IR 05000272/2010004

CAP. These violations and their corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 40A7 of this report. Enclosure

REPORT [[]]

DETAIL [[S Summary ()f Plant Status Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No. 1 (Unit 1) began the period at full power. On July 7, Unit 1 automatically tripped following a fault on the B main power transformer (MPT). Unit 1 was synchronized to the grid on July 24 and full power was reached on July 25. On September 17, after operators isolated bleed steam valve,]]

12BS [[22, due to an internal steam leak, operators reduced power to 98 percent to comply with engineering established main turbine operating limits. Unit 1 remained at 98 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period. Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No.2 (Unit 2) began the period at full power. Unit 2 remained at or near full power for the duration of the inspection period. 1.]]

REACTO R

SAFETY -2 samples) .1 Evaluate Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions a. Inspection Scope The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample to evaluate for seasonal extreme weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed]]

PSEG [['s and protection of risk significant systems at Unit 1 and Unit 2 during hot conditions between July 6 and July 7,2010. The inspectors evaluated implementation of summer readiness procedures and compensatory measures extreme hot weather that included ultimate heat sink temperatures above 84°F ambient air temperatures above 100°F. The inspectors walked down strlJctures, systems, and components (SSCs) to ensure that weather related did not adversely impact sse operability. In addition, the inspectors assessed condition of balance of plant equipment with the potential to initiate plant-level The inspectors performed detailed walkdowns of the service water (SW) emergency diesel generators (EOGs), vital switchgear rooms, the gas turbine (GTG), main and unit auxiliary transformers, component cooling water (CCW) exchangers, the main turbines and generators, and the station air Th,e inspectors observed portions of]]

GTG performance testing from the control room

GTG local control panel. The inspectors also reviewed

PSEG corrective notifications to ensure that

PSEG appropriately identified and resolved weather problems. The documents reviewed are listed in the b. Findings No findings were identified . . 2 Evaluate Readiness to Cope with External Flooding a. Inspection Scope Enclosure I

.1 The inspectors completed one adverse weather protection sample to evaluate readiness for external flooding. The inspectors reviewed

PSEG [['s preparations and compensatory measures for severe weather conditions that posed a risk of flooding during the week of August 23, 2010. The inspectors interviewed operations and engineering personnel regarding the actions taken to prepare for the impending severe weather and walked down risk significant systems to independently assess the adequacy of]]

PSEG [['s preparations. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the condition of the service water intake structure (SWIS) external flood protection. The inspectors verified that degraded conditions with the potential to impact safety"related components and systems were reported in the]]

CAP. Corrective action notifications written for degraded conditions were reviewed to ensure that operability of components in the

SWIS [[was not impacted. For those areas where operator actions were credited for maintaining safety-related system operability during a flooding event, the inspectors also verified that the procedures used to direct those actions could be fully implemented during the event. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings No findings were identified. 1 R04 Eguipment Alignment (71111.04 -4 samples; 71111.04S -1 sample) Partial Walkdown a. Inspection Scope The inspectors completed four partial system walkdown inspection samples. The inspectors walked down the systems listed below to verify the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was inoperable. The inspectors focused their review on potential discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and increase plant risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, walked down control systems components, and verified that selected breakers, valves, and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation. The inspectors also verified that]]

PSEG properly utilized its

CAP to identify and resolve equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. * Unit 1,

SW system with 13

SW pump out of service (OOS) on August 4 * Unit 2, 21 and

22 CCW pumps with 23

CCW pump

OOS on August 11 and August .. Unit 2,28 and 2C

EDG with 2A

EDG [[]]

ODS on 'July * Unit 2, 21 and 23 chillers with 22 chiller DOS on September 20 b. Findings No findings were identified. Enclosure

.2 Complete Walkdown a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted one complete walkdown inspection sample of the Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. The inspectors independently verified the alignment and status of

AFW [[motor-driven pumps and valves electrical power, labeling, hangers and supports, and associated support systems. The walkdown also included verification of valve pesitiens, evaluation of system piping and equipment te verify pipe hangers were in satisfactery condition, oil reservoir levels were nermal, pump r]]

IO [[ems and pipe chases were adequately ventilated, system parameters were within established ranges, and equipment deficiencies were appropriately identified. The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and reviewed cerrective action evaluations associated with the system to determine whether equipment alignment preblems were identified and apprepriately resolved. Decuments reviewed are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings]]

NI [[t) findings were identified. 1 R05 Fire Protection (71111.050 -6 samples) .1 Fire Pretectien -Tours a. Inspection Scope The inspectors cempleted six quarterly fire protection inspectien samples. The inspecters walked dewn the systems listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protectien features. The inspectors verified that combustibles and ignition sources were contrelled in accordance with]]

PSEG [['s administrative procedures; fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use; that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition; and that compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment were implemented in accordance with]]

PSEG 's fire plan. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. * Unit 2, 4160V switchgear rooms, 64' elevation; * Unit 1 and Unit 2,

AFW pumps area, 84' elevation; * Unit 1 and Unit 2,

SW intake structure, 92' & 112' elevations; and * Unit 2, chemical and volume control system (

CVCS) hold-up tank area, 64' elevation. b. Findings No findings were identified. 'I R06 Flood Protectien Measures (71111.06 -2 samples) .1 Internal Flooding Enclosure

.1 a. Inspection Scope The inspectors completed one internal flooding area inspection sample. The inspectors eVi:lluated flood protection measures for the Unit 1 and Unit

