBY GAS TREATMENT (SGT) SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.1 7 03/01/2017
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER (RHRSW) SYSTEM AND THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (UHS)
TEXT 3.7.2 3 11/16/2016
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER (ESW) SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.3 2 11/16/2016
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS) SYSTEM
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Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM FLOOR COOLING SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.5 2 11/16/2016
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN CONDENSER OFFGAS TEXT 3.7.6 4 11/16/2016
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.7 2 11/16/2016
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.7.8 1 11/16/2016
Title:
MAINE TURBINE PRESSURE REGULATION SYSTEM TEXT 3.8.1 10 11/16/2016
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES - OPERATING TEXT 3.8.2 0 11/18/2002
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES - SHUTDOWN Page .§_ of 8 Report Date: 04/19/17
SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSB2
-,lanual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL TEXT 3.8.3 5 11/16/2016
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DIESEL FUEL OIL LUBE OIL AND STARTING AIR TEXT 3.8.4 4 11/16/2016
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DC SOURCES - OPERATING TEXT 3.8.5 1 12/14/2006
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DC SOURCES - SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.8.6 2 11/16/2016
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BATTERY CELL PARAMETERS TEXT 3.8.7 6 03/01/2017
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - OPERATING EXT 3.8.8 1 11/16/2016
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.9.1 1 11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS REFUELING EQUIPMENT INTERLOCKS TEXT 3.9.2 2 11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS REFUEL POSITION ONE-ROD-OUT INTERLOCK TEXT 3.9.3 1 11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD POSITION TEXT 3.9.4 0 11/18/2002
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION TEXT 3.9.5 1 11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY - REFUELING TEXT 3.9.6 2 11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER LEVEL Page ']_ of 8 Report Date: 04/19/17
SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSB2
..*.~~anual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL TEXT 3.9.7 1 11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) - HIGH WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.9.8 1 11/16/2016
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) - LOW WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.10.1 1 01/23/2008
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING OPERATION TEXT 3.10.2 1 11/16/2016
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS REACTOR MODE SWITCH INTERLOCK TESTING TEXT 3.10.3 1 11/16/2016
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - HOT SHUTDOWN
- .\EXT 3 . 10 . 4 1 11/16/2016
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - COLD SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.10.5 1 11/16/2016
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD DRIVE (CRD) REMOVAL - REFUELING TEXT 3.10.6 1 11/16/2016
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS MULTIPLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - REFUELING TEXT 3.10.7 1 03/24/2005
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD TESTING - OPERATING TEXT 3.10.8 3 11/16/2016
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) TEST - REFUELING Page .§. of 8 Report Date: 04/19/17
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)
Section Title Revision TOC Table of Contents ................................................................................................ 23 B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) 82.1.1 Reactor Core SLs ................................................................................................. 5 82.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL ....................................................... 1 B 3.0 LCO AND SR APPLICABILITY BASES ............................................................... 3 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 83.1.1 Shutdown Margin (SOM) ...................................................................................... 2 83.1.2 Reactivity Anomalies ............................................................................................ 1 83.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY .................................................................................. 3 83.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times .................................................................................... 5 B3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators ........................................................................ 2 83.1.6 Rod Pattern Control. ............................................................................................. 4 B3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System .................................................................. 3 83.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves ..................................... 4 B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS B3.2.1 Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR) ................................... 5 B3.2.2 Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) ................................................................ 4 83.2.3 Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR) .................................................................. 3 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 83.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation .............................................. 6 B3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation .................................................... 3 B3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation ....................................................................... 4 83.3.2.2 Feedwater - Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation ..................... 3 83.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation ................................................. 9 83.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System ................................................................................... 2 B3.3.4.1 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation ................... 2 83.3.4.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation ............................................................. 1 83.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation ................................. 6 83.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation ........................ 1 83.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation ................................................... 8 B3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation ............................................... 5 B3.3.7.1 Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (CREOAS) _
System Instrumentation .......................................................*................................. 3 B3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation .................................................................. 4 B3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring .............................. 1 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B LOES-1 Revision 129
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)
Section Title Revision B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 83.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating ............................................................................. 5 83.4.2 Jet Pumps ......................................................................................................... 4 83.4.3 Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs) ................................................................................ 4 83.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKAGE ................................................................................ 1 83.4.5 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage ...................................................... 4 83.4.6 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation ............................................................. 5 83.4.7 RCS Specific Activity ............................................................................................ 3 83.4.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown ....................................................................................... 3 83.4.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown ..................................................................................... 2 83.4.10 RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits ...................................................... 5 83.4.11 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure ........................................................................... 1 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 83.5.1 ECCS - Operating ................................................................................................ 5 83.5.2 ECCS - Shutdown ............................................................................................... 3 83.5.3 RCIC System ................................................. :...................................................... 3 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 83.6.1.1 Primary Containment. ........................................................................................... 6 83.6.1.2 Primary Containment Air Lock .............................................................................. 2 83.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) ................................................... 16 83.6.1.4 Containment Pressure ................................................................ ******~** .................. 2 83.6.1.5 Drywell Air Temperature ....................................................................................... 2 83.6.1.6 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers ........................................... 1 83.6.2.1 Suppression Pool Average Temperature ............................................................. 3 83.6.2.2 Suppression Pool Water Level ............................................................................. 1 83.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling .................................. 2 83.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray ..................................... 1 83.6.3.1 Not Used ......................................................................................................... 2 83.6.3.2 Drywell Air Flow System ................. .-..................................................................... 2 83.6.3.3 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration ....................................................... 2 83.6.4.1 Secondary Containment. ..................................................................................... 14 83.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) .............................................. 12 83.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System..................................................................5 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B LOES-2 Revision 129
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)
Section Title Revision B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 83.7.1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System and the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) ........................................................................ 7 83.7.2 Emergency Service Water (ESW) System ........................................................... 3 83.7.3 Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (CREOAS) System ............................................................................................... 2 83.7.4 Control Room Floor Cooling System .................................................................... 1 83.7.5 Main Condenser Offgas ....................................................................................... 2 83.7.6 Main Turbine Bypass System ............................................................................... 4 83.7.7 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level .................................................................. 2 83.7.8 Main Turbine Pressure Regulation System .......................................................... 1 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM 83.8.1 AC Sources - Operating ..................................................................................... 10 83.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown ....................................................................................... 0 83.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air ............................................................ 5 83.8.4 DC Sources - Operating ...................................................................................... 4 83.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown ...................................................................................... 1 83.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters ....................................................................................... 2 83.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating ......................................................................... 6 83.8.8 Distribution Systems - Shutdown ......................................................................... 1 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 83.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks ............................................................................ 1 83.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock ................................................................ 1 83.9.3 Control Rod Position ............................................................................................ 1 83.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication ............................................................................ 0 83.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling .............................................................. 1 83.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level. ...................................................... 2 83.9.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - High Water Level. ............................................ 1 83.9.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Low Water Level. ............................................. 1 B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS 83.10.1 lnservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation ............................. .- ................. 1 83.10.2 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing ................................................................ 1 83.10.3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Hot Shutdown .................................................. 1 83.10.4 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Cold Shutdown ................................................ 1 83.10.5 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD) Removal - Refueling ........................................ 1 83.10.6 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal - Refueling ....................................................... 1 83.10.7 Control Rod Testing - Operating .................. ,....................................................... 1 83.10.8 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SOM) Test - Refueling ..................... *............................. 3 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I 8 LOES-3 Revision 129
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)
BASES BACKGROUND The function of the PC IVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, including secondary containment bypass valves that are not PCIVs is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) to within limits. Primary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a DBA.
The OPERABILITY requirements for PCIVs help ensure that an adequate primary containment boundary is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the environment. Therefore, the OPERABILITY requirements provide assurance that primary containment function assumed in the safety analyses will be maintained. For PCIVs, the primary containment isolation function is that the valve must be able to close (automatically or manually) and/or remain closed, and maintain leakage within that assumed in the OBA LOCA Dose Analysis. These isolation devices are either passive or active (automatic). Manual valves, de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), blind flanges, and closed systems are considered passive devices. The OPERABILITY requirements for closed systems are discussed in Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Bases 3.6.4. Check valves, or other automatic valves designed to close without operator action following an accident, are considered active devices. Two barriers in series are provided for each penetration so that no single credible failure or malfunction of an active component can result in a loss of isolation or leakage that exceeds limits assumed in the safety analyses. One of these barriers may be a closed system.
For each division of H202 Analyzers, the lines, up to and including the first normally closed valves within the H20 2 (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-15 Revision 4
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES BACKGROUND Analyzer panels, are extensions of primary containment (continued) (i.e., closed system), and are required to be leak rate tested in accordance with the Leakage Rate Test Program. The H20 2 Analyzer closed system boundary is identified in the Leakage Rate Test Program. The closed system boundary consists of those components, piping, tubing, fittings, and valves, which meet the guidance of Reference 6. The closed system provides a secondary barrier in the event of a single failure of the PCIVs, as described below. The closed system boundary between PASS and the H20 2 Analyzer system ends at the process sampling solenoid operated isolation valves between the systems (SV-22361, SV-22365, SV-22366, SV-22368, and SV-22369). These solenoid operated isolation valves do not fully meet the guidance of Reference 6 for closed system boundary valves in that they are not powered from a Class 1E power source. However, based upon a risk determination, operating these valves as closed system boundary valves is not risk significant. These valves also form the end of the Seismic Category I boundary between the systems. These process sampling solenoid operated isolation valves are normally closed and are required to be leak rate tested in accordance with the Leakage Rate Test Program as part of the closed system for the H20 2 Analyzer system. These valves are "closed system boundary valves" and may be opened under administrative control, as delineated in Technical Requirements Manual (TRM)
Bases 3.6.4. Opening of these valves to permit testing of PASS in Modes 1, 2, and 3 is permitted in accordance with TRO 3.6.4.
