ML062540349

E-Mail from Blough to Holian, Highlights of Interview (10/6) on Salem SCWE

ML062540349
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	10/08/2003
From:	Blough A NRC Region 1
To:	Barber S, Farrar K, Marc Ferdas, Mel Gray, Harrison L, Brian Holian, Johnson S, Meyer G, Miller H, Neff E, Dan Orr, Teator J, Vito D, Wiggins J, Elizabeth Wilson NRC/OI
References
FOIA/PA-2005-0194
Download: ML062540349 (2)

Text

~coi 3col./Th: Highlights Ioio fl~~~rin &N 0/6) on Saile'm-SCWE i(1 ______ Pga(I From: A. Randolph Blough \N' To: Brian Holian; Daniel Orr; David Vito; Eileen Neff; Ernest Wilson; Glenn Meyer; Hubert J. Miller; James Wiggins; Jeffrey Teator; Karl Farrar; Leanne Harrison;. Marc Ferdas; Mel Gray; Scott Barber; Sharon Johnson Date: Wed, Oct 8, 2003 1:32 PM

Subject:

Re: Highlights 1/6)

Deve on Salem SCWE .'

right; we would also need to see what others say, I would thin fbm ithe ', nvolved, etc.

Then make calls on each issues based on the preponderance of the ovrall evdne

>>>>Ernest Wilson 10/08/03 01:23PM>>>>

I would suggest that before officially declaring the "NIA'd" concern as "unsubstantiated" that the NRC (staff) independetyyn- take on the issue thru records and/or procedures, etc. at the site.

Ernie Ay

>>> Scott Barber 10/08/03 11:24AM >>>>

sensitive pre-decisional information Eileen Neff and I intervieweQW or approximately 2 Yz hours on October 6. The interview.

began'about 5:30 p.m. at his huse. Listed below are some highlights of the interview.

-Regardin the"'N/A'ed step o~f the startup procedure" we discovered that this issue involved irecti an SRO to N/A a step regarding the need for a containment walkdown b rior to startup from a Salem Unit 2 scram from problems in the 500 KV wtcyr in mid-2002. ,Jis was a redundant step to the normal SRO Walkdown that is done after every outage.

According to his step was added as a lessons learne'dfrom the Davis Besse event to ensure th'at the highest level anagement on-site was fully aware of the containment conditions prior to closeout.

Apparently believed that the walkdon don se tI by a RO was sufficient to meet the intent

,[&is proced~ure step and directed that it be N/A'ed.M orrected him and told him that bot~~

Omwere going to do the walkdown which they both did.indicated they identified some minor boron leaks that had to be corrected prior to restart. This resulted in a one day delay in their restart schedule..

This concern wa's unsubstantiated.

-Regarding the Mar'ch 2003 Hope Creek event involving a degraded turbine bypass valve - XN portrayed a v'ery different picture than what was in the allegation. He indicated that Hope. Jreek had .

planned a short duration outage to correct three technical Issues (leaky EDG exhaust piping, recirc pump seals, and an RHR valve problem). He stated that the outage went well with all of the previously identified issues being successfully addre sed Dun n startupo ac 4 03atrmi eeao synchronization, he was called ho

... informed him that No. 2 turbine bypass valve,(TBV) failed -to fully close and that operators hala e-dpower ascension to assess the problem. He indicated that - .krovided a course .of actio of how to' safely proceed W ~thn shutdown which iswhat was implemented on March 16. saed that he told t rce wt ore fato he described on how to safely shutdown the plant. [This descripti on w'as derived from IR 50-354/2003-003 - After midnight on March 17, while controlling the TBVs on the bypass jack a perturbation caused the No.1 and 3 BPVs to pulse full shut and back open to their original position which caused a minor change in reactor power, pressure, and level. After a quick review by engineering, the depressurization continued and a more significant transient occurred in which the No. 3 BPV cycled from 0 percent to 75 percent open which caused a reactor level decrease of 8 inches and a 7%increase in reactor power. Operators stopped using the BPV jack to lower pressure and used pressure set as the pressure control means for the remainder of the shutdown and cooldown sequence. Operators completed the shutdown and cooldown with no further operatio 'nal challenges. Subsequent BPV jack troubleshooting identified a problem with the BPV jack potentiometer which contributed to the erratic response of the BPV jack. PSEG management initiated corrective action after the second power transient, including prohibiting Information in this record was deleted in accordance with the Freedom of Information

Page 21I ECo_1 7- ReHghih orve(0/)nSlmSWPae2 - .~ -.... ~ -....--

the use of the BPV jack when the reactor is critical, conducting a self assessment, and initiating an independent review of the transient, including upgrading the initial notification to a significance level 1.)

tepawas After ~ w shutdown, the rearativities took approximately six days to complete. In a later e-day lime frame tohtexeso of a more rea'sonable threewsdspone six days intad iniae3h this additional htonto complete and fteoiia time (extradsuio days) cost the company 25 million doll ars~lfain comment on this after the fact discussion was that this was the only negative feedback that he received on the issue, and he took it as a learning experience on how to better manage emergent problems. He indicated that this interaction and others did not cause

• him to feel that he could not raise safety concerns to senior corporate management.

- Regarding the June 2003 EbG intercooler leak rad an interesting view on this issue. He indicated that he thought the organization let him drown Wbeca~use of the s-lowness in the way the operability decision was made. He erroneously believed that the final operability call at the eleventh hour was made when engineering finally conclu'ded that they met the design basis as written. He also indicated that this timeliness problem was exacerbated by some organizations that were involved because they should not have had a part in the decision making. He attributed the orpnizational delays to the matrixed organizations that were in place at PSE§ during,mentione as nue He also indicated that this type of organization Oiluted accountability whicl%lPOmetoe sa c-ontributor to thei~gird "'3grade in as..

many years~ n reviewing the circumrstances at the time, we noted thaq junderstanding of the cause of the sloW2ezss in making the operability decision Was in error since engineering had, infact, revised the design basis to change the time to take action for a leak from the jacket water system from 7 days to I day (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />). The time frame (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) to not credit operator action~was consistent with the assumptions in the accident analysis. That revision to the design basis was HC's basis for exiting the LCO, and it was not a lack of understanding of the original design basis. Itwas interesting th-"' _did not fully understand this distinction.

These are .some initial highlights that are generally representative of some aspects our interview witfiamj availble.To get a full understanding, it would be appropriate to.read the full transcript once it is made Please control this informa'tion as sensitive pre-decisional inf.ormation.

sensitive pre-decisional Information