2 SW [[pump bays. The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and walked down the areas to assess operational readiness of various features in place to protect redundant safety-related components. These features included plant drains, watertight doors, sump pumps, and wall penetration seals. The inspectors also reviewed the flooding penetration seal inspections. operator logs, abnormal procedures, and corrective action notifications associated with flood protection measures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings No findings were identified . . 2 Underground Bunkers/Manholes Subiect to Flooding a. Inspection Scope The inspectors completed one underground cable inspection sample. The inspectors evaluated the condition of safety-related cables located in underground bunkers and manholes. The inspectors interviewed engineering personnel and examined photographic evidence of conditions in manhole vault]]

MH -SWI-1. The inspectors verified that safety-related cables were not

SU bmerged in water, the integrity of the cables, the condition of cable support structures, and the ability to dewater these structures. The inspectors noted that

PSEG had recently instituted a cable aging management program at the site. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings No findings were identified. 1R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program (71111.11 Q -1 sample) Activities Review by Resident Staff a. Inspection Scope The inspectors completed one quarterly licensed operator requalification program inspection sample. Specifically, the inspectors observed a scenario administered to a single crew during a training drill on September 14, 2010. The scenario included a partial loss of offsite power, a loss of turbine generator stator cooling water that resulted in a reactor trip, and a loss of coolant accident. The inspectors reviewed operator actions to implement the abnormal and emergency operating procedures. The inspectors examined the operators' ability to perform actions associated with high risk activities, the Emergency Plan, previous lessons learned items, and the correct use and implementation of procedures. The inspectors also observed and verified that the deficiencies were adequately identified, discussed, and entered into the CAP, as appropriate. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Enclosure

b. Findings No findings were identified. 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q -3 samples) a. Inspection Scope inspectors completed three quarterly maintenance effectiveness inspection samples. The inspectors reviewed pelformance monitoring and maintenance effectiveness issues 'for three components/systems listed below. The inspectors reviewed

PSEG [['s process for monitoring equipment pelformance and assessing preventive maintenance effectiveness. The inspectors verified that systems and components were monitored in accordance with the Maintenance Rule Program requirements. The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailability hours to those being tracked by]]

PSEG to evaluate the effectiveness of

PSEG [['s condition monitoring activities and to determine whether performance goals were being met. The inspectors reviewed applicable work orders (Was), corrective action notifications, and preventive maintenance tasks. The documents reviewed are IiStl3d in the Attachment. * 13 and 23 positive displacement charging pumps * Unit 1]]

AFW pumps * Unit

3 GTG [[b. Findings No findings were identified. 1 R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 -6 samples) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors completed six maintenance risk assessment and emergent work control inspection samples. The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were pelformed as specified by 10]]

CFR [[50.65(a}(4) prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations, work schedules, and control room logs for these configurations.]]

PSEG 's risk management actions were reviewed during shift turnover meetings, control room tours, and plant walkdowns. The inspectors also used

PSEG 's on..line risk monitor (Equipment

OOS [[workstation) to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations. The inspectors reviewed notifications documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. * Unit 1, 13]]

AFW pump unavailability from July 7 to July 9 during Unit 2 forced outage * Unit 1 and Unit 2, control area ventilation (CAV) in maintenance mode on July 28 * Unit 2, 2A

EDG [[]]

OOS on July 29 * Unit 2, 2A EDG 008 on August 23 Enclosure

.1 Unit 1,

13 AFW emergent repairs due to trip throttle valve overspeed tripped after a remote trip of

MS -52 from the control room on September 3 Unit 2, 23 control area supply fan

OOS [[for planned maintenance on September 7 b. Findings No findings were identified. 1 R 15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15 -5 samples) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors completed five operability evaluation inspection samples. The inspectors revi:ewed the operability determinations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with: Unit 1, 1]]

CV [[284 reactor coolant pump seal return isolation valve with inactive boron leak on weld; Unit 2, 22 residual heat removal (RHR) pump room cooler with]]

22 SW inlet valve (22

SW 153) failed in open position; Unit 2, 2A

EDG failure to shutdown at the end of a routine surveillance; Unit 2, 22

BF 22 feedwater containment isolation valve internal noise; and * Unit 1 and Unit 2,

CAV isolation damper degraded seals. The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to ensure the conclusions were justified. The inspectors also walked down accessible equipment to corroborate the adequacy of

PSEG 's operability determinations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed other

PSEG [[identified safety-related equipment deficiencies during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability screenings. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. No findings were identified. 1 R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 -2 samples) Temporary Modifications a. Inspection Scope The inspectors completed two plant modification inspection samples by reviewing the key characteristics associated with the two temporary plant modifications listed below. Th<<9 inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the affected'systems were not degraded by the temporary modifications. The license amendment associated with the Technical Specification (]]

TS) change for the 2C battery was also reviewed. Other documents reviewed for these samples are listed in the Attachment. Enclosure

Unit 1, 11 &

12 AFW pumps lifted leads . Unit 2, 2C battery temporary installation b. Findings A violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by

PSEG and is documented in Section 40A7. 1 R 19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111 .19 -7 samples) a. InslDection Scope The inspectors completed seven post-maintenance testing (PMT) inspection samples. ThE: inspectors observed portions of and/or reviewed the

PMT [[results for the maintenance activities listed below. The inspectors verified that the effect of testing on the plant was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; acceptance criteria were clear, demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design and licensing basis documentation; test instrumentation had current calibrations and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application; tests were performed, as written, with applicable prerequisites satisfied; and equipment was returned to an operational status and ready to perform its safety function. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.]]

WO s 60091111 and 60091124, 13 turbine-driven

AFW pump trip solenoid and overspeed trip mechanism head lever following emergent corrective maintenance

WO 60090467.