Each H202 Analyzer Sampling line penetrating primary containment has two PC IVs, located just outside primary containment. While two PCIVs are provided on each line, a single active failure of a relay in the control circuitry for these valves could result in both valves failing to close or failing to remain closed. Furthermore, a single failure (a hot short in the common raceway to all the valves) could simultaneously affect all of the PC IVs within a H20 2 Analyzer division. Therefore, the containment isolation barriers for these penetrations consist of two PCIVs and a closed system. For situations where one or both PCIVs are inoperable, the ACTIONS to be taken are similar to the ACTIONS for a single PCIV backed by a closed system.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-15a Revision O
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES BACKGROUND The drywell vent and purge lines are 24 inches in diameter; the (continued) suppression chamber vent and purge lines are 18 inches in diameter. The containment purge valves are normally maintained closed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure the primary containment boundary is maintained. The outboard isolation valves have 2 inch bypass lines around them for use during normal reactor operation.
The RHR Shutdown Cooling return line containment penetrations
{X-13A(B)}are provided with a normally closed gate valve
{HV-251F015A(B)} and a normally open globe valve
{HV-251 F017A(B)} outside containment and a testable check valve {HV-251 F050A(B)} with a normally closed parallel air operated globe valve {HV-251F122A(B)} inside containment.*
The gate valve is manually opened and automatically isolates upon a containment isolation signal from the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System or RPV low level 3 when the RHR System is operated in the Shutdown Cooling Mode only. The LPCI subsystem is an operational mode of the RHR System and uses the same injection lines to the RPV as the Shutdown Cooling Mode.
The design of these containment penetrations is unique in that some valves are containment isolation valves while others perform the function of pressure isolation valves. In order to meet the 10 CFR 50 Appendix J leakage testing requirements, the HV-251 F015A(B) and the closed system outside containment are the only barriers tested in accordance with the Leakage Rate Test Program. Since these containment penetrations {X-13A and X-13B} include a containment isolation valve outside containment that is tested in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix J requirements and a closed system outside containment that meets the requirements of USNRC Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 (September 1975), paragraph 11.3.e, the containment isolation provisions for these penetrations provide an acceptable alternative to the explicit requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 55.
Containment penetrations X-13A(B) are also high/low pressure system interfaces. In order to meet the requirements to have two (2) isolation valves between the high pressure and low pressure systems, the HV-251F050A(B), HV-251F122A(B), 251130, and HV-251F015A(B) valves are used to meet this requirement and are tested in accordance with the pressure test program.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-15b Revision 3
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES APPLICABLE The PCIVs LCO was deriv-ed from the assumptions related to SAFETY ANALYSES minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory, and establishing the primary containment boundary during major accidents. As part of the primary containment boundary, PCIV OPERABILITY supports leak tightness of primary containment.
Therefore, the safety analysis of any event requiring isolation of primary containment is applicable to this LCO.
The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material within primary containment are a LOCA and a main steam line break (MSLB). In the analysis for each of these accidents, it is assumed that PCIVs are either closed or close within the required isolation times following event initiation. This ensures that potential paths to the environment through PCIVs (including primary containment purge valves) and secondary containment bypass valves that are not PCIVs are minimized. The closure time of the main steam isolation valves (MS IVs) for a MSLB outside primary containment is a significant variable from a radiological standpoint. The MSIVs are required to close within 3 to 5 seconds since the 5 second closure time is assumed in the analysis. The safety analyses assume that the purge valves were closed at event initiation. Likewise, it is assumed that the primary containment is isolated such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled.
The OBA analysis assumes that within the required isolation time leakage is terminated, except.for the maximum allowable leakage rate, La.
The single failure criterion required to be imposed in the conduct of unit safety analyses was considered in the original design of the primary containment purge valves. Two valves in series on each purge line provide assurance that both the supply and exhaust lines could be isolated even if a single failure occurred.
The primary containment purge valves may be unable to close in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, each of the purge valves is required to remain closed during MODES 1, 2, and 3 except as permitted under Note 2 of SR 3.6.1.3.1. In this case, the single failure criterion remains applicable to the primary containment purge valve (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-16 Revision 3
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES APPLICABLE due to failure in the control circuit associated with each valve.
SAFETY ANALYSIS The primary containment purge valve design precludes a single (continued) failure from compromising the primary containment boundary as long as the system is operated in accordance with this LCO.
Both H2 02 Analyzer PC IVs may not be able to close given a single failure in the control circuitry of the valves. The single failure is caused by a "hot short" in the cables/raceway to the PCIVs that causes both PCIVs for a given penetration to remain open or to open when required to be closed. This failure is required to be considered in accordance with IEEE-279 as discussed in FSAR Section 7 .3.2a. However, the single failure criterion for containment isolation of the H2 0 2 Analyzer penetrations is satisfied by virtue of the combination of the associated PCIVs and the closed system formed by the H2 0 2 Analyzer piping system as discussed in the BACKGROUND section above.
The closed system boundary between PASS and the H20 2 Analyzer system ends at the process sampling solenoid operated isolation valves between the systems (SV:-22361, SV-22365, SV-22366, SV-22368, and SV-22369). The closed system is not fully qualified to the guidance of Reference 6 in that the closed system boundary valves between the H202 system and PASS are not powered from a Class 1E power source. However, based upon a risk determination, the use of these valves is considered to have no risk significance. This exemption to the requirement of Reference 6 for the closed system boundary is documented in License Amendment No. 170.
PC IVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRG Policy Statement. (Ref. 2)
LCO PCIVs form a part of the primary containment boundary, or in the case of SCBL valves limit leakage from the primary containment.
The PCIV safety function is related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establishing the primary containment boundary during a OBA.
The power operated, automatic isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits and actuate on an (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-17 Revision 3
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES LCO automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO are (continued) listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-1 and Table B 3.6.1.3-2.
The normally closed PCIVs, including secondary containment bypass valves listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-2 that are not PCIVs are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic valves are in their closed position, blind flanges are in place, and closed systems are intact. These passive isolation valves and devices are those listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-1.
Leak rate testing of the secondary containment bypass valves listed in Table 3.6.1.3-2 is permitted in Modes 1, 2 & 3 as described in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
Purge valves with resilient seals, secondary containment bypass valves, including secondary containment bypass valves listed in Table B 3.6.1.3-2 that are not PCIVs, MSIVs, and hydrostatically tested valves must meet additional leakage rate requirements.
Other PCIV leakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," as Type B or C testing.
This LCO provides assurance that the PCIVs will perform their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establish the primary containment boundary during accidents.
- APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, most PCIVs are not required to be (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-17a Revision 1
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES APPLICABILITY OPERABLE and the primary containment purge valves are not (continued) required to be closed in MODES 4 and 5. Certain valves, however, are required to be OPERABLE to prevent inadvertent reactor vessel draindown. These valves are those whose associated instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation."
(This does not include the valves that isolate the associated instrumentation.)
ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the controls of the valve, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for primary containment isolation is indicated.
A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for the purpose of this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable PCIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable PCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.
The ACTIONS are modified by Notes 3 and 4. Note 3 ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable PCIV (e.g., an Emergency Core Cooling System subsystem is inoperable due to a failed open test return valve). Note 4 ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken when the primary containment leakage limits are exceeded. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, these actions are not required even when the associated LCO is not met. Therefore, Notes 3 and 4 are added to require the proper actions be taken.
A.1 and A.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable except for purge valve leakage not within limit, (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-18. Revision 1
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) the affected penetration flow paths must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check valve with flow through the valve secured.
For a penetration isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1 , the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available valve to the primary containment. The Required Action must be completed within the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for main steam lines). The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. For main steam lines, an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is allowed. The Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for the main steam lines allows a period of time to restore the MSIVs to OPERABLE status given the fact that MSIV closure will result in isolation of the main steam line(s) and a potential for plant shutdown.
For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, and no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those devices outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment" is appropriate because the devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the devices inside primary containment, the time period specified "prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4, if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the devices and other administrative controls ensuring that device misalignment is an unlikely possibility.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-19 Revision 1
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) .
Condition A is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two PCIVs except for the H20 2 Analyzer penetrations. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions. For the Hz02 Analyzer penetrations, Condition D provides the appropriate Required Actions.
Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas, and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.
With one or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs inoperable except for purge valve leakage not within limit, either the inoperable PCIVs must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is consistent with the ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1.
Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PCIVs except for the H20 2 Analyzer penetrations. For penetration flow paths with one PCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions. For the H20 2 Analyzer penetrations, Condition D provides the appropriate Required Actions.
C.1 and C.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable, the inoperable valve must be restored to (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-20 Revision 2
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)
OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action C.1 must be completed within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time. The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. The closed system must meet the requirements of Reference 6. For conditions where the PCIV and the closed system are inoperable, the Required Actions of TRO 3.6.4, Condition B apply. For the Excess Flow Check Valves (EFCV), the Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is reasonable considering the instrument and the small pipe diameter of penetration (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the small pipe diameter of the affected penetrations. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.
Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one PCIV. For penetration flow paths with two PC IVs and the H202 Analyzer penetration, Conditions A, B, and D provide the appropriate Required Actions.
Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use ofadministrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-21 Revision 3 L
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.
D.1 and D.2 With one or more H2 0 2 Analyzer penetrations with one or both PCIVs inoperable, the inoperable valve(s) must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action D.1 must be completed within the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time. The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering the unique design of the Hz02 Analyzer penetrations. The containment isolation barriers for these penetrations consist of two PCIVs and a closed system. In
. addition, the Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action D.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.