23 CCW pump inboard and outboard pump seals replacement

WO 60091466. 2A

EDG PanAlarm power supply replacement

WO 60081294.

2SJ 2. charging pump suction valve, thermal overload replacement

WO 60092089, 22 control area chiller compressor replacement

WO 60087957, 2C 125 Vdc temporary battery

WO 30197598,13

AFW [[pump following head lever maintenance b. Findings No findings were identified. 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20 -1 sample) a. Inspection Scope Plant Trip Following Main Generator Trip_ On July 7, 2010, Unit 1 tripped following a main generator trip related to a failure of the B phase of the]]

MPT. [[]]

PSEG conducted a forced outage from July 7,2010, through July 24.2010, to repair the

MPT , replace the

1CV 284, and perform additional maintenance activities. During the outage, the inspectors monitored or observed the activities listed below to verify

PSEG controls over the outage activities. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Portions of the shutdown and cool down processes Outage risk management Decay heat removal operations Enclosure

Configuration management, including maintenance of defense in depth Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that

TS [[swere met Walkdown of selected containment areas to check for unidentified leakage or other (liscrepant conditions Personnel fatigue management controls b. Findings No findings were identified. 1 R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 -5 samples) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors completed five surveillance testing inspection samples. The inspectors observed portions of and/or reviewed results for the surveillance tests listed below to verify, as appropriate, whether the applicable system requirements for operability were adequately incorporated into the procedures and that test acceptance criteria were consistent with procedure requirements, the]]

TS requirements, the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR), and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section

XI for pump and valve testing. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. S2.0P-

ST.DG -0001, 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test S2.0P-ST.SJ-0001, Inservice Testing -21 Safety Injection Pump S1.IC-FT.RCP-0023,

1PT -474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel

IV Functional Test S2.0P-ST.RHR-0002, Inservice Testing -22

RHR Pump S2.0P-

ST.RHR -0002,

RHR Discharge Check Valve 22

RH 8 Forward and Reverse Flow Test b. Findings No findings were identified. 2.

RADIAT [[]]

ION [[]]

SAFETY Cornerstone: Radiation Safety -Public and Occupational 2

RS 1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01) a. Inspection Scope Inspection Planning The inspectors reviewed

PSEG performance indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone for follow-up. The inspectors reviewed the results of radiation protection program audits (e.g.,

PSEG's quality assurance audits or other independent audits). Enclosure

The inspectors reviewed reports of operational occurrences related to occupational radiation safety since the last inspection. The inspectors reviewed Prompt Investigation Report -Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm* Received During Radiography (notification 20467421) regarding an event on June 16, 2010, during radiography operations in the Unit 2 mechanical penetration service water room. During this activity, a locked high radiation event took place (dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem per hour measured at 30 centimeters from the source of radiation).

PSEG has reported this event under the occupational exposure cornerstone and the associated performance indicator. The inspectors observed radiography operations conducted in the Unit 1 containment on July 19-20,2010, and verified that

PSEG [[had implemented corrective actions from the June 16, 2010, event and that these corrective actions were effective. Ris,k-Significant High Radiation Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation Area (VHRA) Controls The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) the controls and procedures for high-risk]]

HRA s and

VHRA s. The inspectors verified that any changes to

PSEG procedures did not substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection. The inspectors discussed with first-line health physics supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become

VHRA s during certain plant opl9rations. The inspectors verified that

PSEG controls for all

VHRA s, and areas with the potential to become a

VHRA , ensured that unauthorized individuals were not able to gain access to the

VHRA. [[Radiation Worker Performance During job performance observations. the inspectors observed radiation worker performance with respect to stated radiation protection work requirements. The inspectors determined that workers were aware of the significant radiological conditions in their workplace, radiation work permit controls/limits were in place, and that their performance reflected the level of radiological hazards present. The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports since the last inspection that found cause ofthe event to be human performance errors. The inspectors determined that there was no observable pattern traceable to a similar cause. The inspectors determined that this perspective matched the corrective action approach taken by]]

PSEG to resolve the reported problems. The inspectors discussed with the

RPM any problems with the corrective actions planned or taken. b. Findings No findings were identified. Occupational As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (71124.02) Enclosure

a. Inspection Scope Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems The inspectors selected

ALARA [[work packages and reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collective exposure estimate for reasonable accuracy. The inspectors reviewed the applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and the intended dose outcome. The inspectors verified that for the selected work activities that]]

PSEG had established measures to track, trend, and, if necessary, to reduce, occupational doses for ongoing work activities. The inspectors verified that trigger points or criteria were established to prompt additional reviews and/or additional

ALARA planning and controls. The inspectors reviewed

PSEG 's collective exposure performance during the Spring 2010 refueling outage at Unit 1 ('I

RF 20). Total collective exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit. The inspectors evaluated

PSEG 's method of adjusting exposure estimates, or planning work, when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered. The inspectors determined that adjustments to exposure estimates were based on sound radiation protection and

ALARA principles or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work. The inspectors evaluated the frequency of these adjustments 10 determine the adequacy of the original

ALARA planning process. No findings were identified.