When an Hz02 Analyzer penetration PCIV is to be closed and deactivated in accordance with Condition D, this must be accomplished by pulling the fuse for the power supply, and either determinating the power cables at the solenoid valve, or jumpering of the power side of the solenoid to ground.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-21a Revision 0
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS D.1 and D.2 (continued)
The OPERABILITY requirements for the closed system are discussed in Technical Requirements Manual (TRM)
Bases 3.6.4. In the event that either one or both of the PC IVs and the closed system are inoperable, the Required Actions of TRO 3.6.4, Condition B apply.
Condition D is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to the H2 0 2 Analyzer penetrations.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-21 b Revision 0
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS (continued)
With the secondary containment bypass leakage rate not within limit, the assumptions of the safety analysis may not be met.
Therefore, the leakage must be restored to within limit within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Restoration can be accomplished by isolating the penetration that caused the limit to be exceeded by use of one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. When a penetration is isolated, the leakage rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If two isolation devices are used to isolate the penetration, the leakage rate is assumed to be the lesser actual pathway leakage of the two devices. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to restore the leakage by isolating the penetration and the relative importance of secondary containment bypass leakage to the overall ,containment function.
E1 In the event one or more containment purge valves are not within the purge valve leakage limits, purge valve leakage must be restored to within limits. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable, considering that one containment purge valve remains closed, except as controlled by SR 3.6.1.3.1 so that a gross breach of containment does not exist.
G.1 and G.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-22 Revision 2
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS H.1 and H.2 (continued)
If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, action must be immediately initiated to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel
. draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release.
Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended or valve(s) are restored to OPERABLE status. If suspending an OPDRV would result in closing the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation valves, an alternative Required Action is provided to immediately initiate action to restore the valve(s) to OPERABLE status. This allows RHR to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valve.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.1.3.1 This SR ensures that the primary containment purge valves are closed as required or, if open, open for an allowable reason. If a purge valve is open in violation of this SR, the valve is considered inoperable. If the inoperable valve is not otherwise known to have excessive leakage when closed, it is not considered to have leakage outside of limits. The SR is also modified by Note 1, stating that primary containment purge valves are only required to be closed in MODES 1, 2, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, the purge valves may not be capable of closing before the pressure pulse affects systems downstream of the purge valves, or the release of radioactive material will exceed limits prior to the purge valves closing. At other times when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during handling of irradiated fuel), pressurization concerns are not present and the purge valves are allowed to be open. The SR is modified by Note 2 stating that the SR is not required to be met when the purge valves are open for the stated reasons. The Note states that these valves may be opened for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open. The vent and purge valves are capable of closing in the environment following (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-23 Revision 2
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.1 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS a LOCA. Therefore, these valves are allowed to be open for limited periods of time. The Su1veillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.6.1.3.2 This SR verifies that each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits.
This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation.
Rather, it involves verification that those PCIVs outside primary containment, and capable of being mispositioned, are in the correct position. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these PCIVs, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open.
This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, since these were verified to be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing.
SR 3.6.1.3.3 This SR verifies that each primary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is located inside (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-24 Revision 2
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.3 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS primary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the primary containment boundary is within design limits. For PCIVs inside primary containment, the Frequency defined as "prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days" is appropriate since these PCIVs are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, since these were verified to be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing. Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note
. allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable since the primary containment is inerted and access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these PCIVs, once they have been verified to be in their proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that PCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not
. required to meet the SR during the time that the PCIVs are open.
SR 3.6.1.3.4 The traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. Surveillance of explosive charge continuity provides assurance that TIP valves will actuate when required. Other administrative controls, such as those that limit the shelf life of the explosive charges, must be followed. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.6.1.3.5 Verifying the isolation time of each power operated and each automatic PCIV is within limits is required to demonstrate (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-25 Revision 2
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.5 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS OPERABILITY. MSIVs may be excluded from this SR since MSIV full closure isolation time is demonstrated by SR 3.6.1.3.7.
The isolation time test ensures that the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the Final Safety Analyses Report. The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the requirements of the lnservice Testing Program.
SR 3.6.1.3.6 For primary containment purge valves with resilient seals, the Appendix J Leakage Rate Test Interval is sufficient. The acceptance criteria for these valves is defined in the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, 5.5.12.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Progra~.
The SR is modified by a Note stating that the primary containment purge valves are only required to meet leakage rate testing requirements in MODES 1, 2, and 3. If a LOCA inside primary containment occurs in these MODES, purge valve leakage must be minimized to ensure offsite radiological release is within limits. At other times when the purge valves are required to be capable of closing (e.g., during handling of .
irradiated fuel), pressurization concerns are not present and the purge valves are not required to meet any specific leakage criteria.
SR 3.6.1.3. 7 Verifying that the isolation time of each MSIV is within the specified limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures that the MSIV will isolate in a time period that does not exceed the times assumed in the OBA analyses. This ensures that the calculated radiological consequences of these events remain within regulatory limits.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-26 Revision 4
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.7 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the requirements of the lnservice Testing Program.
SR 3.6.1.3.8 Automatic PCIVs close on a primary containment isolation signal to prevent leakage of radioactive material from primary containment following a OBA. This SR ensures that each automatic PCIV will actuate to its isolation position on a primary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.1.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function.
The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.
SR 3.6.1.3.9 This SR requires a demonstration that a representative sample of reactor instrumentation line excess flow check valves (EFCV) are OPERABLE by verifying that the valve actuates to check flow on a simulated instrument line break. As defined in FSAR Section 6.2.4.3.5 (Reference 4), the conditions under which an EFCV will isolate, simulated instrument line breaks are at flow rates, which develop a differential pressure of between 3 psid and 10 psid. This SR provides assurance that the instrumentation line EFCVs will perform its design function to check flow. No specific valve leakage limits are specified because no specific leakage limits are defined in the FSAR. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The representative sample consists of an approximate equal number of EFCVs such that each EFCV is tested at least once every 10 years (nominal). The nominal 10 year interval is based on other performance-based testing programs, such as lnservice Testing (snubbers) and Option B to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. In addition, the EFCVs in the sample are representative of the various plant configurations, models, sizes and operating environments. This ensures that any potential common problem with a specific type or application of EFCV is (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-27 Revision 4
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.9 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS detected at the earliest possible time. EFCV failures will be evaluated to determine if additional testing in that test interval is warranted to ensure overall reliability and that failures to isolate are very infrequent.
Therefore, testing of a representative sample was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint (Reference 7).
SR 3.6.1.3.10 The TIP shear isolation valves are actuated by explosive charges. An in place functional test is not possible with this design. The explosive squib is removed and tested to provide assurance that the valves will actuate when required. The replacement charge for the explosive squib shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch that has been certified by having one of the batch successfully fired. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. I SR 3.6.1.3.11 This SR ensures that the leakage rate of secondary containment bypass leakage paths is less than the specified leakage rate. This provides assurance that the assumptions in the radiological evaluations of Reference 4 are met. The secondary containment leakage pathways and Frequency are defined by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This SR simply imposes additional acceptance criteria. A note is added to this SR, which states that these valves are only required to meet this leakage limit in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In the other MODES, the Reactor Coolant System is not pressurized and specific primary containment leakage limits are not required.
SR 3.6.1.3.12 The analyses in References 1 and 4 are based on the specified leakage rate. Leakage through each MSIV must be :::;; 100 scfh for anyone MSIV and:::;; 300 scfh for total leakage through the MS IVs combined with the Main Steam Line Drain Isolation Valve, HPCI Steam Supply Isolation Valve and the RCIC Steam Supply Isolation Valve. The MSIVs can be tested at either~ Pt (24.3 psig) or Pa (48.6 psig). Main Steam Line Drain Isolation, HPCI and RCIC Steam Supply Line Isolation Valves, are tested at Pa (48.6 psig). A note is added to this SR, which states that these valves are onlyrequired to meet this leakage limit in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In the other (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-28 Revision 8
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.12 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS conditions, the Reactor Coolant System is not pressurized and specific primary containment leakage limits are not required. The Frequency is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
SR 3.6.1.3.13 Surveillance of hydrostatically tested lines provides assurance that the calculation assumptions of Reference 2 are met. The acceptance criteria for the combined leakage of all hydrostatically tested lines is 3.3 gpm when tested at 1.1 Pa, (53.46 psig). The combined leakage rates must be demonstrated in accordance with the leakage rate test Frequency required by the Primary Containment Leakage Testing Program.
As noted in Table B 3.6.1.3-1, PCIVs associated with this SR are not Type C tested. Containment bypass leakage is prevented since the line terminates below the minimum water level in the suppression chamber. These valves are tested in accordance with the IST Program. Therefore, these valves leakage is not included as containment leakage.
This SR has been modified by a Note that states that these valves are only required to meet the combined leakage rate in MODES 1, 2, and 3, since this is when the Reactor Coolant System is pressurized and primary containment is required. In some instances, the valves are required to be capable of automatically closing during MODES other than MODES 1, 2, and 3. However, specific leakage limits are not applicable in these other MODES or conditions.
REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter 15.
- 2. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).
- 3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.
- 4. FSAR, Section 6.2.
- 5. NED0-30851-P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System," March 1988.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-29 Revision 5
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES REFERENCES 6. Standard Review Plan 6.2.4, Rev. 1, September 1975.
(continued)
- 7. NED0-32977-A, "Excess Flow Check Valve Testing Relaxation," June 2000.
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-29a Revision 0
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 1 of 10)
- isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.
Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds)}
Containment 2-57-199 (d) ILRT Manual NIA Atmospheric 2-57-200 (d) ILRT Manual NIA Control HV-25703 Containment Purqe Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)
HV-25704 Containment Purae Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)
HV-25705 Containment Purqe Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)
HV-25711 Containment Purqe Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)
HV-25713 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)
HV-25714 Containment Purqe Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)
HV-25721 Containment Purqe Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)
HV-25722 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)
HV-25723 Containment Purqe Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)
HV-25724 Containment Purqe Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)
HV-25725 Containment Purge Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e (15)
HV-25766 (a) Suooression Pool Cleanup Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (35)
HV-25768 (a) Suooression Pool Cleanup Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (30)
HV-257113 (d) Hardened Containment Vent Power Operated NIA (Air)
HV-257114 (d) Hardened Containment Vent Power Operated NIA (Air)
SV-257100-A Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.f Svst SV-257100 B Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.f Svst SV-257101 A Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.f
' Svst SV-257101 B Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.f Svst SV-257102 A Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.f Svst SV-257102 B Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.f Svst SV-257103 A Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.f
- Syst SV-257103 B Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.f Syst SV-257104 Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.f Svst SV-257105 Containment Radiation Detecti6n Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.f Svst SV-2?7106 Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.f Svst SV-257107 Containment Radiation Detection Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.f Svst SV-25734 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-25734 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-25736 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-25736 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-25737 Nitroqen Makeup Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-30 Revision 3
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Paqe 2 of 1O)
Isolation Signal LCO Plant System Valve Number 3.3.6.1 Function No.
Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))
Containment SV-25738 Nitrogen Makeup Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e Atmospheric SV-25740 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Control SV-25740 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (continued) SV-25742 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-25742 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-25750 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-25750 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-25752 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-25752 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-25767 Nitrogen Makeup Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e SV-25774 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-25774 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-25776 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-25776 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-25780 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-25780 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-25782 A (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-25782 B (e) Containment Atmosphere Sample Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-25789 Nitrogen Makeup Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d, 2.e Containment 2-26-072 (d) Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check NIA Instrument Gas 2-26-074 (d) Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check NIA 2-26-152 (d) Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check NIA 2-26-154 (d) Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check NIA 2-26-164 (d) Containment Instrument Gas Manual Check NIA HV-22603 Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (20)
SV-22605 Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d SV-22651 Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d SV-22654A Containment Instrument Gas Power Operated NIA SV-22654 B Containment Instrument Gas Power Operated NIA SV-22661 Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d SV-22671 Containment Instrument Gas Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d Core Spray HV-252F001 A (b)(c) CS Suction Power Operated NIA HV-252F001 B (b)(c) CS Suction Power Operated NIA HV-252F005 A CS Injection Power Operated NIA HV-252F005 B CS Injection Power Operated NIA Air Operated HV-252F006 A CS Injection NIA Check Valve Air Operated HV-252F006 B CS Injection NIA Check Valve HV-252F015 A (b)(c) CS Test Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (80)
HV-252F015 B (b)(c) CS Test Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (80)
HV-252F031 A (b)(c) CS Minimum Recirculation Flow Power Operated NIA HV-252F031 B (b)(c) CS Minimum Recirculation Flow Power Operated NIA SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-31 Revision 3
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve
<Pace 3 of 1Ol Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.
Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))
Core Spray HV-252F037 A CS Injection Power Operated NIA (continued) <Air)
HV-252F037 B CS Injection Power Operated NIA CAir)
XV-252F018 A Core Spray Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-252F018 B Core Spray Excess Flow NIA Check Valve Demin Water 2-41-017 (d) Demineralized Water Manual NIA 2-41-018 (d) Demineralized Water Manual NIA HPCI 2-55-038 (d) HPCI lniection Manual NIA 255F046 (b) (cl (d) HPCI Minimum Recirculation Flow Manual Check NIA 255F049 (a) (d) HPCI Manual Check NIA HV-255F002 HPCI Steam Supply Automatic Valve 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.e, 3.f, 3.a, 150)
HV-255F003 HPCI Steam Supply Automatic Valve 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.e, 3.f, 3.a, 150)
HV-255F006 HPCI lniection Power Ooerated NIA HV-255F012 (b) (c) HPCI Minimum Recirculation Flow Power Ooerated NIA HV-255F042 (b) (c) HPCI Suction Automatic Valve 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.e, 3.f, 3.a, 1115)
HV-255F066 (a) HPCI Turbine Exhaust Power Ooerated NIA HV-255F075 HPCI Vacuum Breaker Automatic Valve 3.b, 3.d, (15)
HV-255F079 HPCI Vacuum Breaker Automatic Valve 3.b, 3.d, (15)
HV-255F100 HPCI Steam Supply Automatic Valve 3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.e, 3.f, 3.Q, (6)
XV-255F024 A HPCI Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-255F024 B HPCI Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-255F024 C HPCI Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-255F024 D HPCI Excess Flow NIA Check Valve Liquid Radwaste HV-26108A1 Liquid Radwaste Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)
Collection HV-26108A2 Liauid Radwaste Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)
HV-26116A1 Liauid Radwaste Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)
HV-26116A2 Liauid Radwaste Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15)
Nuclear Boiler 241F010 A (d) Feedwater Manual Check NIA 241F010 B (d) Feedwater Manual Check NIA 241 F039 A Cdl Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check NIA 241 F039 B (d) Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check NIA 241818 A (d) Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check NIA 241818 B (d) Feedwater Isolation Valve Manual Check NIA SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-32 Revision 2
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Paae 4 of 1O)
Isolation Signal LCO
~.3.6.1 Function No.
Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds))
Nuclear Boiler HV-241F016 MSL Drain Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (continued) (10)
HV-241F019 MSL Drain Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (15)
HV-241F022 A MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)
HV-241 F022 B MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)
HV-241 F022 C MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)
HV-241 F022 D MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)
HV-241F028 A MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)
HV-241F028 B MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)
HV-241F028 C
- MSIV Automatic.Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)
HV-241 F028 D MSIV Automatic Valve 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e (5)
HV-241F032A Feedwater Isolation Valve Power Operated NIA Check Valves HV-241F032 B Feedwater Isolation Valve Power Operated NIA Check Valves XV-241F009 Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-241 F070 A Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-241 F070 B Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-241 F070 C Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-241F070 D Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-241F071 A Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-241F071 B Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-241F071 C Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-241F071 D Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-241 F072 A Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-241F072 B Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-241 F072 C Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-241 F072 D Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-241F073 A Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow NIA Check Valve SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-33 Revision 2
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Paae 5 of 10)
Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No.
Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds Nuclear Boiler XV-241F073 B Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow NIA (continued) Check Valve XV-241F073 C Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-241F073 D Nuclear Boiler EFCV Excess Flow NIA Check Valve Nuclear Boiler XV-24201 Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Vessel Check Valve Instrumentation XV-24202 Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F041 Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F043 A Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F043 B Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F045 A Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F045 B Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F047 A Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F047B Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F051 A Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F051 B Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F051 C Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F051 D Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F053 A Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F053 B Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F053 C Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F053 D Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F055 Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F057 Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F059 A Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-242F059 B Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-34 Revision 1
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PaQe 6 of 10) Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No. Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds)} Nuclear Boiler XV-242F059 C Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Vessel Check Valve Instrumentation XV-242F059 D Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow N/A (continued) Check Valve XV-242F059 E Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-242F059 F Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-242F059 G Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-242F059 H Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-242F059 L Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow N/A
.Check Valve XV-242F059 M Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-242F059 N Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-242F059 P Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-242F059 R Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-242F059 S Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow N/A Check Valve-XV-242F059 T Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-242F059 U Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-242F061 Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instrument Excess Flow NIA Check Valve RB Chilled Water HV-28781 A1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (40)
System HV-28781 A2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (40) HV-28781 B1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (40) HV-28781 B2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (40) HV-28782 A1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (12) HV-28782A2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (12) HV-28782 B1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (12) HV-28782 B2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (12) HV-28791 A1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15) HV-28791 A2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15) HV-28791 B1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15) HV-28791 B2 RB Chilled Water , Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (15) HV-28792A1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (8) HV-28792A2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (8) HV-28792 B1 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (8) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-35 Revision 3
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Paqe 7 of 10) Isolation Signal LCO Plant System 3.3.6.1 Function No. Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds)) RB Chilled Water HV-28792 B2 RB Chilled Water Automatic Valve 2.b, 2.d (8) System (continued) RBCCW HV-21313 RBCCW Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (30) HV-21314 RBCCW Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (30) HV-21345 RBCCW Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (30) HV-21346 RBCCW Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (30) RCIC 2-49-020 (d) RCIC Injection Manual NIA 249F021 (b) (c) (d) RCIC Minimum Recirculation Flow Manual Check NIA 249F028 (a) (d) RCIC Vacuum Pump Discharge Manual Check NIA 249F040 (al (d) RCIC Turbine Exhaust Manual Check NIA FV-249F019 (b) (c) RCIC Minimum Recirculation Flow Power Operated NIA HV-249F007 RCIC Steam Supply Automatic Valve 4.a, 4.b, 4.c, 4.e, 4.f, 4.q (20) HV-249F008 RCIC Steam Supply Automatic Valve 4.a, 4.b, 4.c, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g (20) HV-249F013 RCIC lniection Power Operated NIA HV-249F031 (b) (c) RCIC Suction Power Operated NIA HV-249F059 (a) RCIC Turbine Exhaust Power Operated NIA HV-249F060 (a) RCIC Vacuum Pump Discharge Power Operated NIA HV-249F062 RCIC Vacuum Breaker Automatic Valve 4.b, 4.d (10) HV-249F084 RCIC Vacuum Breaker Automatic Valve 4.b, 4.d (10) HV-249F088 RCIC Steam Supply Automatic Valve 4.a, 4.b, 4.c, 4.e, 4.f, 4.Cl (12) XV-249F044 A RCIC Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-249F044 B RCIC Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-249F044 C RCIC Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-249F044 D RCIC Excess Flow N/A Check Valve Reactor 243F013 A (d) Recirculation Pump Seal Water Manual Check NIA Recirculation 243F013 B (d) Recirculation Pump Seal Water Manual Check N/A HV-243F019 Reactor Coolant Sample Automatic Valve 2.b (9) HV-243F020 Reactor Coolant Sample Automatic Valve 2.b (2) XV-243F003 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-243F003 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-243F004 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow NIA Check Valve XV-243F004 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow NIA Check Valve SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-36 Revision 3