2RS 4 Occupational Dose Assessment (71124.04) a. Inspection Scope §Qecial Bioassay The inspectors selected internal dose assessments obtained using in-vitro monitoring. The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of

PSEG 's program for in-vitro monitoring of radionuclides, including collection and storage of samples. The inspectors determined that

PSEG had not specifically qualified their vendor laboratory to perform in-vitro sample counting, having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis, nor verifying the lab's participation in an anal

YS is cross-check pmgram. The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of

PSEG 's program for dose assessments based on airborne/

DAC [[monitoring. The inspectors verified that flow rates and/or collection times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate lower limits of detection are obtained. The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of procedural guidance used to assess dose when]]

PSEG personnel apply protection factors. The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using airborne/

DAC monitoring. The inspectors verified that

PSEG procedures. Dosimeter Placement and Assessment of Effective Dose Equivalent for External The inspectors reviewed

DAC calculations were Enclosure

representative of the actual airborne radionuclide mixture, including hard-to-detect nuclides. The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of

PSEG [['s internal dose assessments for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed effective dose equivalent. The inspectors determined that the affected personnel were properly monitored with calibrated equipment and the data was analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance with]]

PSEG 's methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields are expected or large dose gradients exist. The inspectors verified that

PSEG [[had established criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques were to be implemented. The inspectors reviewed dose assessments performed using multibadging during the current assessment period. The inspectors verified that the assessment was performed in accordance with]]

PSEG procedures and dosimetric standards. Shallow Dose Equivalent (

SDE ) The inspectors review

SDE dose assessments for adequacy. The inspectors evaluated

PSEG 's method for calculating

SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive particles. Neutron Dose Assessment The inspectors evaluated

PSEG [['s neutron dosimetry program, including dosimeter types and/or survey instrumentation. The inspectors selected neutron exposure situations and verified that (a) dosimetry and/or instrumentation was appropriate for the expected neutron spectra, (b) there was sufficient sensitivity for low dose and/or dose rate measurement, and (c) neutron dosimetry was properly calibrated. The inspectors verified that interference by gamma radiation was accounted for in the calibration. The inspectors verified that time and motion evaluations were representative of actual neutron exposure events, as applicable. For the special dosimetric situations reviewed in this section, the inspectors determined how]]

PSEG a

SSigned the dose of record for total effective dose equivalent, SDE. and lens dose equivalent. b. Findings No findings were identified. Enclosure*

4.

OTHER 40A1 Performance Indicator (

PI ) Verification (71151 6 InsRection Scope The inspectors reviewed

PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating systems cornerstone

PI s listed below. To verify the accuracy of the

PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the

PI definition and guidance contained in

NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5. Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems * Unit 1 and Unit 2

AFW systems; * Unit 1 and Unit

2 RHR systems; and * Unit 1 and Unit 2

SW systems. The inspectors verified the accuracy of the data' by comparing it to

CAP records, control room operators' logs, the site operating history database, and key

PI [[summary records. b. Findings No findings were identified. 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152 -1 work-around sample) Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems," and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into]]

PSEG 's operator workaround program. The inspectors reviewed

CAP. [[This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Review of Operator Workaround Program Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted a cumulative review of operator workarounds for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness of]]

PSEG's control room distraction report, operator burden list, and operator burden self-assessment. The inspectors focused on the potential impact on mitigating systems and the potential to affect operator ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures. The review included interviews with licensed and walkdowns of main control room panels. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Findings and No findings were Enclosure

.1

16 PSEG [[identified twelve operator challenges at Unit 1 and Unit 2, but none of the challenges were classified as operator workarounds. The inspectors did not identify additional operator challenges or workarounds. The inspectors reviewed 103, "OperatorWorkaround Program", and]]

OP -AA-1 02-1 03w1001 ,

UO [[perator Burdens Program>>, for]]

PSEG program requirements and found that

PSEG [[adequately implemented these procedures. The most recent operator burden assessment was reviewed for each unit. The inspectors determined that the cumulative impact of the identified operator challenges was within manageable limits. Event Followwup (71153 -3 samples) iQ!.osed) Licensee Event Report 05000272/2010-001-00, Automatic Start of the 1C]]

EDG On April 16, 2010, at 1641 hours, the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power. Surveillance testing was being performed to demonstrate the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source. The 1 C

EDG automatically started but the

EDG output breaker did not close per design. Abnormal operating procedure S1.0P-ABAKV-0003 was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus. Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended. Thl9 unexpected start of the 1 C

EDG was the result of the failure of the 13

CSD breaker auxiliary position switch (52STA switch). The failure of the

52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment of the gap between the breaker and the 52

STA switch assembly. The mis-adjustment was the result of unclear procedural guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap. Corrective actions consist of replacement of the

13CSD 52

STA [[switch, proper adjustment of the breaker plunger gap. inspection of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps, and procedure revisions to improve the guidance for measuring breaker plunger gaps. The inspectors' review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements, specifically that]]

PSEG maintenance procedure guidance for measuring the breaker plunger gap was inadequate. The enforcement aspects ofthis violation are discussed in Section 40A7. This

LER above 50% reactor power. The turbine trip was caused by the actuation of the regular and back-up phase B]]

...C and bushing failure.]]

PSEG corrective actions included replacing the main power transformer deluge system air-pilot sprinkler heads with sprinkler heads that have a higher temperature setpoint. The Enclosure

.1 inspectors completed a review of this

LER and did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements. This l

ER is closed . . 3 (Closed)

LER 05000272/2010-003-00, Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 3.0.4 On July 25, 2010, at 0940, a

PSEG technician identified that the circuitry was disabled for the motor driven

AFW pump automatic start on a trip of both steam generator feedwater pumps (

SGFP s). At the time of discovery, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the

AFW automatic start circuitry is required by

TS 3.3.2.1 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2.

PSEG re-established the automatic start of the

AFW pumps on a trip of both

SGFP s at 1557 on July 25, 2010. The cause of the failure to re-establish the automatic start circUitry for the start of the motor driven

AFW pumps on a trip of the

SGFP [[s was due to operators performing the incorrect section of the procedure to re-establish the start circuitry during mode ascension. Corrective actions consisted of training, procedure revisions, and personnel accountability. The inspectors review of this issue noted a licensee identified violation of regulatory requirements, specifically that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry required by]]

TS 3.3.2.1 function 8f disabled was a condition prohibited by

TS 3.0.4. The enforcement aspects of this violation are discussed in Section 40A7. This

LER is closed. 40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary Instruction (

TO 2515/177 -Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling. Decay Heat Removal. and Containment Sgray Systems a. Inspection Scope

NRC staff developed

TI 2515/177 to support the

NRC 's confirmatory review of licensee responses to

NRC Generic letter (GL) 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems." Based on the review of

GL 2008-01 response letters, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff provided guidance on

TI inspection scope to the regional inslPectors. The inspectors used this inspection guidance along with the

TI to verify that

PSEG implemented or was in the process of acceptably implementing the commitments, modifications, and programmatically controlled actions described in their

GL 2008-01 response. The inspectors verified that the plant-specific information (including licensing basis documents and design information) was consistent with the information that

PSEG submitted to the

NRC in response to

GL 2008-01. The inspectors reviewed a sample of isometric drawings and piping and instrument . diagrams and conducted selected system piping walkdowns to verify that

PSEG 's drawings reflected the subject system configurations and

UFSAR descriptions. Specifically, the inspectors verified the following related to a sample of isometric drawings for the

CVCS ,

RHR , safety injection (

SI), and containment spray (CS) systems: High pOint vents were identified; High points that did not have vents were recognized and evaluated with respect to their potential for gas accumulation; Enclosure

Other areas where gas could accumulate and potentially impact subject operability, such as orifices in horizontal pipes, isolated branch lines, exchangers, improperly sloped piping, and under closed valves, were evaluated in engineering reviews or had ultrasonic testing (UT) points which reasonably detect void formation; For piping segments reviewed, branch lines and fittings were clearly shown. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the above systems to reasonably assure the acceptability of

PSEG 's drawing utilized during their review of

GL 2008-01. The inspectors verified that

PSEG [[conducted walkdowns of the applicable systems to confirm that the combination of system orientation, vents, instructions and procedures, tests, and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently full of water to assure operability. The inspectors reviewed]]

PSEG 's methodology used to determine system piping high pOints, identification of negative sloped piping, and calculations of void sizes based on

UT equipment readings to ensure the methods were reasonable. The inspectors verified that

PSEG included all emergency core

COO ling systems, along with supporting systems, within scope of the

GL. In addition, the inspectors verified that P5EG acceptably addressed flashing of

RHR suction lines when initiating

RHR [[while the lines are at elevated temperatures to ensure system operability. The inspectors also reviewed engineering analyses associated with the development of acceptance criteria for <:is-found voids, which included engineering assumptions for void transport and acceptability of void fractions at the suction and discharge piping of the applicable system pumps. The inspectors coordinated this review with]]

NRR , who was concurrently pursuing questions associated with void acceptance criteria at the time of the inspection. The inspectors reviewed a sample of P5

EG 's procedures used for filling and venting the associated

GL systems to verify that the procedures were effective in venting or redl:..Icing voiding to acceptable levels. The inspectors verified the installation of a hardware vent, located in the Unit 1

RHR cross connect discharge piping, as committed to in P5EG's

GL [[response. A similar vent installation is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011. The inspectors also confirmed the planned implementation of an additional hardware high point vent modification on each unit that was associated with the common]]

RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated 51 to

RHR [[check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion and accumUlation to be vented off (two vents per unit). The Unit 2 modification is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810) and the Unit 1 modification is expected to be implemented in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453). The inspectors verified that]]

PSEG 's surveillance frequencies were consistent with the

UFSAR , T5s, and associated bases. The inspectors reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance results to ensure proper implementation of the surveillance program anc! that the existence of unacceptable gas accumulation was evaluated within the

CAP , as necessary. In addition, on August 4, 2010, the inspectors observed portions of the performance of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance to assess the adequacy of procedures and implementation. The inspectors reviewed

CAP documents to verify that selected actions described in P5

EG 's nine-month and supplemental submittals were acceptably documented, including completed actions and the implementation schedule for incomplete actions. The inspectors also verified that

NRC commitments in

PSEG 's submittals were included in the

CAP. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed evaluations and corrective actions for various issues

PSEG identified during their GL 2008-01 Enclosure

review. The inspectors performed this review to ensure

PSEG appropriately evaluated and adequately addressed any gas voiding concerns, including the evaluation of for gas voids discovered in the field. Finally, the inspectors reviewed

PSEG [['s training associated with gas accumulation to assess if appropriate training was provided to the operations and engineering support staff to ensure appropriate awareness of the effects of gas voiding. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings No findings were identified.]]

NRR is still evaluating some technical aspects associated with void acceptance criteria and will likely request additional information from

PSEG. Because of this, the

TI may require additional inspections prior to final closure. Final closure of

GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented via separate correspondence from

NRR. 40A6 Meetings, Including Exit The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. C. Fricker and other members of

PSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 7, 2010. The inspectors asked

PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection were proprietary. No proprietary information was identified. 40A7 UcensesMldentified Violations The following violations of

NRC requirements were identified by

PSEG. They were determined to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 2.3 of the

NRC Enforcement Policy,

NUREG -1600, for being dispositioned as

NCV s:

TS 6.8.1 "Procedures and Programs" states, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained for activities specified in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978, Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section

IX. includes written procedures for performing maintenance, which can affect the performance of safety related equipment. Contrary to the above,

PSEG did not adequately implement and maintain the 4

KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification maintenance procedure. Specifically, the inappropriate guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments for

4KV magne-blast breakers resulted in a miswadjustment of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521

STA [[auxiliary switch operating mechanism. This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours on April 16, 2010. This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory, it did not affect]]

PSEG 's ability to terminate a leak path or add

RCS inventory, and it did not degrade

PSEG 's ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost.