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Page 8 of 10) Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No. Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds)) Reactor XV-243F009 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Recirculation Check Valve (continued) XV-243F009 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F009 C Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F009 D Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F010 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F010 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F010 C Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F010 D Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F011 A Reactbr Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F011 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F011 C Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F011 D Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F012 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F012 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F012 C Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F012 D Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F017 A Recirculation Pump Seal Water Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F017 B Recirculation Pump Seal Water Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F040 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F040 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F040 C Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F040 D Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F057 A Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-243F057 B Reactor Recirculation Excess Flow N/A Check Valve Residual Heat HV-251 F004 A (b) (c) RHR - Suppression Pool Suction Power Operated N/A Removal HV-251 F004 B (b) (c) RHR - Suppression Pool Suction Power Operated N/A HV-251 F004 C (b) (c) RHR - Suooression Pool Suction Power Operated N/A SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-37 Revision 2
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Paqe 9 of 10) Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No. Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds)) Residual Heat HV-251 F004 D(b) (c) RHR - Suooression Pool Suction Power Operated N/A Removal HV-251F007 A (b) (c) RHR - Minimum Recirculation Power Operated N/A (continued) HV-251F007 B (b) (c) RHR - Minimum Recirculation Power Operated N/A HV-251F008 RHR - Shutdown Coolinq Suction Automatic Valve 6.a, 6.b, 6.c (52) HV-251F009 RHR - Shutdown Coolinq Suction Automatic Valve 6.a, 6.b, 6.c (52) HV-251F011 A (b) (d) RHR - Suooression Pool Coolinq Manual N/A HV-251F011 B (b) (d) RHR- Suppression Pool Cooling Manual N/A HV-251 F015 A (f) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Power Operated N/A Return/LPCI Injection HV-251 F015 B (f) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Power Operated N/A Return/LPCI Injection HV-251 F016 A (b) RHR - Drvwell Sorav Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (90) HV-251F016 B (b) RHR - Drvwell Spray Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (90) HV-251F022 RHR - Reactor Vessel Head Spray Automatic Valve 2.d, 6.a, 6.b, 6.c (30) HV-251F023 RHR - Reactor Vessel Head Spray Automatic Valve 2.d, 6.a, 6.b, 6.c (20) HV-251 F028 A (b) RHR - Suppression Pool Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (90) Coolinq/Sprav HV-251 F028 B (b) RHR - Suppression Pool Automatic Valve 2.c, 2.d (90) Coolinq/Spray HV-251 F050 A (g) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Air Operated N/A Return/LPCI Injection Check Valve HV-251 F050 B (g) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Air Operated N/A Return/LPCI Injection Check Valve HV-251 F103 A (b) RHR Heat Exchanger Vent Power Operated N/A HV-251F103 B (b) RHR Heat Exchanger Vent Power Operated N/A HV-251 F122 A (g) RHR - Shutdown Cooling Power Operated N/A Return/LPCI Injection (Air) HV-251F122 B (g) RHR- Shutdown Cooling Power Operated N/A Return/LPCI lniection (Air) PSV-25106 A (b) (d) RHR- Relief Valve Discharqe Relief Valve N/A PSV-25106 B (b) (d) RHR- Relief Valve Discharqe Relief Valve NIA PSV-251F126 (d) RHR- Shutdown Cooling Suction Relief Valve N/A XV-25109 A RHR Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-25109 B RHR Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-25109 C RHR Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-25109 D RHR Excess Flow N/A Check Valve RWCU HV-244F001 (a) RWCU Suction Automatic Valve 5.a, 5.b, 5.c, 5.d, 5.f, 5.Q (30) HV-244F004 (a) RWCU Suction Automatic Valve 5.a, 5.b, 5.c, 5.d, 5.e, 5.f, 5.g (30) XV-24411 A RWCU Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-24411 B RWCU Excess Flow N/A Check Valve SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-38 Revision 3
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (Paqe 10of10) Isolation Signal LCO Plant System 3.3.6.1 Function No. Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds)) RWCU XV-24411 C RWCU Excess Flow N/A (continued) Check Valve XV-24411 D RWCU Excess Flow N/A Check Valve XV-244F046 RWCU Excess Flow N/A Check Valve HV-24182A RWCU Return Power Operated N/A HV-24182 B RWCU Return Power Operated N/A SLCS 248F007 (a) (d) SLCS Manual Check N/A HV-248F006 (a) SLCS Power Operated N/A Check Valve TIP System C51-J004 A (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5) Valve) C51-J004 B (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5) Valve} C51-J004 C (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5) Valve) C51-J004 D (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5) Valve) C51-J004 E (Ball TIP Ball Valves Automatic Valve 7.a, 7.b (5) Valve} TIP System C51-J004 A (Shear TIP Shear Valves Squib Valve N/A (continued) Valve) ' C51-J004 B (Shear TIP Shear Valves Squib Valve N/A Valve} C51-J004 C (Shear TIP Shear Valves Squib Valve N/A Valve} C51-J004 D (Shear TIP Shear Valves Squib Valve N/A Valve} C51-J004 E (Shear TIP Shear Valves Squib Valve N/A Valve) (a) Isolation barrier remains filled or a water seal remains in the line post-LOCA, isolation valve is tested with water. Isolation valve leakage is not included in 0.60 La total Type B and C tests. (b) Redundant isolation boundary for this valve is provided by the closed system whose integrity is verified by the Leakage Rate Test Program. This footnote does not apply to valve 255F046 (HPCI) when the associated PCIV, HV255F012 is closed and deactivated. Similarly, this footnote does not apply to valve 249F021 (RCIC) when it's associated PCIV, FV249F019 is closed and deactivated. (c) Containment Isolation Valves are not Type C tested. Containment bypass leakage is prevented since the line terminates below the minimum water level in the Suppression Chamber. Refer to the IST Program. (d) LCO 3.3.3.1, "PAM Instrumentation," Table 3.3.3.1-1, Function 6, (PCIV Position) does not apply since these are relief valves, check valves, manual valves or deactivated and closed. (e) The containment isolation barriers for the penetration associated with this valve consists of two PCIVs and a closed system. The closed system provides a redundant isolation boundary for both PCIVs, and its integrity is required to be verified by the Leakage Rate Test Program. (f) Redundant isolation boundary for this valve is provided by the closed system whose integrity is verified by the Leakage Rate Test Program. (g) These valves are not required to be 10 CFR 50, Appendix J tested since the HV-251 F015A(B) valves and a closed system form the 10 CFR 50, Appendix J boundary. These valves form a high/low pressure interface and are pressure tested in accordance with the pressure test program. SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-39 Revision 7
Rev. 16 PC IVs B 3.6.1.3 Table B 3.6.1.3-2 Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage Isolation Valves (Not PCIVs) (Page 1 of 1) Isolation Signal LCO 3.3.6.1 Function No. Plant System Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve (Maximum Isolation Time (Seconds)) Residual Heat HV-251F040 RHR - RADWASTE LINE IB ISO VLV Automatic Valve 2.a, 2.d (45) Removal HV-251F049 RHR- DISCH TO RADW OB ISO VLV Automatic Valve 2.a, 2.d (20) 2-51-136 RHR - COND TRANSFER OB SCBL Check Valve N/A CHECK VALVE 2-51-137 RHR - COND TRANSFER IB SCBL Check Valve N/A CHECK VALVE SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-39a Revision 1
Rev. 14 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment BASES BACKGROUND The secondary containment structure completely encloses the primary containment structure such that a dual-containment design is utilized to limit the spread of radioactivity to the environment to within limits. The function of the secondary containment is to contain, dilute, and hold up fission products that may leak from primary containment into secondary containment following a Design Basis Accident (OBA). In conjunction with operation of the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and closure of certain valves whose lines penetrate the secondary containment, the secondary containment is designed to reduce the activity level of the fission products prior to release to the environment and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during certain operations that take place inside primary containment, when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE, or that take place outside primary containment (Ref. 1). The secondary containment is a structure that completely encloses the primary containment and reactor coolant pressure boundary components. This structure forms a control volume that serves to hold up and dilute the fission products. It is possible for the pressure in the control volume to rise relative to the environmental pressure (e.g., due to pump and motor heat load additions). The secondary containment boundary consists of the reactor building structure and associated removable walls and panels, hatches, doors, dampers, sealed penetrations and valves. Certain plant piping systems (e.g., Service Water, RHR Service Water, Emergency Service Water,* Feedwater, etc.) penetrate the secondary containment boundary. The intact piping within secondary containment provides a passive barrier which maintains secondary containment requirements. Breaches of these piping systems within secondary containment will be controlled to maintain secondary containment requirements. The secondary containment is divided into Zone I, Zone II and Zone Ill, each of which must be OPERABLE depending on plant status and the alignment of the secondary containment boundary. Specifically, the Unit 1 secondary containment boundary can be modified to exclude Zone II. Similarly, the Unit 2 secondary containment boundary can be modified to exclude Zone I. Secondary containment may consist of only Zone Ill when in MODE 4 or 5 during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during handling of irradiated fuel within the Zone Ill secondary containment boundary. (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-83 Revision 4
Rev. 14 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES BACKGROUND To prevent ground level exfiltration while allowing the secondary containment (continued) to be designed as a conventional structure, the secondary containment requires support systems to maintain the control volume pressure at less than the external pressure. Requirements for the safety related systems are specified separately in LCO 3.6.4.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)," and LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System." When one or more zones are excluded from secondary containment, the specific requirements for support systems will also change (e.g., required secondary containment isolation valves). APPLICABLE There are two principal accidents for which credit is taken for secondary SAFETY containment OPERABILITY. These are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) ANALYSES (Ref. 2) anq a fuel handling accident inside secondary containment (Ref. 3). The secondary containment performs no active function in response to either of these limiting events; however, its leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis and that fission products entrapped within the secondary containment structure will be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment. Secondary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4). LCO An OPERABLE secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in secondary containment, can be diluted and processed prior to release to the environment. For the secondary containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained. The leak tightness of secondary containment must also ensure that the release of radioactive materials to the environment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis. For example, secondary containment bypass leakage must be restricted to the leakage rate required by LCO 3.6.1.3. The secondary containment boundary required to be OPERABLE is dependent on the operating status of both units, as well as the configuration of walls, doors, hatches, SCIVs, and available flow paths to the SGT System. (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-84 Revision 2
Rev. 14 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES (continued) APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. ACTIONS A.1 If secondary containment.is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours. The 4 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal. A temporary (one-time) Completion Time is connected to the Completion Time Requirements above (4 hours) with an "OR" connector. The Temporary Completion Time is 48 hours and applies to the replacement of the Reactor Building Recirculating Fan Damper Motors. The Temporary Completion Time of 48 hours may only be used once, and expires on December 31, 2005. B.1 and B.2 If secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-85 Revision 4
Rev. 14 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1, C.2, and C.3 (continued) Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS, and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause fission product release to the secondary containment. In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier to release of fission products to the environment. CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended if the secondary containment is inoperable. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position. Also, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. Required Action C.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that the secondary containment boundary is sufficiently leak tight to preclude exfiltration under expected wind conditions. Expected wind conditions are defined as sustained wind speeds of less than or equal to 16 mph at the 60m meteorological tower or less than or equal to 11 mph at the 1Om meteorological tower if the 60m tower wind speed is not available. Changes in indicated reactor building differential pressure observed during periods of short-term wind speed gusts above these sustained speeds do not by themselves impact secondary containment integrity. However, if secondary containment integrity is known to be compromised, the LCO must be entered regardless of wind speed. (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-86 Revision 2
Rev. 14 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 (continued) REQUIREMENTS The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the SuNeillance Frequency Control Program. SR 3.6.4.1.2 and SR 3.6.4.1.3 Verifying that secondary containment equipment hatches, removable walls and one access door in each access opening required to be closed are
- closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur.