PSEG entered this violation in their

CAP as notification 20459055.

TS 3.2.1.1 function 8f requires that both motor-driven

AF [[]]

VV pumps start when both steam generator feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2. Contrary to this requirement. from 2132 hours0.0247 days 0.592 hours 0.00353 weeks 8.11226e-4 months on July 22.2010, to 1557 hours0.018 days 0.433 hours 0.00257 weeks 5.924385e-4 months on July 25,2010, Enclosure

lhis auto start function was disabled. Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded prior to ascension to Mode 2. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent the loss of a system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the

TS allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event.

PSEG entered this

TS violation in their

CAP as notification 20471722.

AITACH [[]]

MENT [[:]]

SUPPLE [[]]

MENTAL [[]]

INFORM [[]]

ATION Enclosure

SUPPLE [[]]

MENTAL [[]]

INFORM [[]]

ATION [[]]

KEY [[]]

POINTS [[]]

OF [[]]

CONTAC T Licensee personnel:

C. [[Fricker, Site Vice President E. Eilola, Plant Manager L. Rajkowski, Engineering Director R. DeSanctis, Maintenance Director J. Garecht, Operations Director J. Higgins, System Engineer F. Hummel, System Engineer R. Gary, Radiation Protection Manager S. Bowers, System Engineer E. Villar, Licensing Engineer M. Wolk, Senior Reactor Operator]]

LIST [[]]

OF [[]]

ITEMS [[]]

OPENED ,

CLOSED ,

AND [[]]

DISCUS SED Closed 05000272/2010-001-00

LER Automatic Start of the 1 C

EDG (Section 40A3.1) 05000272/2010-002-00

LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer Bushing Failure (Section 40A3.2) 0500027212010-003-00

LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 3.0.4 (Section 40A3.3)

LIST [[]]

OF [[]]

DOCUME [[]]

NTS [[]]

REVIEW [[]]

ED In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report, the inspectors reviewed the following documents and records: Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection Procedures

SC.OP -

AB.ZZ -0001, Adverse Environmental Conditions, Revision

13 OP -

AA-1 08-111-1 001, Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines, Revision 5 Orders 70111536 70049239 Attachment

Section 1 R04: Equipment Alignment S1.0P-ST-SW-0013, Service Water Valve Verification Modes 1-4, Revision S 1.

OP -

SO [[,AF-0001, Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation, Revision S1.0P-ST.AF-0008, Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Verification Modes 1-3, Revision Se.MD-PM.ZZ-0005, Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance, Revision Drawings 205331 222508 205236 Notifications 20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722 Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793 Other Documents]]

VTD 174547, Terry Turbine Inspection Manual, Revision 21 Section Fire Protection Procedures

FRS -II-421, Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan, 4160V Switchgear Rooms & Battery Rooms Elevation: 64', Revision

6 FRS -

II -433, Salem Unit 1, (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan, Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation: 84', Revision

6 FRS -

II -9111, Salem Unit 1, (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan, Service Water Intake Structure Elevation: 92' & 112', Revision

2 FRS -

II -424, Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan, cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation: 64', Revision 2 Drawings

FA -01, Detection Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No.2 Elev. 64', Revision 0

FP -01, Sprinkler Design Layout 4160V Switchgear Room Unit No.2 Elev. 64', Revision A

FP -12B. No.1 Unit Auxiliary Building Fire Protection Piping Aux. Feedwater Pump Area Elev. 84', Revision 2 Notifications 20429890 20472945 Orders 70044438 Other Documents Design Change Plan 80089591, S2 C02 Replacement 64', 78' and 84' Elevations

NC.DE -PS.zZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA, Salem Fire Protection Report Fire Hazards Analysis, Revision 6 .

IS -2-

FP-FEE-1987, Fire Suppression System Performance Capability Evaluation -2FA-AB-64A, Revision 0 I Attachment

Section 1 R06: Flood Protection Measures Procedure§ S2.0P-AB.SW*0001, Loss of Service Water Header Pressure, Revision 16 S2.0P-AB.SW-0003, Service Water Bay Leak, Revision 7 S2.0P-AB.ZZ-0002, Flooding, Revision 3 S2.0P-SO.SW-0005, Service Water System Operation, Revision

40 SC.FP -

SV.FBR [[-0026. Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection, Revision 3 Drawings 205342 212805 Notifications (*NRC identified) 20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545* 20474629* 20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20;318626 20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450 Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098 Other Documents]]

SC.DE -

TS.ZZ -2034. Technical Requirements for Construction of Electrical Installation, Salem Generating Station. Revision

5 SC.FP -

SV.FBR -0026, Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Inspection, dated April 23,

2010 SC.OP -

DLZZ -0008, Circulating/Service Water Logs, dated July 26,2010, and August 2.

2010 ER -

AA -3003, Cable Condition Monitoring and Aging Management Program, Revision

0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01, Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients, dated 2/7/2007

PSEG Response to

NRC Generic Letter 2007-01. dated 1211212007 Specification No A-O-

ZZ -EDS-0225-0, Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use at Salem & Hope Creek Generating Stations General Specification 85651-0-1,

5KV to 15

KV Insulated Cable Program Element 5, Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments

NRC Information Notice 2002-12. Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables

NRC [[Component DeSign Bases Inspection Report 05000416/2009006 Engineering Evaluation Number: S-C-4KV-EEE-1751, Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially submerged condition for Salem Unit 1 and 2 Seabrook Issue Summary, Condition Report No. 211208,357, Topic Submerged Service Water Electrical Cables, dated 11/19/2009 Section 1 R11: Licensed Operator Regualification Program Procedures]]

TO -

AA-301, Simulator Configuration Management, Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response, Revision 27 Attachment

Section 1 R12: Maintenance Effectiveness Notifications 20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633 Other Documents Salem 1 Jet Narrative Log, from 9/28/2008 -9/28/2010 evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) Goal Setting Template Maintenance Rule Scoping Document (for

CVC ) Section 1 Ri3: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work .control Procedures Risk Management, Revision 6

OP -AA-1 01-112-1 002, On-Line Risk Management, Revision

5 WC -

AA -101, On-Line Work Management Process, Revision

18 OP -

AA -1 08-116, Protected Equipment Program, Revision 2 Notifications 20476129 Orders 30105373 30188989 60091834 Other Documents

SGS Unit 2

PRA [[Risk Assessment for Work Week 037 Section iRiS: Operability Evaluations Procedures S2.0P-PTSW-0005, Service Water Fouling Monitoring Room Coolers, Revision 8 S2.0P-SO.SW-0008, Inservice Room Cooler Flushes, Revision 0 S2.0P-STDG-0001, 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test, Revision 46 Drawings 205228 205342 205337 Notifications 20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841 Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466 Other Documents]]

SER [[]]

OTDM. Issue Resolution Documentation Form for 1 CV284, Revision 6 Attachment

Section 1 R18: Plant Modifications Procedure§, S1.0P-IO.ZZ-0002, Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby, Revision 56 S1.OP-IO.ZZ-01 03, Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative Requirements, Revision 6 S1.0P-SO.RPS-0009, Install/Removal of

AFW Start Function from

SGFP Trips, Revision 5 S1.0P-SO.PC-0001,

SW itchgear and Penetration Areas Ventilation Operation, Revision 20 Design Changes

TCCP No 2SnO-006, 2C

125VDC Battery Online Replacement Notifications 20471722 20477280 Orders 70104212 Other Documents Letter from the

NRC to

PSEG , Subj: Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No.2, Issuance of Amendment Re: One-time On-line Battery Replacement. daled 9/112010 Control Room Logs Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing Procedures S1.0P-

SO.AF -0001(Q), Auxiliary Feedwater System Operation, Revision 27 S2.0P-ST.CC-0003(Q), Inservice Testing, 23 Component Cooling Pump, Revision

25 SC.MD -

PM.AF -0007(Q), 13 and 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection and Lubrication, Revision 0 S2.0P-ST.CH-0004, Chilled Water System -Chillers, Revision 17 S2.0P-ST.125-0001, Electrical Power Systems

125VDC Distribution, Revision 11 S2.0P-

ST.SJ [[-0003, Inservice Testing. Safety Injection Valves, Modes 1 -6, Revision 12 S2.RA-ST.SJ-0003, Inservice Testing, Safety Injection Valves, Modes 1 -6, Acceptance Criteria, Revision 14' . S1.0P*PT.AF-0003, 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Periodic Run, Revision 0 S2.0P-ST.DG-0001, 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test, Revision 46 Notifications 20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141 Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466 Other Documents Salem 2 Narrative Log, dated 9124/2010 Salem Prompt Investigation Report, No.]]

13 TDA [[]]

FW Trip Latch Issue 9/2/2010 Root Cause Investigation Report, 13123 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious Trips, dated 9/20/2010 Attachment 1 (page 1 of 3), Revision 10 Attachment

Section 1 R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities Procedures

OP -

AA -10B-108, Unit Restart Review, Revision 9 Notifications 20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651 Orders 60091125 Other S1.0P-SO.AF-0001, Attachment 2, Turbine-Driven

AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of Revision 27

OP -SA-1 08-114-1 001, Attachment 1, Trip Report, Revision

1 OP -

SA -1 08-114-1001, Attachment 2, Post Reactor Trip/ECCS Actuation Review, Revision 1 Prompt Investigation Report. "B" Phase Main Power Transformer/High Voltage Bushing Failure, dated 7fll2010

PSEG -

NBU [[-SaJem Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer & Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency Classificati.on Guide, Attachment 14, Four Hour Report -NRC Operations Salem Emergency Classification Guide, Attachment 29, Twenty-four Hour Report North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Disturbance Reporting SequencE' of Events Review Report Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing Procedures S1.IC-FT.RCP-0023,]]

1PT -474 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel

IV [[, Revision 16 S2.0P-ST.DG-001, 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test, Revision 46 S2.0P-ST.SJ-0001, Inservice Testing -21 Safety Injection Pump, Revision 19 S2.0P-ST.RHR-0002, Inservice Testing -22 Residual Heat Removal Pump, Revision 28 S2.RA-ST.RHR-0002, Inservice Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance Criteria, Revision 8 S2.0P-PT.RHR-0002,]]

22 RHR Pump Flow Data, Revision 4 Drawings 223678 Notifications (*

NRC identified) 20153697' 20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159* 20474660 20474496 20472575 Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347 Section 2RS1: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls Notifications 20467421 Attachment

Other Prompt Investiga1ion Report, Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography Section

2RS 2: Occupational

ALARA Planning and Controls 20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304 Other Documents Salem Unit 1 20th Refueling Outage Radiological Performance Report Past-ALARA Review 2010-59 Section