Verifying that all such openings are closed also provides adequate assurance that eXfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur. In this application, the term "sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. An access opening typically contains one inner and one outer door. Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying one door in each access opening to secondary containment zones is closed. In some cases (e.g., railroad bay), secondary containment access openings are shared such that a secondary containment barrier may have multiple inner or multiple outer doors. The intent is to maintain the secondary containment barrier intact, which is achieved by maintaining the inner or outer portion of the barrier closed at all times. However, brief, inadvertent, simultaneous opening of the inner and outer secondary containment doors for personnel entry and exit is allowed. Intentional or extended opening of both doors simultaneously, even for personnel entry and exit, is not permitted and will result in Secondary Containment being declared INOPERABLE. All secondary containment access doors are normally kept closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit or when maintenance is being performed on an access opening. (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-87 Revision 4
Rev. 14 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.2 and SR 3.6.4.1.3 (continued) REQUIREMENTS When the railroad bay door (No. 101) is closed; all Zone I and Ill hatches, removable walls, dampers, and one door in each access opening connected to the railroad access bay are closed; or, only Zone I removable walls and/or doors are open to the railroad access shaft; or, only Zone Ill hatches and/or dampers are open to the railroad access shaft. When the railroad bay door (No. 101) is open; all Zone I and Ill hatches, removable walls, dampers, and one door in each access opening connected to the railroad access bay are closed. The truck bay hatch is closed and the truck bay door (No. 102) is closed unless Zone II is isolated from Zones I and Ill. The access openings between secondary containment zones which are not provided with t\"lo doors are administratively controlled to maintain secondary containment integrity during exit and entry. This Suiveillance is modified by a Note that allows access openings with a single door (i.e., no airlock) within the secondary containment boundary (i.e., between required secondary containment zones) to be opened for entry and exit. Opening of an access door for entry and exit allows sufficient administrative control by individual personnel making the entries and exits to assure the secondary containment function is not degraded. When one of the zones is not a zone required for secondary containment OPERABILITY, the Note allowance would not apply. The Suiveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-87a Revision 5
Rev. 14 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The SGT System exhausts the secondary containment atmosphere to the environment through appropriate treatment equipment. To ensure that all fission products are treated, SR 3.6.4.1.4 verifies that the SGT System will rapidly establish and maintain a pressure in the secondary containment that is less than the pressure external to the secondary containment boundary. This is confirmed by demonstrating that one SGT subsystem will draw down the secondary containment to ~ 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge in less than or equal to the maximum time allowed. This cannot be accomplished if the secondary containment boundary is not intact. SR 3.6.4.1.5 demonstrates that one SGT subsystem can maintain ~ 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge for at least 1 hour at less than or equal to the maximum flow rate permitted for the secondary containment configuration that is operable. The 1 hour test period allows secondary containment to be in thermal equilibrium at steady state conditions. As noted, both SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 acceptance limits are dependent upon the secondary containment configuration when testing is being performed. The acceptance criteria for the SRs based on secondary containment configuration is defined as follows: SECONDARY MAXIMUM DRAWDOWN TIME(SEC) MAXIMUM FLOW RATE (CFM) CONTAINMENT (SR 3.6.4.1.4 (SR 3.6.4.1.5 TEST CONFIGURATION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA) ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA) Group 1 Zones I, II and Ill (Unit 1 ~ 300 Seconds ~5400 CFM Railroad Bay aligned to (Zones I, II, and Ill) (From Zones I, II, and Ill) Secondary Containment). Zones II and Ill (Unit 1 ~ 300 Seconds ~4000 CFM Railroad Bay aligned to (Zones II and Ill) (From Zones II and Ill) Zone Ill). Group 2 Zones I, II and Ill (Unit 1 ~ 300 Seconds ~5300CFM Railroad Bay not aligned to (Zones I, II, and Ill) (From Zones I, II, and Ill) Secondary Containment). Zones II and Ill (Unit 1 ~ 300 Seconds ~3900 CFM Railroad Bay not aligned to (Zones II an.d Ill) * (From Zones II and Ill) Secondary Containment). Only one of the above listed configurations needs to be tested to confirm secondary containment OPERABILITY. . (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-88 Revision 6
Rev. 14 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS A Note also modifies the Frequency for each SR. This Note identifies that each configuration is to be tested every 60 months. Testing each configuration every 60 months assures that the most limiting configuration is tested every 60 months. The 60 month Frequency is acceptable because operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance and all active components are tested more frequently. Therefore, these tests are used to ensure secondary containment boundary integrity. The secondary containment testing configurations are discussed in further detail to ensure the appropriate configurations are tested. Three zone testing (Zones, I, II and Ill aligned to the recirculation plenum) should be performed with the Railroad Bay aligned to secondary containment and another test with the Railroad Bay not aligned to secondary containment. Each test should be performed with each division on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. Two zone testing (Zones II and 111 aligned to the recirculation plenum) should be performed with the Railroad Bay aligned to secondary containment and another test with the Railroad Bay not aligned to secondary containment. Each test should be performed with each division on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The normal operating fans of the non-tested HVAC zone (Zone I fans 1V202A&B, 1V205A&B and 1V206A&B) should not be in operation. Additionally, a controlled opening of adequate size should be maintained in Zone I Secondary Containment during testing to assure that atmospheric conditions are maintained in that zone. The Unit 1 Railroad Bay can be aligned as a No Zone (isolated from secondary containment) or as part of secondary containment (Zone I or Ill). Due to the different leakage pathways that exist in the Railroad Bay, the Railroad Bay should be tested when aligned to secondary containment and also not aligned to secondary containment. It is preferred to align the Railroad Bay to Zone Ill when testing with the Railroad Bay aligned to secondary containment since Zone Ill is included in all possible secondary containment isolation alignments. Note that when performing the three zone testing (Zones I, II and Ill aligned to the recirculation plenum) aligning the Railroad Bay to either Zone I or Ill is acceptable since either zone is part of secondary containment. When performing the Zone II & Ill testing with the Railroad Bay aligned to secondary containment, the Unit 1 Railroad Bay must be aligned to Zone Ill. (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-89 Revision 4
Rev. 14 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 (continued) REQUIREMENTS The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6.2.3.
- 2. FSAR, Section 15.6.
- 3. FSAR, Section 15.7.4.
- 4. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-89a Revision 1
Rev. 12 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) BASES BACKGROUND The function of the SCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit *fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) (Ref. 1). Secondary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that fission products that leak from primary containment into secondary containment following a OBA, or that are released during certain operations when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE or take place outside primary containment, are 111aintained within the secondary containment boundary. The OPERABILITY requirements for SCIVs help ensure that an adequate secondary containment boundary is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the environment. These isolation devices consist of either passive devices or active (automatic) devices. Manual valves or dampers, de-activated automatic valves or dampers secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured}, and blind flanges are considered passive devices. Automatic SCIVs close on a secondary containment isolation signal to establish a boundary for untreated radioactive material within secondary containment following a OBA or other accidents. Other non-sealed penetrations which cross a secondary containment boundary are isolated by the use of valves in the closed position or blind flanges. APPLICABLE The SCIVs must be OPERABLE to ensure the secondary containment barrier SAFETY to fission product releases is established. The principal accidents for which ANALYSES the secondary containment bounda1y is required are a loss of coolant accident (Ref. 1) and a fuel handling accident inside secondary containment (Ref. 2). The secondary containment performs no active function in response to either of these limiting events, but the boundary (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 Revision 3
Rev. 12 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES APPLICABLE established by SCIVs is required to ensure that le-akage from the primary SAFETY containment is processed by the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT} System ANALYSES before being released to the environment. *
- (continued)
Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped inside secondary containment so tliat they
- can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.
SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRG Policy Statement (Ref. 3). LCO SC IVs that form a part of the secondary containment boundary are required to
- be OPERABLE. Depending on the configuration of the secondary containment only specific SCIVs are required. The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting. from DBAs.
The automatic isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits and the valves actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, are listed in Table B 3.6.4.2-1. The normally closed isolation valves or blind flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic SCIVs are deactivated and secured in their closed position,* or blind flanges are in place. These passive isolation valves or devices are listed in Table 83.6.4.2-2. Penetrations closed with sealants are considered part of the secondary containment boundary.and are not.considered penetration flow paths.
- Certain plant piping systems (e.g., Service Water, RHR Service Water, Emergency Service Water, Feedwater, etc.) penetrate the secondary containment boundary. The intact piping within secondary containment provides a passive barrier which maintains secondary containment requirements. When the SOHR and temporary chiller system piping is connected and full of water, the piping forms the secondary containment boundary and the passive devices in TS Bases Table 83.6.4.2-2 are no longer required for these systems since the piping forms the barrier. During certain plant evolutions, piping systems may be drained and breached within secondary containment. During the pipe breaqh, system isolation valves can be used to provide secondary containment isolation. The isolation valve alignment will be controlled when the piping system is breached.
(continued} SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS/ B 3.6-91 Revision 3
--1 Rev.12 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 BASES (c6ntinued)
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a OBA could lead to a fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment. Therefore, the OPERABILITY of SCIVs* is required. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are . reduced due to pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES~ - Therefore, maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE is not required in* MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of
*irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3.
- ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by three Notes. The first N~te allows penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative contro!s. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device.
In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated.
- The second Note provides clarification that for the purpose of this LCO separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable.SCIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable SCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.
The third Note ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable SCIV. A.1 and A.2 In the event that there are one or more required penetration flow paths with one required SCIV inoperable, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation
- barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and deMactivated automatic SCIV, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. Fo~ penetrations isolated in (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-92 Revision 2
Rev. 12 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to.isolate the penetration should be the closest available device to secondary containment. The Required Action must be completed within the 8 hour Completipn Time. The specified time period is reasonable considering the time required to isolate
*the penetration, and the probability of a OBA, which requires the SCIVs to close, occurring during this short time is very low.
For affe<;:ted penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that secondary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, but no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. The Completion Time of once per 31 days is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation.* Rather, it involves verification that t~e affected penetration remains isolated. Condition A is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only" applicable to those penetration flow paths with two SC IVs. For penetration flow paths with one SCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required
*Actions.
Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to deyices located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified closed by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low. With two SCIVs in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 4 hours. The method of isolation must (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS/ B 3.6-93 Revision 1
Rev.12 SC IVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS 8.1 (continued)
- include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely
. affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the probability of a OBA, which requires the SCIVs to close, occurring during this short time, is very low.
The Condition has been modified by a Note stating that Condition B is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two isolation valves. For penetration flow paths with one SCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions. C.1 and C.2 With one or more required penetration flow paths with one required SCIV inoperable, the .inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion* are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action C.1 must be completed within the 4 hour Completion Tim~. The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable considering the relative stability of the system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting secondary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that secondary containi:nent penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the (continued)
- SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS/ B 3.6-94 Revision 1
Rev. 12
- SC IVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.
Condition C is modified.by a Note indicating that this Condition is only _ applicable to penetration flow paths with only one SCIV. For penetration flow paths with two SC IVs, Conditions A and B provide the appropriate Required Actions. Required Action C.2 is mooified
. by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted.
Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low. *
- D.1 and D.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without
- challenging plant systems.
E.1 . E.2. and E.3 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe
- position. Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.
(continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-95 Revision 1
Rev. 12 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS E.1. E.2. and E.3 (continued) Required Action E.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving fuel whil_e in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations .. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that each secondary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits*. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification (typically visual) that those required SClVs in secondary containment that are capable of being misposition1;3d are in the correct position. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative *controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these
. areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons.
Therefore, the probability of m_isalignment of these SCIVs, once* they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low. A second Note has been included to clarify that SCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the SCIVs are open. (continued) SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS/ B 3.6-96 Revision 3
l Rev. 12 SC IVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SCIVs with maximum isolation times specified in Table B 3.6.2.4-1 are tested to verify that the isolation time is within limits to demonstrate . OPERABILITY. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the
. Surveillance Frequency Control Program. Automatic SCIVs without maximum isofathn times specified in Table B 3.6.4.2-1 are tested under the requirements of SR 3.6.4.2.3. the isolation time test ensures that the SCIV will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses.
SR 3.6.4.2.3 Verifying that each automatic required SCIV closes on a secondary containment isolation signal is required to prevent leakage of radioactive material. from secondary containment following a DBA or other accidents. This SR ensures that each automatic SCIV will actuate to the isolation position on a secondary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The* Surveillance Frequency is controlled undedhe Surveillance Frequency Control Program. REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6.2.
- 2. FSAR, Section 15.
- 3. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).
SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS/ B 3.6-97 Revision 2
Rev. '12 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2"1 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Automatic Isolation Dampers (Page 1of1) Maximum Reactor Valve Number Valve Descriptiol) Type of.Valve Isolation Building Time Zone (Seconds} I HD-17586 A&B Supply Systelil Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 I HD-17524 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 I HD-17576A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 II HD-27586 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 II HD-27524 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 II HD-27576 A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 Ill HD-17564 A&B
- Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 14.0 Ill HD-'17514 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 6.5 Ill HD-17502 A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 6.0 II[ HD-27564 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 14.0 111 HD-27514 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 6.5 Ill HD-27502 A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 6.0 N/A HD-17534A Zone 3 Airlock 1-606 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-175348 Zone 3 Airlock 1-611 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-175340 Zone 3 Airlock 1-803 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A NIA HD-17534E Zone 3 Airlock 1-805 Automatic Isolation Damper NIA N/A HD-17534F Zone 3Airlock1-617 Automatic Isolation Damper NIA N/A HD-17534H Zone 3 Airlock 1-618 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-27534A Zone 3 Airlock 11-606 Automatic Isolation Damper NIA N/A HD-275340 Zone 3 Airlock 11-803 Automatic Isolation Damper NIA N/A HD-27534E Zone 3 Airlock 11-805 Automatic Isolation Damper NIA N/A HD-27534G Zone 3 Airlock C-806 Automatic Isolation Damper NIA N/A HD-27534H - Zone 3 Airlock 11-618 Automatic Isolation Damper NIA NIA. HD-275341 Zone 3 Airlock 11-609 Autofr!atic Isolation Damper N/A SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I 8 3.6-98 Revision 2
Rev. 12 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2m2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive *isolation Valves or Devices (Page 1of4) Device Number Device Description Area/Elev. Required Position I Notes X-29-2-44 SOHR System to Fuel Pool Cooling Yard/670 Blind Flanged I Note 1 X-29-2-45 SOHR System to Fuel Pool CoolinQ Yard/670 Blind Flanged I Note 1 110176 SOHR Supply Drain-Viv 29/670 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 1 110186 SOHR Discharge Drain Viv 29/670 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 1 110180 SOHR Suoolv Vent Viv 29/749 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 1 110181 SOHR Discharae Fill Viv 27/749 Closed Manual Isa Valve I Note 1 110182 SOHR Discharge Vent Viv 271749 Closed Manual !so Valve I Note 1 110187 SOHR $uooly Fill Viv 29/749 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 1 210186 SDHR Suoolv Drain Viv 33/749 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 1 210187 SOHR Suoolv Vent Viv 33/749 Closed Manual Isa Valve I Note 1 210191 SOHR Dischame Vent Viv 30/749 Closed Manual Isa Valve I Note 1 210192 SOHR Discharae Drain Vlv 30/749 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 1 210193 SOHR Discharae Vent Viv 33/749 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 1 X-29-2-46 Temoorarv Chiller to RBCW Yard/670 Blind Flanaed I Note 2 X-29-2-47 Teinoorarv Chiller to RBCW Yard/670 Blind Flanaed I Note 2 X-29-5-95 Temooraiv Chiller to Unit 1 RBCW 29/749 Blind Flanaed I Note 2 X-29-5-96 Temoorarv Chiller to Unit 1 RBCW 29/749 Blind Flanaed I Note 2 X-29-5-91 Temporary Chiller to Unit 2 RBCW 33/749 Blind Flanaed I Note 2 X-29-5-92 Temporaiv Chiller to Unit 2 RBCW 33/749 Blind Flarn1ed I Note 2 187388 RBCW Temp Chiller Dischan:ie lso Viv 29/670 .Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 2 187389 RBCW Temp Chiller Supply lso Viv 29/670 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 2 187390