2RS 4: Occupational Dose Assessment Procedures

RP -AA-220, Bioassay Program, Revision 6 I

RP -

AA -21, Dosimetry Issue, Usage, and Control, Revision 10 i ! Section

4OA 1: Performance Indicator Verification I Notifications 20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 . 20472916 20477296 Other Documents Salem 1

SW Narrative Lag, from 7/1/2009 -7/1/2010 Salem

1 RHR Narrative Log, from 7/1/2009 -7/1/2010 Salem 1

AF Narrative Lag, from 711/2009 -7/1/2010 Salem

2 SW Narrative Log, from 6/30/2009 -6/30/2010 Salem 2

RHR Narrative Log, from 6/30/2009 -6/3012010 Salem

2 AF [[Narrative Lag, from 6/30/2009 -6/30/2010 Section 40A2: Identification and Resolution of Problems Notifications 20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952 Orders 70092096 Other Documents]]

OP -AA-102-103-1001. Operator Burdens Program, Revision

0 OP -

AA-102-103, Operator Work-Around Program, Revision 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment, Salem Unit 1 -Second Quarter Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment, Salem Unit 2 -Second Quarter Attachment

Section 4()A3: Event Follow-up Procedures

SC.OP -

SOAKV -0001,

4KV Breaker Operation, Revision 23

SC.MD -PRAKV-0002,

4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock Gap Verification, Revision 9 Notifications 20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352 Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345 Other Documents Prompt Investigation Report, Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 11/12

SGFP [[Trips disabled when required by Technical SpeCifications 4.160KV Function Level Maintenance Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Day and Night Shift), dated 4/16/2010 Salem Unit 1 Operations Narrative Log (Night Shift), dated 4/1712010 Section 40A5: Other Activities . S1.0P-AB.LOCA-0001, Shutdown]]

LOCA , Revision S1.0P-

SO.CVC -0007, Fill and Vent of the cves, Revision S1.0P-SO.RHR-0001, Initiating

RHR , Revision S1.0P-

SO.RHR -0002, Terminating

RHR , Revision S1.0P-

SO.RHR -0003, Filling and Venting the

RHR System, Revision S1.0P-

SO.SJ -0001, Preparation of the Safety Injection System for Operation, Revision S1.0P-ST.SJ-0009,

ECCS Subsystems -Tavg 2! 350°F, Revision S2.0P-

SO. eS-0001, Preparation of the

CS System for Normal Operation, Revision S2.0P-

ST.SJ -0009,

ECCS Subsystems -Tavg 2! 350"F, Revision 205228 205232 205234 205235

CVC -1-2B

RH -1-1A

RH-1-1B Notifications (*NRC 20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080 20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108 20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 60082989 70079735 70095588 70096422 70101308 Calculations and 11050-740-02, Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 & 2 eve System, Revision 11050-740-03, Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for Salem 1 & 2 RHR System, Revision 11050-740-04, Waterhammer Technical Evaluation for 5alem 1 & 251 System, Revision Attachment

80097737, Adding Vent Valves on S'IRHR-11RH19 Cross Connect Header between

RHR Pumps (50.59 Review), Revision 0 80099810, Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 21/23

SJ 43 and 22/24SJ43 Valves (Design Change Request), Revision 0 Sargent & Lundy

LLC Project Salem Unit 1

CS System Evaluation, dat,ed 1212012008 Sargent & Lundy

CVC System Evaluation, dated 12/20/2008 Sargent & Lundy

1 GL 2001-01

LLC Project 11050-705, Salem Unit 1

RHR System Evaluation, dated 12/20/2008 Sargent & Lundy

SI System Evaluation, dated 1212012008 Sargent & Lundy

1 GL 2001-01

LLC Project 11050-705, Salem Unit 2

CS System Evaluation. dated 10/2712008 Sargent & Lundy

CVC System Evaluation, dated 10/27/2008 Sargent & Lundy

2 GL 2001-01

LLC Project 11050-705, Salem Unit 2

RHR System Evaluation, dated 1 0/27/2008 Sargent & Lundy

SI System Evaluation, dated 10/27/2008 S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0, Hydraulic Transient Analysis of the Spray System, Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893, Allowable Volume of Non-Condensable Gases in

2 GL 2001-01

RHR Recirculation Connect Piping, Revision 0 Technical Basis for the Simplified Equation,

NEI System Gas Accumulation Management Workshop, dated 1/21/2010

VTD 431261, Industry Guidance -Evaluation of Unexpected Voids or Gas Identified in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems, Revision

1 WCAP -16631-

NP , Testing/Evaluation of Gas Transport to Suction of

ECCS Pumps, Revision 0 Completed Tests S1.0P-

ST.SJ -0009,

ECCS [[Subsystems -Tavg <i! 350"F, performed 4/17/2009, 8/13/2009, 12/11/2009,1/16/2010,211212010,3/11/2010,4/25/20410, and 5/14/2010 S2.0P-]]

ST.SJ -0009,

ECCS Subsystems -Tavg 350D F, performed 7/9/2009, 8/7i2009, 1/8/2010,2/6/2010,3/6/2010,4/9/2010,5/5/2010, and 6/15/2010 Other Documents

NRC [[]]

GL 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems, dated 1/11/2008

LR N08-0234,

NRC , Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month Response to

NRC [[]]

GL 2008-01, dated 10/13/2008

LR N09-0028,

NRC , Salem Unit 1 Supplementa.1 (Post-Outage) Response 10

NRC [[]]

GL 2008-01, dated 2110/2009

LR N10-0014,

NRC , Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage) Response to

NRC [[]]

GL 2008-01, dated 2/8/2010

LR N10-0075,