- RBCW Temp Chiller Supply Drain Viv 29/670 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 2 187391 RBCW Temp Chiller Dischari:ie Drain Viv 29/670 Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 2 X-28-2-3000 Utllitv Penetration to Unit 1 East Stairwell Yard/670 Blind Flarnied I Note 3 X-29-248 U!ilitv Penetration to Unit 1 RR Bay Yard/670 Caooed I Note 5 X-33-2-3000 Utilitv Penetration to Unit 2 East Stabwell Yard/670 Blind Fianaed I Note 4 X-28-2*3000 Utilitv Penetration to Unit 1 East Stairwell 28/670 Blind Flanaed I Note 3 X-29-2-48 Utllitv Penetration to Unit 1 RR Bav 29/670 Capped I Note 5 X-33-2-3000 Utilitv Penetration to Unit 2 East Stairwell 33/670 Blind Flarnied I Note 4 X-29-3-54 U!ilitv Penetration to Unit 1 RBCCW Hx Area 27/683 Blind Flarn:ied I Note 6 X-29-3-55 Utilitv Penetration to Unit 1 RBCCW Hx Area 27/683 Blind Flanaed I Note 6 Utility Penetration from Unit 1 RR Bay to Unit 2 X-29-5-97 33/749 Capped Elev. 749 X-27-6-92 Instrument Tubina Stubs 27/779' Caooed X-29-7-4 1" Spare Conduit Threaded Plua 29/8.18' Installed X-30-6-72 Instrument Tubing stubs som9* Capped X-30-6-1002 Stairwell #214 Rupture Disc 30/779' Installed Intact X-30-6-1003 Airlock 11-609 Rupture Disc 30/779' Installed Intact X-25-6-1008 Airlock 1-606 Rupture Disc 25/779' Installed Intact X-29-4-01-B Penetration at Door 4330 291719' Blind Flange Installed X-29-4-01-A Penetration at Door 4330 29/719' Blind Flange Installed X-29-4-01-B Penetration at Door 404 33/719' Blind Flanae lnstaDed X-29-4-01-A Penetration at Door 404 33/719' Blind Flanae Installed SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-99 Revision 8
Rev. 12 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive .Isolation Valves or Device~ (Page 2 of 4} Device Number Device Description Area/Elev. Required Position I Notes HD17534C Airlock 1-707 Blind Flanqe 28/799' Blind Flanae Installed HD27534C. Airlock 11-707 Blind Flange 33/799' Blind Flanae Installed XD-17513 Isolation damper for Railroad Bay Zone Ill HVAC 29/799' Position Is dependent on Railroad Supplv Bav alignment XD-17514 lsolation damper for Railroad Bay Zc;>ne lll HVAC 29/719' Position is dependent on Railroad Exhaust Bav alianment XD-12301 PASS Air Flow Damoer 11/729' Closed Damoer
*XD-22301 PASS Air Flow Damoer 22/729' Closed Damper 161827 HPCI Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 25/645' Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 3 161828 RCIC Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 28/645' Closed Manual tso Valve I Note 3 161829 'A' RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 29/645' Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 3 161830 'B' RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 28/645' Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 3 261820 RCIC Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 33/645' Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 4 261821 'A' RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 34/645' Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 4 261822 'B' RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 33/645' Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 4 2LRWl810L Zone Ill Floor Drain 34-818 Plugged I Note 7 2LRWl810M Zone Ill Floor Drain 34-818 Plugged I Note 7 2LRWl810N Zone Ill Floor Drain 34-818 Pluaaed I Note 7 2LRWl810R Zone Ill Floor Drain 34-818 Pluaaed I Note 7 2LRWl810S Zone Ill Floor Drain 34*818 Pluaaed I Note 7 2LRWl703A Zone II Floor Drain 34-799 Pluaaed I Note 7 2LRWl615A Zone II Floor Drain 34-779 Pluaaed I Note 7 2LRWl100A Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Pluaaed I Note 7 2LRWl100B Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Pluaaed I Note 7 2LRWl100C Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Pluaaed I Note 7 2LRWl100D Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Pluaaed I Note 7 2LRWl100E Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Pluaaed I Note 7 2LRWl100F Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Pluaaed I Note 7 2LRWl100G Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Pluaaed I Note 7 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-99a Revision 6
Rev. 12 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves orr Devices (Page 3 of 4) Device Number Device Description Area/Elev. Required Position I Notes 1LRWl810U Zone Ill Floor Drain . 29-818 Pluc:med I Note 7 1LRWl1810V Zone Ill Floor Drain - 29-818 PluaaecfI Note 7 1LRWl1810W Zone Ill Roar Drain 29-818 Pluaaed 1 Note 7 1LRWl810X Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Pluaoed I Note 7 1LRWl810Y Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Pluaaed I Note 7 1LRW1810Z Zone 111 Floor Drain 29-818 PIUQQed 1Note 7 1LRWl810FF Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Plugged JNote 7 1LRWl810GG Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Plugged J Note 7 1LRWl810HH Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Pluaaed I Note 7 1LRW1810JJ Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Pluoaed I Note 7 1LRWl810KK Zone Ill Floor Drain 29-818 Plugged I Note 7 1LRWl615A Zone I; Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-779 Plugged I Note 7 1LRW1100A Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Pluaaed I Note 7 1LRW1100B Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Pluaaed I Note 7 1LRWl100C Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Plugged I Note 7 1LRW1100D Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Pluaaed I Note 7 1LRW1100E Zone l, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Pluoaed I Note 7 1LRWl100F Zone I, Zone 111, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Pluaaed I Note 7 1LRW1100G Zone I, Zone 111, or No Zone. Floor Drain 29-670 Pluaaed I Note 7 HCVS Rupture Disc Burst Connection Isolation 257328 OR 257336 21/686' Closed Manual lso Valve I Note 4 Valves SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-99b Revision 5 ________j
Rev*. 12 SCI Vs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2~2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page4 of 4) Note 1: The two blind flanges on the SOHR penetrations (blind flanges for device number X-29-2-44 and X-29-2-45) and all the closed manual valves forttie SOHR system (110176, 110186, 110180, 110181, 110182, 110187, 210186, 210187, 210191, 210192, 210193) can each be considered as a separate secondary containment isolation device for the SOHR penetrations. If one or both of the blind flanges is removed and all the above identified manual valves for the SDHR system are close.d, the appropriate LCO should be entered for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. With the blind flange removed, the manual valves could be opened intermittently under administrative controls per the Technical Speclfication Note. When both SDHR blind flanges are installed, opening of the manual valves for the SOHR system will be controlled to prevent cross connecting ventflation zones .. When the manual valves for the SDHR system are open in this condition, the appropriate LCO should be entered for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. When the SDHR system piping is connected and full of water, the piping forms the secondary containment boundary and the above listed SCIVs in Table 83.6.4.2-2 are no longer required for this system since the piping forms the barrier. Note 2: Due to the multiple alignments of the RBCW temporary chiller, different devices will perform the SCIV function depending on the RBCW configuration. There are three devicesfequipment that can perform the SCIV function for the RBCW temporary chiller supply penetration. The first SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller supply penetration is the installed blind flange on penetration X-29-2-47. The second SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller supply penetration is isolation valve 187389. The third SCIV for the temporary RBCW chiller supply penetration is closed drain valve 187390 and an installed bllnd flange on penetrations X-29-5-92 andfor X-29-5-96. Since there are effectively three SCJVs, any two can be used to define the SCIV for the penetration. Removal of one of the two required SCIVs requires entry into the appropriate LCO for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SC IVs. Opening of drain valve 187390 and operation of blank flanges X-29-5-96 and X-29-5-92 will be controlled to* prevent cross connecting ventilation zones. These three SCIVs prevent air lnleakage into secondary containment. The isolation of the penetration per the.Technical Specification requirement is to assure that one of the above SCIVs rs closed so that there is no air inleakage into secondary containment. There are three devicesfequipment that can perform the SCIV function for the RBCW temporary chiller return penetration. The first SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller return penetratloi:i is the installed blind flange on penetration X-29-2-46. The second SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller return penetration is isolation valve 187388. The third SCIV for the temporary RBCW chlller return penetration Is closed drain valve 187391 and an installed blind flange on penetrations X-29-5-91 and/or X-29-5-95. Since there are effectlvely three SCIVs, any two can be used to define the SCIV for the penetration. Removal of one of the two required SCIVs requires entry into the appropriate LCO for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. Opening of drain valve 187391 and operation of blank flanges X-29-5-91 and X-29-5-95 will be controlled to prevent cross connecting ventilation zones. These three .SCIVs prevent air inleakage into secondary containment. The isolation of the penetration per the Technical Specification requirement is to assure that one of the above SC1Vs is closed so that there is no air inleakage into secondary containment. When the RBCW temporary chiller piping Is connected and full of water, the piping Inside secondary containment forms the secondary containm'?nt boundary and the above listed SCIVs in Table 83.6.4.2-2 are no longer required for this system. Note 3: These penetrations connect Secondary Containment Zone I to a No-Zone. When Secondary Containment Zone I Is isolated from the recirculation plenum, the above listed SCIVs in Table 83.6.4.2-2 are no longer required. Note 4: Th~se penetrations connect Secondary Containment Zone ii to a No-Zone. When Secondary Containment Zone II is isolated from the recirculation plenum, the above listed SC!Vs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required. Note 5: These penetrations connect the Railroad Bay to a No-Zone. When the Railroad Bay ls a No-Zone, the above listed SCIVs In Table 83.6.4.2-2. are no longer required. Note 6: These penetrations connect Secondary Containment Zone I to the Railroad Bay. The aboye listed SCIVs in Table 83.6.4.2-2 are not required if the Railroad Bay is a No-Zone and Zone l Is Isolated from the recirculation plenum OR if the Railroad Bay is alfgned ~o Zone I. Note 7: Due to drain header containing multiple floor drains in different ventilation zones, drain plugs were installed in all of the drain header floor drains. To provlde the passive Secondary Containment boundary, only drain plugs in one ventilatfon zone are required to be installed. SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS I B 3.6-99c Revision 0}}